Moscow’s scramble for valuable resources has come at the cost of regional security. By Colin P. Clarke, the director of research at the Soufan Group and a senior research fellow at the Soufan Center. People fleeing violence in Mali walk through the weekly market in the M'Berra refugee camp in Bassikounou, Mauritania, on June 7, 2022. GUY PETERSON/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES JANUARY 25, 2023, 5:34 PM Speaking before the United Nations Security Council this month, James Kariuki, Britain’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations, warned of the “destabilizing role the Wagner Group plays” in the Sahel, a conflict-ridden stretch of territory spanning western and north-central Africa, from Senegal to Sudan. Speaking of the Kremlin-linked private military contractor, Kariuki concluded, “They are part of the problem, not the solution.” From human rights abuses to a rapacious approach to natural resource extraction, stabilizing countries where it operates—Sudan, Central African Republic, Mali—has never been the Wagner Group’s objective. Instead, the Kremlin’s mercenaries are deployed abroad in a transactional manner, tasked with providing security to kleptocratic regimes in return for access to valuable commodities, including gold, diamonds, uranium, and other precious resources. According to the 2022 Global Terrorism Index, 48 percent of all terrorism deaths worldwide occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, with three of the top 10 countries with the largest increases in terrorism-related deaths located in the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The region also remains awash in weapons, with the proliferation of the smuggling and trafficking of small arms and light weapons further destabilizing the Sahel. Furthermore, in a report released last week, the United Nations said the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali “documented violations of international humanitarian and human rights law allegedly committed during military operations conducted by the Malian armed forces, accompanied by foreign security personnel”—in what was an oblique reference to Wagner. Research that examines best practices and lessons learned from all insurgencies waged between the end of World War II and 2009 suggests that the Wagner Group’s approach in Africa is likely to further destabilize the countries where it operates. Historically, collective and escalating repression against insurgents as well as a singular focus on kinetic operations have failed to quell conflicts and, more often than not, have prolonged them rather than contributing toward their cessation. The Sahel is no exception. There are three primary ways in which Wagner’s presence will directly affect the terrorist threat emanating from the region. First, human rights abuses perpetrated by Wagner Group forces are likely to contribute to grievances among the population, which in turn provide fertile ground for terrorist groups like al Qaeda-linked Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin and the Islamic State Sahel Province to recruit new members, providing much-needed resources to these organizations. In Mali, Wagner’s forces have been accused of mass atrocities, torture, summary executions, and other brutal crimes. Since December 2021, more than 2,000 civilians have been killed in Mali, compared with 500 individuals over the previous year. In the Central African Republic, Wagner has been implicated in instances of forced disappearances, rape, and extrajudicial killings. Since private military contractors will not be held accountable for any of these crimes, as the states where they are operating have weak investigative capabilities and judicial systems that are not independent, the sense of impunity is only likely to incentivize further marauding. Moreover, there is still a gray area regarding where private military contractors fit in terms of accountability and international law, as they are neither civilians nor lawful combatants to conflict. And as Wagner forces suffer significant casualties fighting in Ukraine, reporting suggests that Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner Group, has lowered standards to the point where he is now deliberately recruiting convicts and felons directly from Russian prisons. By adding violent criminals to its ranks, Wagner Group ensures future anomie in areas where its members operate. Second, Wagner’s transactional relationships with Sahelian governments will further delegitimize these regimes in the eyes of the population. Over the past several years, there have been military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad. Legitimate governments maintain a monopoly on the use of violence, enforce the rule of law, and provide basic services to their citizens. Countries where the Wagner Group operates do none of these things, which emboldens terrorists, insurgents, and violent extremists seeking to supplant the government or operate in parallel. Wagner’s assistance comes with no strings attached, so African dictators need not concern themselves with lectures about human rights, anti-corruption initiatives, and good governance. Russian diplomats have interfered and meddled in the politics of the countries where Wagner is deployed. In the Central African Republic, Russian government officials insisted that President Faustin-Archange Touadéra abolish constitutional restrictions on presidential term limits. Wagner-backed disinformation campaigns and influence operations in sub-Saharan Africa also whip up anti-Western sentiment among local populations, further distorting already complex political dynamics. Wagner operatives have even advised dictators on how to run social media campaigns to crush democratic movements. Third, since Wagner mercenaries are only providing security cooperation along purely kinetic lines—eschewing good practices of counterinsurgency training, such as strengthening the rule of law, promoting good governance, and establishing an independent judiciary—any perceived security gains will be fleeting. Accordingly, the Wagner Group’s presence has energized jihadi groups, which have seized and sought to control territory throughout the region. This has given both Islamic State and al Qaeda affiliates greater freedom of maneuver and space to operate. The situation has been exacerbated by the Western pivot from counterterrorism to great-power competition as well as the drawdown and relocation of U.S. and French troops from the region, leaving a power vacuum that the Wagner Group has been eager to fill. The result of more Wagner activity in sub-Saharan Africa will be spillover violence into previously unaffected countries, including Togo, Benin, Senegal, and Ivory Coast. Levels of violence considered beyond the pale will accelerate the movement of internally displaced persons, which can often fuel grievances among the region’s patchwork of ethnic and religious groups. It’s unlikely that Moscow views its involvement in Africa through the lens of long-term security interests. On the contrary, the Wagner Group has acted in a predatory manner, siphoning resources in exchange for security. Once the resources and minerals are depleted, Russia will withdraw, leaving behind a volatile region that could develop into a safe haven and sanctuary for jihadi groups. Washington, Paris, and their allies should reconsider their respective military drawdowns from the Sahel. By ceding ground to the Wagner Group, the West is opening the door for Moscow to consolidate influence in the region while simultaneously making the region more dangerous. Second, Wagner’s transactional relationships with Sahelian governments will further delegitimize these regimes in the eyes of the population. Over the past several years, there have been military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad. Legitimate governments maintain a monopoly on the use of violence, enforce the rule of law, and provide basic services to their citizens. Countries where the Wagner Group operates do none of these things, which emboldens terrorists, insurgents, and violent extremists seeking to supplant the government or operate in parallel. Wagner’s assistance comes with no strings attached, so African dictators need not concern themselves with lectures about human rights, anti-corruption initiatives, and good governance. Russian diplomats have interfered and meddled in the politics of the countries where Wagner is deployed. In the Central African Republic, Russian government officials insisted that President Faustin-Archange Touadéra abolish constitutional restrictions on presidential term limits. Wagner-backed disinformation campaigns and influence operations in sub-Saharan Africa also whip up anti-Western sentiment among local populations, further distorting already complex political dynamics. Wagner operatives have even advised dictators on how to run social media campaigns to crush democratic movements. Third, since Wagner mercenaries are only providing security cooperation along purely kinetic lines—eschewing good practices of counterinsurgency training, such as strengthening the rule of law, promoting good governance, and establishing an independent judiciary—any perceived security gains will be fleeting. Accordingly, the Wagner Group’s presence has energized jihadi groups, which have seized and sought to control territory throughout the region. This has given both Islamic State and al Qaeda affiliates greater freedom of maneuver and space to operate. The situation has been exacerbated by the Western pivot from counterterrorism to great-power competition as well as the drawdown and relocation of U.S. and French troops from the region, leaving a power vacuum that the Wagner Group has been eager to fill. The result of more Wagner activity in sub-Saharan Africa will be spillover violence into previously unaffected countries, including Togo, Benin, Senegal, and Ivory Coast. Levels of violence considered beyond the pale will accelerate the movement of internally displaced persons, which can often fuel grievances among the region’s patchwork of ethnic and religious groups. It’s unlikely that Moscow views its involvement in Africa through the lens of long-term security interests. On the contrary, the Wagner Group has acted in a predatory manner, siphoning resources in exchange for security. Once the resources and minerals are depleted, Russia will withdraw, leaving behind a volatile region that could develop into a safe haven and sanctuary for jihadi groups. Washington, Paris, and their allies should reconsider their respective military drawdowns from the Sahel. By ceding ground to the Wagner Group, the West is opening the door for Moscow to consolidate influence in the region while simultaneously making the region more dangerous. © 2023, GRAHAM DIGITAL HOLDING COMPANY Foreign Policy

