On 4 March 2026, Somalia’s bicameral parliament approved amendments to over forty provisions of the Provisional Constitution adopted in 2012. (Photo: Social Media) Addis Abeba — In 2012, Somalia adopted its Provisional Constitution during a National Constituent Assembly in Mogadishu, marking the country’s transition from a transitional government to a federal system. Intended as a temporary framework until a permanent constitution could be approved by referendum, the document established the legal foundation for the Federal Republic of Somalia (FGS). Yet the Provisional Constitution was never meant to function solely as a legal text; it was, in essence, a ceasefire agreement articulated in the formal language of modern governance. For more than a decade, the document served as the skeletal framework for a nation painstakingly emerging from the ruins of total state collapse. It represented a fragile yet functional consensus, one that held the disparate components of the Somali Republic together within a single, albeit tenuous, orbit. Today, however, that orbit is showing signs of decay. Recent attempts by the FGS to “finalize” this document through non-consensual mechanisms and executive-led maneuvers have reignited the structural grievances that originally precipitated the Somali Civil War. Critics, including the Puntland regional state and various opposition leaders, argue that the FGS has relied on “non-consensual mechanisms” and “executive-led maneuvers” to amend the supreme law without securing the broad-based political agreement essential for such a fundamental transition. In a federal, post-conflict society, constitutional legitimacy cannot be manufactured through parliamentary arithmetic or political coercion. Preserving the Somali state requires a process that moves away from unilateral political action and toward a genuine, nationally owned covenant. The adoption of the Provisional Constitution marked the conclusion of a protracted transition, offering a document forged through profound compromise. The framers deliberately left the most contentious issues—the division of powers, allocation of natural resources, and the precise structure of the federal model—as “provisional.” The rationale was straightforward: these questions required a level of institutional trust that did not yet exist in 2012. It was a “predictable path” intended for collective navigation. Yet, as Somalia confronts the complexities of 2026, that trust has reached historic lows. The current push for finalization, led by the administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, frames the “provisional” label as a constraint, limiting the country’s ability to participate in international conventions and secure definitive debt relief under the HIPC Initiative. While the goal of a permanent constitution is logically defensible, the approach being employed is politically volatile and risks undermining the very state it seeks to strengthen. On 4 March 2026, the bicameral parliament approved sweeping amendments to more than forty provisions, effectively transforming the charter into the “official” constitution. Yet in a post-conflict context, legality does not automatically confer legitimacy. Proponents of the current reform process argue that the Federal Parliament possesses the supreme legal authority to debate and adopt amendments under Chapter 15 of the existing framework. They maintain that prolonging the status quo creates a vacuum exploited by extremists and that the nation’s progress cannot be held hostage by a small group of dissenting stakeholders. However, in the context of the Horn of Africa’s fragile democratization, legal authority rarely equates to political legitimacy. A constitution is not a standard statute; it is the Social Contract. In a federal system founded on the principle of power-sharing between the center and the periphery, any attempt to rewrite the rules without the consent of the constituent units is perceived not as progress, but as an “institutional coup.” As one governance analyst noted, a constitution must unify a nation rather than deepen political suspicion; without trust, even technically valid reforms struggle to achieve enduring legitimacy.The constitutional debate has revealed a widening rift between Villa Somalia and the Federal Member States (FMS), most evident in the firm opposition emerging from Garowe and Kismayo. Puntland, the oldest of the FMS and historically a guardian of the federal project, has taken the unprecedented step of rejecting the amendments, cautioning that it may not recognize changes that alter the federal balance without regional consultation. This represents a landmark crisis that cannot be dismissed as mere regional intransigence. Similar concerns are voiced in Jubaland, where leaders emphasize that the National Consultative Council (NCC) agreements—which underpin many of the proposed changes—lacked the inclusivity and procedural rigor necessary for such significant reform. These disputes reflect deeper structural tensions that have remained unresolved since 2012, heightening the risk of what analysts describe as a “two-speed federation,” in which different political actors operate under competing interpretations of constitutional authority. ​This erosion of trust reached a breaking point on March 18, 2026, when President Abdiaziz Laftagareen resigned as Deputy Chairman of the President’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP), citing the “unconstitutional” nature of the recent amendments. This followed the South West State’s (KGS) unprecedented decision to sever all cooperative ties with Mogadishu. More alarmingly, the dispute is taking on a military dimension; reported troop mobilizations near Baidoa and accusations that the Federal Government is arming local militias have raised the risk of civil confrontation. In a recent address, Laftagareen further inflamed the situation by alleging that the Federal Government and Al-Shabaab are operating in parallel—an accusation that deepens the rift just as the 2026 electoral deadlines loom. Mandate extensions, Somalia’s authoritarian drift One of the most concerning aspects of this trajectory is the timing of these reforms, coinciding with the expiration of the current federal mandate in early 2026. Critics have argued that the “completion” of the constitution is being used as a Trojan horse to justify extensions of political terms. The amendments extend presidential and parliamentary mandates from four to five years, fundamentally altering the political timeline during a sensitive electoral period. This suspicion is reinforced by public statements suggesting that the revised framework would permit a continuation of the current mandate to “ensure stability.” Such rhetoric represents a troubling regression toward the very authoritarianism that Somalis struggled for decades to overcome. Constitutional legitimacy is inherently incompatible with the expulsion of dissenting legislators or the use of state security forces to intimidate political rivals. When the law becomes a tool of the executive rather than a protection for citizens, the state forfeits its moral authority. Former President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as “Farmaajo,” recently urged the current leadership to respect the constitutional timeline, stating that “leadership is temporary” and that one must accept the reality when a term ends. The dispute has now extended beyond Somalia’s borders into the regional judicial arena. Somali Member of Parliament Dr. Abdillahi Hashi Abib has filed a petition with the East African Court of Justice challenging the legality of the amendments. Abib contends that the process violated both Somalia’s Provisional Constitution and the treaty governing the East African Community. Should the court agree to hear the case, its ruling could influence the implementation of the amendments during this transitional period, introducing an additional layer of complexity to an already delicate environment. Debt relief amid security threat Somalia’s constitutional controversy unfolds against the backdrop of historic economic milestones. In December 2023, the country reached the HIPC completion point, securing approximately $4.5 billion in debt relief. This agreement reduced external debt from $5.2 billion to roughly $600 million, a turning point that should enable greater investment in public services. However, international financial institutions have repeatedly emphasized that sustained economic progress depends on political stability, governance reforms, and fiscal transparency. For Somali policymakers, a finalized constitution may serve to reassure donors, but prioritizing international perceptions over domestic political consensus risks undermining the very stability necessary to attract investment. Furthermore, Somalia’s political tensions carry profound security implications. The country continues to confront a high-stakes campaign against Al-Shabaab. While