By Jaclyn Diaz and Alice Fordham Twin suicide bombings at a Baghdad market killed at least 32 people and injured 110 others on Thursday, according to Iraq's health ministry. Of the injured, 36 are being treated in hospitals. ISIS has claimed responsibility for the attacks, according to the SITE Intelligence Group. Two suicide bombers detonated their vests when security forces pursued them through a busy market off Tayaran Square. Witnesses said the first cried out he was ill, causing a crowd to form around him in a street off the main square. He then detonated the bomb he wore. The first attack occurred around 10 a.m. local time, a fruit vendor, Abbas Abdulkareem, told NPR. People fled toward Tayaran Square, Abdulkareem said. Police and an ambulance arrived. Then the second bomber detonated next to the ambulance as people gathered near the dead and wounded from the first blast. This explosion killed dozens of people, including vendors, who sold items such as old bluejeans, tea and cellphone accessories. People gathered Thursday evening at the site of the bombing, murmuring prayers and forming a makeshift vigil. The glow of candles illuminated piles of secondhand clothes in market stalls, some bloodied from the attack. "We were shocked," Abdulkareem said, "because for some time there have been no explosions. The situation was safe, and people were optimistic." This type of attack, once horribly common in the Iraqi capital, has become rare since the Islamic State group was largely defeated in the country in 2017. The last took place in January 2018, according to The Associated Press . Across Baghdad, blast walls and checkpoints had been removed. Maj. Gen. Tahsin al-Khafaji, a Joint Operations Command spokesman, said it was a "terrorist act perpetrated by a sleeper cell of the Islamic State," according to the AP. "This attack is a reprehensible act of cowardice that underscores the dangers of terrorism that millions of Iraqis continue to face," the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad wrote in a statement . "We extend our condolences to the families of these victims, and hope for the swift recovery for those who were injured." Although ISIS has been greatly weakened, with the help of Iraq's international allies, militant groups still conduct operations. Earlier this week, the electricity ministry reported coordinated attacks on power lines, power stations and other infrastructure, causing millions of dollars' worth of damage to the already-shaky electricity sector. Renad Mansour, an analyst with British think tank Chatham House, told NPR that although ISIS may have been defeated on the battlefield, that doesn't rule out a renewed insurgency. Mansour said the roots of ISIS lie in the fact that a large part of the population feels disenfranchised. The terror group is Sunni Muslim, and has long drawn support from some of Iraq's Sunni minority who feel deeply discriminated against by a Shiite-led government. Without a political settlement and an effort at inclusion, the conflict could continue to be cyclical, Mansour said. The Trump administration reduced troop numbers in Iraq, but about 2,500 U.S. soldiers remain in the country. Retired Gen. Lloyd Austin, President Biden's defense secretary nominee, said in his confirmation hearing that he remains concerned about the threat ISIS poses inside Iraq and beyond. "I support maintaining a small number of U.S. troops to carry out a limited mission focused on advising and assisting Iraqi counterterrorism forces to deal with the continuing threat from ISIS," he told the Senate Armed Services Committee in written testimony. Iraq analyst and Baghdad resident Hamzeh Hadad said the attack was shocking because the overall security situation in the Iraqi capital has improved dramatically in recent years. Fewer checkpoints and blast walls mean "you're slowly seeing the beauty of the city come back to life," he said. "Things are busier again, markets are bustling." Hadad moved from Canada back to Iraq in 2019, partly because the danger of such attacks appeared to have been reduced. "So to have something like this reoccur — that hasn't happened in a few years — is really shocking and worrying for everyday Iraqis," he said. NPR’s Reese Oxner contributed to this report. © National Public Radio 2021

June 7, 2021, 12:16PM EDT | Human Rights Watch Bangladeshi navy sailors intake Rohingya refugees as they disembark from a navy vessel bringing them to Bhasan Char island in Bangladesh, December 29, 2020. © 2020 KM Asad/LightRocket via Getty Images UN, Donors Should Urge Protection, Freedom of Movement on Bhasan Char (New York) – The Bangladesh government has relocated nearly 20,000 Rohingya refugees to a remote island without adequate health care, livelihoods, or protection, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. The United Nations and donor governments should urgently call for an independent assessment of the safety, disaster preparedness, and habitability at Bhasan Char during the impending monsoon season and beyond. The 58-page report, “‘An Island Jail in the Middle of the Sea’: Bangladesh’s Relocation of Rohingya Refugees to Bhasan Char,” finds that Bangladesh authorities transferred many refugees to the island without full, informed consent and have prevented them from returning to the mainland. While the government says it wants to move at least 100,000 people to the silt island in the Bay of Bengal to ease overcrowding in Cox’s Bazar refugee camps, humanitarian experts have raised concerns that insufficient measures are in place to protect against severe cyclones and tidal surges. Refugees on the island reported inadequate health care and education, onerous movement restrictions, food shortages, a lack of livelihood opportunities, and abuses by security forces . “The Bangladesh government is finding it hard to cope with over a million Rohingya refugees, but forcing people to a remote island just creates new problems,” said Bill Frelick , refugee and migrant rights director. “International donors should assist the Rohingya, but also insist that Bangladesh return refugees who want to return to the mainland or if experts say island conditions are too dangerous or unsustainable.” Human Rights Watch interviewed 167 Rohingya refugees between May 2020 and May 2021, including 117 on Bhasan Char and 50 in Cox’s Bazar, 30 of whom were later relocated to Bhasan Char. Primary responsibility for the Rohingya’s situation lies with Myanmar. On August 25, 2017, the military began a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing against Rohingya Muslims involving mass killing , rape , and arson that forced over 740,000 to flee to neighboring Bangladesh, which was already hosting an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 unregistered Rohingya refugees who had fled previous persecution. Myanmar has failed to end widespread abuses against the Rohingya and has refused to create conditions for their safe, dignified, and voluntary return. While Bangladesh commendably opened its borders to the Rohingya, the authorities have not made camp conditions truly hospitable , increasing pressure to relocate to Bhasan Char. The authorities shut down internet access for almost a year in the refugee camps, denied formal education to children , and built barbed wire fencing restricting movement and access to emergency services. Security forces face allegations of arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. In May 2020, Bangladesh first brought over 300 Rohingya refugees rescued at sea to Bhasan Char. Although the government initially said they were being quarantined on the island to prevent the spread of Covid-19 in the camps, they have yet to be reunited with their families . In December, Bangladesh authorities started relocating thousands of refugees from the camps to the island , reneging on promises to allow an independent technical assessment of the protection needs, safety, and habitability on the island. Now, after an 18-member United Nations team was taken to see the island from March 17 to 20, the authorities are pressuring the UN to start delivering humanitarian assistance . Refugees said that during the UN visit they were only allowed to speak in the presence of Bangladesh government officials and were compelled to make it appear there were no problems on the island. On May 31, 2021, thousands of refugees gathered to try and meet with a delegation of UN officials that were visiting Bhasan Char and to protest conditions, many saying that they do not want to remain on the island. Bangladesh authorities had earlier warned the Rohingya against complaining, some refugees told Human Rights Watch. There were clashes with security forces after the refugees disregarded those instructions, eyewitnesses said, and several Rohingya, including women and children, were injured . The Bangladesh government should urgently begin consultations with UN officials to discuss any future humanitarian operational engagement on Bhasan Char, Human Rights Watch said. The authorities should also act on recommendations by the UN after their visit to improve the wellbeing, safety, and protection of Rohingya refugees already on the island. The Bangladesh government has informed Human Rights Watch in a letter that it had “ensured adequate supply of food along with proper sanitation and medical facilities for Rohingyas on Bhasan Char” and that all relocations were based on informed consent. However, refugees widely refuted these claims. A 53-year-old man said he went into hiding to avoid being transported after the camp administrator threatened him: “He said, even if I die, they will take my body there. I don’t want to go to that island.” Others said they volunteered based on false promises. Refugees also described the inadequate health facilities on the island . Human Rights Watch interviewed 14 people who said they had sought treatment for a range of conditions, including asthma, pain, fever, arthritis, diabetes, ulcers, and malaria, but most were handed paracetamol (acetaminophen) tablets and sent away. Four of the fourteen later died, as a result of inadequate emergency health care, their family members believe. The island has no emergency medical care services. If referred by a doctor and permitted by the island authorities, refugees have to travel three hours by boat and then two hours by road to the nearest mainland hospital for emergency care. This includes pregnant women needing lifesaving medical intervention. A refugee who lost his wife during childbirth said that after complications, when doctors recommended moving her to a mainland hospital, getting permission took two hours, by which time she had died. Refugees said that they were promised teachers, schools, and formal accredited education for their children on the island. However, an aid worker said that although an estimated 8,495 children are on Bhasan Char “at best four NGOs are providing education to no more than 1,500 children.” Mizan, 35, said the education her 7- and 9-year-old daughters were receiving was actually less than in the camps: “We have been here now for six months and my daughters brought all their belongings, bags, and books, to continue studying, but there aren’t even learning centers here.” With monsoon season due to start in June, the island is at risk from high winds and flooding. Embankments around the island are still likely inadequate to withstand a category three storm or worse . Although the government says that there are adequate storm shelters , there is the risk that refugees, Bangladeshi security personnel, and humanitarian workers, could end up marooned on the island with limited supplies as sea or air transport are restricted in inclement weather. The authorities stopped a recent relocation to Bhasan Char due to the bad weather . “Putting unwilling refugees on a remote, low-lying island where cyclones are common is a bad idea,” Frelick said. “Rohingya refugees who have lost and suffered so much need to be treated with dignity and respect for their safety and well-being and be allowed to make informed, voluntary choices about their living conditions until long-term solutions can be found.” Accounts by Refugees All refugees quoted are identified by a pseudonym given the high risk of retribution by Bangladesh authorities for speaking out about the conditions on Bhasan Char. Informed Consent, Freedom of Movement, Livelihoods Taslima, who is living in Cox’s Bazar but whose 13-year-old son is on Bhasan Char after being rescued at sea in May 2020, said: My son has been confined on Bhasan Char for one year. He is not even an adult. My son kept asking the navy officials to send him back to the camps, but every time he is given false promises. I also contacted the CiC [Camp-in-Charge, an administrator] here in the camp to get my son back but they said the only way I can meet my son is if I relocate to Bhasan Char. But my son keeps telling me not to go over there because it is like a jail. Yusuf Ali, 43, who also lives in Cox’s Bazar and whose two daughters are being held on Bhasan Char, said, “the CiC told us that our daughters would never be returned to us here. They said ‘You still have time to choose to go there [to Bhasan Char], otherwise forget about your children.’” Anjul, 40, a refugee on Bhasan Char, said: They trapped us with promises of good food and plenty of livelihood opportunities, like tending livestock or fishing. Most important, when we boarded the bus they gave us 5,000 taka [US$60] each, promising that we would be given 5,000 taka each month. But after arriving, there are no such opportunities, and now we are facing a food shortage. He said that when the refugees left for Bhasan Char, some officials falsely assured them that they would be able to travel freely between the island and mainland, but that was not happening. “My older parents are in the camps. I would at least want to attend their funeral,” he said. “But even that will not be possible as long as I am held here.” Inadequate Health Care Amdad’s 18-month-old daughter died of pneumonia less than a month after arriving on Bhasan Char. He said that the child had developed pneumonia while they were still in the camps in Cox’s Bazar, but there they were able to get oxygen at the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital. He said that when they arrived on Bhasan Char, his daughter again began having trouble breathing, the doctors rebuffed his concerns: [O]n March 11, [my daughter] was having the breathing problem again and I rushed her to the government healthcare facility here. The doctor prescribed a cough syrup and sent us back home, but she did not improve. The next morning, I took her to the healthcare facility again and requested that the doctor give her oxygen support since I could see the cylinder in his office, and she had received that cure back in the camps. I even tried to show him the prescription that the MSF doctors had provided for her, but he refused to look. He said to me, “Do you think we are sitting here with enough oxygen to support your daughter? I am giving her more medicines, she will be fine,” and asked us to leave the healthcare facility. Soon after I came back to my shelter, her situation deteriorated. After two hours my daughter died. Amdad said that after his daughter died the authorities came to his shelter and took away all documentation of her medical history including documentation from MSF, and they refused to issue a death certificate. The husband of Bibi, 58, died from complications after being denied respiratory support and asthma medication: I took my husband to the healthcare facility here three to four times. They could not give proper treatment or medication. The last time I took him to the healthcare facility when his situation deteriorated again, I requested the medical staff to take us outside the island or take us back to Cox’s Bazar to go to the MSF hospital or Turkish hospital, but they did not allow it. Instead, they discharged my husband from the healthcare facility and said he would recover at home. He died the next morning. Zubair, 62, who arrived on Bhasan Char in February, suffered from a stomach ulcer, digestive difficulties, and severe abdominal bloating. “While I was in the camp [in Cox’s Bazar], aid workers would come to my shelter to give health care because I am an older person and I cannot go to the healthcare facility on my own. Sometimes those volunteers helped take me to the MSF hospital or IOM hospital where I could get medicine or treatment, which would help most of the time.” But when Zubair went to the healthcare facility on Bhasan Char, the medicine they offered did not help. The health workers recommended that he be transferred to a hospital on the mainland, but that he would have to pay. He said: I went to the healthcare facility here after 10 to 15 days of arrival with severe pain in the abdomen. The doctors here prescribed some medicines. When there was no progress and I was unable to move any more, family members and neighbors helped me to get to the healthcare facility twice. But the doctors gave me the same medicines. The last time I went to the healthcare facility, they told me to come up with the money to go to the hospital in Noakhali [on the mainland] as my situation had deteriorated very badly. I do not have my own money and I feel shy to ask for help from the neighbors. It’s better now I die here with my family. Read the full Human Rights Watch Report here . © 2021 Human Rights Watch .

