By Magdalena Grono Sniper fire can hit almost every open-air spot in Nerkin Karmiraghbyur, an Armenian village in the Tavush region on the border with Azerbaijan. Nargiza, who runs a well-stocked shop out of an abandoned railway coach in the village centre, laments the locals’ fate: “We never feel safe. We hear shooting at night, and fear it during the day. My neighbours have stopped cultivating their vineyards. They were being shot at while at work.” Nargiza means “daffodil”. It’s a common name in Azerbaijan and other Muslim cultures, but not in her native Armenia, especially since the start of the three-decade-long conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. As the two country’s foreign ministers prepare for a rare meeting on 18 January, Nargiza’s story is a reminder of how much is spoiled by the collateral damage of three decades of failure to resolve the dispute. Security along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, and the Line of Contact (LOC) around Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent Azerbaijani territories controlled by Armenians, has been precarious since the 1994 ceasefire. Just a handful of Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observers monitor the line, even though this is one of the most heavily militarised regions in the world. The costly and destabilising arms race, aggravated since the early 2000s by Azerbaijan’s oil and gas windfall, has been chiefly facilitated by Moscow, which sells weapons to both Baku and Yerevan. At the same time, Russia co-chairs, together with France and the U.S., the OSCE Minsk Group that steers the conflict settlement process. The downward spiral has grown deadlier since 2014, with increasing use of heavy artillery and renewed fighting in April 2016, which claimed at least 200 lives. That fighting served as a wake-up call and opportunity to galvanise the stagnant peace process. In May and June 2016, President Sargsyan of Armenia and President Aliyev of Azerbaijan agreed on confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) – increasing the number of OSCE observers (likely from the current six to twelve) and creating a mechanism for investigating incidents – and taking forward substantive talks. But they failed to prevent another breakdown in confidence and negotiations in September 2016, when skirmishes broke out again on the conflict divide, and continued until preparations for a new summit began in the summer of 2017. Sargsyan’s and Aliyev’s October 2017 meeting recommitted both to CSBMs and substantive talks. There is refreshed hope that diplomacy can prevent a new escalation, which in the worst case could provoke a regional conflagration, given Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s respective defence and strategic partnership and mutual support agreements with Russia and Turkey. But there is also a risk that meetings, if unproductive, will lead to a renewed sense of frustration with diplomacy, and a temptation to view the use of force as a legitimate means to solve the conflict. For this to be avoided, progress has to be made on security while political discussions need to resume. But as in many conflicts, security and politics hold each other hostage. The Armenian side insists on CSBMs before the substance of a future settlement can be discussed. “Who would discuss settlement while we are being shot at?”, an Armenian politician said to Crisis Group. Azerbaijanis, for their part, have been reluctant to commit to CSBMs that would risk cementing the status quo, without discussions on the content of a future deal. The 18 January meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers will discuss an increase of the number of OSCE observers, according to diplomats close to the peace process. The sides are still at odds on modalities. Baku would at most like to see a light-touch arrangement with no change in the current offices, whereas Yerevan prefers a more hands-on arrangement, including new personnel with new duties. In Nagorno-Karabakh, sources told Crisis Group they seek a permanent OSCE field presence in heavily populated parts of the Line of Contact. Although it is a tall order for a dozen unarmed staff to monitor the full length of the line, and the impact of their presence on overall security may be limited, an increase in numbers would be a small breakthrough in a process that often struggles to secure as much as a date for the next meeting between the sides. The other CSBM on the table, an investigative mechanism, is far less likely to be agreed, diplomats say. In Nargiza’s village, Nerkin Karmiraghbyur, on the international Armenia-Azerbaijan border well to the north of Nagorno-Karabakh, nobody has been killed or injured recently, but the climate of fear is common along the length of the conflict divide. In Armenia’s Tavush region, humanitarian agencies and local government have raised walls around the perimeter of schools and kindergartens to shield children from small arms fire. The local administration has built a bypass road – its exposed segments reinforced by a stone wall – to protect cars travelling between border villages. People move their beds away from windows exposed to the other side and Nargiza’s railway coach shop has old bullet holes in it. In Nagorno-Karabakh itself, 7,000 of the region’s current 150,000-strong population live within 15km of the divide. Hundreds of thousands more people, many of them displaced by fighting in the 1990s, live similarly close to the line on the Azerbaijani side, where an incident in July 2017 killed an elderly Azerbaijani woman and her two-year-old granddaughter. People living near the divide are highly vulnerable, both now and in the event of a renewed escalation. Humanitarian aid workers are making contingency plans, and take a view that resumed fighting would have little regard for civilian lives. In order to prevent such a scenario, a discussion on security alone is insufficient. The political aspects of a future settlement, based on mutual concessions, will have to be addressed with international security arrangements to guarantee them. A possible road map to an even-handed settlement was developed a decade ago in the Basic Principles, which outlines principles for a settlement, including: return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing security and self-government guarantees; a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; future determination of Nagorno-Karabakh’s final status through a legally binding expression of will; the right of return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees; and international security guarantees, including a peacekeeping operation. The principles continue to be accepted by both sides as the general umbrella for a settlement. In practice, they are shunned by people in both societies whose lives over the past quarter-century have developed around the conflict, and whose intractable discourses are in large part fuelled by their leaderships. As long as both leaders envision a settlement on their own terms only, security and politics will keep each other hostage. And men and women like Nargiza, on both sides of the divide, will remain in peril. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan/politics-and-security-hold-each-other-hostage-nagorno-karabakh?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=7bb516246d-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_01_17&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-7bb516246d-359909997 (c) 2018 International Crisis Group

By Michelle Nichols The United Nations Security Council should not condemn Iran in a resolution to renew sanctions on Yemen, Russia’s U.N. ambassador said on Wednesday, resisting a Western bid to denounce Tehran for failing to stop Yemen’s Houthi group getting its missiles. The United States has been lobbying for months for Iran to be held accountable at the United Nations, while at the same time threatening to quit a 2015 deal among world powers to curb Iran’s nuclear program if “disastrous flaws” are not fixed. The 15-member council is negotiating a resolution, drafted by Britain in consultation with the United States and France, that would condemn Iran for violating an arms embargo on Houthi leaders and include a council commitment to take action over it. “We don’t like condemnations at all, in general,” Russian U.N. Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia told Reuters. “The resolution is about Yemen,” he said. “It’s a resolution about the extension of the working group (of independent experts), not about Iran. So we should concentrate on extending the working group first.” The key focus of the draft text, which needs to be adopted by Feb. 26, is to renew targeted U.N. sanctions and the mandate for the independent experts who monitor their implementation. It would also expand sanctions criteria to include “any activity related to the use of ballistic missiles in Yemen.” A resolution needs nine votes in favor and no vetoes by Russia, China, the United States, France or Britain to pass. “It is fair to say the draft is not one the Russians are currently supportive of and they have made their views clear,” said a senior U.N. diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. Another U.N. diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Russia had described the draft text as “unacceptable.” A proxy war is playing out in Yemen between Iran and U.S. ally Saudi Arabia. A Saudi-led coalition intervened in Yemen in 2015, backing government forces fighting Iran-allied Houthi rebels. Iran has denied supplying the Houthis weapons. U.N. experts monitoring the Yemen sanctions reported to the Security Council in January they had “identified missile remnants, related military equipment and military unmanned aerial vehicles that are of Iranian origin and were brought into Yemen after the imposition of the targeted arms embargo.” While the experts said they have “no evidence as to the identity of the supplier, or any intermediary third party” of the missiles fired by the Houthis into neighboring Saudi Arabia, they found Iran had violated sanctions by failing to prevent missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles reaching the Houthis. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-un/russia-resists-western-bid-to-condemn-iran-at-u-n-over-yemen-arms-idUSKCN1G52J0 (c) 2018 Reuters