security forces have made notable gains, the United Nations Security Council has warned that militant groups often exploit governance gaps and political divisions to rebuild their networks. Political fragmentation creates vacuums; wherever governance falters or becomes contested in Somalia, Al-Shabaab seeks to fill the void. Sustained cooperation between the federal government and regional states is not a luxury—it is a critical security necessity. Charting Somalia’s path to unity Somalia’s recent history is marked by the dangers of unilateral political ambitions. The 2021 political crisis, triggered by attempts to extend presidential authority, nearly escalated into armed confrontation in the streets of Mogadishu. At the time, the constitutional framework lacked a clear mechanism to resolve the impasse, creating a dangerous vacuum that was ultimately addressed only through international mediation. The current administration’s push to implement major structural changes—including a shift toward a presidential system—without broad-based consensus risks repeating this perilous history. As former President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as Farmaajo, later reflected, “Power can feel like a lion’s strength, but that moment passes quickly.” To break the cycle of state fragility, Somali leadership must prioritize institutional trust over political expediency. Key measures for a stable transition include prioritizing electoral legitimacy through a consensus-based framework before the mid-2026 deadlines, restoring federal dialogue by returning to negotiations with all Federal Member States to preserve the union, ensuring judicial integrity by allowing independent legal experts to audit amendments for compliance with international standards, and conducting post-electoral deliberation where major structural changes are debated in a stabilized environment following the renewal of political mandates. Somalia stands at its most critical juncture since the 2012 transition. The choice is stark: either renew the nation’s political legitimacy through a painful but necessary consensus, or repeat the historical missteps that precipitated state collapse. As a Somali elder once noted, “A constitution is not only written with legal language—it is written with the trust of the nation.” If President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the Federal Parliament disregard the dissenting voices of the Federal Member States and the political opposition, they may succeed in passing a “Permanent Constitution” on paper, but they will fail in the far more consequential task of building a durable state. The future of Somalia depends on whether its leaders place the social contract above their own political survival. The moral high ground belongs to those who seek to unite, not to those who seek to impose. Editor’s Note: Adam Daud Ahmed is a political and security analyst specializing in the Horn of Africa, with a focus on democracy, regional geopolitics, and counterterrorism. He can be reached at aadan7333@hotmail.com Copyright © 2026, All Rights Reserved Addis Standard

By Juliana Girotto Image: Lev Karavanov/Mostphotos Genocide Watch is issuing a Genocide Warning for Belarus. Five years since mass protests swept Belarus in 2020, the Lukashenko government has deepened its repression and involvement in human rights violations. Belarusians are denied the ability to exercise basic rights, including freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly.  In the February 2024 parliamentary elections and the January 2025 presidential election, no candidates from any opposition party were allowed to register or campaign meaningfully against Lukashenko. There is also currently no registered party that represents the interests of ethnic, religious, or other minority groups . In 2023, amendments to the Law on Public Associations facilitated the dissolution of at least 960 civil society organizations , with 550 more closing out of fear of persecution. The loss of civil society organizations leaves minority populations with no means for gaining meaningful political representation.     There is increasing suppression of all forms of public criticism and peaceful disagreement. Free media have been restricted, with at least 16,000 cases of “extremism” reported during the 2020-2025 period. The Belarusian government owns the only internet service provider and can disrupt and censor internet and media access across the entire country. As of December 2024, 1,265 people were imprisoned on politically-motivated charges, and 3,000 were released after serving their full sentences. In these cases, the United Nations (U.N.) has reported that rights to due process and a fair trial are being denied. Among those recently released, there have been reports of forced deportations and exile to neighboring Lithuania.     In 2024, further amendments to the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organization established broader, arbitrary grounds for liquidating religious organizations , requiring such groups to register with the government and to engage in mandatory reporting of their activities. Since 2023, the government has also actively involved the military and security forces in education . Revised historical curricula have been introduced into schools, and legislation has been enacted to punish any teachers who deviate from the approved historical narrative. These represent serious limitations to freedom of expression.    Belarus’ alliance with Russia and its involvement in the war in Ukraine have provided opportunities for further repression. As of 2024, at least 94 Belarusians had received prison sentences for their anti-war stances, which were expressed through public protests or on social media. Belarus has also engaged in a joint effort with Russia to forcibly relocate Ukrainian children, and at least 2,422 Ukrainian children between the ages of six and seventeen have been taken to 13 different facilities across Belarus. “Re-education” efforts in these facilities promote political, cultural, and social messages that advance the interests of Belarus and Russia. Researchers have asserted that the deportation and re-education of Ukrainian children might be considered war crimes under international law.     Within detention facilities across Belarus, prisoners have been subject to inhuman conditions and torture. Prisoners have been held in severely overcrowded cells with unhygienic conditions and a denial of necessities such as warm clothes, blankets, showers, hygienic items, and medical assistance. Those who were held on politically-motivated charges received harsher treatment in these facilities after being put on a list of people who were “prone to extremism” and having their clothes marked with yellow tags. Detainees in this category have been subject to arbitrary and disproportionate punishment, such as strict observance, isolation, and compulsory and exploitative labor. Prisoners have also died or disappeared: between 2020 and 2023, 27 cases of enforced disappearances and five cases of death that resulted from disproportionate force or from a failure to protect life in detention. U.N. reporters state that these violations may amount to crimes against humanity —specifically persecution—under international law.    There has also been evidence of sex- and gender-based violence committed by Belarusian security forces against individuals of all gender identities. The violence includes rape and other forms of violence like sexualized torture and forced nudity , and it has largely occurred in police vehicles, police stations, and detention facilities. Verbal acts include threats of rape and gang rape to degrade and intimidate detainees; LGBTQ+-identifying individuals have faced more severe verbal violence of this type. Since 2021, there have been 121 documented incidents of unnecessary strip and cavity searches in detention facilities. Such searches were not carried out for security purposes, but rather with the intent to intimidate and humiliate detainees, which could amount to ill-treatment or torture .    Genocide Watch considers Belarus to be at Stage 6: Polarization and Stage 8: Persecution. Genocide Watch recommends:    The United States, European Union, and U.N. should demand the immediate and unconditional release of all individuals imprisoned on politically-motivated charges.   The U.N. Refugee Agency and the International Criminal Court should initiate investigations into torture, enforced disappearances, and deaths in Belarus’ custody which may amount to crimes against humanity under international law.   The U.N. Refugee Agency and the International Criminal Court should also initiate investigations into war crimes involving Belarus’ involvement in relocating Ukrainian children.   Neighboring countries such as Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia should continue to grant asylum and protection to Belarusian dissidents, activists, and journalists.

