Special Report: The Islamic State-K - A Resurgent Threat
By Alžběta Frommerová and Michał Jagielski
Genocide Watch
Introduction
After the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) territorial collapse in 2019, the threat to the West receded as ISIS’ capacity to strike Europe declined. Over the past four years, however, IS branches in sub-Saharan Africa have made the region a major terrorism hotspot, while the Taliban’s return to power, the end of the United States (US)-led war in Afghanistan, and rising Kabul-Islamabad tensions have enabled Islamic State Khorasan’s growth. In 2021-2022, it caused the third-highest terrorism death toll globally. Its deadliest strikes have reached well beyond Afghanistan, from the 2024 Kerman bombings in Iran to the Crocus City Hall massacre in Moscow, underscoring its standing as IS's most capable transnational branch. Despite lower activity in 2025–26, IS-K can still exploit regional instability and power vacuums, particularly as counterterrorism resources shift elsewhere and anti-Western sentiment grows.
What is IS-K
The origins of IS-K lie in a broader development of IS, beginning with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (1999), which became al-Qaeda in Iraq (2004) and then joined the Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen (2006). Zarqawi’s worldview, hostility toward the US, Kurds, Shia Muslims, and “apostate” governments, shaped the group’s strategic culture across this lineage until his death in mid-2006. IS-K's formation began after militants fled a major Pakistani counterterrorism operation in 2010. These groups fragmented, with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) splitting into more violent factions. Beginning in 2014, IS accepted pledges of loyalty from militant Salafi groups, and IS-K officially became IS’s wilayat (province) in 2015, under Hafiz Said Khan. It drew disgruntled Taliban, TTP, al-Qaeda, Islamic Jihad Union, and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan members, plus Uyghurs, South Asian volunteers, and non-Pashtun Afghans. IS’s success in Iraq and Syria let it present the IS-K as the most capable vehicle for global jihad, and the group exploited local grievances and inter- and intra-community conflicts.
Ideologically, IS-K mirrors IS in its support of radical Salafism, a transnational caliphate, and armed struggle against external powers and domestic “apostates.” The name Khorasan denotes both its operational area, including parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. It also denotes an origin myth, a prophecy attributed to the Prophet Muhammad of a black-flag army emerging from Khorasan under the Messiah, echoed in Iran by the legend of Abu Muslim al-Khurasani, who marched from Khorasan to help found the Abbasid dynasty. In Afghanistan, Khorasan serves as a symbolic predecessor of the state for those seeking to counter Pashtun dominance. By invoking the region rather than modern states, IS-K signals its rejection of the status quo.
The bulk of IS-K’s operations has taken place in Afghanistan. However, since 2015, IS expected fealty to its transnational project, while the Taliban, focused nationally, feared IS-K’s rise. IS-K initially moved fighters to Syria, but they later returned to form autonomous cells and operated a loose ecosystem of affiliated groups. It won early battles against the Taliban in Zabul (2015-16), despite being outnumbered, but the Taliban forced an IS-K surrender in Jowzjan by 2018 and scored major victories in Kunar and Nangarhar. IS’s creation of separate Pakistan and India provinces in 2019 further shrank IS-K’s territory, while sustained counterterrorism operations killed its senior commanders.
Starting in 2020, IS-K gained ideological ground by condemning the Doha talks as a betrayal of anti-imperialism and rejecting Taliban rule outright as merely “nationalist.” Exploiting Taliban defectors and the power vacuum after the US withdrawal, IS-K struck repeatedly, including the Kabul airport bombing during the evacuation, which killed 169 Afghans and 13 US soldiers. A subsequent Taliban crackdown weakened the group and killed its leaders, prompting a shift from territorial control to small, autonomous cells under Shahab al-Muhajir. By 2021, the UN estimated 1,500–2,200 core fighters, concentrated in Kunar and Nangarhar.
by Dino Krause
Structure
The public face of IS-K is composed of local Pashtun tribesmen, but a study by Atal Ahmadzai found an outer layer of local militants and a core composed almost exclusively of foreigners. Local elements are more brutal and mostly uneducated, while foreign fighters are more organized and well-equipped. The local militants serve as a protective layer, handling accommodation and provisioning. This outer layer is unstable, shifts with the core, and has thinned considerably since IS-K’s 2020 move northward and the Taliban’s post-2021 crackdown. Recruitment in the northern provinces is now mostly fueled by Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen fighters.
