Cambodia Supreme Court The International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) condemns the decision of the Supreme Court of Cambodia to uphold the 14-year prison sentences imposed on journalists Phorn Sopheap and Pheap Pheara, despite accepting an amicus curiae brief submitted by the IBAHRI setting out Cambodia’s obligations under international human rights law. The criminalisation of journalists via the imposition of lengthy custodial sentences for legitimate reporting is a grave and disproportionate interference with the rights protected by Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), by which Cambodia is bound. IBAHRI calls for legal and policy reform Following the judgment in this case, the IBAHRI urges Cambodian authorities to: grant Phorn Sopheap and Pheap Pheara a royal pardon; urgently review the convictions and sentences in light of Cambodia’s obligations under the ICCPR, including Articles 14 and 19; cease the use of the Criminal Code and national security allegations to prosecute journalists engaged in legitimate public-interest reporting, unless the authorities can demonstrate, by clear and specific evidence, a direct and immediate connection between the publication and a legitimate national security harm; review and amend/remove legislation that unduly restricts freedom of expression; and ensure that journalists can carry out their work free from censorship, intimidation and arbitrary criminal prosecution. Acceptance of IBAHRI amicus curiae brief establishes an important precedent The Supreme Court’s acceptance of the IBAHRI’s amicus curiae brief represents an important procedural development. The IBAHRI filed its amicus curiae brief on 17 June 2026 ahead of the appeal hearing, urging the Court to apply regional and international standards governing freedom of expression, media freedom and the use of criminal sanctions against journalists. There is currently no established procedure governing amicus curiae interventions before the Cambodian Supreme Court. By accepting the submission – following prior practice before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea – the Supreme Court has established a valuable precedent that may enable future third-party legal interventions in cases raising significant human rights and rule of law issues. International law requires strict safeguards for restrictions on journalism In its amicus curiae, the IBAHRI reminded the Court that Cambodia is bound by international human rights law protecting freedom of expression, including under Article 19 of the ICCPR. Article 19 protects not only the right to impart information, but also the public’s right to seek and receive it. Any restriction on that right must be clearly prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary and proportionate. Where national security is invoked, the authorities must demonstrate, by clear and specific evidence, a direct connection between the expression in question and a real threat to a legitimate national security interest. Generalised assertions of risk are insufficient. The judgment also raises serious questions under Article 14 of the ICCPR, including whether the courts subjected the national security justification to rigorous scrutiny, gave adequate reasons for rejecting the international standards placed before them and ensured that the conviction and sentence were compatible with the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. Crucially, criminal sanctions should only be used against journalists in exceptional circumstances. In this case, where there was no demonstrated malintent, no identified concrete harm arising from the publication, nor incitement to violence, a criminal 14-year custodial sentence constitutes disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of expression. Judgment raises wider concerns for media freedom The judgment comes against a backdrop of continued deterioration in Cambodia’s media freedom environment. According to the Reporters Without Borders (RSF) World Press Freedom Index, Cambodia now ranks 151st out of 180 countries and territories globally for press freedom (with 180 indicating the lowest level of press freedom). Authoritative reports reveal that news outlets and independent journalists in the country face frequent threats and intimidation for the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. Censorship and restricted access to information are also widespread, alongside repeated use of the Cambodian Criminal Code to prosecute journalists. Why this matters The case of the journalists Phorn Sopheap and Pheap Pheara is likely to become an important reference point for the future application of national security legislation against journalists in Cambodia and illustrates the continuing tension between domestic criminal law and the country’s international human rights obligations. Media freedom is an essential component of a free and functioning democratic society. IBAHRI is deeply concerned that the restrictions on media freedom in Cambodia do not align with international human rights law and will have broader repercussions on civic space in the country. Mark Stephens CBE, IBAHRI Co-Chair, commented: ‘This case represents a profound miscarriage of justice. Journalists performing their essential public watchdog role should not face fourteen years’ imprisonment for reporting on matters of public interest. Cambodian citizens have a right to be informed. That right cannot be meaningful in an environment where journalists face repeated attacks, criminalisation and restrictions on their work. The decision of the Supreme Court will deter independent reporting, chill public-interest journalism and undermine the public’s right to receive information.’ Hina Jilani, IBAHRI Co-Chair, commented: ‘International human rights law sets an exceptionally high threshold for restricting freedom of expression on national security grounds. In the absence of evidence demonstrating a specific threat, or of incitement to violence or hatred, criminal sanctions of this severity cannot be regarded as strictly necessary or proportionate. The judgment is inconsistent with Cambodia's international human rights obligations and undoubtedly will result in a chilling effect on media freedom in Cambodia.’ Baroness Helena Kennedy LT KC, the IBAHRI’s Director, commented: ‘The Supreme Court of Cambodia had an important opportunity to reinforce the rule of law by aligning its approach with Cambodia’s binding international human rights commitments. While the Court’s acceptance of the IBAHRI’s amicus curiae brief is a welcome procedural development that may strengthen future human rights litigation, its decision to uphold 14-year custodial sentences is a significant setback for freedom of expression and judicial protection of fundamental rights. Independent journalism is indispensable to democratic society, and courts play a vital role in ensuring that criminal law is not used to suppress legitimate reporting.’ The Supreme Court judgment preceded the first official visit by the United Nations appointed Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, Tom Andrews, from 20–31 July 2026, during which freedom of expression was among the issues examined. The IBAHRI urges the Special Rapporteur to scrutinise this judgment and its surrounding circumstances in his forthcoming report, including whether the convictions, sentences and judicial reasoning comply with Cambodia’s obligations under the ICCPR, particularly Articles 14 and 19. The IBAHRI further calls for the case to be raised in the follow-up to Cambodia’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and in the next UPR cycle, including by the rapporteurs/troika and Member States, as an emblematic test of Cambodia’s compliance with international norms on freedom of expression, fair trial rights, legality, necessity and proportionality. ENDS Contact: IBAHRI@int-bar.org International Bar Association 2026 ©

