By Human Rights Watch June 23, 2026 Exposure to Extreme Temperatures, Health Risks, Death Construction workers in Doha, Qatar, November 16, 2022. Credit: Human Rights Watch, © 2022 ddp images via AP Photo (Beirut) – Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are exposing migrant workers to yet another deadly summer without adequate occupational health and safety protections as temperatures soar to dangerous levels, Human Rights Watch said today. Migrant workers, particularly outdoor workers, are left to fend for themselves as they balance the pressures of extreme heat and physically taxing work, and relentless demands from their employers. The “heat [is] so intense that it is beyond the endurance of an ordinary person,” one worker said. “Despite a wealth of evidence on both global temperature increases and the severe health risks extreme heat exposure poses, Gulf states are dragging their feet on adopting adequate protections,” said Michael Page, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “Gulf states have the means and capacity to adopt these protections, including restricting working hours based on actual temperature thresholds rather than fixed schedules.” Between February and May 2026, Human Rights Watch spoke to 20 migrant workers from Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan working in construction and app-based bike delivery about heat and occupational health and safety issues in Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. This is the fourth consecutive year that Human Rights Watch has interviewed outdoor workers to better understand extreme heat risks. June marks the start of the enforcement period of midday work bans in several Gulf states, their sole heat exposure protection measure, which prohibits outdoor work during certain hours in summer months. These bans generally apply from June through August or September and restrict outdoor work between late morning and mid-afternoon. However, there is growing scientific evidence on the limitations of calendar- and time-based bans to shield workers from heat-related health risks. A UAE-based road construction worker described the heat as “unbearable” and recalled working outdoors when temperatures reached 48 degrees Celsius (118.4 degrees Fahrenheit). “During summer, it becomes difficult to work by 7:30 or 8:00 a.m., but we have to work until 11:30 a.m. no matter what. That is the most difficult time.” He said migrant workers in Gulf states have to mentally prepare themselves for the upcoming summer, thinking, “How will we get through this year?” Exposure to extreme heat can cause fatal heat stroke, exacerbate pre-existing conditions, impair cognitive function, and increase the risk of workplace injuries. It can also cause lasting health harm, including kidney failure, and even premature death. A UAE-based worker said, “Sometimes we hear news that someone in another company collapsed from the heat and died. When we hear that, we get goose bumps. We think, ‘Maybe tomorrow it will be our turn. We are also working in the same heat.’” The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Sixth Assessment Report establishes that heat extremes have increased across the Arabian Peninsula, with human-induced climate change having a contributing role. World Weather Attribution's 2024 study of the West Asian heat wave found that human-induced climate change made the event roughly five times more likely and about 1.7 degrees Celsius more intense than it would have been in a world without fossil-fuel warming. According to a rapid World Weather Attribution study, climate change is making the Hajj pilgrimage for Muslims to Mecca dangerously hot earlier in the year compared to the past, with temperatures that were confined to peak summer months June-August now occurring in May or even earlier. Human Rights Watch spoke to six app-based, or so-called platform, bike delivery workers who described a lack of cool or shaded rest areas, poor visibility under intense sunlight, heat distorting their vision, the overheating of devices required for their jobs, and direct health impacts such as sunburns and heat-related illness, including dizziness and fainting, as common. They also described pressures from platform companies, including time-sensitive deliveries and fear of losing income or losing their jobs, making it difficult to refuse orders even when conditions were unhealthy or unsafe. “If an order comes, you have to deliver it even if it is hot or rains,” said a UAE-based worker. Some pickup locations provided rest areas and cool water, some companies provided rest areas such as air-conditioned buses, and others were able to adjust their schedules to include cooler night hours. “During the very hot three months, in some places, every 15-20 kilometers, there were buses with AC arranged for rest for bike delivery riders,” one worker said. “Water was also available there. If the heat was too much, we could rest there … but those were only in limited places.” Some GCC countries, such as Kuwait and Qatar, have explicitly banned bike deliveries during summer midday ban hours. The UAE has mandated rest and cooling stations for bike delivery riders and announced the recent expansion of these rest areas. Gulf states should adopt evidence-based occupational heat protection measures, such as the widely used Wet Bulb Globe Temperature (WBGT) index, which measures occupational heat stress based on air temperature and relative humidity. These measures should include evidence-based work-rest schedules guided by real-time WBGT thresholds and work intensity, as well as access to cool water and cool, shaded rest areas, to prevent heat-related illness and death among outdoor workers. Only Qatar, in 2021, has introduced the index with an upper WBGT threshold of 32.1 degrees Celsius (89.78 degrees Fahrenheit) to stop outdoor work, but the threshold is too high and enforcement gaps remain. “When we sweat a lot, the body becomes extremely weak,” one worker said. “But because of company pressure, we continue working. The mind says, ‘I can do it,’ but the body does not support us … Every season, someone collapses.” There are also significant variations in the occupational health and safety measures provided by private employers. “If anything happens at the site, medical facilities are available immediately,” one worker said. “On large sites, doctors are stationed. Good companies provide all facilities. In smaller companies, however, such facilities do not exist.” Another worker said, “Some sites provide cool water, others don’t. To stay hydrated, you need to use the toilets frequently. But many construction sites did not have proper toilet provisions.” A Qatar-based masonry helper said: “We would feel dizzy when working in the heat. We would rest for 5 to 10 minutes after which the foreman would again call us to work. If we laid down, he would immediately shout telling us to get up and work.” The rest area at his construction site did not have air conditioning or refrigeration for workers’ food. “Sometimes, the food would smell bad and we had to throw it away.” The lack of strong evidence-based policies to prevent dangerous heat exposure and inadequate oversight from authorities has turned heat protections into a game of chance, Human Rights Watch said, as workers’ health and safety in extreme temperatures often depends on the mercy of supervisors and employers. The recent Human Rights Watch report on platform work found that gig workers often face dangerous working conditions, including extreme heat, with little protection when they are injured or unable to work. A new International Labour Organisation treaty, adopted on June 12, sets labor standards for gig work and includes a section on occupational safety and health. It requires governments to take adequate preventive measures to prevent occupational accidents, occupational diseases, and other risks to gig workers’ health. Governments should promptly ratify the convention and implement it in domestic law, including measures to adequately address extreme heat risks, Human Rights Watch said. “Rising global temperatures are making existing extreme summer heat in the Gulf more dangerous, especially for the millions of migrant workers who work outdoors without adequate rest and hydration,” Page said. “Gulf states should guarantee safety and health protections to all workers.” © 2026 Human Rights Watch

By Fatma Khaled June 25, 2026 This is a locator map for Yemen with its capital, Sanaa. Credit: AP Photo CAIRO (AP) — A Yemeni journalist was killed in a car bombing in southeastern Yemen and investigators have been ordered to search for the culprits, the government said Thursday. Mohamed Eida, a correspondent for the Saudi-backed television networks Al-Arabiya and Al- Hadath, was killed late Wednesday when an explosive device planted in his car detonated in the port city of Mukalla in Hadramout province, according to the broadcaster. The network said local authorities had warned him about a month ago that his life was at risk. Eida’s body has not been returned to his family, who were informed by authorities that it would be held pending the investigation, according to a relative who requested anonymity for fear of reprisal. An investigation is launched The death and bombing were confirmed by Rashad al-Alimi, chairman of the country’s Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council — the leadership body of Yemen’s internationally recognized government. He ordered local authorities to investigate, a council statement said. Al-Alimi gave no word about suspected perpetrators. But Al-Hadath reported that two suspects had been arrested and that authorities were pursuing a third. It cited unidentified sources. The attack is condemned The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate condemned the bombing as a “terrorist” attack, calling it a flagrant violation of press freedom, showing that the country remains unsafe for journalists. Allowing the culprits to escape justice would encourage more such attacks, threaten the safety of journalists and violate national and international laws guaranteeing freedom of expression, the group said. U.N. Special Envoy Hans Grundberg also condemned the killing in a statement Thursday, calling for the protection of media professionals and welcoming the “continued efforts to establish the facts, ensure accountability, and strengthen public confidence.” The victim had long been under pressure Eida previously had fled the capital, Sanaa, some years ago after being pursued by Houthi rebels who are the de facto authorities in that city, according to the journalists syndicate. He was working as a correspondent for the U.S.-funded broadcaster Alhurra at the time, the syndicate said. Al Arabiya reported that Eida was forced to leave Sanaa for Aden after armed men tried to arrest him. The broadcaster said the men also raided his home and stole his belongings, but it did not identify the armed men. Eida later joined the network in the city of Mukalla. Journalists face dangers in Yemen Yemen has been fractured by over a decade of civil war that began when Iran-backed Houthis seized Sanaa and much of northern Yemen, forcing the internationally recognized government into exile. A Saudi-led coalition including the United Arab Emirates intervened later to try to restore the government to power. Over 30 journalists were reportedly killed in Israeli airstrikes that targeted Houthis in Sanaa last September, as part of a series of attacks between Israeli forces and the Iran-backed group, which said it was targeting Israel in response to the war in the Gaza Strip. —— Associated Press writer Ahmed al-Haj in Aden, Yemen contributed to this report. Copyright 2026 The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved.

