Sudan: Interview with war correspondent Wojciech Jagielski

Genocide Watch’s Michał Jagielski speaks with Wojciech Jagielski, a Poland-based war correspondent and author, and an expert on African and Central Asian affairs, including Sudan and South Sudan. Over a career spanning more than thirty-five years, he has traveled repeatedly to Sudan, witnessing its many wars: the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005), the ongoing conflict in Darfur (2003–present), and the Eastern Sudan Insurgency (1994–2006).  

A Darfur conflict survivor moves past temporary shelters near Sudan-Chad border. [Zohra Bensemra/Reuters]

Historical comparison: 

- Given your extensive experience in the field, how would you compare the current acts of genocide and military operations to past episodes of violence in Sudan? 

WJ: In terms of brutality, the conflict has not changed much; however, its scale has. Over two million people have died during the South Sudan Independence War in the second half of the 20^th century. During the first Darfur War, at the beginning of the 21^st century, the number of casualties was estimated to be around 250,000. In the ongoing war, which began almost three years ago, tens of thousands of casualties have been reported, and more recently, the number has exceeded 100,000. These are general estimates that can change at any time.  

In any case, the brutality of the ongoing war in Darfur has not changed much compared to that at the beginning of the century. There is one difference – then the violence was employed by Khartoum to subjugate Darfur; today, Arabs from Darfur, the ones that rebelled against the historic leadership of Arabs from Khartoum, are murdering everyone who challenges their claim to control of the entire country. Today’s war is more about who will rule in Khartoum, while the previous conflict aimed to stifle the rebellion in Darfur.  

- How does the international community’s response to the ongoing genocide compare to previous wars and acts of violence in Sudan and Darfur? 

WJ: The difference could not be more striking. Then the case was picked up by the International Criminal Court (ICC), which charged then-President Omar al-Bashir with war crimes and issued international arrest warrants. The crimes and violence in Sudan were widely spoken about and criticized by American celebrities such as George Clooney and institutions, including the White House. Thanks to their efforts, the war crimes in Darfur became a talking point in the entirety of the Western world and were covered extensively by international newspapers. It was proclaimed the first genocide in the 21st century, while the last one, at the end of the 20th century, had been the genocide in Rwanda, which the West ignored for geopolitical reasons. The war in Darfur gave the United States a chance to compensate for its silence in Rwanda.  

Today, nobody cares about Darfur and Sudan aside from their neighbors and humanitarian aid organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières. The traditional media, which has grown poorer over the years, simply cannot afford to send their journalists into the field or even dedicate their columns to cover the war, while the digital outlets are not interested unless something startling occurs. The Western world and its media are exclusively preoccupied with the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. 

Darfur Crisis: 

- What do Sudanese civilians feel about the people from Darfur? If the guns fall silent tomorrow, will those from Darfur still live under the shadow of suspicion, discrimination, or even renewed violence from other ethnic and religious communities? 

WJ: The essence of the Darfur war is more about the conflict between the military and the civilian population. The military, which —excluding brief moments of attempted civilian rule —has been ruling the country since its independence, has gotten accustomed to viewing Sudan as its own private property. It is enjoying the perks of being in power, accumulating wealth, and does not want to waste its time and energy on wars.  

Whenever an armed rebellion or insurgency took place in Sudan, the military did not engage itself; instead, it delegated the fighting to the various militias it supported. That was the case in the South, where Khartoum sent its air force to deal with the insurgency; however, on the ground, fighting was done by Arab militias from the borderlands that were trained, armed, and paid for by the military. Similarly, in Darfur, the non-Arab Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa rebellion was dealt with by sending the Janjaweed, Arab militias from the region. 

In 2019, the military generals, in collaboration with the Janjaweed, overthrew the military Dictator because his rule was wavering because of street protests in Khartoum, and there existed a real chance of civilians taking over the country. In the spring of 2023, the military generals and the Janjaweed began competing for power, sparking the ongoing war. The army, for the first time, fought along the Nile and in Darfur, but recently, after the front line has stabilized (with the army controlling the Nile, and the Janjaweed controlling Darfur), both sides have once again returned to the old habit of backing ethnic militias. The military is now supporting the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa militias, the same groups that it fought 15 years ago alongside the Janjaweed, in their fight against the Janjaweed. The war is engulfing new regions. In Kordofan, the army is supporting local Arab militias against the Darfuris, while the Darfuris, in turn, are supported by black rebel groups that had fought Khartoum for decades during the South’s secession war, but whose lands, after the border was drawn, ended up in the North. Because of this pattern, wars in Sudan only inflame ethnic and neighbor conflicts over land and access to water. After the war, the division between Arabs living along the Nile, who have ruled Sudan since its independence, and Arabs from Darfur, who have long been regarded by Khartoum as backward and primitive relatives, will only deepen. 

- How is the genocide in Darfur viewed by neighboring countries (Chad, South Sudan, Central African Republic)? Given their ethnic allegiances, what is your opinion on the possible impact that neighboring governments could have on the conflict? 

WJ: The Sudanese war has forced almost all of the neighboring countries to get involved. South Sudan is in the most perilous situation. Its only source of income is exporting oil, and the pipelines required to do so go through Kordofan into the terminal in Port Sudan. For the pipeline to function, South Sudan needs to have a good working relationship with both Khartoum and Darfur, as the oil infrastructure is in the regions controlled by the two parties. The Darfuris have allied themselves with black militias from Kordofan, who previously fought against Khartoum alongside today’s South Sudanese leadership. It would be unseemly for South Sudan not to support its former allies. This, in turn, enrages the Khartoum elites, who at any time can cut off South Sudanese oil from the Port Sudan terminal and are currently supporting the opposition to the government in Juba. The struggle for power in South Sudan has been ongoing since the country’s independence in 2011 and overlaps with the old ethnic conflict between the Dinka and Nuer communities. Since the spring of this year, clashes between the ruling Dinka and the opposing Nuer have resumed. The war in Darfur increases the risk of the violence spilling over to South Sudan.  