By Magnus Taylor There was guarded hope in Khartoum when the U.S. government removed many of its economic and trade sanctions on Sudan in October 2017. Officials thought Washington would move forward with normalising relations, the next step being to strike Sudan from the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list. That would allow the Nile basin country to obtain relief from its $50 billion international debt and attract external investment, both of which are essential for saving Sudan’s failing economy. The economy has hit rock bottom. It remains crippled by the loss of millions in annual oil revenue since South Sudan seceded in 2011. After a new budget was announced in early January 2018, which included the devaluation of the Sudanese pound against the dollar, inflation spiralled upward. Bread prices also more than doubled after cuts to subsidies on wheat imports. The runaway prices, along with anger at the mismanagement of the economy and corruption sparked protests in January 2018, resulting in hundreds of arrests – including of several opposition politicians. Police beat protesters, killing at least one. Following pressure from the U.S. and European Union some of the detainees were released a few days ago. Many others remain in prison without charge. Khartoum’s optimism for a quick normalisation of its relations with the U.S. after economic sanctions repeal was premature. Indeed, the U.S. had been clear that this would not happen without further tangible progress from the Sudanese government, including improvements to its human rights record. In November 2017, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan travelled to Khartoum, reiterating that phase two of U.S. engagement, which would lead to further lifting of sanctions – including removal of Sudan from the terrorism list – would require Khartoum to make such reform. Khartoum Plays the Field Since then, Khartoum has signalled that it can look for support elsewhere. Shortly after Sullivan’s visit, President Omar al-Bashir flew to Moscow, where he secured a deal from his counterpart Vladimir Putin to buy Russian wheat at a discounted rate. Bashir also caused consternation in Washington by declaring his support for Russia’s intervention in Syria and criticising U.S. Middle East policies. Sudan’s leaders still view rapprochement with the U.S. and other Western countries, as well as with the European Union, as critical in the long term. But in the meantime, the regime needs to cultivate friends who can help it fend off immediate threats, notably those related to its lagging economy. In this spirit, Bashir has adapted to an increasingly thorny geopolitical landscape, both in the Horn and beyond, by moving from one alliance to another, juggling rivalries among his potential allies. This has delivered some gains to his government, but they are likely to prove short-term at best. Nowhere is this strategy more evident than in Sudan’s relations with the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar. Enticed by promises of money for infrastructure and agriculture development, as well as deposits in the Sudanese Central Bank, Sudan – a close ally of Iran during the 1990s and early 2000s – switched its allegiance to the Arab Gulf bloc in 2014. The biggest consequence of this realignment was Khartoum’s dispatch of thousands of troops to Yemen to join the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Huthi rebels. Khartoum is disappointed, however, with the financial rewards it has received in return, despite also benefitting from Saudi lobbying of the U.S. over sanctions repeal. In mid-2017, when tensions escalated between Qatar and the Saudi-UAE axis, Khartoum chose not to break with its longstanding ally in Doha, preferring to keep its options open. Tensions with Egypt Sudan’s relations with Egypt, its neighbour to the north, are also strained. A December visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – a close ally of Qatar – to Khartoum brought simmering tensions out into the open. Erdoğan announced $650 million in investments, including a Turkish commitment to restore and lease the Ottoman-era Red Sea port on Suakin Island. Turkey’s sudden interest in Sudan is of particular concern to Cairo as both Doha and Ankara support various chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood across the world. Since Abdel Fattah el-Sisi seized power in July 2013 from President Mohamed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood leader, Cairo has presumed the Bashir regime to be close to the Islamists. Its willingness to allow Muslim Brothers expelled from Egypt to visit Sudan is a sore spot for Sisi. A graver diplomatic problem is Sudan’s perceived divergence from Egypt’s opposition to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Ethiopia is building on the Blue Nile. Khartoum claims neutrality in negotiations over the dam, but in reality has developed its own distinct position that departs from its earlier support for colonial-era agreements on the allocation of Nile water, which heavily favour Egypt. Sudan will benefit from the dam’s construction: it will supply the country with cheap electricity, as well as Nile water for greatly expanded agricultural irrigation, particularly in Blue Nile state. Such ambitious plans worry Cairo, which sees upstream projects as a major threat to its own water supply and, therefore, its stability. The ongoing war in Libya has caused tensions too. Khartoum is concerned that Darfuri rebels, now based in southern Libya, have served as mercenaries for General Khalifa Haftar, de facto ruler of Libya’s east, who is backed by Egypt and the UAE. In return, the rebels have received money, guns and equipment, which Khartoum fears they will use to restart their rebellion. When Sudanese Liberation Movement insurgents briefly re-entered Darfur (from both Libya and South Sudan) in May 2017, Khartoum angrily accused Cairo of arming them. Escalation in Eritrea These frictions came to a head in January 2018 when, amid the economic crisis, reports emerged that Egypt had deployed troops in Eritrea (it appears now that Cairo sent only a small number of advisers and trainers). In response, Khartoum closed the border with Eritrea, declared a state of emergency in the region and deployed additional militia forces to the area without entirely explaining why. It may have been a ploy to divert public attention from worsening economic woes. A meeting between Presidents Bashir and Sisi on the margins of the African Union summit in Addis Ababa in late January, followed by a visit to Cairo by the Sudanese foreign minister in early February, helped de-escalate tension. But they have done little to address the disagreements underpinning it. With the dividends of U.S. engagement still mostly unpaid, Khartoum’s foreign policy will likely continue to evolve with shifts in relations among richer and more powerful players. Sudan’s economic crisis increases pressure on President Bashir at home as regional politics are becoming ever more complex. Recent shifts of key regime figures, including at the helm of the powerful National Intelligence and Security Services, show that the president is keen to shore up his own position. Khartoum’s international standing is higher than it was some years ago, when it was a near pariah due to the atrocities of wars in Sudan’s peripheries, and it has long proven adept at navigating choppy geopolitical waters. But its ability to do so is likely to be tested further over the coming months. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/can-sudan-manage-economic-discontent-amid-volatile-geopolitics?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=ffbee9830d-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_02_23&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-ffbee9830d-359534617 (c) 2018 International Crisis Group

By Magdalena Grono and Jonathan Brunson The war in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region will soon enter its fifth year. In September 2017, talk of a settlement picked up after Russia circulated a draft UN Security Council resolution proposing the deployment of UN forces along the front line separating Kyiv’s forces, on one side, from Kremlin-backed separatists, on the other. Moscow had ignored Kyiv’s calls for peacekeepers since early 2015, so its proposal was regarded with suspicion by Ukraine and its Western allies. Most saw the small force envisaged along the front as a non-starter, more likely to freeze the conflict than end it. Nonetheless, the proposal spurred fresh thinking about ways out of the stalemate. U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations Kurt Volker has now met several times with Vladislav Surkov, an aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin, to discuss what a compromise on peacekeeping might entail. After their fourth meeting in Dubai in January 2018, both expressed cautious optimism regarding initial aspects of force composition and deployment. In February, former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, whose political consultancy group runs a strategic campaign called the Ukraine Initiative, floated a detailed proposal for a peacekeeping force. While scepticism about Moscow’s intentions is justified, the Kremlin’s willingness to discuss peacekeepers marked a shift in the tenor of dialogue on Donbas, as Crisis Group argued in its December report Can Peacekeepers Break the Deadlock in Ukraine? Whether the change in tone brings a change in substance remains to be seen. The evolution of the peacekeeping debate, and the fact it even remains on the table, suggest it should be taken seriously. So too should the impact inside Ukraine. As the country prepares for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019, Moscow’s peacekeeping overtures – genuine or not – risk fuelling political infighting motivated more by competition to establish patriotic credentials than by efforts to reintegrate Donbas. Competing Perspectives Since Russian-backed separatists seized parts of Donbas in early 2014, fighting has left more than 11,000 dead and thousands injured. Millions of civilians are either displaced in Ukraine or living as refugees in Russia. The February 2015 Minsk II Agreement sets out a framework that leaders both in Russia and among Kyiv’s Western allies say they view as the only way to end the conflict. That agreement foresees the withdrawal of troops and heavy weapons from the area and reestablishment of Kyiv’s control over its side of the Ukraine-Russia border. It also sets out political provisions for the reintegration of separatist-held areas into Ukraine, including on local elections in those parts of Donbas, self-governance of these areas and amnesties. Kyiv’s argument