How Iranians Protest: 2025-2026 Anti-Government Protests
- Genocide Watch
- 10 hours ago
- 5 min read
By Michał Jagielski
Senior Middle East and Iran Analyst
Genocide Watch
The protests that took place in late December 2025 through early January 2026 were one of the most significant acts of social opposition to the Iranian religious leadership since the inception of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Their sheer scale, motivations, and, possibly most significantly, the government’s ruthless reaction highlight their importance and potential to drive change.
Unrest began on December 28, 2025, in response to the dwindling economy. The value of the Iranian rial reached new lows against the American dollar, trading at 1.4 million to 1, 40% inflation caused food prices to rise by around 70% compared to last year, the economy was growing by a mere 1% on an annual basis, and the public’s mood was exacerbated by the perceived mismanagement of state finances by Iran’s authorities. Furthermore, the cost of the 12-day war with the United States and Israel in June 2025, combined with the reintroduction of international sanctions by the United Nations due to Iran’s labored pursuit of its nuclear program, put even more pressure on the already struggling economy. Living conditions in Iran have plummeted in recent years due to water and electricity shortages and air, soil, and water pollution, all of which have not been addressed competently by the authorities.
As was the case with most major protests in Iran, including the 1978-1979 revolution against the Shah, the 2025-2026 demonstrations began with the Bazaaris, merchants and shopkeepers, who closed their establishments and staged strikes in major cities. The protests include the full spectrum of Iran’s struggling population, which quickly spread to all 31 provinces. Fueled by economic grievances, the demands of the demonstrators evolved into a general outcry against the political system and its many human rights abuses. People across the country chanted anti-government slogans, with people branding the then Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei a dictator and a small minority calling for the return of Reza Pahlavi, the son of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
The government’s response was swift and brutal. Despite initially ‘limiting’ their use of physical force to tear gas, water cannons, beatings, and arbitrary arrests, authorities quickly gave security forces almost absolute authority to deal with the protesters in any manner they saw fit. The state deployed all its available forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Basij, and undercover personnel. Security forces stationed on the streets and rooftops began their indiscriminate campaign of murder, shooting men, women, and children as young as 14 years old, with shotguns and rifles. Medical workers treated people admitted to hospitals for close-range gunshot wounds to the face, upper body, eyes, and genitalia. The state-sponsored massacres reached their climax on January 8 and 9, killing thousands of civilians, the most brutal crackdown in decades. In preparation, the authorities imposed an almost complete communications blackout and cut access to the Internet.
The exact number of civilians security forces murdered during the protests remains unclear. The figures presented by Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) on February 15, 2026, put the casualties at over 7,000 people, including 226 children. The real numbers are likely significantly higher. The Guardian’s investigation presents evidence consistent with claims that more than 30,000 civilians were murdered. Eyewitness testimonies from hospitals, morgues, and graveyards describe scenes of piles of bodies being loaded into trucks and taken to remote locations to be buried in unmarked mass graves. Convoys of ice cream trucks and produce trucks drove day and night between morgues and undisclosed locations, disposing of the thousands of bodies.
Following January 16, the end of the initial stage of the protests, the authorities continued to engage in arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances. Security forces raided hospitals, and security forces took injured protestors to detention centers. As a result, many people with relatively minor injuries did not seek medical attention and died in their homes. Authorities subjected thousands of detained civilians, including children, to ill-treatment, sexual abuse, and torture.
As was the case in previous years, the state framed the protestors as “rioters”, “terrorists”, and “opportunistic elements affiliated with the enemy”. The language used by state officials served two purposes. Firstly, it criminalized legal public dissent and legitimized brutal security crackdowns by presenting demonstrators as savage outlaws. In a speech issued during the protests, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei addressed the reports of mounting casualties; however, he focused solely on the alleged thousands of patriots and security officials who had been killed in “an inhuman, savage manner”. Furthermore, state television broadcast dozens of confessions in which protestors admitted attacking security forces. The narrative was constructed to shift the blame from incompetent and corrupt state officials to foreign and domestic enemies. By claiming that the murdered and detained participants were acting in the interest of the U.S. and Israel, the government attempted to redirect the attention of its loyalists and people who have not joined the protests from domestic troubles to an external threat. The judiciary handed out capital sentences on an immense scale, charging the demonstrators with moharebeh (enmity against God), a common tool in Tehran's arsenal used against ethnic minorities such as the Kurds and the Baloch, both of which have been accused of working for the benefit of Iran’s enemies.
The 2025-2026 Demonstrations are another iteration in the struggle between state authorities and the economically struggling population. Despite many similarities to the 2019 Economic protests and the 2022-2023 Women, Life, Freedom protests, the most recent round of unrest offers many lessons and indications of the future trajectory of the country. The frequency of major protests in Iran seems to be on the rise. The last 10 years alone saw four nationwide instances of public mobilization against the state’s handling of the economy and its oppressive religious laws. Every subsequent protest was larger than the previous one. Even if economic suffering motivated the initial strikes, they quickly evolved into general demands for structural change in the system. This trend has contributed to the continued rise in violent state crackdowns and stigmatizing narratives. Observers can interpret both as desperation and a sign of an eroding status quo. The scale of the protests and the government’s ruthless responses indicate a growing rift between what the authorities and the population believe to be the best path forward. The median age in Iran is 34.5 years, and only around 15% of the population is old enough to remember the brutal dictatorship of the Pahlavi dynasty. Most Iranians have only experienced life under the current system that has consistently brought them pain and injustice.
Even though the general domestic mood seems to be growing increasingly anti-government, the lack of alternative political leadership is one of the biggest obstacles on the way to meaningful and long-lasting change. The state successfully extirpated grass-roots initiatives and organized opposition through enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrests. The existing opposition groups are in exile, due to which they might not be best suited to address the issues faced by Iranians in their day-to-day lives. Protesters have repeatedly struggled with a lack of leadership. Without a central figure to rally around, without a face that could negotiate in the best interest of the Iranians, most of the initiatives have quickly faced a dead end, and security forces have rapidly quashed most initiatives. This situation has partially contributed to the sporadic demands for Reza Pahlavi to return; the loudest supporters of the exiled figure are part of the Iranian diaspora. Despite the protests not bringing meaningful change to the country, their scale and the brutality security forces used against them indicate a growing resentment towards the system established in 1979 and possible anxiety among the ruling elites that one day the demonstrations might succeed.
