Amnesty International decries Argentina’s expanding AI surveillance as tool of social control Tiana Nowzari | Lincoln Alexander School of Law, CA August 21, 2026 Neslihan_Turan, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons Amnesty International on Wednesday accused Argentina of building techno-authoritarian surveillance infrastructure without adequate legal safeguards, as the government’s newly created AI security unit expands state monitoring powers over citizens’ online communications and physical movements. In its latest report, the rights group stated that Argentina‘s Ministry of Security spent at least USD$1.2 million on surveillance technology between 2024 and 2025, which included social media monitoring tools, facial recognition software, and thermal-camera drones with automatic tracking and ability to transmit images in real time. Amnesty expressed concern for the surveillance of protesters, journalists, activists, human rights defenders, migrants, young people, and marginalized groups. They warn that this can create a “chilling effect,” in which people who believe they are being monitored may avoid speaking, protesting or organizing, even without being directly arrested or punished. This raises concerns about the impact of surveillance on the right to freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, and freedom of association. In October 2025, Argentina bought a Clearview AI facial recognition license for USD$33,500. Clearview’s database contains more than 70 billion facial images scraped from the internet, and data protection authorities in France, Italy, Greece, and the Netherlands have already fined the company over its data practices. The Ministry, however, maintains that the Federal Police use facial recognition only in connection with active judicial investigations, and no evidence has surfaced that Clearview was used specifically to identify protesters. Argentina’s expansion of AI-driven surveillance has largely occurred through executive and ministerial measures. On July 26, 2024, then-Security Minister Patricia Bullrich signed Resolution 710/2024, creating the Artificial Intelligence Unit Applied to Security (UIAAS) inside the Ministry of Security’s Directorate of Cybercrime and Cyber Affairs. The resolution authorizes the unit to patrol open social media, applications, websites, and the dark web, and permits real-time facial recognition through CCTV footage, machine-learning analysis of historical crime data to predict future crimes, and large-scale data aggregation to build suspect profiles. It states that these powers must operate within the Constitution and existing law, but it does not specify data retention limits, access restrictions, or independent oversight mechanisms. A related May 2024 rule let the Federal Police monitor social media and other public digital sources without judicial authorization. Argentina has already struck down a predecessor system on similar grounds. The Legislature’s required oversight commission was never established, and the Ombudsman’s Office never filed the reports the law required. A separate 2024 challenge led courts to suspend a related Buenos Aires facial recognition system pending an independent audit and privacy impact assessment. More recently, on December 31, 2025, the government issued DNU 941/2025, amending Argentina’s National Intelligence Law by decree instead of through Congress. The Association for Civil Rights argues the decree is unconstitutional because it bypasses the constitutional requirement that decrees of necessity and urgency apply only when Congress cannot convene or a genuine emergency exists. The organization specifically objects to a provision letting intelligence personnel detain individuals before notifying police, calling it an unlawful transfer of policing power to intelligence agencies. Amnesty uses the term “techno-authoritarianism” to describe the harnessing of technology to enable government control. The concern is that governments can use AI-powered tools to make monitoring and identifying people easier and more widespread. Amnesty is calling on Argentina to ban remote biometric recognition for mass surveillance and adopt more concrete rules governing the purchase, development, sale, import, export and use of surveillance technologies. Copyright © 2026, JURIST Legal News & Research Services, Inc.

By Alžběta Frommerová An anti-female genital mutilation (FGM) protester outside the National Assembly in Banjul on March 18, 2024, during the debate between lawmakers on a highly controversial bill seeking to lift the ban on FGM. File Photo: Muhamadou Bittaye, AFP/Getty Images. The Gambia, officially the Republic of The Gambia, fronts the Atlantic Ocean and is the smallest country in continental Africa. The Gambia has a long history of colonization: spanning Portuguese trading posts in the late fifteenth century, subsequent Anglo-French rivalry over the river trade, and formal British rule and protectorate status that lasted until gaining independence in 1965. In the early 2000s, The Gambia had one of the highest maternal mortality rates in Africa, estimated at 1,050 per 100,000 live births. Today, maternal mortality has declined but remains significant at 289 deaths per 100,000 live births. The country’s healthcare system continues to face challenges such as inadequate funding, shortages of trained personnel, uneven distribution of facilities, and limited access in rural areas. Preventable and treatable conditions such as malaria, respiratory infections, malnutrition, and neonatal sepsis remain major contributors to illness and death among children. The country continues to face high child mortality rates, with 56 deaths per 1,000 live births among children under five and 29 neonatal deaths per 1,000 live births. The Gambia’s Supreme Court is currently reviewing a constitutional challenge to the 2015 ban on female genital mutilation (FGM). International human rights law recognizes FGM as a form of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment that can have severe lifelong consequences, including infections, obstetric complications, fetal deaths, psychological trauma, and, in some cases, death. The ban in The Gambia criminalized the practice, imposing penalties of up to three years’ imprisonment and life imprisonment where the procedure results in death, although enforcement has remained limited and the practice continues in some communities. Pressure to repeal the law has persisted, with the Supreme Islamic Council supporting repeal efforts and describing female genital cutting as “one of the virtues of Islam,” while supporters of the legal challenge have argued that the case concerns religious freedom and cultural rights. Despite the ban, The Gambia remains one of the countries with the highest prevalence of FGM in Africa. According to a 2019–2020 Demographic and Health Survey, 65% of girls undergo FGM before the age of five and a further 18% between the ages of five and nine, while UNICEF estimates that approximately three-quarters of Gambian women have undergone the practice. Each year FGM threatens approximately three million girls, and nearly two-thirds undergo FGM within their first year of life. Factors such as maternal age, marital status, and community norms contribute to the continued practice, while maternal education and household wealth serve as important protective factors. Furthermore, the Sexual Offences Act does not criminalize marital rape, despite advocacy efforts by human rights groups to have marital rape recognized as an offense. Due to its continued mistreatment of women and girls, Genocide Watch places The Gambia at Stage 3: Discrimination. There are also emerging indicators of Stage 6: Polarization, because the country continues to treat women and girls unequally through the widespread practice of FGM, challenges to legal protections against FGM, and the failure to criminalize marital rape. Genocide Watch recommends: The Gambia must strengthen enforcement of the 2015 FGM ban, rejects all efforts to decriminalize the practice, criminalizes marital rape under the Sexual Offences Act, and repeals Article 33(5) of the 1997 Constitution which exempts marriage, divorce, and inheritance from the prohibition on discrimination. The Gambia must invest in community-level educational programs targeting mothers and expectant mothers, engages male partners and in-laws in anti-FGM campaigns, integrates cash transfer and livelihood support with FGM abandonment messaging, and prioritizes high-prevalence regions such as Basse, Janjanbureh, and Mansakonko for geographically targeted interventions. The United Nations and the European Union should provide sustained financial and technical support to Gambian civil society organizations, hold The Gambia accountable to its CEDAW and CRC obligations through the Universal Periodic Review and CEDAW Committee reporting, and support full implementation of the TRRC recommendations relating to sexual and gender-based violence.

