The Iranian Economic and Political Protests of 2017-2018
- Genocide Watch
- May 5
- 3 min read
Updated: 7d
By Alžběta Frommerova
Genocide Watch
As Iran navigates the pressures of the current global war, which has left many Iranians concerned that the conflict may end without meaningful regime change, despite a century-long struggle against tyranny and for democracy, patterns of protests continue to evolve under pressure. Notably, although perceptions of the United States and Israel among Iranians are now deteriorating, this has not led to greater support for the Islamic Republic. This article builds on the previous analysis of the Green Movement by examining the 2017–2018 economic protests--sometimes called the Dey Protests and marked by their scale, violence and lack of coordination--with the aim of shedding light on how and why Iranians have continued to protest under shifting political and socio-economic conditions.
The protests began in December 2017, in the conservative city of Mashhad, then spread quickly to more than 80 cities across the country. The protests were driven by economic grievances, including high unemployment, inflation, corruption, and the perceived failure of President Hassan Rouhani’s government to deliver post-sanctions recovery. Demonstrators also criticized state spending on regional conflicts while domestic conditions deteriorated. Before the demonstrations erupted, Iranians had become, on average, 15% poorer, with consumption of basic goods such as bread, milk, and red meat declining by 30% to 50%, and unemployment in some regions exceeding 60%.
Unlike earlier movements that centered in urban, university circles, such as the Green Movement, these demonstrations took place in smaller areas and featured more radical slogans, including direct criticism of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Thus, they also took on a political dimension, even calling for systemic change. The movement appeared socially diverse, but it lacked central leadership, with many participants drawn from economically-marginalized groups facing declining living standards, high unemployment, and worsening inequality, particularly among the youth. However, the scale and unexpected geographic spread of the protests caught political elites off guard, and, as they intensified, segments of the unrest escalated into violence, prompting a state-sponsored crackdown that resulted in thousands of arrests and over 20 deaths. In 2018, protesters went a step further by challenging the regime’s long-standing portrayal of the United States as the “Great Satan.” Many demonstrators openly blamed their own government for domestic failures, not the sanctions imposed by the United States.
A key difference between the 2017–2018 protests and earlier episodes in the 1990s lies in their geographical distribution, slogans, and persistence. One of the most significant patterns was their concentration in smaller cities: of all locations where protests occurred, 73% had populations below 380,000, and a quarter were below 105,000. This is noteworthy because small cities in Iran are typically more apolitical and socially conservative, so grievances linked to urban middle-class discontent are less immediately salient. Moreover, protest participation in such settings carries higher personal risk, as close-knit social structures increase the likelihood of identification and arrest.
Following the protests, Iranian authorities introduced measures to limit perceived Western influence, including banning English-language teaching in primary schools. This decision was framed as a defense against “cultural invasion.” While officials emphasized protecting national culture, the policy also reflected broader efforts to reassert ideological control despite public demand for greater opportunities. Authorities also moved to restrict information flows, temporarily limiting access to social media platforms such as Instagram and Telegram, which had been widely used to share information and coordinate demonstrations. Moreover, there were reports of deliberate internet slowdowns in parts of the country, further limiting communication among protesters.
Despite intensifying repression, all the episodes of protests reflect an enduring pattern of mobilization that adapts to changing political conditions. In this sense, the 2017–2018 protests form part of a longer historical continuum of contention, suggesting that the struggle for political voice and social justice in Iran continues across generations.