Security Forces ‘Kettled’ Demonstrators, Fired on Rescuers in Hlaing Tharyar Myanmar security forces deliberately “kettled” protesters and used lethal force during the March 14, 2021, anti-junta protests in Yangon’s Hlaing Tharyar township, Human Rights Watch said today. Soldiers and police armed with military assault rifles fired on trapped protesters and on those trying to assist the wounded, killing at least 65 protesters and bystanders . Following the February 1 military coup against Myanmar’s democratically elected government, numerous demonstrations broke out in Yangon and other cities. The police and military forces repeatedly used lethal force against largely peaceful protesters in violation of international human rights law. The deadly shootings in Hlaing Tharyar stand out because of the large number of people killed and the security forces’ apparent premeditated use of lethal force. “The Myanmar security forces’ massacre of several dozen people outside Yangon in mid-March was not a case of riot control gone astray,” said Manny Maung , Myanmar researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The Hlaing Tharyar killings have the hallmarks of a planned attack on protesters for which those responsible, regardless of rank, should be held to account.” Human Rights Watch remotely interviewed six witnesses to the Hlaing Tharyar violence. Human Rights Watch also verified 13 videos of the protests recorded on March 14, and 31 photographs uploaded to Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube. Anti-coup demonstrations began around early March in Hlaing Tharyar, a largely industrial zone across the Hlaing River, west of Yangon. Because many trade union members live and work in the area, the protests were particularly large and well-organized. Before dawn on March 14, protesters set up cement-block barricades and sandbags as barriers at major bus stops along the Hlaing River Road, the area’s main thoroughfare, ahead of sit-in strikes starting at 5 a.m. Around 10 a.m., about 200 soldiers and police began moving into Hlaing Tharyar, bypassing the barriers and causing protesters to retreat or disperse. Witnesses said that, by 11 a.m., the security forces had trapped many protesters from the east and west, a tactic known in some countries as “ kettling .” Only one witness at Mie Kwat Zay said that security forces gave verbal warning before the military and police began firing at protesters, but at all other locations, witnesses heard no warnings. The witness accounts and videos indicate that security forces deliberately fired upon protesters to kill or maim without there being any threat to the security forces’ lives. One video shows police and military gathered at 1 p.m. on the Aung Zeya Bridge, which separates Hlaing Tharyar from Yangon. The forces look at the protesters on the streets below and can be heard discussing when and whom to shoot. An unidentified person off camera says, “Just shoot them in the head,” while two police officers point assault rifles toward the protesters. Gunshots are heard and the same unidentified person yells, “Shoot! Shoot! Shoot!” All six witnesses said that the security forces also fired on people who were trying to reach the wounded. “[W]e weren’t able to help those who were injured because they would shoot at us if we tried,” one witness said. “We couldn’t get to them, and they died. Some people who tried to help went forward anyway and they were shot in the head and died.” Witnesses said that some protesters used weapons, such as rocks, slings, and Molotov cocktails, in response to the security forces firing on them, but no security force casualties were reported. On March 15, the day after the killings, the junta accused “rioters” of burning down garment factories and blocking firefighters, and imposed martial law in Hlaing Tharyar and nearby Shwe Pyi Thar township. “Rioters created havoc on roads, and over 2,000 rioters also blocked the roads to prevent fire engines from leaving their stations and fighting the fire,” a junta statement said. The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials state that security forces should “apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms,” and use the minimum necessary force at all times. Firearms may only be used when other less harmful means are not practicable but must still be used to the minimum extent necessary. Intentionally lethal use of firearms is only permitted when strictly unavoidable to protect life. The Basic Principles further provide that in “cases of death and serious injury or other grave consequences, a detailed report shall be sent promptly to the competent authorities.” Since the coup, throughout the country, Myanmar security forces have killed more than 1,200 protesters and bystanders, committing killings, torture, and other crimes that amount to crimes against humanity. The crime against humanity of murder has been defined by international tribunals as death that “results from an act or omission by the accused, committed with the intent either to kill or to cause serious bodily harm with the reasonable knowledge that it would likely lead to death.” The State Administration Council, Myanmar’s junta, is not known to have taken any action against security force officers or personnel, for their involvement in criminal offenses at Hlaing Tharyar or as a matter of command responsibility. The military commander with responsibility for the Yangon Region, including Hlaing Tharyar, was Brig. Gen. Nyunt Win Swe . The Yangon Region police chief was Brig. Gen. Myo Min Htike . Former Myanmar military officers told Human Rights Watch that regional military commanders control police forces during joint operations. The UN, regional bodies, and governments, including the European Union, United States and United Kingdom, should respond to ongoing human rights violations and crimes against humanity in Myanmar by supplementing, strengthening, and coordinating international sanctions against the junta leadership and military under Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. Actions should include targeted sanctions on specified military and police commanders, including Brig. Gen. Nyunt Win Swe and Brig. Gen. Myo Min Htike ; a global arms embargo; and financial restrictions that would reduce the junta’s revenues from extractive industries. “Hlaing Tharyar was a bloodbath for which all those responsible should be brought to justice,” Maung said. “Such atrocities will continue unless the UN Security Council and concerned governments take concerted action to hold Myanmar’s junta leaders to account.” For details and accounts of the attacks, please see below. Killings, Other Abuses in Hlaing Tharyar In early March protesters set up barricades at several bus stops along the main Hlaing River Road, which runs perpendicular to the Hlaing River. Before dawn on March 14, they gathered at the barriers to participate in sit-ins starting at 5 a.m. By 10 a.m., security forces arrived at the first barricade at Bus Stop 1. Witnesses said that about 200 soldiers and police easily bypassed the barriers, forcing protesters to back up westward along the road, or to disperse north and south into side streets. By 11 a.m., the security forces came from both east and west and trapped protesters between Bus Stop 3 and Bus Stop 5. Between noon and 12:40 p.m., the security forces encircled or “kettled” the protesters between Bus Stop 1 and Bus Stop 3, based on Human Rights Watch analysis matching key landmarks visible in two videos with satellite imagery, and the length and angle of shadows in the videos. Video of teargas and gunfire coming from the west at Bus Stop 3 around 12:30 p.m., posted online on March 14, 2021. Credit: Unknown uploader. Verified by Human Rights Watch. Witnesses are identified by pseudonyms for their protection. “Ko Phyo,” who joined the sit-in at dawn at Mie Kwat Zay bus stop near the local market, said that, at about 11:30 a.m., police and soldiers began firing live rounds. They shot continuously, trapping protesters for the next two hours: At Mie Kwat Zay, a group of soldiers and police joined the ranks from the direction of the BOC [junction] bus stop, and another group from Bus Stop 1 came to trap us in between. The police were at the front and the soldiers were behind them. The soldiers started the shooting. “Zaw Zaw” said that, at about 11 a.m., security forces started firing at protesters near Bus Stop 5: They started with teargas and then rubber bullets. After 30 minutes, they started using live rounds. From our side, we used slingshots and rocks, and some even threw Molotov cocktails back … Many people died in front of my eyes … I will never forget that day. “Zaw Htet,” who had joined a sit-in with other labor rights activists at the Tar Tar Phyu bus stop on Hlaing River Road, said that by 1:40 p.m. at least 50 military trucks had made their way to the Aung Zeya Bridge near the protesters’ barricade. The security forces had overrun other barricades ahead of him. He said that they began to shoot when they reached Tar Tar Phyu. At least two armed security force personnel were positioned on two higher buildings: Four people got shot at Tar Tar Phyu in front of me. Out of four, three people died on the spot, and another one was carried by taxi to a clinic … A boy next to me was so scared. I told him to stay on the ground and not to get up, but he was so scared, he stood up to run. He got shot in the neck and died. “Thiri” said that by the time she arrived at Bus Stop 3 around 2:30 p.m., three people were already dead. She could see that others were trapped because of the shooting, but a few were trying to back up from the main road into a smaller road adjacent to the main highway. She could make out two security force personnel on a high building pointing their weapons toward the bus stop, and another two under a tree on the opposite side of the road: We could see the police and soldiers making their way towards us, bit by bit. So those of us who could started backing off and dispersing towards Bus Stop 5 by trying to go down the alleyways and back streets. That was when they sent [an aerial] drone out to see which way we were running. There weren’t that many soldiers at this point, but they knew which directions all the protesters were taking … Just in front of my eyes, I saw a person get shot in the abdomen and his abdomen burst open. Myanmar security forces have used low-flying drones during protests elsewhere in the country, in Monywa in Sagaing Region and in Mandalay Region . “Thiri” said that, shortly after seeing the drone, five more military trucks came over the Aung Zeya Bridge. Running along with four others, security force personnel shot at them, and one bullet hit a nearby lamp post. She fled back and hid behind a barricade at Bus Station 5, but the security forces were also shooting there: I saw police and soldiers come into the small roads and snatch everyone they saw. I was at Bus Station 5 by then, and I saw they shot at the people who were running and trying to hide behind the barricades. When additional forces came, the combined police and military team moved forward and fired nonstop. I saw another man get shot dead. Photograph of sandbags and soldiers between Mie Kwat Zay and the BOC bus stop around sunset on March 14, 2021. © Frontier Myanmar “Zaw Zaw” said: Around 4 p.m., we regrouped at the BOC bus stop. Police and soldiers had attacked other stops ahead, such as at Tar Tar Phyu and Mie Kwat Zay. When we got to the BOC stop, one person was shot with a rubber bullet, and it penetrated their backbone. They even chased us into smaller back streets. Another protester, “Honey,” said that around 5 p.m., when the sounds of gunfire had died down, she took her motorbike to check on her friends: That’s when I ran into a sniper shooting from a high building, possibly from Ko Nyi Ma Swe’s phone shop on Hlaing River Road. I had to get off my motorbike and run away. Earlier, there was a guy shot dead. I saw his blood on the road. His body was taken away by residents nearby. Witnesses said the shooting continued well into the evening. A journalist reported that, at 6 p.m., security forces were still chasing and shooting at protesters near Bogyoke Aung San Road and the Hlaing River Road, near Bus Stop 3. Deliberate Shooting of Protesters Witnesses described situations in which they believed the security forces were aiming at and shooting demonstrators. Video that Human Rights Watch analyzed corroborated these accounts. In one video , recorded around 1 p.m., police and military on the Aung Zeya bridge can be heard discussing who and when to shoot, and where to aim. The suspension bridge is high above the protesters on the ground below, and two police officers on the north side of the bridge can be seen pointing their rifles down toward Bo Ba Htoo Road. Commands are shouted in the background to hold fire as the security forces coordinate when to shoot. Repeated gunshots are then heard off frame. Security force personnel with an assault rifle on Aung Zeya Bridge while commands are shouted to “Shoot [protesters] in the head.” Credit: Unknown uploader. Verified by Human Rights Watch. A police officer posted a video on Tik Tok, which Human Rights Watch analyzed, that shows 11 police officers wearing the distinctive insignia of the Lone Htein riot police, preparing to advance on protesters from a location in Yangon at around noon. As they discuss the weapons they were going to use, one officer says to the others, “You guys will handle Hlaing Tharyar.” Another replies: “I will show no mercy for these people.” Human Rights Watch and others have long documented the highly abusive role that the Lone Htein riot police have played in previous government crackdowns, beating and wrongfully detaining protesters, often working closely beside the army. Video filmed around noon in Yangon of Lone Htein riot police discussing their plans to use violence against protesters in Hlaing Tharyar. Credit: Unknown uploader. Verified by Human Rights Watch. Two witnesses said that they heard automatic weapons being used during the crackdown. Both military personnel and police carried military