Why Save Darfur Didn't Save Darfur

Relatives mourn over the body of 1-year-old Ali, who died of malnutrition in June 2004 in a refugee camp in El-Geneina in the Darfour, Sudan. The total number of people who have died as a result of the Darfur conflict is uncertain, but activists say it could exceed 400,000.Marco Longari / AFP - Getty Images file

Why Save Darfur Didn’t Save Darfur

By Prof. Gregory Stanton

Founding President

Genocide Watch

Written in March 2012, converted to past tense in 2025

In 2003, Humanity United (HU) called a national conference of people its staff identified as potential activists for an anti-genocide movement. Notably missing were any members of the Republican party, most of the heads of member organizations of the International Campaign to End Genocide and any leaders of the International Association of Genocide Scholars. 

At the conference, Humanity United announced that Pierre and Pam Omidiyar, HU’s funders, intended to donate $100 million over the next seven years to support activism against genocide, human trafficking, and a few other causes.  They also announced that unsolicited applications for grants would not be accepted.  Most of the money they pledged was spent by 2012.

The Genocide in Darfur, Sudan

In early 2003, after an attack by rebels on a Sudanese Air Force base in Al Fasher, the Sudanese government began a genocidal counter-insurgency war against the Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa and other black African groups in Darfur.  Genocide Watch was the first organization to declare a Genocide Watch for the situation in June, 2003.

In the summer of 2004, a few human rights activists founded the Save Darfur Coalition, and a number of organizations quickly joined it. Genocide Watch was among the first to join in 2004, but was not listed as a member on the Save Darfur website until 2008, and was excluded from all leadership meetings. 

The Coalition staff were paid from funds donated by Humanity United and other fundraising via the Center for American Progress, the liberal think tank organization funded by George Soros.  The Center for American Progress later played a prominent role in Barack Obama’s campaign for President.

In 2004, Save Darfur’s 180 member organizations adopted a Unity Statement that included the following goals regarding people in Darfur:

 · Ending the violence against civilians;

·  Facilitating adequate and unhindered humanitarian aid;

·  Establishing conditions for the safe and voluntary return of displaced people to their homes;

·  Promoting the long-term sustainable development of Darfur; and

·  Holding the perpetrators accountable.

From its start, the Save Darfur Coalition was weakened by several role conflicts:

1.     Save Darfur set out to organize a grass-roots political movement against the genocide in Darfur but it acted as a coalition in name only.  In fact, Save Darfur was directed exclusively by a small elite staff and board from offices in Washington, DC. 

Increasingly, statements by the “coalition” were actually made after short consultations among only eight of its members: Save Darfur (meaning its central staff and Board of Directors) by Humanity United itself, Enough, Investors Against Genocide (a project of Save Darfur, Massachusetts), the Genocide Intervention Network and StopGenocideNow, all funded by Humanity United, and by Physicians for Human Rights USA, American Jewish World Service, and Human Rights Watch.  The statements were then issued on behalf of all 180 members of the Save Darfur Coalition, though few received them or read them before they were issued.

Grassroots initiatives were never treated as central to the movement and were even discouraged.  Two projects organized by Rev. Tim Nonn, for example, were not endorsed by Save Darfur. One was a Mock Trial of Omar al-Bashir in November 2006 at the Church Center for the UN with Wole Soyinka as Chief Judge. Another was Rev. Nonn’s Tents of Hope project that placed hundreds of painted tents from every state on the Washington, DC Mall in September 2008. That project was reluctantly accepted by Save Darfur only when it was clear that Nonn’s project would proceed even without Save Darfur’s endorsement. Save Darfur finally gave Tents of Hope a tiny grant of $10,000, less than Rev. Nonn had spent from his own pocket.

2.     Huge amounts of money were donated to Save Darfur, both directly by HU and through direct fund-raising.  The success of Save Darfur at fundraising is indicated on its IRS 990 forms.  Gross receipts were $16 million in 2005, $49.3 million in 2006, $7.6 million in 2007, $4.8 million in 2008, and $5 million in 2009.  Net assets of Save Darfur in September 2009 were $2.7 million.  Total receipts from 2004 through 2009 were over $82.7 million.