Chad is also wary of the war in Darfur. The country is the main recipient of refugees from Darfur and the Chad-Sudan border, which splits Darfur into two, separating the Zaghawa, Fur, Masalit, and Arab communities from the province. For close to 50 years now, Chad has been ruled by the Deby family, members of the Zaghawa community. The previous ruler, Idriss Deby, had aided his compatriots in Darfur; however, after his death (he was killed in a clash with rebels in 2021), power passed to his son, Mahamat, who now mainly sides with his mother’s people, the Gorane, has distanced himself from the Zaghawa and is quietly supporting the Darfuri Arabs in the war. It is a dangerous game, as through alienating his fellows, the Zaghawa, he is risking a coup, losing power, and his life. However, Mahamat needs money to stay in power, and ever since he broke ties with France last year, the only party willing to fund his rule is the United Arab Emirates. The Sheikhs are the core allies of the Darfuris (in exchange for access to the regional gold mines). The Sheikhs are utilizing Chad to deliver weapons to Darfur (using airports, hospitals, and camps supposedly built for refugees). 

Another beneficiary of the Emirati sheikhs is Darfur’s neighbor, eastern Libya, which is controlled by the warlord Khalifa Haftar. Through the airports under his control, the Emirates supply the Darfuris with weapons, while the Russians provide both arms and mercenaries—originally from the Wagner Group, and now from the Africa Corp. 

Another debtor of the UAE is Sudan’s eastern neighbor, Ethiopia. A few years ago,  Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was able to stop the rebels from Tigray from advancing towards Addis Ababa, only thanks to the drones and operators provided by the Emirates. It will have to pay back its debt on the Sheikh's demands, especially since its main competitor in the Horn of Africa, Egypt, is allied with the government in Khartoum and is supporting Ethiopia’s enemies – Somalia and Eritrea. 

Sudan’s southern neighbor, the Central African Republic, does not have to worry about the war spilling over to its territory, but it has for years been the main bridgehead for Russia’s operations in Africa. Mercenaries from the Wagner Group first landed in the Central African Republic, and the country now serves as a supply hub for Russia’s allies in Darfur. The Wagner Group, for years, has supplied the Darfuri Arabs with weapons in exchange for access to Darfur’s gold, from which the ore was shipped to Abu Dhabi and Dubai, while the profits went on to Moscow. 

The role of journalists in preventing genocide and reporting on it: 

- What are the biggest obstacles to reporting accurately and safely in a context where genocide is taking place? Did you ever face pressure from editors or governments to tone down or alter your coverage of Sudan? 

WJ: The main and most difficult obstacle is the inability to access Sudan, and even if one manages to get in, there are serious logistical problems. Sudan is an enormous country; it was the biggest African country before the division into South and North in 2011. It is almost completely devoid of roads, especially in the underdeveloped desert of Darfur. Getting the news that something important is happening and getting there, particularly in Darfur, is an incredibly difficult task. My agency never put pressure on me in regards to my reports from the field. Neither did the Sudanese government, probably because for them I came from an obscure country and wrote for a newspaper they had never heard of. I suspect that if I were writing for the BBC, Reuters, or the Guardian, people in Khartoum would read my articles with scrutiny, and they would protest if they deemed them to be putting the country in a bad light, to be too critical. But even I, a journalist for “Gazeta Wyborcza”, found that whenever I was accompanied by an official, especially in Darfur, they would present and explain reality in a way that tried to convince me of a version of events favorable to Khartoum.  

- In your view, how effective is international media coverage in shaping the political will to intervene in conflicts such as Darfur or the 2023 civil war?  

WJ: Yes, I do believe that. However, in the case of the ongoing war in Sudan and Darfur, I remain skeptical. Due to the twilight of the liberal West’s global domination and global crises in Gaza and Ukraine, nobody pays attention to Sudan and its wars, which appear to be exclusively localized issues that do not pose a threat to international peace. It is a false assumption because the dozen million refugees from Sudan, who are now residing in neighboring countries devoid of humanitarian aid —mainly due to US aid cuts —will eventually embark on a journey to Europe. Their movement will be aided by hostile to the West Russia, which, thanks to its mercenaries, has established bridgeheads in Africa. Their allies control Sahel, and most importantly, Eastern Libya, which might serve as the main migration corridor for the refugees to get to Europe and potentially become weapons for Russia’s hybrid war against the West. OR Their movement may be facilitated by Russia, which, through its mercenaries, has established footholds across Africa. Russia’s allies control the Sahel and, most importantly, eastern Libya, which could serve as the main migration corridor for these refugees. In such a scenario, they risk being instrumentalized as part of Russia’s hybrid war against the West. 

Personal insights and Experiences: 

- Was there ever a time when you doubted the value of what you were doing — either because of limited impact or overwhelming brutality? 

WJ: No, I never doubted that, but I also never believed that it was a journalist’s role to change the world. I believed that a journalist’s task is to inform the world about all of the most important events from all aspects of life, including the geopolitical situation, economy, politics, culture, and sport. We do not have a say in how the information we have provided will be used, if at all. But if we do our job correctly, nobody will be able to say that they did not know what was happening. I tried my best to fulfill my role in the best way that I could, but I do have to admit that returning to refugee camps, meeting with people, war victims whom I have met during my previous visits, was incredibly difficult. I knew they hoped that the presence of journalists and us telling their stories would change or improve their fate, and when nothing changed, and we journalists met them again, you could sense their resentment—they were disappointed in us. 

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