IS-K keeps a hierarchical leadership under emir Shahab al-Muhajir, reportedly the first IS-K leader of Arab, rather than regional, descent, with a Shura Advisory Council, provincial commanders, and functional branch heads below him. Earlier leaders were TTP commanders who founded the group, while most mid-level leaders were former Taliban fighters; more recent recruits include former Lashkar-e-Taiba and al-Qaeda members with local and insurgent expertise.
After 2019, within IS’s global structure, the caliphate-era Administration of Distant Provinces became the General Directorate of Provinces (GDP), placing all provinces under a horizontal coordinating body. Its current leader is unknown, but is likely Abdulqadir Mu’min, leader of IS's Somalia Province. Below the GDP sit regional “offices” (makatib); IS-K falls under the al-Siddiq Office, based in Afghanistan and headed by Tamim Ansar al-Kurdi, which also oversees the Pakistan and India provinces.
A March 2024 estimate put the core group at about 4,000 individuals, of whom only several hundred are fighters. The actual size is unknown, though the group appears to be increasing in size.
by Dino Krause
Operations and Strategy
IS-K operates as a separately funded branch, with its own budgeting and operational autonomy, under general IS oversight. It relies on targeted attacks against Taliban officials, foreign missions, and minorities, and on propaganda to discredit the Taliban, recruit defectors, and prevent the regime from stabilizing into a functioning government.
Recruitment exploits jihadist rivalries and offers cash incentives. Foreign fighter inflow has been a “trickle” rather than a windfall, and the destruction of the caliphate did not spur a large influx.
The US Treasury has assessed that IS-K raises funds through local donations, extortion, and financial support from core IS leadership, and that it relies on a significant network of hawalas (informal money brokers) to move funds.
Ideology and Propaganda
The rivalry with the Taliban is doctrinal: IS-K follows Salafi-jihadism, which treats armed jihad as the path to a transnational caliphate and accepts mass civilian casualties as legitimate. The Taliban, a nationalist Deobandi-Hanafi movement rooted in Pashtun identity and Pashtunwali, seeks recognition within the existing state system rather than a borderless caliphate. IS-K brands the Taliban apostate for following Hanafi jurisprudence over direct scriptural interpretation; tolerating shirk, superstition, religious innovations, grave worship, nationalism, and tribalism; and pursuing political legitimacy over religious purity, using takfir to declare the Taliban illegitimate. This use of takfir mirrors the classification and dehumanization dynamics that Genocide Watch identifies as early stages of genocidal process, a pattern IS-K extends from the Taliban to Shia and Hazara communities more broadly.
IS-K runs the most sophisticated propaganda operation of any surviving IS affiliate, inheriting IS’s “media jihad” doctrine through its production house, Al-Azaim. Al-Azaim publishes in more than eleven languages across Telegram, Facebook, and TikTok, as well as its own channel, the Voice of Khurasan. Its content serves two aims, legitimization and intimidation. The group views propaganda as a weapon. IS-K’s ideologues have long claimed that “our pens are daggers in the hearts of kuffar” and that propaganda is “more dangerous than the mujahid’s gun.”
Since the Taliban takeover in 2021, the propaganda has been aimed squarely at delegitimizing the new regime, whereas the Voice of Khurasan took on a global focus. The media effort has also kept pace with technology, including propaganda videos generated by artificial intelligence and seen on Khurasan TV. Analysts tie the media effort directly to the group’s operational rise, as its robust and modern media strategy elevates IS-K’s status, gives it a global networked capacity, and draws recruits.
Targets
IS-K’s increased transnational attack capabilities became clear in 2019-2020. Since then, it has struck or plotted to do so in Afghanistan, India, Tajikistan, the Maldives, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Türkiye, Uzbekistan, and Europe. In 2021-2022, the group caused the third-highest terrorism death toll worldwide.
Domestically, attacks on the Taliban and government institutions reflect IS-K’s claim to exclusive religious legitimacy: targeting foreign nationals, diplomats, and aid workers undermines the Taliban’s legitimacy and deters investment. US Central Command (CENTCOM) noted in 2024 that the Taliban's inexperience in counterterrorism has let IS-K “regenerate and harden their networks.” Shia Muslims and the Hazara community are frequent targets, including a 2015 Jalalabad suicide attack, a 2022 mosque bombing in Balkh, and a 2023 Baghlan Mosque bombing, alongside repeated strikes on Hazara neighborhoods, mosques, and schools. This sustained targeting of the Hazara, a distinct ethnic and religious minority, reflects the kind of pattern Genocide Watch’s early-warning framework flags as markers of elevated persecution risk. In 2026, following a Kabul bombing that killed seven, IS-K explicitly declared intent to target Chinese nationals, consistent with prior attacks tied to Beijing’s crackdown on Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities.
