Peace and closure among families as girls who died at residential school are reburied Natalie Pressman July 23, 2026 Alice and Rosanna Drygeese will be buried in Yellowknife, N.W.T., next to their father Mary Jane Drygeese and her great-granddaughter. Drygeese's two sisters are coming home to Yellowknife decades after they died at residential school in Fort Resolution. (Submitted by Berna Ross) In some of his final words, Berna Ross’s grandfather spoke of how nice it would be to reunite with his two daughters in heaven. It’s been decades since he’d seen his daughters Alice and Rosanna Drygeese, Ross’s aunties, who went away to residential school in Fort Resolution and never came home. Ross’s mother, Mary Jane, is Alice and Rosanna’s sister. They were 14 and 6 years old when they died of tuberculosis. “They were supposed to come home for Christmas,” Ross said, recalling her mother’s story. “She was never given a full explanation.” Soon, Alice and Rosanna will be buried next to their father in Yellowknife. “Just knowing that they're going to be close to their dad, it just gives me joy and peace, closure as well,” Ross said. Deninu Kųę́ First Nation has been working to map the graves of those who died at residential school in Fort Resolution and identify unmarked graves while connecting family with their missing loved ones. So far, they've identified the names of 70 children who never made it home from St. Joseph's Mission School in Fort Resolution. It’s a process that takes years of work, ground penetrating radar, DNA testing and hundreds of thousands of dollars. Thanks to that work, the remains of Alma Beaulieu were brought home to Fort Smith in October and Alice Abel and Denise Boucher to Łútselk'e last week. Berna Ross, left, and her mother Mary Jane Drygeese. Ross says she feels joy, peace and closure to have her aunts, her mother's sisters, returning home to Yellowknife. (Submitted by Berna Ross) Linda Vanden Berg, an anthropologist working with the First Nation, said the work is intensive but everyone involved is dedicated. “We're trying to repatriate as many children as possible because when the elders contact us, they aren't young and they want to bring these children home to be buried beside their relatives,” she said. Deninu Kųę́ is leading the country in repatriating remains of children who died in residential schools, she said, and that has a lot to do with the Jon Hansen, the bishop of the Mackenzie-Fort Smith diocese, allowing access to historical church records. “Without the burial records, it would have been nigh on impossible to achieve this. And I don't think that access is there for the rest of the country,” she said. Vanden Berg said their team has also been able to make strides because the residential school in Fort Resolution was relatively small compared to others in the country so they can go through the documents more quickly. Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC) funds this work through a Residential Schools Missing Children Community Support Fund. That supports research to help communities gather local knowledge, find burial sites and honour the children with grave markers, monuments or commemorative events. ‘All of the what ifs’ The Northwest Territories previously prevented families from bringing home remains of their loved ones because of legislation that considered ancestral remains to be artifacts. Last year, the government of the Northwest Territories established a process to get around that. The chief public health officer could authorize families to exhume the children, or families could go through the courts for permission. At least five children have been brought home to their communities and Vanden Berg said several more are forthcoming. Ross also has another aunt she hopes they can bring home. She says they think she may have been moved to Fort Providence or the Fort Smith hospital. “It still hurts, you know, that we’ve had aunties that we could have known and cousins that we could have had,” Ross said. “It was just all of the what ifs.” Ross said she feels compassion for all the families working to bring their loved ones home. “What they’re going through is not easy.” But she hopes they can be encouraged to see it through. “Just be hopeful,” she said. “Be hopeful and that hopefully they can get their loved ones back.” ©2026 CBC/Radio-Canada.

Where does genocide happen, and where are warning signs already visible? Genocide Watch’s new Ten Stages of Genocide Map provides a global overview of our latest findings. It is a major update to the previous version from October 2025 and includes our latest assessments and reports through the beginning of August 2026. The new map is now available on the Ten Stages page, below the explanations of the individual stages. See where the Ten Stages are occurring Countries and regions are colored according to the highest stage currently identified in our latest analysis. The donut charts show which of the Ten Stages are present. Each segment represents one stage. The more stages identified, the larger the donut. Search globally The map can now be searched by countries, regions, perpetrators, targeted groups, and other terms found in our reports. Search for “Indigenous” or “LGBTQ,” for example, to see where these groups have been identified as targets in our latest assessments. Filter individual stages The Ten Stages can also be filtered directly. Click on a segment in the donut menu on the left, for example Stage 7: Preparation, to see all countries and regions where this stage was identified in the latest available assessment. Filter by alert level You can also filter the map by Genocide Watch’s alert levels: Watch, Warning, and Emergency. This makes it easier to explore situations that may receive less international attention. Conflict fatalities A new layer based on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) shows where conflict-related deaths have been recorded. The data does not represent the full human cost of a conflict, but it provides an indication of where direct conflict fatalities are concentrated. The layer can be hidden or viewed on its own. Globe or flat map Explore the data on an interactive globe, let the globe rotate automatically, or switch to a flat world map for a global overview. We hope the map encourages people to explore our findings and learn more about atrocities and warning signs around the world. The map is now embedded on Genocide Watch’s Ten Stages of Genocide page, where you can also read more about each of the stages. For questions, corrections, or feedback, please contact maps@genocidewatch.org. Map created by the Genocide Watch Mapping Team / Bela Müller.