South & Southeast Asia: The Medicalization of Female Genital Mutilation   By Juliana Girotto, Genocide Watch March 2026 Activists carry banners to commemorate International Women’s Day. Toto Santiko Budi/Shutterstock The World Health Organization (WHO) has recently released a call to action surrounding the medicalization of female genital mutilation (FGM) in the Asia-Pacific region. FGM can be defined as “all procedures involving partial or total removal of the female external genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons.” As of March 2025, over 230 million women and girls across the world have undergone FGM, including around 80 million in Asia. In many communities, FGM is a deeply-rooted cultural practice performed with parental consent and based on beliefs that it is necessary for marriage and safeguarding girls’ futures. Parents feel they are acting in their daughters’ best interests by protecting morals and virginity or by conforming to community standards . However, FGM has no health benefits, lacks a scientific basis , and causes immediate and long-term harm. FGM is a violation of girls’ and women’s human rights.   Increasingly, medical professionals, doctors and midwives, are performing FGM instead of traditional practitioners, a trend known as medicalization. There is evidence that the medicalization of FGM is taking place in at least eight countries within South and Southeast Asia. Those countries include Brunei, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. The highest rates of medicalization are found in Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia . Parents often prefer medical professionals as they seek to avoid the health risks from unsterilized equipment. Yet this narrative of harm reduction legitimizes and normalizes FGM, threatening to undo decades of human rights advocacy against the practice.   Recognized as a form of gender-based oppression, FGM targets women’s right to bodily autonomy and sexual freedom. The practice functions as a mechanism of social control over female sexuality, rooted in beliefs that women’s sexual desire must be limited to preserve “purity,” marital suitability, and family honor. According to the WHO , all forms of FGM interfere with the natural functioning of women’s sexual organs, causing long-term urinary, vaginal, and menstrual problems. FGM also causes sexual problems, increased risk of childbirth complications, and a higher risk for surgeries required later in life. In addition, women who undergo FGM frequently experience psychological issues, such as depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and low self-esteem.   By restricting bodily and sexual autonomy, FGM operates as a tool that subordinates women’s bodies to cultural expectations rather than personal choice. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has affirmed that these forms of control constitute violations of the rights of women to make free and responsible decisions and choices about their sexual and reproductive health. It also concluded that they violate women’s rights to be free from violence, coercion, and discrimination regarding matters concerning one’s sexual and reproductive health.   Calls for states to eliminate the human rights violations posed by FGM have been made by several international human rights conventions, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and The Convention on the Rights of the Child. Nevertheless, national legal and policy frameworks following this standard are rare in the South and Southeast Asia region. The only country to date that has adopted such a framework is Indonesia, who in 2024 became the first Asian country to pass a specific legal provision against FGM. Though this shows progress, the existing regulations contain loopholes within wording that still allow for some forms of FGM, which must be changed to fully combat this issue.  To effectively address the medicalization of FGM and ensure the upholding of rights of women and girls to bodily autonomy, the following steps should be taken:   Strengthen professional accountability: Regulatory bodies and medical associations across the region should adopt and enforce clear codes of conduct that prohibit health workers from performing FGM. Integrating FGM-focused training for doctors, nurses, and midwives will enable them to confidently refuse requests, counsel families, and become agents for change in their communities.   Strengthen international governance and oversight mechanisms: United Nations bodies and global health agencies should push countries in South/Southeast Asia to adopt clearer standards against the medicalization of FGM, providing model legislation and technical assistance to these states’ progress in enforcing anti-FGM laws.  Promote high-quality care for women with FGM: State governments should ensure that women and girls who have undergone FGM have quality and affordable access to health and mental services that enable them to address the physical and psychological issues that arise.  Community engagement and norm changes: International organizations should mobilize community education campaigns to challenge the idea that medicalized FGM is safe and acceptable. These campaigns should involve health workers and religious/cultural leaders. So far, such efforts have primarily been focused within Sub-Saharan Africa. These efforts need to be expanded specifically to the South/Southeast Asia region and target countries like Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia.

Samantha Granville Beirut Israel says it will not tolerate Syrian attacks on the Druze minority (Reuters) Israel says it has carried out air strikes on Syrian government infrastructure in the south of the country, in response to what it described as attacks on Druze civilians in Suweida province. In a statement, the Israeli military said it hit a command centre and weapons stored at army compounds overnight. "The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] will not tolerate harm towards the Druze population in Syria and will continue to operate to defend them," it said. The Syrian foreign ministry denounced the attack as "an outrageous assault on Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity" and called Israel's justification "flimsy pretexts and fabricated excuses". It said the strikes were an escalation that continued Israel's policy of "interference in internal affairs with the aim of undermining security and stability". Israel, which has a sizable Druze minority, has previously framed such strikes as efforts to protect the community across the border. The Druze are a community in Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, whose religion is an offshoot of Shia Islam with its own unique identity and beliefs. Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz warned of further action, saying Israel would not allow the Syrian government to "exploit" the wider regional war to target Druze communities, and would strike "with even greater force" if necessary. Until now, Syria has largely remained on the margins of the current regional conflict across the Middle East, which started at the end of last month, when Israel and the United States launched coordinated missile strikes against Iran. This latest military action in Syria comes amid escalating violence in Suweida, a predominantly Druze province in southern Syria, where clashes between government forces and local armed groups have intensified in recent days after a group of Druze militiamen attempted to enter government-held territories. A UK-based war monitor, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, said fighting broke out after mortar fire landed in areas controlled by Druze groups, before shelling later struck residential neighbourhoods in Suweida city, causing panic among residents. Syrian authorities, however, described a different version of events. The interior ministry said security forces had dismantled an organised criminal network involving car theft and drug trafficking, adding that nine suspects had been arrested in the operation. The unrest follows previous violence in Suweida, where clashes between Druze fighters, Sunni Bedouin tribes and government forces last July left hundreds dead. Government forces have been accused of siding with tribal groups despite saying they were intervening to restore order. Israel also carried out strikes at the time, saying it was defending Druze communities and enforcing the demilitarisation of southern Syria. While some have raised concerns that Syria could be drawn more directly into the conflict - particularly as Israel increases strikes against Hezbollah in Syria's neighbour Lebanon - analysts say the latest escalation is more closely tied to internal dynamics than regional war. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has made it clear Damascus was seeking to avoid becoming involved. "We are calculating our steps with extreme precision and working to keep Syria away from any conflict," he said in a speech after Eid al-Fitr prayers in the capital. Copyright 2026 BBC. All rights reserved.