Human rights organisations are worried China's new ethnic unity law could restrict cultural, religious and linguistic freedoms. File Photo: Reuters, Tingshu Wang The Australian government says it has raised concerns directly with China over the country's new ethnic unity law, which allows Beijing to target people overseas. China's Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion law, which comes into effect next week, is designed to create a "shared" national identity among the country's 55 ethnic minority groups, including Tibetans and Uyghurs. It formalises longstanding policies to promote Mandarin as the language of education, official business and public space while criminalising "violent terrorist activities, ethnic separatist activities, or religious extremist activities". But it also includes a clause that people and groups beyond the borders of the People's Republic of China can be held legally accountable for undermining "ethnic unity and progress or inciting ethnic separatism". A spokesperson for Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade said it had raised concerns about the law "directly with China and at the UN Human Rights Council". "The Australian government is concerned about the human rights implications of China's Ethnic Unity Law, including its potential to curtail the rights and freedoms of individuals beyond China's borders," the spokesperson said. "All people in Australia, regardless of citizenship, are protected by Australian law and enjoy Australian political freedoms." Party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region, Wang Junzheng, during the National People's Congress. File Photo: Reuters: Tingshu Wang The Australia Tibet Council said the law could impact Australian citizens and called on Foreign Minister Penny Wong to "take action". "For Tibetans, this law represents a significant escalation of policies that seek to erase Tibetan identity," the council said. "This law could be used to target people and organisations outside China, raising serious concerns about transnational repression and the safety of Tibetan-Australians." Overseas clause 'distorted', vice justice minister says The ethnic unity law comes into effect on July 1. File Photo: Reuters: Tingshu Wang Beijing's Vice Justice Minister Hu Weilie said the law was "legitimate", "lawful" and "necessary", and said the overseas provision had been "distorted and misinterpreted". "This provision is based on China's national conditions, conforms to legal principles, and is consistent with international practice," he said. "Countries around the world all have the right to prevent separatist and destructive activities, and to maintain social solidarity and normal order, through domestic legislation." He said the overseas provision would effectively safeguard China's sovereignty and security as well as the lawful rights and interests of people of all ethnic groups. It would do so by targeting illegal acts and using rule-of-law methods to "guard against various unlawful acts involving ethnic affairs from outside the country", Mr Hu said. "It will not affect normal people-to-people exchanges between China and other countries, academic discussions, economic and trade cooperation, or other activities." European Parliament calls for law to be repealed It has also sparked alarm in Taiwan that the ethnic unity law could give Beijing another legal basis to go after Taiwanese it views as separatists. The European Parliament has called on the Chinese government to repeal the law, which was passed in March, warning its enforcement would lead to "serious consequences" for EU-China relations, as well as for populations originating from Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. "Parliament condemns this law for encouraging assimilation policies and restricting cultural, religious, and linguistic freedoms, in contradiction with China's obligations under international law," the parliament said in a statement. Delegates in ethnic minority outfits outside the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, where the law was passed. File Photo: Reuters: Tingshu Wang Similarly, eight United Nations human rights experts raised concerns about the new law in a letter to the Chinese government in April. "We would like to draw attention to risks that the law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress could entrench a uniform approach to ethnic relations across all regions of China, thereby potentially amplifying restrictions on minority rights," it said. "In this context, the law … could have serious implications for the linguistic, cultural, and religious autonomy of ethnic communities, including Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Mongols." ABC/Reuters/AFP

Authorities Should Immediately Release Moussa Tiangari and Others Arbitrarily Detained Moussa Tiangari, Niamey, Niger, June 2024. File Photo: Amnesty International 18 months ago, Niger’s military junta arrested and detained Moussa Tiangari, a prominent human rights defender in the country. Following an investigation, the United Nations is now calling for his release. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, an independent expert body that investigates cases of deprivation of liberty, found that Tiangari’s detention is arbitrary and violates international human rights law. In its opinion released on June 23, the UN working group called on Nigerien authorities to release Tiangari and provide him with reparations. It also called for an independent investigation into his arbitrary detention and accountability for those responsible. Tiangari, 56, is the secretary general of a civil society organization, Alternative Espaces Citoyens, and an outspoken critic of the military junta. He was arrested at his home in Niger’s capital, Niamey, on December 3, 2024. He was held incommunicado for two days before finally being located at the Central Service for Combating Terrorism and Organized Transnational Crime, an inter-agency law enforcement body, headquartered in the capital. On January 3, 2025, Niamey’s High Court charged him with “terrorism apology,” and “plotting against the authority of the state through collaboration with enemy powers,” among other offenses. The investigating judge ordered his pretrial detention in Filingué prison, about 170 kilometers from Niamey. Family visits require judicial authorization and, because of the distance, are limited to twice a week. In 2025, Tiangari’s lawyers unsuccessfully filed three appeals seeking his release. He is yet to stand trial. According to the UN working group, Tiangari has not been informed of the identity of the alleged terrorist group he is accused of having links to. The charges brought against him, including allegedly plotting with enemy powers, means he could face the death penalty. Since seizing power in July 2023, the junta has targeted political opponents, civil society members and journalists. The military authorities continue to arbitrarily detain former President Mohamed Bazoum and have withdrawn Niger from key regional and international accountability bodies, including the regional bloc Economic Community of West African States and the International Criminal Court. The UN working group has spoken clearly: now Niger’s military authorities should act. They should immediately release Tiangari and the other detainees who are languishing in prison because of baseless and politically motivated charges.