IS-K is IS’s most successful branch when it comes to carrying out international attacks:
Iran: A natural target given IS-K’s anti-Shia stance and Tehran’s treatment of Sunnis. Attacks include the 2017 strike on Iran’s Parliament and Khomeini’s mausoleum (17 dead), two 2022-2023 shootings at the Shah Cheragh Shrine (19 dead combined), and the 2024 Kerman bombings marking Soleimani’s death anniversary (91 dead), the deadliest attack on Iranian soil. A 2024 study found that IS-K appears to alternate between domestic and international operations: attacks in Afghanistan peak from April to August, while attacks in Russia and Iran tend to occur later in the year. Its activity abroad also appears inversely related to its position against the Taliban: after Taliban gains in 2023, IS-K expanded overseas operations.
Pakistan: Accused by IS-K of enabling Taliban rule and serving foreign interests, Pakistan has seen attacks on its diplomats (the 2016 Jalalabad consulate attack, a 2022 assassination attempt) and on its own soil (a 2023 JUI-F rally bombing, a 2023 attack on a Prophet’s birthday procession).
Russia: Targeted over its history in Afghanistan, the Syrian civil war, and treatment of Muslim minorities. Attacks include a 2022 bombing near a Mazar-e Sharif Russian cultural center, a 2022 Kabul embassy attack (four dead), and the 2024 Crocus City Hall massacre in Moscow (150 dead).
Europe and Türkiye: Smaller scale, but geographically wide-reaching. Türkiye, an active counter-IS partner and recruit transit hub, saw a 2024 church shooting in Istanbul. Europe has suffered the 2017 Stockholm truck attack (five dead), a 2023 killing of two Swedes in Belgium, and a 2023 stabbing in France, alongside foiled plots against a German NATO base, the 2024 Paris Olympics, and a Vienna Taylor Swift concert. CENTCOM warned in 2023 that large-scale attacks on European and American soil remain IS-K’s ultimate ambition.
Conclusions
IS-K has, over its existence, proven to be a highly capable organization. In the face of tremendous regional and global turmoil, flexible organizations such as IS-K are perfectly situated to take advantage of the world’s redirected focus and funds and exploit the emerging power vacuums.
Regionally, the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict and Taliban infighting have created openings IS-K is already exploiting, such as its assassination of a senior Taliban official. The longer both conflicts persist, the greater the opportunities for IS-K. Pakistan’s own vulnerability stems both from its conflict with Afghanistan and its treatment of minorities. Some oppressed communities have already aligned themselves with armed groups sympathetic to radical Islamists. Iran’s diversion of resources to its war with the US and Israel similarly weakens border monitoring, and the regime’s history of targeting religious and ethnic minorities could further ideologically charge IS-K’s campaign against it.
For Russia and Europe, Moscow’s nearly five-year war in Ukraine has strained its security focus, while its post-Crocus anti-Muslim crackdowns, affecting large Muslim migrant populations, risk fueling further radicalization. Europe’s Ukraine-related resource diversion and some states’ support for Israel amid the genocide in Gaza offer IS-K’s propaganda machine further recruitment material.
In the Middle East, ongoing wars and instability in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran create conditions favorable to non-state actors; IS retains active sleeper cells in Syria and Iraq, evidenced by a 2026 Damascus cafe bombing, and IS-K’s Türkiye networks could help sustain its membership.
IS-K has proven resilient, shifting from territorial control to decentralized, high-impact cells while maintaining the most sophisticated propaganda operation among surviving IS branches. Its rivalry with the Taliban has shaped both its position in Afghanistan and its expansion abroad. Its significance stems less from its size than from conflicts and instability across Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and the Middle East, which divert counterterrorism resources and fuel recruitment. Its threat varies by region but remains significant. The convergence of doctrinal targeting of specific religious and ethnic minorities, intensifying regional conflict, and shrinking international oversight raises the kind of elevated genocide risk that frameworks like Genocide Watch’s 10 Stages of Genocide are designed to monitor.
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