By the Central Asia Task Force Genocide Watch An Afghan mother holds her daughter, staring at the light from behind her obscured window. Photo: UN Women/Sayed Habib Bidell. The conditions facing women in Afghanistan today reflect a systematic, multilayered assault on their rights, dignity, and survival. The Taliban’s return to power has not only reversed 20 years of progress but has intensified gender-based persecution to levels amounting to femicide. From the collapse of legal protections and the destruction of educational and economic opportunities to the rise of targeted violence, the current situation leaves Afghan women with few places of safety and non-existent paths of upward social mobility. Facing dangers from both the state and their family members, Afghan women have become prisoners in their own country and homes.   Any meaningful path forward requires sustained international attention, protection for the most vulnerable, and long-term support for Afghan women's own efforts to reclaim autonomy and rebuild the foundations of a just society. Full report:

By Alžběta Frommerova   Since late December 2025, Iran has experienced widespread protests in response to a dramatic decline in the value of its currency, ongoing government mismanagement of basic services, and deteriorating living conditions. The protests began with strikes and store closures, then progressed into large-scale street rallies across the country. Millions of Iranians went into the streets demanding the overthrow of the Islamic Republic regime.  Supporters rally for Mir-Hossein Mousavi on June 9, 2009 These protests are part of a much longer struggle. For more than one hundred years , Iranians have repeatedly mobilized in pursuit of democracy, but they have not yet achieved it. In just the past three decades, major protest movements have erupted, the first being the Green Movement (2009-2010).    The Green Movement formed after the 2009 presidential election, when, just hours after polls closed, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was proclaimed the victor , sparking widespread charges of electoral fraud and leading the other three candidates to contest the validity of the vote. Public indignation increased when official results revealed opposition candidates were underperforming even in their home regions. In response , Iranian authorities arrested journalists, activists, and opposition leaders, curtailed media coverage, and blocked access to the internet and telephones. At first, protests were allowed, but the government quickly approved a brutal reaction by security forces, including the Basij militia . Thousands were unlawfully detained, and dozens died in jail or were killed in the streets. Many protesters said they were tortured or otherwise mistreated.    The Green Movement was driven largely by the youth, university graduates, and a disillusioned middle class facing economic hardship. Protesters adopted green, the campaign color of reformist candidate and Movement leader, Mir Hossein Mousavi , as a unifying symbol during mass demonstrations demanding electoral accountability. The movement’s central slogan, “ Where is my vote? ”, framed dissent as a demand for accountability rather than regime overthrow. However, a clear divide existed between its leaders and the protesters: while the leadership sought reform within the Islamic Republic, many demonstrators pushed for fundamental change.     By the time the Green Movement took shape, Iran’s public sphere was already tightly constrained . Activists adapted by building and maintaining informal networks, especially within student communities, which enabled political engagement despite repression. Protesters also relied on citizen journalism and digital platforms to record and circulate events independently, signaling a deep mistrust of state-controlled media and positioning the Green Movement as one of the earliest globally “ socially broadcasted ” protest movements.    Women played a crucial role in the Green Movement, drawing on a long tradition of political activism and well-established grassroots networks developed through decades of organising for legal and social rights. Those networks enabled women to mobilize effectively during the 2009 election protests.    The movement stemmed from Iran’s long history of resistance to unaccountable rule and demands for governance in accordance with the law. Although it did not succeed in overturning the 2009 election or dismantling the state, it did succeed in discursively undermining the regime’s ideological foundations. At the same time, many Iranians involved in the Green Movement emphasized that Iran’s future must be determined by Iranians inside the country, arguing that foreign involvement would compromise the movement’s autonomy and legitimacy. Therefore, rather than seeking external support, Green Movement activists framed their struggle as an internally-driven process.    The Green Movement demonstrates how Iranians organize protests through informal networks and symbolic legitimacy, while its failure helps explain the shift from reformist demands to calls for regime change in later uprisings.

Kaab TV journalist Amiro Sulaiman Ibrahim and Iqro Abdullahi Abdirahman from Five Somali TV. | PHOTO/Courtesy. MOGADISHU, Somalia 19 March 2026 The Somali Journalists Syndicate (SJS) strongly condemns the violent arrest and confiscation of equipment from two women journalists in Mogadishu on Wednesday, 18 March, while they were covering a public protest against forced evictions in Mogadishu's Dayniile district. Kaab TV journalist Amiro Sulaiman Ibrahim and Iqro Abdullahi Abdirahman from Five Somali TV were violently arrested by armed police officers reportedly led by Captain Jamilo Faradar. The officers beat Iqro Abdullahi Abdirahman before forcing her into a police vehicle. Both journalists told SJS that they were taken to Dayniile police station, where they were detained before being released later in the afternoon. Although the two reporters were freed, police confiscated their equipment. Kaab TV reported that its camera equipment, including a camera, microphones, and a memory card, has still not been returned. The journalists witnessed police opening fire on civilians, resulting in deaths and injuries, the station said . On Wednesday night, armed police officers from Hamar Jajab Police Station raided the home of Iqro Abdullahi Abdirahman and rearrested her. A colleague told SJS that officers beat Iqro before taking her to the police station, where she remains in detention. "We strongly condemn the arrest of two women journalists, Amiro Sulaiman Ibrahim of Kaab TV and Iqro Abdullahi Abdirahman of Five Somali TV. We also condemn the physical assault of Iqro Abdullahi Abdirahman,” said SJS Secretary General, Abdalle Mumin. "We call for respect for press freedom, the protection of journalists, and the immediate return of the camera equipment confiscated from Kaab TV.” "Last night, police raided the residence of Iqro Abdullahi Abdirahman and beat her before rearresting her. These attacks are a blatant violation of media freedom and the safety of journalists, particularly women journalists working in an already dangerous environment,” Mr. Mumin added. Copyright © 2015 - 2026 Horn Observer All Rights Reserved.