has been that continued fighting and Russia’s financial and military support for separatists prevent Ukraine from advancing the political elements of Minsk. But more fundamentally, most Ukrainians see the deal as generally favourable to Moscow and the separatists. Kyiv has long seen the war in Donbas as an inter-state conflict involving Russia rather than a civil conflict. A new reintegration law signed by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in February 2018 makes this view explicit, labelling Russia as an aggressor and Donbas as an illegally occupied territory. Political and civil society actors in Kyiv insist this designation was necessary to place full responsibility for the conflict – its costs, as well as the human rights protection of those living in rebel-held Donbas – on Russia, and prevent it from participating in a peacekeeping operation, as the Ukrainian side formally considers Moscow a party to the conflict. Parliamentary Chairman Andriy Parubiy says the next step is to enact a de-occupation law. In this climate, Ukrainian leaders are likely to accept peacekeepers only if they believe the mission would safeguard Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, at the very least by monitoring the Russian border. For its part, Moscow blames the deadlock on Kyiv’s failure to implement the Minsk agreement’s political provisions. The Kremlin also voices fears of reprisals against inhabitants of separatist-held areas were Ukrainian forces to return. In principle, Russia may gain from finding a way out of eastern Ukraine, where its interference has incurred both financial costs – due to U.S. and EU sanctions, as well as expenditures required to keep the regional administration afloat – and wider reputational costs. But despite the Volker-Surkov talks, it is unlikely that Moscow is seeking a way out, almost certainly not ahead of Russian elections in March 2018. At this stage, Putin’s peacekeeping proposal and participation in subsequent dialogue probably aim to gauge reactions from others; possibly, to explore under what conditions Western powers might lift sanctions; and likely, to test how much pressure prospects of reintegrating Donbas by implementing the political provisions unpopular among most Ukrainians could put on Kyiv ahead of elections there in 2019. Whether Moscow is more willing to find a constructive solution after its elections remains unclear. Its degree of openness will depend on the nature of Putin’s domestic and foreign policy calculations after his almost guaranteed re-election. An optimistic scenario has Russia compromising on Donbas to help reframe relations with the West and prompt the lifting of sanctions. But some Western diplomats in Kyiv fear Moscow may float proposals that would stop short of guaranteeing Ukraine’s sovereignty, all the while increasing the onus on Kyiv to deliver on the divisive political aspects of Minsk. Of Ukraine’s Western allies, the U.S. has been most active in exploring peacekeeping options, primarily through the bilateral channel between Volker and Surkov. Talks among the Normandy Four – the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany – complemented by more frequent exchanges among their respective advisers, and the Trilateral Contact Group comprising representatives of Ukraine, Russia and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, proceed in parallel with the Volker-Surkov track. Volker’s diplomacy continues to overshadow any European role. In 2018, however, Germany’s leaders appear to have again found their voice. Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel called for a UN peacekeeping mission in early January, and Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces Hans-Peter Bartels announced on 15 February that Germany is ready to contribute troops. Renewed European attention to Ukraine, particularly from the EU itself, could be useful. The EU’s close political ties to Ukraine and substantial aid give it critical leverage in Kyiv. A first step might be for Brussels to nominate its own special envoy or representative with a mandate similar to that of Volker. According to one EU official, a senior former politician would stand the best chance of making an impact, particularly given the sensitivity of the agenda and differences among member states. Including the EU and U.S. in an expanded Normandy format might make sense, too. For now, that course appears unlikely, but it would serve to keep all actors on the same page and discourage both Moscow and Kyiv from shopping among rival forums. Ukrainian Resistance to Minsk Russian interference in Donbas is not the only obstacle to ending the crisis. In Ukraine, resistance to the Minsk agreement’s political provisions is growing. It is already a central campaign issue ahead of the 2019 elections. Bar pro-Russia factions, President Poroshenko’s party stands alone in endorsing the accord. Even some in the president’s ruling coalition reject it. His junior partner, the People’s Front, openly declares that Minsk is dead, says Ukraine never endorsed its contents in the first place, and argues that Kyiv signed only to check the Russian-backed separatists’ military momentum and buy time. Indeed, even Poroshenko’s own commitment to Minsk is not entirely clear; he may merely be paying it lip service, so as not to alienate Kyiv’s Western allies. The vast majority of Ukrainian parties and civil society groups consider Kyiv’s obligations under Minsk unwanted concessions to the Kremlin, whose leverage in Donbas looks set to endure even if Russia pulls out its forces. A narrative appears to be taking hold among Ukrainian elites that implementing controversial Minsk provisions could provoke a new wave of anti-government violence, even if the Minsk security provisions are implemented. The provisions on amnesties and self-rule for the now rebel-controlled areas are particularly contentious; many Ukrainians would see granting the special status stipulated in the agreement to parts of Donbas as rewarding a separatist area with privileges no other region in the country enjoys. For now, however, there are few visible omens of mass civil disobedience. Little suggests Ukrainians would come out onto the streets in large numbers, other than their recent history of doing so. The failure of successive revolutions to root out pervasive corruption appears to have provoked fatigue as much as anger among many. And Western diplomats have been speculating since October 2017 that the government was preventing the assembly of crowds outside parliament and on Maidan by occupying traditional demonstration spaces with an uninhabited protest camp and large outdoor exhibition. Authorities’ sudden March 2018 clearance of these may indicate government fears of public turmoil have largely abated. After the dismantling of the camp outside parliament, some prominent reformers and social media influencers criticised what they called aggressive policing reminiscent of old regime tactics, but the immediate reaction on the street has been muted. Still, animosity toward Minsk fuels an early pre-election campaign in which discourses are hardening, as elites seek to outbid each other in their expressions of patriotism. A G7 diplomat privately commented: “Moscow knows full well how much damage it can create in Ukraine by floating more peace plans”, and said he expected it to do so after Russia’s presidential election. Peacekeeping dialogue needs to factor in this resistance and anxiety across the country about how the disputed areas would be reintegrated. European powers, in particular, could push Kyiv to explore how it might enact Minsk in a way that would not challenge Ukraine’s national cohesion and sovereignty. They should also help Kyiv prepare for the social and political challenges that the implementation of Minsk might engender. An Expansive Peacekeeping Mandate? To help resolve the conflict, the mandate of any peacekeeping mission would likely have to involve at least three elements. First, peacekeepers would need to establish control over the front line, protect civilians, provide security across the conflict zone, and verify the cantonment of weapons, disengagement and withdrawal of forces. A sustained ceasefire (a tall order, given that the record, set in September-October 2017, is twelve days) should be a precondition for any deployment. Second, peacekeepers ought to be mandated to monitor the Ukrainian side of the border with Russia to deter infiltration to the extent possible, with the eventual goal of reestablishing Kyiv’s control over its own side. Third, peacekeepers would have to lay the groundwork for Kyiv to implement the Minsk political provisions, starting with creating conditions for credible local elections that guarantee all candidates the right to safely campaign. The composition of a potential peacekeeping force – which nations would contribute troops – has been the topic of some discussion in Kyiv. NATO and Russian forces would likely be unacceptable: Russia is predisposed to reject the former, Ukraine and its Western allies the latter. Many Ukrainian military and civil society experts also posit that Collective Security Treaty Organization members like Belarus or Kazakhstan be excluded. Other options might include troops from countries such as Austria, Switzerland, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and Argentina, all of which would probably be acceptable to most Ukrainians. That said, even were consensus to emerge on the principle of peacekeeping, finding a mix of troop contributors acceptable to both Kyiv and Moscow, and persuading those countries to commit forces, would likely prove a challenge. Another decision relates to the number of peacekeepers required. Volker and some Ukrainian diplomats have floated the concept of a force of 20,000, a number now widely cited by Kyiv and its Western partners as necessary to carry out a robust mandate over a large and heavily populated area. That number would already be at the upper end of existing UN operations, but a smaller force would likely be unable to both monitor the border and project force across all of Donbas as local elections approach. Many Kyiv elites contemplate a higher number that would exceed 30,000. The Security Council would also need to decide on the degree to which UN peacekeepers would enjoy explicit enforcement capability, how robust a posture they would adopt in the face of spoilers, and the manner in which they would deploy. Even with the consent of both Moscow and Kyiv – a prerequisite for any mission’s deployment – peacekeepers could still face local hostility. Phased deployment – first along the front line, then within a wider radius, and finally across the entire disputed territory, including the Russian border – almost certainly would be required to dispel dual fears of non-compliance and reprisals. While Kyiv might oppose such a proposal, given suspicions that the Kremlin could obstruct latter phases, a fast deployment with clear deadlines might mitigate such concerns. Western officials say they are exploring options for a phased deployment that would combine security and political steps: deployment along the line of contact; followed by Kyiv’s adoption of legislation on greater autonomy for conflict regions; then deployment all the way to the border; and finally, local elections in Donbas. There are many hurdles to such a scenario, which would, however, address key points of the Minsk framework. Any mission should also facilitate the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and commuters who continue to live on both sides of the front line, as well as refugees. IDPs and commuters could be a politically moderating force in reintegrating a Donbas society dominated, on the rebel-controlled side, by a siege mentality and exposed to potent anti-Kyiv and anti-Western propaganda. A final question is whether the Security Council ought to establish a temporary UN administration to govern separatist-held areas until the return of Ukrainian authority. Some past UN missions – Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo and Timor Leste – played this role. Whether such an intrusive mandate is needed in eastern Ukraine remains a divisive question for Kyiv. Ukrainian authorities would not be able to return immediately, but many elites also resent the notion of outsiders meddling in domestic affairs. Existing local de facto authorities are largely out of the question; indeed, the U.S. has long insisted on a change in their leadership as a precondition in its negotiations with Russia on Donbas, and Kyiv clearly would prefer a temporary UN administration to one led by pro-Russian separatists. If the UN does not play an administrative role, it is unclear what a transitional regime might look like. At the very least, the Security Council would need to empower a peacekeeping mission to help local state institutions perform basic functions during the transition. A Rare Opening Ukraine’s Western allies need to reassure Kyiv that any deal on peacekeeping would be acceptable only if it addressed security concerns without further undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty. Ukraine must not become a bystander to this process; spoilers on either side could easily exploit the perception that Kyiv is unable to influence the outcome. The West should continue to make clear to Moscow that non-Crimea sanctions on Russia will be lifted only once Minsk is fully implemented or when Russia ends its interference in Donbas, and that partial withdrawal will not give rise to partial lifting of sanctions. A peacekeeping mission may still be a distant possibility. It is far from clear that Moscow is seeking an exit. Mounting resistance among Ukrainian leaders to the Minsk accord presents another challenge, which Russia may well be factoring into its calculations. Nonetheless, the current talks represent a rare opening to test ideas on how to settle the eastern Ukraine conflict and reintegrate the disputed Donbas into Ukraine. All parties should make the most of it. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/donbas-peacekeeping-opportunities-and-risks?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=19a34a4a46-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_03_05&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-19a34a4a46-359909997 (c) 2018 International Crisis Group

By Michael Schwirtz The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum has revoked a prestigious human rights award it had given to the Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, now Myanmar’s civilian leader, faulting her for failing to halt or even acknowledge the ethnic cleansing of her country’s Rohingya Muslim minority. Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi, who endured 15 years of house arrest for taking on the military dictatorship in Myanmar, was only the second person to receive the award, in 2012. It was named after Elie Wiesel, a fellow recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize and a Holocaust survivor who was one of the museum’s founders. Mr. Wiesel was the first recipient. The award, according to the museum, is given annually “to an internationally prominent individual whose actions have advanced the Museum’s vision of a world where people confront hatred, prevent genocide and promote human dignity.” But Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi, the museum said, has failed to live up to that vision. “We had hoped that you — as someone we and many others have celebrated for your commitment to human dignity and universal human rights — would have done something to condemn and stop the military’s brutal campaign and to express solidarity with the targeted Rohingya population,” the museum said in a letter to Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi. The letter, which was made available to The New York Times, was dated Tuesday and addressed to Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi via the Myanmar Embassy in Washington. Instead, the letter said, she and her political party, the National League for Democracy, have refused to cooperate with United Nations investigators, blocked access to journalists and “promulgated hateful rhetoric against the Rohingya community.” The museum’s decision is perhaps the strongest rebuke yet of Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been increasingly criticized as a seemingly unrepentant apologist for Buddhist nationalism and the Myanmar military’s campaign of ethnic violence. Beginning last August, Myanmar’s military, joined by armed Buddhist civilians, systematically killed thousands of Rohingya in the western state of Rakhine. As many as 700,000 more fled across the border to Bangladesh, where they remain. Behind them, soldiers moved in to burn their villages and bury the dead in mass graves. The United States and other countries have accused the Myanmar authorities of ethnic cleansing, while the United Nations special envoy on human rights in Myanmar said the killings bore “the hallmarks of a genocide.” Meanwhile, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi has refused to even utter the word Rohingya in public. In private, she becomes angry when the topic comes up, according to people who have spoken with her. Though she has set up half a dozen commissions to look into the violence, which began after Rohingya militants attacked Myanmar security posts, the authorities continue to insist that no Rohingya civilians have been harmed. Bill Richardson, a former governor of New Mexico and longtime friend of Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi, recently quit an advisory board on the Rohingya crisis, calling it a “cheerleading squad” for the government. In the wake of the violence, the government imposed an information blockade that continues to this day. It has barred United Nations investigators from Rakhine and has allowed only a few aid organizations to work there. Two Reuters journalists, who were investigating the killing of 10 Rohingya men and their burial in a mass grave, were arrested and face 14 years in prison. The authorities in Myanmar accused them of possessing state secrets. Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest in 2010 and, in 2015, ascension to the role of state counselor after her party’s landslide victory at the polls raised hopes that the country had finally emerged from decades of military dictatorship. In response, President Barack Obama eased sanctions, provided financial assistance and became the first sitting American president to visit Myanmar. For many of her one-time admirers, her handling of the Rohingya issue has been nothing short of a betrayal. In an open letter last year, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a fellow Nobel laureate, described her as “a dearly beloved younger sister” whose photograph he had long kept on his desk. “My dear sister: If the political price of your ascension to the highest office in Myanmar is your silence, the price is surely too steep,” he wrote. Though she is Myanmar’s civilian leader, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi’s power is limited in the face of the military’s continued popularity and domination of the country’s economy and its important institutions. The post that she holds, state counselor, was created after her party’s 2015 election victory, as she is constitutionally barred from becoming president. But the museum said the scale of the human suffering inflicted on the Rohingya demands action. It called on her to cooperate with United Nations investigators to establish details about the violence and to help bring those responsible to justice. It also urged her to amend a 1982 law that stripped the Rohingya, who have lived in the western region of Myanmar near Bangladesh for centuries, of their citizenship. The letter closes with a quote from Mr. Wiesel: “Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented.” https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/world/asia/aung-san-suu-kyi-holocaust-rohingya.html (c) 2018 The New York Times

