Rising tensions in the Horn of Africa
- GIS Reports
- 2 days ago
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Geopolitical ambitions, ethnic divisions and contested access to the sea and fresh water are intensifying anxieties in Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Tigray region.
July 7 2025
Teresa Nogueira Pinto
Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have intensified this year, fueled by regional disputes and instability in the Tigray region. These developments raise concerns about the possible resurgence of conflict in the strategic Horn of Africa and in Tigray, an area rich in gold where war recently claimed over 600,000 lives and caused widespread displacement and infrastructure destruction.
Although a full-scale return to armed conflict has not yet materialized, the convergence of deep-rooted political fractures within Tigray and mounting geopolitical strains across the Horn of Africa – not least related to landlocked Ethiopia’s quest for a port and water rights − increases the risk of renewed violence and regional destabilization.
Shifting allegiances in the Horn of Africa
The prospect of renewed conflict between Addis Ababa and Asmara will largely depend on how both governments interpret the risks and potential gains of escalation within a shifting regional landscape. At the heart of current situation lies Ethiopia’s ambition − with a population of over 128 million, it is the most populous landlocked country in the world − to regain access to the Red Sea, which it lost in 1993 after Eritrea’s secession. This aspiration, driven by economic and geopolitical concerns, is viewed in Asmara as a threat to Eritrean sovereignty and regional stability.
At the heart of current situation lies Ethiopia’s ambition to regain access to the Red Sea, which it lost in 1993 after Eritrea’s secession.
Ethiopia’s ambitions are reflected in the “Grand Strategy of the Two Waters,” a national policy according to which the Abay River (in the Blue Nile) and the Red Sea are critical areas for the country’s development. As Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali pursues these goals, Ethiopia faces rising hostility from its longstanding rival, Egypt, and two neighbors in the Horn of Africa, Eritrea and Somalia.
In 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding according to which Addis Ababa would recognize Somaliland’s claim to independence in exchange for access to the Red Sea. Unsurprisingly, the move infuriated Somalia. Egypt sided with Mogadishu, reflecting a decade of tense diplomatic relations with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Cairo continues to see as an existential threat to its water supply.
In October 2024, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki hosted a trilateral meeting between Eritrea, Somalia and Egypt. Diplomatic pressure worked, leading to the Ankara Declaration, in which Ethiopia committed to respect Somalia’s territorial integrity.
Ethiopia is heavily dependent on the small coastal country of Djibouti, whose port handles over 90 percent of Ethiopia’s trade as the main gateway for imports and exports in the region. This dependency has deepened with the development of infrastructure, including port facilities, a pipeline and the Addis-Ababa-Djibouti Corridor − new roads and railways connecting the capital of Ethiopia to the port in Djibouti.
Ethiopia’s ambitions continue to fuel tensions with several countries, including Eritrea, which fears that its neighbor will eventually seek to reclaim the Port of Assab on the Red Sea coast.
Underlying triggers and context
To understand the profound shifts in Ethiopia’s internal power dynamics in recent years and why its volatility causes waves around the Horn of Africa, it is essential to understand the country’s internal challenges and revisit the pivotal moment of 2018.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power that year. This marked a significant turning point in the decline of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which had long dominated the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The TPLF had ties with Eritrean liberation movements but originally formed as a guerrilla movement in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, aiming to secure self-determination for Tigrayans within Ethiopia.
The erosion of the TPLF hegemony, however, had already begun in 2012 with the sudden death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia’s longtime political strongman. The TPLF consolidated its power after the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991. However, its leadership was increasingly viewed by other regional groups, particularly the Amhara and the Oromo (the two largest ethnic groups in Ethiopia), as exclusionary and marginalizing. This perception fueled growing resentment and demands for political reform.
Facts & Figures: Who are the Tigrayans?
The Tigrayans are descendants of a Semitic people who intermixed with the Cushitic inhabitants of the region and founded the Christian kingdom of Aksum, which had its capital in the historic region of Tigray in northern Ethiopia. The Tigray are agricultural people who have their own language and are predominantly Orthodox Christian. In the early 21st century, the Tigray accounted for about half of Eritrea’s population and less than one-tenth of the population of Ethiopia.
After assuming office, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed dissolved the EPRDF and established the Prosperity Party to replace it. The TPLF, however, refused to join the new party, viewing its creation as a threat to Ethiopia’s federal arrangement and, more specifically, to the status and political autonomy of the Tigrayan minority. While Tigrayans should not be seen as a monolithic political entity, the region’s distinct blend of strong ethnic identity, tradition of cohesive political leadership, and military experience (shaped by decades of war), provides them with significant leverage in both the domestic and regional spheres.
Tigray shares internal borders with two of Ethiopia’s nine regional states, Amhara and Afar, and lies along critical export routes to the Red Sea. Internationally, it borders both Eritrea and Sudan. In 2018, the federal government, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, signed a peace agreement with Eritrea. The landmark development included a crucial concession: Ethiopia’s formal recognition of Eritrean sovereignty over Badme, a town located in Tigray and the original flashpoint of the 1998-2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea war.
For the TPLF, this decision was viewed not as a step toward peace, but as a unilateral and politically charged compromise that undermined both regional integrity and Tigrayan interests, deepening mistrust between the federal government and Tigrayan leadership and laying the groundwork for renewed conflict. Despite the historical rapprochement between Addis Ababa and Asmara, which earned Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, hostility between Eritrea and the TPLF has grown after the peace agreement.
In 2020, the TPLF held regional elections in Tigray, openly defying the federal government’s rule to postpone elections due to the pandemic. The Prime Minister described the polls as a “shanty election,” deprived of legal basis. Tensions further escalated in November when, after the TPLF attacked the Northern Command of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, the federal government launched a “law and order” military operation.
Turning enemies into allies
The conflict in Tigray was both a cause and a consequence of important shifts in domestic and regional allegiances. Eritrea, a historical adversary of Ethiopia, especially since gaining independence in 1993, unexpectedly allied with the federal government, joining military operations against the TPLF. Eritrean forces were subsequently accused of committing atrocities against civilians. Meanwhile, the TPLF, once the dominant force at the heart of Ethiopia’s political establishment, found itself in open combat not only with federal forces, but also with the Amhara regional army, local militias and Eritrean troops.
The war ended with the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, which determined the disarmament of the TPLF and the withdrawal of foreign forces. However, the agreement overlooked the extent of the role played by Eritrean forces in the conflict. Despite formal stabilization, multiple tensions remain on the ground. Eritrean forces are still present in Tigray, and the Eritrean regime has connections with Amhara rebels, specifically the Fano militias. Moreover, while Amhara forces have sided with the federal army in Tigray, they rebelled against the federal government following the decision, in 2023, to dissolve regional special forces as part of a national security reform.
Read more on the Horn of Africa
As for the TPLF, while the group was removed from the terrorist list after the Pretoria Agreement, it remained excluded from representation in Ethiopia’s parliament. The post-war context generated divisions within the TPLF, now split between those who signed the 2022 peace agreements and favor reconciliation with the federal government, and those who are considering an allegiance, even if implicit, with Eritrea, against the Abiy Ahmed regime.
Split into two irreconcilable factions, the TPLF is blocked. Citing the party’s inability to hold a general assembly, the National Election Board recently banned the TPLF from political activity. It is important to note that besides longstanding ethnic and political cleavages, competition for control over Tigray is also intensified by its strategic location and significant gold reserves.
Scenarios
Most likely: Instability and proxy war ahead of 2026 elections in Ethiopia
The most likely scenario is a period of fragile peace followed by a proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the Tigray region. This outcome is increasingly likely due to a convergence of internal and regional tensions. The TPLF leadership is fractured, the peace agreement remains only partially implemented and parts of Tigrayan territory are still under the control of Eritrean forces.
Moreover, there is a risk of contagion and regional spillover. The Eritrean regime is reportedly backing insurgent movements in the Amhara region, while the Ethiopian government faces accusations of supporting Eritrean opposition groups such as the Blue Revolution, movements which are largely confined to the diaspora due to the country’s repressive political environment.
Further instability is expected in the lead-up to the 2026 Ethiopian general elections, as Ethiopia remains divided between two opposing political visions: the ethnic federalism that has defined recent decades, and the centralized, nationalist and populist model championed by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.
Less likely: International mediation gives Ethiopia access to the sea
A second, albeit less likely, scenario involves successful international mediation. Ethiopia, which joined the BRICS in 2024, maintains close ties with both Beijing and Ankara, two nations with substantial investments in the region and a strong interest in avoiding instability in the Horn of Africa. Diplomatic pressure from influential actors respected by both sides, such as China or Turkey, could help pave the way for a negotiated settlement.
In such an outcome, Ethiopia might secure access to the sea without directly challenging the sovereignty of its neighbors. While external mediation could play a key role in preventing a renewed conflict between Asmara and Addis Ababa, it would be far more difficult to contain the internal unrest fueled by ethno-political tensions in Tigray and Oromia. These domestic fault lines may continue to drive instability, even in the absence of a regional armed conflict.
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