By Cooper Denison Demonstrators mark the first anniversary of deadly antigovernment protests in Nairobi on June 25, 2025 [Donwilson Odhiambo/Reuters] Kenya gained independence in 1963 following decades of oppressive British colonial rule. The 1952 Mau Mau Uprising, an armed anti-colonial rebellion led by members of the dispossessed Kikuyu ethnic group, was met with brutal violence under a lengthy state of emergency that lasted until 1960. Atrocities included imprisonment, torture, and sexual abuse, and while official numbers report that 11,000 people were killed and 80,000 were detained, researchers estimate a death toll of up to 25,000 and the imprisonment of 160,000 to 320,000 people. Following independence, further problems ensued, including single-party rule, massacres and election-related violence. Following deadly post-electoral violence in 2007, Kenya emerged from the crisis with a renewed commitment to democracy in the form of its 2010 Constitution. The Constitution contains an extensive bill of rights with specific protections for historically marginalized communities. Its language is notably progressive, addressing corruption, ethnic violence, and centralism. However, forces within and outside the Kenyan government have fought to stall its implementation. Today, Kenya risks losing its tangible democratic and humanitarian gains by neglecting constitutional safeguards, denying funds to key programs, and failing to enforce legal protections ,     In 2024, anti-government protests erupted over increased taxation measures included in the annual finance bill. The protests reflected widespread discontent with Kenya’s rising unemployment and affordability crisis. Despite being initially peaceful, the demonstrations turned violent when protesters stormed Parliament , resulting in the death of 65 individuals at the hands of state-security forces. Anger over the government’s handling of the crisis has carried over to other issues, and protests over corruption, femicide, and police brutality have elicited intense resistance from municipal and federal police .      Violence against women and girls in Kenya is widespread, with 97 recorded femicides in 2024 alone. Although public outcry has led to the initiation of several legislative solutions, including the Sexual Offenses Act and the Protections against Domestic Violence Act , these safeguards are rarely enforced due to limited funding and implementation issues. In late 2024, mass demonstrations over government inaction materialized, and police beat demonstrators while throwing tear gas into the crowd. President Ruto has since convened a national working group to address gender-based violence, but Parliament has yet to consider any law ​​ labeling femicide as a crime in need of special legal protections.     Violence against members of the queer community is commonplace in Kenya, as exemplified by the death of Edwin Chiloba , a prominent activist whose body was found mutilated in late 2024. The rights of LGBTQ+ people in Kenya are marked by legal uncertainty and social volatility. In 2019 the High Court upheld laws discriminating against the queer community , but a 2024 ruling affirmed the legal recognition of trans people while directing the state to protect them.     Kenya hosts the two largest refugee camps in the world, which are home to over 830,000 refugees fleeing violence in South Sudan and Somalia. Although the government initially threatened to close the camps in 2021, citing security concerns, it has since shifted to a more integrative approach– designating the camps as municipalities to allow for freedom of movement and greater self-sufficiency. Despite this progress, the recent suspension of US aid has significantly impacted the ability of the camps to access food and clean water, leading to the “slow starvation” of hundreds of thousands of refugees in Kakuma.   Genocide Watch considers Kenya to be at Stage 1: Classification, Stage 2: Symbolism, Stage 3: Discrimination, and Stage 4: Dehumanization.      Genocide Watch recommends that:   The government of Kenya direct additional resources towards the implementation of the 2010 Constitution.  The government of Kenya initiate a national dialogue addressing issues of affordability and youth unemployment, and Parliament address these issues through legislation in consultation with civil society.  The government of Kenya examine and reform how security forces interact with civilian protests in order to allow for peaceful demonstrations, in line with rights outlined in the 2010 Constitution.  The government of Kenya repeal discriminatory legal statutes that adversely affect its LGBTQ+ citizens.  The United Nations provide additional funding to prevent starvation in the Kakuma and Dabaab Refugee Encampments, while supporting the Kenyan government’s efforts to integrate refugees.