By Megan Specia and Rick Gladstone Israeli soldiers on Tuesday on the Israeli side of the fence between Israel and Gaza. Credit: Thomas Coex/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images A snaking metal fence that divides the Gaza Strip from Israel has become the latest focal point in a generations-long conflict between Arabs and Jews in the area. It was along this fence that at least 60 Palestinians were killed and many hundreds wounded on Monday as thousands converged to protest what they call an arbitrarily enforced demarcation line by an occupier. As protesters rushed toward the fence, some throwing rocks or homemade fire bombs, Israeli soldiers fired live bullets, which the Israeli military said was done as a last resort. What are the fence’s origins and purpose in separating Gaza, a 25-mile-long, five-mile-wide Mediterranean coastal enclave where nearly two million Palestinians live? Is the fence recognized as an international border? And how has Israel justified deadly force to stop mostly unarmed Palestinians from breaching it? Here are the basics: What is the fence? The fence is actually two parallel barriers built by the Israelis: a formidable one of barbed-wire within Gaza and a 10-foot-high metal “smart fence” packed with surveillance sensors along the Israel demarcation line. A restricted buffer zone as wide as 300 yards is between them. Israel has warned that people in the zone without authorization risk being subjected to deadly force. Israeli forces advancing against Egyptian troops at the start of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Credit: Micha Han/Israeli Government Press Office What is the history? Like other parts of the Holy Land, Gaza’s history stretches back to ancient times. It was originally a Canaanite settlement and was variously ruled later by the Israelites, Egyptians, Romans and Ottomans, among others. The British seized the territory during World War I. Gaza’s boundaries were established in a 1949 armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel, halting the conflict after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. During the Arab-Israeli war of that period, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were forced from their homes or fled, many to Gaza, and they and their descendants have been classified as refugees by the United Nations. Egypt occupied Gaza until the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, when Israel seized the territory. The first Gaza-Israel fence went up in 1994 as a way to control Palestinian movement after the Oslo Accords — the agreement aimed at ending the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and establishing a Palestinian state. Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, vacating all Israeli settlements and removing its soldiers. But Israel maintains control of the northern and eastern land boundaries — Egypt controls the southern crossing, known as Rafah — and Israel controls the air and sea approaches. Most Gaza-bound food, fuel and other aid flows through Israeli-controlled crossings. Like the Israelis, the Egyptians have in recent years restricted the movement of people and goods in and out of Gaza. Both Israel and Egypt imposed a blockade on Gaza after Hamas, the Palestinian militant organization that denies Israel’s right to exist, took control there more than a decade ago. The deprivations in Gaza have continually worsened. Most of its people rely on aid from the United Nations and other outside groups, and the inability of residents to freely leave has created what human rights advocates call an open-air prison. Why is the conflict flaring up now? The “March of Return,” as Palestinians are calling the protest campaign that began in March, was intended by its creators to publicize global awareness that about two-thirds of Gaza residents are considered Palestinian refugees. The Israelis have accused Hamas, which Israel, the United States and several other countries consider a terrorist organization, of exploiting the “March of Return” to physically attack Israel. “Hamas has used ‘nonviolent protests’ to attempt to overrun Israel’s border and kill its civilians, and it is Hamas that bears responsibility for the recent bloodshed,” the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, an influential lobby group in the United States, said Wednesday in countering critics of Israel’s behavior. Israeli soldiers patrolling the newly constructed barrier fence in 1994. Credit: David Rubinger/The LIFE Images Collection, via Getty Images So is the fence a legal border? It is not recognized as a border like that between two sovereign nations. While Israel has created what it regards as a defensive buffer zone inside Gaza for security, Israel has not altered the original 1949 armistice line that delineated the territory. Supporters of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict foresee Gaza as part of a future Palestinian state. But for now, Gaza’s status is complicated. “Gaza is not a Palestinian state,” said David Makovsky, an expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “Part of the problem is that nobody wants Gaza.” While Egypt could theoretically do more to ease the travails of Gaza’s population, Mr. Makovsky said, “Egypt sees it as political quicksand.” The Palestinians and United Nations human rights officials say Israel remains an occupying power in Gaza, making it subject to certain obligations to protect civilians under international law, because the Israelis exert effective control over most of Gaza’s land, air and sea borders. Israel has rejected that argument, asserting that it voluntarily departed Gaza 13 years ago. “The political point is that each side of this conflict has their own narrative about the status of the Gaza Strip and Israel’s role,” said Tamara Cofman Wittes, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy. “The argument is not whether this is a border. The argument is whether Israel is occupying Gaza.” Hamas supporters in Hebron celebrated the results of the 2006 election, which the militant group won. Both Israel and Egypt imposed a blockade afterward. Credit: Stoyan Nenov/Reuters Do border protests violate Israel’s sovereignty? Israel considers attempts by Palestinian protesters to approach the fence a threat to its sovereignty, and has framed its responses to these protests as a lawful defense of the Israeli border. The Israeli authorities have dropped leaflets over Gaza warning Palestinians to not approach the fence. “The Israel Defense Forces is determined to defend Israel’s citizens and sovereignty against Hamas’s attempts at terrorism under cover of violent riots,” the leaflets read, a position reiterated by Ronen Manelis, a spokesman for the Israel Defense Forces. “A sovereign nation cannot allow this,” he said. The question of whether the protesters threaten Israeli sovereignty is part of the broader dispute, Middle East scholars say. Nadia Abu El-Haj, co-director of the Center for Palestine Studies at Columbia University, argued that Israel’s own actions across the fence meant that it was not a border. “A border implies a place where one state’s authority ends and another’s begins,” Dr. Abu El-Haj said. “Israel has never recognized the fence as a limit to its authority. Through closure and military incursions, Israel sustains its sovereign authority over the territory.” Israeli soldiers firing tear gas toward Palestinian protesters near the border fence in March. Credit: Tsafrir Abayov/Associated Press Is deadly force at the fence defensible? While Israeli authorities have justified the military’s use of deadly force, many international monitoring groups, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have condemned it. A number of countries at the United Nations have asked for an independent inquiry into the deaths. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel said that defending the border fence with lethal force was necessary. “I don’t know of any army that would do anything differently if you had to protect your border against people who say, ‘We’re going to destroy you, and we’re going to flood into your country,’” Mr. Netanyahu told CBS News. Other Israelis have said that if thousands of angry Palestinians breached the Gaza fence, the outcome would be far bloodier. The Israeli military maintains it is only targeting those instigating violence, and has sought to use nonlethal deterrents — including drones that drop tear gas — to counter the protests. American officials have backed Israel’s actions. Heather Nauert, the State Department spokeswoman, said “Israel has a right to defend itself,” while Nikki R. Haley, the United States ambassador to the United Nations, said Israel had responded with “restraint.” United Nations human rights officials have disputed that view. Michael Lynk, the special rapporteur on human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory, said the killings on Monday reflected a “blatant excessive use of force by Israel” and likened them to “an eye for an eyelash.” Mr. Lynk said that protesters appeared to pose no credible threat to Israeli military forces on the Israeli side. Under humanitarian law, he said, the killing of unarmed demonstrators could amount to a war crime, and he added that “impunity for these actions is not an option.” Jodi Rudoren contributed reporting. (c) 2018 The New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-fence.html

By Moulid Hujale Children at a camp for people displaced by violence. Campaigners say many victims of rape and sexual assault come from the overcrowded shelters around the capital, Mogadishu. Photograph: Zohra Bensemra/Reuters When Anab’s madrasa teacher in Mogadishu told her to stay behind after classes, everyone but her two younger brothers left. He ordered the boys to face the wall, then assaulted their six-year-old sister. Anab’s father, Yusuf, says he clearly saw the “shock and horror in the face” of his daughter later that day. “She told only her mother what the teacher did to her. I could not believe it. We rushed her to the nearest clinic,” says Yusuf. Five months after her ordeal, Anab now attends a new school and is beginning to recover. The Somali Women Development Centre, a Mogadishu-based organisation that provides medical, psychological and legal support to survivors of sexual violence, has been central to her rehabilitation. But she is not alone. Recently, there has been a rise in the number of reported cases of sexual violence involving children, according to the centre. “In the last three months alone, we have documented about 100 rape cases including 26 children, some as young as four, in Mogadishu,” says Amina Arale, the centre’s executive director. “Most victims come from overcrowded camps for internally displaced people in and around the outskirts of the capital, Mogadishu.” Young women in a session at the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre in Mogadishu, where survivors of sexual violence can find refuge, medical care and support. Photograph: Carl de Souza/AFP/Getty Images Sexual violence is pervasive in Somalia, but most cases go unreported because of the accompanying stigma. Between September 2016 and February 2017, the Somalia Protection Cluster – a network of about 130 organisations focused on rights and support – reported more than 1,500 incidents in the country. Yusuf says two of his neighbours told him the same teacher had sexually assaulted their daughters. Shame prevented them from reported the incidents. “If they first reported him to the police, my daughter would not have been affected today. I suspect he