By: Alexander Smith Far-right Patriots for Europe group meets in Madrid, February 8-9, 2025. (X/Viktor Orban). The far right has resurged across Europe. Over the past decade, the United Kingdom left the European Union (EU) after a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment; the National Front in France took more than 100 seats in the French parliament; Germany's right-wing became the second largest party in its parliament; dissatisfaction with mainstream governments surged across the continent; and far-right extremist attacks grew by over 300 percent. While these statistics represent a startling pattern in recent years, the rise of contemporary far-right political ideology in Europe traces back to the late 20th century, when nationalism started brewing amid the Cold War. In the following decades, political parties tending to xenophobia and anti-globalization started popping up all over Europe. As European institutions formed and consolidated, the far right found its footing. This year, nearly one-quarter of European voters are likely to back right-wing parties. Their favorability is near or surpassing all-time highs. Mainstream parties throughout Europe are crumbling, and extremist parties on both sides are picking up the pieces. With a far-right populist in charge of the U.S. government, the pressure is off from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, but this meteoric rise wouldn't be complete without help from the European Parliament. Read the full report:

By the West Africa Task Force Residents gather among houses damaged by landslides and flooding in Attécoubé. File Photo: Chris Boli/AFP/Getty Images. Burkina Faso In July 2026, the CIVICUS Monitor placed Burkina Faso on its Watchlist amid reports of an intensified crackdown by the military junta, including the suspension of over 1,100 civil society organizations, the dissolution of political parties, and restrictions on critics and independent voices. Over half the 26,000 people killed in Burkina Faso since 2015 died in the last three years, according to Human Rights Watch citing ACLED data. Furthermore, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) reported that Burkina Faso’s ruling junta was linked to a coordinated online network known as the BIR-C, which allegedly targeted journalists and critics through disinformation, smear campaigns, cyber harassment, threats, and online intimidation. RSF’s investigation identified several journalists as targets and alleged that the network was connected to senior government officials. Cameroon In northern Cameroon, a WHO-supported campaign at the Mokolo Regional Annex Hospital provided life-changing treatment for women suffering from obstetric fistula, a childbirth-related complication that can cause long-term physical, social, and psychological impacts. The initiative identified 60 women with suspected fistula cases, confirmed 37 diagnoses, and provided corrective surgery to 12 patients. Additionally, the initiative strengthened community awareness, early detection, and access to maternal healthcare services. Côte d’Ivoire In July 2026, authorities in Côte d’Ivoire reported that flooding and landslides had killed at least 59 people since the start of the rainy season in May, with authorities warning the death toll could rise as rescue operations continued. The severe rains were part of a broader wave of flooding across West Africa, including Ghana, where teams rescued hundreds of people and at least 13 people died. Officials and experts attributed the growing severity of the flooding to a combination of extreme weather linked to climate change, rapid urbanization, poor drainage systems, and inadequate waste management. The Gambia In The Gambia, a catch-up HPV vaccination campaign expanded access to cervical cancer prevention for adolescent girls aged 9–14 who had missed the previous vaccination drive. Led by the Ministry of Health with support from WHO, UNICEF, and Gavi, the initiative brought vaccines directly to schools, madrassas, and communities across three regions. Health workers vaccinated nearly 8,500 girls, achieving 95% coverage, while strengthened collaboration with educators, community leaders, and families helped improve vaccine acceptance and protect future generations from cervical cancer. Guinea On July 9, 2024, Oumar Sylla, a prominent journalist, activist, and opposition coalition organizer for the National Front for the Defense of the Constitution, along with Mamadou Billo Bah, mobilization coordinator for the FNDC, were taken hostage during a government raid. They have not returned as of July 2026. Government forces adamantly deny any participation in their disappearance, and instead state that non-government forces are responsible. Assailants also took a third person, who returned the next day with signs of torture, and later claimed that special forces in the Loos Archipelago interrogated and tortured them. There is a growing list of alleged abductions and tortures. The former president of the Guinean Bar Association was forcefully taken and abused in June of 2025. Other figures include Abdoul Sacko, national coordinator of the Forum of Social Forces of Guinea, and journalist Habib Marouane Camara, director of the online media outlet Le Révélateur 224, who authorities have not located since December 2024. In July 2026, Amnesty International called on Guinean authorities to reveal the fate and whereabouts of victims of abductions and enforced disappearances, including Oumar Sylla and Mamadou Billo Bah, and to ensure authorities prosecute those responsible. Guinea-Bissau Last month, health authorities confirmed the first reported case of mpox in Guinea-Bissau after the Institut Pasteur de Dakar validated laboratory testing. The Ministry of Public Health activated response measures, including case investigation, contact tracing, enhanced disease surveillance, infection prevention and control in health facilities, community awareness efforts, and coordination with health partners to strengthen the national response. Ghana Ghana has taken steps to protect its citizens amid recent xenophobic violence and anti-immigrant protests in South Africa. This past month anti-immigration protests have surged in South Africa, causing other African countries to warn and express caution to their citizens. In April, Ghana’s Foreign Affairs Minister Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa called for an intervention to prevent escalation. In May, Ghana evacuated 300 citizens after reports of violent protests. In July 2026, as protests continue to occur, two Ghanaian nationals have asked the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate crimes against foreigners. Liberia Liberia continues to face challenges related to drug trafficking and a growing addiction crisis. This past month, authorities made the largest drug seizure in the country’s history with 3,971 kg of cocaine worth nearly $371 million. While the origin is still unknown, several people were arrested during the raid in Duazon, a town 12 miles east of the capital, Monrovia. This drug bust, while extreme, reflects the broader drug crisis in Liberia. The growing kush crisis continues to affect communities, particularly young people. While the government tries to combat the issue, drug traffickers’ methods are increasingly changing, and authorities reported only eight drug-offense convictions between September 2025 and June 2026. Sierra Leone As in Liberia, a kush drug crisis has spread in Sierra Leone, particularly among young people. The highly addictive synthetic drug has become increasingly visible in Freetown, where users face severe health consequences, addiction, homelessness, and social isolation. A Le Monde investigation reported that kush first appeared in Sierra Leone in the mid-2010s before spreading to neighboring Liberia, where local producers make the drug using imported chemical ingredients. Nigeria Nigeria continues to deal with growing violence, after 20 people were killed in a recent attack on a village in Zamfara State. Although there did not appear to be a specific target in the raid, the attack highlights the continuing rise in violence. Kidnappings are also becoming increasingly common, as kidnappers seek large ransom payments from civilians and government authorities. Earlier this month, a court sentenced several men to life in prison in connection with a May 2026 abduction of