The money was spent to pay:

·       high staff salaries (the Save Darfur President’s salary in 2008 was $185,455; in 2007, the top five salaried employees ranged from $138,000 to $87,656; in 2006, salaries totaled over $1 million and the top five officers earned from $130,000 to $68,000).  United to End Genocide, the successor to Save Darfur, and GI-Net continued to pay these high salaries to its top staff members until funding ran out.

·       professional fundraisers: $1 million in 2007 and $1.3 million in 2008;

·       professional advertising firms, including a remarkable $34.9 million in 2006, which included payment for numerous full-page ads in the New York Times and Washington Post;

·       for postcard and call-in campaigns to members of the US Congress.

None of Save Darfur’s budget was used to directly assist victims of the genocide in Darfur.  For example, in 2008, out of total expenditures of $9.3 million, total grants by Save Darfur to recipients in Sub-Saharan Africa for various services totaled only $84,050, and even that money did not go for aid to the victims.  A tiny number of Save Darfur’s grantees included small projects in Darfur as part of their programs, but they are not detailed in Save Darfur’s reports, and the average grants to coalition members were under $5000.

3. Save Darfur leaders were never willing to work with Bush Administration officials as the primary foreign policy makers during the Darfur genocide.  Although several members of the coalition, including Genocide Watch, repeatedly reminded Save Darfur’s leaders from the beginning that foreign policy in the USA is made by the Executive Branch – especially by the President, National Security Council, State Department, and Defense Department, Save Darfur concentrated its efforts on lobbying members of Congress.  The coalition was proud of rallying bipartisan Congressional condemnation of the Sudanese regime.  But Congress was never willing to advocate by resolution or law any US military intervention to stop the genocide.  Congressional resolutions were toothless – never advocating US or UN intervention.

Congress has a secondary role in foreign policy making in the US.  Its greatest impact is on appropriations.  Save Darfur, Enough, and GI-Net claimed that their congressional lobbying increased relief assistance to the IDP and refugee camps. But their claims had a post hoc, ergo propter hoc logic.  Money for Darfur IDP’s and refugees was appropriated through the normal channels of the State Department’s well-funded Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, which receives an annual appropriation without any pressure from outside groups. 

There is little evidence that appropriations for Darfur IDPs and refugees were increased through efforts of the Save Darfur Coalition.  In fact, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the Bush administration, Dr. Jendaye Frazier, said that Save Darfur and Enough’s constant criticism of Bush administration policies, despite the President and Secretary of State’s direct condemnation of Sudanese government’s crimes as “genocide,” frustrated several of her initiatives for a more active, interventionist policy.

4. Throughout the Darfur genocide, the US and Canada were preoccupied with two major wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  These nations were therefore unlikely to commit American or Canadian troops to intervention in Darfur, and the Bush administration’s emphasis on the “War on Terror” even led to attempts to cooperate with the intelligence services of Sudan.

The Save Darfur Coalition’s 180 member organizations came almost exclusively from the United States and Canada, with a few from the UK.  The result was that Save Darfur was unable to put political pressure on leaders in the European Union, or other states in the UN to support intervention to stop the genocide and crimes against humanity in Darfur. 

France, for example, was in a much better position than the US to take strong action because France was not tied down in the Iraq and Afghan wars, and because of France’s historic influence in Africa. France had military bases in Chad, and a demonstrated willingness to intervene in states like Côte d’Ivoire, where French interests were at stake.  But Save Darfur had no organization in France, and it failed to enlist the support of the French government.

Similarly, Save Darfur was unable to exert any pressure on Sudan’s main supporter, China, in spite of a well publicized, but ultimately fruitless “Genocide Olympics” campaign led by actress Mia Farrow, partially funded by HU, including a few trips for talks with Chinese officials, without results. 