Photo by Abid Katib/Getty Images by Karolina Bonde May 2026 Historically civilians’ restricted access to water during warfare has been a form of collateral damage when infrastructure is damaged and water supply chains are disrupted. Recently, restricting water usage has been used as a key method of warfare. By damaging water infrastructure, military combatants gain cumulative tactical leverage while avoiding actual combat. However, international actors have not been able to protect civilians’ access to water during war by applying the relevant and established laws. Thus, the tactic spreads with impunity. Humanitarian groups have extensively documented this pattern in Gaza, especially since the October 7 attacks committed by Hamas and Israel's ensuing military onslaught. Humanitarian groups have documented this pattern extensively in Gaza during the Gaza War. Several other prominent cases show that combatants are ignoring the established laws that protect civilians’ access to water during war. In Gaza, observers have documented clear deprivation of water as a tool against civilians. The violations of law have not been addressedmand this lack of accountability may encourage this violation in future warfare. Already, United States (US) President Donald Trump has threatened to target Iran’s power plants and desalination infrastructure, despite longstanding protections afforded to civilian infrastructure that is necessary for survival. Indeed, strikes on desalination plants in Iran, Bahrain, and Kuwait have already been reported in March and again in July. This report examines the systematic restriction of water in Gaza through the findings of Doctors Without Borders (DWB), presented in its April 2026 report. It also considers how such acts have spread with impunity in warfare elsewhere. Water Deprivation in Gaza For years, DWB has warned about the collapse of water and sanitation conditions in Gaza. Operating directly on the ground, DWB has repeatedly documented how restrictions on infrastructure, fuel, and humanitarian aid have affected the civilian population’s ability to access necessities essential for survival. In April 2026, DWB stated, “Israeli authorities have used access to water as a weapon against Palestinians, systematically depriving people in Gaza, Palestine, of water in a campaign of collective punishment.” Since the start of the war, DWB reports that Israel has destroyed or damaged nearly 90% of Gaza’s water and sanitation infrastructure, including desalinationplants, boreholes, pipelines, and sewage systems. Israel’s use of water deprivation was signaled openly in the immediate aftermath of the October 7, 2023 attacks by Hamas on Israeli citizens. Genocide Watch has previously stated that those attacks were acts of genocide, as is the Israeli response. On October 9, 2023, the then-Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant announced a "complete siege” of the Gaza Strip and that there would “be no electricity, no food, no water, no fuel, everything is closed.”Similar rhetoric followed from Major General Ghassan Alian, head of the Israeli Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), who stated: “There will be no electricity and no water [in Gaza], there will only be destruction. You wanted hell, you will get hell.” The destruction of water and sanitation systems in Gaza has penetrated every aspect of civilian life, including hygiene, disease prevention, childbirth, food preparation, and psychological survival itself. Families dig makeshift toilets into the sand inside overcrowded tent encampments, often meters away from the boreholes used to access drinking water. During winter flooding, sewage spreads directly into living spaces. Access to soap, detergent, and basic hygiene products has repeatedly been cut off. Mothers have reportedly torn pieces of clothing into improvised diapers for infants. Women and girls struggle for access to menstrual hygiene products, increasing their risk of infection and illness. Some women have resorted to bathing in the sea, despite reports that Israeli forces fire towards civilians who approach the shoreline. Untreated solid and medical waste compounds this collapse. As early as March 2024, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) warned that if the issue of solid waste, including medical waste, was not adequately addressed, it would exacerbate the suffering of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, severely affecting public health given limited access to healthcare, and contaminating agricultural land and the aquifer as pollutants seep into the soil. Children’s daily existence is shaped by the crisis. Many wake each morning not knowing whether water trucks will arrive. DWB's mental health professionals have documented suicidal ideation linked directly to the collapse of water and sanitation conditions. Therefore, deprivation of water to Gazans is not only a humanitarian issue. Restricting access to water and sanitation is one form of systematic destruction of the conditions necessary for their life, health, and human dignity. The Mechanisms of Deprivation of Water In the Gaza War, Israeli authorities have used three interrelated systems to deprive Gazan civilians of access to water: Direct destruction: The Israeli authorities have destroyed or damaged 89% of water and sanitation infrastructure in Gaza. The northern desalination plant has been demolished entirely. Damaged infrastructure includes over 60% of its 196 publicly- and NGO-run desalination plants. This has stripped Gaza of the physical capacity to produce clean water at scale. Access denial: On July 30, 2025, 87% of Gaza's territory was under Israeli evacuation order or military control, cutting residents off from wells, water points, and repair sites within these zones. As of March 2026, 58% of Gaza remains inaccessible, leaving much of the population unable to reach functioning water infrastructure even where it exists. This control extends to humanitarian delivery: in September 2025, during Israeli forces' incursion into Gaza City, Israeli authorities denied 100% of DWB's 27 requests for water trucking movements, blocking emergency water supply to areas cut off by military control. Supply blockage: Since January 1, 2026, every single DWB request to bring supplies through the Israeli-controlled approval system has been denied. Israel classifies water desalination pumps, water testing kits, RO membranes, chlorine tablets and even latrine units as requiring complex military approval; in any other context, those items would be considered basic humanitarian supplies. In November 2025, six large reverse osmosis units, each capable of producing 10,000 liters of drinking water per hour, were turned away at the Kerem Shalom crossing. Initially approved, then rejected in November, they were rejected again in December following US military intervention. As of March 2026, they have still not entered Gaza. Meanwhile, 2,150 latrine units have been sitting in a warehouse in Jordan since April 2025. In addition to targeting equipment and supplies, Israeli military attacks have targeted the people who try to provide or access them. In July 2025, seven children were killed in central Gaza while waiting for water at a distribution point. More recently, UNICEF announced its outrage after Israeli forces killed two drivers it had contracted to deliver clean water to families in northern Gaza. The same attack wounded two others and occurred during routine water trucking at the Mansoura filling point. UNICEF suspended operations at the site. Thus, water infrastructure is not simply caught in the crossfire of war, subject to collateral damage. Rather, water is being denied at every link in the chain, from demolished plants to blocked supplies and fatal attacks on the people physically carrying water. Independent experts appointed by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), have expressed despair for the situation, stating, “Israel is using thirst as a weapon to kill Palestinians. Cutting off water and food is a silent but lethal bomb that kills mostly children and babies. The sight of infants dying in their mothers’ arms is unbearable. How can world leaders sleep while this suffering continues?” The Legal Framework: Clear Prohibitions, Limited Enforcement For decades, international humanitarian law has addressed the weaponization of water. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) identifies four core prohibitions directly applicable to water in armed conflict: the ban on poisoning or rendering water unfit for use the ban on destroying objects indispensable to civilian survival the ban on attacking works containing dangerous forces such as dams, and the ban on destroying enemy property. Drinking water installations and supplies are explicitly named within these protections, and starvation as a method of warfare is prohibited, regardless of the nature of the conflict. Even if a water installation is targeted because it is used solely by armed forces for military action, adversaries must refrain from any action that would deprive civilians of essential water. In the current war, Israel has breached each of these four prohibitions through direct attack and blocking humanitarian aid, supplies, and equipment. As occupying power, Israel's obligations go further. The Berlin Rules on Water Resources, grounded in the Fourth Geneva Convention Article 55, state that the obligation to protect water installations and ensure adequate supply to an occupied population is absolute. Israel is not merely prohibited from destroying Gaza's water infrastructure: it is legally required to maintain it. Also, under the Rome Statute, intentionally using starvation as a method of warfare, including by depriving civilians of water, is a war crime and may constitute the crime against humanity of extermination or an act of genocide. In November, 2024, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issuedarrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-Minister Gallant on precisely this charge. In the Geneva Conventions, the underlying prohibition on starvation as a method of warfare is established in Additional Protocol I. Israel is not a party to Additional Protocol I, so it disputes that the prohibition is legally bindingon it. This argument does not hold, as the prohibition on starvation is also part of customary international law, which binds all states, regardless of which treaties they have ratified. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was equally unambiguous. In its January 2024 order, the court found a "real and imminent risk of irreparable harm arising from the deprivation of potable water" in Gaza and issued binding measures requiring Israel to restore humanitarian access. Israel has not complied with that order, nor with the three that followed. Israel's position implicitly echoes the argument of legal scholar Yoram Dinstein, who has called the prohibition "unjustifiable and utopian" on the grounds that siege warfare has historically been lawful. But even a siege has legal limits. According to the ICRC, a siege aimed at starving civilians is prohibited, and any starvation effects directed at enemy forces must be exclusively confined to them. A party cannot use military purposes as cover for depriving civilians of what they need to survive. Israel’s deprivation of access to water and sanitation that the DWB report documents in the Gaza War goes far beyond those limits. Impunity, Resistance, and Failure of Enforcement Regarding Israel’s deprivation of water to civilians in Gaza, the law has spoken repeatedly, through ICC arrest warrants, ICJ provisional measures, and extensive documentation by humanitarian and human rights organizations. The response, however, has increasingly been to undermine and dismantle the institutions doing the speaking. Following President Trump's return to office as the US President in January 2025, the US sanctioned the ICC prosecutor, deputies who lead the Office of the Prosecutor, and four judges including two on the pre-trial chamber that issued the warrants regarding Prime Minister Netanyahu and then-Minister Gallant. The ICJ orders have been ignored in their entirety. The October 2025 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas explicitly promised "full aid" and "rehabilitation of infrastructure including water, electricity and sewage, without interference from the two parties." However, since that agreement took effect, 13 types of water, sanitation and hygiene items submitted by DWB have been rejected for importation to Gaza. These items include chlorine tablets, antiscalant essential for running desalination systems, and water pipes for a hospital. Acts like these underscore the urgency of addressing the prevailing impunity. A Pattern of Water Deprivation in the West Bank and Gaza The events unfolding in Gaza reflect a longer history of Israeli control over Palestinian water resources. In November 1967, Military Order 158 was issued after Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. It stated that Palestinians could not construct any new water installation without first obtaining a permit from the Israeli army. However, those permits proved almost impossible to obtain. What followed was a structural and sustained disparity in access to water. Israelis, including settlers in the West Bank, use an average of 247 liters of water per day per person, or three times the 82 liters available to Palestinians in the West Bank. In Palestinian communities not connected to the water grid, daily consumption is only 26 liters per person, a level comparable to disaster zones. The Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem concludes that the crisis of water access facing Palestinians is the direct result of a deliberate Israeli policy that treats water as a tool of control over the Palestinian population. It explains that Israel justifies this policy by citing the arrangements laid out in the Interim Agreement it signed with the PLO in 1995. But that agreement was only ever intended to hold for five years, and the West Bank today looks nothing like it did when it was signed. Since then, the Palestinian population has nearly doubled, yet Israel has never adjusted the ceiling on how much water Palestinians are allowed to draw. The gap forces the Palestinian Authority to buy water back from Israel's state-owned supplier, Mekorot, at a steep premium over its actual cost. Gaza has long struggled with contaminated water. Even before October 2023, 90-95% of its water supply was contaminated and unfit for human consumption. Gaza's only freshwater source, the Coastal Aquifer, had been progressively depleted and contaminated by sewage and seawater infiltration. Israel restricted the entry into Gaza of materials and equipment necessary for the development and repair of infrastructure, contributing further to a marked deterioration in the water and sanitation situation. In addition, Israel did not allow water transfers from the West Bank to Gaza. Israel damaged and destroyed water infrastructure in Gaza during its multiple military operations there. Amnesty International documented such damage done between 2002 and 2009. In just eight months ending in March 2003, the Israeli army destroyed 102 wells in Gaza, forcing residents to use unsafe water sources such as agricultural wells. In a single invasion in Rafah in early 2003, Israeli forces demolished two public wells providing drinking water to half of the town's 120,000 residents. In a subsequent May 2004 raid in Rafah, UN aid agencies reported that damage to water and sewage networks caused an immediate public health collapse in which over 1,300 children were brought to a single clinic in ten days, suffering from diarrhea and skin diseases. In the winter of 2008-09, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead caused approximately $6 million worth of damage to water infrastructure, including the damage or destruction of four reservoirs, eleven wells, and 20,000 meters of water mains. Taken together, these incidents illustrate Israel’s systemic pattern of attacking water infrastructure as a means of warfare in Gaza. Beyond Gaza In Gaza, the world is witnessing the systematic deprivation of a resource indispensable to civilian survival, carried out as a method of warfare, documented exhaustively, and met with impunity, despite clear legal prohibitions. But Israel’s deprivation of water in Gaza is not an isolated case, but the most extensively-documented instance of this tactic. This crisis in Gaza thus represents a test of whether the protections underpinning civilian survival in armed conflict retain any practical meaning. For example, in Ukraine in 2023, the dam at the Kakhovska Hydroelectric Power Plant was destroyed by Russian forces with catastrophic consequences, including the disruption of drinking water and sanitation services for one million people. In Yemen in 2023, both Houthi forces and Saudi-backed government forces have weaponized water infrastructure in Taizz: Houthis have shut off supply valves and blocked water trucks, while government forces have diverted water resources to fund military operations. In Sudan in 2025, the deliberate seizure of water resources has worsened famine and triggered mass displacement, creating one of the world's largest humanitarian crises for 30 million people. The logic in each case is the same. Attacks on water infrastructure offer military, political, and psychological leverage without requiring direct combat. The tactic is deniable, cumulative, and effective. In April 2026, that logic was stated openly at the highest level. US President Trump threatened "complete demolition" of Iran's power plants, including water desalination plants, unless Iran reopened the Strait of Hormuz. Amnesty International's Secretary General responded that intentionally attacking civilian infrastructure constitutes war crimes under international law. Tehran responded that it would "irreversibly destroy" essential infrastructure across the Middle East, including vital water systems, if the US followed through. In regions such as the Gulf, where desalination plants supply the vast majority of drinking water, such an exchange would be immediately catastrophic. In July 2026, the US and Iran each struck desalination plants, disrupting water supply for thousands of civilians; such strikes were also reported in March. The Ten Stages of Genocide As identified in prior analysis, Genocide Watch recognizes Palestine as experiencing all Ten Stages of Genocide. In addition, the engineering of water scarcity through infrastructure destruction, supply blockades, and displacement orders reflects the preparatory logic of Stage 7: Preparation, in which conditions are deliberately constructed to make survival impossible for the targeted group before extermination accelerates. These acts also amount to Stage 8: Persecution, as the group is deliberately deprived of a resource essential to life in order to slowly destroy it, and to Stage 9: Extermination, as the resulting deprivation directly drives mass death within the population. Genocide Watch recommends that: Israel must immediately allow unimpeded entry of all water and sanitation supplies and equipment. Israel must restore humanitarian access across the full Gaza Strip and end displacement orders that cut people off from water sources. Israel must comply fully with all four ICJ provisional measures of orders. All states must apply the same legal standards to attacks on civilian water infrastructure, regardless of which party commits them.