nearly 50 school pupils from Oyo state. Niger In July 2026, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that three years of military rule in Niger had deepened the human rights crisis. The junta had weakened democratic institutions, restricted civil society and media freedom, detained political opponents and activists, and expanded laws limiting basic freedoms. HRW also highlighted abuses linked to counterinsurgency operations, the criminalization of same-sex relations, and Niger’s withdrawal from regional and international accountability mechanisms. The organization has called on the authorities to release people arbitrarily detained by authorities, protect fundamental rights, and establish a credible path back to civilian rule. Mali In July, Mali’s conflict entered a new phase as the separatist Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and al-Qaeda-linked JNIM coordinated attacks against government forces. The alliance has strengthened armed groups’ ability to carry out ambushes, attacks on military convoys, and drone strikes across northern Mali. Russia’s Africa Corps supports the government and continues to fight the groups, but neither side has secured a decisive advantage. The partnership has complicated prospects for a political settlement, as the FLA seeks independence for Azawad while JNIM seeks to overthrow the government. With both sides maintaining opposing political goals, the conflict shows little sign of ending. Mauritania In a July 2026 report, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the Association Mauritanienne des Droits de l’Homme (AMDH) found that, despite legal reforms, Mauritania continued to face serious human rights problems, including restrictions on free expression, harassment of activists and journalists, slavery, violence against women, abuses against migrants and refugees, and continued death sentences issued by courts. The organizations have urged the government to implement reforms, protect fundamental freedoms, combat impunity and slavery, and work toward abolishing the death penalty.

A widening diplomatic rift is complicating efforts to confront a shared cross-border security threat Security cooperation in the Sahel has become increasingly fragmented as regional governments pursue different approaches to fighting armed groups. File Photo: Philippe Desmazes/AFP. By Mubarak Aliyu Abuja, Nigeria – In December 2025, Burkina Faso detained 11 Nigerian Air Force personnel after their C-130 transport aircraft made an emergency landing in Bobo-Dioulasso while travelling to Portugal for scheduled maintenance. Burkina Faso said the aircraft had entered its airspace without the required authorisation, while Nigerian officials said the landing followed a technical problem. The Nigerian Air Force said the precautionary landing was made in accordance with safety procedures. The aircraft and its 11-member crew were released following diplomatic talks on December 17. They departed Burkina Faso two days later, continuing their journey to Portugal via Ghana. The incident underscored the widening political divide between Nigeria and the three Sahelian countries of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The three countries formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2023 through the Liptako-Gourma Charter, establishing a framework for collective defence and mutual assistance. They later withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the regional bloc created to promote economic integration and cooperation in West Africa. Their withdrawal became effective on January 29, 2025.ú) Bolaji Akinyemi, a professor and former external affairs minister of Nigeria and director-general of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, told Al Jazeera that the region’s current security challenges can in part be traced to the aftermath of the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 2011. “The influx of bandits from the AES into Nigeria is something that had been ongoing since Gaddafi was overthrown. There was no doubt the suspicion as to where the bandits would go. They couldn’t go across the Mediterranean. They could only come down south. This made Nigeria a target.” “I hope that it will not go beyond where it has gone so far. I hope that good sense and diplomacy will allow these four countries to show maturity,” Akinyemi added. Security threats cross the borders The dispute comes as security threats facing Nigeria and its Sahelian neighbours continue to overlap. Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) remain active in Nigeria, while ISWAP also operates in southeastern Niger, particularly in the Diffa region. Niger withdrew from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in March 2025, the regional force created to fight armed groups around the Lake Chad Basin. Niger’s government said the move was aimed at strengthening security around its oil assets. Abiola Sadiq, a Nigerian resilience adviser, told Al Jazeera that Niger’s withdrawal had created a significant gap in regional counterterrorism cooperation and cross-border coordination. “With ISWAP remaining active in southeastern Niger, particularly in the Diffa region, Niger’s withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force in 2025 has further created a significant gap in regional counterterrorism cooperation and cross-border coordination,” Sadiq said. Schoolchildren displaced by armed group attacks attend a class in Dori, Burkina Faso. The impact of security challenges continues to be felt across the Sahel as armed groups exploit regional security gaps. File Photo: Zohra Bensemra/Reuters. He warned that the deterioration in relations between Nigeria and the AES could give ISWAP greater freedom to exploit border areas and move personnel and resources across poorly coordinated security zones. Nigeria shares a long northern frontier with Niger. Borno and Yobe states border Niger in the northeast, while Sokoto and Katsina lie further west along the frontier. The security picture is similarly fluid further west. On April 25, 2026, coordinated attacks targeted several locations in Mali. Defence Minister Sadio Camara was killed in an attack on his residence in Kati, near Bamako, according to Mali’s government and Reuters. The attacks involved al-Qaeda-linked Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), which later claimed joint responsibility. Reuters described the cooperation between the two groups as unusual, given their different objectives and common opposition to Mali’s military government. Trade caught in the middle The political rupture has also left questions over trade and movement. Nigeria is West Africa’s largest economy and a key market for goods moving through the Sahel corridor. Nigeria and the three AES states also share established patterns of cross-border trade and labour migration. When Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger’s withdrawal from ECOWAS took effect on January 29, 2025, the regional bloc said it would seek to avoid disruption to trade and movement while the future terms of its relationship with the three countries were determined. ECOWAS said citizens of the three countries would continue, until further notice, to enjoy visa-free movement, residence and establishment within the ECOWAS region. It also said goods and services from the three countries would continue to be treated under existing regional trade arrangements. For traders, transport operators and workers, the uncertainty surrounds how easily goods and people can continue to move across borders, and under what rules. A widening divide The latest diplomatic dispute followed remarks by Nigerian President Bola Tinubu on July 30 about the security situation in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Tinubu said the lack of security in the three countries had compounded Nigeria’s own security challenges. The three AES governments subsequently rejected the assessment. In response, Burkina Faso’s Foreign Minister Karamoko Jean-Marie Traore met Nigeria’s charge d’affaires in Ouagadougou, with representatives of Mali and Niger also present. Traore said the three AES countries and Nigeria faced the same security threat and criticised what he described as an overly simplistic assessment of the situation. A Malian international relations analyst, who requested anonymity, told Al Jazeera that successive confrontations had hardened positions.