5.     Probably the single most effective blow against the Sudanese regime was referral of the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court.  The Save Darfur Coalition claimed credit for the referral, but Save Darfur had nothing to do with it.  In fact, Genocide Watch, working with policy makers inside the US government, particularly Nick Rostow, the legal adviser to the US Ambassador to the UN in New York, and a classmate of Genocide Watch’s President, resulted in Rostow’s carefully drafted UN Security Council resolution referring the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court.

The UNSC Resolution immunized citizens of countries that were not parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC.  That paragraph permitted abstentions, rather than vetoes, by China, Russia, and the US. It was the first resolution by the UN Security Council that referred to the ICC a situation in a country not a State-Party to the ICC’s Rome Statute.

The effect of the ICC referral was the indictment of President Omar al-Bashir, Ali Kushyb, leader of the Janjaweed militias, and Ahmed Haroun, the Sudanese minister in charge of “humanitarian assistance,” for crimes against humanity and genocide.  The Sudanese government greeted the indictments and arrest warrants by expelling thirteen NGO relief groups, further evidence of the genocidal intent of the regime.

Omar al-Bashir became persona non grata in Uganda, South Africa, and other countries. But emboldened by his “victory” in fraudulent “elections”, al-Bashir stepped up his campaign of “ethnic cleansing” in Jebel Mara.  Al-Bashir and his new Governor in South Kordofan, the ICC-indicted war criminal Ahmed Haroun, then began genocidal massacres in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile states.

Prognosis for the future of Darfur

1.     There is still no effective plan supported by the US or any other great powers to end the Sudanese civil war, and to provide security for over two million IDP’s and refugees to safely return to their former homes.  Save Darfur didn’t have a plan with any reasonable chance of implementation, nor did any of the eight organizations that ran the Save Darfur Coalition.

2.      Al-Bashir told the IDP’s they should return home to their devastated villages, and a few did, but millions understandably remained untrusting of al-Bashir’s assurances of their security and stayed in IDP camps.

3.     After the 2011 referendum in South Sudan, when South Sudan voted to become independent, Sudan demanded outrageous fees to ship South Sudanese oil through Port Sudan in Sudan. South Sudan stopped producing oil and Sudan threatened war.  The Sudanese government finally extracted an agreement from South Sudan to pay reduced fees and the flow of oil resumed. The misnamed Comprehensive Peace Agreement failed to include resolution of the civil war in Darfur. The genocides in Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur continued.

Lessons to be learned from Save Darfur’s failure to Save Darfur

1.     The Save Darfur Coalition claimed credit for organizing the largest anti-genocide movement to date, and its successor, United to End Genocide, made the same claim.  But United to End Genocide dropped any pretext that it was a coalition.  Most of the people and organizations in the US, Canada, and the UK who joined the Save Darfur Coalition had no role in United to End Genocide.

Nevertheless, United to End Genocide continued to use Save Darfur’s e-mail list to solicit funds.  All funds in the coffers of the Save Darfur Coalition and GI-Net were transferred to United to End Genocide without approval of the other members of the Save Darfur Coalition.  And United to End Genocide retained exclusive rights to the e-mail and fund-raising lists developed by the Save Darfur Coalition, which it refused to share with other coalition members, but eventually transferred to Enough.

2.     Support for UN Security Council Resolutions, the African Union Peacekeeping Force, and other objectives of the Save Darfur Coalition in 2004 proved to be naïve hopes.  Save Darfur never advocated an armed UN/AU Peacekeeping Operation with a mandate to disarm the Janjaweed and to protect hundreds of thousands of displaced Darfuri persons so they could return to their homes. Instead, the UN/AU Mission in Darfur became an Observer Mission, without a mandate to stop genocide and destruction of Darfur’s villages.

A former US Marine who joined the UN Mission in Darfur resigned in disgust at its failure to protect civilians. His photos of burning villages taken from a UN helicopter was proof of a continuing genocide.

Save Darfur’s preference for pacifism paralyzed its effectiveness.  The head of the successor United to End Genocide was also a pacifist, and there were no changes to Save Darfur’s aversion to legitimate use of armed force.