The attack hit a drug rehabilitation facility, and Afghanistan vowed to retaliate, risking an escalation of the conflict between the two countries. By Safiullah Padshah and Elian Peltier The airstrike hit a drug rehabilitation center in Kabul, Afghan officials said. Sayed Hassib/Reuters A Pakistani airstrike on a drug rehabilitation center killed dozens of people in Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, on Monday night, in the deadliest single attack of an escalating conflict between the two neighbors. There were at least 75 bodies in body bags or coffins in the backs of ambulances that shuttled back and forth throughout the night and on Tuesday morning. An initial assessment by a United Nations agency at the site said that the death toll could be much higher, noting that its observers found the “complete destruction” of one part of the facility, which housed about 180 adolescents, with “no survivors reported.” Pakistan claimed responsibility for the strike, one of six that it carried out on Afghanistan on Monday, but, in a post on X, Pakistan’s information minister, Ataullah Tarar, said the target had been an ammunition depot. Monday’s strike was the third time Pakistan hit the Afghan capital in recent weeks. A Taliban spokesman warned on Tuesday that Afghanistan would retaliate, a step that could lead to all-out war between two countries, whose populations share deep cultural bonds. Pakistan, which once supported the Taliban, accuses Afghanistan’s Taliban government of harboring an Islamist terrorist group responsible for hundreds of attacks in Pakistan in recent years. Armed groups operate on both sides of their 1,640-mile border. Officials from the two countries met regularly until last October, when the two militaries clashed along that border. In late February, Pakistan declared “open war” against the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Since then, Pakistan has launched dozens of airstrikes on Afghanistan’s two largest cities and in border areas. Though Pakistan’s ultimate objective remains unclear , it has pummeled Afghan military infrastructure with strikes that have also hit or damaged civilian homes, refugee camps and health facilities , according to the United Nations. The United States has said that Pakistan has a right to defend itself — a stance that Pakistani officials have said privately that they interpret as a green light to conduct their operations. Pakistan has ignored calls for dialogue from China, its primary partner, despite public mediation efforts over the past week. Afghan Red Crescent Society volunteers at the site of the strike. Wakil Kohsar/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images “Both sides urgently need to step back and return to the negotiation table,” said Ibraheem Bahiss, a senior Afghanistan analyst at the International Crisis Group, based in Kabul. “Without a cease-fire, the situation risks escalating further, with civilians likely to bear the brunt.” The compound hit by the Pakistani airstrike on Monday housed a drug rehabilitation facility run by the Taliban government. A spokesman for the Afghan Ministry of Health said 200 patients were staying in the building that had been struck. A billboard atop an adjacent, charred building read “Support and Treatment Center, Omid” — or “hope” in the Dari dialect. On Tuesday, hundreds of people pressed against the compound’s entrance, many inquiring after relatives. Basmina Khudadadi asked for news about her brother, who had been admitted about six weeks ago, she said. She had brought him fresh clothes last month, she said. “We have not informed his wife yet,” Ms. Khudadadi said. Afghan firefighters and security personnel work to extinguish a fire after the strike on Monday night. Wakil Kohsar/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images “The numbers are in the hundreds,” Jacopo Caridi, the head of the Afghanistan office for the Norwegian Refugee Council, said about casualties after visiting the site. He said he had seen no military facilities in the immediate area. In a statement on Tuesday, Pakistan’s minister of information, Attaullah Tarar, said : “All targeting has been done with precision only at those infrastructures which are being used by Afghan Taliban regime.” Taliban security personnel arrived at the scene of the strike. The government vowed to retaliate against Pakistan. Wakil Kohsar/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images Monday’s death toll was the worst since late February, when Pakistan launched strikes on more than 20 locations, killing at least 274 people, according to the Pakistani military. Afghan troops attacked more than 50 Pakistani border positions during that fighting, and Afghanistan said it killed 55 Pakistani soldiers. The U.N. mission in Afghanistan estimates that 115,000 people have been displaced there. People said to have been wounded in the attack, at a hospital in Kabul. Sayed Hassib/Reuters Some facilities built during the U.S. war in Afghanistan have been repurposed by the Taliban authorities, including former military bases now housing religious schools. The Omid drug rehabilitation center was set in a former U.S. base, not far from Kabul’s international airport. By Tuesday, dozens of bloodstained mattresses lay scattered among the debris as firefighters and emergency teams carried bodies into ambulances, under the close watch of hundreds of armed personnel. The destroyed building, Afghan officials said, was a 180-foot-long structure used for meals and prayer. In smaller adjacent buildings, the debris contained white and blue patient gowns, identical sandals and bottles of medicinal syrup. Patients of what was described a rehabilitation center gathered after the strike. Pakistan said it had targeted military infrastructure. Wakil Kohsar/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images Other buildings adjacent to the large structure, each containing 20 to 30 bunk beds, also caught fire. Afghanistan has long been the world’s leading source of illegally produced opium, but a ban by the authorities led to a sharp decline in opium production in 2023. Still, the use of cannabis and synthetic drugs like methamphetamine remains a major public health concern. The facility was recognized by local residents as a drug-treatment center. Sayed Hassib/Reuters As flames were still raging in the early hours of Tuesday, Muhammad Haidari, 23, stood dumbfounded. He said his two uncles had been admitted to the center in February. “I don’t know if they are alive or dead,” Mr. Haidari said. “Each one has children and family waiting for them to return home.” Afghans waiting outside to seek news of their relatives at the site. Wakil Kohsar/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images © 2026 The New York Times Company

Mother-of-five Nyawan Koang was trapped between warring sides Thousands of people have been fleeing the South Sudanese town of Akobo and surrounding parts of Jonglei state, where the army says it has intensified strikes on its enemies to regain control. The latest fighting has led the UN to warn of a possible return to full-blown civil war in the world's youngest nation. Nyawan Koang, 30, and her five children had to walk for two days to reach the dusty village of Duk. They had fled Ayod, a remote and largely pastoralist county in Jonglei state, where armed clashes had been raging between the military and their opponents who had been fortifying their presence there since the beginning of the year. "We were [wedged] between two forces: the SPLA-IO and the government. And their bullets kill us," she told the BBC. Government forces are trying to retake territory from those loyal to First Vice-President Riek Machar, who has been suspended from his post after being accused of plotting to overthrow President Salva Kiir. Machar has been under house arrest in Juba for a year awaiting trial for murder, treason and crimes against humanity. He denies all charges. Aligned with Machar are the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO), who have been seizing towns in Jonglei and other neighbouring states. As they advanced, threatening Jonglei's capital, Bor, they left devastated communities in their wake. Whole villages have been torched and civilians indiscriminately killed. The government has responded swiftly - and ferociously - deploying more troops to attack the positions of their rivals. But civilians were also attacked - including Nyawan's family. She lost both her parents when an air strike hit their small thatched-roof