By Farhaad June 24, 2026 Mourners walk through a street decorated with religious flags and banners during Muharram observances in Herat. (Photo credit: 8am.media) Local sources in Herat say that the Taliban have not permitted the observance of Tasu’a and Ashura ceremonies in the province, including street processions, chest-beating rituals, and the carrying of religious standards, and have imposed extensive restrictions on mourners. Sources told the Hasht-e Subh Daily on Wednesday, June 24, 2026, that representatives of the people of Herat had met several times with Taliban officials to obtain permission for Ashura-related ceremonies, but the Taliban opposed holding the events in the same manner as in previous years. According to the sources, the Taliban governor of Herat ultimately informed community representatives that mourners would only be allowed to gather on the day of Ashura, while all forms of street chest-beating, public processions, and the carrying of flags and religious standards would be completely prohibited. The sources added that in previous years, the Hazara community of Herat would march in organized processions from various mosques on the day of Tasu’a and gather at the Jibrail Grand Mosque, and would also hold large gatherings on the day of Ashura. According to the sources, restrictions this year have been so severe that even small mourning flags placed on the rooftops of some homes have been taken down by Taliban fighters. Local sources say that the people of Herat are dissatisfied and angered by the situation and are calling on the Taliban to allow the free observance of Tasu’a and Ashura religious ceremonies. © 2023 - ©Hasht-e Subh Daily

Eighteen is now the minimum age to wed but cases of forced marriages of underage girls persist. File photo: Getty Images By Umaru Fofana BBC News For the first time since child marriage was banned in Sierra Leone two years ago, people accused of committing the crime are being brought to trial. Four men are to appear in court charged with the forcible marriage of a 17-year-old girl. Among the accused are the girl's father and her so-called husband. The BBC is not naming them so as to protect the child's identity. If convicted, the defendants will be jailed for at least 15 years or fined around $4,000 (£3,200), or both. Under the law, even those who attend the wedding of a child can be arrested and jailed. Sierra Leone is a patriarchal society and it has long been common for a father to give his daughter's hand in marriage forcibly. Despite the fact that 18 is now the minimum age to wed, many instances of underage girls being forced to marry persist in the country, often officiated by local religious figures. Prosecutors say this particular marriage happened in Grafton, in the outskirts of the capital city Freetown. "The charges represent a significant milestone in the enforcement of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2024", Sierra Leone's Attorney General and Minister of Justice Alpha Sesay told the BBC. He confirmed this was the first time that charges had been brought against anyone for offences related to contracting, consenting to or facilitating child marriage. "Before 2024 we had conflicting pieces of legislation one of which – the Customary Marriage Act – allowed parents to give their consent if the bride was a minor." But this changed two years ago when customary law was struck out, he explained, giving "a new regime to indict anyone taking part in the marriage of someone below the age of 18". The four men in this landmark case are charged with contracting marriage with a child, consenting to child marriage, plus aiding and abetting child marriage. The bride's father is alleged to have facilitated the marriage between one of the defendants and the child, and allegedly played active roles during the marriage ceremony, "ensuring that the marriage was successfully conducted". Gender activists have been quick to respond to the unprecedented move. The president of the all-female lawyers' group, Legal Access through Women Yearning for Equality Rights and Social Justice, told the BBC she felt "extremely happy". Menisa Sesay said it showed the legal reforms for which they had fought so hard were finally being enforced, vindicating their mission to protect the rights of vulnerable women and girls. As many as 30% of girls in Sierra Leone are married before they turn 18, according to a recent report by Human Rights Watch, while in rural areas some of the brides are said to be as young as 14. Activists had expressed concerns that despite the tough laws, lawbreakers were not being reigned in. "The charges brought against the four… is reassuring that there is light at the end of the tunnel for women and girls in Sierra Leone", Sesay said

DFID - UK Department for International Development, CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons 9 Jun 2026 Following hearings in January this year, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will next deliver its judgment in The Gambia v. Myanmar. When it does, the Court may finally confront the role that the systematic destruction of a group’s food system plays in a finding of genocide. The Rohingya case is unusual among genocide proceedings. The most visceral evidence – massacres, sexual violence, and village burnings that began in August 2017 – has inevitably dominated public attention. Beneath that spectacular violence, however, lies a slower, more bureaucratic, and arguably more revealing pattern of destruction, which is the decades-long dismantling of the Rohingya’s capacity to feed themselves. The Gambia’s application to the Court explicitly invoked Myanmar’s “policy of forced starvation,” including “widespread confiscation of agricultural lands on which the Rohingya grow subsistence crops essential to their survival.” The question now is whether, and to what extent, the Court will give food deprivation the weight it deserves. Why Food Matters in Genocide Law The destruction of a group’s food system can be central to a finding of genocide. Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention prohibits “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.” This provision was drafted in part with Nazi ghettos in mind – sealed communities where food was rationed to starvation levels as a method of incremental death. The Genocide Convention’s drafters originally listed lack of proper food, hygiene, and medical care as examples of inflicting such conditions. They dropped the list from the final text not to narrow the scope, but to ensure no method would be inadvertently excluded. The international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have interpreted “conditions of life” expansively, citing subsistence diets and food deprivation as examples. The ICJ itself, however, has never conducted an exhaustive or in-depth analysis of Article II(c). In both Bosnia v. Serbia and Croatia v. Serbia, the Court considered the provision but reached no genocide finding under it, meaning that The Gambia v. Myanmar may be the first case in which the Court engages in depth with Article II(c) in the context of food deprivation. The Blueprint of Engineered Hunger A review of the record reveals at least eight interlocking mechanisms through which Myanmar deprived the Rohingya of food: denial of citizenship and land tenure; travel permit requirements; checkpoint proliferation; curfew regimes; camp confinement and aid dependency; confiscation of farming tools; identity document prerequisites for farmland access; and restrictions on humanitarian delivery. These mechanisms did not emerge in isolation, but fit within the Myanmar military’s (Tatmadaw’s) longstanding “Four Cuts” counterinsurgency doctrine, which aimed to sever food, funds, recruits, and intelligence from targeted populations. Modeled on the British Malayan Emergency counterinsurgency, the doctrine was developed by the Tatmadaw in the mid-1960s under General Ne Win. In the Rohingya context, food appears to have become a primary instrument of control. At the domestic level, this control began with Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, which excluded the Rohingya from the 135 recognized “national races” and denied them secure land tenure. Without legal standing, every interaction with the state became an opportunity for extortion – checkpoint tolls, livestock registration fees, fishing permit bribes – draining resources from the beleaguered population. Layered on top was a permit regime requiring documentation for even short journeys between villages, with checkpoints so dense that one refugee described nine in a four-kilometre stretch, and curfew regimes that eliminated peak fishing hours. Following sectarian violence in June 2012, over 128,000 Rohingya and others were confined in camps where they became entirely dependent on humanitarian aid that was itself distributed through discriminatory channels and restricted by the state. Markets became inaccessible and remittances were cut off, while the Rohingya could not leave, farm, fish, or trade. By the time of the 2016-2017 escalation of conflict, the government had confiscated farming implements, imposed identity documents as prerequisites for accessing farmland, and restricted humanitarian organizations from delivering food. In the period surrounding the state’s August 2017 “clearance operations,” the government pressured the UN World Food Programme (WFP) over a food security assessment, published in July, that estimated 80,500 children under five were “wasting” in