assault rifles that can be fired in a fully automatic mode. A photo posted by a local media outlet shows military officers and vehicles stationed on Hlaing Road between Mie Kwat Zay and the BOC bus stops between 4 and 6 p.m. and a soldier carrying an apparent MA-1 assault rifle. Other photos of police officers on the Yangon side of the Aung Zeya bridge show them using BA series assault rifles. Videos and images Human Rights Watch reviewed capture the security forces using lethal force against protesters. They also show security forces making a coordinated maneuver to surround protesters and block their exit routes. In one video, taken just before 12:30 p.m., a group of protesters stand under a row of tarps about 35 meters from Bus Stop 3, as intermittent gunshots can be heard nearby. Soon tear gas is deployed from the west and more gunshots are heard, causing the protesters to disperse to the east. The video shows a group of protesters under a row of tarps about 35 meters from Bus Stop 3 who then disperse after tear gas is deployed. Credit: Unknown uploader. Verified by Human Rights Watch. A second video, filmed one block north of Bus Stop 3 at around 12:30 p.m., appears to show protesters fleeing from gunshots, with tear gas visible about 10 to 40 meters east of the bus stop. A minute later, at least 10 security force trucks are seen in an apparent pincer move, driving west from the Aung Zeya bridge into Hlaing Tharyar toward the retreating protesters. One man is seen lying on the pavement from an apparent gunshot wound to his head. Someone attempts to help him, but gunshots force them to leave the man and run for cover. Video posted on March 14, 2021, shows security force vehicles driving west over the Aung Zeya Bridge into Hlaing Tharyar around 12:30 p.m. Credit: Local News Agency. Videos corroborate witness accounts that the security forces cut off protesters’ exit routes from the west and the south. A very brief video and two images posted on social media appear to show security forces crossing the Bayint Naung bridge over the Hlaing River, south of Aung Zeya bridge, into Hlaing Tharyar around 3 p.m. Two other photos show at least one bulldozer and two military trucks on an elevated highway roughly a kilometer east of Bayint Naung bridge driving toward Hlaing Tharyar. The one-second video shows three trucks parked at the western end of Bayint Naung bridge. The angle and length of shadows in the video and photos indicate they were taken between 3 p.m. and 3:30 p.m. Targeting People Trying to Assist the Wounded Protesters carried injured people to mobile clinics that had been set up around the wards and to a clinic nearby Mie Kwat Zay. However, all six witnesses said they saw security forces prevent injured people from receiving help, and fire on those trying to reach wounded protesters or retrieve dead bodies. “Yadanar,” a medical student, anticipated violence on March 14 so volunteered at a mobile clinic near Mie Kwat Zay. She said patients started arriving shortly after 1 p.m.: At least 10 people who came into the clinic were people who’d been shot. They were shot in the arms, legs, head and neck. One person died at our clinic. There might have been other patients who died on their way to a hospital ... When a headshot patient came in, I saw he was having a seizure. We sent him off with an ambulance to a hospital. But one ambulance that took an injured person from our clinic to a hospital was attacked and the ambulance driver badly injured, so they were even shooting at ambulances. Witnesses said the security forces piled bodies on the back of military vehicles. Other bodies remained on the street because the security forces shot at protesters who tried to retrieve them. The police and soldiers also shot at protesters and health care workers who tried to assist other wounded protesters. Security forces shot a healthcare worker who was trying to retrieve a body just 30 meters away, hitting the healthcare worker in the thigh, a witness said. Screenshot of the video referred to below showing protesters dragging the wounded away from advancing security forces, posted online on March 14, 2021. Verified by Human Rights Watch. © Uploader unknown Human Rights Watch analyzed a video recorded around noon about 100 meters east of Bus Stop 5 on Hlaing River Road that shows protesters under gunfire as they attempt to carry wounded demonstrators away from advancing security forces. At least four protesters are visibly injured as they try to help others who are shot; one protester is limp and motionless as he is carried away and another is bleeding from his back on the pavement. Teargas is visible in the center of the road. Gunshots ring out throughout the video, and police and military officers are seen advancing west together toward the bus stop. © 2021 Human Rights Watch

Refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, have long been run by the Polisario movement, which seeks an independent state in Western Sahara, also claimed by Morocco. But a new generation of Sahrawi refugees is growing fractious as aid dwindles and diplomatic efforts fail to deliver a settlement. By Hannah Armstrong An indigenous Sahrawi woman walks at a refugee camp of Boudjdour in Tindouf, southern Algeria, on 3 March 2016. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra Set deep in the desert outside Tindouf, Algeria, the Sahrawi refugee camps are a remote yet lively political hub. The camps are home to 173,000 refugees of a forgotten conflict: an older generation who remember the war against Morocco from 1975 to 1991, and a younger generation born in the camps since the latter year’s ceasefire agreement. All are active in the struggle for a return to the disputed territory of Western Sahara, a 100,000-square-mile coastal stretch of desert now mostly controlled by Morocco. The camps resemble other Saharan settlements, with trucks threading through low sand-clad structures and herds of camels, goats and sheep grazing the desert bush. But their politics are unique: the Polisario Front, a military and political movement formed in the early 1970s to fight for independence for Western Sahara, controls them. Living conditions in the seven Tindouf camps have improved a great deal since 1976, when Sahrawi refugees first fled here from fighting between the Polisario and the Moroccan army. With the men in combat, nomad women, with no experience in administration, had to set up rudimentary structures for social welfare. Over the next 40 years, the camps grew and the Polisario invested heavily in education and health. In the past several years, more schools – including kindergartens, a film school and an arts academy – and clinics have popped up, and six of the seven camps have been connected to electricity grids. With electrification, access to the Internet – and its galaxy of virtual worlds – has become widely available. Between aid reduction and ambient despair, the Polisario risks losing control of the generation born and raised in the camps. But while some doors have opened, others are closing. The international assistance upon which the camps rely is shrinking: an aid worker said annual donations had dropped from $10 million to $7 million over the past several years. Jobs in the camps are scarce. A senior Polisario defence official said an unusually high number of youths, perhaps 500, left the camps in mid-2017 in search of work. In general, though, opportunities for legal migration to Europe – normally to Spain, the former colonial power in Western Sahara – are fewer. Between aid reduction and ambient despair, the Polisario risks losing control of the generation born and raised in the camps. “Without work and without money, men are fragile. The temptation toward migration, extremism or narco-trafficking is strong”, the senior defence official said. Meanwhile, the Internet allows youths to express themselves outside of traditional channels. “There’s a sense of transition from a mass movement to something less centralised”, a 30-year-old video blogger and activist said. Social media is tying refugees more tightly to Sahrawis living in the parts of Western Sahara controlled by Morocco, with activists circulating mobile phone videos of Moroccan repression. Most of all, the younger generation appears to doubt that diplomatic efforts can resolve the crisis they have grown up with. “When our fathers were fighting against the Moroccan occupation, the whole world, and especially the UN, were listening to Polisario”, said Hamdi, a youth leader. But not now, he continued. “Either we get our land back or we go back to war”. Souring on the UN The Western Sahara conflict has been frozen, with a few flare-ups, since the 1991 ceasefire along a line snaking from the south-eastern corner of the Moroccan-Algerian border to the Atlantic Ocean. Moroccan soldiers sit on the western side of the line, now fortified by a berm of sand and stone two metres high, and Polisario fighters patrol the eastern side. In 1991, the UN created a peacekeeping mission with the additional mandate of supervising a referendum in Western Sahara on self-determination. The referendum has never been held and the peace process appears stuck. In many respects, the conclusions of Crisis Group’s last extensive report on the conflict, published in June 2007, remain relevant today: a resolution will have to come through direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario, rather than the UN-led process. Since 2007 Morocco has proposed autonomy for Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty as the basis for a settlement. The Polisario rejects the idea. Negotiations between 2008 and 2012 bore no fruit, with Morocco unwilling to consider any alternative to its proposal and the Polisario remaining committed to self-determination. In the meantime, the parties’ relationship with the UN has soured as both sides have become more aggressive. In November 2015, Rabat declared the secretary-general’s special representative, U.S. diplomat Christopher Ross, persona non grata in the disputed territory, after he pushed to restart negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario. In 2016, it expelled dozens of civilian staffers of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) after Ban Ki-moon, then the secretary-general, used the term “occupation” to refer to Morocco’s presence in Western Sahara during a trip to Sahrawi refugee camps. Rabat allowed only some of the MINURSO personnel to return following discreet talks with UN officials. For the Polisario, these incidents amount to an erosion of the UN’s role, even as the status quo continues to its disadvantage, since Morocco controls two thirds of Western Sahara’s territory. Both [Morocco and the Polisario] share a similar complaint: that the UN is inadequately enforcing the ceasefire. In August 2017, the current UN Secretary-General António Guterres appointed a new envoy, Horst Köhler, a former president of Germany. Köhler embarked on a listening tour of the region as a prelude to relaunching negotiations, but thus far he has not succeeded. The Polisario remains cool to UN efforts. For its part – ahead of the annual renewal of MINURSO’s mandate in late April, when Morocco and the Polisario customarily trade accusations to mobilise allies on the Security Council – Rabat is saying that the UN has been “insufficiently firm” about Polisario violations in the buffer zone. It is threatening to take military action if the supposed infractions continue. In a sense, both sides share a similar complaint: that the UN is inadequately enforcing the ceasefire. The Guerguerat Events The rise in tensions suggests that the conflict’s structure is changing, albeit slowly. On the Polisario side, an important factor is that the movement’s leader throughout most of the conflict, Mohamed Abdelaziz, died in May 2016. He had held the position of Polisario secretary general since 1976 and was the first and only president of the state the front declared, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). His successor as secretary general, Brahim Ghali, another Polisario founder, is temperamentally different: he has shown greater willingness to confront Morocco and the UN, something that has earned him credit among deeply frustrated Sahrawis. Events in Guerguerat are a sign of this change of approach. Guerguerat is a buffer zone just outside the berm abutting the border with Mauritania. In August 2016, Morocco deployed gendarmes to supervise the construction of a road through Guerguerat. The Polisario protested that the deployment was a violation of Military Agreement No. 1 of the ceasefire, which stipulates that the berm is a line of demarcation neither party can cross. After weeks passed with no response from the UN, Ghali dispatched Polisario fighters to the area, triggering a months-long standoff, with the two sides at times just 200m apart. It was the closest they had come to armed confrontation in decades. The Polisario also increased its high-visibility deployment of fighters to areas east of the berm (which it calls liberated territory) – despite Morocco’s withdrawal of forces outside the berm in February 2017 – to assert its claim to sovereignty. Most recently, in December 2017, it held a live-fire military exercise in Guerguerat that Rabat termed a provocation. Because top Polisario leaders attended, it likely was meant as one. The preceding April, the UN said it would dispatch a technical commission to investigate ceasefire violations at Guerguerat, but it has yet to do so, reportedly due to Moroccan opposition. The Polisario cites the delay as proof of the UN’s bias in favour of Morocco and the status quo. Since the idea of holding a referendum continues to structure the peace process, the Polisario says that without a vote it has no option but to return to war. Morocco, for its part, advances its autonomy proposal as the only viable way forward, and has effectively ruled out a referendum. Direct negotiations have never moved beyond this impasse. “If the referendum is not going to happen, the UN should declare this officially, so we can decide our next step”, a Polisario diplomat told me. Rays