By AFP April 6, 2026 Thirty-three people were also wounded as gunmen raided village and seasonal cattle camp in northwest of the country. Sudanese refugees wait for their turn to get drinking water from a muddy pond in Gerbana, a village 22km (14 miles) from the Sudanese border, South Sudan [File: Diego Menjibar/EPA] An armed raid on a seasonal cattle camp and village in the northwest of South Sudan has killed least 49 people, according to local officials. The raid, which also wounded 33 people, took place early on Thursday, as gunmen attacked the Machar-Pakuek cattle camp and Mading Juer Boma in Majak Payam, Tonj North County, Warrap State, according to an official statement. The young African nation is plagued by violent cattle raids, with herders competing for scarce grazing lands and water for their livestock. “The attack was perpetuated by an armed cross-border, criminal network,” said Warrap spokesperson William Wol Mayom Bol. “We extend heartfelt condolences to the families that lost loved ones in the attack and appeal for restraint,” he added. The local government condemned the attack and called on humanitarian organisations to help respond to the “humanitarian catastrophe resulting from conflict-induced displacement”. The attack comes barely three weeks after another raid in the same area left 60 people dead and 50 wounded. Last year, President Salva Kiir declared a six-month state of emergency across South Sudan amid a surge of violent inter-communal cattle raids. Earlier this month, the head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), Anita Kiki Gbeho, expressed concerns over the cycle of communal violence in places such as Warrap. © 2026 Al Jazeera Media Network

India Must Be Held Accountable for Religious Freedom Violations Washington, DC – The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) is deeply concerned about the visit of Mohan Bhagwat, chief of India’s Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), to the United States. As USCIRF has reported in recent years, members of RSS subgroups have perpetrated violent attacks against religious minorities, including Christians, Dalits, Muslims, and Sikhs. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has enforced policies that closely align with the RSS’ Hindutva ideology, inherently discriminating against religious minority communities. The government has also engaged in acts of transnational repression to target religious minorities beyond its borders, including assassination and assassination attempts on members of Sikh communities in North America. “Religious freedom conditions in India continue to deteriorate as violence and incitement are frequently used to target religious minority communities,” said Chair Asif Mahmood. “We urge the U.S. government to consider targeted sanctions against RSS members and Indian officials complicit in religious freedom violations, including revoking the visa issued to Mohan Bhagwat and making him ineligible for future entry into the United States.” Under the BJP-led government, Indian authorities have failed to prevent, investigate, or punish egregious mob violence against Muslims and Christians. Such vigilante violence is often predicated on enforcing the Indian government’s strict anti-conversion laws predominately targeting Christians and other religious minorities. Authorities have also forcefully expelled Muslim citizens in Assam under the National Register of Citizens (NRC) and Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). Space for civil society has additionally diminished under the ruling BJP government, with pending amendments to the Financial Contributions Regulation Act (FCRA) threatening the ability of faith-based organizations to continue their operations in the country. “The U.S. government has an opportunity to hold India accountable and signal that the United States stands for religious freedom for the people of India,” said Vice Chair Cece Heil. “Without this accountability, religious freedom will only deteriorate further, as vigilante mobs continue to attack religious minorities and their houses of worship under the guise of enforcing anti-conversion laws and other harmful policies.” In its 2026 Annual Report, USCIRF recommended that the U.S. Department of State designate India as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious religious freedom violations. USCIRF highlighted India’s religious freedom conditions during its hearing on Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions in India in May 2026. ### The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) is an independent, bipartisan federal government entity established by the U.S. Congress to monitor, analyze and report on religious freedom abroad. USCIRF makes foreign policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State and Congress intended to deter religious persecution and promote freedom of religion or belief. To interview a Commissioner, please contact USCIRF at media@USCIRF.gov. Statement by USCIRF can be found here.

By Tom Bateman , State department correspondent and Helen Livingstone August 25, 2026 US President Donald Trump welcomed his Syrian counterpart Ahmed al-Sharaa to the White House last year (Source: AP) The US has removed Syria from its list of state sponsors of terrorism after 47 years, lifting what it said was the "final major barriers" for private sector investment in the country and its reintegration into the global economy. US Secretary Of State Marco Rubio said the move was in recognition of the Syrian government's positive actions to fully distance itself from acts of international terrorism. The Trump administration has embraced Syria's new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former militant who once had an American bounty on his head as the leader of an al-Qaeda off-shoot. His Islamist group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), was also removed from the US list of global terrorist organisations. HTS, formerly known as al-Nusra Front, was al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria until Sharaa severed ties with the jihadist network in 2016. In late 2024, HTS led the rebel offensive that overthrew former president Bashar al-Assad and it dominates Sharaa's transitional administration. The US hopes to bring Syria into its orbit rather than that of Russia or China. But the risks remain significant, with Syria still far from secure and lacking representative government. It is also at the centre of growing tensions between its neighbours Israel and Turkey. Rubio said Monday's move, which had been initially flagged in July, would give the Syrians "a path to prosperity". US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said: "Today's action will help foster additional investment in Syria to promote political and economic stability." Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani greeted the news as a "historic step", according to state-run news agency SANA. "We will continue working to remove the effects of isolation and create an environment based on transparency, mutual interests and respect," he said. Last year, the US also revoked the designation of HTS as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation and removed Sharaa from its list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Syria's removal from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism - where it had been since 1979 - leaves just three remaining: Cuba, North Korea and Iran. The listing carries financial sanctions, restrictions on US foreign aid and defence exports and sales and can also penalise people and other countries that trade with the sanctioned state. © 2026 All rights reserved., BBC