northern Rakhine’s majority-Muslim areas. By October 2017, after the “clearance operations” had begun, WFP had withdrawn the assessment from public view and replaced it with a notice that the report should not be cited. From Destruction to Appropriation The August 2017 “clearance operations” destroyed at least 392 villages, or 40 percent of all settlements in northern Rakhine State. Over 40,600 structures were razed, including marketplaces. Livestock including cattle, goats, and chickens were systematically killed or confiscated, depriving Rohingya both of food and of income-generating opportunities. Some 740,000 people were forced to flee with little to nothing. Screening on arrival in Bangladesh found 145,000 children under five malnourished, with at least 14,000 of them suffering from severe acute malnutrition. What happened next should be central to the Court’s analysis. Following the mass displacement, Myanmar’s government – through a body chaired by then-State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi – systematically harvested and sold crops from Rohingya land. The Rakhine State Minister of Agriculture confirmed that 45,000 acres of “ownerless Bengali land” were harvested, and the Chief Minister stated that proceeds from 70,000 acres of rice paddies would go to the national budget. The land was then leased to ethnic Rakhine farmers and private companies, while the government built “model villages” on confiscated Rohingya land to resettle other ethnic groups. This sequence – expulsion, appropriation of agricultural output, transfer of land to the national budget and to members of other groups – points to more than counterinsurgency and reflects the systematic destruction of a group’s food-production base and the redistribution of its productive assets. In 2018, amendments to the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land Management Act compounded this by creating a legal mechanism to make the dispossession effectively permanent. Rohingya, not being a recognized “national race,” were ineligible to reclaim the very land from which they were expelled. Ongoing Deprivation After the mass displacement of some 740,000 people, approximately 600,000 Rohingya remained in Rakhine State under what the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women described in 2019 as “conditions of forced starvation.” In September 2019, the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar found that the food restrictions “constitute one of several indicators that the Mission has identified to infer that the Government continues to harbour genocidal intent.” The Mission rejected Myanmar’s argument that restrictions were justified by conflict, finding that Myanmar “used movement restrictions and deprived Rohingya of food and humanitarian relief in many different ways and did so long before the conflict . . . intensified.” Since late 2024, the situation has only worsened dramatically. In November 2024, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) warned that Rakhine State was on the precipice of famine, with over two million people at risk of starvation and domestic food production projected to cover only 20 percent of needs by March-April 2025. UN human rights experts confirmed in March 2025 that the Myanmar military’s near-total blockade of humanitarian aid to Rakhine State since 2023 likely constitutes a war crime. The OHCHR’s latest annual update on the human rights situation in Myanmar, published in February 2026, reported that the nutrition situation in northern Rakhine is projected to rapidly deteriorate to Critical Phase 4 in Maungdaw township and to Catastrophe Phase 5 in Buthidaung. Food Evidence, Intent, and the “Only Reasonable Inference” The most formidable obstacle in any genocide case is proving the specific intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group. The ICJ requires that genocidal intent be the “only reasonable inference” from all the evidence. In other words, if another reasonable explanation exists, for example that the conduct was intended to deport rather than destroy the group, then the standard may not be met. Genocide Watch comment: The ICJ's single or "only intent" doctrine is legally wrong. No individuals or states ever have only one intent for their actions. Imposing this "only intent" test would render the Genocide Convention unenforceable. It would even exclude the Holocaust as a case of genocide. In the Myanmar case, food deprivation evidence carries particular inferential weight for two reasons. First, it demonstrates sustained, centrally directed planning over decades, and at least since the 1982 Citizenship Law. Genocide through mass killing can sometimes be attributed to troops exceeding orders or local actors acting on their own initiative. The systematic construction of a food-deprivation regime – through citizenship laws, permit systems, checkpoint networks, and land confiscation legislation – simply cannot be explained by battlefield chaos. Second, the post-displacement appropriation directly addresses Myanmar’s most plausible defence. Myanmar has argued at various stages that the violence was directed at counterterrorism or deportation, not destruction. A state that displaces a civilian population, however, does not then harvest that population’s crops, deposit the proceeds in the national budget, and lease the land to members of other ethnic groups, unless the aim extends beyond removal to the destruction of the material conditions necessary for the group’s continued physical existence. That is what Article II(c) prohibits. Why the Famine Framing Matters Beyond Myanmar A notable feature of this litigation is that The Gambia channels the food evidence through the “conditions of life” concept rather than the language of famine. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) has never formally classified northern Rakhine State as experiencing famine. Notably, the absence of a formal famine declaration does not mean the absence of mass food deprivation. International law recognizes the deliberate infliction of destructive conditions by their intentionality and their calculable effect, not solely by the degree of suffering actually produced. For purposes of a genocide finding, a formal IPC famine classification could be useful but is not legally required. This understanding has profound implications for other situations. In Gaza, the IPC has classified parts of the territory at Phase 5, but this classification has been fiercely contested by Israel. If the ICJ anchors its Article II(c) “conditions of life” analysis in formal famine thresholds, it could create a perverse incentive for perpetrator states to obstruct the very data collection that would trigger international legal consequences. If, instead, the Court focuses on the intentional manipulation of the conditions necessary for group survival, it will create a framework that captures how modern food-based persecution works. Conclusion The Rohingya never experienced hunger and starvation because of drought or crop failure, but were rather starved through permits and checkpoints, citizenship laws and land acts, the confiscation of farming implements, the suppression of food data, and the harvesting of their crops for the national budget after they were expelled. Such entrenched measures reinforced one another, and the ICJ has a clear evidentiary basis to place food at the centre of its analysis. A judgment in The Gambia v. Myanmar that focuses exclusively on the killings and sexual violence of the “clearance operations,” without addressing the systematic food deprivation that preceded, accompanied, and followed them, would be an incomplete account of what the Rohingya have experienced and a missed opportunity to establish that the deliberate destruction of a group’s food system may be among the most insidious methods of genocide – through the slow, bureaucratic strangulation of subsistence. Establishing such a framework could matter significantly for understanding state-engineered hunger in Gaza, Sudan, and beyond. Author Yousuf Syed Khan is the Investigations Manager at a Geneva-based organisation with a global footprint, overseeing international criminal investigations across multiple conflict-affected regions in support of strategic litigation. He is also a nonresident senior fellow with the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council, and an associate fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague. Khan has over fifteen years of legal experience dealing with complex conflict situations, with specific expertise on the contributions and practice of UN atrocity inquiries. He has served on four commissions/investigative accountability bodies established by the UN Human Rights Council, regarding situations in Syria, South Sudan, Belarus, and Ethiopia. In these capacities, he conceptualized and led the drafting of over a dozen public UN reports, including the first-ever report by a UN-mandated mechanism on starvation as a method of warfare. Several of his most visible legal contributions have centered on the use of siege warfare, attacks against objects indispensable to the survival of a civilian population, and forced displacement as a warring strategy. Khan also worked in Ukraine supporting the Government to prosecute starvation crimes; on human rights with the UN in Afghanistan; led a team monitoring the post-ISIS administration of justice countrywide with the UN in Iraq; and served with the Trial Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague.