of Sahrawi Hope While the UN process has stalled, Polisario has pursued alternative routes to press its cause, particularly by filing complaints with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) over Morocco’s exploitation of natural resources in Western Sahara. It has booked some successes. On 21 December 2016, the ECJ ruled that an agricultural trade agreement between Morocco and the European Union (EU) could not be applied to goods from Western Sahara. On 27 February 2018, the ECJ barred the inclusion of waters off the Western Saharan coast in a EU-Morocco fisheries agreement, further confirming it did not allow the EU to consider Western Sahara as part of Morocco. “The Moroccan strategy of using the passage of time to legitimise its occupation isn’t working”, a Polisario minister told me. “As time passes, we are seeing more affirmations that the international community will not endorse the Western Sahara’s Moroccan-ness”. Countries friendly to the Polisario are also acting on the precedents set in the European court. In May 2017, South African customs officials boarded the NM Cherry Blossom, a vessel carrying 50,000 tonnes of phosphates for the Moroccan state-run Office chérifien des phosphates from the Western Saharan port of Laayoune that docked in the South African port, Port Elizabeth, on its way to New Zealand, and seized its cargo. An area where the Polisario claims to be making progress but faces greater uncertainty is its handling of Morocco’s accession to the African Union (AU) in January 2017. Morocco immediately started lobbying for the SADR’s expulsion from the AU and sought to exclude the self-styled Sahrawi state from the November 2017 AU-EU summit in Abidjan. It failed in these efforts. In the Polisario’s view, Morocco miscalculated its ability to shift AU member states’ positions in a multilateral organisation long dominated by states sympathetic to the legality of the group’s claims to self-determination, including Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa. Polisario leaders are of two minds about Moroccan accession to the AU. They assert that the SADR’s membership alongside Morocco as equals may create an opportunity to use the AU for dialogue and diplomacy, even though Rabat adamantly opposes using the AU as a negotiating channel and is trying to kick out the SADR. At the same time, the Polisario is concerned that while the AU has successfully pushed back against Morocco and remains committed to recognising the SADR, which is an AU founding member, the regional organisation no longer is the reliable ally it once was. Instead, it has become a new battleground. MINURSO’s Job Back in the camps around Tindouf, young leaders are conflicted. On the one hand, they feel grateful for the sacrifices made by the older generation. They appreciate the efficiency of the Polisario’s management of the camps and the political freedoms they enjoy there, aware that such liberties are unusual in a region where autocratic governance prevails. “We have freedom here. We can go to hospitals and schools for free; we can travel [Sahrawi refugees have broad access to training and education programs in Spain, Cuba and Algeria]; we can criticise our leader and government and send our message to the world. When I talk to him [Brahim Ghali], I feel like we’re on the same level”, an elected leader from Polisario’s youth wing said. On the other hand, they are impatient with the pace of diplomacy on the Western Sahara question. “If we wait for the UN Security Council to deliver the referendum and the freedom to go back to our land, we will be here for 300 years”, said Hamdi, the youth leader quoted above. “I believe that the UN and MINURSO represent international protection for the Moroccan occupation of the Western Sahara. If we don’t go back to war, nothing will change. After all this time, I don’t believe in a political solution. The UN thinks it can just give us some food and essentials and we won’t bother them”. The older generation is somewhat fearful about how the ascent of these more confrontational, more militant youths will affect the Polisario movement. “We’re doing our best to calm our youths, but how long can this last? Every night on TV they see Moroccans beating Sahrawis and the international community does nothing”, a senior Polisario diplomat said. The uptick in tensions raises wider questions. Is it the conflict that is frozen or the nearly three-decade-old framework for resolving it? What would the breakdown of the status quo precipitate in a regional environment that has radically changed since 1991? Both the Maghreb and the Sahel, which Western Sahara straddles, face political upheaval and violent turmoil. With the frozen conflict showing signs of thawing – at least on the Polisario’s side – while also appearing with new urgency on the EU and AU agendas, creative thinking is needed to unblock the peace process. It is complacent to imagine that the status quo can continue indefinitely. A final settlement of the conflict may be elusive for now, but are there better modalities of conflict management worth contemplating? Can the parties be pushed to modify their maximalist positions, and if so, how? These are not easy questions to answer, but they are important ones to ask – for the UN secretary-general and Secretariat, for members of the Security Council, for the involved parties, and for the Maghreb and the Sahel more broadly. UN envoy Köhler, who has started to ask some of these questions, will need the support and engagement of Security Council members to get answers, since neither side is likely to budge from its position without external pressure. In the interim, Köhler needs space to bring a new strategic direction to efforts to resolve the conflict. For this he also will need the support of MINURSO, which is mandated to support his efforts but also to fulfil a number of operational functions. The mission should carry out the investigation it promised in Guerguerat and enforce the ceasefire – the latter in particular is critical to improving Köhler’s prospects of restarting talks that remain the best option for resolving the long-running crisis and reducing prospects it again turns violent. (c) 2018 International Crisis Group https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/western-sahara/youth-movement-sahrawi-refugee-camps?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=107d61115b-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_04_25&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-107d61115b-359909993

By Helen Griffiths Estonia's President Toomas Hendrik addresses the United Nations General Assembly in the Manhattan borough of New York, U.S. September 21, 2016. © 2016 Reuters This week, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child will review Estonia’s child rights record. It is crucial that this include child statelessness. As of January 2016, about 6.1 percent of Estonia’s population of 1.3 million is stateless – 79,300 people. When Estonia gained independence in 1991, the government adopted strict citizenship policies that made nearly 40 percent of the population stateless. Residents who were not Estonian citizens before World War II – many of them ethnic Russians – had to go through a strict naturalization process, including a language test and a residency period. Disappointingly, while Estonia has made some strides in reducing child statelessness since then, it has not fully addressed the problem. In 2015, Estonia amended its Citizenship Law to make it easier for several categories of people, including children, to become naturalized from January 2016. But there’s one glaring gap for children: Adolescents between the ages of 16 and 18 and children born outside Estonia to stateless residents of Estonia still cannot automatically obtain citizenship. There are huge implications for these children. In Estonia, the stateless hold a special legal status and children can access education and health care on an almost equal basis. But a lack of citizenship and identity can expose children to discrimination, meaning they often don’t feel at home in the country in which they live. It can also affect them psychologically. Estonia’s government seems reluctant to want to change this. Recommendations from other states to act on child statelessness, and statelessness more generally, at a UN review last year were noted, but not accepted. Estonia is also not a party to the principal international human rights treaties relating to statelessness, stating in its report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child that it has found that, “persons with undetermined citizenship residing in Estonia are currently enjoying all the rights under the Convention [Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons].” Of course, child statelessness is not just limited to Estonia. At a time when there’s a global campaign to end all statelessness by 2024, the Committee on the Rights of the Child should help focus attention on the particular challenges stateless children face. All children have a right to a nationality and to live in a society free from discrimination. The committee needs to send a clear message that this key gap in Estonia’s child rights record requires an urgent fix. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Human Rights Watch

By Gregorio Baggiani Ukraine has just concluded its month-long role as rotating president of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) during February 2017. Kyiv has specifically pledged to use this high-level international forum to confront Moscow for its aggression and to seek reimbursement for the damages Ukraine has incurred following Russia’s forced annexation of Crimea and subsequent war in Donbas (Ukraineun.org, accessed March 1). Indeed, the question of how to legally pursue damages using international law and multinational courts has been gaining momentum recently, as Ukraine prepares for its case to be heard before the UN International Court of Justice, in The Hague In October 2016, Ukrainian energy giant Naftohaz and six of its oil and natural gas subsidiaries officially filed an arbitration against Russian authorities, who seized the companies’ assets after Moscow illegally occupied Crimea in March 2014. The Ukrainian firms heretofore operating on the Crimean peninsula never received any material compensation from Moscow. The damages are estimated at $2.6 billion (Naftogaz.com, October 19, 2016). Naftogaz, in particular, lost 15 oil and gas field–connected facilities in Crimea and offshore, 3 potential oil and gas extraction areas, the underground storage facility in Glebovskoe, over 1,200 kilometers of main gas pipelines, 43 gas distribution stations, 29 extraction facilities, and several other assets (Zerkalo Nedeli, October 19, 2016; see EDM, April 24, 2014). According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, six lawsuits have been initiated against the Russian Federation regarding the energy sector (Mfa.gov.ua, accessed February 28). The lawsuits were filed based on a clause in the Ukrainian-Russian intergovernmental agreement on the encouragement and mutual protection of investments, better known as the Russian-Ukrainian Bilateral Investment Treaty (Investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org, November 27, 1998). These lawsuits were initiated by Privatbank, Ukrnafta, Belbek Airport, Stabil, Everest Estate and Oschadbank. Naftogaz and several other companies are also in the process of preparing lawsuits, and they have involved legal advisers from the start so as to avoid early mistakes in forming their legal position (Zerkalo Nedeli, January 27, 2016). In a January 2016 interview with Zerkalo Nedeli, Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Elena Zerkal explained that while her government continues to strive unrelentingly to protect Ukraine’s sovereign rights and the rights of its citizens, Kyiv’s actions are limited to some degree by various multilateral and bilateral agreements—including ones binding for both Ukraine and Russia (Zerkalo Nedeli, January 27, 2016). The problem is that there are not many tribunals whose jurisdiction is recognized by both Kyiv and Moscow. One such prominent institution, however, is the International Court of Justice—the most authoritative judicial body with regard to handling cases involving the sovereign interests of states in the broadest sense. And indeed, as noted above, Ukraine will be pursuing its case against Russia in this forum. The trial will take place on March 6 to 9 (Zerkalo Nedeli, February 1). But complicating matters for Kyiv in this approach is the fact that both Ukraine and Russia have inherited the old Soviet practice of a highly selective recognition of the ICJ. In other words, the two sides are only able to use the ICJ to enforce their rights when both Ukraine and Russia decide at that instance to recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Therefore, when it comes to relying on the authority of this international tribunal, the options Ukraine could take advantage of are actually quite limited. Earlier this year, Ukraine filed a lawsuit against Russia in the ICJ over the latter’s annexation of Crimea and mistreatment of the local Crimean Tatar population (UAWire, January 17). Specifically, Kyiv charged Moscow with contravening several international treaties, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (pertaining, in this case to the harassed Tatar minority in Crimea) (Ukrinform, February 15), the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (including considering Russia’s role in the downing of Malaysian Flight 17 over occupied Donbas in mid-2017), as well as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (concerning Russian exploitation of Ukrainian fishery stocks, prevention of free navigation to Ukrainian vessels in and around Crimean waters, as well as Russia building infrastructure to which Ukraine has not given its consent). But Moscow has simply replied that everything it had done was in full compliance with international law and refused, therefore, to “legitimize” its actions by arguing its case before the ICJ (Mid.ru, January 17). Notwithstanding its pending cases in the ICJ, the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice has repeatedly stated, in the past, that the economic losses suffered by the state following the occupation of Crimea will be reimbursed as part of the claim presented by Ukraine against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (Interfax, February 2). Whether such an approach ultimately proves fruitful remains to be seen—especially considering that in the past two years, Russia has backed away from coming under the jurisdiction of several international tribunals. In December 2015, the State Duma passed a law allowing Russia to overrule decisions made in the ECHR; and last November, Moscow pulled out of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (The Moscow Times, December 15, 2015; Sputnik News, November 16, 2016). The decision by the Russian authorities to circumvent various international law institutions highlights Moscow’s approach to dealing with Ukrainian efforts to defend its sovereign and commercial interests in international tribunals. Indeed, Ukrainian investors who lost valuable assets in Crimea as a consequence of the occupation have a better chance of winning their case in arbitration under the bilateral agreement on the mutual protection of investments. Still, some mechanisms exist that could compel Russia to implement the decisions of the International Court of Justice in the event of a judgement friendly to Ukraine: A failure to comply with ICJ decisions would trigger the involvement of the UNSC. And as laid out in the United Nations Charter, Russia, as a member of the Security Council involved in a judicial litigation, would have to abstain from voting. In its role as a non-permanent UNSC member, Ukraine will almost certainly seek to utilize such legal strategies and institutional mechanisms this year. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 HRWF