By Umar Farooq August 26, 2026 The Tohono O’odham people have sued the US government to stop construction of a border wall through their reservation. The Tohono O'odham Nation, an Indigenous tribe along the US-Mexico border, has warned that construction along the border could harm sacred sites and natural resources [File: Jose Luis Gonzalez/Reuters] An Indigenous tribe located between the United States and Mexico has accused US federal agents and construction workers of illegally trespassing on its land to begin work on a controversial border wall in the state of Arizona. In a statement released on Tuesday, the Tohono O’odham Nation said “approximately 20 masked, armed Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents” accompanied construction workers to three locations before dawn. The statement added that CBP prevented tribal police from issuing trespassing citations to the contractors. CBP had cordoned off the area with a “vehicle blockade” and deployed a special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team to protect the contractors, according to Tohono O’odham authorities. Mexican police had also been deployed to keep watch, the statement said, also noting the presence of a “tethered balloon” for surveillance purposes. “At this time, interactions between [Tohono O’odham police] and federal law enforcement have been peaceful and professional,” the statement said. “We will continue to monitor the situation.” The early-morning activity is the latest chapter in a years-long fight between the Tohono O’odham and the administration of US President Donald Trump, which has pushed to build a border wall through the tribal nation’s land. The conflict stretches back to Trump’s first term in office, from 2017 to 2021, when he proposed a border-spanning barrier to deter irregular migration into the US. But many Indigenous groups, including the Tohono O’odham, opposed the construction, which threatened to bulldoze sensitive habitats, sacred sites and other parts of tribal land. A federally recognised tribe of around 37,000 members, the Tohono O’odham Nation sits along roughly 100km (62 miles) of the US-Mexico border. Its territory straddles the US state of Arizona and the Mexican state of Sonora. The tribe has members in both countries, who often cross without passports or other documentation beyond their tribal identification cards. Under US law, federally recognised tribes are considered “domestic dependent nations”. They exercise sovereignty over their own land and are not subject to state-level laws. But their relationship to the US government is particularly fraught. The degree to which federal authorities can impose their will on tribal nations has long been the subject of heated legal battles. The border wall has been at the centre of some of those fights. In June, the Tohono O’odham legislature voted unanimously to file a lawsuit against the Trump administration over efforts to appropriate tribal land for the barrier. The nation argued that it had cooperated closely with federal authorities to stop irregular border crossings and drug smuggling, spending millions of dollars on the effort. It claims that cross-border detentions have dropped by more than 95 percent as a result of that work. Attempting to trespass on tribal land to build a border wall would be a violation of Indigenous rights, the Tohono O’odham Nation has said. It maintained it had not been asked for consent prior to construction. By pushing ahead, the Indigenous nation argued that the US Department of Homeland Security “has chosen to disregard our sovereignty, ignoring proven border security strategies and dismissing the irreversible environmental and cultural destruction that will follow”. “We have been left with no other choice,” the tribal government added. “We would prefer to use the resources that the litigation will require for services directly to Nation members. But our priority MUST always be to protect our people, our culture, and to stand up for what is right.” On August 14, however, US District Judge Richard Leon declined to issue a preliminary injunction to stop the border wall’s construction on Tohono O’odham land. Tuesday morning’s construction activity appears to be a result of that decision. The Trump administration has argued the land along the border does not belong to the tribe. Instead, it has pointed to a 1907 proclamation declaring the area roughly 18 metres (60 feet) around the border as federal land for security purposes. In 2023, however, a report from the Government Accountability Office, a US federal watchdog agency, found that the border wall effort had caused harm to Indigenous land, including by “blasting at a tribal burial site and altering water flows”. In recent months, the Tohono O’odham tribe has put up large signs warning against trespassing on its reservation. © 2026 All rights reserved., Al Jazeera

An analysis shared by Pansak Vinyaratn says the return of about 900,000 Cambodian workers exposes the two economies’ deep dependence. Veteran Thai policy adviser Pansak Vinyaratn Thailand and Cambodia are paying a mounting economic and humanitarian price for their border conflict, with the mass return of Cambodian workers exposing how deeply the two neighbouring economies depend on each other, according to a third-party analysis shared by veteran Thai policy adviser Pansak Vinyaratn. The commentary argues that the departure of about 900,000 Cambodian workers has delivered a shock on both sides of the border. Cambodia has lost remittance income and must absorb a large returning workforce, while Thai farms, factories and other labour-dependent businesses face worker shortages. Entitled “The Billion-Dollar Border: Five Surprising Truths About the Thailand-Cambodia Conflict”, the analysis was posted on Pansak’s personal Facebook account. Pansak chaired former prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s policy advisory board and previously served as an economic policy adviser to former premier Thaksin Shinawatra from 2001 to 2006. In a personal preface, Pansak wrote that he was nearing the end of his life’s journey and wanted to present a third-party perspective on the conflict. The post did not identify the author of the analysis or provide detailed methodology for every estimate it cited. The commentary traces the present crisis to the unresolved demarcation of the countries’ border and a disputed map drawn in 1907 under French colonial rule. It argues that a century-old territorial dispute has developed into a modern economic, diplomatic and humanitarian emergency. Thailand and Cambodia signed an immediate ceasefire on December 27, 2025, at the Ban Pak Kard-Prum border crossing between Chanthaburi and Pailin provinces. The agreement froze troop movements, prohibited further attacks and assigned a monitoring role to the ASEAN Observer Team. Worker exodus reveals mutual dependence Thailand accounted for about 93% of Cambodia’s outward labour migration before the fighting intensified, hosting approximately 1.2 million Cambodian workers across agriculture, construction, manufacturing and other industries. Cambodian immigration figures cited in regional reporting showed that 786,899 people returned through the Poipet crossing between July 24 and August 31, 2025. A subsequent UN-backed assessment said around 900,000 Cambodian migrant workers had returned from Thailand by late September. The analysis describes the movement as an economic double-edged sword. For Cambodia, the loss of wages earned in Thailand has reduced remittance income supporting households and domestic consumption. The commentary put Cambodian workers’ remittances at US$2.8 billion in 2024, equivalent to 6.1% of GDP. An assessment by the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office used a lower estimate of about US$2 billion, or 5.6% of GDP, but reached a similar conclusion about the risk. Under its worst-case scenario, a 37.5% fall in remittances could reduce Cambodian economic growth by more than 0.3 percentage points. Thailand does not depend on those remittance flows, but the analysis says it has been left with a “production vacuum” in sectors that had relied heavily on Cambodian labour. An ageing domestic population cannot immediately replace the departing workers, it argues. The labour shortage prompted Thailand to authorise the recruitment of 10,000 Sri Lankan workers in August 2025, while officials also considered workers from Nepal, Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines. Border closure adds a regional logistics bill The commentary argues that the conflict has imposed a hidden “logistics tax” on Southeast Asia. With many border crossings closed and traditional trade routes disrupted by fighting, some freight has had to be redirected through Laos and Vietnam. The analysis estimated that the longer routes had raised logistics costs by