By Sarah Johnson June 26, 2026 Sentencing of 27-year-old Sadia Moalim Ali condemned by former president and prime ministers as well as rights groups Ali says she has been subjected to torture while in custody. Photograph: Handout A rickshaw driver in Somalia has been sentenced to three years in prison for comments she made on social media, in a case that has caught the public’s attention and provoked outrage in the country. Sadia Moalim Ali, a 27-year-old nursing graduate, was originally charged with insulting government institutions and incitement to commit a crime, but convicted only of the former. Her sentence, immediately condemned as “fundamentally unjust”, was handed down on 25 June. She had made critical comments on Facebook and TikTok about the federal government of Somalia, speaking out about the youth unemployment and high fuel prices gripping the country, as well as against alleged corruption, nepotism and forced evictions. The sentencing of the young mother has been condemned by former high-ranking government officials, including the former president of Somalia, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and human rights organisations. Hassan Ali Khaire, former prime minister of Somalia, wrote on X: “The three-year prison sentence handed down today … is deeply troubling and fundamentally unjust. This politically motivated arrest and conviction … reflects a disturbing pattern of judicial overreach, political retaliation, and abuse of state authority.” In a statement, the Coalition of Somali Human Rights Defenders called for her immediate release, saying: “Ali’s conviction and harsh sentence represent a serious attack on freedom of expression and the legitimate work of human rights defenders in Somalia.” It said her case reflected a broader pattern of systematic discrimination against women who advocated for social and political change. “Female human rights defenders in Somalia continue to face disproportionate risks,” it said, “including arbitrary arrest, judicial harassment, intimidation, online abuse and gender-based discrimination, aimed at excluding them from civic and political participation.” Somali media reported that Mohamed Sheikh Osman, one of Ali’s lawyers, rejected the ruling and said the defence would appeal. “[Ali] is not satisfied with the decision of the Banaadir Regional Court,” he told reporters. “The court issued a harsh ruling that could have been avoided.” Ali, who is the main breadwinner for her family and has a one-year-old daughter, has been in custody since 12 April. In an interview from prison in May, she told the Guardian she had been subjected to torture. She said: “I was forced to lie face down on the ground, and water was poured on me. I was kicked by guards with boots on. They stood over me and beat me with a baton. “I was taken into solitary confinement and kept there for two days. I was deprived of food and basic necessities while I was locked in that cell. I wasn’t allowed to leave to go to the toilet.” At court, Ali said police officers had threatened her with rape. Torture – defined as any act by which severe pain or suffering, physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted – is prohibited under international law and by the UN Convention against Torture in all circumstances. Since 2022, Somali authorities have been accused of engaging in a systematic and escalating crackdown on human rights, using arbitrary arrests, detention, harassment, threats and intimidation to silence journalists, activists and other people who express dissenting views.

Sudan Is The Genocide Which Dares Not Speak Its Name – with warnings ignored by the British Foreign Office – “The world’s greatest humanitarian catastrophe” – but where are the protests against the perpetrators. My Call for Blue Helmets; an Arms Embargo Across Sudan; The Imposition of A No Fly Zone; And For War Lords To Face Justice. Jun 26, 2026 [Genocide Watch comments are highlighted in green.} Genocide Watch Report Genocidal RSF reach 500,000 people in El Obeid, Sudan Rebecca Tinsley: Sudan: a genocide unfolds | ICN Telegraph: House of Lords Statement on the G7 Summit: Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB) My Lords, the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe is in Sudan. Can the noble Baroness say what more was said at the G7 summit about the atrocities in Sudan, given that it is a major root cause of displaced people, of whom there are now 120 million in the world? Will she look at the statements issued yesterday by the African Union and by the US State Department about the dangers now emerging in North Kordofan, and the danger that the genocidal attack that was made in El Fasher in Darfur quite recently will be replicated? Given our duties under the genocide convention to look for emerging signs of genocide, will she take this away as a matter of great urgency? Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab) Of course. I think the noble Lord has raised these issues already with my noble friend Lady Chapman, who is well aware of them, and I will pass his comments on to her. Yes, it is a matter of urgency. It is something of a shock, when we think of what is going on in the world, that Sudan gets so few column inches and so little attention in our newspapers in this country. It seems sometimes that they move on to another issue and then another, but it is still happening and is still important. I will discuss this with my noble friend Lady Chapman and see what more we can say to the noble Lord. House of Lords Private Notice Question Private Notice Question: https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2026-06-24/debates/DD896C67-14BA-4C9F-858E-2A9F21298F46/DarfurAtrocities3.49pmAsked Asked by Lord Alton of Liverpool: To ask His Majesty’s Government, following atrocities in El Fasher in the Darfur region of Sudan, what assessment they have made of (1) the situation in El Obeid, and (2) of the likelihood of further genocide in Sudan. The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office(Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)The Government are deeply concerned by reports of a potential RSF offensive on El Obeid. Last year, unimaginable horrors unfolded in El Fasher. The RSF has moved troops towards El Obeid and sent dozens of drone strikes. The risk of grave atrocities is acute. The UK maintains that genocide should be determined by a competent court. [Genocide Watch comment: This requirement of a court determination for genocide is a tactic for genocide denial. The Genocide Convention does not require that a court determine that a genocide is underway or has taken place before governments can act to prevent or stop genocide. The UK Foreign Office uses this excuse to avoid preventive action when genocide is underway. Courts seldom make judgments that a genocide has occurred until after a genocide is over. This doctrine means that the UK will never fulfill its duty to PREVENT a genocide, as required by the ICJ in the Bosnia v Serbia case.] This does not prevent us taking action. [But in fact the UK never does take any action to stop a genocide.] The Foreign Secretary has sounded the alarm on El Obeid [the usual handwringing diplospeak], mobilizing [????] the international community [Does this “international community actually exist, or is it a mythical dragon lurking in a cave somewhere?] through the UN Security Council [always paralyzed by Russian vetoes] and the Human Rights Council [which cannot authorize forceful intervention] and raising it directly with counterparts [more meaningless diplospeak]. Lord Alton of Liverpool(CB): My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. The Foreign Secretary has said: “El Obeid is on the precipice of an atrocity”, in a country with an estimated 150,000 fatalities and between 14 million and 15 million displaced people. Given that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office said yesterday, without a court determination, that what has been happening bears all “the hallmarks of genocide”, how does the Minister counter the criticism of the Government and their policies made yesterday at the International Development Committee of another place? In order to prevent further atrocities, as penholder at the United Nations Security Council, [a neo-colonial vestige of Perm-5 power to offer only watered down, ineffective resolutions] will we now demand an emergency debate, work for the extension of the arms embargo across Sudan and consider the deployment of blue helmets and the imposition of a no-fly zone? Baroness Chapman of Darlington(Lab): I was at the International Development Committee yesterday, and I thought the evidence provided by the witnesses was compelling and impressive. I did not agree with it all,[Note that the Baroness doesn't say what she disagreed with] but I thought that those giving evidence did themselves a great deal of credit. I have asked officials [which officials? the Lame Mr. Lammy?] this morning for renewed advice on duty to prevent and whether our responsibilities under the genocide convention are engaged in this instance, given what has happened so recently in El Fasher. The noble Lord will know that, up to now, the UN Secretary-General has deemed that the deployment of a force to protect civilians or a UN peacekeeping force would not be possible in this situation for reasons of there being no peace to keep and the difficulties of doing that, but we will continue to look at all available avenues in this situation. We do not want to see, as we did in El Fasher, another siege situation and all that unfolded at the end of that. The Earl of Courtown(Con) My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for bringing this subject to the attention of the House once again. It is an incredibly important subject, and we should be concentrating more on it. The UN Human Rights Office has said that it has verified 546 instances of conflict-related sexual violence and that sexual violence is increasingly being used as a weapon of war in Sudan. Given the UK’s experience supporting the investigation—and hopefully, later, prosecution—of war crimes in Ukraine, what plans do His Majesty’s Government have to provide equivalent support for the prosecution of war criminals in Sudan? Baroness Chapman of Darlington(Lab) We have done a couple of things: we have deployed specialist teams on gender-based violence in the area, and we have a fact-finding mission. [Analysis paralysis] We are doing that so that proceedings can follow. I