By Anna-Lisa Paul, Senior Reporter, anna-lisa.paul@guardian.co.tt August 20, 2026 Valpark Plaza, Valpark (Source: Trinidad & Tobago Guardian) Chaguanas Magistrates' Court (Source: Trinidad & Tobago Guardian) Security agencies across Trinidad and Tobago, including the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) and the Trinidad and Tobago Fire Service (TTFS), were placed on high alert yesterday, after a series of 11 bomb threats targeted several courts, a shopping plaza and a government ministry. The wave of threats, received between 1 pm and 1.40 pm, prompted an immediate response from law enforcement and emergency personnel, who were deployed to locations stretching from Sangre Grande to Point Fortin, as well as Tobago. The alleged threats targeted the Valpark Shopping Plaza in Valsayn, the Ministry of Rural Development and Local Government at Kent House in Maraval, the Judicial Building in Bacolet, Tobago; and magistrates’ courts in Sangre Grande, Arima, Chaguanas, Couva, Princes Town, San Fernando, Siparia and Point Fortin. The TTFS yesterday confirmed that all the affected locations were evacuated and subjected to strict security checks before being cleared for re-entry. A senior TTFS official said the flurry of calls arriving within such a short period appeared coordinated. “It was somebody up to mischief,” the official said. However, the official added that a more pressing concern was the absence of trained bomb technicians within the Fire Service. In a startling revelation, the official disclosed that the TTFS currently has no active bomb technicians. Claiming that some officers’ certifications had expired while others had retired, the official said, “The TTFS has no bomb techs right now.” As a result, the Fire Service’s role at incidents such as yesterday’s is limited to ensuring the public is safe within the muster points and in other areas, while waiting on the TTPS bomb techs to search the properties to ensure they are safe and give the clearance to return. “All we do on arrival is make sure persons are accounted for and are at assembly locations,” the official explained. “We cordon off the area to prevent any incidents and wait for the police bomb techs to show up.” Asked why fire officers were not receiving training in this specialised area, the official responded: “There was no money.” According to the official, the last time fire officers received bomb technician training was in 2006, despite the need for annual refresher programmes. Despite these challenges, the official assured that the TTFS was able to respond effectively to all reports yesterday because sufficient vehicles and personnel were available. Efforts to contact Chief Fire Officer Andy Hutchinson for a comment on the claims were unsuccessful yesterday, as calls to his cellphone went unanswered. The threat also disrupted operations at the Ministry of Rural Development and Local Government’s Kent House offices in Maraval, forcing an early closure. In a statement on the issue, the TTPS said after receiving seven reports through different mediums, it immediately activated the relevant security protocols, heightened its security posture and deployed officers to conduct the necessary checks. However, the TTPS said no explosive devices were found at any of the locations. It said the Ministry of Rural Development and Local Government received a bomb threat shortly after midday at its Kent House, Maraval, location. The building was evacuated, with staff and tenants directed to leave in an orderly manner. The Police Service said investigations are ongoing and urged members of the public to remain vigilant and comply with the instructions of law enforcement officers. BOMB THREAT LOCATIONS • Arima Magistrate’s Court • Chaguanas Magistrate’s Court • Couva Magistrate’s Court • Point Fortin Magistrate’s Court • Princes Town Magistrate’s Court • San Fernando Magistrate’s Court • Sangre Grande Magistrate’s Court • Siparia Magistrate’s Court • Valpark Shopping Plaza • Ministry of Rural Development and Local Government • Judicial Building, Bacolet, Tobago © 2026 Trinidad & Tobago Guardian. All rights reserved

By Basillioh Rukanga, Thomas Mukhwana, Reporting fromin Nairobi, Henry Moore and Vanessa Buschschluter Published August 19, 2026 Rescue officials at the crash site in a remote area of Samburu County by Mount Ololokwe (Source: Kenya Red Cross/Handout via Reuters) Ecuador's intelligence chief and his wife have been killed in a helicopter that crashed at Mount Ololokwe in central Kenya. Michele Sensi-Contugi, 44, and his wife, fashion designer Stephany Hollihan, 42, were among the group of seven people - six tourists and the pilot - killed in Samburu county at approximately 09:13 (06:13 GMT) on Wednesday. Five of victims were Americans, a US State Department spokesperson said. The Reuters news agency reports that Hollihan also held US citizenship. The Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA) said the helicopter was on a scenic flight from a wildlife conservancy in Loisaba to Ewaso Nyiro, a river that flows along several national reserves. Samburu county is a popular tourist destination with many private wildlife conservancies and is renowned for its stunning landscape. Images from the scene show smoke at the wooded crash site on Mount Ololokwe, as members of the Kenya Red Cross approach the still-burning wreckage. Ecuador's President Daniel Noboa named Sensi-Contugo director of the country's Centre of Strategic Intelligence (CIES) in January 2024. The office of the president and Ecuador's National Assembly expressed their condolences over his death and that of Hollihan. The Italian-Ecuadorean businessman had had close links to Noboa even before he was chosen to lead the intelligence service and was considered a close ally of the president. Shortly before being named head of the CIES, he had served for four months as a minister in his cabinet. Noboa has declared three days of national mourning starting on Thursday. Newspapers in Ecuador have also run obituaries of Hollihan. The Guayaquil-based designer founded Sensi Studio, a brand praised for incorporating traditional Ecuadorean elements and materials in its designs. Source: BBC Lady Lori Helicopters, which operated the Eurocopter EC130 B4 aircraft, said it was "deeply saddened" by the accident. "Our deepest sympathies are with the guests, crew, their families and loved ones, and all those affected by this tragic accident," a statement read. According to a memo seen by the BBC's US partner CBS News, external one of the Americans killed in the crash was NBCUniversal journalist José Alberto Suárez. In the memo, NBCUniversal called Suárez "a deeply respected leader and beloved friend and colleague. "José was an exceptional colleague and mentor to many," the memo read. Miami restaurateur Roger Duarte was among the Americans killed in the crash, according to local and US media. Commenting on his death on X, US Rep Carlos Antonio Gimenez wrote: "Our prayers are with their loved ones during this incredibly difficult time. May their memories be a blessing." The other victims have not yet been identified. Helicopter crashes are not uncommon in Kenya. In February, a helicopter crash in the Rift Valley county of Nandi killed six people, including a member of parliament. In 2024, the military chief, Gen Francis Omondi Ogolla, died after an army helicopter that was carrying 11 people crashed in the west of the country, with only two survivors. In June 2021 at least 10 soldiers were killed when their helicopter crashed while landing near the capital, Nairobi. © 2026 BBC. All rights reserved