between 25% and 40%. It said the higher costs were feeding through to consumer prices and threatening cross-border gas projects valued at trillions of baht, with potential implications for regional energy security. The analysis also presented a tariff-risk scenario in which continued regional instability could expose exports to US tariffs of 25-30%, potentially causing a further 201.9 billion baht in losses. Those figures were presented as scenarios rather than confirmed outcomes, and the Facebook post did not provide the underlying calculations or identify the gas projects concerned. The broader argument is that even geographically limited border fighting can weaken trade corridors, interrupt production networks and reduce the attractiveness of both countries within global supply chains. Uneven resilience tests both economies The analysis portrays the confrontation as highly unequal on paper. It says Thailand’s economy is more than 10 times larger than Cambodia’s and compares Thailand’s US$5.7 billion defence budget with Cambodia’s US$739 million allocation. Cambodia might therefore have been expected to suffer economic exhaustion first, it says, but the events of 2025 and 2026 have produced a more complicated outcome. The commentary argues that Thailand entered the crisis with significant domestic vulnerabilities, including high household debt and political instability. It cited the change of prime minister following the leaked telephone-call controversy as an additional constraint on the country’s response. Two Thai macroeconomic figures in the commentary require qualification. It described household debt as equivalent to 170% of GDP, but SCB Economic Intelligence Centre reported a household debt-to-GDP ratio of 85.9% in the first quarter of 2026. Although still high, that is approximately half the ratio stated in the post. The analysis also attributed to the University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce a forecast that Thailand’s economy would contract by 0.74% in 2026, with export losses of 66.6 billion baht. The Bank of Thailand’s baseline forecast published on June 24 instead projected economic growth of 2.3% for 2026. The Facebook post did not explain whether the 0.74% figure represented a specific conflict-impact scenario rather than a forecast for the economy as a whole. For Cambodia, the commentary links greater-than-expected resilience to stronger ties with China and a diversification of economic partners. It says Cambodia accelerated its military modernisation with Chinese support after the United States suspended military financial assistance in 2023, including through the expansion of the disputed Ream Naval Base. The analysis also cited US$5.1 billion in Chinese foreign direct investment in Cambodia during 2025 and export growth of 17.7%, arguing that these inflows and new trading relationships helped soften the impact of the confrontation. Humanitarian costs keep diplomacy fragile The economic disruption has been accompanied by two major waves of fighting and displacement. Five days of clashes in July 2025, involving air strikes, artillery and rocket fire, killed at least 43 people and displaced about 300,000 on both sides of the border. Fighting resumed in December and continued for 20 days. At least 101 people were killed and more than half a million were displaced before the December 27 ceasefire took effect. A UN socio-economic assessment recorded a peak of 644,589 displaced people in Cambodia between December 25 and 27, including more than 200,000 children. World Vision reported that 20,923 people remained unable to return home as of July 8, 2026, because of damage and continuing disputes over villages and residential areas. The Cambodian government had constructed more than 4,000 temporary shelters, while World Vision had mobilised US$1.8 million to assist families across five provinces. The analysis characterises the ceasefire as a pause driven by exhaustion rather than a final settlement. It argues that the disputed boundary remains the underlying driver of the confrontation, regardless of the economic damage suffered by both countries. The December joint statement called for the Thailand-Cambodia Joint Boundary Commission to resume survey and demarcation work, but the commentary says the unresolved 1907 map dispute continues to cast a shadow over bilateral relations. It contrasts the use of modern aircraft, rockets and other 21st-century military technology with a boundary document drawn before television was invented. Pansak concluded: “The Thailand-Cambodia crisis shows that ‘sovereignty’ carries a very real price tag. When two countries choose a line on a map over billions of dollars in trade ties, the true cost is paid by workers, families and consumers caught in the crossfire of history.” © 2026 All rights reserved., The Nation

With elections set for January, President Tinubu seeks to clamp down on kidnapping trend in northern Nigeria. An estimated 600 worshippers were kidnapped at a mosque in northern Nigeria last week. File Photo: Sunday Alamba/AP. By Al Jazeera Staff and Reuters Nigeria has launched a hunt for hundreds of people kidnapped from mosques in the north of the country. The military and other security services began the operation on Wednesday after President Bola Tinubu ordered a major rescue mission to find an estimated 600 worshippers who were abducted from an area around Dekera village in north-central Niger State last week. “I have directed the Armed Forces, the Nigeria Police Force, the Department of State Services, and all relevant security and intelligence agencies to launch a coordinated rescue operation immediately for the victims of the recent mass abduction in Niger State,” the Nigerian president wrote on social media late on Tuesday. Mass kidnappings for ransom have been on the rise in northern Nigeria since the start of the year. The issue has become politically sensitive before a presidential election in January with security likely to be a major campaign issue. On Sunday, kidnappers released a video of what appears to be a large group of people being held captive by armed men in a forested area. In the footage posted on Facebook and WhatsApp and circulating widely, children can be heard crying. A gunman can be heard speaking in the Hausa language directly to families of the captives, telling them to identify their relatives. News agencies could not verify the exact date or location where the video was filmed, but no version of the video has been found posted before Sunday. An official from the district where Friday’s attacks happened, told the Reuters news agency that 30 people were killed and they were buried on Sunday. Amnesty International urged Nigerian authorities to secure the release of the worshippers, warning of the growing threat posed by mass abductions in northern Nigeria. In its first public statement on the incident, the Nigerian presidency condemned the “cowardly attack on defenceless Nigerians” and pledged that those responsible would be brought to justice. “You are not alone,” Tinubu wrote, addressing the families of those killed and kidnapped. “The entire nation shares your anguish. We will not rest until your sons, daughters, mothers and fathers are brought back safely to you.” Abubakar Umar, head of the Dekera community, told Reuters that at least 2,000 people fled into neighbouring Benin after the ⁠attacks. Northwest Nigeria has long been a transit zone for arms and gunmen crossing through West Africa. Alongside neighbouring Niger, Chad and Benin, the area is increasingly the site of Boko Haram and ISIL (ISIS) attacks. Kabir Adamu, an Abuja-based security expert, told Reuters it was not possible to say who was responsible for the mass abductions but he expected the gunmen who released the video to reach out and demand a ransom. The kidnapping, ⁠which took place in broad daylight, showed how ineffective security operations in Nigeria have been, he said. However, “terror will not cow Nigeria,” the Nigerian president insisted. “We will defend our people, protect our communities, and uphold the sanctity of human life,” Tinubu said, noting he had directed the country’s security chiefs to give him regular briefings on the rescue operation’s progress “until all those abducted are accounted for”.