Mahmoud Shamrouk /UNITAMS Dr. Volker Perthes, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Sudan and Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) during an interview with UN News. Facebook More than a year after the military coup in Sudan, political parties began talks this month aimed at restoring a civilian-led transition, which the UN has hailed as an important step towards peace and democracy. The coup ended a power-sharing agreement between military and civilian leaders established following the April 2019 overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir, who had ruled for 30 years. “After almost 15 months after the coup of 25 October 2021, returning to the transition path would be a major, major step forward for all Sudanese whether they are civilians or in the military,” said Volker Perthes, the UN Special Representative for Sudan, speaking recently to UN News. Aspirations for peace The talks mark the second and final phase of a political process that began in December with the signing of a Political Framework Agreement for a two-year transition leading to elections. They are being facilitated by the UN, the African Union (AU) and the East African bloc IGAD, together known as the Tripartite Mechanism. In a statement issued following the 8 January launch in the capital, Khartoum, UN Secretary-General António Guterres described the development as “another important step forward towards realizing the aspirations of the Sudanese people for democracy, peace and sustainable development.” Results-oriented discussions Representatives from civil society, academia, the private sector, youth, and women rights groups, as well as traditional and religious leaders, are also taking part in the talks. Five workshops will be held, the first of which focused on a road map for the dismantling of the old regime, said Mr. Perthes, who also heads the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS). “I was able to witness quite a number of sessions, some meetings and workshops, and I was personally impressed by the level of discussions and sincerity with which the Sudanese talked to one another, interacted with one another,” he continued. “It was very result-oriented, and that is important in this context.” Accountability a priority Last month, the envoy briefed the UN Security Council on the framework agreement, saying it could signal a way out of the uncertainty and insecurity sparked by the coup. Some factions have criticized the deal for neglecting issues such as accountability, but Mr. Perthes refuted these claims. “Accountability is being mentioned in the framework agreement, but it is true that it needs to be spelled out further,” he said. “There will be a workshop - probably one of the most important of the five workshops - on transitional justice, which of course is about accountability and how to practice it in a difficult context,” he added. In a better place now With the talks underway, Mr. Perthes was asked about the next steps, expressing hope for the future. “I am more optimistic, much more optimistic than I was a year ago,” he revealed. “I think there is a real chance to get to a political solution, which of course means that a government has to be formed very, very soon.” He also urged the Sudanese people not to lose hope. “We are in a better place than we were a year ago and support those who try to find a solution. No solution is ideal, but having a solution is better than having none.” Copyright © United Nations 2023

Timothy Obiezu January 27, 2023 FILE - Herders graze their livestock in Nigeria's northern state of Kaduna, Nov. 15, 2016. The death toll has risen to 40 from an attack on animal herders on the border between Nigeria's Nassarawa and Benue states, officials said Jan. 26, 2023. ABUJA, NIGERIA — Officials in Nigeria say the death toll from an attack on animal herders has risen to 40. The strike took place Wednesday in Rukubi, a village on the border between Nigeria's Nassarawa and Benue states, a region known for ethnic and religious conflict. Nassarawa state governor Abdullahi Sule has refuted claims that a military jet bombed pastoralists and said Thursday it was an unidentified drone operated from an unknown location that exploded. He said he has deployed security operatives to the area to prevent tensions or reprisals. "I've been on it all night trying to resolve the matter with chief of defense staff, Miyetti Allah, and all the security agencies including our commissioner of police to ensure that we continue to douse the tension that may generate as a result of this," Sule said. Pastoralists were returning from nearby Benue state with hundreds of cattle they had bailed out from officials enforcing an anti-open grazing law when the bomb exploded among them. Sule said 40 people were killed and many others were injured. Many herds were also affected. A Nigerian Air Force spokesperson did not take calls from VOA for comment. However, Nassarawa state police spokesman Nansel Ramham told VOA by phone that authorities are investigating. Farmers and herders in central Nigeria have been clashing over grazing land for decades. Benue and Nassarawa are the most affected. An umbrella group for cattle breeders in Nigeria, the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria, condemned the attack Thursday and asked authorities to capture the perpetrators. Abuja-based Beacon Security analyst Kabiru Adamu said the attacks could be the result of wrong profiling. "Nobody as at date, not the military, not the state governor, Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association, has been able to clarify what type of incendiary attack it was. The media has created this monster called Fulani herdsmen. It's been highlighted by the media to the extend that stigmatization and profiling has occurred," Adamu said. But the Nigerian military has in the past recorded accidental airstrikes on civilians while battling Islamist militants and armed gangs in the northern region. In January 2017, more than 100 people were killed when a military jet hit a camp housing people displaced by jihadist violence in the town of Rann, in northeast Borno state. The military blamed the attack on a lack of appropriate markings of the area. Last year, an arms trade between the United States and the Nigerian government was stalled due to concerns about extrajudicial killings. Adamu said authorities should be more proactive. "By now I expect that the National Assembly would have set up a committee to look at this latest incident in Doma, identify what went wrong and introduce measures to prevent a reoccurrence," Adamu said. "It could have been mistaken identity or poor intelligence that may have suggested the movement was by bandits." Security is a significant challenge and a major issue as Nigeria prepares for presidential and parliamentary polls next month. Voice of America

WUC claimed UK unlawfully failed or refused to investigate cotton imports from Xinjiang Haroon Siddique Legal affairs correspondent Lawyers and representatives from the World Uyghur Congress and members of the Uyghur community in the UK standing outside the high court in London last October. Photograph: Tom Pilgrim/PA The World Uyghur Congress has said it is disappointed to have lost a legal challenge against UK authorities for not launching a criminal investigation into the importation of cotton products manufactured by forced labour in China’s Xinjiang province but would continue to fight for accountability. The WUC took the home secretary, HM Revenue and Customs and the National Crime Agency (NCA), to the high court, claiming an unlawful failure or refusal to investigate imports from Xinjiang, allegedly home to 380 internment camps used to detain Uyghurs and people from other Muslim minorities. It said 85% of Chinese cotton was grown in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and the “vast majority” was manufactured in facilities under “conditions of detention and forced labour”, implicating UK companies that imported from certain Chinese firms. However, on Friday, Mr Justice Dove ruled against the WUC. He accepted the government’s argument that the WUC had not proved that a specific consignment of cotton imported into the UK was the product of unlawful conduct. In his written judgment, the judge further said that for UK companies to be prosecuted under the Proceeds of Crime Act, it would have to be shown that “the consignment had been purchased for significantly less than its value”. Dolkun Isa, of the WUC, said: “This is a greatly disappointing outcome for the Uyghur community that has been seeking accountability for years. However, this is only the beginning of such a process, with this case being the first [brought by Uyghurs concerning repression] in a foreign court. Our legal team has worked hard on this, and together we will continue to hold the Chinese government accountable.’’ Global Legal Action Network (GLAN), which supported the WUC in its claim, said it was considering appealing against the judgment. It said the government’s position made the UK an international outlier and a safe haven for importers of goods produced as a result of crimes against humanity, and genocide. In the US, legislation came into effect last year assuming that any product partly or wholly made in Xinjiang, north-west China, is linked to the region’s labour camps. Gearóid Ó Cuinn, the director of GLAN, said: “The whole purpose of the Proceeds of Crime Act is to ensure that crime doesn’t pay. This judgment sends a message to the Uyghur victims that as long as UK companies pay market value for slave labour cotton, the UK government and courts will not intervene.” Defending the case, the government argued that the claimant had only provided evidence “of a chance that a crime had been committed”, without any of the necessary details to warrant a criminal investigation. It stressed that it considered China’s treatment of Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang to be “appalling”, a point reinforced by Dove in his written judgment. He said: “The outcome of the case does not in any way undermine the striking consensus in the evidence that there are clear and widespread abuses in the cotton industry in the XUAR, involving human rights violations and the exploitation of forced labour.” He added that there may be other tools or resources available to the government and law enforcement agencies or evidence that could be provided to them “which could provide an effective basis for tackling the concerns in respect of cotton production in the XUAR and the exploitation and abuse of the Uyghur people with which it has been associated”. © 2023 Guardian News & Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved. (modern)

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is still reverberating around the world—and setting the stage for more large-scale violence to come JANUARY 1, 2023, 7:00 AM By Comfort Ero, the president and CEO of the International Crisis Group, and Richard Atwood, executive vice president of the International Crisis Group. Ukrainian soldiers fire toward Russian positions in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine on June 15, 2022. ARIS MESSINIS/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES Will he, or won’t he? This time last year, that was the question. Russian President Vladimir Putin had massed almost two hundred thousand troops on Ukraine’s borders. U.S. intelligence warned that Russia was preparing for all-out war. All the signs pointed to an assault, bar one: It seemed unthinkable. True, Russia had attacked Ukraine in 2014, and in the spring of 2021 had staged a dress rehearsal for an invasion, building up forces on the frontier before sending them home. Putin seemed ever angrier at Kyiv’s refusal to bow to his will. He openly derided Ukrainian national identity and sovereignty. Still, it was shocking, when Russian forces did roll in, that a nuclear-armed power in 2022 would seek to conquer a neighbor in an act of unprovoked aggression. Beyond the devastation in Ukraine, the war has cast a long shadow over global affairs. For Russia, so far it has been disastrous. An offensive that was supposed to subjugate Ukraine, weaken the West, and strengthen the Kremlin has, up to now, done the opposite. It has turbo-charged Ukrainian nationalism and pushed Kyiv closer to Europe. It has breathed new purpose into a previously adrift NATO. Finland and Sweden joining the alliance, which seems on track, will dramatically shift the balance of force in Northern Europe, more than doubling the length of Russia’s borders with NATO states. The war has laid bare weaknesses in Russia’s military that operations in Syria (2015) and Ukraine (2014 and 2015) had disguised. It has revealed resolve and competence in the West that fiascoes in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya had obscured (though admittedly things might have been different had the United States been under other leadership). Still, the war is far from over. Russia’s economy has adapted to massive Western sanctions. The Kremlin appears convinced that Russia has staying power. Moscow might yet force an ugly settlement and set a troubling precedent for aggression elsewhere. If, on the other hand, Putin feels truly in peril, due to Ukrainian advances or other reasons, it is not impossible—unlikely but hard to completely rule out—that he will use a nuclear weapon as a last roll of the dice. Whatever happens in Ukraine, the West and Russia will likely remain a miscalculation away from confrontation. For China, the war has been mostly a headache. Despite Chinese President Xi Jinping’s public embrace of Putin and continued trade between the two countries that has helped Russia weather sanctions, Beijing’s material support has been lackluster. Xi has not sent weapons. He appears disturbed by Putin’s travails and nuclear bluster. Beijing does not want to undercut Moscow and is unlikely to compel Putin to reach a settlement. But neither does it wish to provoke Western capitals by abetting the invasion. It watches warily as U.S. allies in Asia bolster defenses and seem even keener to keep Washington around, even as they still want access to Chinese markets. The war has heightened fears of a Chinese