By Al Jazeera Staff, AP and Reuters August 18, 2026 Eight air strikes hit an airbase in northwestern Syria's Idlib governorate, state TV reports [Al Jazeera] Turkiye rejects Israeli allegations that it posed a threat by preparing to send troops to airbase in Syria’s Idlib. Israel has bombed an airbase in Syria’s Idlib, according to Syrian media, with Turkiye denouncing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s “expansionist” policies and the United States criticising what it called an “unnecessary escalation”. Syria’s state-run Ekhbariya television, citing a military source, said on Tuesday that Israel ⁠carried out eight air strikes on the runway and storage facilities at the Abu al-Duhur base near Aleppo in northwest Syria. There were no casualties. The attack appeared to be Israel’s first attack on Syrian government assets since March. After a day of official silence, Netanyahu’s office said late in the evening that it was aiming to stop Turkish troops from deploying at the base. The statement said Israel and Syria had “agreed to a status quo in security matters” but that Damascus was “on the verge of breaching” the agreement by allowing Turkish troops to deploy at the airbase. Israel had “repeatedly warned Syria” of the risk, the statement said, but “Syria chose to ignore these warnings.” Turkiye dismissed the allegations as “frivolous”. In a statement on X, the Turkish Presidential Communications Directorate said the claims “aim to legitimise Israel’s unlawful air strikes targeting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria”. It tied the accusations to Netanyahu’s intent to continue “expansionist and destabilising policies” in the region before general elections in Israel, adding that Turkiye would “steadfastly continue its cooperation with the Syrian government on legitimate grounds” and would “never allow Syria to be destabilised”. Turkiye was the first Muslim-majority nation to recognise Israel and is a NATO ally of the US. But Israel has tense relations with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has vociferously denounced Netanyahu’s government, especially over its genocidal war in Gaza. ‘Unnecessary escalation’ Meanwhile, the US envoy for Syria Tom Barrack said earlier on Tuesday it was confirmed that Israel carried out the strikes on the Abu al-Duhur airbase in Idlib province. The attacks “constitute an unnecessary escalation that does not advance regional stability”, Barrack, a business friend of President Donald Trump who is also ambassador to Turkiye, wrote on X. “We encourage all parties to prioritise logical discourse over further military incidents,” he said. Israel has launched hundreds of attacks on Syria since the December 2024 toppling of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad by forces led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, now the country’s interim leader. It has also sent troops into a United Nations-patrolled buffer zone that had separated Israeli and Syrian forces in the Israeli-occupied Golan since 1974, and carries out regular incursions deeper inside Syrian territory. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani called for the attacks to stop, saying Israel should recalculate its position towards Syria because it was confronting not only Damascus, but also Syria’s allies. “These attacks don’t have security justifications… We will continue in our diplomatic path to dissuade Israel from this policy and to force it to ⁠stop its attacks on Syria,” he said at a news conference with International Atomic Energy Agency chief Rafael Grossi in Damascus. Jordan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates also condemned the air attacks. “We consider these strikes an unjustified act of aggression, a flagrant violation of Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a blatant breach of international law and the UN Charter,” the ministry said in a statement. The base, ⁠about 70km (43 miles) east of the Turkish border, has been out of service as a dedicated military airfield since 2013 and changed hands several times during Syria’s 14-year civil war between forces loyal to al-Assad and opposition factions. Al Jazeera’s Heidi Pett, reporting from Saraqeb, 30km (20 miles) northwest of Abu al-Duhur, noted that Israel has increased attacks on Syrian military sites since al-Assad fled the country. “There is a continuing Israeli campaign to degrade Syrian military capabilities that began under the Assad regime, but it rapidly escalated immediately after its fall,” she said. “Israel systematically bombed the Syrian air force basically out of existence, and in the last year and a half, there has been an effort to rebuild some of that air capacity,” she added. © 2026 Al Jazeera. All rights reserved

Picture showing White Helmets volunteer unconscious and with bruises on his body went viral By William Christou Mourners carry the coffin of Mohammad Ghamira for burial in the village of al-Haffah, in Latakia province, Syria on Monday. Photograph: AP Syrians have protested over the death of a man who was arrested and allegedly beaten by security forces, sparking widespread anger at a practice thought to have ended with the fall of Bashar al-Assad. A crowd gathered in the city of Aleppo, demanding accountability for the security forces who are alleged to have carried out the torture, with participants holding signs and slogans such as: “Do not repeat the same oppression that we revolted against.” Protests were also planned to take place in front of Syria’s parliament in Damascus on Tuesday, as well. Mohammad Ghamira, a 29-year-old father of two and former volunteer in the White Helmets, had visited a police station in the coastal province of Latakia last week after an accusation of theft. Ghamira emerged from the station in a critical condition, and died in hospital on Sunday from “complications from cerebral and gastrointestinal haemorrhaging” that “resulted from a beating he sustained after being detained”, said Raed al-Saleh, the former head of the White Helmets and current Syrian minister of emergency and disaster management. A picture of Ghamira pre-detention, smiling and healthy, next to another picture of him unconscious in a hospital bed with bruises on his body, went viral, sparking outrage in Syria. Ghamira’s parents told the police station chief prior to their son’s detention that he had haemophilia, a disease which makes it hard to stop bleeding once started, and asked them not to beat him. Even with the warning, Ghamira was beaten while in custody, Issam Ghamira, the man’s uncle, told Syrian state media. The Syrian interior ministry promised accountability