Without accompanying reforms, the risk is that President Tinubu’s plan only makes Nigeria’s army bigger but not better. Nigerian soldiers from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) run while singing during training, at the MNJTF military base, Sector 3 Headquarters, in Monguno, Borno state, Nigeria, on 5 July 2025. File Photo: JORIS BOLOMEY/AFP via Getty Images. By Matthew Page In July, President Bola Tinubu announced a major expansion of the Nigerian Army, adding four new divisions to its existing eight. Rather than framing it as a long-planned response to Nigeria’s many worsening security challenges, Tinubu indicated that the announcement was a direct response to a mass school kidnapping in his home region, the latest in a series of such attacks. Regardless, the groundbreaking decision has the potential to make Nigeria more secure. The expansion plan involves recruiting 28,000 soldiers and creating several new brigades and battalions in conflict-prone areas. Some of the troops will be trained at two new facilities built to expand the army’s recruitment capacity – and training has already begun. Tinubu also approved a huge pay increase (from 30 to 80 per cent, depending on rank) for military personnel, as real wages have dwindled due to high inflation. While undoubtedly historic, Tinubu’s announcement begs some important questions. How tangible and transformative is this expansion, and how will it be paid for? Can the deployment of more soldiers translate into long-term security gains without fundamental security sector reform? And what opportunities does this expansion create for the Nigeria’s security assistance partners, such as the UK and the US? Does size matter? Before answering these questions, it should be said that this expansion is long overdue. Nigeria has a population of roughly 240 million and is set to overtake the US as the world’s third most populous country by 2043. Meanwhile, the Nigerian Army only has approximately 100,000 active personnel according to recent estimates. Its vast and growing population requires a larger military. Nigeria also needs more military capacity to address its many complex security challenges – insurgency, banditry, kidnapping and communal conflict, for example – that have proliferated in recent years, destabilizing parts of the country that were once considered safe. Stationing more soldiers outside of their traditional garrisons, especially in rural areas, would help protect vulnerable civilian targets and make it easier for the army to locate and eliminate remote safe havens used by bandit gangs and insurgent groups. Meanwhile, a greater military presence along Nigeria’s porous borders could improve operational coordination and intelligence sharing with army units in neighboring Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. This could help offset the decline in regional security cooperation that followed the 2025 withdrawal of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). That said, Tinubu’s expansion plan does not address many of the army’s institutional challenges; a list that includes lacklustre leadership, poor operational planning, inadequate training, equipment shortfalls, endemic corruption and a dire human rights record. This suggests that Nigeria’s reform-resistant army could experience a sort of ‘operational stagflation’: becoming bigger but not better. Stagflation has already affected Nigeria’s defence budget, which – although appearing to have skyrocketed in recent years – has in fact grown only modestly in dollar terms, rising from $3.9 billion in 2021 to $4.7 billion in 2026. Moreover, the overall share of the national budget spent on defence actually decreased from 21 to 11 per cent during the same timeframe due to Nigeria’s rising debt burden and the steady devaluation of its currency, the naira. To pay for more soldiers and higher military salaries, President Tinubu will need to increase the defence budget, which may force cuts to infrastructure, health and education spending. It also remains to be seen whether the creation of new divisions, brigades and battalions will increase the army’s operational capacity, or just make it even more top heavy. Already known for its woeful tooth-to-tail ratio – ‘teeth’ meaning the combat troops and ‘tail’ the support personnel – the Nigerian Army has far too many general officers for a force its size. According to one estimate, 30 per cent of all Nigerian military officers achieve general/flag officer rank, compared to no more than 3 per cent in many other countries. Until this dynamic changes, a disproportionate number of Nigerian soldiers will end up serving as orderlies, rather than patrolling communities to protect civilians. How to ensure bigger also means better Having taken the bold decision to increase the size of the country’s military, Nigeria’s leaders should look to maximize the impact of that investment by embracing key reforms. Tinubu could, for example, take steps to consolidate Nigeria’s sprawling security apparatus which now consists of an alphabet soup of security agencies that perform poorly and compete more than they cooperate. But in a country where politicians have long relied on agency-creation to build out their patronage networks, such bureaucratic streamlining will require sustained high-level impetus. Security sector consolidation would also alleviate pressure on the army if it freed up human and budget resources for Nigeria’s struggling police. This investment will be especially critical as Nigeria prepares to pass a constitutional amendment to allow states to create their own police forces. If trained and resourced effectively, state forces could work with the federal police to relieve the army of routine internal security duties, freeing troops up to tackle some of Nigeria’s toughest security challenges. Any domestic security sector reform effort, however modest, would also give Nigeria’s security assistance partners a clear opportunity to re-engage in ways that play to their strengths: planning and technical assistance, leadership training and education, and facilitating interagency cooperation and intelligence sharing. As partners like Britain and the US engage with Nigeria’s newly expanded army, they should stress to Nigeria’s leaders that security sector reform is the best way to ensure that bigger also means better.