By Sophia Khan and Kristie Moore Protests in Karakalpakstan in 2022. Peaceful protestors had only flags in their hands, but were met with violence (Source: RFE/RL) Central Asia has seen conflict break out frequently, in the form of interethnic violence within divided communities, border conflict over disputed territory, and skirmishes over shared resources. However, in the post-independence period, authoritarian governments and leaders have protected their own interests by using force against local populations. This research report will look at the history of political violence in Central Asia, considering both its rise and the implications of injustice on civilians today. It will focus on three instances of political violence: Kazakhstan’s “Bloody January," crackdowns on Protests in the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan, and violent Suppression of the Pamiri Minority Community in Tajikistan. It will argue that increased accountability is necessary, both to prevent future violence but also as a means of establishing the importance of rule of law and human rights compliance in Central Asia. Read the full report here:

By Vladimir Kovtun, Alexander Smith, Kristie Moore, and Flora Tu Ultra-nationalists carry flags and banners as they take part in the so-called 'Russian March' in Moscow / Source: Al Jazeera Neo-Nazism has been present in Russian society for decades, emerging in the wake of significant political upheaval and societal change. It has intensified with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While the Russian government has, at times, prosecuted extremist organizations, it has also tolerated and even cooperated with them to achieve political goals, repress opposition, and meet military objectives through its strategy of managed nationalism. This report will trace the history of neo-Nazism in modern Russia, examine its recent rise, and consider the Russian government’s evolving response to extremist groups and ideologies.

By Renata Lampert Image by AP Photo/Eraldo Peres. Brazil is home to more than 200 million people, of whom 56% identify as Black or Brown. Structural racism remains a major problem in Brazil. Black people account for 82% of the deaths from police operations. Additionally, 79% of murder victims and 53.6% of victims of feminicide are also Black. Recently, the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the João Pinheiro Foundation published the Municipal Human Development Index Radar. Although Brazil has reached the “very high human development” level for the first time, significant disparities between White and Black populations remain. Black people still consistently rank one development level lower than White people, though this difference has decreased from 14% in 2012 to 9% in 2024. A similar pattern of structural violence persists among Brazil’s Indigenous peoples. According to a report by the Indigenous Missionary Council (CIMI), an intense wave of violence against the Indigenous peoples marked 2024 in Brazil, with 211 murders of Indigenous people, one of the highest figures in the last decade. The implementation of the controversial “Marco Temporal” legislation largely fueled this violence. The law severely restricts the territories Indigenous peoples can claim, denying many the possibility of claiming the lands from which the state or private actors evicted them during and before Brazil’s dictatorship. In January 2026, the Supreme Federal Court declared the law’s central provisions unconstitutional, preventing the application of the law for the time being. Other institutional barriers remain, as some 857 Indigenous lands are pending regularization. Roughly 63% of the cases have completely stalled, with no administrative progress. The 2025 U.N. Climate Change Conference (COP30) highlighted tensions surrounding Indigenous rights. Despite the largest Indigenous participation in COP history, critics saw government actions, such as issuing decrees for 10 new Indigenous territories, as diplomatic public relations rather than systemic reform, revealing the institutional prejudice that focuses on diplomatic optics over enforcing protections in practice. Structural violence along the agrarian frontier constitutes a critical context in which genocidal dynamics emerge, particularly targeting land and environmental defenders who oppose resource extraction and agro-industrial expansion. This violence becomes genocidal not only through individual homicides, but also through a systematic neutralization of leadership and enforced territorial displacement, with the aim of dismantling community leadership structures, clearing the path for environmental destruction and land appropriation without accountability. A report by the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT) indicates a dramatic escalation in the lethality of land conflicts, with killings rising from 13 in 2024 to 26 in 2025, illustrating how armed groups and land interests pursue territorial clearing through physical erasure. For the LGBTIQ+ community, President Lula’s government has reestablished national councils for LGBTIQ+ rights and integrated protective policies across ministries. Additionally, the Federal Supreme Court (STF) has reinforced protections by ruling that courts can prosecute transphobic and homophobic hate speech under Brazil’s strict anti-racism law, which means it carries severe prison sentences without bail. Despite a 34% decline in murders compared with 2024, Brazil ranked in 2025 as the deadliest country in the world for transgender individuals for the 18th consecutive year. Currently, Genocide Watch considers Brazil to show overlapping risk factors for Stage 3: Discrimination, indicative of the institutionalization of the controversial Marco Temporal legislation, which severely restricts indigenous territorial rights; Stage 7: Preparation, marked by systemic administrative freezes and delays that leave 857 Indigenous land pending regularization; and Stage 8: Persecution, characterized by a surge in agrarian-related assassinations, the return of rural massacres targeting land defenders, and persistent, lethal violence against transgender individuals and Black people. Genocide Watch recommends: Brazil should formally dismiss PEC 48/2023 and amend Law 14.701/2023 to remove the “compensation trap” which currently blocks the land demarcations. Brazil must introduce legally binding deadlines for the 857 cases on Indigenous lands pending regularization. Brazil should mandate body-worn cameras across all military police and advocate for greater police accountability. Brazil should strengthen the PPDDH with independent funding, police protection, and relocation support for threatened land and environmental defenders.