has been abusing her for quite a long time,” he says. The few who dare to speak out encounter a weak legal justice system. Consequently, many people turn to customary law – conducted by clan elders – which often results in victims marrying their assailants while their families are given some cash compensation. Yusuf resisted pressure from elders and demanded the perpetrator be brought to book. In February, the man was arrested, found guilty and sentenced to two years in prison. “I am not satisfied with the judgment,” Yusuf says. “I am working with my lawyer to appeal against the decision and seek a tougher punishment. I do not understand how they come to such a verdict. If I stop pushing the case now, the chances are he will come back and abuse other children.” The same court sentenced a man convicted of raping a 14-year-old boy to five years in prison earlier this year. The boy’s mother told the Guardian: “For me it is just like a murder. He killed my son, he destroyed his future and my son will live with the trauma for the rest of his life. “He threw him on the ground, held his head against a ditch – face down – and raped him.” The ruling was based on a colonial-era penal code written in Italy in the 1930s. “The penal code is a weak, non-comprehensive legislation that does not respond to the realities on the ground in Somalia in 2018,” says Antonia Mulvey, executive director of Legal Action Worldwide (Law), a non-profit network of human rights lawyers that is supporting the federal government in the drafting of a new sexual offences bill. The bill has been in the making for the past four years, but has still not been passed. Political in-fighting within the executive delayed much-needed justice for the many victims of gender-based violence. The speaker of the Somali parliament resigned last month following internal conflict with the president. Eight-year-old Fartun is still waiting for justice. He was allegedly raped by a man in his 40s in the outskirts of Mogadishu last October. The man was arrested on the same day, and is being held in the central prison. “I was told the political crisis in the parliament has affected everything,” says Fartun’s father, Jelle. It is more difficult when the alleged perpetrator is from the security forces, which means the victims themselves might end up being arrested. Faiza, 20, and her brother were both detained about three weeks ago after they reported a police officer, who had allegedly raped Faiza in Mogadishu. Their mother says Faiza is being coerced to withdraw the case if she wants her children to be released. “My daughter was in the house alone when the police entered and raped her, and when her brother came, the officer fired at him,” she says. “They charged them of false accusation and want us to withdraw the case but I will not do that. I will continue to fight until I get justice.” Activists say many victims, particularly those from poor backgrounds or less powerful clans, fear reporting assaults if the attacker is from the security forces. In 2013, a woman who said she was raped by Somali security forces and the journalist who interviewed her were arrested and sentenced to one year in prison. The widely publicised case was later overthrown by a judge in Mogadishu. The new bill, if enacted, will empower victims and give special protection to vulnerable children and internally displaced people. But rights groups believe enforcement will be difficult. A landmark law criminalising all forms of sexual offence was passed in August 2016, in Puntland, the relatively stable semi-autonomous region in north-eastern Somalia. But it has not lived up to campaigners’ hopes, according to rights activist Hawa Abdi, who runs a centre that supports survivors of sexual violence. Hawa described her frustrations in a blog she wrote earlier this year: “Incredibly, in a majority of the cases that my organisation, the Galkayo Centre, has worked on, the men accused of rape have been members of the police force, military or marines.” In Somaliland, northern Somalia, a long-awaited rape bill is yet to be passed into law following a historic approval by parliament and elders in January this year. Since then a record number of 54 rape cases were reported in the state in just three months, including those of young boys and girls. Based on these figures, campaigners estimate that reported cases for 2018 will be nearly triple those for 2017. In Mogadishu, Fartun and her family are closely following developments in parliament. “It is very unfortunate that we have to wait until the government settles its own internal dispute – the very people who are meant to protect us,” says Jelle. Names changed to protect identities (c) 2018 The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/may/17/surge-sexual-attacks-children-somalia

By Monica Davey and Alan Blinder Workers lifting fallen headstones on Tuesday at Chesed Shel Emeth Cemetery in University City, Mo. Credit: Nick Schnelle for The New York Times 2/17/2018 - UNIVERSITY CITY, Mo. — Families waited in silent clusters in a century-old Jewish cemetery here on Tuesday. Some clutched slips of paper describing where relatives were buried. Others carried small plastic bags full of rocks to leave beside graves, a tradition. They came with a single question: Was the grave of a loved one among the nearly 200 that had been vandalized here sometime over the weekend? “You hope it’s not a resurgence of something, of anti-Semitism, but I don’t know,” Herschel Price, 87, of Creve Coeur, Mo., said as he walked toward the graves of his mother and father. “This is holy ground,” his wife, Margie, said, “and all I feel now is heartbreak.” The Prices joined scores of others in a frantic search of Chesed Shel Emeth Cemetery, just west of St. Louis, as they tried to learn whether their relatives’ graves were intact. They found their family’s gravestones unharmed. Cemetery officials said they were overrun with calls, emails and visits on Tuesday from distressed families. But callers also asked whether the vandalism at this 124-year-old cemetery might be another in a rash of anti-Semitic episodes occurring in recent weeks. On Tuesday, President Trump condemned the episodes, which some critics argued were an outgrowth of the vitriol of last year’s presidential campaign and Mr. Trump’s tone during it. Since the start of the year, at least 53 Jewish community centers around the country have received bomb threats, according to the J.C.C. Association of North America. More than a dozen of the facilities, including centers in Albuquerque; Baltimore; Birmingham, Ala.; Milwaukee; and Wilmington, Del., have reported repeated threats. In addition, jarring graffiti of swastikas have been reported on some college campuses as well as the New York City subway. “While we are relieved that all such threats have proven to be hoaxes and that not a single person was harmed, we are concerned about the anti-Semitism behind these threats, and the repetition of threats intended to interfere with day-to-day life,” said David Posner, the director of strategic performance for the Jewish community centers group, which also said that a facility in Canada had been threatened. Ron Glazer, 61, said the cemetery where his parents and grandparents were buried was widely known as a Jewish cemetery and had never, in his memory, been vandalized. “You don’t expect this in a cemetery, and with everything that’s been going on, you cannot help but wonder and worry,” he said. “I can’t believe this is happening here and now, but it is. And people need to speak out on it.”The law enforcement authorities, who have made no arrests in the Missouri case, said they had no indication that the vandalism was a hate crime, and no investigators have publicly suggested a link between this and the scores of other anti-Semitic episodes. Yet many of the families drawn to the cemetery on Tuesday said that they sensed an increasingly sinister mood behind the pattern of threats. “We’ve never had this level of anti-Semitism — from different places on the ground, on your phone, literally over the phone — come at a time when hate groups and white supremacists, in particular, felt they had a champion in the highest office,” said Oren Segal, the director of the Anti-Defamation League’s Center on Extremism. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division opened an inquiry into the bomb threats last month, and a spokeswoman for the F.B.I. said Tuesday that the bureau was “aware of the incident in University City.” “If, in the course of the local investigation, information comes to light of a potential federal civil rights violation, the F.B.I. is prepared to investigate,” the spokeswoman, Rebecca Wu, said in an email. The police in University City, with a population of about 35,000, said investigators were reviewing surveillance videos in the aftermath of the episode, which may have happened on the Jewish Sabbath. (The cemetery is closed on Saturdays.) Fences surround the cemetery, and the gates are locked at night. People came to the Jewish cemetery to see if the graves of their loved ones were among the nearly 200 vandalized over the weekend.CreditNick Schnelle for The New York Times Although most hate crimes in the United States are connected to biases involving race, ethnicity or ancestries, the federal authorities recorded 664 anti-Jewish incidents in 2015, the most recent year for which F.B.I. data is available. That was an increase of about 9 percent from the previous year, but the number of episodes remained far lower than in some other recent years, like 2010, for which federal officials reported 887 anti-Jewish incidents. “Something has been released over a period of, I would say, a couple of years now,” Mr. Segal said. “Some of it is people literally feeling emboldened by the divisive rhetoric. Other parts of it, frankly, are the ability of people to harass and create fear with much more ease than any other time in human history.” Jewish organizations have long been aware of security risks. Indeed, the first of 18 best security practices recommended by the Anti-Defamation League is to “make safety and security part of the culture of your institution, involving staff, leadership and constituents.” Another recommended practice is developing a bomb threat response plan. “Security is part of the culture of the Jewish community in this country and, frankly, around the world,” Mr. Segal said. “You can be prepared and outraged at the same time, and concerned at the same time.” Still, synagogues, not community centers and cemeteries, have historically