will not go into the detail of some of the violence here, but the degradation is abominable and truly shocking, and the impunity with which it is carried out is really quite shocking. We need to continue to do everything we can to prevent it and to hold those responsible to account. Lord Oates(LD) My Lords, I note the Minister’s reference to the action by the Security Council and the joint statement by Foreign Ministers of like-minded countries calling for a halt on the attack on El Obeid. But does she agree that the absence of any reference to consequences in those statements renders them ineffective and, furthermore, that repeated statements over the past few years that have not been backed up by action have emboldened rather than deterred the perpetrators of atrocities on all sides of the conflict? Baroness Chapman of Darlington(Lab) I have been on the record in this House on many occasions expressing frustration with the futility, sometimes, of the statements we make. They are hard to get agreed and very carefully worded, as the noble Lord knows. Do they have the real-world impact that we would wish to see? The truth is, not often enough. That does not mean it is wrong to pursue them, because the more light that is shone on these atrocities, the better. It is really important that we do that. I think we all agree that not enough attention is paid to this conflict and to what is happening in Sudan. They are an important tool. Are they sufficient? I agree with the noble Lord that they are not. Lord Davies of Brixton(Lab) I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for his important Question. I know that my noble friend the Minister is well aware of the nature of the appalling tragedy taking place in Sudan. One of the factors fuelling the extent of that ongoing tragedy is the continued supply of modern weaponry, showing location of drones and the training of mercenaries. Does she agree with me that our Labour Government should do all that they can to prevent the supply of such equipment? It is fuelling this disaster. Baroness Chapman of Darlington(Lab) Absolutely. There is no doubt that this conflict is being prolonged and intensified because of the supply of drones and other high-tech equipment to armed groups within Sudan, not just the SAF and the RSF but many others. There are now double digits of countries involving themselves in this conflict. They need to stop. That is the only way we will see any kind of resolution. [Note that the Baroness proposes no actions to stop the arms flows.] We need to get on to a ceasefire, some dialogue and a civilian-led process. [Empty words signifying nothing.] That is the only way forward here. The arms pumped into Sudan and the illicit gold flows need to stop, because until they do there will be no motivation for the warring parties to get around the table and resolve this. Baroness D’Souza(CB) My Lords, the Government were well aware of the arms pipeline between the UAE and the RSF, which took place from mid-2023 onwards and resulted in several genocidal attacks. Therefore, there was a choice for the Government to put pressure on the UAE to stop that arms traffic, but they did not do so. Can the Minister say why that decision was made? Was it made by officials or, indeed, by the Minister? Baroness Chapman of Darlington(Lab) I would like to stop arms flows from every country into Sudan. I think there should be a complete embargo, which is what the UK Government are pushing for. As for specific conversations with particular countries, I do not think there is a conversation that I or my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has had with the UAE or several other countries where we do not make that specific point. Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon(Con) My Lords, I draw attention to my entries in the register on organisations working in the Middle East and on conflict resolution. I thank the Minister. At a time when there is a lot of challenge in the air and on budgets, I know that she prioritises the issue of conflict-related sexual violence, having visited Sudan and Darfur. She has talked of the abhorrent nature of it. Meeting the victims of sexual violence in conflict leaves an impact embedded on one’s brain and heart. Therefore, I commend what she has done to continue what I hope she recognises as the important work of the previous Government.My My focus is very much on conflict resolution. What specific role is the United Kingdom playing in support of the efforts of the Quad, which brings all the key parties together, and notably the United States, to bring an end to this awful conflict? Baroness Chapman of Darlington(Lab) We very much support the Quad process and have been active in doing so. We have provided channels of communication in support of the Quad. It is not the only process and there are other tasks to be undertaken. The UK is also involved in the civilian track because when, God willing, showing location of a ceasefire is achieved, we need to have that track up and running and in play. We are actively involved, alongside other partners, in having the relevant conversations to bring that about. Baroness Blower(Lab) My Lords, I thank my noble friend for all the answers she has given, as I thank the noble Lord for asking the Question. Only this week it was said in this Chamber that the conflict in Sudan does not have a high enough profile in our own media here and everywhere else. Will she talk to her friends and colleagues about whether it is possible to open a safe and legal route for any of the population of Sudan who would wish to come to the UK to escape the terrible situation they are in? We know that we have a large diaspora in the UK. It may be that, through a safe and legal route, we could alleviate the suffering of small numbers of people. Baroness Chapman of Darlington(Lab) Obviously, that is a matter for the Home Office. I point out that most Sudanese refugees I have spoken to wish to stay in their region. They are furious about what is happening to their country. They feel very strongly that they wish to return and to provide leadership and support for the services that are needed to rebuild and reinstate peace. The UK supports millions of people on the borders of Sudan. It is desperately sad that they are unable to return home at this moment. Lord Bellingham(Con) My Lords, I too support the Minister’s robust and strong [????] response. She mentioned the illicit flows of gold. Is she aware that the RSF has been exporting substantial quantities of gold to countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia and the UAE to help finance the provision of weapons and arms? Twenty years ago, there was a lot of focus on blood diamonds in west Africa. This blood gold is fuelling this truly horrendous conflict. Can more be done to try to expose the people who are buying this gold and to find ways of tracking and tracing it? Baroness Chapman of Darlington(Lab) Yes, that is a very good suggestion. It is why we had an illicit gold conference recently. I am well aware of the problem the noble Lord describes. The idea of having a consumer-facing campaign around this is excellent. I would like to get involved in leading it. It is so destructive, and it is without doubt fuelling this conflict. Why hasn't the UK government (not private consumers) sanctioned the United Arab Emirates and the UAE's royal family and its businesses? They own and operate the gold mines, and import most of the Blood Red Gold the UAE is mining in Darfur. IT IS THE UAE THAT IS FINANCING THE GENOCIDAL Rapid Support Forces. I would welcome any move to make consumers more aware of where their gold comes from and of the fact that it can be used to support the devastating atrocities that we see in Sudan. Baroness Hussein-Ece(LD) My Lords, I take the Minister back to the International Development Committee meeting that she attended yesterday, which has already been referred to. Nathaniel Raymond, executive director of the Humanitarian Research Lab at the Yale School of Public Health, testified that the UK had failed to act on intelligence and genocide warnings in Sudan. He specifically said that there had been not enough political will, and that it was blocked by the UK’s unwillingness to confront the UAE, the primary military enabler, as we know, of the RSF massacre in El Fasher in 2025. What direct representations were made in response to the intelligence that was received in order to try to combat an impending genocide? Baroness Chapman of Darlington(Lab) I have huge respect for Nathaniel [Note that the respectful Baroness does not use Mr. Raymond's full name], but I disagree with the analysis that some options were put to Ministers and we chose the least. That is just not my version of what happened. It is important that analysts are able to give their perspective, but sometimes it is also acceptable for government to gently push back and disagree. [And deny the UK Foreign Office's complicity in this genocide.] There are things we can do to attempt to prevent these kinds of atrocities, but we have to be completely honest about the extent of our powers in some of these situations. I think that because El Fasher happened we are seeing a very different approach to El Obeid, and we are being much more active. [How? What is the UK proposing to do to prevent a massacre in El Obeid?] That is because of the visibility of the atrocities. We saw people videoing themselves committing those heinous acts in El Fasher. I respectfully disagree with Nathaniel on the narrow point that he made yesterday, although I have enormous respect for him. [Note that the respectful Baroness doesn't say what Mr. Raymond's point is that she disagrees with.] Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle(GP) My Lords, it was recently reported that hundreds of Colombian private military contractors, apparently hired by a UAE-based company, transited through UAE military facilities before being deployed to Sudan to support the RSF. Are the Government aware of this case, and have they made representations to the UAE about it? Baroness Chapman of Darlington(Lab) We make frequent representations and I am aware of the Colombian link, alongside the links of very many other nations. This needs to stop. [More empty words.] As long as this continues, this conflict will persist. We will not see the loss of life, the degradation of communities and the hideous sexual violence finish until other countries desist and stop fuelling this conflict.