Posted Monday, 3 Aug 2026 by Tone Sommerfelt Political crisis in Gambia. File Photo: Getty Images/Anadolu In January 2017, the streets of Banjul, the tiny capital of The Gambia, fell silent. Shops shuttered. Families packed bags. Tens of thousands of people streamed across the border into Senegal – not because war had broken out, but because a deadline was approaching. January 19 was the date on which President Yahya Jammeh’s mandate legally expired. The regional body ECOWAS had set it as the moment of reckoning: step down or face military intervention. As the clock ticked down, ordinary people made extraordinary calculations about where to be, and whether to move. They were not reacting to violence. They were anticipating it. In new research published in Population, Space and Place, anthropological colleague Simon Turner and I examine what happens to residents when political deadlines approach, that is, when a named date on the calendar becomes a threshold between safety and danger. Drawing on fieldwork in The Gambia, Burundi and Rwanda, we argue that displacement is often not a reaction to violence but an anticipation of it, shaped by the pressure of an approaching threshold. We call the mechanism at the heart of this process a “politically structured deadline.” Two kinds of deadline Not all politically structured deadlines are alike. Some are endogenous and derive their authority from within a legal or constitutional order. A presidential term limit is the clearest example: a date named in the constitution by which power must change hands. When Burundian President Nkurunziza announced he would seek a third term in 2015, in apparent violation of constitutional limits, the approaching convention date became a trigger. People began reading the city – which neighbourhoods had rebel paths from the 1990s, which areas were now ruled by regime loyalists – and making decisions about whether to stay or leave. Close to half a million people fled in the months that followed. Others are exogenous, i.e., deadlines imposed from outside by an external actor, backed by an explicit threat of force. The ECOWAS ultimatum to Jammeh was one such deadline. So, with devastating effect, were the evacuation orders issued by the Israeli military in Lebanon in March 2026. On March 4, the Israeli military published a social media post calling on all residents south of the Litani River to evacuate immediately. This area covers roughly eight percent of Lebanon’s territory and home to hundreds of thousands of people. The statement named the spatial threshold (the Litani River) and the temporal one (immediately), and it made clear what would happen to those who remained or moved in the wrong direction. Within days, over a million people had been displaced – one in five of Lebanon’s entire population – many of them fleeing along single roads under bombardment, many of them returning to the same makeshift shelters they had occupied just fifteen months earlier during the previous round of fighting. This is a politically structured deadline operating at catastrophic scale. The deadline as a line in the landscape The word "deadline" has a precise origin. In the Confederate prison camp at Andersonville during the American Civil War, it referred to a physical line, that is, a railed fence inside the outer wall, that prisoners could not cross without being shot. It was simultaneously a line in space and a moment in time: cross it, and consequences follow. That double quality, temporal and spatial at once, is under-analysed, yet it is what makes political deadlines so powerful. Our article shows that deadlines do not only produce displacement when they are crossed. As a named future moment, they reorganise space and movement in advance of their arrival. In The Gambia, people mapped Banjul street-by-street in the days before the deadline: those closest to the Presidential Palace left first; families calculated whether Jammeh would close the bridge before they could cross it; diaspora members in Oslo urged relatives to leave before borders shut. In Bujumbura, old maps of danger along ethnic lines re-emerged as guides for navigation. The future moment had not yet arrived, but it was already reshaping the present. Why does it matter? Humanitarian response systems are poorly calibrated for anticipatory displacement. They are built around reactive logic, mobilising after violence has occurred. But much of the most consequential movement happens before a single shot is fired, driven by the calculation of risk under conditions of radical uncertainty. Understanding the countdown, not only the explosion, is therefore essential. Across Africa, a dense calendar of elections in 2026 involves leaders who have dismantled or manipulated term limits, removing the constitutional deadlines that would have forced transitions. In Uganda, elections held in January produced a heavily disputed result for a president who removed term limits to stay in power indefinitely. When deadlines are erased rather than approached, the threat becomes diffuse rather than concentrated, but it does not disappear. The case of Lebanon shows the power of political deadlines in their starkest form: a future moment approaches a line in the landscape at high speed, named and enforced by an external actor, with explicit consequences for those who remain. The people fleeing from the south of the Litani River were not reacting to what had happened. They were acting on what the deadline told them would happen if they stayed. That distinction, between reactive and anticipatory displacement, is not merely academic. It is a matter of life and movement at great human cost, of who leaves and when, and of whether the international community can see the crisis coming before it fully arrives. Our journal article on countdowns to deadlines in Population, Space and Place engages with theoretical questions raised in the research project Future Migration as Present Fact (FUMI), yet it brings them into new territory. In the FUMI project we ask how thoughts and feelings about migration in the future, affect personal lives and societal development in the present, even for those whose migration aspirations never translate into transnational movement. Taking inspiration from theoretical debates on time, future and migration in the FUMI project, we twist the lens in another direction, asking how crises that have not yet occurred, affect migration and displacement in the present. The FUMI project is an ERC Consolidator Grant led by Jørgen Carling. This post draws on research published in Population, Space and Place: Sommerfelt, Tone and Turner, Simon (2026): "Countdown: Timespaces of Deadlines and Displacement."