hut. "Fire came from the sky and burned them," she said. Nyawan and her family are among the more than 280,000 people forced from their homes by recent clashes. Thousands of them are in Duk, where aid organisations provide food, medicine and other basic essentials. Yet more lives are likely to be turned upside-down, or snuffed out altogether, unless a political change of course is made. Fighting between forces loyal to President Kiir and his rival-turned-deputy Machar first broke out in 2013, just two years after the euphoria of independence. A 2018 peace deal ended the civil war that had killed nearly 400,000 people, but it has never been properly implemented and the relationship between the pair has become increasingly strained amid ethnic tensions and sporadic violence. It is not clear how many people - civilians or combatants - have been killed in the renewed conflict. One report by the UN's rights body documented 189 civilian deaths in January alone. "Civilians are bearing the brunt of a spike in indiscriminate attacks including aerial bombardments, deliberate killings, abductions and conflict-related sexual violence," said the body's head Volker Türk. Nyawan remembers seeing several dead bodies while she was fleeing to Duk. "But I don't know [which side] killed them." As government forces and SPLA-IO fighters, who are supported by another armed group called the White Army, battle for control of territory, the lives of innocent civilians are being sacrificed. "There's no army in the world that actually fought without civilians being caught in the crossfire," Information Minister Ateny Wek Ateny told the BBC in his office in the country's capital, Juba. He says the army is "responsible" in its conduct, and adds that his government is "trying its best" and has "taken measures [to ensure] civilians are not involved in the situation". But he concludes, "Civilians who find themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time might be caught in the crossfire. There's no way you can prevent that." Yet some of the attacks on civilians appear to be deliberate. By the government's own admission, in the last week of February more than 20 civilians - including women and the elderly - were executed at close range in Ayod by government soldiers who took control of the area. Army spokesman Maj Gen Lul Ruai Koang told the BBC that soldiers from two platoons and their commanders had been put in detention following internal investigations and now face a court martial. In the government fallout that preceded this latest spike of violence, President Kiir not only fired Machar but also his wife - Interior Minister Angelina Teny - along with several other senior government figures. The reason for Machar's detention and trial are his alleged links to White Army fighters who seized control of a military base from the national army last year, say the authorities. But Machar's supporters see the move politically motivated and in breach of South Sudan's power-sharing agreement. 'We suffered a lot' Like many people seeking refuge and help in Duk, Hoth Wan Kornyom, a community leader and father of seven, has lost a relative in the violence. His brother was killed in gunfire and his own house was set ablaze. While his fellow villagers in Uror county were fleeing the conflict, he recalls, some parents became separated from their children and it is not clear if they were ever reunited. Twenty-seven-year-old Neyasebit, who also left Uror for Duk, said her two uncles, a brother-in-law and a younger brother were killed in air strikes. "They were just staying at home," she explained, insisting they were not combatants. "We suffered a lot. That's why we ran away," she told the BBC. "Both sides" are perpetrators of such attacks, according to her. The resurgence of violence in Jonglei has exacerbated already dire humanitarian needs in the state. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), 60% of Jonglei's two million people are facing hunger. Across South Sudan as a whole, 10 million out of 14 million people need food aid. "South Sudan is one of the world's most complex environments to provide humanitarian assistance," WFP's acting country director Adham Affandy told the BBC. "We have conflict... natural disasters - and there are inter-communal violence, economic instability and the physical access challenges." The country also has one of the least-developed road networks in the world, with only 400km (248 miles) of South Sudan's estimated 20,000km of roads being paved, according to a 2022 study. During the rainy season - which can last up to eight months per year - around 80% of South Sudan is inaccessible, Mr Affandy said. This has forced humanitarian groups to rely on aircraft to deliver assistance - at huge cost. But the most pressing issue is insecurity. When clashes flared up in January, many relief agencies withdrew from conflict areas only to return once the violence had subsided. Earlier this month, the army told aid agencies - and some 50,000 civilians - to leave Akobo county, one of the strongholds of SPLA-IO forces in Jonglei as it prepared to launch what it called a "second-phase" offensive. Since its independence in 2011, South Sudan has struggled with several cycles of fighting. It is also being affected by instability across the region. In the past three years, more than a million people have crossed its borders from its northern neighbour Sudan - where a devastating civil war is raging. Now, many observers fear, the 2018 power-sharing agreement that brought relative calm could be shattered - something millions across the country dread. "South Sudanese people are exhausted," WFP's Affandy told the BBC. "They want peace." Copyright 2026 BBC. All rights reserved

A report by Areeka Khan, Genocide Watch August, 2023 Survivors look at the pictures of the Gujarat riots victims at a photo exhibition held to commemorate its 10th anniversary in Ahmedabad in February 2012. Photograph: Reuters In 2002, anti-Muslim carnage engulfed the Indian state of Gujarat, killing at least 1,000 people. Most of the victims were Muslims. The Chief Minister of Gujarat was Narendra Modi, a lifelong member of the Hindu extremist RSS. He ordered police not to stop the massacres. What led to the 2002 Gujarat massacres? On February 27, 2002, Sabarmati Express, a train carrying Hindu kar sevaks (pilgrims) returning from the site of the demolished Babri Masjid, was attacked. 59 people lost their lives in a fire that broke out in one of the train cars just outside the station of Godhra. The cause of the fire is still the subject of contention. In 2008, the Gujarat government-appointed Nanavati-Mehta Commission concluded that local Muslims had set the train on fire. The Justice Bannerjee Committee , established by the Indian government's railway minister in 2005, reached the opposite conclusion, concluding that the fire was accidental. The death of 59 Hindu passengers was instantly exploited by Hindu extremist groups like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), and Bajrang Dal to incite Hindu hysteria, incite the genocidal massacres, and claim they were in self-defence against Muslim terrorism. Hindu mobs, unrestrained by state police and encouraged by then Chief Minister Narendra Modi, launched a state-wide campaign of retaliation against Muslims. Should the massacres be considered Genocide? Genocide is defined as "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; or imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.” Genocide Watch and many genocide scholars contend that the massacres in Gujarat between February and March 2002 meet the definition of genocide. The Gujarat massacres included four of the acts of genocide enumerated in the Genocide Convention. a) Killing members of the group A Hindu mob faces off with a Muslim mob during during Gujarat’s 2002 riots. Photograph: AFP By the afternoon of February 27, retaliatory attacks had already begun. Donning the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) uniform of khaki shorts and a saffron headband, the mobs carried out attacks in a highly coordinated manner. Armed with a list of Muslim homes and businesses, they arrived in Muslim neighbourhoods by truckloads carrying swords, metal pipes, and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) cylinders. The rampaging mob stormed into the housing complex of Ehsan Jafri, a former highly regarded Muslim member of the Indian parliament . The mob murdered Ehsan Jafri and 68 other Muslims who had sought refuge in his house . Jafri