By Hing Socheata and Meng Neradey Taing Kim came forward with her story in 2003, when she became one of the first women to speak publicly about her experience, which was also covered in a 2005 television documentary filmed by DC-Cam in the rice field. (Courtesy photo of DC-Cam) One evening in 1975, soon after the Khmer Rouge forces had taken control of Cambodia, some of the cadres came to Taing Kim’s village in Boribo district of Kampong Chhnang Province. The cadres inspected each household, and Taing Kim and her husband, who had soldiered for the defeated Khmer Republic forces of General Lon Nol, were taken to a nearby rice field. Taing Kim, then 23 years old, realized a terrible fate awaited them. Her husband of five years was bludgeoned to death in front of her. The cadres raped Taing Kim and then planned to kill her. Afterward, as soldiers murdered another villager, a Khmer Rouge cadre let her slip away. Taing Kim, now 61, recalled the traumatic violence in a recent interview with VOA Cambodia and said she hid in a large village pond for three days before escaping. “I dream about those soldiers every night,” she said. “They chase me. I am really scared. They catch me and shoot. I feel a huge flame come over me until I wake and realize it’s just a dream.” ​Thousands of victims Though she was lucky to survive the Khmer Rouge’s reign from April 1975 until January 1979, which left 1.7 million Cambodians dead, she is among the thousands of women who were victims of sexual violence. Many of them have had to suffer the effects of their trauma in silence and shame, because Cambodia’s conservative society offers little sympathy or understanding for rape victims. “Cambodian culture blames women who were victimized by criticizing them as if they provoked the crime,” said Kasumi Nakagawa, a professor of gender studies at Pannasastra University in Phnom Penh. “Therefore, any woman who is abused or assaulted commonly finds it extremely difficult to disclose the crime.” That attitude prevails, as shown in early August, when a Cambodian TV anchor on the Hang Meas television network appeared to blame female rape and murder victims for encouraging their attackers. Speaking about Khmer Rouge-era rape The Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), a nongovernmental institute tasked with documenting the Khmer Rouge regime and educating the public about it, has recorded more than 190 rape survivors from the era. FILE - Women arrive at the entrance gate to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) for the trial hearing on evidences of forced marriage and rape during the Khmer Rouge regime, on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Aug. 23, 2016. Taing Kim came forward with her story in 2003, when she became one of the first women to speak publicly about her experience, which was also covered in a 2005 television documentary. In 2007, when the newly called U.N.-backed Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) was still determining its legal scope as a war crimes court, she filed a criminal complaint. The tribunal later rejected her complaint largely on a technicality. Khmer Rouge survivors have generally had little chance of finding justice against individual perpetrators, as the tribunal’s jurisdiction has been limited to only a handful of senior leaders and “most responsible” perpetrators who have been imprisoned. Taing Kim said she felt disappointed with the court proceedings. “I have come to the court, however, I did not have a chance to give a testimony. Maybe they think my case is really common,” she said. “I am really tired of going to the court since my health is not well, and I have to spend a lot of money for transportation and food.” Many ordinary Khmer Rouge veterans also continue to live, unpunished, in the countryside, sometimes near their victims. Taing Kim said she knows many former cadres who live near her home in Kampong Chhnang Province. FILE - Youk Chhang, director of the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), poses after an interview with Reuters in Phnom Penh, April 17, 2015. Youk Chhang, DC-Cam’s executive director, said Taing Kim’s early public testimony paved the way for other victims to speak out and file a complaint with the U.N.-backed tribunal. “She inspires many women in Cambodia, those who suffered under the Khmer Rouge regime or later, to bring their burden stories to the world,” he said, even though the culture of silence around rape and the lack of justice for victims meant “double suffering.” Recent rape victims suffer, too Taing Kim’s suffering became more acute when her second husband learned about the rape. Although married since the 1980s and the parents of three children, their union frayed as he and his family blamed her for the rape. Eventually, her husband divorced her, leaving her with the children. Taing Kim turned to Buddhism and became a nun to seek to relief from the pain of her life. She continues to speak about her experience and this month she visited South Africa to present her story at the Johannesburg Holocaust and Genocide Foundation Center. Ms. Taing Kim is one of the survivors during Khmer Rouge before leaving Cambodia to visit South Africa on July 31, 2017. (Hing Socheata/VOA Khmer) Nakagawa, the Pannasastra University professor, said Taing Kim’s experience in publicly discussing her experience laid bare the problems for rape survivors. “She showed to the Cambodian people, or to the world, that it is difficult for a (rape) survivor to openly seek justice,” she said. “The fact that she decided to become a nun also demonstrated that she found that it is impossible to find peace of mind if she stays in a lay society,” Nakagawa said. “By becoming a nun, she gave up her choice to seek for justice, but rather stay safe and in peace in a religious world.” Justice elusive Criminal justice and social acceptance often remain elusive for recent Cambodian rape victims as well. Local human rights group Licadho studied 762 reported rape cases from 2012-2014 and found that a third of the victims avoided any pursuit of justice or compensation because of fear of social condemnation, and half of them settled out of court by accepting compensation money from the perpetrators. DC-Cam’s Youk Chhang said it remains difficult and painful for Khmer Rouge rape victims and others who suffered under the regime to accept the court’s proceedings. “The truth in the court is different from the truth in history,” he said. “There are many crimes that Khmer Rouge has done. The judge has to decide which one is the most serious, how beneficial it is (to prosecute), how long will it take, how much financially it will cost. The judge cannot prosecute all of the crimes.” ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 VOA

By Glenn Kessler It's rare to have two U.S. agencies that report to the same person disagree. But this a matter of international politics. (Meg Kelly/The Washington Post) “As of July 7, health actors had recorded more than 23,200 cases of acute watery diarrhea (AWD) since August 2016, according to the U.N. World Health Organization (WHO) and the Government of Sudan (GoS) Ministry of Health (MoH).” — U.S. Agency for International Development, fact sheet, July 27, 2017 “The U.S. Embassy in Khartoum informs U.S. citizens that there are confirmed reports of cholera cases in some areas of Sudan, including the greater Khartoum metropolitan area, that have resulted in fatalities.” — U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, emergency message, June 1 The State Department and USAID are related agencies, both reporting to the secretary of state, but there is an odd disconnect in how they have described a looming public health emergency in the African country of Sudan. The embassy declared that there were “confirmed reports” of cholera that have killed people, whereas USAID, citing the World Health Organization and the Sudanese government, said there were cases of “acute watery diarrhea,” known in medical circles as AWD. What’s going on here? The Facts According to the WHO, there are three types of diarrhea: acute watery diarrhea, which lasts several hours or days; acute bloody diarrhea, also called dysentery; and persistent diarrhea, which lasts 14 days or longer. AWD can include cholera, which is an acute diarrhea infection caused by ingestion of food or water that is contaminated with Vibrio cholerae bacterium. (Cholera infections are most commonly acquired from drinking water, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.) If left untreated, however, cholera can kill within hours. AWD is a symptom of cholera, but cholera requires more urgent care and immediate rehydration. The first indication of a problem in Sudan was in August 2016, when 100 deaths, mainly children, were reported in Sudan’s Blue Nile state. “A medical worker from Blue Nile state revealed an increase in incidences of diarrhea that he believes to be cholera,” reported Radio Dabanga, an independent news source that operates out of the Netherlands with correspondents in the field. “He attributes the spread to polluted water and said that hospitals in the state have to isolate patients with diarrhea to avoid infecting others.” Sudan has known little but civil conflict since its independence more than a half-century ago, especially between the largely Arab, Islamic northern part of the country and the largely animist and Christian African south, which formed the independent country of South Sudan in 2011. There are also ongoing conflicts in other parts of the country, principally Darfur in the West and the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, which border South Sudan. President Omar al-Bashir, who has ruled the country since 1989, was indicted by the International Criminal Court in 2009 for allegedly pursuing a genocide campaign in Darfur. South Sudan, the world’s youngest country, descended into civil war shortly after independence, and a cholera outbreak was declared there in May 2014. The index, or first, case was retrospectively identified with an onset of illness on April 23, and then four cases were laboratory-confirmed in Kenya; by May 25, officials had reported 586 cases, including 22 deaths. The WHO has assiduously tracked the spread in the country and administered more than 1.5 million doses of cholera vaccination in an effort to stem the spread, but an additional 2 million doses are required, according to the agency. Recent reports say another 2,500 cases in South Sudan have been registered since April, for a total of 8,000, including 250 deaths. The cholera outbreak in South Sudan is probably linked to the growing health emergency in Sudan. ACAPS, a nonprofit, nongovernmental project that assesses humanitarian needs, on June 16 issued a report stating that a “cholera outbreak” that started in Blue Nile “began to spread rapidly as of April this year. Conservative estimates suggest a minimum of between 15,000- 23,000 people infected, with 280-820 deaths.” But the group said that without immediate intervention, infection is likely to spread further now that it had reached the densely populated capital of Khartoum. Almost 2 million people live in the capital. ACAPS said a factor in the rapid spread may be the large refugee population from South Sudan that fled the fighting and is crowded in refugee camps in the White Nile state. “ACAPS is curating and triangulating a lot of different sources to produce its own independent analysis,” said spokeswoman Caroline Draveny. “In the case of Sudan, all data we analyzed led us to call it cholera.” In its reports in South Sudan, WHO acknowledged that “all the states bordering South Sudan are affected” by a growing number of cases of acute watery diarrhea. But here’s the problem: The government in Sudan refuses to acknowledge one. In fact, Khartoum has actively sought to prevent hospitals, doctors and journalists from reporting that there is a cholera outbreak. As far back as January, doctors reported that laboratory tests on acute diarrhea samples proved that it was cholera. “The management problems at the Health Ministry have impeded containment of the disease. Instead of acknowledging the disease and taking measures to prevent the spread of cholera