As kush spreads across Liberia, families face the fallout while traffickers remain largely out of reach. Abraham Jackson, 26, has used kush since he was 16. He says his father abandoned him once he became addicted. File Photo: Lennart Dodoo/Al Jazeera. By Lennart Dodoo Published On 1 Aug 20261 Aug 2026 On the streets of Liberia’s capital, the signs of the kush crisis are increasingly hard to miss. Young people gather in neighbourhoods where families say addiction has pulled children away from school, their homes and their communities.Kush, a cheap and highly addictive synthetic street drug, has spread across parts of West Africa and become one of Liberia’s most urgent public concerns. First reported in neighbouring Sierra Leone, it has since spread into Liberia, where parents say they have watched young people slip into addiction and struggle to return to everyday life. For Miata Paye, the crisis is not a statistic. It is her son. Paye told Al Jazeera that her son was in the 10th grade in 2018 when he first encountered kush. Twice, she paid for rehabilitation, $80 and a 25kg (55-pound) bag of rice each time, money and food supplies her family could barely afford. She hoped each treatment would help him recover, but after both attempts he returned to the roadside. “This thing is killing our children,” she said. “My heart is bleeding.” Liberia declared drug abuse a public health emergency in 2024, but for families like Paye’s, the emergency has long been personal. Young lives disrupted Paye’s experience reflects what many families across Liberia are facing as kush spreads among young people. Some have left school and ended up living on the streets, where they are often known locally as zogos. Abraham Jackson is among them. He has smoked kush since he was 16. Now 26, he never completed 10th grade. Jackson told Al Jazeera that after his mother died, his father disowned him, leaving him without the support he depended on. Abraham Jackson, 26, far right, sits with other kush users at a drug den in Monrovia. Users are known locally as zogos [Lennart Dodoo/Al Jazeera] “Since my mother died, my father disowned me,” he said. “Nobody would pay attention to me.” His story shows how addiction can deepen poverty, family breakdown and homelessness, making recovery far harder. For families trying to help relatives recover, treatment options remain limited. Liberia’s government rehabilitation centre in Bentol City, about 30km (19 miles) from Monrovia, remains unfinished. Many families are left to seek help from private facilities, some of which doctors say operate without trained staff or proper oversight. The hidden business behind the street crisis While families grapple with the visible consequences of kush, authorities have uncovered evidence of a much larger narcotics trade operating through Liberia. Figures obtained by Al Jazeera from the Liberia Drug Enforcement Agency (LDEA) show that between September 2025 and 22 June 2026, the agency arrested 1,167 people on allegations of drug trafficking. During the same period, Liberian courts recorded only eight convictions, about one conviction for every 146 arrests. The figures suggest a criminal justice system that arrests suspected traffickers far more often than it secures convictions, raising questions about whether enforcement efforts are reaching those who organise and finance the trade or mainly those caught at the lowest levels. The scale of the trafficking networks operating through Liberia became clearer through two major cocaine seizures. On June 8, security officers at Roberts International Airport in Harbel, Margibi County, about 55km (34 miles) southeast of Monrovia, opened six cargo boxes declared as food seasoning and textiles. Inside were nearly 200 compressed blocks of cocaine weighing 237.6kg (523.8 pounds), with an estimated value of about $19.2m. Investigators believed the shipment had been prepared for export. Weeks later, security forces raided a warehouse in Duazon, Margibi County, recovering nearly four tonnes of cocaine. Police Inspector General Gregory Coleman described it as the largest cocaine seizure in Liberia’s history, estimating its value at roughly $317m. The seizures revealed a broader reality: while communities struggle with kush on the streets, international trafficking networks appear to be using Liberia as a route for much larger shipments. Traffickers adapt Authorities say the drug market has continued to evolve as traffickers adjust to enforcement pressure. According to LDEA figures obtained by Al Jazeera, kush seizures more than doubled, rising from 80.15kg (176.7 pounds) in 2025 to 166.88kg (367.9 pounds) between September 2025 and 22 June 2026. About 38 percent of those arrested were foreign nationals, mainly from Ivory Coast, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, according to the agency. The market also shifted after Liberia banned tramadol, an opioid painkiller, in August 2025. While seizures of the drug declined, tapentadol seizures rose sharply, increasing from 3.61kg (7.96 pounds) to 198.5kg (437.6 pounds). Investigators say the changes show how quickly traffickers adapt when authorities increase pressure. “Traffickers treated the emergency declaration like a weather report,” Special Agent G Orlando Demey of the LDEA told Al Jazeera. “When the president declared it, they slowed down. After the year passed, they decided to increase.” The exact contents of kush remain unclear in Liberia. Authorities know the drug is spreading, but further testing is still needed to determine the substances being mixed into it. Research from other parts of West Africa has found that kush can contain dangerous combinations of synthetic substances, making its effects unpredictable. Communities on the front line The damage has spread beyond those using the drug. Across Liberia, local leaders have become a bridge between residents and authorities, helping identify drug hotspots and support efforts to respond to the growing problem. Thomas Wesseh is one of them. He has helped authorities locate drug ghettos in his community, but the crisis has also reached his own home: His son dropped out of college after two semesters and now lives in a cemetery. Wesseh told Al Jazeera that residents who cooperate with authorities often feel vulnerable because suspected dealers return after police operations end. “The LDEA would carry out a raid, and after two days, they’re back in the community and begin to threaten us,” he said. For Wesseh, raids offer only temporary relief. The deeper problem, he said, is that communities are left exposed when suspected dealers return and threaten those who cooperated with authorities. The government has promised tougher enforcement, asset seizures, border controls and expanded rehabilitation services. But for families like Paye’s, the question is whether the response will move beyond those struggling with addiction and reach those bringing the drugs into the country. For Paye, the crisis is not only about the drugs entering Liberia. It is about the young people left behind after they arrive. “They are only after the users, not the ones bringing it in,” she said.

Activists in the region say politicians regard LGBTQ+ people as ‘the easiest scapegoats to maintain their power’. African leaders who are toughening anti-LGBTQ+ laws have been accused of ‘political opportunism’ by campaigners. File Photo: Ben Curtis /AP. By Rachel Savage A growing number of west African countries are implementing or strengthening anti-LGBTQ+ laws, amid local political pressures and a global pushback against LGBTQ+ rights. In March, Senegal doubled the maximum prison sentence for gay sex to 10 years and criminalised the “promotion” of homosexuality. Niger criminalised “sexual relations with a person of the same sex” in February, the first time same-sex intimacy had been outlawed in the country. Mali and Burkina Faso, which neighbours Niger, also criminalised same-sex relations for the first time in the last two years. All three are ruled by military juntas. In June, Ghana, which already outlaws gay sex, passed a law criminalising LGBTQ+ “activities”. The bill, which hasn’t been signed into law by the president, is the latest iteration of a bill that was first introduced in 2021. “What I see in all of them is a political opportunism,” said Anthony Oluoch of Pan Africa ILGA, a continental LGBT+ rights campaign group. In some countries, he said, the new or harsher laws had been backed by religious groups and campaigns for “family values”, while in Burkina Faso, whose population is predominantly Muslim, the law was framed as boosting its sovereignty in opposition to the west. “Underneath that all, there’s a lot of transnational reinforcement,” Oluoch added. LGBTQ+ people “are the easiest scapegoats to maintain their power”, said an activist in Burkina Faso, who could not be named for her security. The impact on the community, even before the law was implemented, has been devastating, activists said. Thirteen transgender women were detained without trial from June to November last year, a HIV worker said, with the women reporting they had been beaten by a military unit that imprisoned them. After the law was passed, there have been at least two sets of convictions. Police are entrapping LGBTQ+ people on social media and demanding they denounce other community members, said the HIV worker, who fled the country in May after he was named by someone who had been arrested. Despite military president Ibrahim Traoré’s anti-western rhetoric, Burkina Faso has also caught the eye of anti-LGBTQ+ campaigners that include conservative, western Christian groups. Ibrahim Traoré, the president of Burkina Faso, which has criminalised same-sex relations for the first time. File Photo: Stanislav Krasilnikov /AP. The African Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Family Values and Sovereignty, a forum that many argue has influenced anti-LGBTQ+ laws on the continent, will be held in Burkina Faso and then Eswatini (formerly Swaziland) next year, it was announced this year. The first three conferences were held annually in Uganda, in east Africa, beginning in 2023. Uganda imposed the death penalty for some same-sex sexual acts that year. According to US-based international reproductive rights organisation Ipas, the annual gatherings are supported by Family Watch International (FWI), an Arizona-based Christian campaign group that opposes abortion and comprehensive sex education (CSE). Also in attendance has been Dutch-founded lobby group Christian Council International, which promotes similar views. At this year’s conference, hosted by Ghana’s parliament in June, the draft African Charter on Family Sovereignty and Values treaty was drawn up. It condemns abortion and CSE, states that gender is either male or female, and asserts that parental rights supersede children’s. A draft copy was published on FWI’s website. The anti-LGBTQ+ bill passed by Ghana’s parliament is a “very effective political tool”, supported by powerful religious organisations in the country, said Amanda Odoi, a researcher at the University of Cape Coast. Nonetheless, Odoi added: “These international actors were very key in empowering, supporting, funding, financing and giving voice to the anti-LGBT campaign.” She noted the Ghana bill’s similarity to Uganda’s law, as well as its “alphabet soup” – the bill uses the acronym “LGBTTQAP+” – that includes words like “questioning” not commonly used in Ghana. Ghana has passed a law criminalising LGBTQ+ ‘activities’. File Photo: Eleventh Hour Photography/ Alamy. Bringing this year’s African parliamentary conference to Ghana was a deliberate decision due to the country’s influence on the continent, said Ebenezer Peegah, executive