By: Genocide Watch A protest in Tajikistan's capital Dushanbe before the country's civil war. (Source: RFE/RL) Located in Central Asia, Tajikistan continues to navigate the aftermath of Civil War (1992-1997), which resulted in the loss and displacement of thousands of civilians. The Civil War’s widespread devastation, along with other internal issues (poverty, economic stagnation, internal division, and longstanding corruption), continues to plague the State today—particularly among its leadership. Political figures such as President Emomali Rahmon use the Civil War to promote peace, unity, and harmony among the people. Unfortunately, such messages can have more sinister motives, especially in a State known for its corruption and violations of free speech, press, and assembly. This is the case in the Gorno-Badakhshan region of the Pamir Mountains in Eastern Tajikistan, home to ethnic Pamiris. On numerous occasions, Tajikistan government has accused local leaders of seeking to break away from the State. Fears of secession have triggered the use of intense force and restrictions on rights to speech, assembly, and press. This article will examine how the Tajik Government weaponizes narratives of the Civil War to legitimize its power and justify restrictions on human rights. You can read the full article here:

In this final part of our Ten Stages of Genocide in India Series, we explain how Denial enables and continues genocidal processes in India. Ahmadabad, India, on February 28, 2002. (Manish Swarup/AP) Denial is a continuation of genocide because it continues the erasure of a group’s culture and denies survivors accountability, mourning, and closure for murders of their relatives. It continues the intentional destruction of a group. Denial is the stage that starts from the beginning and lasts throughout the genocidal process. Denial always accompanies and follows every genocide. Perpetrators deny the existence of discriminatory laws, targeted attacks, hate crimes, and genocidal massacres. They conceal evidence, intimidate witnesses, and publicly deny that any crimes were committed. They blame victim groups for the persecution and murders of their members. Genocide is justified as counterinsurgency or anti-terrorism. It is portrayed as necessary to protect the country's national security. In India, judicial manifestations of denial include refusal to prosecute murders of Muslims and acquittals of Hindus who lynch Muslims. The rhetoric of denialism is used by BJP-led state governments to frame exclusionary discrimination and persecution of Muslims. Genocidal attacks are justified as self-defense by Hindus. The 2013 Muzaffarnagar “communal riots” killed 52 people, mostly Muslims, and forcibly displaced over 50,000 people. Uttar Pradesh’s BJP Chief Minister, Yogi Adityanath, a virulent Hindutva nationalist, withdrew prosecutions of more than 100 criminal cases against Hindu perpetrators of the riots. In 2023, 69 Hindus were acquitted of the murder of 11 Muslims during the 2002 Gujarat riots in which over two thousand Muslims were murdered. These non-prosecutions and acquittals reflect official denial and create an expectation of impunity for murders of Muslims. BJP state governments portray their Muslim citizens as criminals to justify violence against them. A 2026 report by three independent human rights experts, published by the Transnational Legal Clinic at King’s College London, highlights how evictions in BJP-ruled Assam have exclusively targeted Muslim communities. Muslims are labelled as “illegal encroachers” even though many Muslims in Assam are Indian citizens born and raised in Assam. By portraying Muslims as criminals (a tactic of Stage 4, Dehumanization) the BJP justifies violence against Muslims as necessary to protect the state from "infiltrators" and “terrorists.” In August 2023, communal riots in Haryana's Nuh district killed six people. Following the clashes, the state government demolished 1200 Muslim homes and businesses. The BJP governments of Punjab and Haryana claimed the demolitions were justified because of “illegal encroachments on government land.” State officials denied any form of discriminatory and genocidal intent. A woman walks amid the remains of her son's demolished shop in Nuh, Haryana [File: Md Meharban/Al Jazeera] The Punjab and Haryana High Court rejected these denials. It said the demolitions may be characterized as “ethnic cleansing”. Muslim houses and businesses were selectively targeted, and no prior notice was given to the owners of demolished structures. The Punjab and Haryana High Court ruled that the demolitions were carried out “without following the procedure established by law.” Despite the striking presence of early warning signs of every stage in the genocidal process in India, as illustrated in this series, the Modi government has denied any attacks against Indian Muslims. In June 2023, during Modi's visit to the U.S., he held a news conference with U.S. President Joe Biden. [It should be noted that in his entire time in office, Modi has not held an open press conference in India.] In the U.S. press conference, Modi was asked, “What would you do to improve the rights of Muslims in India?”. Modi, responded, “When I say deliver, regardless of caste, creed, religion, gender – there is absolutely no space for any discrimination [in my government],” suggesting that Muslims in the country do not face discrimination.In the months leading up to Modi's visit to the U.S., there were numerous cases of mob lynching, cow vigilantism, and attacks based on the anti-Muslim conspiracy theory and hate speech of “Love Jihad.” The process of Denial in India is also manifest as “triumphalism,” actual celebration of acts of genocide. On 22nd January 2024, a temple for the Hindu deity Lord Ram was consecrated on the site where the Babri Masjid mosque was demolished by Hindu mobs in 1992. The religious ceremony was presided over by PM Narendra Modi. He claimed that the event was “not just a date on the calendar” but “the dawn of a new era”. The demolition of the Babri Mosque in 1992 was followed by nationwide riots that resulted in the death of more than 2000 people, mostly Muslims. The Ram temple’s extravagant celebrations show how the deaths of thousands of Muslim citizens are not just overlooked but instead are celebrated as a victory for Hindus. Genocide Watch recognizes these events and the justifications for them as signs of the genocidal process of Denial. Genocide Watch recommends: A fact-finding commission should be appointed by an independent organization such as the International Commission of Jurists or the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal to review the facts about the 2002 Gujarat massacres and subsequent attacks on Muslims to determine whether then Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi was complicit in perpetration of the Gujarat massacres and Hindutva policies since then. The Delhi government, the North East Delhi Riots Claims Commission (NEDRCC), and Sub-Divisional Magistrates (SDMs) must compensate all survivors of the 2020 Delhi pogrom for property loss, medical costs, and livelihood destruction. The Indian government must immediately halt eviction and deportation drives that target Muslim communities in BJP-ruled states such as Assam. Political leaders who disseminate hate speech and incite violence against Muslims should be arrested and prosecuted. Political leaders who planned and carried out demolition drives against Muslims in Nuh and elsewhere must be prosecuted and held criminally liable to the people whose homes and businesses they destroyed. The U.S and EU must hold the Indian government accountable for its attacks on Muslims. They should raise India’s deteriorating human rights record during Prime Minister Modi’s foreign visits, and in diplomatic discussions such as the EU-India Human Rights Dialogue. Genocide is not a sudden event. It is a process. Through this series, we have illustrated how the Ten Stages of Genocide are unfolding in India. However, genocide is not inevitable in India. Indian citizens must take electoral and legal action to stop the genocidal process in India. If the Modi government and Hindutva movement are not stopped, India will plunge from its status as the world’s largest democracy into the abyss of religious bigotry and political autocracy. Read Part One of the series here : The Ten Stages of Genocide in India - Classification Read Part Two of the series here : The Ten Stages of Genocide in India - Symbolization Read Part Three of the series here : The Ten Stages of Genocide in India - Discrimination Read Part Four of the series here : The Ten Stages of Genocide in India - Dehumanization Read Part Five of the series here: The Ten Stages of Genocide in India - Organization Read Part Six of the series here: The Ten Stages of Genocide in India - Polarization Read Part Seven of the series here: The Ten Stages of Genocide in India - Preparation Read Part Eight of the series here: The Ten Stages of Genocide in India - Persecution Read Part Nine of the series here: The Ten Stages of Genocide in India - Extermination Read Part Ten of the series here: The Ten Stages of Genocide in India - Denial