during the past six months, the authorities opted for not announcing the test results,” said one doctor. Al-Fateh Omar al-Sayed, a leader of the Sudanese Doctors Union and the National Epidemiological Corporation, in June told Radio Dabanga that the cholera epidemic has turned from a severe temporary situation to a constant epidemic. But the Sudanese government has taken steps to play down the threat: In April, newspaper reporter Ammar al-Daw was detainedfor reporting on the outbreak and accused of defamation by the health minister of his home state, Gedaref, of violating the Information Crimes Act. The reporter was accused of “defamation for publishing materials related to the watery diarrhea that has swept many localities in the state and led to the death and infection of hundreds.” In June, the Sudanese health ministry fired a hospital director who dared to publicly say it was treating cholera cases. In July, security officers questioned a group of volunteers who had set up an awareness campaign on how to prevent the spread of cholera in the area. “The volunteers were told to stop mentioning cholera,” Radio Dabanga reported. “WHO has not received any lab results to date that confirm cholera in Sudan,” said Gregory Hartl, a WHO spokesman. “However, the Government of Sudan has confirmed an outbreak of AWD. Preventing the spread of the AWD outbreak and saving lives are two of the highest priorities for WHO and Sudan’s Federal Ministry of Health. WHO is coordinating efforts with all parties to ensure an effective and rapid response. Early detection is key to containing any outbreak, regardless of the cause.” He added that “whether an outbreak is called ‘cholera’ or ‘acute watery diarrhea’ does not alter WHO response, and in the case of Sudan, WHO and partners are free to act on the ground to support the government in providing people with the care they need.” He did not respond to a query about whether a cholera declaration would allow the use of the cholera vaccine to prevent further spread of the disease. In an open letter to WHO, a group of U.S. physicians have decried “WHO’s failure to confirm or disconfirm the findings of Sudanese labs tests in Geneva, using stool samples appropriately transferred from Sudan.” Addressing WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the letter said: “Your failure to transport stool samples from victims in Sudan to Geneva for official confirmation of cholera makes you fully complicit in the terrible suffering and dying that continues to spread, out of control, with daily new reports confirming that this is indeed a cholera epidemic.” When he was health minister of Ethiopia, Dr. Tedros, as he is known, was accused of covering up cholera outbreaks by labeling it as AWD to avoid harming the country’s tourism industry. Tests by the United Nations confirmed it was cholera that had led to 60,000 infections and more than 600 deaths. WHO’s Hartl insisted: “Sending stool samples overseas is not called for at this point. WHO understands that the capacity of the Central Public Health Laboratory of Sudan to test and confirm Vibrio cholerae has been demonstrated in the past, and that the Government of Sudan has in fact performed such laboratory tests in response to the recent outbreaks.” A USAID spokesman noted that “typically, a cholera outbreak is declared by the Ministry of Health in the affected country, in coordination with the World Health Organization. In Sudan, there is no official cholera declaration.” He said USAID was responding to the AWD outbreak and added: “The United States calls on the Government of Sudan to support timely testing and identification of the causes of acute watery diarrhea, in order to enable both government and international donor efforts to address the immediate outbreak, and provide longer-term solutions.” The U.S. Embassy in Khartoum did not respond to a query about why it warned of a cholera outbreak. Representatives of the Sudanese Embassy in Washington and Sudanese mission to the United Nations did not reply to queries about the government’s handling of the health emergency. An admission of a cholera outbreak would be embarrassing for the regime in Khartoum, exposing its deeply troubled health system. It also comes as the Trump administration is facing an October deadline on whether to lift some sanctions on Sudan. One of the issues under review is improving humanitarian access throughout Sudan. Eric Reeves, a senior fellow at Harvard University’s Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights who closely follows Sudan, said it was “preposterous” to assume that a government that punishes people for uttering the word cholera could be trusted to report accurate lab results. The embassy announcement indicated the outbreak was “only now getting attention because it is occurring in areas where Americans might travel (not the case with Darfur, Eastern Sudan, Blue Nile, or South Kordofan),” Reeves said. “Up until then, only Sudanese lives were at risk.” “Any time a specific disease appears in certain nations, political sensitivities unfortunately arise about announcing it,” said Amesh A. Adalja, senior associate at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security. “Cholera is a disease that does carry some stigma around it and that may be behind the ‘acute watery diarrhea’ label despite the diagnosis of cholera being confirmed. In early stages of an outbreak when precise causation hasn’t been established, a clinical descriptor will temporarily suffice but once a definite disease agent has been confirmed it is important to name it exactly and respond accordingly.” David A. Sack, professor of internal health at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, noted that most sub-Saharan African nations, with the exception of Sudan and Ethiopia, do report cholera outbreaks. “Most Asian countries fail to report, and do not even report AWD even though the largest numbers of cases actually occur in Pakistan and Bangladesh,” he said. “India does report a few cases, but they report only a small proportion of the actual numbers.” The Pinocchio Test We understand the diplomatic niceties here. A country’s health ministry is supposed to declare a health emergency, and WHO may be reluctant to intervene for fear that the regime would eject needed medical professionals. But it seems absurd for the State Department to warn Americans of confirmed reports of deaths from cholera while USAID sticks with the more politically convenient designation of acute watery diarrhea, even as the death toll rises. Amazingly, the death toll may be higher (800) in Sudan than South Sudan (250), but that’s because WHO has been able to respond to the crisis in South Sudan with a program of vaccinations and education about the deadly disease. The Pinocchios here are mainly for the Sudanese government, which refuses to admit an apparent cholera outbreak, but WHO and USAID should not escape blame either. Words make a difference. The accusations that WHO’s director-general tried to mask a cholera outbreak in Ethiopia by labeling it as AWD, when tests showed otherwise, make it even more imperative that the international agency should appear above politics. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Washington Post

By Helen Regan and Sarita Harilela Myanmar's ousted State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi on December 11, 2019 in the Peace Palace of The Hague. Myanmar's ousted civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been charged with violating the official secrets act, her lawyer said Thursday, as the ruling military junta cut all wireless internet services in the Southeast Asian country until further notice. Suu Kyi's charge of breaking the British colonial-era law is the fifth and most serious charge leveled against her since the military seized power in a coup on February 1. A conviction can carry a prison sentence of up to 14 years, according to Reuters. Pro-democracy demonstrators have repeatedly filled streets across the country for nearly two months in protest over the military's bloody takeover, which overthrew Suu Kyi's elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government over claims of election fraud, and installed a ruling military junta. Suu Kyi and other government officials have been detained since the coup. She faces four other charges, including violating the import-export law and prohibiting publishing information that may "cause fear or alarm." Her lawyer, Khin Maung Zaw, told CNN Suu Kyi was charged on March 25 alongside detained Australian economic adviser Sean Turnell and several other advisers. He said he was only informed of the new charge on March 30. The ousted civilian leader, whose party won a landslide in the November 2020 elections, has not been seen in public since her detention. Appearing in court via a video link on Thursday, Khin Maung Zaw said she seemed to be in "good physical condition," according to a junior lawyer who was present at the hearing. "She demanded to arrange a meeting between her and the lawyers -- the defense lawyers -- a private meeting to give instructions to her lawyers to discuss about the case without any outside interferences like the police or other force," Khin Maung Zaw said. On Friday, Myanmar citizens were expecting to wake up to no wireless broadband internet services after telecoms companies received instructions from the Ministry of Transportation and Communications to stop the service. Customers of telecoms company Ooredoo received text messages the night before saying wireless services will be stopped until further notice. The directive was dated from April 1. Anti-coup demonstrators raise the three finger of resistance and a portrait of deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi as prepare to confront police during a protest in Tarmwe township, Yangon on April 1. A majority of customers in Myanmar connect to the internet through wireless data services and the move will leave only those with physical connections to access the web. In an effort to stifle communication and the flow of information, the junta has imposed nightly internet shutdowns. Internet monitor Netblocks confirmed the internet was cut from 1 a.m. Friday morning -- the 47th consecutive night of military-imposed shutdowns. Mobile data has also been disabled for the 19th day, the company said. CNN has reached out to Myanmar's military for comment. UN condemns 'use of violence' Late Thursday, the United Nations Security Council issued a statement to the press condemning the "use of violence" against protestors in the streets of Myanmar. The response to ongoing protests by security forces has seen unarmed civilians shot in the street, and beatings, arbitrary detentions and nighttime raids on the homes of suspected opposition members. At least 543 people have been killed by junta forces, according to advocacy group the Assistance Association of Political Prisoners. "Members of the Security Council expressed deep concern at the rapidly deteriorating situation and strongly condemned the use of violence against peaceful protestors and the deaths of hundreds of civilians, including women and children," the UN Security Council statement said. In order to get the support of China and Russia, Western countries were forced to modify the language used in the statement. The final UNSC statement, the third issued by the Council since the coup, did not threaten Myanmar military rulers with sanctions or an arms embargo. Demonstrators burn a copy of Myanmar's constitution during a protest against the military coup in Mandalay, Myanmar, on April 1. A UN diplomat told CNN that countries wanted to include the phrase "a readiness to consider further steps" -- a reference to the possibility of sanctions -- but China, Myanmar's strongest defender in the 15-nation council, blocked the language, said the diplomat. Attempts to refer to the hundreds of civilian deaths as "'killing," became simply "civilian deaths," the diplomat added. Russia wanted to include language condemning the death of Myanmar security officials, which stopped approval of the final text several times, according to the diplomat. It comes after the Security Council concluded its meeting Wednesday with no immediate sign of any agreement on more aggressive actions on Myanmar. Diplomats at the UN still insist it is important for the Council to speak with one voice. Russia's deputy UN Ambassador told reporters Wednesday that sanctions would represent intrusion into the internal affairs of a member country of the UN. Airstrikes continue Relief group Free Burma Rangers said air strikes continued early Thursday morning in Myanmar's southeastern Karen state, the same day the military said it would begin a unilateral ceasefire. Since Saturday, the military has been conducting airstrikes in Karen state, as tensions increase between armed ethnic groups in the country and the military. Thousands of residents have been forced to flee into the jungle and into neighboring Thailand. Many of the villages targeted are controlled by the Karen National Union (KNU), an ethnic armed group that holds large swathes of territory in the borderlands. The KNU is one of many ethnic armed groups to have come out in support of the protests and to condemn the military takeover. Free Burma Rangers said strikes occurred in areas that were previously targeted and that there were no casualties as residents were in hiding. Burma Campaign UK also reported two more airstrikes in the state early Thursday, in statement on Twitter. Members of the KNU shared a video with CNN that purports to show the aftermath of an airstrike at a gold mine in Dwe Lo, township, in Papun district on March 30. Multiple bodies could be seen on the ground and fires burned at what appeared to be a work site. Myanmar's military declined to comment on Thursday's strikes. In a statement on state television Wednesday, the military said it would suspend its "operations unilaterally from April 1 to April 30," but that it would reserve the right to take action against those who "threaten to disrupt the government, security and administration." © 2021 Cable News Network.

As bombs rain down on Myanmar's hotbeds of rural resistance, tens of thousands flee to the jungle without food or water. By Helen Regan and Sandi Sidhu In a remote part of Myanmar's far west, where narrow roads zigzag through treacherous mountain passes and villages nestle on precipitous slopes and ridges, lives a centuries-old community of hunters. Traditionally, the Chin people used their intimate knowledge of this hilly, jungle terrain and homemade hunting rifles, called Tumi, to kill wild boar, goat and deer for food. But lately their skills have been deployed to hunt a far more vicious prey: the Myanmar military . When security forces started shooting unarmed peaceful protesters in the streets and arresting people by the thousands after a February military coup, Chin villagers picked up their guns to protect their towns and villages from similar attacks. Forming people's defense forces, these local militia groups made up of mainly young men have become a deadly thorn in the side of the military, known as the Tatmadaw, as it struggles to assert control over the whole country. A member of the Chinland Defense Force (CDF), who wanted to remain anonymous for security reasons, said its fighters are "ordinary citizens" including "farmers, university students, hunters and some high school students." "The Tumi guns that we use are part of our culture as we are hunters and farmers, every house has it," he said. Chin State's Mindat in Myanmar's east has been at the center of some of the fiercest fighting since the military coup. Their homemade rifles and explosives were put to the test against the military's heavy weaponry of artillery, automatic guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) last month, when the Tatmadaw launched an all-out offensive on the Chin town of Mindat, according to multiple humanitarian groups and the CDF. As bombs and bullets rained down on the town, thousands of people fled. They remain stranded in the nearby jungle hills with little food or medical aid. Water supplies were cut off to Mindat, which is now occupied by junta forces who have reportedly looted and burnt houses and installed snipers on roads into the town. In the weeks since, fighting between the military and the Chin resistance fighters has spread to other areas of the state, with reports of whole villages forced to abandon their homes. All-out assault Mindat is a town of between 15,000 to 20,000 people perched on a mountain ridge 1,000 meters (4,000 feet) high in the Chin Hills, about 100 kilometers (60 miles) from the Indian border. Like in most regions across Myanmar, Mindat residents took to the streets to protest the coup. The Chin, often called one of Myanmar's most-persecuted minority groups, suffered decades of oppression and abuse at the hands of the Tatmadaw, including killings, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, forced labor and displacement. They did not want to see the armed forces back in power. Seeing the bloodshed inflicted against protesters in towns and cities across the country, which left at least 840 people dead, Chin people formed the CDF on April 25. By then, Mindat was already a center of defiance. The Mindat People's Administration Team, formed in February by officials aligned with civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her ousted National League for Democracy government, had declared they -- not the junta -- were in charge of the town, according to local media. Then in April, clashes broke out between the CDF and the military, with resistance fighters launching ambush attacks on military convoys and shoot-outs between the two sides. The military said in state media that "armed terrorists" had attacked a police station and a bank in Mindat and assailed security forces, destroying vehicles and killing soldiers, so it imposed martial law on the town. But the Chin fighters said the clashes started after the military arrested protesters, who put up anti-coup posters in the town, and people gathered to demand their release. Tensions boiled over on May 15 when the military launched an air and ground offensive on Mindat, using machine guns, RPGs, artillery fire, mortars and helicopters in an effort to quash the Chin resistance. Houses and public buildings were destroyed and about half the town's residents fled into the jungles or nearby villages. Others unable to leave dug bunkers in their yards to try to protect themselves from the incoming fire, local humanitarian group the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO) said. CHRO accused the military of human rights violations and "grave breaches of the Geneva Convention," saying war crimes may have occurred in Mindat. "They've used human shields during the battle, indiscriminately bombed and destroyed civilian properties, they target civilians -- they don't differentiate -- they occupy schools and hospitals," said CHRO's deputy director Salai Za Uk Ling. "If those are not war crimes, I don't know what is." CNN cannot independently verify reports of the incidents. Myanmar's military did not respond to CNN's requests for comment. As the assault on Mindat intensified, the CDF decided to retreat. "If we fight back there will be a lot of loss for the civilians, there will be more shooting with heavy weapons on houses and buildings, we couldn't sacrifice the civilians and we had to avoid the clash," the CDF member said. Protesters hold signs in support of the town of Mindat in Chin state, during a demonstration in Mandalay on May 17. Myanmar's military now has full control of the town, he said. The once bustling marketplace is deserted, as those who remain are afraid to step out of their homes. The people left are mostly women, children and the elderly who were unable to flee the bombardments. Salai Za Uk Ling believes the assault on Mindat was intended as a message from the junta to the militia groups that have formed across Myanmar: If you resist, you'll be crushed. "It shows to me the extent to which they are prepared to go in trying to put the population under their control," he said. "They were trying to make Mindat an example, and the fact they have been engaged in these kind of violent methods means they are willing to do anything. It's a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and human rights laws." As the CDF's activities gain momentum in other areas, Salai Za Uk Ling said he's "very concerned about the possibility of a situation like Mindat repeating in other towns." A 'humanitarian disaster' An estimated 10,000 people -- about half Mindat's population -- are hiding in the jungle, staying in informal camps or nearby villages. Food and medical supplies are scant and the monsoon rains are setting in -- with the potential for flooding and mudslides to inundate the hilly forests. Unverified images on social media show groups of people huddling together under rocks and lying on rattan mats. Some villagers have bandaged arms and legs, while others have IV drips hooked up to bamboo poles. It is unclear how many civilians died in the assault on the town. At the time, CHRO said at least 50 people had been wounded by shrapnel and were being treated in the jungle, and that some of the injuries sustained were serious. Salai Ben, 24, was in Mindat during the attack and said his brother-in-law was severely wounded. "He is barely alive now as he's got severe injures on his whole body and on his face. He cannot speak nor eat properly, he couldn't drink properly either and we have to use a straw to drop water on his mouth," he said. Salai Ben, who worked in Mindat, said the town was completely surrounded by the military. He was one of a group of people able to leave in the days after the attack. "The military asked the civilians who want to get out from town to fly a white flag. When we left the town the military checked our phones, IDs, luggage, and our motorcycles. There were around five checkpoints," he said. People flee from fighting in Myanmar's northwestern town of Mindat in Chin State, Myanmar, May 17. Unlike others who could only flee by foot, carrying their possessions on their backs, Salai Ben was lucky enough to escape on his motorcycle, which he now uses to help distribute supplies and medical support to the displaced people. "The IDPs (displaced peopled) are in need of food and medical support as it is difficult to buy them in towns. The number of the IDPs is getting bigger," he said. "The main thing they need is medical support." Salai Ben said some people in the camps died from their injuries. He fears the approaching rainy season will make it even harder to get food to those in need. One of the main roads, he said, is blocked by military snipers. "The military is still arresting people even if we use the white flag. They checked our phones and they will arrest us if they find pictures of the protests, and I am worried that they will harm us and we will have to flee again," he said. Fears are also growing for the welfare of people trapped in Mindat town. "Nobody dares to go out because it is simply too risky. They risk being shot by the soldiers," Salai Za Uk Ling said. Locals report no supply trucks have entered the town since the assault, he said. If the fighting continues and more people are forced to flee, Salai Za Uk Ling warned of a "humanitarian disaster." Already, 15,000 people have fled across the border of Chin state to neighboring India's Mizoram , H. Rammawi, vice chairman of Mizoram's State Planning Board, told Reuters. "The escalation of violence, the weather, the fact India has shut its border, and Covid on other side worsening, and the Burma army in control, are the perfect ingredients for a disaster," Salai Za Uk Ling said, adding: "We need urgent help and intervention." Death in the jungle After the Mindat assault, the military's crackdown continued on nearby villages where many of the town's displaced residents had fled. It was raining heavily on the morning of May 21 when one village near to Mindat got word soldiers were advancing. "We heard that these soldiers kill everybody, even women and children, and rape women. So I said to my wife to leave. I and other men -- young guys -- stayed to defend the village," a 23-year-old villager said. His wife fled with their 6-day-old baby into the jungle with the other women and children, while he and the other men picked up their hunting rifles to confront the advancing troops. The young man said the military attacked them with automatic guns and RPGs. "We were shooting back with our hunting guns, but we can only shoot one time before we need to reload the gun powder. As it was raining heavily, our guns were not very good to shoot back," the young villager said. "They kept shooting us with the automatic guns, snipers and RPGs and a lot of our people were injured." The villager said he was hit in the back with shrapnel from an RPG -- he has a puncture wound on his upper back. As evening fell, he said the villagers were forced to retreat, with about eight of their number wounded. One of his friends was killed by a sniper, he said. The boy was just 15 years old. People displaced by fighting from Myanmar's northwestern town of Mindat are pictured in Chin State on May 20. But the young villager's ordeal was far from over. His wife, still recovering from giving birth, had fled into the jungle and endured a night in the heavy rain with no shelter or food. That night, he said, their baby started having difficulty breathing and died the following morning. The distraught parents were unable to give the child a proper burial, he said, because the soldiers were occupying their village. "This child is our first child. Until today, my wife could not eat, I myself could not eat," he said. "I can't even express how I feel." They remain in the jungle with about 500 others who fled. They are in desperate need of shelter, food and medical supplies, he said. Most fled with no possessions. "It keeps raining, we get bitten by the bugs and insects in the jungle. We are full of fear," he said. They dare not go back to retrieve blankets, food and other supplies as the military have blocked the roads. They cannot tend their farms or harvest their crops. He believes soldiers targeted his village because many people fled there from Mindat during the offensive. "The military helicopters, the fighter jets keep coming above our village. They keep dropping soldiers in our village areas. There is no safe area. We need protection, we need help. We need someone to protect us from this military junta," he said. Across Myanmar, defense forces fight back Similar stories of displacement and death are playing out across Myanmar. In the resistance stronghold of neighboring Sagaing region, in eastern Shan state, and in small Kayah state, fierce battles are being waged almost on a daily basis as the military tries to quell uprisings. In Kayah state, also known as Karenni, that borders Thailand, the military has cracked down hard on the resistance, reportedly using helicopter gunships and artillery, with about a dozen civilians killed and 50,000 residents forced to flee the anti-insurgent operations, according to local media Myanmar Now. There are reports of arrests, killings, homes being looted, and churches sheltering displaced people being destroyed or damaged by the military. And of resistance fighters ambushing military trucks, seizing police outposts and clashing in shootouts with regime soldiers, using guerillas tactics to hold off the junta troops, with losses on both sides. The uptick in fighting comes as the National Unity Government -- set up by ousted lawmakers and opponents of the coup and seeking to be the legitimate government in Myanmar -- announced on May 5 the formation of a "people's defense force" to protect civilians from the military's violence. The NUG said the provisional force is a precursor to a planned federal army. According to the UN special envoy to Myanmar, Christine Schraner Burgener, the NUG is trying to bring the local resistance groups under "a single command structure." The group recently issued a code of conduct under which people's defense force fighters must abide. The military says the people's defense forces and the NUG are "terrorist groups" that have "perpetrated bombing, arson, manslaughter, and intimidation to disrupt the state administrative machinery." Almost daily in state media there are reports of "armed insurgents" attacking security forces, destroying bridges, roads, and killing administrative or junta officials, and of security forces seizing weapons including homemade bombs, guns and bullets. In state media, the military frames the security forces' response as "joining hands in controlling the terrorist acts under the law." Following Mindat, the junta said a military tribunal will be convened to try "perpetrators of the terrorist attacks and those who encouraged the violence and crimes" in the town. "Protesters have started to shift from defensive to the offensive, with sometimes homemade weapons or receiving military training from certain ethnic armed organizations," Schraner Burgener said during a recent news briefing. "We have to understand, the people are really frustrated and fearing attacks. And they just told me that they need to have self-defense." Resistance against the coup appears to be evolving and it's raising fears of a deepening civil war in the country. Though it is unclear to what extent the civilian-turned-resistance fighters could threaten Myanmar's battle-hardened military, many, like the Mindat CDF member, say their fight is not over. "We will regroup, re-operate and fight them back. We believe completely that we will defeat the dictatorship and the revolution must win. We will fight patiently until we get our victory," he said. © 2021 Cable News Network.

By Giada Corsoni and Dr. Gregory Stanton The Gambia v. Myanmar will decide whether the Genocide Convention is international law by Giada Corsoni and Gregory Stanton February 18, 2022 Only a few days remain before the International Court of Justice [1] rules on Myanmar's preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and on its application to dismiss in The Gambia v. Myanmar . This is only the third time the ICJ will rule on an alleged violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [2] . In Bosnia v. Serbia and Croatia v. Serbia , the ICJ made the Genocide Convention almost unenforceable against States. This case represents an opportunity to correct the Court's errors in those cases. If the Court were to decide that it has no jurisdiction, and the case is therefore inadmissible, it would deal a fatal blow to State accountability for violation of the Genocide Convention. In its ruling on Provisional Measures, the Court has already indicated that it is likely to find that it has jurisdiction. When it decides on the merits of The Gambia's claim against Myanmar, the Court will have the opportunity to correct its errors in Bosnia and Croatia . In both of those cases, the Court held that to prove genocidal intent, destruction of part of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group must be the only intent that could reasonably be inferred from the acts of a State. The Court held that "ethnic cleansing" was another possible intent of Serbia. Therefore, special intent to commit genocide was not Serbia's only intent, and Serbia could not be conclusively proven to have violated the Genocide Convention. The ICJ applied a logic of exclusion. If there could be any other possible intention, then the special intent to destroy could not be conclusively proven. This concept of intentionality does not accord with international criminal law or even with ordinary criminal law. It would make it impossible to convict any murderer if the killer also had some other intent such as robbery. Nearly every human act has multiple intentions. Actions of States in all their complexity and their many officials must have even more intentions than acts of individuals. The Court's interpretation of intent in the Genocide Convention will make it nearly impossible to prove that any State has violated the Genocide Convention. China's oppression of the Uyghurs has included every act of genocide enumerated in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention. But China claims it is not committing genocide because its intention is to prevent terrorism and counter Uyghur separatism. China seems to have studied the ICJ's judgments in Bosnia and Croatia . The Court handed China a "Permit to build a jail" card. In The Gambia v Myanmar , the ICJ must move away from its requirement that the destruction of a group must be the State's only intent. Forced deportation ("ethnic cleansing") through terror may be one objective of genocide. The two intents are, logically, not incompatible and mutually exclusive as has been argued in an influential treatise. [3] Genocide is often a means to achieve forced deportation. In fact, the two crimes often go together. Indeed, the Holocaust shared these and many other intentions and it would be perverse in the extreme to argue that, therefore, the Holocaust was not a genocide. Norms that prohibit genocide have become customary law norms. According to Article 38, para. 1 of the ICJ Statute, the primary sources of law that the Court will consider in its decisions, include treaties (or Conventions), customary law, and general principles recognized by civilized nations. Customary law does not require the support of all nations, but rather requires a course of conduct widespread among the majority of States (a “general practice accepted as law”, not a uniform one), together with the belief that such conduct is juridically binding. No State can claim immunity from customary norms, including the prohibition of genocide. As soon as a customary norm crystallizes, such as the prohibition of genocide, all nations must legally comply with it, including those States that have not ratified a convention [4] . The ICJ should take into account not only the Genocide Convention but also the customary norms prohibiting genocide. Myanmar ratified and deposited the Genocide Convention on 14 March 1956. Myanmar is also bound by the substantial customary international law that has developed since then. The prohibition of genocide is a jus cogens norm, which confers on it imperative duties superior even to primary customary norms. The importance of this case lies in the fact that it concerns the violation of a convention prohibiting the "crime of crimes" under international law. In addition to correctly applying the substance of the law, the ICJ should not allow the military junta to represent Myanmar in this case. Recognition of a government differs from the recognition of a State. This junta is illegitimate not only because it overthrew a legitimately elected government, but also because of the atrocities it has committed against the people of Myanmar, including the Rohingya. Those very crimes are the subject of this case. The junta is an unelected military dictatorship that is currently shunned by other nations and nearly every international forum. As such, the appearance of the junta before the ICJ would not be in accordance with international law, and so the Court should not allow it. Enforcement is one of the primary attributes that constitute law. If a law cannot be enforced, it can no longer be considered law. It is crucial that the ICJ's judgment in The Gambia v. Myanmar be used to correct the ICJ's erroneous requirement that genocide must be the only intent of a State to prove its special intent to commit genocide. This case will have an enormous impact on the enforceability of the Genocide Convention and it demands the greatest care. Indeed, it will determine whether the Genocide Convention can continue to be considered international law. [1] Hereinafter ICJ or Court. [2] Hereinafter Genocide Convention. [3] W. Schabas, Genocide in International Law , 2nd Edition, Cambridge, 2009, p. 234. [4] A. Cassese, a cura di Paola Gaeta, Diritto Internazionale , Il Mulino, Seconda Edizione, 2013, p. 238.

By Gershom Gorenberg Israeli soldiers guarding the Israel-Gaza border on Tuesday. (Ariel Schalit/AP) Here are the two takes from the Israeli military on the Gaza border clashes on Monday, during which soldiers killed at least 60 Palestinians: “We won.” And, “Well, not so much.” “We won” is my abbreviation of the banner headline in the daily Yediot Ahronot. As the paper’s military commentator explained, the army kept demonstrators from crossing the border and entering Israeli communities, and no Israelis were hurt. If you measure victory by whether you held your territory, and by the relative body count, that’s a win. “Not so much” is the very short version of what an Israel Defense Forces spokesman reportedly said during a briefing organized by the Jewish Federations of North America on Tuesday. Explaining why the army hadn’t been able to keep down civilian casualties, Lt. Col. Jonathan Conricus said, “Hamas wanted people to die. Hamas wanted the pictures of the wounded.” The result, he admitted, was a public-relations “knockout.” If you knew that the point of the demonstrations was to call world attention to Gaza, and if you believed that Hamas wanted casualties for that purpose, then victory would have meant containing the demonstrations with a minimum of injuries. The death toll was a military defeat, even before we discuss the moral cost, and an investigation is essential. It’s very possible that the army, belatedly, will develop better nonlethal means for controlling mass demonstrations at a distance. If the new methods succeed, though, they will only underscore the interlocked problems Israel’s army has had for years regarding its dealings with Gaza. First, it has sometimes been slow in accepting that it needs new tactics as Hamas and other militants change theirs. Second, tactical successes will never be enough when the government you serve has no strategy to end to the conflict. The Gaza Strip, with its crowded refugee camps and dearth of hope, was once a source of terror attacks, in Israel and against Israeli settlers in the area. With a well-guarded border fence and checkpoints, Israel made it much more difficult for terrorists to cross into Israel. In 2005, Ariel Sharon’s government removed the settlements and the soldiers who protected them in its unilateral withdrawal. By then, Hamas and other radical factions were attacking over the fence, with mortar shells and rockets. The answer to that was Iron Dome, Israel’s sophisticated antimissile system. In the early days, then-Defense Minister Amir Peretz had to overcome resistance from the generals to budget Iron Dome. Yet even before Iron Dome was ready, Hamas and its rivals were digging tunnels under the fence. The army ignored experts’ proposal for high-tech means of detecting tunnels until the Gaza War of 2014, when the shock of attacks from below ground spurred an Israeli ground invasion. Israel is now using technology to find existing tunnels, and building an underground barrier to block new ones. To which Hamas has responded with mass marches aimed at going through the fence. I don’t know if anyone in the organization really expected to get through or to carry out the promise of Palestinian return to long-lost homes in what became Israel. The immediate goal, though, was to focus the world’s attention on the blockade of Gaza and to the stalled Palestinian struggle against Israel. I certainly hope the Israeli army finds nonlethal tactical responses. That is a moral imperative in itself. But the army can’t solve the underlying political problem of Gaza. And Israel’s current leaders have no answer, no vision of a plausible peaceful outcome. By “disengaging” from Gaza in 2005, Sharon hoped to disengage from any diplomatic process with the Palestinians. The policy of Netanyahu’s government — as shown by its deeds if not always by its statements — is to maintain Israeli rule of the West Bank, with the Palestinian Authority as a subcontractor for endless occupation. Yet there is no political solution for Gaza without the West Bank. So the Israeli government relates to Gaza as a chronic, incurable disease and relies on the army to come up with new prescriptions to relieve the pain. Without an outside intervention, the next spasm of Gaza fever seems inevitable. (c) 2018 The Washington Post https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/05/16/with-no-plan-for-peace-even-if-it-wins-israel-will-always-lose/?utm_term=.5073f992712c