By Larisa W Chikanya Genocide Watch A poster shows the faces of victims of a massacre that took place in Bora during the Tigray war [Gelila Getahun/ Al Jazeera] What led to atrocities? Tigray is the most northern of Ethiopia's 11 regional states, lying along the southern border of Eritrea with Sudan to the west. Armed conflict between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), erupted in November 2020, and rapidly escalated into a large-scale military campaign involving Ethiopian federal forces, allied regional militias, and Eritrean Defense Forces. Ethiopia's prime minister denied the presence of Eritrean troops in Tigray for months, despite it becoming clear he had formed an alliance with the country's former enemy to mobilize both nations’ armies. As fighting intensified, the federal government imposed severe restrictions on access to Tigray, including limitations on humanitarian aid, telecommunications, and independent media. These measures contributed to a deepening humanitarian crisis, widespread displacement, and acute food insecurity. At the center of this violence was a gendered campaign of terror: widespread and deliberate sexual and reproductive violence (SRV), a form of conflict related sexual violence; targeting Tigrayan women and girls. Evidence indicates that this violence was not incidental to the conflict but formed a strategic axis of ethnic cleansing, deployed through the systematic destruction of women’s bodies, reproductive autonomy, and societal roles. The war resulted in massive civilian casualties, with atrocities and crimes against humanity committed by all parties. As troops moved into Tigray, Ethiopia blockaded the region, preventing journalists, UN agencies and aid from entering and limiting information getting out. Tigray quickly descended into an acute hunger crisis. Over 2.2 million citizens were displaced out of their places of origin and ended in either internally displaced camps inside Tigray or refugee camps in Sudan. Despite the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in November 2022 by the government of Ethiopia and the TPLF, reports indicate that violence continued, including widespread and severe sexual and reproductive violence along ethnic-political lines across regions by military actors. Full Report:

Men push a cart at the Adre border post between Sudan and Chad. AFP Sudan's RSF closes in on Al Obeid as UN warned of imminent atrocities Battle over city in North Kordofan region follows string of setbacks for Sudanese army in Darfur The National News June 21, 2026 By Hamza Hendawi Cairo: Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces is closing in on army-held Al Obeid, in the heavily contested North Kordofan region, with dozens of countries warning an attack on the city could lead to a new wave of atrocities against civilians. In videos widely shared online, RSF fighters have warned residents of Al Obeid to stay clear of military installations in the city, amid reports of daily drone attacks on army positions and civilian infrastructure. The city, home to about 500,000 people, was plunged into darkness last week when RSF drones struck its main power station, residents said. The attacks also cut water supply to thousands of homes and halted work in several hospitals. Sudan war escalates as 1,000 civilians killed in drone attacks this year, says UN “Life inside Al Obeid continues at a level that's close to normal,” said resident Zoheir Hashem. “But we have a fuel shortage because five gas stations were hit and disabled on a single day last week.” Another video shared online purportedly shows RSF fighters posing next to a column of new olive green fighting vehicles. The fighters, carrying rifles and wearing desert camouflage fatigues, can be heard saying confidently that they would capture Al Obeid in a matter of days. RSF General Mohamed Dagalo Al Obeid sits about 400km south-west of the capital Khartoum. It is home to the army's 5th Infantry Division, a storied outfit with vast combat experience in the country's past civil wars. Militias aligned with the army are also stationed in the city, a major commercial hub. Losing Al Obeid would be a major blow to the army, similar to the loss in October of El Fasher, its only remaining foothold in Darfur. That defeat left an area about the size of France in the hands of the RSF, which also controls parts of Kordofan. The capture of El Fasher was followed by a wave of atrocities by the RSF, some ethnically-motivated, prompting an international outcry and a stream of condemnations. The RSF commander, Gen Mohamed Dagalo, pledged to investigate the incidents and prosecute the perpetrators. Dozens of countries, including Britain, France and ​Germany, raised the alarm on Thursday at the UN Human Rights Council that the RSF could imminently escalate ⁠an assault on Al Obeid, possibly resulting in large-scale atrocities. Tormod ⁠Endresen, the Norwegian ambassador to the UN “We are deeply concerned at the risk of imminent escalation on the ground, leaving approximately 500,000 civilians at risk of falling victim to large-scale atrocities, including more than 100,000 internally displaced persons,” Tormod ⁠Endresen, the Norwegian ambassador to the UN, told the council in Geneva. Norway shared a statement calling on the RSF to immediately ​cease its ⁠assault on Al Obeid. The statement was presented ‌on behalf of the Coalition for Atrocity Prevention and Justice for Sudan, which comprises Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and ​Norway. The declaration was also signed by 21 other countries. The coalition urged the international community to apply maximum pressure on the RSF and the Sudanese armed forces to prevent atrocities and protect civilians. It also reaffirmed the need for unhindered humanitarian access. Like the RSF, the army is also accused of war crimes, including the use of chemical weapons and indiscriminate bombing that has killed thousands. Sudan Armed Forces General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan The army controls the capital as well as the nation's eastern, northern and central regions. The army-backed Sudanese government is based in Port Sudan on the Red Sea, while a parallel government formed by the RSF last year has its headquarters in Nyala, Darfur. The war broke out in April 2023 when months of tension between army chief Gen Abdel Fattah Al Burhan and Gen Dagalo escalated into open warfare. Since then, tens of thousands of people are believed to have been killed and about 14 million displaced. The war has also created the world's worst humanitarian crisis, with 25 million people – almost half the country's population – facing hunger. Copyright 2026 The National News

By Saeed Al Batati June 8, 2026 Millions of Yemenis grapple with a heatwave as power cuts add to the suffering of people in the war-torn nation. Salah Mohammed holds his shirt open and fans himself with a piece of cardboard during prolonged power cuts in Yemen's port city of Mukalla, where he and his wife often struggle to sleep amid scorching heat and high humidity. Credit: Al Jazeera Mukalla, Yemen – Yemen is sweltering under a heatwave as temperatures soar above a blistering 40C (104F), turning houses into ovens. Long power cuts have added to the suffering of millions of people across the war-torn nation. With authorities struggling to boost power supply, people have nowhere to escape from the hot and humid weather gripping much of the country’s southern, eastern and western regions, further compounding the humanitarian crisis in the most impoverished Arab nation. Residents of coastal cities such as Mukalla and Aden, under the control of the internationally recognised government, say prolonged blackouts are hurting businesses, disrupting daily life, robbing people of sleep and aggravating health problems. “Power was cut for eight hours and restored for only two,” Saddam Al-Jamlani, a resident of Aden, told Al Jazeera. There is no respite from the heat and frequent blackouts in the northern part of the country under the Iran-backed Houthis either. The growing frustration has also rekindled fears of unrest in a country still struggling to recover from more than a decade of conflict that has battered nearly every aspect of life. In Aden, residents say electricity is available for only a few hours a day as temperatures approach 40C. Many describe their homes as ovens, with little respite from the heat and humidity. Al-Jamlani said he and many others had hoped electricity supplies would improve during the Eid holiday (May 27), when thousands of residents left the city to visit relatives in the countryside, and many factories, workshops and businesses temporarily shut down. However, power cuts continued unabated, he said. “The electricity situation in Aden during Eid remained unchanged, with no improvement,” he told Al Jazeera. Crisis years in the making For more than a decade, Yemen has been engulfed in a war between the Houthis and the internationally recognised government backed by Saudi Arabia, a conflict that has killed and wounded thousands of people, displaced millions and devastated much of the country’s infrastructure, including its electricity sector. Solar panels cover the roof of a fuel station in Yemen’s city of Mukalla, where businesses, like many households, have turned to renewable energy to cope with prolonged power cuts and keep operations running. Credit: Al Jazeera The collapse of public services and the worsening economic crisis have repeatedly fuelled public anger. In recent years, violent protests triggered by prolonged power outages and deteriorating living conditions have left people dead and injured, while rival political factions have sought to exploit public frustration to mobilise support against their opponents. Earlier this year, shortly after Yemeni forces, backed by a Saudi-led coalition, pushed the UAE-supported Southern Transitional Council (STC) out of several southern provinces, Riyadh announced an $81.2m financial package to buy more than 300 million litres of fuel from the local market to operate dozens of power stations across Yemen. The Saudi intervention in January, which came during the cooler months when electricity demand is lower, helped keep many power stations running around the clock and allowed residents in cities such as Aden to enjoy near-continuous electricity for the first time in years. But as summer temperatures and humidity began to rise, the electricity situation deteriorated. On May 27, Saudi Arabia announced another support package worth $150m to buy fuel derivatives for power stations in government-controlled areas of Yemen. Residents and business owners, however, say the assistance has yet to bring noticeable improvements to electricity supplies in many of the affected cities. Searching for relief In the port city of Mukalla, known for its hot and humid summers, Salah Mohammed and his wife, a childless couple, say they sleep less than five hours a day and suffer from skin conditions they blame on prolonged power cuts. “When the power goes out at night, I wash myself and use a piece of cardboard to cool down. I don’t have a battery, an air conditioner or anything else,” Mohammed told Al Jazeera. He said the most difficult time is at night, when the heat and humidity rob them of sleep. If electricity has not returned by dawn, he often heads to a nearby mosque for prayers and a chance to cool off in its air-conditioned hall. “There is no comfort in the summer. The only time I feel cool is when I go to the mosque, which has air conditioning,” he said. “If we sleep on the roof, we get bitten by mosquitoes. If we use a mosquito net, it becomes unbearably hot. My wife has pimples all over her body, and her face and legs are swollen. I also suffer from a skin condition.” Businesses struggle Severe summer blackouts have also crippled businesses, forcing some to close early, while others struggle with spoiled products and fewer customers as people avoid venturing out in the heat. Muhanad Salem, who works at an auto repair shop in Mukalla, said the power cuts frequently shut down equipment, forcing workers to suspend operations or spend scarce money on fuel for a generator that often breaks down and requires repairs. A tyre repair worker services a vehicle in Yemen’s city of Mukalla, where prolonged power cuts are hurting businesses, including car repair and maintenance garages. Credit: Al Jazeera “Prolonged power cuts have hurt our work,” he told Al Jazeera, wiping sweat from his face with a hand and part of his T-shirt, both stained with grease. “We only switch on the generator when it is urgently needed, and even then, it sometimes breaks down and requires maintenance.” Omer Baesa, a fish seller in Mukalla, said prolonged power cuts have forced him to buy ice from the local market to keep his fish fresh, though some still spoil due to inadequate refrigeration. “I spend at least 10,000 Yemeni riyals [$6.7] a day on two bags of ice to preserve my fish for the following day, but sometimes I still find some of it rotten,” he told Al Jazeera as he cut fish with a knife behind his counter at Mukalla’s fish market. The Yemeni riyal is trading at about 533 to the US dollar in Houthi-controlled areas, compared with about 1,500 to the dollar in government-controlled areas. System on the brink Yemen’s newly appointed electricity minister, Adnan al-Kaf, blamed the collapse of power services in government-controlled areas on ageing and deteriorating power stations, years of inadequate maintenance, delays in the arrival of critical spare parts, the high cost of electricity from private suppliers, weak revenue collection and an inflated payroll, among other factors. Salah Mohammed like others in Yemen’s port city of Mukalla have been struggling with the soaring temperatures. Credit: Al Jazeera “I would be lying if I told them [people] to expect a cool summer. I do not want to make empty promises,” al-Kaf told state television in April when asked whether Yemenis could expect better electricity services during the summer months. “The situation is disastrous right now, and this summer is going to be difficult.” Blackouts in Houthi-held areas In Houthi-controlled areas, residents say the electricity situation is just as severe. Many households now rely almost entirely on solar power, as electricity from the state grid remains unavailable for long periods. The situation has been further complicated by waves of Israeli air attacks targeting infrastructure in Houthi-controlled areas, including power facilities in the capital, Sanaa, and the western city of Hodeidah. In Hodeidah, which is also known for its intense heat and humidity, residents recently expressed outrage after receiving sharply higher electricity bills despite frequent power outages. Many took to social media to vent their frustration. Ali Omar, a resident of Hodeidah, posted a video complaining that his electricity bill had jumped from less than 3,000 riyals ($5.6) to 19,000 riyals ($35.6), even though his household relies primarily on solar power during the day. “This cannot be my bill. It must belong to someone else,” he said in the video. “How did you calculate my electricity bill at 19,000 riyals when I use solar power during the day?” © 2026 Al Jazeera Media Network