been seen as the most threatened. Mark Potok, a senior fellow at the Southern Poverty Law Center, which also tracks anti-Semitic activity, said that he thought that the recent harassment of community centers was driven by the perception that they were so-called soft targets, especially in comparison to houses of worship. “The kind of thing like the bomb threats strikes me as being trolling on steroids,” Mr. Potok said. “It’s not actually blowing up anything, but it’s causing an incredible amount of havoc, and it’s possible to do anonymously.” Extremism researchers say that a small group of people could be behind the phone calls and that it is to soon to know whether the vandalism in Missouri is directly connected to the bomb threats. But Mr. Potok cautioned that the desecration of the cemetery should be seen as alarming. “My guess is it might be bored and extremely unpleasant teenagers, but it’s not pure happenstance that it’s a Jewish cemetery,” he said. “They may not be big-time, serious anti-Semites who deny the Holocaust and all the rest, but they might be little gangsters who are prodded on by the enormous amount of anti-Semitic propaganda.” Here in Missouri, Gov. Eric Greitens announced on Tuesday that he would assist in cleanup at the cemetery on Wednesday afternoon. Although the police cautioned against linking the University City vandalism to other crimes, the destruction here still resonated powerfully and broadly as a symbol of contemporary anti-Semitism. On his television show on the Bravo network, Andy Cohen noted that he had relatives buried in the cemetery. Speaking during his broadcast, Mr. Cohen added, “I don’t have to have a personal connection, though, to know that this is not who we are as Americans, and this certainly should not be where we’re heading.” The vandalism, blended with the broader wave of anti-Semitic activity, was demoralizing, Mr. Cohen said. “This does not feel like a coincidence,” he said. “We cannot allow acts of hate against anyone to become normal.” By late Tuesday, cemetery workers, some bearing maps and elaborate paper files, were conducting a meticulous search of every grave to try to figure out how many stones had been toppled and how many were seriously damaged. Some of the cemetery’s oldest gravestones were in the section that was vandalized. A monument company had arrived to assist in putting some stones that had simply been knocked down back up. Others, officials said, will require repair. “We are working as fast as we can to get a complete list together because we know how much people need to know about their families,” Anita Feigenbaum, the cemetery’s executive director, said. “We’re going row by row, stone by stone. These families need to know.” Monica Davey reported from University City, and Alan Blinder from New York. (c) 2018 The New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/21/us/missouri-jewish-cemetery-chesed-shel-emeth.html

Protesters Call for UN Action on Accountability By Meenakshi Ganguly In Sri Lanka, families like those of Mariyasuresh Easwary, whose husband was forcibly disappeared by the authorities, have been waiting a long time for answers—and for justice. "We have approached the courts, we did not get justice there. We approached commissions of inquiry, we did not get our justice there either," she told reporters . Now, many families of Sri Lanka’s “disappeared” are joining others to call upon the United Nations Human Rights Council to support international accountability efforts for grave violations committed during the 26-year civil war that ended in 2009. "We need the international community and the United Nations to deliver justice for us,” she said. Sri Lankan officials immediately tried to muzzle victims’ groups, issuing numerous court orders against a five-day protest march around the country’s independence-day celebrations on February 4. For example, the Kalavanjikudi Magistrates Court on February 1 issued an order to “prohibit protests planned in support of the accusation of human rights violations at the Geneva sessions.” A sinister threat followed with the public security minister warning that the protesters would be arrested. “Now we have their photographs and we have their vehicle numbers, we know who these individuals are,” the minister said in a television interview . Thousands of Tamil civilians were killed in the final months of fighting between the Sri Lankan government and separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, when both sides were responsible for numerous atrocities . With Sri Lanka having failed to uphold commitments to prosecute alleged perpetrators, the Human Rights Council later this month is expected to consider measures to promote international accountability. Instead of addressing concerns, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s government has denounced international efforts for justice, adopted discriminatory measures against Tamils, and harassed victims’ groups. For a second year, the singing of the national anthem in Tamil, an official language, was dropped from the government’s independence-day parade. In January, authorities demolished a memorial to Tamil civilians killed during the war. UN human rights commissioner Michelle Bachelet has warned that the government’s policies of protecting alleged perpetrators while persecuting minority groups are a “warning sign” of future violations. Human Rights Council members should now pay heed to the victims and their families who are trusting them to pass a strong resolution to advance accountability and deter the government from committing further abuses. © Human Rights Watch 2021

By Meenakshi Ganguly Indian leaders have committed to supporting the rights of minority Tamils in Sri Lanka to “live with equity, equality, justice, peace and dignity”. In pledges to the United Nations, the Indian government has also vowed to uphold global human rights. These commitments have become crucial. The human rights situation in Sri Lanka has worsened since Gotabaya Rajapaksa became President in 2019. At its next session starting February 22, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) will face a crucial test in taking action for protecting vulnerable Sri Lankans and upholding international law. India, as a council member, will have a key role. Rajapaksa was the defence secretary in the government led by his brother Mahinda from 2005 to 2015, a period marked by particularly egregious human rights abuses. Critics of the government were murdered, tortured, and forcibly made to disappear. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed in the civil war which ended in 2009 between government forces and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), with both sides responsible for numerous war crimes. In the final months of the war, the armed forces indiscriminately shelled civilians and summarily executed suspected LTTE fighters. Renewed Fears When Mahinda Rajapaksa lost the 2015 presidential election, there was hope for change. There was greater freedom of expression. The repressive and heavily militarised situation in Tamil-majority areas began to improve. The new government supported a consensus resolution at the Human Rights Council that offered victims of abuses and their families truth, justice, and reconciliation. But now, fear has returned. Tamil communities in the north and the east fear increasing abuses. Since last year, singing the national anthem in Tamil has been dropped from Independence Day celebrations . The religious rights of minorities are under attack, including interference with Hindu temples. In January, the authorities bulldozed a memorial at Jaffna university that commemorated Tamil civilian victims of the civil war. People who participated in a protest march in February are now facing criminal investigation. The Rajapaksa government, in 2020, renounced its commitments under the 2015 Human Rights Council resolution and is threatening victims’ families and activists who supported it. A presidential commission set up to investigate supposed “political victimisation” of officials by the previous government has recommended the exoneration of those implicated in cases of abuse. Numerous people who were involved in war crimes have been appointed to senior roles. Loss of Accountability The Rajapaksa government has shown outright disdain for accountability. In September last year, Sri Lanka told the Human Rights Council that allegations against senior military officers are “unacceptable” and without “substantive evidence”. Last March, Rajapaksa pardoned former army sergeant Sunil Ratnayake , who killed eight Tamil civilians, including children. In October, the government amended the Constitution to remove constraints on political interference in Sri Lanka’s courts. Since 2012, the Human Rights Council has sought to work with Sri Lanka to promote reconciliation and accountability, efforts that India has backed. Sri Lanka is now rejecting that endeavour, instead proposing a new domestic commission that UN experts have dismissed as lacking credibility or independence. The UNHRC should recognise the government’s actions for what they are — an effort to impede justice. A new resolution is urgently needed to protect vulnerable minority communities in Sri Lanka, by upholding the principle of accountability for the worst crimes. India should join other member states in supporting a resolution to reduce the growing risk of future atrocities. © Human Rights Watch 2021

Saturday, February 20, 2021 | By Maria Panina and Victoria Loguinova-Yakovleva The judge rejected Navalny's appeal of a Feb. 2 ruling A Moscow court on Saturday upheld a ruling to jail the Kremlin's most prominent opponent, Alexei Navalny, sealing his first lengthy prison sentence after a decade of legal battles with Russian authorities. Judge Dmitry Balashov dismissed Navalny's appeal against a decision to imprison him for violating the terms of a suspended sentence received for embezzlement. Navalny was ordered on Feb. 2 to serve the time in a penal colony for breaching his parole terms while he was in Germany recovering from a nerve agent poisoning he blames on the Kremlin. The anti-corruption campaigner appeared in court Saturday inside a glass cage for defendants, wearing a plaid shirt, smiling and flashing the V for victory symbol. In a closing address that often broke from his usual sarcastic tone, Navalny referenced the Bible and said he had no doubts about his decision to return to Russia. "The Bible says: 'Blessed are those who hunger for righteousness, for they will be satisfied,'" he told the court. "I have no regrets that I am back." He also quoted from a character in the Harry Potter books, saying it was "important not to feel alone" because that was what the series' villain Voldemort wanted. He described the legal process to jail him as "absurd" and called on Russians to take action to make the country a better place. "Russia should be not only free, but also happy," Navalny said. Prosecutors lashed out at Navalny, saying he acted as if he was above the law and had "an exclusive right to do as he pleases". The judge decided however to count six weeks Navalny was under house arrest as part of the time served, so he will now be imprisoned for just over two-and-a-half years in a penal colony. The ruling against one of the most prominent players in Russian political life came just hours before Navalny was back in court on defamation charges. A judge is expected Saturday to decide whether to fine Navalny the equivalent of $13,000 for calling a World War II veteran a "traitor" on Twitter last year. Prosecutors also asked for him to be jailed on the same 2014 fraud conviction because the tweet was posted while he was serving the suspended sentence. The 94-year-old veteran appeared in a video that Navalny derided for promoting constitutional reforms, passed last year, that could allow President Vladimir Putin to stay in power until 2036. "One day of this trial costs much more than the veteran got in the last four years from the very state that dares to claim it cares about veterans," Navalny said at the defamation hearing Saturday. Western pressure for release Supporters of the outspoken opposition figure say the cases are a pretext to silence his corruption exposes and quash his political ambitions. The Kremlin said it had nothing to do with Navalny's court cases and that the decision to reject his appeal would not alter Russia's political landscape in the run-up to parliamentary elections later this year. "Political life will be rich and multifaceted," Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov said. Russia has come under increasing Western pressure to release Navalny since he was detained on arrival at a Moscow airport in January. He had spent months recovering in Germany from the attack with Novichok that he blames on the Kremlin. Russia has repeatedly denied involvement. His arrest sparked large demonstrations across the country while the European Union threatened to impose new sanctions on Moscow. Europe's rights court ruled this week that Russia must immediately release Navalny, a motion swiftly brushed aside by the justice ministry. EU foreign ministers, who are considering fresh sanctions over Navalny's arrest, are due to meet with two top Navalny aides in Brussels on Sunday. Link to Original Article the Moscow Times © 2021

June 29, 2021, 10:47 EDT | By Laura Paddison and Nina Lakhani Landmark ruling orders state to pay reparations, protect trans people and legalise gender change LGBTQ+ activists march against homophobia in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras, a year after the murder of Vicky Hernández. Reuters/Alamy. In a landmark ruling for transgender rights, the Honduras government has been found responsible for the 2009 murder of the trans woman and activist Vicky Hernández. The ruling, at the inter-American court of human rights , was published on the 12th anniversary of Hernández’s death, and marks the first time the highest regional human rights court has held a state accountable for failing to prevent, investigate and prosecute the death of a trans person. The court has ordered Honduras, which has the world’s highest rate of murders of trans people , to pay reparations to Hernández’s family and implement a sweeping range of measures designed to protect trans people, including anti-discrimination training for security forces and state collection of data on violence against LGBTQ+ people. It also ruled that the state must allow people to alter their gender identity on identification documents and public records. This could set an important precedent for Central America, where most countries do not allow people to legally change their gender. Hernández, a 26-year-old trans woman, activist and sex worker from San Pedro Sula in northern Honduras , was killed by a single gunshot to her head, a crime for which no one was ever charged. Lawyers acting on behalf of Cattrachas, a Honduran LGTBQ+ advocacy organisation that brought the case, successfully argued that the Honduran state had violated Hernández’s right to life, to a fair trial and judicial protection by failing to properly investigate her death and failing to take into account the evidence that her murder was connected to her identity as a trans woman. The court’s ruling found “a context of violence against LGBTI people, and in particular against trans women who are sex workers” and a “context of impunity” for acts of violence against trans women. The Honduras government did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Hernández was killed on the first night of the June 2009 coup d’état , in which the Honduran military ousted President Manuel Zelaya and enforced night-time curfews across the country. The curfews were brought in to contain demonstrations against the coup, but were part of wider crackdown in which journalists, teachers, students and LGBTQ+ people were targeted. Hernández, who relied on sex work to survive, had been on the streets with two other trans women when they saw a police car coming towards them. Fearing violence, they ran in different directions. The next morning, Hernández was found dead. The authorities dismissed her murder as a “crime of passion”, said Angelita Baeyens, director of litigation and advocacy at Robert F Kennedy Human Rights, a Washington-based non-profit organisation that assisted Cattrachas in bringing the claim. The police did not interview anyone from the crime scene, never examined the bullet casing found near Hernández and it is not clear whether they performed a postmortem examination on her. Lawyers working on Hernández’s case argued that state agents actually committed the murder. “She was murdered during a curfew, on the first night of the coup d’etat, when only security forces were on the streets,” said Baeyens. The court ruling, which ordered Honduras to restart its investigation into Hernández’s death, found “several indications of the participation of state agents”. For those involved in bringing the case against the Honduran authorities, the significance of Hernández’s murder is that her death ushered in a new era of violence against trans women. Cattrachas, which has documented violence against LGBTQ+ people in Honduras for two decades, recorded a total of 20 deaths of LGBTQ+ people in the 15 years leading up to the 2009 coup d’etat. In the eight months afterwards, it recorded 31 deaths of LGBTQ+ people, 15 of whom were trans women. These women were all found on streets and all showed signs of having been violently assaulted. There was “a pattern of social cleansing against trans women”, said Indyra Mendoza, the founder of Cattrachas. Of the two trans women to see Hernández last, one of them, Michelle Torres , was murdered months later; the other, Fergie Alice, was killed just over a year afterwards. “Vicky’s death set a precedent,” said Mendoza. “There’s a ‘before Vicky’s death’ and an ‘after Vicky’s death’.” Claudia Spellmant, founder of the Honduran trans collective Colectivo Unidad Color Rossa and a witness in the case, knew Hernández well. Hernández used to visit Spellmant’s San Pedro Sula office regularly, at first for condoms and to attend safety training, but later as an active member of the collective. “She really became a public face and a defender of human rights of trans women,” said Spellmant. Hernández’s activism may have made her more vulnerable. “Just to be born trans puts your life at risk in Honduras,” said Spellmant, “but to be trans and to be a human rights defender just escalates your risk so much.” The case is hugely significant for Spellmant, who fled Honduras for New York City in 2013 after increasing harassment from the authorities. She gave testimony at the virtual trial at the inter-American court last November along with an expert witness, Marlene Wayar, an Argentinian social psychologist and trans woman. “This is a case about a trans woman, presented by trans women,” said Spellmant. “That’s historic on many levels.” Transphobia in Latin America remains pervasive and deadly and trans women in the region have a life expectancy of between 30 and 35 years . “This [ruling] is a roadmap for other states in the region that have similar a context of violence and discrimination against trans women and LGBTI people more generally,” said Baeyens. While the decision offers the beginnings of justice for Hernández and her family, the next challenge is the battle for enforcement. “The inter-American court has absolutely no teeth,” said Juliana Martínez, an associate professor at American University, Washington DC, who focuses on gender and sexuality in Latin America. “That doesn’t mean that [the decision] is meaningless; it is very powerful,” she said. “But legal decisions have limits and we’ve seen that repeatedly in the region.” Although Latin American countries have passed legislation over the past decade to protect LGTBQ+ rights, enforcement is often irregular. Court rulings such as this one, said Martínez, can be “weaponised by gender-restrictive movements or politicians”. In Costa Rica, a conservative evangelical pastor, Fabricio Alvarado Muñoz, rose to prominence in the country’s 2018 national elections campaigning against an inter-American court of human rights decision that same-sex couples must have equal marriage rights. Martínez said: “Any legal victory is temporal and it’s fragile if it doesn’t go hand in hand with a cultural shift.” In the 12 years since the coup, Cattrachas has recorded 117 killings of trans women. “The Honduran state is a very hostile country,” said Mendoza, “it’s not only violent and deadly, but also religious fundamentalism here has a lot of power.” However, she believes the ruling will bring international pressure on Honduras to act. For now, Mendoza plans to celebrate the significance of a tiny LGBTQ+ organisation bringing a historic case on such a significant stage. “Vicky’s case is a form of collective justice for every trans woman in Latin America,” said Mendoza, “because we know that Vicky’s life is a reflection of what it is like to be trans in Latin America.” © 2021 Guardian News & Media