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Vetting Recruits
The first port of call for new arrivals to the Islamic State is a network of dormitories in Syria, just across the border from Turkey. There, recruits are interviewed and inventoried.
Mr. Sarfo was fingerprinted, and a doctor came to draw a blood sample and perform a physical examination. A man with a laptop conducted an intake interview. âHe was asking normal questions like: âWhatâs your name? Whatâs your second name? Whoâs your mom? Whereâs your mom originally from? What did you study? What degree do you have? Whatâs your ambition? What do you want to become?ââ Mr. Sarfo said.
His background was also of interest. He was a regular at a radical mosque in Bremen that had already sent about 20 members to Syria, at least four of whom were killed in battle, according to Daniel Heinke, the German Interior Ministryâs counterterrorism coordinator for the area. And he had served a one-year prison sentence for breaking into a supermarket safe and stealing 23,000 euros. Even though the punishment for theft in areas under Islamic State control is amputation, a criminal past can be a valued asset, Mr. Sarfo said, âespecially if they know you have ties to organized crime and they know you can get fake IDs, or they know you have contact men in Europe who can smuggle you into the European Union.â
The bureaucratic nature of the intake procedure was recently confirmed by American officials after USB drives were recovered in the recently liberated Syrian city of Manbij, one of the hubs for processing foreign fighters.
Mr. Sarfo checked all the necessary boxes, and on the third day after his arrival, the members of the Emni came to ask for him. He wanted to fight in Syria and Iraq, but the masked operatives explained that they had a vexing problem.
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âThey told me that there arenât many people in Germany who are willing to do the job,â Mr. Sarfo said soon after his arrest last year, according to the transcript of his interrogation by German officials, which runs more than 500 pages. âThey said they had some in the beginning. But one after another, you could say, they chickened out, because they got scared â cold feet. Same in England.â
By contrast, the group had more than enough volunteers for France. âMy friend asked them about France,â Mr. Sarfo said. âAnd they started laughing. But really serious laughing, with tears in their eyes. They said, âDonât worry about France.â âMafi mushkilahâ â in Arabic, it means âno problem.ââ That conversation took place in April 2015, seven months before the coordinated killings in Paris in November, the worst terrorist attack in Europe in over a decade.
While some details of Mr. Sarfoâs account cannot be verified, his statements track with what other recruits related in their interrogations. And both prison officials and the German intelligence agents who debriefed Mr. Sarfo after his arrest said they found him credible.
Since the rise of the Islamic State over two years ago, intelligence agencies have been collecting nuggets on the Emni. Originally, the unit was tasked with policing the Islamic Stateâs members, including conducting interrogations and ferreting out spies, according to interrogation records and analysts. But French members arrested in 2014 and 2015 explained that the Emni had taken on a new portfolio: projecting terror abroad.
âItâs the Emni that ensures the internal security inside Dawlaâ â the Arabic word for state â âand oversees external security by sending abroad people they recruited, or else sending individuals to carry out violent acts, like what happened in Tunisia inside the museum in Tunis, or else the aborted plot in Belgium,â said Nicolas Moreau, 32, a French citizen who was arrested last year after leaving the Islamic State in Syria, according to his statement to Franceâs domestic intelligence agency.
Mr. Moreau explained that he had run a restaurant in Raqqa, Syria, the de facto capital of the groupâs territory, where he had served meals to key members of the Emni â including Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the on-the-ground commander of the Paris attacks, who was killed in a standoff with the police days later.
Other interrogations, as well as Mr. Sarfoâs account, have led investigators to conclude that the Emni also trained and dispatched the gunman whoopened fire on a beach in Sousse, Tunisia, in June, and the man who prepared the Brussels airport bombs.
Records from French, Austrian and Belgian intelligence agencies show that at least 28 operatives recruited by the Emni succeeded in deploying to countries outside of the Islamic Stateâs core territory, mounting both successful attacks and plots that were foiled. Officials say that dozens of other operatives have slipped through and formed sleeper cells.
In his own interactions with the Emni, Mr. Sarfo realized that they were preparing a global portfolio of terrorists and looking to fill holes in their international network, he said.
He described what he had been told about the groupâs work to build an infrastructure in Bangladesh. There, a siege by a team of Islamic State gunmen left at least 20 hostages dead at a cafe last month, almost all of them foreigners.
Mr. Sarfo said that for Asian recruits, the group was looking specifically for militants who had emerged from Al Qaedaâs network in the region. âPeople especially from Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia â they have people who used to work for Al Qaeda, and once they joined the Islamic State, they are asking them questions about their experiences and if they have contacts,â he said.
In his briefings with the German authorities, and again in the interview this week, Mr. Sarfo raised the possibility that some of the recent attackers in Europe who pledged allegiance to the Islamic Stateâs leader during their assaults might have a more direct link to the group than officials believe.
Mr. Sarfo explained that the Emni keeps many of its operatives underground in Europe. They act as nodes that can remotely activate potential suicide attackers who have been drawn in by propaganda. Linking them are what Mr. Sarfo called âclean men,â new converts to Islam with no established ties to radical groups.
âThese people are not in direct contact with these guys who are doing the attacks, because they know if these people start talking, they will get caught,â he said of the underground operatives.
âThey mostly use people who are new Muslims, who are converts,â he said. Those âcleanâ converts âget in contact with the people, and they give them the message.â And in the case of some videotaped pledges of allegiance, the go-between can then send the video on to the handler in Europe, who uploads it for use by the Islamic Stateâs propaganda channels.
The intelligence documents and Mr. Sarfo agree that the Islamic State has made the most of its recruitsâ nationalities by sending them back to plot attacks at home. Yet one important region where the Emni is not thought to have succeeded in sending trained attackers is North America, Mr. Sarfo said, recalling what the members of the branch told him.
Though dozens of Americans have become members of the Islamic State, and some have been recruited into the external operations wing, âthey know itâs hard for them to get Americans into Americaâ once they have traveled to Syria, he said.
âFor America and Canada, itâs much easier for them to get them over the social network, because they say the Americans are dumb â they have open gun policies,â he said. âThey say we can radicalize them easily, and if they have no prior record, they can buy guns, so we donât need to have no contact man who has to provide guns for them.â
Training Days
Since late 2014, the Islamic State has instructed foreigners joining the group to make their trip look like a holiday in southern Turkey, including booking a return flight and paying for an all-inclusive vacation at a beach resort, from which smugglers arrange their transport into Syria, according to intelligence documents and Mr. Sarfoâs account.
That cover story creates pressure to keep things moving quickly during the recruitsâ training in Syria, and most get a bare minimum â just a few days of basic weapons practice, in some instances.
âWhen they go back to France or in Germany, they can say, âI was only on holidays in Turkey,ââ Mr. Sarfo said. âThe longer they stay in the Islamic State, the more suspicious the secret service in the West gets, and thatâs why they try to do the training as quickly as possible.â
Mr. Sarfoâs facility in both German and English â he studied construction at Newham College in East London â made him attractive as a potential attacker. Though the Emni approached him several times to ask him to return to Germany, he demurred, he said.
Eventually, Mr. Sarfo, perhaps because of his burly build â 6-foot-1 and around 286 pounds when he arrived in Syria, though he has lost weight since then â was drafted into the Islamic Stateâs quwat khas, Arabic for special forces.
The unit only admitted single men who agreed not to marry during the duration of their training. In addition to providing the offensive force to infiltrate cities during battles, it was one of several elite units that became recruiting pools for the external operations branch, Mr. Sarfo said.
Along with his German friend, he was driven to the desert outside Raqqa.
âThey dropped us off in the middle of nowhere and told us, âWe are here,ââ he said, according to the transcript of one of his interrogation sessions. âSo weâre standing in the desert and thought to ourselves, âWhatâs going on?ââ When the two Germans looked more closely, they realized there were cavelike dwellings around them. Everything above ground was painted with mud so as to be invisible to drones.
âShowering was prohibited. Eating was prohibited, too, unless they gave it to you,â Mr. Sarfo said, adding that he had shared a cave with five or six others. Even drinking water was harshly rationed. âEach dwelling received two cups of water a day, put on the doorstep,â he said. âAnd the purpose of this was to test us, see who really wants it, whoâs firm.â
The grueling training began: hours of running, jumping, push-ups, parallel bars, crawling. The recruits began fainting.
By the second week, they were each given a Kalashnikov assault rifle and told to sleep with it between their legs until it became âlike a third arm,â he said, according to his interrogation transcript.
The punishment for failing to keep up was harsh. âThere was one boy who refused to get up, because he was just too exhausted,â Mr. Sarfo told the authorities. âSo they tied him to a pole with his legs and his arms and left him there.â
He learned that the special forces program involved 10 levels of training. After he graduated to Level 2, he was moved to an island on a river in Tabqa, Syria. The recruitsâ sleeping spots now consisted of holes in the ground, covered by sticks and twigs. They practiced swimming, scuba diving and navigating by the stars.
Throughout his training, Mr. Sarfo rubbed shoulders with an international cadre of recruits. When he first arrived at the desert campus, he ran laps alongside Moroccans, Egyptians, at least one Indonesian, a Canadian and a Belgian. And out on the island, he learned of similar special units, including one called Jaysh al-Khalifa, or the Army of the Caliphate.
A 12-page criminal complaint indicates that the Islamic State tried to recruit at least one American into that unit, but he declined to enroll.
The man, Mohamad Jamal Khweis, a 26-year-old from Alexandria, Va., traveled to Syria in December, only to be captured by Kurdish troops in Iraq in March. In his debriefing with the F.B.I., he explained that early on, he was approached by members of the unit. âDuring his stay at this safe house, representatives from Jaysh Khalifa, a group described by the defendant as an âoffensive group,â visited the new ISIL recruits,â the complaint says. âThe representatives explained that their group was responsible for accepting volunteers from foreign countries who would be trained and sent back to their countries to conduct operations and execute attacks on behalf of ISIL. The groupâs requirements, among other things, were that recruits had to be single, would train in remote locations, must be free of any injuries and had to stay reclusive when returning to their home countries.â
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©New York Times 2016