3.     Nothing would have stopped the Darfur genocide except the insertion of superior military force no later than mid-2004.  France and NATO could have imposed a “passive” no-fly zone over Darfur, with mortars positioned to destroy Sudanese aircraft on the ground after they returned from their bombing missions.

The UN, ECOWAS, NATO, and other alliances could have put heavily armed infantry on the ground to stop the murderous Janjaweed and Sudanese Army, in cooperation with African Union troops recruited from Rwanda. But the UN Mission in Darfur’s mandate never authorized such use of force.

4.     NATO warships could have blockaded Port Sudan’s export of oil and import of refined petroleum, while permitting imports of food and other goods.  But the US, the UK and NATO were pre-occupied by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. France lacked the will to take such aggressive action, and the African Union, Arab League, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations objected to obstruction of fuel supplies. 

Instead, weak UN Security Council Resolutions and an impotent African Union observer mission became substitutes for stopping the genocide. Wishful UN resolutions became covers for failure to take effective action.

5.     The inability of the Save Darfur Coalition to organize outside the US, Canada, and the UK weakened its ability to affect the foreign policy of other countries.

6.     The top-down, high-cost, elite-driven organizational structure of the Save Darfur Coalition significantly undermined its long-term effectiveness.  It failed to become a self-sustaining movement.  GI-Net called for the creation of a “permanent anti-genocide constituency.” United to End Genocide declared the same goal.  But neither had any experience in organizing such a mass movement.

7.     STAND (the student division of GI-Net) was the most effective member of the Save Darfur Coalition in creating this anti-genocide constituency. But STAND was limited to student members, and therefore it had limited influence.

8.     Save Darfur called itself an “interfaith” organization, and many of its members were faith groups.  But it made little use of the potentially enormous “permanent anti-genocide constituency” that could be based in religious organizations. Faith groups transcend national boundaries and connect with groups in countries at risk of genocide.

Conclusion

These critiques of the Save Darfur Coalition and of United to End Genocide are not meant to diminish what the Coalition accomplished – awareness among the American and Canadian people of the genocide in Darfur.

Save Darfur involved actors, sports stars, and other celebrities to an unprecedented degree.  It mobilized members of Congress, and some of its supporters joined the Obama administration.

These were major accomplishments of the Save Darfur Coalition and should not be minimized.

But US and European organizations of young white people are an inadequate foundation for the global anti-genocide movement that will be necessary to prevent genocide in the twenty-first century.

I remain hopeful that a “permanent anti-genocide constituency” can be organized to prevent and stop genocides and massive crimes against humanity in this century. 

But it will take major paradigm shifts in thinking about genocidal processes, anti-genocide education, effective organization, public communications, how to influence policy, and the international institutions needed to prevent genocide.

The effectiveness of the US, Canada, and the EU in preventing genocide is currently limited by the impotence of the United Nations, which remains paralyzed by the Perm-5 veto in the UN Security Council.

A new United Nations Charter is needed. Article 109 of the UN Charter should be invoked to call a General Conference to rewrite the Charter. A new UN Charter should free the UN from the 1945 colonial powers that imposed the paralyzing Perm-5 veto.

The Statute of the International Criminal Court should be supplemented by a Protocol to create an effective international police force to arrest persons charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide by the ICC.

Regional, national, and local organizations must take the lead in genocide education and prevention. Religious organizations must be enlisted to create the moral education needed to move people beyond their narrow ethnic loyalties.

The Anti-Genocide Movement must be organized from the ground up in countries at risk.  Organizing an anti-genocide movement will have to be a grass-roots effort like the organization of Amnesty International chapters.

US, Canadian, EU governments and Western NGOs can financially support local efforts. But the Anti-Genocide Movement cannot be limited to America and Europe. It must become a truly global movement to free humanity from our endless wars and genocides.

The first step toward ending genocide is the realization that there is only one race: the human race.

Copyright 2025 Gregory H Stanton

Under Creative Commons Copyright. May be copied and republished freely so long as full credit is given to the author, it is republished in its entirety without alteration, and republication is not by a profit making corporation, publication, individual, or other entity.  

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