had desperately tried to contact the police commissioner and the office of chief minister Modi but never got through. Investigative journalist Ashish Khetan secretly taped conversations with the three Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) activists Mangilal Jain, Prahaladji Asori, and Madanlal Raval, who described the events surrounding Eshan Jafri's murder. They confirmed to Khetan that Jafri had made desperate phone calls to police officers and political leaders. According to the three men, the police not only gave them unfettered freedom but also encouraged the rioters to kill Muslims. They claimed that the rioters were given three to four hours to carry out the killings by the police inspector in charge of Meghaninagar police station, KG Erda. These secretly taped conversations, however, were ignored by the Supreme Court of India's Special Investigation Team. During the massacres, at least 250 women and girls were gang-raped before being burned to death. A mob of 5,000 people set fire to houses of Muslims in Ahmedabad's Naroda Patia neighbourhood, resulting in the death of at least 65 people. Before being burned and hacked to death, women and girls were gang-raped in public. Their male family members were forced to watch the rapes and then were killed. Hina Kausar from Naroda Patiya was pregnant when she was raped. Several eyewitnesses testified that she was raped and tortured and that her womb was slit open with a sword to extract the foetus, which was then hacked to pieces and burned alive alongside the mother. Bilkis Yakoob Rasool was five months pregnant when she was gang-raped. Fourteen members of her family, including her three-year-old daughter, were murdered in front of her eyes. The Gujarat government has now granted early release to all eleven of her convicted rapists. A mass grave in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, in which sixty-one bodies — thirty-four of women and twenty-seven of children — are buried. Since February 27, 2002, more than 850 people have been killed in communal violence in the state of Gujarat, most of them Muslims. Unofficial estimates put the death toll as high as 2,000. The attacks against Muslims in Gujarat have been actively supported by state government officials and by the police. Police told Muslims, "We don't have any orders to save you." Photograph: Human Rights Watch A mass grave was discovered in Ahmedabad in January 2004 by a group of medical professionals and forensic specialists. 46 of the 96 bodies were of females. Most of the bodies showed evidence of torture, mutilation, and burning. The female bodies had burns from cigarettes on their bottoms and breasts. Sharp objects had been inserted inside their damaged, cut-open genitalia. b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group The young women and girls who were raped and killed, as well as the male family members who were made to witness it , suffered irreparable mental harm. Parents were forced to watch their children being murdered . A child injured in the 2002 riots sits inside an Ahmedabad mosque after his father took shelter there. Photograph: Reuters Children who survived, the vast majority of whom were orphaned, ha ve been severely harmed and traumatised by the violence . They witnessed the rape, mutilation, murder, and burning of family members. Surviving family members had to fend for themselves in recovering and identifying their loved ones' bodies, which added to their trauma. c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part Gujarat state police stood by and refused to assist Muslims fleeing from Hindu mobs . Muslim NGOs were left with the responsibility to provide relief and rehabilitation. A policeman watches on as fire ravages shops at the entrance to a mosque in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, following an attack by Hindu activists in February 2002. Photograph: AFP The Muslim community of Gujarat experienced the carefully planned destruction of their homes, businesses, and property. d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group Hundreds of Muslim girls and women were raped, mutilated, and burned to death in Gujarat. Many of the women interviewed in relief camps were victims of sexual violence, including rape, gang rape, and insertion of objects into their bodies. International law in cases in the ICTR and other courts recognise that the use of sexualised violence in genocide is a method of preventing births by causing serious physical and mental harm to the women and by knowingly degrading and stigmatising them, rendering women either unable or ineligible to participate voluntarily in the reproductive life of the community. The State's Complicity and Intent Many attacks on Muslims took place within view of police posts and police stations. However, the first police and troops did not arrive where mobs struck before March 1 , three days after the massacres began. The mobs carried the voter lists and lists of all Muslim-owned businesses . According to an Outlook magazine report, attempts to pinpoint the exact location of Muslim businesses began months before the attacks . Politicians at the local and state levels were spotted directing the violent mobs, controlling the police, and organising the distribution of weapons. Gujarat's then-home minister, Haren Pandya, claimed Modi convened a meeting on February 27, 2002, in the aftermath of the Godhra train fire. According to Pandya, Modi instructed the police officers not to interfere with "the Hindu backlash" . Pandya was later assassinated and therefore unable to testify before commissions of inquiry. Similar allegations were made in an affidavit filed in the Supreme Court of India by ex-India Police Service officer Sanjiv Bhatt . According to Bhatt, during his meeting on February 27, 2002, Modi asked police officials to allow Hindus to "vent out their anger" against Muslims. Genocide Watch recommends: The Indian Supreme Court should reverse the Gujarat government's release of 11 rape and murder convicts in the Bilkis Yakoob Rasool case. A fact-finding commission should be appointed by an independent organization such as the International Commission of Jurists or the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal to review the facts about the 2002 Gujarat massacres and determine whether then Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi was complicit in their perpetration.

By Michał Jagielski Senior Iran and Central Asia Team Leader Genocide Watch The conflict between the state of Pakistan and Balochistan has been ongoing since the 1940s. Its nature and intensity have changed throughout the years, as both sides adapt and respond to global and regional developments. However, the immense suffering of the civilian population has been consistent. Even during relatively calm years, the Balochs’ livelihoods were made worse by state initiatives designed to cripple their political proficiency and dilute their culture and identity. Insufficient investments in the province directly impacted their futures and capability for upward social mobility. Outbreaks of violence and armed clashes between the military and the separatists put the civilians in the crossfire. Despite claiming that they act in the best interests of the Baloch, terrorist movements have accepted the civilian toll as a necessary sacrifice in their quest for autonomy. In a similar vein, the state and its security branches have taken extreme steps to combat the spread of Baloch nationalism, threatening, kidnapping, and murdering civilians they suspect of having links to the movement.   The aftermath of an attack that targeted a police station in Quetta, the capital of Balochistan province. Photograph: Reuters Both sides have committed countless atrocities against each other and against the civilians. What began as a struggle for Baloch autonomy has transformed into a prolonged intra-state conflict in which no party has any respect for human rights or international law. The state’s actions throughout its existence have not been designed to address the underlying issues which gave rise to the Baloch nationalist movement. Instead, they have aimed to stifle any form of dissent in favor of absolute centralization.   Islamabad has an inherent responsibility to care for and protect all of its citizens, regardless of their ethnic allegiances. If it truly wants to end the conflict, it has to first rebuild the Balochs’ trust in state institutions and address the abuses it has committed against the community.  Full report: