Arakan Army Expands Influence along the Bangladesh Border
By Md. Abu Saim
September 23, 2026
On March 14, 2025, Bangladesh’s interim Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, along with UN Secretary-General António Guterres, visited Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar, raising hopes among the Rohingya community that they could eventually return to their homeland. Back in 2017, the Rohingya population in Rakhine State faced a genocide perpetrated by the Myanmar junta. Behind the scenes, however, another force, the Arakan Army, was also positioning itself to control the state. Although the armed militia did not directly participate in the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya population, they maintained tacit alignment with the junta during the genocide, regarding the Rohingya as illegal immigrants.
In 2016, the Arakan Army had already emerged as a significant force in Myanmar’s regional power dynamics by joining a coalition of four prominent ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), known as the Northern Alliance, alongside the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), to dislodge the junta from ethnic territories. However, as their operational priorities and strategic objectives diverged from the KIA, the other members, including the Arakan Army (AA), MNDAA, and TNLA, formed another coalition, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, in 2019 to simultaneously choke key connectivity routes and isolate the junta from strategic corridors.
The strategy eventually worked. Through Operation 1027, named after the alliance’s October 27 offensive in 2023, the groups began coordinated offensives against the junta and advanced toward key cities. While the MNDAA captured Lashio, the capital of Northern Shan State on July 25, 2024, it subsequently withdrew from the city center on April 21, 2025, amid intense Chinese pressure. The Arakan Army, however, maintained its campaign and between January 14 and December 29, 2024, captured major cities including Maungdaw, Rathedaung, and Buthidaung, all along Bangladesh’s immediate neighborhood and populated by Rohingya communities still residing in Myanmar’s Rakhine State.
Yet this was not the only significant development. The Arakan Army’s initial capture was not in Rakhine but neighboring Chin State, when on January 14, 2024, it seized Paletwa, another area bordering Bangladesh’s Bandarban district. Consequently, the Arakan Army emerged as the de facto authority on the Myanmar side of Bangladesh’s southeastern frontier, taking control of the entire 271-kilometer stretch of Bangladesh-Myanmar border. This also brought the Arakan Army closer to Bangladesh’s sensitive Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region.
As the border has grown increasingly unstable, Bangladesh now faces three worsening challenges involving the Arakan Army:
Alongside the existing 1.2 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, Rohingya still living in Rakhine are facing renewed crises inside Myanmar.
The occasional abduction of Bangladeshi fishermen and frequent shelling into Bangladeshi territory has heightened border insecurity.
The Arakan Army’s growing influence in Bangladesh’s CHT region, particularly Bandarban, presents an additional concern for this sensitive region.
Arakan Army’s Growing Influence in Bandarban Hill District
Once a marginal armed group formed in 2009, the Arakan Army has now gained formidable momentum in the Myanmar civil war, capturing 14 of Rakhine’s 17 key townships. The city of Ann, home to the Myanmar military junta’s Western Military Command headquarters, has also fallen under AA control. However, the Arakan Army’s power extends beyond Rakhine. The AA has reportedly expanded its influence among key rebel groups and across Myanmar’s southern and central regions, including Bago, Magway, and Ayeyarwady. In the north, the Arakan Army has opened offices in Mizoram’s Aizawl, Lawngtlai, and Siaha districts in India.
The group’s influence has also notably extended into Bangladesh’s Bandarban district. Indigenous people from the Bandarban region have occasionally crossed the border and joined the Arakan Army to fight the junta in Rakhine State. On recent occasions, members of the armed group also entered Bangladesh to organize a large-scale cultural event on Bangladeshi soil. These are not merely sporadic incidents; rather, they demonstrate how influential the armed group has become and how deeply rooted its ‘Arakan Dream’ remains— a call to restore the historic Arakan State of old. These developments also point to an expanding regional footprint, altering Bangladesh’s traditional bilateral border-security calculations.
Renewed Atrocities toward Rohingya People
Bangladesh has little prospect of sending the Rohingya refugees back to their homeland, Rakhine, as the Arakan Army has given no indication that it is prepared to receive them. Additionally, Rohingya remaining in Rakhine are reportedly being treated poorly, much like under the previous junta regime. These two realities have pushed Bangladesh’s refugee crisis into deep uncertainty.
The AA’s political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), has consolidated power in Rakhine, establishing governance structures, providing local services, and implementing administrative measures. Yet, its alleged mistreatment of the Rohingya population has further damaged the organization’s international standing.
Since the Arakan Army began its war against the junta in early 2024, more than 150,000 Rohingya have newly arrived in Bangladesh, deepening the country’s refugee crisis and turning it into a prolonged humanitarian challenge.
Meanwhile, life for Rohingya under the Arakan Army remains highly restrictive, as they are reportedly prohibited from working, fishing, farming, or moving without AA permission. Compounded by the junta’s tightening supply blockade on Rakhine State and the Arakan Army’s restrictions on Rohingya movement, the population faces severe food shortages, leaving many people dependent on begging from others.
Moreover, the Arakan Army’s tightening recruitment policy has further exacerbated the crisis. While the junta has also launched nationwide recruitment to counter ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), the Arakan Army has reportedly made military service compulsory for men aged 18 to 45 in Rakhine since May 2025. A 62-year-old Rohingya man told Human Rights Watch that he was beaten, and his house burned after the AA failed to find his son, whom it sought to recruit into its ranks.
A Way Forward
With the Arakan Army’s growing influence along the Bangladesh border, security experts have consistently called for a dual-track diplomatic approach to engage with Myanmar. Amid the prolonged Rohingya refugee crisis, heightened border tensions with the Arakan Army, and perceived interference by the armed group in Bangladesh’s sensitive hilly districts, Bangladesh can no longer remain a passive observer and must pursue every available avenue to address these challenges.
The objective for the engagement should be dignified Rohingya repatriation, alongside ensuring a safe environment for returnees in Rakhine, as well as citizenship and legal identification for the Rohingya population.
The UN secretary-general’s proposal for a humanitarian corridor between Bangladesh and Myanmar has also drawn attention in this context. However, where feasible, Bangladesh should pursue informal dialogue with the Arakan Army to help ease tensions, while leveraging international mechanisms to secure international support for Bangladesh’s interests.
Dhaka would also prefer to maintain stability along its southeastern border and safeguard Bangladesh’s territorial integrity through preemptive and preventive measures.
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