assault on Taiwan. But an invasion that seemed too risky for Beijing in the near term even before the war seems—at least for now—even less likely. The massive sanctions imposed on Russia are not lost on China. Nor are Moscow’s battlefield failures. As for the relationship between the United States and China, which will dominate the coming decades, the Russia-Ukraine war has not changed the fundamentals. U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August visit to Taiwan riled Beijing, but the meeting three months later between U.S. President Joe Biden and Xi promised a resumption of dialogue. Competition is still baked into the two countries’ foreign policies, however. Chinese designs upon Taiwan aren’t going anywhere. Though the world’s two biggest economies remain entwined, technological decoupling is underway. The war has shone light on non-Western middle powers’ influence and autonomy. Turkey, long walking a tightrope between NATO membership and ties to Moscow, has brokered, with the United Nations, a deal to get Ukrainian grain onto global markets via the Black Sea. The initiative follows years of Turkish assertiveness abroad, including tipping the battlefield balance in Libya and the South Caucasus and expanding drone sales. For Saudi Arabia, the abrupt removal of Russian oil from the market was a boon. It forced a visit from Biden, who had entered office promising to shun Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Riyadh decided, with other oil producers, to keep prices high, much to Washington’s fury. India, at once a U.S. security partner and major purchaser of Russian arms, has both bought knock-off Russian oil and chided Putin for his nuclear saber rattling. This is no coordinated nonaligned movement. But activist middle powers feel space to chart their own course and, while few welcome big-power rivalry, will seize the opportunities that multipolarity brings. Elsewhere in the global south, the war exposed raw nerves. Most non-Western capitals joined in U.N. General Assembly votes against Russia’s aggression. But few have condemned Putin publicly or imposed sanctions. Many have reason—trade, mostly, but also historical ties or reliance on Kremlin-linked Wagner Group mercenaries—not to break with Moscow. They see picking a side or incurring costs for a war many believe is Europe’s problem as against their interests. Frustration with the West plays a role, too, whether over COVID-19 vaccine hoarding, migration policy, or climate injustice. Many see a double standard in outrage over Ukraine given the West’s interventions elsewhere and colonial record. Many global south leaders also believe, particularly when it comes to sanctions, that Western governments have put fighting Russia over the global economy. Indeed, outside Europe, the war’s biggest ramifications are economic. Financial jitters triggered by the invasion and announcement of sanctions roiled markets that COVID-19 had already shaken. Food and fuel commodity prices shot up, sparking a cost-of-living crisis. Though prices have since come down, inflation remains rampant, magnifying debt problems. The pandemic and economic crisis are two among several mutually reinforcing threats, notably also including climate change and food insecurity, that can beset vulnerable countries and fuel unrest. On this year’s list, Pakistan is a prime example. Many countries are in similar boats. Did 2022 give any cause for optimism for the year ahead? Given Ukraine’s anguish, finding good in the war might seem perverse. But had Kyiv put up less of a fight, had the West been less united than it was under Biden’s leadership, and had Russia quickly prevailed, Europe, and arguably the world, would be in a more dangerous place. Nor was Putin the only strongman who had a bad year. Several populists whose politics had recently sown much discord also lost out. Jair Bolsonaro was defeated in Brazil. Former U.S. President Donald Trump appears, for now, a diminished figure. Marine Le Pen failed to win the French presidency. In Italy, where populists did win power, they mostly tacked center once in office. Far-right populism is not a spent force, but some of its champions suffered setbacks. Plus, multilateral diplomacy largely muddled through. Notwithstanding their bitter differences, China, Russia, and Western powers still mostly saw the U.N. Security Council as a venue to manage crises outside Ukraine. A deal that could end Ethiopia’s horrific war and warmer Colombia-Venezuela ties show that peacemaking elsewhere can trundle along despite conflict in Europe. Overall, though, it was an unsettling year, all the more so given that it’s the latest in a string of them. The pandemic upended much of the globe. An angry mob stormed the U.S. Capitol. Temperatures in parts of the world threaten human survival. Now, a major war rages in Europe, its architect invokes nuclear escalation, and several poor countries face debt crises, hunger, and extreme weather. None of these events arrived without warning, yet a few years ago they would have boggled the mind. They also come as the number of people killed in conflicts is ticking up and more people are displaced or hungry, many due to war, than at any time since World War II. So, will 2023 see major powers go to war or break a nearly 80-year nuclear taboo? Will political crises, economic hardship, and climate breakdown cause social meltdown in not just individual countries but a swath of the world? Worst-case answers to this year’s big questions seem far-fetched. But after the past few years, it would be complacent to dismiss the unthinkable. Ukraine Thus far, Ukraine has resisted Russia’s assault, thanks to Ukrainians’ valor and Western aid. But after nearly a year of fighting, there’s no end in sight.When the Kremlin launched its all-out invasion in February, it seemingly expected to rout Ukraine’s government and install a more pliant regime. It miscalculated. Ukraine’s resistance was as fierce as Russia’s planning was inept. Driven back from around Kyiv in the spring, Moscow concentrated forces in the east and south. Then, in late summer, Ukrainian troops, now armed with more powerful Western-supplied weapons, advanced there, too. Yet Moscow has upped the ante. It mobilized perhaps 300,000 additional men, although data is unreliable. At least as many Russians fled the country and shortages of personnel and gear still plague the army. The Kremlin also announced the annexation of parts of Ukraine, including territory it does not control. It began a punishing campaign of airstrikes on Ukrainian infrastructure. The resulting power outages have rendered many areas nearly unlivable. As many as one in three Ukrainians have been displaced over the past year. Thus far, little suggests either Kyiv or Moscow will back down. Ukrainians see each new attack and revelation of Russian abuses (including summary executions and sexual abuse) as more reason to fight. In Russia, propaganda and oppression deter opposition. Neither side shows genuine appetite for peace talks. Ukrainians are understandably loath to give up land when they’ve been winning it back. Moscow, despite saying it is open to diplomacy, still demands that Kyiv capitulate, scorning the Ukrainian government as Nazis controlled by a degenerate West. By escalating after each setback, Putin seems to be blowing up his own off-ramps. Stalemate is setting in, though how long it will last is anyone’s guess. Dug in, both sides probe for openings to inch forward. A new attack on central Ukraine from Belarus, though much hyped, seems improbable given low odds of success. Moscow hopes that winter cold and high gas prices, brought about by Western boycotts of Russian hydrocarbons, will sour Europeans on supporting Ukraine. But Western unity thus far shows few cracks. Many European capitals believe Ukraine’s defeat, in emboldening Moscow, would endanger them. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to Washington at the end of 2022 confirmed bipartisan support there, despite grousing from the Republican Party’s right flank. As for the truly cataclysmic scenario—a potentially nuclear escalation between NATO and Russia—both Moscow and Western capitals have taken pains to avoid direct clashes. The West has rejected ideas of no-fly zones, for example, and drawn a line at supplying some advanced weaponry. Russia has avoided strikes on NATO territory. Putin has repeatedly referenced Russia’s nuclear capacity, seemingly aiming to warn off the West, though has recently walked back his rhetoric. A nuclear strike would serve little military purpose and could trigger precisely the direct NATO involvement Moscow hopes to avoid. Still, the possibility cannot be dismissed, particularly if Putin feels his grip on power slipping. Indeed, the war has created probably the highest risk of nuclear confrontation in 60 years. It also sets the stage for what could be a long standoff, with Europe poised for ever-more dangerous showdowns, whatever happens in Ukraine. Certainly, Western leaders should keep the door open to a settlement by making clear to the Kremlin the benefits, particularly in sanctions relief, that would follow a deal Ukraine can live with. For now, though, they judge that, for all the war’s horrors, backing Ukraine, even at some risk of nuclear escalation, is better than allowing Russia to prevail through a brutal military campaign and nuclear menacing. That’s a tough calculation to make; to some degree, it disconcerts other parts of the world. Thus far, though, it’s the right one. Armenia and Azerbaijan If Russia’s war in Ukraine has reverberated across crises worldwide, its impact has been especially acute in the South Caucasus. Two years after their latest war over Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan appear headed toward another confrontation. Russia’s travails in Ukraine have upset calculations in the region. A new war would be shorter but no less dramatic than the six-week conflict in 2020. That war, which killed more than 7,000 soldiers, saw Azerbaijani forces rout Armenians from parts of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and nearby areas, all of which had been held by Armenian forces since the early 1990s. Moscow eventually brokered a cease-fire. Since then, the balance has shifted further in Azerbaijan’s favor. The Armenian army has not replenished its troops or weapons, as Russia, its traditional arms broker, is short on supplies. Azerbaijan, by contrast, has been ramping up. Its army outmatches Armenia’s several time over, is far better equipped, and is backed by Turkey. Heightened European demand for Azerbaijani gas has also emboldened Baku. Russia’s travails in Ukraine matter in other ways, too. As part of the 2020 cease-fire, Russian peacekeepers deployed to areas of Nagorno-Karabakh still settled by Armenians. Russia has beefed up its border guards and military personnel along parts of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border that, since the war, have become new front lines. The idea was that the contingents, though small, would deter attacks because Baku would be wary of needling Moscow. But Russian forces haven’t stopped several flare-ups this past year. Azerbaijani troops in March and August captured more territory in Nagorno-Karabakh, including strategic mountain positions. In September, Azerbaijani forces seized territory inside Armenia proper. Each bout of attacks was progressively bloodier. The war in Ukraine has also overshadowed peace talks. Moscow has historically tended to lead peacemaking efforts over Nagorno-Karabakh. The 2020 cease-fire was supposed to open up trade in the region, including by reestablishing a direct route through Armenia from Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhchivan on the Iranian border. Improving trade would pave the way to compromise on the thorny question of Nagorno-Karabakh’s future. (After the 2020 war, Yerevan dropped its decades-long demand for a special status for Nagorno-Karabakh, but it still wants special rights and security guarantees for Armenians living there; Baku argues that local Armenians can enjoy rights like any Azerbaijani citizens.) In late 2021, Moscow accepted new European Union-led mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, hoping that it would reinforce Russia’s peacemaking, which had been making little headway. Since the war in Ukraine began, however, Moscow views the EU’s diplomacy as part of wider efforts to curb Russia’s influence. Despite attempts by Western capitals, the Kremlin refuses to engage. As a result, there are two draft agreements floating around—one prepared by Russia and another Armenia and Azerbaijan themselves have developed with Western backing (many sections of which have contrasting text proposed by the two sides). Each draft tackles trade and stabilization of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, with the fate of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh left to a separate and so far uninitiated process. The bilateral track supported by the West is probably more promising, in part because it’s homegrown, though how Moscow would respond if it yielded an agreement is unclear. In any case, the two sides are far apart. Baku holds all the cards, and it would gain more from a deal, notably in terms of trade and foreign relations, than it would militarily. The danger is that the talks go nowhere or another flare-up sinks both the Moscow-led and West-backed tracks and Azerbaijan takes what it can by force. Iran Massive anti-regime protests, Iran’s merciless crackdown, and its supply of weapons to Russia have left the Islamic Republic more isolated than at any point in decades just as a crisis over its nuclear program is brewing. The protests rocking the country have posed the most durable and determined threat to the Islamic Republic’s authority since the 2009 Green Movement. Tens of thousands of mostly young people, fronted by women and schoolgirls who reject the compulsory hijab as a symbol of misogyny and broader oppression, have taken to the streets in acts of raw defiance against the regime. The Iranian government has killed hundreds of people in response, including dozens of children. Formal executions of protesters have followed trials that human rights groups regard as shams. Thousands are in jail, many subject to horrific torture. The regime paints what is an emphatic grassroots expression of popular anti-government sentiment, particularly among youth and in long-neglected peripheries, as a foreign plot. Few buy it. The challenge for Iran’s heroic young protesters is to win over older middle-class Iranians, many of whom sympathize but fear the regime’s violence or radical change. More of them might join were the protests to reach a critical mass, but without their joining, that seems unlikely to happen—at least not unless another trigger tips the balance or leaders emerge from among the protesters. Nothing, as yet, suggests the regime will splinter. But nor can a crackdown quell deep societal anger. Something has broken. The regime can’t turn the clock back. Meanwhile, talks to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, stalled since early September, are now in deep freeze. Tehran’s nuclear capability has advanced leaps and bounds over the past few years. Its uranium enrichment capacity has expanded, and its breakout time is down to almost nil. Monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency is severely curtailed. The moment the United States and its allies have long hoped to avoid—when they must choose between the possibility of Iran acquiring a nuclear bomb or using force to prevent that happening—seems to be coming into view. Even if they can muddle through for some months, October 2023, when U.N. restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missiles lapse, is a flash point. Viewing those restrictions as crucial to containing Iran’s proliferation of missiles and drones, especially to help Russia in Ukraine, Western leaders’ only option for stopping them from expiring is to snap back U.N. sanctions. That will likely prompt Iran to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—a potential casus belli for the United States and Israel. Any strike by them on Iran’s nuclear program would risk setting off a tit-for-tat escalation across the region. With Iran furious at Saudi Arabia for its support for satellite channels that Tehran blames for fueling protests to a multifaceted confrontation between Iran and Israel that could heat up with Israel’s new far-right government, risks abound. In this light, keeping the door open to diplomacy makes sense. Western capitals—revulsed by the Islamic Republic’s repression at home, incensed by its arms supplies to Russia, and under pressure from vocal domestic constituencies that savage anyone who recommends talks—understandably worry that engaging Tehran could throw the regime a lifeline. Thus far, however, they have opted not to totally sever contacts—partly because some need to negotiate hostage releases but mostly with the nuclear threat in mind. Given today’s poisonous relations, prospects for talks to defuse the nuclear crisis appear dim. But at least gaining an understanding over each other’s red lines could help keep a lid on tensions until there is more space for de-escalation and substantive diplomatic engagement. It’s hard to see protesters gaining were the nuclear crisis to come to a head; more likely, the embattled regime could change the subject at home and exert an even tighter grip. Yemen Yemen is in limbo. A truce in April between Houthi rebels and the country’s internationally recognized government, backed primarily by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, lapsed in October. Major fighting has not resumed, but both sides are preparing to go back to war. The U.N.-brokered truce was an unexpected bright spot in a brutal eight-year conflict. In November 2021, Houthis, who control much of Yemen’s northwest, seemed to be nearing victory. Had they taken the city of Marib and nearby oil and gas facilities, that would have won them the war for the north, bought their quasi-state badly needed funds, and spelled the end for then-President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s government. Their offensive was averted when UAE-affiliated forces pushed the Houthis out of strategic territory in Marib and neighboring Shabwah in January 2022. The Houthis responded with cross-border missile and drone strikes on the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Then the Ukraine war prompted global food and fuel shortages that placed new pressures on all parties. The resulting stalemate created space for mediation. In early April, the U.N. announced a two-month truce between Hadi’s government and the Houthis. Riyadh, increasingly disillusioned with the war, backed the deal. Several days later, Hadi resigned. He was replaced by an eight-man presidential leadership council (PLC), handpicked by the Saudis and Emiratis, which is more representative of the coalition of Yemeni factions fighting the Houthis and, almost as often, each other. Initial hopes that a broader settlement would follow have dimmed. After two extensions, U.N.-led negotiations over an expanded truce collapsed in early October, scuttled by the Houthis’ demand that the government pay rebel military and security force salaries. (According to sources on both sides and in the United Nations, the government and Saudis had agreed to pay civilian salaries but drew the line at covering the cost of forces fighting against them on the ground.) Fighting is mostly on hold even without the truce. Major ground offensives and cross-border attacks have not resumed, and talks continue, mostly now through bilateral Saudi-Houthi channels. But tensions are rising. The Houthis have launched what they call warning shots at PLC-controlled oil and gas infrastructure, leading to a halt in oil exports. They say oil sales can resume when they and their forces are paid their share of revenues. In retaliation, the government sought to halt fuel imports into the Houthi-controlled Red Sea port of Hodeidah, but Riyadh stopped it. Both sides are reportedly building up forces and military equipment around key front lines. The risk of renewed war is uncomfortably high. Some within the Houthi camp lean toward another offensive, though for now, while probably stronger than their rivals, the Houthis are starved of funds and their forces are weakened. Alternatively, they might strike a deal with the Saudis on salary payments, extend the truce, and use the money and time to regroup. Some Houthi leaders hope for a wider agreement with Riyadh that entails a Saudi exit from the conflict and cements the Houthis’ status as Yemen’s dominant force. But such an arrangement, by ignoring the interests of many anti-Houthi factions that already chafe at being left out of bilateral talks, would likely plunge Yemen into a new phase of war. Even with the Saudis out, it seems unlikely that the Houthis could easily overrun all of Yemen, as the Taliban did in Afghanistan. Better would be an extended truce that paves the way to intra-Yemeni talks. A genuine settlement has to meet all major Yemeni factions’ requirements and probably requires U.N. mediation. But with the Houthis sensing that they get more through intransigence and with Iran, the one outside actor with some influence over the group, in no mood to help, such a settlement is perhaps the least likely scenario. Ethiopia One of 2022’s deadliest wars, in and around Ethiopia’s Tigray region, has for now ground to a halt. Two of the main belligerents—Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which dominated Ethiopian politics for decades before Abiy assumed power in 2018 and then fell out with him—signed a deal on Nov. 2 in Pretoria, South Africa, and, 10 days later, a follow-up agreement in Nairobi. But the calm is fragile. Key questions remain unsettled, notably whether Tigray’s forces will disarm and whether Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, whose army has been fighting alongside Ethiopian troops, will withdraw his troops to the internationally recognized border. Hostilities broke out in late 2020 when Tigray’s forces seized a series of national military bases in the region, claiming to be preempting a federal intervention. Over two years of fighting, the advantage tipped back and forth. A March 2022 truce offered some respite. In late August, it broke down, and full-fledged war resumed. Federal, Amhara, and Eritrean forces again overwhelmed Tigray’s defenses. The toll has been staggering. Researchers at Belgium’s Ghent University estimate that, as of August 2022, 385,000 to 600,000 civilians had died of war-related causes. Sources from both sides say hundreds of thousands of combatants have died in fighting since the start of the August offensive. All parties stand accused of atrocities, with Eritrean forces leaving a trail of particularly cruel devastation. Sexual violence has been rampant, seemingly used strategically to humiliate and terrorize civilians. For most of the war, Addis Ababa blockaded Tigray, cutting off electricity, telecommunications, and banking and constricting food, medicine, and other supplies. The Pretoria agreement was a victory for Abiy. Tigray’s leaders conceded to restoring federal rule and disarming within a month. Addis Ababa said it would lift both the blockade and a terrorism designation on the TPLF. In Nairobi, Abiy’s commanders appeared to offer a more flexible timeline for disarmament, agreeing that Tigrayan forces would give up heavy weapons as Eritrean and Amhara regional fighters withdraw. Since then, the truce has held. Aid has surged, and federal authorities have reconnected Mekelle, the Tigrayan capital, to electricity. But plenty could go wrong. A dispute over Western Tigray’s fertile borderlands, which Amharas call Welkait and claim as their own, is especially thorny. The Eritreans, for their part, have not yet pulled out, though reports suggest some of their troops have begun withdrawing. Nor have Tigrayans handed over weapons. The parties need to coordinate a delicate sequencing, lest each side blame the other for delays. It’s Abiy’s battlefield ally, Isaias, who could end up his biggest headache. In 2018, Abiy’s peace deal with Isaias ended decades of hostility between the two countries, even if to some degree it also paved the way for the joint Ethiopia-Eritrea offensive against Tigray. Abiy has come out on top in his struggle with the TPLF. But despite all the bad blood, he probably needs some form of accommodation with Tigray’s leaders to avoid sowing the seeds of another insurgency. His government needs to determine the TPLF’s role in any interim regional administration and whether to permit some Tigrayan soldiers to become regional forces or reenter the federal army. Whether the Ethiopian prime minister recognizes the need for magnanimity is unclear. Equally critical, though, is whether, if he does, he can sell that to Isaias, who joined the war hoping to kill off his archenemy, the TPLF. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes M23, a previously dormant rebel group, which U.N. reports suggest is backed by Rwanda, is wreaking havoc in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Fighting has driven tens of thousands of people from their homes and could spiral into a wider regional proxy war. M23 holds several towns and surrounds the provincial capital of Goma. In 2013, the group was beaten back by a ramped-up United Nations force but now appears well-armed and organized. It includes ex-Congolese soldiers, many of whom are Tutsis, an ethnic group spread across Africa’s Great Lakes region, and professes to champion communal interests. M23’s sudden reemergence owes as much to tensions among Great Lakes states as it does to local dynamics. The Congolese government had been trying to reassert its authority in the troubled east, home to dozens of rebel groups, including some from neighboring countries. In late 2021, Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi invited in Ugandan troops to fight the Allied Democratic Forces, a mostly Ugandan group that declares itself part of the Islamic State. The Congolese president appears to have quietly approved Burundian operations on Congolese soil, too. That irked Rwandan President Paul Kagame. He saw his neighbors’ presence as potentially depriving Rwanda of influence in eastern Congo, where it has economic interests, like Burundi and Uganda, and has long fought insurgents of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (known by the French acronym FDLR), a remnant of the Hutu militia responsible for the 1994 genocide. Tshisekedi accuses Kagame of backing M23 as a way to extract Congolese resources. U.N. experts also point to Rwandan support for the rebels, with one leaked U.N. report in December 2022 saying there was “substantial evidence” that the Rwandan army directly intervened in Congo’s fight against M23 and backed the group with weapons, ammunition, and uniforms. Kigali rejects the allegations. In turn, it accuses the Congolese army of working with the FDLR (which Tshisekedi denies, though U.N. reporting also largely confirms). An added complication is Congo’s general election in 2023. The vote could mark for the country another step away from its disastrous civil wars two decades ago. But suspended registration or voting in the east due to violence would cast a shadow over the results. Tshisekedi might also want to turn up the anti-Rwanda rhetoric when campaigning, which would endanger minorities that some Congolese already paint as M23 supporters. An East African military mission—minus Rwanda, whose contingents Kinshasa rejected—has a mandate to restore calm to eastern Congo. The U.N. has a 14,000-strong peacekeeping force, with many housed in Goma, but it appears reluctant to take on insurgents and is deeply unpopular among many Congolese. Instead, Kenya, as part of the regional force, has the unenviable task of taking the fight to M23. Long-suffering locals have high hopes that Kenyan troops can beat back rebels, but Kenya sensibly views the goal more as securing Goma and its surrounding main roads and pushing M23 into a cease-fire. The group might then rejoin peace talks between the Congolese government and dozens of eastern armed groups from which it had been expelled due to the fighting. Getting Rwanda on board will be crucial, given its influence on M23 leaders. The best shot to achieve that lies in concerted diplomacy by East African leaders aimed at repairing relations between Kagame and Tshisekedi, which has shown some initial signs of progress, alongside efforts to curb collaboration between the Congolese military and the FDLR. The East African force is an opportunity, in other words, to make space for diplomacy as much as it is to fight M23. If that diplomacy fails, Kenyan troops could get bogged down in eastern Congo’s treacherous terrain. Already, the deployment of so many neighbors’ forces in eastern Congo runs the risk of a return to the proxy wars that tore the region apart in the 1990s and 2000s. The Sahel Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger show no signs of beating back stubborn Islamist insurgencies. Western leaders, whose military involvement over the past decade has done little to stem violence, seem at a loss at how to respond to coups in Burkina Faso and Mali. Burkina Faso is in the direst straits. Jihadi groups control an estimated 40 percent of its territory, including vast rural areas in the north and east. Militants have laid siege to a major northern town, Djibo, for months. Fighting has killed thousands of people and driven nearly 2 million from their homes. As the losses mount, so does finger-pointing within the army. Two coups this past year, both triggered by massacres of troops by militants, have seen a lieutenant colonel, Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, seize power in January, only to be ousted in September by a previously unknown captain, Ibrahim Traoré. Traoré himself is struggling to unify divided security forces. He may follow the lead of his Malian counterparts by playing to populist sentiment, criticizing France, and drawing closer to Russia. Most worryingly, Traoré is recruiting volunteers to battle jihadis, which could send ethnic bloodshed spiraling. Mali suffered two coups of its own, in 2020 and 2021. The state is virtually absent in the far north. There, Islamic State- and al Qaeda-linked militants fight one another and battle non-jihadi rebels, who are predominantly Tuareg, a community that spans much of the Sahel. Tuareg rebels inked a deal with Bamako in 2015, hoping to win army positions and devolution. But now, feeling abandoned, some rebels may see benefit in again uniting with jihadis. (Al Qaeda-linked militants joined and then usurped a Tuareg-dominated separatist rebellion that captured northern Mali about a decade ago.) Farther south, in central Mali, fighting that pits Malian forces and Russian Wagner Group mercenaries against militants seems stalemated and marked by both sides’ rampant human rights abuses. Niger is in better shape, though there are worrying signs there, too. The government has either integrated civilian militias into the security forces or refused to arm them. Its readiness to engage jihadi groups may also have contributed to a lull in violence. Still, President Mohamed Bazoum survived a coup attempt in March 2021, and subsequent arrests, including among high-ranking officers, may have fueled hostility within the army. Jihadis have entered parks and forests along the Burkina Faso and Benin borders, drawing closer to the capital, Niamey. Outside involvement in the Sahel is evolving fast. France, which intervened to oust militants from northern Mali in 2013, has ended its operations in that country, given fraught ties with Bamako, though it retains bases in Niger. A U.N. mission, in Mali since April 2013, has also struggled to make headway. The West now seems most concerned with preventing jihadis from spreading southward to the Gulf of Guinea. Regionwide anger against the French is rising, thanks in large part to a decade of Western failures to check militants’ advances but also to Russian disinformation. Wagner’s brutal guns for hire are hardly likely to do better, but many locals chafe at criticism of the Russian group given the West’s legacy. Most vital at a moment of inflection for the region is that leaders rethink what has been a predominantly military-centric approach to tackling Islamists. Military operations play a role but must be subservient to efforts to mend intercommunal relations, win over people in the hinterlands, and potentially even talk to militant leaders. Western governments should feel chastened by their record over the past decade. But as some Sahelian leaders turn to Moscow, it would be a mistake to cut ties and try to force them to pick sides. Haiti Since the murder of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, Haiti has been paralyzed by political gridlock and rampant gang violence. Public services have collapsed and cholera is spreading. Things are so bad that some Haitians now pin their hopes on foreign troops, despite the dismal legacy of earlier interventions in Haiti. Ariel Henry, Haiti’s interim prime minister who took over from Moïse, enjoys support from influential foreign powers but faces stiff Haitian resistance. Since he assumed power, Henry’s rule has been opposed by the Montana Accord, a group of opposition politicians and civil society representatives. Henry was supposed to steer a transition to elections, but rampant insecurity has prevented a vote, and Henry also disbanded the election commission. Hundreds of gangs control more than half of the country. They suffocate the capital, Port-au-Prince, by blocking roads and imposing a reign of terror, including using rape to punish and intimidate people, sometimes targeting children as young as 10. The biggest coalition, the G9, is headed by notorious gang leader Jimmy “Barbeque” Chérizier. Haiti’s gangs have existed for decades, often with ties to politicians. But their power has ballooned since Moïse’s murder. Things have come to a head over the past six months. In July, battles between the G9 and another gang over Cité Soleil, a slum near Port-au-Prince, killed more than 200 people in a little over a week. Two months later, Henry lifted fuel subsidies, sending prices spiraling and causing mass protests, which gang members joined. The G9 then seized a major oil terminal, leaving almost the entire country with shortages of fuel, which has, among other things, disrupted access to clean drinking water. Chérizier said he would only give the terminal back once Henry stepped down, though Haitian police forces were able to recapture it some months later. The result has been humanitarian catastrophe. Half the population, 4.7 million people, faces acute hunger, and almost 20,000 are thought to be at risk of starving. Aid workers’ struggles to reach health clinics combined with clean water shortages have given rise to resurgent cholera. A recent World Health Organization report said there were more than 13,000 cases between early October and early December, with 283 recorded deaths—but these are likely huge underestimates. Faced with these challenges, Henry in October called for foreign military support. Any such mission will have its work cut out fighting gangs of young men and children embedded in densely populated urban areas. There’s political opposition, too: The Montana group largely opposes any mission, believing the interim prime minister will use it to prop up his rule. Many other Haitians are wary, given the island’s subjugation by outside powers and the troubled record of previous foreign deployments. Yet an increasing number of people, especially in areas that suffer the worst gang violence, have expressed support out of sheer desperation. U.S. and Canadian sanctions on several sitting and former top politicians, alongside Chérizier, have sent shockwaves through Haitian elites and might give them some pause to think about future ties to gangs. But few foreign countries are champing at the bit to deploy troops. That said, if Henry and his rivals were to agree on the role of such a mission and on a transitional road map, foreign forces could be Haiti’s best hope. Even their arrival and the threat of operations might lead gangs to abandon main roads and loosen their chokehold on the capital. Pakistan Pakistan is entering an election year with a deeply divided body politic, as former Prime Minister Imran Khan whips up populist support against the government and the all-powerful military. Khan’s exit from office last spring came alongside his fall from the Pakistan Army’s grace. Having won office backed by the top brass, relations deteriorated due to Khan’s inept rule, fiery anti-U.S. rhetoric, and attempts to plant loyalists in top army positions. As support for a no-confidence vote grew, Khan claimed that Washington was behind a plot to oust him. Army chief Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa rejected the conspiracy, concerned about the impact it might have on relations with the United States, and rebuffed Khan’s last-ditch effort to win him over with an indefinite extension as chief. In April, Khan was ousted. A coalition government headed by Shehbaz Sharif took over. Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party then quit Parliament and took to the streets. Countrywide, violent protests intensified when Sharif’s government rejected Khan’s demand for snap polls. His supporters also slammed the top brass, particularly Bajwa. Anti-Western rhetoric has whipped up anger among a receptive public. Khan’s claims that Sharif is mismanaging the economy also strike a chord as living costs rise. On Nov. 3, during a weekslong anti-government march on the capital, Islamabad, Khan was shot and wounded. The would-be assassin, apprehended on the spot, insists he acted alone. But Khan accuses Sharif, a cabinet minister, and a senior military intelligence official of conspiring to murder him. All this bodes poorly for elections, due before October 2023. Already the main contenders disagree on the rules of the game, with Khan accusing top election officials of backing Sharif’s government. He looks set to reject the outcome if his party loses. Now under new command, the military has vowed to stay out of the political fray. But the generals may find it hard to stand by if things fall apart or head in a direction they perceive as threatening. Another political crisis is the last thing Pakistan needs atop many other challenges. In 2022, devastating floods submerged a third of the country, affecting 1 in 7 Pakistanis; 20.6 million people still require humanitarian aid. Credible estimates put total damages and economic losses at $31.2 billion, with at least another $16.3 billion required for recovery. The most vulnerable segments of the population, women and girls, are among the worst affected, seeing their limited access to education, income, and health care further decrease. Conditions on an August 2022 International Monetary Fund bailout that stopped Pakistan from defaulting on its debt also put Sharif in a bind: Rescind and lose the bailout, or roll out painful reforms and risk driving populist support for Khan. Thanks to the floods, Pakistan now requires even more aid, which has been slow to come. Delays in relief and reconstruction could further deepen grievances and boost Khan’s base. Meanwhile, Islamist militants are resurgent. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, bordering Afghanistan, has seen militant attacks on security forces spike. The uptick owes both to the Taliban’s sheltering of Pakistani militants in Afghanistan and Islamabad’s own failed bid, mediated by the Taliban, to strike a deal with militants. Having hosted Taliban leaders for decades during the U.S. war in Afghanistan, Islamabad appears to be struggling to impose its will on its erstwhile ally. Taiwan The biggest flash point between the United States and China looks increasingly unstable, as Washington seeks to maintain primacy in the region and Beijing pursues unification with the island. Unification has long been China’s objective. Beijing says it hopes this happens peacefully, but it will not rule out force. Washington’s assessment is that Xi has set 2027 as the date by which China’s military should be capable of seizing Taiwan. For its part, the United States maintains a “One China” policy—aiming for a peaceful resolution of Taiwan’s status without prejudging the outcome—and a posture of “strategic ambiguity” about whether it would come to Taiwan’s defense. But with Beijing increasingly powerful and assertive, Washington shows signs of hardening policies adopted when China’s military was weaker. Things heated up last summer, when outgoing U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei, Taiwan’s capital. As a legislator, Pelosi does not report to U.S. President Joe Biden (whose administration reportedly discouraged the visit). But Beijing unsurprisingly saw her visit as a powerful signal of support to Taipei and a harbinger of eroding U.S. commitment to the “One China” policy. In response, it staged unprecedented military exercises around Taiwan and deployed warships and aircraft across the “median line,” which has served as the tacitly agreed upon edge of Chinese military activity in the Taiwan Strait for decades. Growing concern about China’s rise, its assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific, and its commitment to build its military capabilities has become a core preoccupation of U.S. policy. Hawkishness on China—including related to Taiwan—is a rare issue enjoying bipartisan consensus in Washington. Both the Biden administration and Congress believe that the United States’ ability to deter a Chinese invasion has slipped, and they want to build it back. For the U.S. government, the challenge is to make credible both the costs that China would incur should it launch a military campaign and the assurance that if it desists, Washington will not seek Taiwan’s permanent separation. China seems unlikely to invade anytime soon. Breaching Taiwan’s defenses would be a slog and, having seen the West’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Beijing likely grasps the international opprobrium and economic cost an offensive could trigger—even if the United States opts not to intervene militarily. Still, credible U.S. threats—continuing to strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, making its Asia-Pacific military posture less vulnerable to Chinese attack, and identifying punitive economic measures with allies and partners—can help deter Beijing. But such steps must go hand in hand with assurances that U.S. policy remains unchanged. If Beijing believes that refraining from attacking gives Washington and Taipei space to create conditions for Taiwan’s permanent separation, then its calculus will lean toward war. Biden seems aware of the danger. Although he has a troubling tendency to commit to aiding Taiwan militarily (aides have walked back his comments quickly each time), he was on script when he met Chinese President Xi Jinping face to face during the G-20 meeting in November. He assured Xi that U.S. policy remains unchanged. Xi, in turn, told Biden that China continues to pursue peaceful unification. Still, near-term hazards could increase tensions. On the U.S. side, Kevin McCarthy, who led the Republicans while they were in the House minority, has already said he will visit Taiwan if he succeeds Pelosi as speaker. At a minimum, China would respond with shows of military strength on par with its exercises in response to Pelosi. Should Beijing’s internal economic and political woes mount, a more forceful show of resolve is possible, particularly if the United States is seen to be pressing its advantage at a time of perceived Chinese weakness. Such an escalation would not spell war right away, but it could inch the world’s mightiest economic and military powers closer to it. POWERED BY WORDPRESS VIP © 2023, GRAHAM DIGITAL HOLDING COMPANY

Congressional , NGO and church leaders at press conference at US Capitol January 28 Credit:ANCA #SaveKarabakh Coalition Launched to End Azerbaijan’s Blockade of Artsakh January 28, 2023 WASHINGTON, DC – Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA) was joined by Congressional Armenian Caucus Co-Chair David Valadao (R-CA), House Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee Ranking member Barbara Lee (D-CA), and Representatives Judy Chu (D-CA), Lou Correa (D-CA), Jim Costa (D-CA), and Nicole Malliotakis (R-NY) in calling on the Biden Administration to stop U.S. military aid to Azerbaijan and send emergency aid to Artsakh in response to the devastating humanitarian crisis in Artsakh caused by Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin Corridor, reported the Armenian National Committee of America (a leading partner in the broad-based Save Karabakh coalition). The Capitol Hill press conference, held in the Press Triangle at the foot of the U.S. Capitol Building, featured the participation of former U.S. Ambassador for Religious Freedom, Senator Sam Brownback, Artsakh Representative to the U.S. Robert Avetisyan, and representatives of the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) and a diverse group of non-government organizations led by the Anglican Office of International and Government Affairs, Christian Solidarity International, the Baroness Caroline Cox of Queensbury and founder of the Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust (HART), the Vulnerable Peoples Project, and supported by Genocide Watch, the Hellenic American Leadership Council, and In Defense of Christians, who announced the launch of the Save Karabakh Coalition. The press conference was moderated by Reverend Canon Justin Murff, Executive Director of the Anglican Office for Government and International Affairs. “This is a diverse coalition with a laser focus – saving Artsakh,” said ANCA Executive Director Aram Hamparian. “We stand shoulder to shoulder with our coalition and in solidarity with our Congressional friends advancing anti-blockade legislation, set to be introduced in the U.S. House. Now, more than ever, Armenian and allied Americans need to stand up, and speak out – and that starts with taking action today at www.anca.org/blockade.” The press conference was live-streamed on the ANCA Facebook page and is available on YouTube. Rep Brad Sherman: “The Tactic is Blockade. The Effect is Civilian Deprivation. The Purpose is Forced Deportation.” House Foreign Affairs Committee senior member Brad Sherman (D-CA), who spoke on the U.S. House floor just a day before condemning Azerbaijan’s Artsakh blockade, hosted the Capitol Hill press conference and called for concrete U.S. action. Azerbaijan’s “tactic is blockade. The effect is civilian deprivation. The purpose is ethnic cleansing (forced deportation),” explained Rep. Sherman. “I urge the Administration to impose real consequences that I have for plunging the people of Artsakh into this humanitarian disaster. The Administration must enforce Section 907 and stop all military assistance to Azerbaijan. Actions are needed. The words are good, but there’s no time to act.” Rep. Judy Chu: Save Karabakh Coalition Launch “an inspiring show of support” for Artsakh Rep. Judy Chu (D-CA) shared fond memories of her visit to Artsakh, condemned Azerbaijan’s blockade, and reiterated her call on the“Biden administration to use all the tools at its disposal, including sanctions, to ensure the safety of those in danger.” She praised the Save Karabakh Coalition launch as an “inspiring show of support for the 120,000 Armenians living in Artsakh peacefully but suffering at the hands of the Aliyev regime. I will continue to work with my colleagues here in Congress to make sure that the United States stands up for the ideals of democracy and self-determination and, to that end, stands with the people of Artsakh.” Rep. David Valadao: We must work “to hold Azerbaijan accountable” Congressional Armenian Caucus Co-Chair David Valadao (R-CA), who had visited Artsakh in 2017, also condemned the Artsakh blockade, noting, “Azerbaijan is once again weaponizing critical infrastructure and manufacturing humanitarian crisis for Armenians living in the Nagorno Karabakh.” Rep. Valadao stated, “the U.S. must use every single diplomatic tool we have available to end this blockade and ensure the safety of Armenians living in Artsakh. I continue to work with my colleagues in Congress to raise awareness about this very important issue and work to hold Azerbaijan accountable.” Rep. Barbara Lee: “This is now a dire humanitarian crisis.” House Foreign Operations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, former Chair, and Ranking member Barbara Lee noted, “I have long been a strong advocate for humanitarian support and recovery needs arising from the Artsakh conflict,” explained Rep. Lee. As we all know, Artsakh is enduring a major and growing humanitarian crisis caused by Azerbaijan’s illegal, illegal blockade of the Lachin corridor, Artsakh’s only humanitarian lifeline to Armenia. So yes, like all of you, I strongly condemn Azerbaijan’s blockade of the vital corridor of connecting Armenia and Artsakh and call for the immediate opening. Rep. Lee applauded the leadership of the Armenian American community for working with her committee to include language in the Fiscal Year 2023 Omnibus funding bill calling for a comprehensive strategy to address Artsakh’s humanitarian needs. “I’m looking forward to continuing to work with the Administration to get this done,” stated Rep. Lee. Rep. Nicole Malliotakis: “I’m here today to continue to stand with the Armenian community” Hellenic-American Congresswoman Nicole Malliotakis (R-NY), citing the shared history of genocide during the Ottoman Empire, noted that the Greek and Armenian people have “experienced a lot together, and so that is why I’m here today to continue to stand with the Armenian community” and urged the Administration to work with the United Nations to break Azerbaijan’s blockade. Rep. Jim Costa Spotlights “continued ethnic cleansing on behalf of Azerbaijan” Rep. Jim Costa (D-CA), discussing the deepening humanitarian crisis in Artsakh, noted, “This is a horrific impact on this continued ethnic cleansing on behalf of Azerbaijan. Failure to resolve this current dispute will only result in their suffering and isolation and will prevent new unrest. And therefore, we call upon the Administration and our coalition partners in Europe to put all the diplomatic pressures on Azerbaijan to comply with the OSCE Minsk support.” Rep Lou Correa committed to “bring justice to the Armenian people” Rep. Lou Correa (D-CA), speaking to Armenian Americans and coalition partners, summed up the situation, noting, “our job is to make sure that we bring justice to the Armenian people. Your job is to make sure that we don’t forget to make sure that we’re reminded that the struggle continues. As we move forward, I know we will reach a place. I know a continuity record to reach a place where the Armenian people can enjoy freedom, human rights, and religious freedom.” Amb. Sam Brownback: [Section 907] “sanctions need to go back in place” Former U.S. Senator and Ambassador-At-Large for Religious Freedom Sam Brownback, who had been an early opponent of Section 907 restrictions on U.S. aid to Azerbaijan, offered powerful remarks at the Congressional press conference calling on the Biden Administration to sanction Azerbaijan in response to their ongoing blockade of Artsakh. Sen. Brownback, who now serves as the Chairman of the National Committee for Religious Freedom, stated, “Those sanctions need to go back in place. They need to be effective against Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan could cause this blockade to stop today. They’re not allowing it to continue. And those sanctions need to go back on Azerbaijan if this blockade is not lifted.” Robert Avetisyan: “This is a Civilizational Issue” Artsakh Representative to the U.S. Robert Avetisyan described Azerbaijan’s blockade of Artsakh as not simply an issue of 120,000 Armenians. “This is a civilizational issue, and everyone has their say in this. We very much welcome the fact that the resolution will be introduced next week. We hope it will become one of the next solid steps by the US legislature to break this blockade and bring normal life to our Artsakhsis. I want to convey my gratitude to every one of you here for forming this coalition, and this is indeed a very important manifestation for us that the international community, the international community of nations and organizations which care about our rights, about our rights to education, about our rights to religion, our rights to live, our rights to be one of the members of the safer and more prosperous world.” concluded Avetisyan. Avetisyan and Congressional referenced their support for the anti-blockade legislation, spearheaded by Congressional Armenian Caucus founding Co-Chair Frank Pallone (D-NJ), Rep. Sherman, and the Congressional Armenian Caucus leadership. The legislation strongly condemns Azerbaijan’s blockade of Artsakh, calls for U.S. sanctions and enforcing Section 907 restrictions on U.S. aid to Azerbaijan, and urges immediate humanitarian assistance to Artsakh. For over 40 days – since December 12 – the government of Azerbaijan has been blocking the Lachin Corridor, the only road linking Nagorno Karabakh and its 120,000 Armenian Christian residents to the Republic of Armenia, and to the outside world. Under the blockade, supplies of food and medicine are dwindling, and local authorities have been forced to begin strict rationing of meager supplies. Azerbaijan has also cut natural gas, electricity, and telecommunications to the region, leaving large parts of the population in the cold and dark in freezing winter temperatures. The Save Karabakh Coalition, launched at the Capitol Hill press conference, calls on the U.S. government to take all necessary measures to safeguard the Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh, to apply economic pressure on Azerbaijan – including the suspension of military and economic aid – to pressure it to lift the blockade and to work within the framework of the UN Security Council to provide for adequate peacekeeping in the region to protect the people of Nagorno Karabakh. The Coalition is directed by a central committee composed of the Anglican Office of International and Government Affairs, Christian Solidarity International, the Baroness Cox of Queensbury, the Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust, the Vulnerable Peoples Project, and the ANCA. The Save Karabakh Coalition’s website is: www.savekarabakh.org , and is made up of the following organizations and activists: — Christian Solidarity International — The Baroness Cox, Independent Member of the House of Lords — American Friends of Kurdistan — Anglican Office for Government and International Affairs — Armenian Bar Association — Armenian National Committee of America — Genocide Watch — Hellenic American Leadership Council — Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust — In Defense of Christians — International Christian Concern — The Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention — The Philos Project — The Vulnerable People Project — Lela Gilbert, Fellow, Hudson Center for International Religious Freedom — Dr. Charles Jacobs, President, American Anti-Slavery Group — Professor Elisa Von Joeden-Forgey, Endowed Chair, Dept. of Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Keene State College; Co-president, Lemkin Institute — Professor Irene Victoria Massimino, Co-president, Lemkin Institute — Sheila Paylan, International Human Rights Lawyer and Activist — David L. Phillips, Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University Media Contact: Elizabeth S. Chouldjian Email / Tel: (202) 775-1918 Armenian National Committee of America 1711 N Street NW Washington, DC 20036 anca@anca.org | anca.org/facebook | @anca_dc

Originally published by Euronews on January 22, 2023 Police border guards patrol along a border wall near the town of Feres, along the Evros River which forms the frontier between Greece and Turkey on Sunday, Oct. 30, 2022. Greece prevented some 260,000 migrants from entering illegally in 2022 and arrested 1,500 traffickers, Greece’s minister in charge of the security told ambassadors from other European Union countries plus Switzerland and the United Kingdom Saturday, Jan. 21, 2023, as he guided them to a still expanding border wall in the country’s northeast. (AP Photo/Petros Giannakouris, File) Greece says it prevented around 260,000 migrants from crossing its border with Turkey in 2022. Ankara insists it has adhered to international law, but if a migrant qualifies for refugee status they cannot be ruled to have broken the law by crossing a border. Many of the migrants come from war-torn countries, mainly Afghanistan and Syria. Greece has often been accused by human rights organizations of forcing some of them back into Turkey. In October 92 men, who were mostly from Afghanistan and Syria, were found almost naked and bruised at the border. At the time the UN refugee agency said in a tweet that it was “deeply distressed by the shocking reports." On Saturday the minister of citizen protection showed ambassadors from other European Union countries, as well as Switzerland and the United Kingdom, a section of an expanding border wall with Turkey. He told them that it also acts as one of the European Union's borders. "It is a message of application of international law and I believe that Turkey should receive it," Christos Stylianides said. The five-meter-high steel wall faces east across the Evros river which marks the border. Greece is expanding the wall, adding a 35-kilometer stretch with the ultimate goal of extending it to cover most of the 192-kilometer border. The EU's border protection agency, Frontex will also send another 400 guards to the border, adding to the existing 1,800-strong force. Athens has repeatedly accused Turkey of weaponizing the plight of migrants, encouraging them to cross the border to put pressure on Greece and the rest of the EU and effectively cooperating with people traffickers. Meanwhile Turkey accuses Greece of violent pushbacks that endanger the lives of migrants. It hosts some 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees, more than any other country in the world. EU leaders are worried that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan could encourage a mass exodus to the EU, where most of the migrants and refugees want to end up, preferably at one of the more prosperous bloc members. Copyright © euronews 2023

Last year, we made important progress in atrocity prevention and advocacy. The BURMA Act officially became law in December and imposes sanctions limit the power of the military junta in Myanmar. Join our Burma Action Committee to help continue that progress and keep pressure for peace. You can also learn more about our other advocacy and tools at our Advocacy Training on February 11 at 4 PM ET/ 1 PM PT. Sign up here or invite the young people in your life to learn about lobbying, writing conflict updates, and more! Our Managing Committee met virtually for retreat this month and has exciting new plans for this semester, including the launch of our genocide education campaign coming soon. Keep an eye out for more educational resources, events, and advocacy opportunities! In solidarity, Mira Mehta co-Student Director Brown University '25 Conflict Updates Read the latest news from our student authors. Advocacy Training Sign up here or invite your friends to connect with other STAND activists. You can also stay up to date with STAND on Twitter and Instagram @standnow.

Originally Published by CNN on January 22, 2023 Michele Cattani/AFP/Getty Images/FILE French soldiers patrol the village of Gorom Gorom in northern Burkina Faso in November 2019. By Niamh Kennedy, CNN The military government of Burkina Faso has demanded the departure of French troops from the country, according to the government press agency Agence d’Information du Burkina (AIB). France has exactly one month to remove its troops from Burkina Faso, according to the terms of the 2018 agreement, AIB reported, citing sources. The military government “denounced last Wednesday, the agreement which has governed since 2018, the presence of the French Armed Forces on its territory,” AIB reported Saturday. France still has 400 special forces based in Burkina Faso, according to Reuters, to help fight Islamist militants linked to al Qaeda and the Islamic State after years of violence in the region. On Friday, residents in the capital Ouagadougou took to the streets to protest the presence of French troops in the country. Video from the protest showed protesters carrying signs with the slogans “French army get out our house” and “Friendship Burkina Russia.” Some protesters carried the national flags of Burkina Faso and Russia. In December, Ghanaian President, Nana Akufo-Addo said the Burkina Faso military government invited in mercenaries from the Russian private military group, Wagner. Burkina Faso Deputy Minister for Regional Cooperation, Jean Marie Traoré called the claims “very serious” in a press conference on December 16 after the government summoned the Ghanaian ambassador. France – the former colonial power – first entered the Sahel region in January 2013 at Mali’s request and launched Operation Serval, a United Nations-sanctioned ground and air operation against Islamist militants. The mission was succeeded in August 2014 by Operation Barkhane, a broader French anti-terror initiative targeting Islamists across the Sahel, including in Burkina Faso. French President Emmanuel Macron announced in June 2021 that the mission would be replaced by a more international effort, and Western troops began withdrawing from Mali in February last year though they remain in Burkina Faso. On January 24, 2022, Burkina Faso’s army seized power, deposing former President Roch Kaboré and dissolving the government and parliament. The military suspended the constitution and closed borders. Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba was installed as the West African country’s new leader. Damiba’s time in power proved short-lived, however, as he was ousted from the country’s top position during a coup d’état in October 2022. Army Captain Ibrahim Traoré was subsequently appointed as the country’s new president. © 2023 Cable News Network. A Warner Bros. Discovery Company. All Rights Reserved. CNN Sans ™ & © 2016 Cable News Network.

VOA News January 23, 2023 By Kate Bartlett Somali journalist Abdalle Ahmed Mumin is seen at work in a broadcast studio. (Courtesy - Abdalle Ahmed Mumin) The old maxim that “the pen is mightier than the sword” couldn’t be more appropriate when it comes to Somali journalist Abdalle Ahmed Mumin. As a child, Abdalle lost his arm in a militia attack. Determined to still write, he had to teach himself to do so with his left hand. The clan fighting that maimed Abdalle killed his 11-year-old brother as the siblings walked home together from school. At that time, the family were living in a refugee camp in Mogadishu, and the daily human rights violations and unfairness that Abdalle witnessed there set him on his career path as a journalist. “Whenever there was food distribution the militia would come and loot that food and my mind was always asking me, when I grow up what can I do?” Abdalle told VOA. “Every day I used to buy a newspaper. I said, the best way to fight injustices is to become a journalist.” But now the 37-year-old, whose work has appeared in international outlets including the The Guardian and The Wall Street Journal, is in his own fight for justice. He is accused of publicly disobeying a government directive and holding a press conference that criticized the directive. The Ministry of Information in a statement in October denied the charges are related to Abdalle's work as journalist. But press freedom groups say the charges are spurious Country in conflict The case against Abdalle is linked with Somalia’s long battle with militancy. Al-Qaeda-linked Islamist militant group al-Shabab has been waging a brutal insurgency for about 15 years. The militant group sees journalists who work for Western media as spies and often targets them. In 2015, Abdalle survived an assassination attempt when militants shot at his car. He took his family and fled to neighboring Kenya, where they lived for several years. Ultimately though, Abdalle couldn’t keep away from what he felt was his calling. He returned and helped form the Somali Journalists Syndicate (SJS). Set up to defend the rights of working journalists, the independent trade union provides support and training, and is vocal in its defense of media rights. Which is why it went into action in October last year when Somalia’s Ministry of Information published a directive that “prohibited dissemination of extremism ideology messages, both from official media broadcasts and social media.” The ministry ban covered messages sent “intentionally or unintentionally, directly or indirectly and consciously or unconsciously.” Officials later told journalists to refer to al-Shabab as “khawarij,” which means "a deviation from Islam." The government said the directive was intended to stop the spread of al-Shabab propaganda, as U.S.-backed Somali forces battle the group, which regularly launches deadly attacks that kill hundreds of civilians every year. While it is in the government’s remit to try to curb terrorist messaging, for the SJS and other media advocates, the vague wording raised concerns that the directive could be used to stifle independent reporting. Somali Minister of Information Daud Aweis however believes journalists misunderstood the order. “The journalists are free to do their job according to the law. What we only asked them is not to fall into the trap of al-Shabab, of spreading the hate and incitement propaganda of the terrorist group,” he told VOA via a messaging app. When asked what role the government believes media could play in the fight, Daud — a former journalist who worked for outlets including VOA and the BBC — said, “Very simple, report objectively on these matters. That’s all what we need. Don’t be used as a tool of propaganda by the terrorists who are shedding the blood of Somali people, including the journalists themselves.” Somali journalist Abdalle Ahmed Mumin is seen out on assignment in Somalia. (Courtesy - Abdalle Ahmed Mumin) Despite claims by the government that Somalia supports a free press, Abdalle says that in reality authorities want only military successes reported and nothing negative, like extra-judicial killings. So, as secretary-general of the SJS, he called a press conference on October 10 and read a statement outlining concerns about the rules. After that, Abdalle says, his office was raided and he received a call from government asking that he retract the statement. He refused. The following day, Abdalle was arrested and taken to the National Intelligence Agency’s underground jail. There, he says, he was interrogated without access to a lawyer. From his one-meter long cell he said he “could hear other inmates screaming.” He was later transferred to police custody and on October 16, a court released Abdalle on condition that he didn’t leave the country and didn’t speak to the media. “But a journalist always speaks,” he said, adding that he refused a request by officials in the Ministry of Information to quit journalism and issue an apology in exchange for the case going away. Officials at the time denied to VOA such an offer was made. Pressure from all sides Somalia has long been a challenging place for journalists to work. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) considers the country one of the most dangerous in Africa for journalists, Muthoki Mumo, the group’s sub-Saharan Africa representative, told VOA. “At least 73 journalists have been killed in connection to their work since 1992 and justice remains elusive in the majority of these cases,” she said. Al-Shabab is responsible for many of these deaths, but Mumo said, “Government officials and security personnel whose responsibility it is to guarantee the safety of journalists, including by investigating attacks, also pose a threat.” Journalists are frequently detained arbitrarily and intimidated by officials, she said. “Eight months into the presidency of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, his government seems intent on using the fight against the al-Shabab as pretext to muzzle independent reporting and critical commentary.” Mumo said the CPJ has heard that some journalists are avoiding reporting on certain stories because of the directive. Somalia's media for years have faced harassment, attack and persecution. Mohamed Odowa, a freelance journalist working for international press outlets in Mogadishu, says the environment has deteriorated over the past eight months. Some journalists have "opted to leave the country for exile while others decided to remain home and keep in silent for fear of being harmed by the warring sides,” he told VOA. He said those who refuse bribes to write positive stories, face threats and harassment. “The current government is trying to use independent media houses and journalists to cover the news related to the military operations in its favor,” he said. Information Minister Daud rejects with such assessments on Somalia’s media environment, telling VOA, “We don’t want to see freedom of speech being violated at any cost.” When asked about Abdalle’s case, he told VOA, “I would like to remind you that it’s not wise to comment on a case that’s before the court. Let’s allow the judiciary to do their job.” Abdalle is due back in court Thursday. The case has shaken him. Despite years of living in a war zone he said, this is the first time that he’s truly afraid: “I’m fearing for my life and I’m fearing for the lives of my colleagues, other journalists.” © 2023 VOA News

Bloomberg January 19, 2023 By Philip Heijmans Party chief gets another chance to elevate preferred candidate Observers expect little impact on Vietnam’s economic policy Nguyen Phu Trong Photographer: Nhac Nguyen/AFP/Getty Images Over the past few years, Vietnamese Communist Party Chief Nguyen Phu Trong has won praise from investors for removing corrupt officials. Now as some big names fall, it’s becoming clear his campaign serves another purpose: strengthening his hand in choosing a successor. This week Nguyen Xuan Phuc was ousted as president after assuming “political responsibility” for the “violations and shortcomings” involving two graft cases related to a manufacturer of Covid-19 test kits and repatriation flights. Phuc — a familiar face to foreign investors who oversaw a booming economy as prime minister — was once seen as a strong contender to take over from Trong, who has been in the role since 2011. But at a party reshuffle two years ago, Phuc lost out and was put in the largely ceremonial role as president. Trong, 78, kept his job for an unprecedented third term but failed to position his preferred conservative candidate as successor, all but assuring a leader from a rival faction seen as more reformist would one day take power. Phuc’s ouster now opens the door for Trong to line up a successor to run Vietnam, which has recently attracted investment from companies leaving China and improved relations with the US. The battle will take place in the run-up to a mid-term plenum in April, when a new Politburo member will be announced and there’s a chance the president may be revealed then. Usually the president is named in May after the National Assembly votes. “There’s definitely an element of conservatism in Trong because he sees the threat from those in government who are more directly involved in business,” said Linh Nguyen, lead analyst for Vietnam at Control Risks. “He has felt the need to reorganize the party to strengthen party ideology and not let those who make decisions in business policies hold important party positions.” Like China, which is also one-party communist state, much of what happens in Vietnam is opaque. Without formal elections, corruption purges are frequently used to oust rivals and clear the way for allies to take key positions. Vietnam’s anti-graft push is starting to look similar to one by Chinese President Xi Jinping that ensnared some 4.7 million officials, including a potential successor. While Xi vowed to catch “tigers” and “flies” as part of his crackdown, Trong has likened his to a “blazing furnace.” More than 530 party members were punished in 2022 alone. “It is a fairly murky situation,” said Peter Mumford, head of Southeast Asia at risk consultancy Eurasia Group. “There is an ideological bent to Trong’s purges, along with desire to influence succession process, but he also views corruption as a major threat to the party’s legitimacy and one that needs to be tackled, even if somewhat selectively.” There are a handful of candidates for president, which is one of Vietnam’s four most powerful positions along with party secretary general, prime minister and head of the legislature. According to party rules, candidates for party chief must have served on the Politburo for at least one term. One top contender is Public Security Minister To Lam, who has been carrying out Trong’s crackdowns. Lam was also the subject of social media outrage in Vietnam when a TikTok video emerged of him getting served a gold-leaf encrusted steak in London during the corruption crackdown in 2021. It’s unclear to what extent the political shakeup may impact domestic and foreign policy. Vietnam has leaned closer to the US in recent years, particularly on defense issues as China has become more assertive over disputed territory in the South China Sea. Trong, who was the only Vietnam Communist party chief to meet a US president at the White House, last year became the first foreign leader to pay an official visit to China after Xi secured a precedent-breaking third term in office, and he’s since conveyed a desire bring the relationship to “new heights.” Phuc had overseen a push to improve relations with the US and frequently met top executives and advocated for free trade during regular addresses to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland Asked about Phuc’s resignation this week, a senior US defense official who asked not to be identified said the outlook for ties with Vietnam remained positive. Meanwhile, the American Chamber of Commerce in Hanoi doesn’t see drastic policy changes coming. “The main issue for the business community is that things — licenses, permissions, etc. — have been moving very slowly as there is a lot of paranoia throughout the government these days,” said Adam Sitkoff, Amcham executive director. Investors so far have shrugged off the news. A day after Phuc’s resignation, the stock benchmark entered a bull market, though that was largely on expectations of easing monetary policy and China’s reopening. Foreign investment last year rose 13.5% last year to $22.4 billion. Some investors, including Vietnam’s largest fund manager Dragon Capital, see the crackdown as burnishing the Vietnam’s investment outlook. “As evidenced by the President’s resignation, we can see that responsibility is taken at all levels of government,” the fund said in a commentary posted online. “We believe the height of the anti-corruption campaign is behind us.” Others see more fireworks ahead. It remains likely more officials will fall in the lead up to the next party congress in 2026 as political jockeying continues, said Le Hong Hiep of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore. “Corruption still happens and it’s likely more officials may be implicated and removed,” he said. “There are also still cases under investigation and decisions on those will be made in the coming months, so the campaign is still ongoing. They will not stop.” — With assistance by John Boudreau and Nguyen Dieu Tu Uyen Copyright 2023 @ Bloomberg. All Rights Reserved.