for Ghamira, forming a committee to investigate his death and detaining seven members of the interior ministry for questioning. The interior minister, Anas Khattab, vowed a “fair punishment” after the conclusion of the investigation. “I confirm that any violation or abuse by the elements of the ministry of interior will be dealt with firmly within the laws and procedures followed and any violator will receive his fair punishment,” Khattab said in a post on X. The interior minister spokesperson Nour al-Din al-Baba acknowledged issues in the ministry, but promised that justice would be served. Al-Baba said that the investigative committee met with family members on Tuesday and informed them of the progress of the investigation. Despite the promises of accountability, Syrians were incensed by the allegations of torture, enraged that the practice continued even after the 14-year revolution aimed at stopping such brutality. Al-Assad’s regime used mass detention and torture on a systematic scale to control its population, accelerating its brutality when protests broke out against the government in 2011. The current government, made up mostly of former members of the Islamist rebel group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), overthrew al-Assad in a lightning offensive in December 2024. It promised an end to the atrocities committed under the police state that al-Assad oversaw, dismantling the dense network of security agencies that oversaw the country. However, rights groups have alleged that torture continues to be used in Syrian detention centres, and that the policy of abuse is being rebuilt. Syrians for Truth and Justice documented 14 cases of individuals being tortured or dying in custody from June 2025 to June 2026, and said that “the change in political authority has not yet been accompanied by the effective dismantling of the structures and practices that enable torture”. STJ collected testimonies that showed severe beatings, electric shocks, humiliation, threats, deprivation of basic necessities by Syrian security forces across different agencies, often seemingly motivated by sectarian discrimination. The rights group pointed to a lack of oversight and accountability for militias and members of the security forces as an explanation for the persistence of torture in Syria, rather than a centralised policy of torture originating from security agencies themselves. It contrasted this with al-Assad’s regime, where torture was not due to gaps in law, but state policy itself. The report echoed the findings of the UN independent commission of inquiry in March, which documented torture and abuse in 30 official and makeshift detention facilities across Syria in 2025. Civil society groups called for protests and demanded accountability, pointing to the sacrifices of those who died under torture fighting for freedom in Syria. “So many sacrificed dearly for freedom and dignity, to close the dark chapter of their country’s history and to end these practices forever,” said Diab Serieh of the Association of Detainees and the Missing in Sednaya Prison. “Justice for [Ghamira], and for all those forcibly disappeared and under torture in detention, remains an unwavering demand that we will never abandon.” © 2026 Guardian News & Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved. (dcr, adapted)

By Mohammad Yunus Yawar August 18, 2026 Members of the Hazara community pray outside a mosque on the outskirts of Kabul, Afghanistan in October 2021 (AAMIR QURESHI / AFP - Getty Images) KABUL, Aug 18 (Reuters) - An explosion at an education centre in Kabul injured at least 42 children on Monday, the United Nations Assistance ​Mission in Afghanistan said on Tuesday, calling for an "investigation to establish ‌the circumstances of this incident." The blast occurred on Monday evening in Dasht-e-Barchi, a Kabul neighbourhood that is predominantly home to Afghanistan's Hazara and Shi'ite minority communities. It has frequently ​been the target of Sunni Islamist militants — including Islamic State — in the ​past. Reuters was unable to independently verify what caused the explosion. The ⁠Taliban-run Kabul police department did not respond to a request for comment. A ​Kabul hospital that admitted at least 35 of the injured students said all ​patients were between the ages of 10 and 14. "All the patients were suffering from shrapnel injuries, with at least three of them requiring surgical care," Dejan Panic, the Afghanistan Country ​Director for the EMERGENCY hospital in Kabul, was quoted as saying in ​a statement. The explosion's location led some to condemn it as a targeted attack. The UN's Special ‌Rapporteur ⁠on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett, condemned the incident as a "heinous attack" in a post on social media. The European Union's mission in Afghanistan also said in a post on social media that "deliberate attacks on children & ​education centers are ​unacceptable." Dasht-e-Barchi, a densely ⁠populated neighbourhood in western Kabul with a large Hazara community, has been repeatedly hit by attacks in recent years, ​many of which have targeted civilians, students and members of ​the Shi'ite ⁠minority. In May 2021, a school attack killed at least 85 people and wounded hundreds. The vast majority of victims were girls and women. In September 2022, a ⁠suicide attacker ​targeted a tutoring centre during a practice university ​entrance examination, killing at least 19 people — many of them also young women and teenage girls. © 2026 Reuters. All rights reserved

Brazil marks borders for isolated Indigenous group in the Amazon after decades. Shanna Hanbury August 19, 2026 The first sign demarcating the Rio Pardo Kawahiva Indigenous Territory. Image courtesy of FUNAI. Agents of Brazil’s Indigenous agency, FUNAI, spent 60 days in June and July 2026 physically marking the borders of the Rio Pardo Kawahiva Indigenous Territory. The 411,000-hectare (1 million-acre) area in the Amazon biome of Mato Grosso state is home to the Kawahiva, an isolated Indigenous group. The government agency confirmed the presence of the Indigenous group in 1999 and began demarcating its territory in 2001. “The uncontacted Kawahiva have been under threat in their own forest home for decades, while simply trying to exercise their right to live as they choose without contact,” Caroline Pearce, director of the UK-based NGO Survival International, said in a statement. Still image of a Kawahiva individual taken by federal agents in August 2013. Image courtesy of FUNAI. The territory has been invaded by land-grabbers and loggers, causing deforestation. Historically, the Kawahiva territory was intermittently protected via temporary land protection orders, which faced opposition from logging companies. To officially demarcate the territory, FUNAI agents opened a path around the land and installed roughly 140 signs at strategic locations, FUNAI agents told Mongabay. “Here in our region, all owners of plots of land do this,” Jair Candor, coordinator of the FUNAI unit that safeguards the Kawahiva, told Mongabay in an audio message. “The limits of land are marked by opening a path around that territory, whether it belongs to the white man or to an Indigenous person.” The last of more than 100 signs was placed on July 3, 2026. Image courtesy of Kenedy Vicente da Silva. The last known invasion of the territory was in 2023 when a farmer cleared 4-5 hectares (10-12 acres) of Kawahiva land, Candor said. When confronted, the farmer noted that there were no physical markers identifying the Indigenous land. “The physical demarcation is for this purpose,” Candor said. “So that people can identify that there is an Indigenous land there and a people who inhabits it and needs that territory.” An abandoned Kawahiva camp. Image courtesy of FUNAI. Physically marking the territory is the penultimate step to full legal recognition. The only thing remaining is for President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to sign a decree formally creating the Indigenous territory. The president’s office told Mongabay by email that the administration is awaiting Supreme Court decisions concerning the marco temporal, a controversial cutoff date for Indigenous land claims, before proceeding with further land recognition to ensure legal certainty. “If we can keep it the way it is there, without invasions, they will be OK,” Candor said, adding that monitoring expeditions indicate the forest still provides sufficient game, fish, honey and other food sources for the Kawahiva to survive on the land. “They are also human and just need a place where they can live in peace, like everyone else.” © 2026 Copyright Conservation news. Mongabay is a U.S.-based non-profit conservation and environmental science news platform.

By Aqil Shah August 17, 2026 Protestors burn tyres along a road after clashes with police in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-administered Kashmir on July 31, 2026. (Sajjad Qayyum-AFP via Getty Images) Irish poets and American presidents have long spoken of Kashmir: its beauty and its dangers. The question of Kashmir has shaped the trajectories of India and Pakistan since the end of British rule and their birth as nation-states in August 1947. Both countries claim Kashmir in its entirety, have fought multiple wars over it, and each controls a separate part of the territory. Historically, references to Kashmir have largely focused on the dispute between India and Pakistan, or on the most visible troubles in Indian-administered Kashmir. Global attention has rarely lingered on the part of Kashmir administered by Pakistan. Yet, since an outbreak of protests in the region in June, more than 80 people have been killed by security forces. A different kind of political struggle has been gathering momentum there—one that is less a contest over sovereignty than an expression of long-simmering grievances over the conditions of daily life, from unaffordable electricity bills and rising food prices to a scarcity of jobs. Pakistan-administered Kashmir has not been insulated from the wider economic crisis in Pakistan. Rising prices, fiscal pressures, energy deficits, and repeated International Monetary Fund bailouts have pushed successive governments to reduce subsidies and raise utility prices. The people of the region, already squeezed by inflation and unemployment, experience these policies not as fiscal prudence but as evidence of how little influence they have over the decisions that shape their lives. Kashmir and the making of a protest movement Kashmir is home to major hydropower projects that feed Pakistan’s national grid, and many residents argue that local tariffs should better reflect the territory’s contribution to power generation. The grievance is not new: protests over rising electricity and basic commodity prices have erupted periodically since 2022. The failures of the local government to resolve these issues created an opening for a new form of political organization. Citizens committees emerged across districts, bringing together traders, lawyers, students, and community leaders. In September 2023, these committees coalesced into the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), a unified body intended to coordinate mobilization across the region. The JAAC initially demanded lower wheat and electricity prices, an end to official privileges for ministers and bureaucrats, and empowered elected local governments. It has remained outside Pakistan’s political party system. Rather than aligning with the major parties—the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), the Pakistan People’s Party, and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf—it presented itself as a nonpartisan platform. The movement’s appeal seems to rest on its ability to unite constituencies across partisan divides around everyday economic and governance concerns. In response to the JAAC’s organizing, authorities arrested its members on criminal charges and restricted its meetings. But these measures failed to subdue the movement, which pressed on through shutdowns, transportation strikes, and local protests. The protest movement’s strength lies in its decentralized structure, with its chapters across small towns and villages offering a grassroots network that can be activated across the region. In May 2024, after the government pledged to consider its demands but delayed making any substantive concessions, the JAAC called a long march and a shutdown strike. The mobilization drew hundreds of thousands of protesters toward the capital, Muzaffarabad, in one of the largest episodes of mass mobilization in the region’s history. Attempts to prevent the march backfired, broadening the movement. Protests continued to swell in Muzaffarabad despite arrests, roadblocks, and restrictions on internet and cellular communications. Clashes during the May 2024 march left at least four people dead, including three protestors and a police officer. Islamabad ultimately intervened with a relief package reportedly worth about 23 billion rupees ($82.9 million), which included subsidized electricity tariffs and lower wheat prices. But the government’s repressive response turned a campaign over utility prices into a broader test of whether the people of Pakistan-administered Kashmir could exercise meaningful political agency. Citizens or subjects? The May 2024 settlement demonstrated that collective action could compel Islamabad to address immediate economic grievances. But it did not resolve the broader issue of political accountability: how Pakistan-administered Kashmir is governed? The territory has its own president, government, legislative assembly, and courts, but Pakistan retains decisive influence over key administrative, security, and external affairs. A council chaired by Pakistan’s prime minister used to be a major source of Islamabad’s formal control over legislation, finances, and development planning. Although a constitutional amendment in 2018 stripped many of its powers, reducing it to a largely advisory body, significant authority still rests with the federal government. Key civil servants—including the chief secretary and the inspector general of police—are appointed by Islamabad, leaving the regional elected government with limited control over crucial aspects of administration. Pakistan has long defended this exceptional arrangement in Kashmir as necessary for an exceptional situation: administering a territory whose international status remains contested. For residents, however, it has created a persistent gap between political responsibility and political authority. Elected politicians are expected to answer to voters, but the decisions that shape their daily lives are made in Islamabad. The electoral system of the region adds another layer of complexity. The legislature of Pakistan-administered Kashmir has 53 seats. Eight of those seats are reserved for women, religious scholars, technocrats, and overseas citizens. Lawmakers are elected for the remaining 45 seats through elections. Thirty-three of those lawmakers are elected by the people living in the region. Twelve more seats in the legislature are reserved for refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir who live elsewhere in Pakistan—an arrangement introduced in the 1960s and formalized in the 1970s. Critics argue that these 12 seats significantly dilute the political weight of the territory’s voters and make it easier for whichever party rules in Islamabad to shape the assembly’s composition. In June, the top court of the region ruled that those 12 seats enjoy statutory protection, and that any change would require a formal constitutional amendment. The ruling affirmed the government’s legal position, but it did not address the political question at the heart of the dispute. Can a legislature in which more than a quarter of directly elected seats are filled from outside the territory truly reflect the will of the people who live there? The trouble with military hegemony The dominant role of Pakistan’s military further constrains political space. Pakistan is governed by a hybrid regime in which civilian governments function within boundaries imposed by the military, which continues to exert tutelary control over national security, foreign policy, and even political competition. Pakistan-administered Kashmir reflects a concentrated version of this wider political order. The geopolitical stakes of the Kashmir dispute are high, leaving the room for independent political action quite narrow. The Pakistan Army’s 12th Infantry Division, commanded by a major general and headquartered in the hill town of Murree, exercises operational control over the region, giving the military a direct hand in maintaining security. Human rights observers have long documented the influence and the abuses of Pakistan’s military and intelligence services in the territory. The JAAC and rights activists argue that organized political activity and free expression are readily treated as security threats, narrowing the room for dissent. Elected institutions, they say, are reduced to a facade while the security apparatus determines whether political discontent can be expressed and mobilized. The consequences of this militarized approach were on display during the renewed mobilization in the summer. In June, Pakistani authorities banned the JAAC under anti-terrorism laws, declaring it a threat to public order, and launched a broader crackdown on protesters ahead of regional assembly elections planned for Jul. 27 to Aug. 10. In late July, scores of protesters were killed, according to the leaders of the JAAC. Pakistan defended the tactics of its security forces, and a federal minister described the protesters as “militants.” While the number of civilians killed remains contested, but the political significance of the state’s response is clearer: treating a largely peaceful movement rooted in economic and democratic demands as a terrorist group reinforced the perception among the JAAC’s supporters that Islamabad would rather break heads than count them. The JAAC had called for a boycott of the vote, making the abolition of the 12 refugee seats one of its central demands. The first phase of voting recorded a turnout of about 46%, while officials put turnout in the second phase at roughly 50%, lower than the 60% recorded in the previous two elections in 2016 and 2021. Voting in the third phase was postponed because of continued unrest. Preliminary results gave the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, the governing party of Pakistan, 24 general seats, though the delayed contests meant the election had yet to be finalized. The results lend credence to the JAAC’s contention that polling alone cannot resolve who exercises meaningful political authority in Kashmir. This is particularly true when the ruling party in Islamabad can draw on state resources and the military establishment’s backing to shape both the electoral environment and, ultimately, the composition of the legislature. This manipulation begins well before polling day. Critics say officers from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and Military Intelligence, operating under the area’s army command structure, use pressure tactics and patronage to favor candidates who endorse Kashmir’s integration with Pakistan. The 12 refugee seats, critics argue, are not simply a constitutional problem but an additional lever through which politically loyal candidates can be brought into the assembly. The movement’s durability suggests that it is more than a dispute over economic disparities; it reflects a broader crisis of affordability, legitimacy, and accountability. In that sense, the deeper shift is one of political expectations. Support for the JAAC, particularly among young people, reflects a growing impatience with political subordination justified as a geopolitical imperative. The unrest also reveals an uncomfortable contradiction in Pakistan’s official position on Kashmir. For decades, Islamabad has accused India, not without justification, of gross human rights violations against Kashmiris on its side of the Line of Control. Pakistan’s foreign policy rests on the claim that Kashmiris possess a moral and legal “right of self-determination” and that Kashmir’s final status should be decided through a United Nations-administered plebiscite. Yet those claims are difficult to sustain when Islamabad’s own governance of Pakistan-administered Kashmir falls short of the very standards it invokes in criticizing India. For Islamabad, the lesson is clear. Stability cannot be bought with temporary economic relief that leaves the underlying structure of political power intact. Nor can it be secured through repression, which amplifies alienation, fuels anger, and breeds broader resentment toward the Pakistani state. Stability depends on meaningfully addressing the local demand for responsive and credible government, and on recognizing that the people of Pakistan-administered Kashmir are citizens with political rights, not supplicants dependent on Islamabad’s largesse. Kashmiris are not merely demanding lower bills and cheaper bread. They are demanding respect and representation. In the towns and valleys of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, these aspirations cannot simply be suppressed by force. © 2026 TIME USA, LLC.