director of Rightify Ghana, an NGO that supports LGBTQ+ people. “Ghana has a lot of credentials that Uganda does not have … some clout that other countries in Africa do not have,” said Peegah, listing Ghana’s stable democracy, free and fair elections and relative press freedom. Across west Africa, LGBTQ+ people are suffering the consequences of the new and harsher laws. In Senegal, the law is also hindering HIV prevention for men who have sex with men and transgender women, who have higher rates of HIV prevalence, as well as lawyers representing LGBTQ+ people, said Marame Kane, a French-Senegalese activist based in Paris. About 100 Senegalese people fled to the Gambia this year, although most had to return to Senegal as they had no money, according to a Gambian HIV worker. Same-sex relations are already punishable with up to life in prison in the Gambia, while transgender women are criminalised by a cross-dressing ban. However, the HIV worker worried that the government could strengthen the laws, making HIV services even harder to provide. The crackdown in Senegal had also increased homophobia in the Gambia, he said, adding, “Gambia and Senegal share the same culture, the same religion, literally everything.”

By: Alexander Smith President Donald Trump holds the FIFA World Cup Winners Trophy as FIFA President Gianni Infantino looks on during an announcement in the Oval Office of the White House, Aug. 22, 2025, in Washington. (AP Photo/Jacquelyn Martin, File) Summary: Three North American countries hosted the 2026 World Cup: The United States (U.S.), Canada, and Mexico. Fans traveled globally to support their teams, filling stadiums seating 40,000 to 80,000 people. This quadrennial soccer tournament, with its 48 qualifying international soccer teams, engages nearly five billion people worldwide. Historically, the World Cup has showcased globalization and cultural exchange. The 2026 event was no different. In the U.S. alone, over 40% of World Cup viewers were people of color. After the 2026 World Cup, the tournament’s popularity in the U.S. is projected to climb. The players were the most diverse group in World Cup history, and nearly a quarter of them were “born outside the country they represent.” These markers suggest that the tournament bridged geopolitical fractures. However, the U.S., a country currently mired in immigration crackdowns, systemic racism, and war with participating Iran, hosted most of the 2026 World Cup games. In the U.S., the World Cup’s global character clashed with the isolationist and racist context. Full report:

State Repression of Civil Society and Protest Rights in Pakistan-Administered Kashmir July 2026 By Juliana Girotto Student activists protest in Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, on Wednesday after unrest during the first phase of voting for the local legislature in the part of Kashmir it administers. Farooq Naeem / AFP via Getty Images Since early June 2026, authorities in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) have carried out an escalating crackdown on protest movements and civil society organizing in the region. This raises serious concerns about human rights violations against protestors and citizens living in the AJK region. The government has responded to these recent protests by criminalizing a civil society organization under anti-terrorism law, imposing communications blackouts, carrying out mass arbitrary arrests, and using lethal force against demonstrators. Together, these measures represent a systematic effort to suppress dissent ahead of regional elections. The Jammu and Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) is a civil society organization that advocates for the rights of citizens in the AJK region and has led a sustained movement since 2023. JAAC originally organized around economic grievances such as high electricity costs and wheat shortages; the group has since broadened its demands to include increased economic subsidies, anti-corruption measures, and, importantly, the abolition of 12 seats in the region's legislative assembly reserved for refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir who resettled elsewhere in Pakistan after 1947. The current crisis began after dialogue collapsed between JAAC and federal officials in May 2026 over JAAC's demands regarding reserved seats. Following this, JAAC organized a rally on June 9. In response, the AJK government began taking highly suppressive actions. On June 5, the government formally designated JAAC as a “proscribed organization” under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2014, accusing the group of creating anarchy and intimidating the public. Police subsequently arrested more than 100 people associated with the organization within two days and raided JAAC’s central office in Muzaffarabad. In addition, a journalist who had covered the movement on his YouTube channel was arrested under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act on charges of defamation and spreading false information. Designating a civil society organization that engages in peaceful protest as a terrorist entity, while simultaneously prosecuting journalists who cover it, functions to quell dissent and shield the government from opposition. Alongside these legal restrictions, government authorities suspended all internet and mobile network services across the region from June 5 to at least June 12. Officials also issued a travel advisory, ordering tourists and outsiders to leave the region and warning prospective visitors to stay away. Taken together, these measures cut AJK off from outside communication and monitoring while security forces engaged in lethal confrontations with protestors. These measures made it far more difficult for journalists, human rights monitors, and residents’ own families to verify what was happening on the ground during these protests. The crackdown on protests has also caused deaths, driven by the government’s disproportionate deployment of federal paramilitary troops. A JAAC activist, Shahzeb Habib, was shot and later died after police stopped his vehicle on June 5, although there was no indication he posed an imminent threat to officers. Habib’s death triggered more clashes, leaving at least eight protestors and four police officers dead, with dozens more injured. Local accounts later put the death toll even higher, at more than 30 people killed and over 200 injured. These events involve several human rights violations, including the freedom of association and peaceful assembly, freedom of expression and of the press, protection from arbitrary arrest and detention, and the right to life, which requires that authorities use lethal force only as a last resort and in proportion to any genuine threat. The use of counterterrorism law against a civil society movement, combined with a communications blackout timed to obscure the violence, suggests that the government is attempting to frame political dissent as a security threat to justify extreme measures. With AJK's elections scheduled for July 27, there is a risk this pattern will continue. Genocide Watch recommends: The government of Pakistan and the AJK authorities must immediately lift the terrorism designation of JAAC and cease prosecuting civil society members and journalists under anti-terrorism laws. Authorities must restore full internet and mobile communications access in AJK and refrain from imposing further internet shutdowns. Authorities must conduct an independent, impartial investigation into all deaths arising from the crackdown. The international community should press Pakistan to adhere to international standards on freedom of assembly and association, to allow independent monitors and mediators to access AJK, and to resume genuine dialogue with JAAC and other civil society organizations ahead of the July 27 elections.

Peru's newly inaugurated President Fujimori vows military-led crackdown on crime. Peru's newly inaugurated President Keiko Fujimori - the ninth in just a decade - pledged to deploy the armed forces to crime-ridden areas and adopt a hardline security strategy as Peru grapples with its worst wave of gang violence, extortion and illegal mining in decades. July 28, 2026 By FRANCE 24 Peru's President Keiko Fujimori speaking after taking the oath of office. Photo: AFP. Peru's conservative President Keiko Fujimori took office on Tuesday, vowing to tackle the wave of crime sweeping the Andean nation. On her fourth presidential bid, Fujimori won June's runoff by fewer than 50,000 votes. Addressing Congress, the newly inaugurated leader announced plans to deploy the military to areas where crime, drug trafficking and illegal mining are rife. "During states of emergency, the armed forces will temporarily take the lead in security operations" until they can "return these territories to the citizens", she said. A group of leftist lawmakers left the room in protest at Fujimori's inauguration, which marks Peru's ninth presidency in a decade. Latin American leaders, including Argentina's Javier Milei, Chile's Jose Antonio Kast, Bolivia's Rodrigo Paz, Ecuador's Daniel Noboa and Uruguay's Yamandu Orsi, attended the ceremony. The 51-year-old ran a campaign shadowed by the divisive legacy of her father, who ruled Peru in the 1990s. Alberto Fujimori was jailed for corruption and crimes against humanity committed during what he considered a fight against terrorism. His daughter's hardline messaging taps into Peru's worst security crisis in decades, fueled by the spread of both local and foreign criminal gangs that oversee contract killings and extortion. She has proposed fighting crime by expelling undocumented people, setting up courts with anonymous judges and making prisoners work for their food. "She is going to be a replica of her father," said 80-year-old retiree Cesar Fuentes, who fears that a crime crackdown will lead to abuses. But housewife Nelly Vega believes Fujimori "is going to lead us to something better". "We're in a country with a lot of terror," the 68-year-old said. The new president has also vowed to tackle the El Nino climate phenomenon, which meteorologists predict will be the most intense and devastating since 1998. 'Fighting for justice' Right-wing parties in Peru's Congress still fall short of the majority required to push through the new president's initiatives. But Fujimori's Fuerza Popular party, the largest one in the legislature, still carries a lot of weight. "It is a party with deep popular roots that has had a dynamic presence in Peruvian politics, even when it was losing elections, because of its uninterrupted presence in Congress," said Jeffrey Radzinsky, director of the political consultancy GFP. Fujimori will govern until 2031 following a decade of political chaos that has burned through eight Peruvian leaders, many of whom were removed from office or forced to resign by a Congress under Fujimori's influence. "There are high expectations," independent worker Marci Angeles, 31, told AFP. "But given how she has behaved as an opposition leader" in recent years, Angeles said, "the outlook is not good". Fujimori has called for reconciliation between political camps, but the appeal has not gone down well with the families of victims of state violence. On Monday, more than 100 people held a vigil in the capital, vowing to reject the incoming government and demanding justice for crimes committed under the last Fujimori administration. "We expect nothing good from her," said Marly Anzualdo, who is still searching for the body of her disappeared brother Kenneth. "For so many years we have been fighting for justice to be done, and we know how they operate," she told AFP. © 2026 Copyright FRANCE 24 All rights reserved.

By Vladimir Kovtun Roma family: Galina and Vijai and their young children. © OHCHR/Vincent Tremeau Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Moldova has continued to experience authoritarian influence and weak rule of law. Most recently, from 2015 to 2019, the oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc effectively controlled Moldova and entrenched a system of corruption and oppression towards opposition figures. Despite the election of the more democratic Party of Action and Solidary (PAS) to power in 2021, Moldova struggles with notable human rights issues, including torture, prevalent domestic violence, and discrimination against the country’s Roma minority. Systemic torture is a significant issue within Moldova’s police and prison systems. Ill-treatment, including beatings and physical assault, remains common during detention. Torture investigations tend to last over four years, and only 5% of investigations result in convictions. Prison hierarchies also contribute to this abuse. The Council of Europe notes that, as of 2025, Moldova has not made considerable progress in addressing informal prison hierarchies. Prison guards have de facto relinquished control of prisons to certain inmates. Individuals considered “untouchables” face significant abuse without recourse. Overall, Moldovan prisons have a culture of intimidation and violence that is not commensurate with the rule of law. Domestic violence reports increased 50%, reaching 20,000 from 2024 to 2025. It has to be noted that increased awareness may explain part of this rise by encouraging more victims to report abuse, Moldova continues to face significant challenges regarding violence against women. Although Moldova’s legal framework for gender equality meets international standards, implementation and real support remain lacking. As many as 73% of Moldovan women reported experiencing partner violence at least once since the age of 15, and only 7% of victims had access to qualified legal assistance. Moldovan society is generally based on traditional gender values, conservative views on women’s place in society remain common, and women generally earn 15% to 17% less than men. Furthermore, the country’s efforts against human trafficking continue to face problems. Moldovan law enforcement continued to provide support to only a limited number of identified victims, and the government decreased victim protection funding. Challenges remain in Moldova’s treatment of the Roma people. In 2022, Human Rights Watch reported that Romani refugees from Ukraine faced discrimination upon arriving in Moldova, with the government deliberately housing them separately from other refugees. Continued disparities are not limited to refugees. Overall, 72% of Moldova’s Roma population lives in substandard housing. According to the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), racial profiling against Roma continues within Moldovan police operations. Moldovan Border Control also continues to perpetuate practices akin to profiling against Black, Muslim, and Roma individuals at Moldovan airports. Additionally, Roma face disproportionately low access to employment; only 6.4% participate in the labor market, and most Roma rely on the informal market for employment. Due to the continuation of racial disparities in Moldova, Genocide Watch assesses Moldova to be at Stage 1: Classification. Due to the active profiling committed by Moldovan police against the country’s Roma minority, increased scrutiny of other minorities at airports, systemic torture conducted by police against detainees, and Moldova’s lack of legal assistance for most domestic assault victims, Genocide Watch assesses that Moldova stands at Stage 3: Discrimination. Genocide Watch Recommends: Moldova’s General Police Inspectorate should provide training for police meant to combat bias and racial profiling behavior towards Roma individuals. Moldova’s General Police Inspectorate should also provide additional training geared towards non-violent arrest practices. Moldova’s police should also implement body cameras. Moldova’s National Administration for Penitentiaries within the country’s Ministry of Justice must create and implement a comprehensive plan to dissolve informal prison hierarchies. Moldova’s Parliament should provide additional funding to Moldova’s Ministry of Interior Affairs to adequately fund Moldovan police initiatives against domestic violence and human trafficking. Moldova’s Ministry of Education, National Agency for the Prevention and Combating of Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (ANPCV), and Moldovan NGO National Coalition Life without Violence should work together to develop sexual education classes geared towards preventing domestic violence.

By Michał Jagielski Senior Middle East and Iran Analyst Genocide Watch For almost three years, the daily lives of the Lebanese have been scored by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Since the prospect of renewed hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah materialized into a full-scale war following Hamas’ terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, the buzzing of Israeli drones has become a constant feature of Lebanon’s soundscape. Children try to protect themselves from dust and smoke rising from rubble after Israeli air strikes targeted the Corniche al-Mazraa area in Beirut, Lebanon, causing large-scale destruction [File: Murat Sengul/Anadolu] Lebanese people have lived with Israel’s military presence for decades. The two have been in an almost constant state of war, or at best frozen conflict, since 1978, with occasional periods of relative calm. Living under this near half-century-old shadow of war has equipped the Lebanese people with an admirable yet tragic level of resilience to armed conflict. Israel’s strategy, however, has evolved. Drones have become a terrifyingly effective tool in modern, asymmetric warfare, a development Israel has taken full advantage of. The IDF has been using drones at an unprecedented scale for surveillance, intimidation, and murder across Lebanon. Given the prolonged regional conflict, the occupation of southern Lebanon, Israel’s apparent impunity on the international scene, and Lebanese officials’ inability to assert the country’s sovereignty over its territory, the long-term consequences of Tel Aviv’s drone warfare on the Lebanese people are grave. This paper’s aim is not to highlight the physical destructiveness of drones, but to draw attention to the intimidation, oppression, and psychological warfare carried out by the IDF against Lebanese civilians, a strategy that amounts to collective punishment and torture. Full Report: