EDITH M. LEDERER Associated Press The chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court is urging the U.N. Security Council to accelerate action to help deliver justice for thousands of people in Sudan’s western Darfur region, which was wracked by bloodshed in 2003 ICC Prosecutor Khan speaks to the ICC member from Khartoum on August 23, 2022 UNITED NATIONS -- The chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court urged the U.N. Security Council on Tuesday to accelerate action to help deliver justice for thousands of people in Sudan’s western Darfur region, which was wracked by bloodshed in 2003. Karim Khan said in a virtual briefing from the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, that his just-concluded visit to Darfur reinforced his resolve to press for a greater focus and more resources to arrest and bring to trial alleged ringleaders of the violence. “The simple truth is that the nightmare for thousands of Darfuris has not ended,” he said. “And that nightmare of their experiences in large part continues because meaningful justice and accountability has not been felt in the manner that is required, or in my respectful view was anticipated by the council in 2005,” when it referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC. Khan said that the people of Darfur “are tired of promises” and that “this is the time to move forward.” The vast Darfur region was engulfed in bloodshed in 2003 when rebels from the territory’s ethnic central and sub-Saharan African community launched an insurgency accusing the Arab-dominated government in Khartoum of discrimination and neglect. The government, under then President Omar al-Bashir, responded with a scorched-earth assault of aerial bombings and unleashed local nomadic Arab militias known as the Janjaweed, who are accused of mass killings and rapes. Up to 300,000 people were killed and 2.7 million were driven from their homes. In a first-ever briefing to the Security Council by an ICC prosecutor from a country where the court is pursuing justice, Khan said council members should consider visiting Sudan to hear from survivors who still live in refugee camps and still have hopes of seeing those sought by the court prosecuted. In April, the first ICC trial to deal with atrocities by Sudanese government-backed forces in Darfur began in The Hague, Netherlands. The defendant, Janjaweed leader Ali Muhammad Ali Abd–Al-Rahman, also known as Ali Kushayb, pleaded innocent to all 31 charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Khan said the prosecution’s case is expected to conclude early next year. Al-Bashir, who has been in prison in Khartoum since he was ousted from power in 2019, also faces ICC charges of genocide and crimes against humanity related to the Darfur conflict. Two other senior figures of al-Bashir’s rule accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the ICC are also under arrest in Khartoum: Abdel-Rahim Muhammad Hussein, interior and defense minister during much of the conflict, and Ahmed Haroun, a senior security chief at the time and later the leader of al-Bashir’s ruling party. Khan told the Security Council that there has been “a backward step” in cooperation between the ICC and Sudan’s current government in recent months. An October military coup in Sudan upended Sudan’s democratic transition after a popular uprising forced the military to remove al-Bashir. In his report to the council circulated Tuesday, Khan welcomed and acknowledged recent government steps, including the provision of some multiple-entry visas and support with a limited number of requests for assistance. But it called the overall picture challenging and “a backwards step from the strong period of cooperation enjoyed by the (prosecutor’s) office from Sudanese authorities from February to October 2021.” “The insecurity that persists following the events of Oct. 25, 2021, also continues to cause disruption to investigative activity,” the report said. “A pivotal moment is being reached in which cooperation by the Government of Sudan must be improved.” Khan told the council that his office needs multiple entry visas for ICC staff, help in opening an office in Khartoum as soon as possible, and monthly meetings with government officials. Eight council members that are parties to the ICC — Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, France, Ireland, Norway and Britain — issued a joint statement after the council meeting supporting Khan's call on Sudan for greater cooperation. They also encouraged all countries to support the courtin ensuring justice for the world's most serious crimes. Asked what the Security Council could do to help ensure justice for victims in Darfur, none of the eight countries' representatives responded. Copyright © 2022 ABC News Internet Ventures. All rights reserved.

Anniversary of Atrocities Highlights International Inaction (Bangkok) – Rohingya Muslims are still awaiting justice and protection of their rights five years after the Myanmar military began a sweeping campaign of massacres, rape, and arson in northern Rakhine State on August 25, 2017, Human Rights Watch said today. More than 730,000 Rohingya fled to precarious, flood-prone camps in Bangladesh, while about 600,000 remain under oppressive rule in Myanmar. No one has been held accountable for the crimes against humanity and acts of genocide committed against the Rohingya population. This anniversary should prompt concerned governments to take concrete action to hold the Myanmar military to account and secure justice and safety for the Rohingya in Bangladesh, Myanmar, and across the region. “Governments should mark the five-year anniversary of the devastating campaign against the Rohingya with a coordinated international strategy for accountability and justice that draws on Rohingya input,” said Elaine Pearson, acting Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Donors should support Rohingya refugees to study and work freely and safely so they can build independent and self-reliant futures.” Since August 2017, Human Rights Watch has interviewed hundreds of Rohingya in Bangladesh who fled the Myanmar military’s atrocities. They described incidents in which soldiers systematically killed and raped villagers before torching their homes. Altogether, the security forces killed thousands and burned down nearly 400 villages. Those who escaped to neighboring Bangladesh joined a few hundred thousand refugees who had fled earlier waves of violence and persecution. “Myanmar authorities brutalized us,” said Abdul Halim, 30, a Rohingya refugee in Bangladesh. “They burned down our houses, raped our mothers and sisters, burned our children. We took shelter in Bangladesh to escape that brutality. Now I’ve been living in Kutupalong camp for five years.” Abdul carried his very ill mother on his back when they fled Myanmar in 2017. She died shortly after reaching Bangladesh. The Rohingya who remain in Rakhine State face systematic abuses that amount to the crimes against humanity of apartheid, persecution, and deprivation of liberty. They are confined to camps and villages without freedom of movement, cut off from access to adequate food, health care, education, and livelihoods. “Since we were children in Myanmar, we never had any freedom,” Abdul said. “They called me ‘nowa kalar’ [a slur for Muslims], to say we are like animals.” Rohingya are effectively denied citizenship under Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, rendering them stateless. The 2017 atrocities were rooted in decades of state repression, discrimination, and violence. “In Myanmar, we struggled through life,” Hasina Hatu, 40, said. “When we raised goats, the border guard forces took away the goats. When we raised cattle, they took away the cattle. When we farmed paddy fields, they took away the rice.” Hasina’s father died after falling down a muddy slope as they fled in 2017. In February 2021, the generals who had orchestrated the atrocities against the Rohingya staged a coup and detained Myanmar’s elected civilian leaders. The military junta responded to mass demonstrations with a nationwide campaign of mass killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and indiscriminate attacks that amounted to crimes against humanity and, in conflict areas, war crimes. Military units that had been implicated in the 2017 atrocities – since sanctioned by the United States and United Kingdom – have been deployed in renewed operations around the country. The junta has imposed new movement restrictions and aid blockages on Rohingya camps and villages, increasing water scarcity and food shortages, along with disease and malnutrition. Since the coup, security forces have arrested an estimated 2,000 Rohingya, hundreds of them children, for “unauthorized travel.” Many have been sentenced to the maximum five years in prison. Increased fighting between the Myanmar military and ethnic Arakan Army has also left Rohingya caught in the middle. Rohingya walk through rice fields after fleeing across the border from Myanmar to Bangladesh near Teknaf, September 1, 2017.© 2017 AP Photo/Bernat Armangue In Bangladesh, about one million Rohingya refugees live in sprawling, overcrowded camps in Cox’s Bazar and the isolated silt island of Bhasan Char. For five years, the Bangladesh government has respected the international principle of nonrefoulement, the right of refugees not to be returned to a country where their lives or freedom would be threatened. However, Bangladesh authorities have recently intensified restrictions on livelihoods, movement, and education that make many refugees feel unwelcome and at risk. Officials have closed community-led schools, arbitrarily destroyed shops, and imposed new obstacles on travel. “If our children can’t be educated here in Bangladesh either, then anywhere we go, we will still be persecuted,” Abdul said. Bangladesh authorities have moved about 28,000 Rohingya to Bhasan Char, where they face severe movement restrictions, food and medicine shortages, and abuses by security forces. Despite the involvement of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), many continue to be transferred without full, informed consent, and have been prevented from returning to the mainland. Bangladesh authorities should lift the new restrictions and end forced relocations of refugees, Human Rights Watch said. “How long will we live like this?” Hasina said. “I don’t think the world will solve our condition.” The 2022 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya humanitarian crisis has received only a quarter of its requested US$881 million in funding. Donors including the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and Australia should increase funding to meet the massive needs of the refugee population to help Bangladesh support the Rohingya and host communities. The Bangladesh government and Myanmar junta have renewed discussions around repatriation, announcing in January joint plans to “expeditiously complete the verification process.” Two prior repatriation attempts failed, with Rohingya refugees unwilling to return due to the ongoing persecution and abuse in Myanmar. Michelle Bachelet, the outgoing UN high commissioner for human rights, announced on August 17, following a visit to Cox’s Bazar, that “the current situation across the border means that conditions are not right for returns.” “We want to go back to Myanmar but to go there we want justice,” Mohammad Ayaz, 21, said. “How long will we have to live in a tarpaulin house? It’s been five years. Who knows how long we have to live here. Who knows whether the world will help us get justice or not.” Mohammad was shot while fleeing his village of Tula Toli on August 30, 2017. At least 12 members of his family, including his parents and sisters, were killed. In Malaysia, India, and Thailand, thousands of Rohingya refugees are being held indefinitely in immigration detention sites or living without adequate support and protection. The international response to the 2017 violence was fragmented and halting, with governments favoring quiet diplomacy that achieved little over strategic measures to place real pressure on the military, Human Rights Watch said. Building conditions for the voluntary, safe, and dignified return of Rohingya refugees will require a cohesive international response to establish rights-respecting rule in Myanmar and achieve justice for the crimes in Rakhine State. A future Myanmar under democratic civilian rule will entail full citizenship rights for Rohingya and reparations for the atrocities, including for stolen or destroyed land and property. The UN Security Council should end its inaction borne of anticipated vetoes by China and Russia and urgently negotiate a resolution to institute a global arms embargo on Myanmar, refer the situation to the International Criminal Court, and impose targeted sanctions on the junta and military-owned conglomerates. “What are we waiting for?” a US diplomat said in a speech at a Security Council meeting in 2021. “The longer we delay, the more people die. This council is failing in our collective responsibility to safeguard international peace and security. And it is failing the people of Burma.” The US, UK, EU, and other governments should together strengthen international sanctions to cut off the Myanmar military from the revenue funding its abusive operations, including in Rakhine State. Governments should target the junta’s gas revenues, its largest source of foreign income, totaling about $1 billion in annual profits. The EU sanctioned the junta-controlled Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise in February, but other governments have so far failed to follow suit. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should urgently abandon its failed five-point consensus response to the crisis and instead coordinate strong action against the junta’s abuses. “We hope that, with help from foreign governments and Bangladesh, we will be able to get back our rights,” Abdul said. “That is what we want.” Governments should explore every avenue for justice and accountability for the Myanmar military’s atrocity crimes, including by formally supporting the case under the Genocide Convention brought by Gambia against Myanmar before the International Court of Justice. Canada and the Netherlands have publicly declared their intention to support the proceedings. Governments should also actively pursue investigations and prosecutions under the principle of universal jurisdiction, an avenue to justice for crimes so serious that all states have an interest in addressing them. The Argentine judiciary has opened an investigation into Myanmar’s atrocities against the Rohingya under universal jurisdiction. “The Myanmar junta’s killing of demonstrators, shelling of civilians, and other abuses reflect in large measure the failure to hold the generals accountable for their atrocities of five years ago,” Pearson said. “Influential governments should overcome their past mistakes and take strong measures to sever the flow of arms and revenue underwriting the junta’s ongoing crimes.” © 2022 Human Rights Watch

A woman who gave her name only as S. sits in a chair in her home in Makariv, Ukraine, a town that had been under Russian occupation. She says a Russian soldier taunted her after her neighbor was raped and killed. (Kyrylo Svietashov / For The Times) BY LAURA KING - STAFF WRITER AUG. 21, 2022 5 AM PT MAKARIV, Ukraine — The Russian soldier taunted her: Your friend, he sneered, is lying on the floor, raped and naked and dead. S., a Ukrainian writer and government worker in her early 60s, froze at his words. Her neighbor Tetiana, a bold, dark-haired 37-year-old widow, had quickly attracted the attention of Russian soldiers who, within days of the Feb. 24 invasion, captured and occupied the small town of Makariv, about 30 miles west of the capital, Kyiv. “She would defy them,” said S., still shaken and sorrowful as she described the harrowing events of five months earlier, before late-winter chill gave way to spring, then high summer. “She would tell them: ‘I’m not afraid of you.’” S. holds the door of her home, which was kicked in by Russian forces. (Kyrylo Svietashov / For The Times) Weeks would pass before the outside world learned of the horrors that occurred in streets and basements and back gardens of these once-tranquil suburbs and satellite towns, which were occupied for roughly a month before Russian forces in early April broke off a failed bid to seize the capital. Townspeople who were unable or unwilling to flee endured the first wave of what Western governments and Ukrainian officials would later describe as a systematic campaign of atrocities by Russian forces against civilians: torture, execution-style killings, starvation. And rape. Little by little, month by month, investigators have laid the groundwork for what are now more than 25,000 active cases of suspected war crimes, covering a wide variety of offenses. Investigators compile narratives from witness testimony, from forensic examinations of mutilated corpses that are still regularly turning up — outside Kyiv, one body was recently found stuffed beneath a manhole cover — from intercepted communications by Russian soldiers describing their own acts, or from surveillance cameras that before the war monitored traffic and deterred shoplifters. As the war nears the six-month mark, however, cases involving sexual assault are proving particularly resistant to documentation. A woman on a bicycle passes the home of S.'s slain neighbor in Makariv, Ukraine. (Kyrylo Svietashov / For The Times) The prosecutor general’s office said last week there are “several dozen” criminal proceedings underway involving sexual violence committed by Russian military personnel. But police, prosecutors and counselors say the true number is likely far larger, in part because of reluctance to report such attacks. “Sexual violence in this war is the most hidden crime,” Ukrainian civil-society activist Natalia Karbowska told the U.N. Security Council in June. A complex tangle of reasons underpins that silence. Some, like Tetiana, did not live to tell their stories. Some fled the country, joining an enormous exodus, and are not in contact with Ukrainian authorities. Others feel ashamed, clinging to the belief that they could somehow have prevented what befell them. Or a sexual attack might have taken place in the context of separate, overwhelming wartime loss: a home destroyed, a loved one killed. Still others look to the near-industrial-scale atrocities occurring elsewhere — daily bombardment of civilian areas; the deaths of dozens of Ukrainian POWs last month in what evidence suggests was a deliberate mass execution by Russian forces; reports of torture, detention and abductions in currently occupied areas – and convince themselves that they ought to quietly put their private agonies behind them. “They think others suffered more,” said Nadiia Volchenska, a 32-year-old Kyiv psychologist who co-founded a network that connects sexual assault victims with counselors. She said people who had been raped or sexually abused in the course of this conflict — most are women and girls, but many are men and boys — are often reluctant to speak even in confidence with a therapist, let alone go to police or other investigators and provide a detailed account. A fence damaged by Russian forces sits in front of S.'s home in Makariv, which was under Russian occupation early in the war on Ukraine. (Kyrylo Svietashov / For The Times) “Quite often, after making a first contact with us,” she said, “people will simply vanish.” Rape as a weapon is as old as war itself. The objective, say those who deal with such cases, is to humiliate and degrade, to break the spirit of defenders, to shatter families and communities, to instill a sense of hopelessness and despair. It often leaves wreckage too profound to repair. “Of course it is not about sexual gratification,” said Natalya Zaretska, a military psychologist by training who is currently a volunteer in the Territorial Defense Forces, working with people in the formerly occupied territories in the Kyiv oblast, or province. “Rape is one instrument that is used to try to achieve this goal of subjugation.” Ukrainian officials believe a Russian campaign of terrorism against civilians was sanctioned at the highest levels, rather than the work of rogue troops. The Kremlin has derided well-documented atrocities in occupied areas as a fabrication, so for Ukraine, compiling proof and moving ahead with prosecutions is considered vital, even if such a reckoning takes many years. “Evil must be punished, or it will spread,” said Andriy Nebytov, the police chief for the Kyiv region. Authorities are circumspect about the specifics of sexual assault cases under investigation, but in a statement in response to written questions from the Los Angeles Times, the prosecutor general’s office cited a few representative examples. In the town of Chernihiv, north of the capital, a Russian unit commander used “physical and psychological violence” against a 16-year-old girl, threatening to kill family members if she resisted his sexual advances, or to hand her over to others to be gang-raped instead. In Brovary, east of Kyiv, a serviceman has been indicted in absentia for repeatedly raping the wife of a slain civilian. In another case in that same district, soldiers singled out one woman for assault, herding others into a locked basement. Another, Ukrainian officials say, was raped with her young child nearby. In carefully couched language, the prosecutor’s office cited obstacles faced by investigators, including the need to protect the privacy of minors and to avoid re-traumatizing survivors. But sheer stigma was described as the overriding factor. “Women who have been raped,” the statement said, “do not want to spread such information about themselves.” Those who lived under Russian occupation earlier in the war describe a nauseating sense of constant fear. A damaged home in Makariv, Ukraine. (Kyrylo Svietashov / For The Times) S., who did not want even her full first name used because some of the troops who occupied Makariv back in March are still in Ukraine, is working with the authorities to try to identify those involved in Tetiana’s assault and death. Some of the occupiers addressed one another by names or nicknames, aiding in this process. On her smartphone, S. showed photos of individual soldiers sent to her by prosecutors, who for months have tracked the unit’s activities and obtained images of the suspects from social media and elsewhere. She recognized several, including ones who came regularly to her house and to Tetiana’s simple brick home next door to loot and carouse and threaten. She particularly feared one, a Chechen, whose erratic behavior made her think he was on drugs. When the Russians first arrived, S. was caring for her 90-year-old mother, who was in fragile health and adamantly refused to leave. But in the ensuing weeks, the soldiers’ violence and volatility persuaded her that they must seize any chance to escape. A neighbor man was shot by soldiers, eventually dying of his wounds, and S. was told his wife had been sexually assaulted. (That woman declined to speak with journalists about what had happened.) One day, a young soldier came to S.’s own house and tried to get her to go upstairs with him. Fearing he intended to rape her, she tried to dissuade him by noting the 30-year disparity in their ages. In the midst of this, other soldiers came to the house, telling the would-be assailant he was needed elsewhere, and he eventually left with them. S. felt a rush of terrified relief. On the day that she, her mother, Tetiana and a home health aide had been promised a ride to safety with a neighbor, her friend was nowhere to be found. Troops again burst into S.’s house, with one of them behaving bizarrely and demanding a bandage for an injury. After downing a shot of vodka, he blurted out news of her friend’s fate. In Makariv, S. still thinks often of her neighbor Tetiana, of her humor, her quirks, her determination. S. looks out at the house her friend once lived in, trying to picture her vibrant and alive. (Kyrylo Svietashov / For The Times) Soldiers refused to let her see Tetiana’s body, S. said. Eventually, a serviceman she believed to be an ethnic Buryat from Siberia offered to let her speak to someone he said knew the full story. That soldier told S. that Tetiana had been raped by several others, and that the Chechen was the one to stab and kill her. Ordered to bury the naked corpse, the soldier told S. they first wrapped the body in a blanket. “I felt shame that she is dead and I am still alive,” she said months later on a heat-heavy summer afternoon, brewing tea for visitors and keeping an eye on her mother dozing in an armchair nearby. “I have that guilt.” Rape counselors say that with many instances of assault having taken place early in the war, some of those people may be recovering their equilibrium enough to talk about what happened to them. “Sometimes we see this around six months later, the beginning of a willingness to open up,” said Volchenska, the Kyiv therapist. “But now we expect a wave of similar cases from Kherson” — a southern city seized by Russia early in the invasion, which Ukrainian forces hope to retake. “The problem is that you need to feel safe to talk,” she said. “And really nowhere in the country is safe.” In Makariv, S. still thinks often of Tetiana — her humor, her quirks, her determination. Every day, she looks out on the now-empty house her friend once lived in, trying to picture her vibrant and alive. She remembers Tetiana telling her about a dream she’d had, during the frightening days of occupation. “In it, she was on the cloud, flying,” S. said. “It was so peaceful. It was so good.” Copyright © 2022, Los Angeles Times

By Vincent Ni and agencies Former student leader among 29 pro-democracy activists entering same plea on subversion charges after more than a year in jail Joshua Wong arriving at court in Hong Kong, October 2020. Photograph: Kin Cheung/AP Joshua Wong and a group of 28 Hong Kong pro-democracy activists charged under a controversial national security law have entered guilty pleas, in the largest joint prosecution in the territory in recent years. A total of 47 defendants, aged 23 to 64, were charged with conspiracy to commit subversion under the sweeping national security law. They were detained in 2021 over their involvement in an unofficial primary election in 2020 that authorities said was a plot to paralyse Hong Kong’s government. At the time, the primary showed strong support for candidates willing to challenge the Beijing-backed local government. Among the 29 making guilty pleas on Thursday were well-known dissidents and activists including Wong, and Benny Tai, a legal scholar, Hong Kong media said. The two men are already serving sentences for protest-related convictions. The Chinese state-owned outlet, The Global Times, reported on Thursday that in addition to Wong and Tai, others who pleaded guilty included the former lawmakers Claudia Mo, Eddie Chu, and Alvin Yeung. The Chinese tabloid called those who pleaded guilty on Thursday “anti-China figures” and “separatist”. It quoted a Beijing-based legal scholar as saying: “Following [US house speaker Nancy] Pelosi’s provocative visit [to Taiwan] and the release of the latest white paper on the Taiwan question, I believe the crackdown on the separatists will be a continuous process.” Media reporting restrictions were finally lifted for the cases, which will start next month at Hong Kong’s high court. Defence lawyers have previously argued that prosecutors have not properly detailed what the conspiracy is that their clients are alleged to have taken part in. “The prosecution has been allowed to dance around and change and add [to the charges],” Gladys Li, a barrister, argued at one of the hearings. “We will not be held at gunpoint to offer a plea.” The case was decried by activists as a part of the steady deterioration of the special rights promised to the territory under a “one country, two systems” framework in 1997. About 2,000 Hong Kong residents have been detained, and the main opposition Apple Daily newspaper shut down since the pro-democracy protests in 2019. More people have been arrested over ensuing actions, including the Catholic cardinal Joseph Zen, 90, and political speech and public gatherings have been frozen by uncertainty about where the authorities’ red lines are set. In 2020, China responded to the protests by imposing the sweeping national security law, rounding up opposition figures in the media and civil society, and reorganising the local legislative council to ensure only pro-Beijing figures could hold office. Critics say the legislation has eviscerated Hong Kong’s freedoms and brought Chinese mainland-style laws into a business hub renowned for its common law legal system. With Associated Press and Agence France-Presse © 2022 Guardian News & Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

By Aleksandar Brezar & Euronews • Updated: 09/08/2022 A protester holding an historical Belarusian flag stands in front of police officers as they block a road in Minsk , 9 August 2020 - Copyright AP Photo Tuesday marks two years since the disputed presidential election in Belarus, which sparked a protest movement of unprecedented size in a country that has been labelled “the last dictatorship in Europe”. Alexander Lukashenko was declared the victor -- by a landslide -- in the August 9 2020 vote. In fact, he has been declared the winner of every presidential election held in the country since it split from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Many believe he has held onto this position by rigging elections. This was the accusation of the opposition in Belarus, and tens of thousands of the general public, who took to the streets following the 2020 election result. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who ran in the August 2020 presidential contest against Lukashenko following her husband's arrest, is thought by many to have won the election instead. "I want to applaud Belarusians and friends of Belarus around the world for carrying our torch of freedom. You made sure that our voices are heard," Tsikhanouskaya said in a Twitter post on the anniversary of the 2020 election on Tuesday. "On this Day of Solidarity with Belarus, two years after the stolen elections, I thank all who kept our light burning," she added. Tsikhanouskaya fled Belarus two days after the election when Lukashenko cracked down on the ongoing protests. Some 11 people were killed in the clashes with the Belarus police with at least six considered to be missing, and thousands of people were arrested. The European Union and the United States have branded the election fraudulent and imposed sanctions on high-ranking Belarusian officials for the violent repression of the mass pro-democracy demonstrations that followed the plebiscite. In the aftermath of the election, as many as 30,000 were arrested for protesting against Lukashenko's reelection, with some declaring they were subjected to torture. A 2020 United Nations Human Rights Office statement cited over 450 documented cases of torture and ill-treatment. The regime has also cracked down on independent media and non-profit organisations, branding them "extremist" outfits and ordering their closure. The death of Vitali Shishov, the director of the Belarusian House in Ukraine, in August 2021, also sparked fears that the KGB -- Belarus' intelligence agency that never changed its Soviet moniker -- might be intent on taking out people deemed dangerous to the Minsk regime. The arrest of journalist Roman Protasevich after his Ryanair flight to Vilnius was diverted to Minsk was seen as another act of persecution of any opponents of Lukashenko by any means available. 'Minsk regime threat to neighbours' The two years following the election have seen virtually the entire political opposition in Belarus locked up or forced to flee over the border, with Lukashenko and his government amending the constitution to give him even more executive powers than before. Additionally, the Minsk regime has introduced severe penalties for any dissenting voices, further made worse by Russia's 24 February invasion of Ukraine, in which Lukashenko played a role as Russian President Vladimir Putin's key ally in the region. Vocal opposition to Lukashenko is now punishable by death if the country's authorities -- considered to be completely under his control -- deem it an "act of terrorism". The EU has levied further sanctions on Lukashenko and his associates, while opponents of his regime have turned into outright saboteurs. The Railroad Partisan movement, which sprung from the opposition to Minsk's involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has seen the country's infrastructure regularly sabotaged to slow down or prevent the movement of Moscow troops as the Kremlin continues to use Belarus as a staging area for its attacks. Meanwhile, Tsikhanouskaya has led the opposition movement in exile, becoming even more vocal after her husband -- a notable blogger and Lukashenko critic -- was doled out an 18-year prison sentence in December 2021. For her fight against the Belarus strongman, Tsikhanouskaya has received many international plaudits, including European Parliament's Sakharov prize for human rights in 2020. David Sassoli, the European Parliament president, said at the time: “The strength of your spirit has shown the way to revolution, which has taken power in the country in 2020 and we pay tribute to you and to your resistance and to your perseverance.” Right before Russia's February invasion of Ukraine, Tsikhanouskaya told Euronews that “Belarus rule in regional security is crucial. "Our crisis that started in illegal elections and crackdowns spilt over the region,” she said. “The regime in Minsk became a threat to neighbours to the whole continent and it’s time to stop it right now.” Copyright © euronews 2022

By Geoffrey York, The Globe and Mail Kenyan presidential candidate Raila Odinga delivers an address to the nation at his campaign headquarters in downtown Nairobi on Aug. 16. (BEN CURTIS/THE ASSOCIATED PRESS) Losing candidate Raila Odinga has rejected the official results in Kenya’s presidential election, vowing to launch a legal challenge of the results in a move that throws the country into a new chapter of political turmoil. Mr. Odinga, who won 48.9 per cent of the vote, slightly behind the 50.5 per cent of president-elect William Ruto, said the results announced on Monday were “null and void” and must be quashed by the courts. “Kenya faces a grave legal and political crisis,” Mr. Odinga said on Tuesday in his first speech since the results were declared. He said the announcement was “a travesty and a blatant disregard of the constitution and the laws of Kenya.” He did not provide evidence for his rejection of the results, except to say that the election commission’s chairman, Wafula Chebukati, did not have the legal right to declare an election winner if a majority of the election commissioners have not approved his decision. This argument has been dismissed by Mr. Ruto and a number of legal experts. Mr. Odinga’s speech appeared to be co-ordinated with a nearly simultaneous press conference by four dissident election commissioners, broadcast to his audience just minutes before his speech. The dissident commissioners made points similar to those of Mr. Odinga, saying that the chairman did not have the power to issue the results without a consensus among the seven commissioners. Analysts noted, however, that the four dissidents had been nominated last year by Kenya’s outgoing president, Uhuru Kenyatta, who has strongly supported Mr. Odinga’s candidacy. The dissident commissioners did not offer any alternative vote tally. They also weakened their argument with a mathematical error that was quickly spotted by alert Kenyans. The commissioners claimed that the results contained an “absurdity” because the official vote percentages of the four presidential candidates added up to a total of 100.01 per cent of the 14.2 million votes. They said the discrepancy of 0.01 per cent would amount to 142,000 missing votes. But as many Kenyans pointed out, the discrepancy in fact was only 1,420 votes, and the total of 100.01 per cent itself was a normal result of rounding errors after each candidate’s percentage had been rounded. In another blow to the credibility of the dissidents, a report on Tuesday by the independent Elections Observation Group said the official results were “consistent with” the results of a parallel vote count, conducted by about 1,000 observers from the Kenyan-based group. Regardless of the numbers, Mr. Odinga’s decision to reject the official results is an ominous sign in a country that has a history of postelection violence. In another worrisome sign, Mr. Kenyatta himself has not commented on the results, raising concerns that the government too could reject the official outcome. An estimated 1,500 people were killed in postelection violence after the disputed 2007 election, and more than 100 died in violence after the 2017 election when the Supreme Court quashed the result because of irregularities. Kenya’s election last week was considered the most transparent and open in the country’s history. For the first time, the voting tallies from more than 46,000 voting stations were uploaded to the election commission’s public website, within hours of the vote. But the narrowness of the presidential contest and the country’s history of electoral irregularities has heightened the risk of disputes. Mr. Odinga and other Kenyans have a constitutional right to file a challenge to the official results within seven days, and the Supreme Court must issue a ruling within two weeks of the challenge. It has the power to nullify the results and order a new election, which it did in 2017. While some of Mr. Odinga’s supporters protested in the streets on Monday evening, the country was generally calm. But many analysts are worried that Mr. Odinga’s rejection of the results will spark political unrest and the risk of violence. Some Kenyan shops and businesses remained shuttered on Tuesday as a precaution against attacks. Despite rejecting the results, Mr. Odinga urged his supporters to remain calm and peaceful. “Let no one take the law into their own hands,” he said. The body of a missing election official, Daniel Musyoka, was discovered on Tuesday near Mount Kilimanjaro, far from his home base in Nairobi, and local media reported that his body had signs of torture. He had been missing since last Thursday. Police are investigating the case. Mr. Chebukati, the election commission chairman, said he had faced “intimidation and harassment” during the election. Some the commission’s staff were “arbitrarily arrested for unknown reasons,” he said. The election uncertainties have already contributed to a weakening of Kenya’s currency and bond markets over the past week. “Investors seem to be jittery,” London-based Capital Economics said in a commentary on Monday night. “Kenya’s fragile balance sheet – including a large current account deficit – mean that the economy is particularly vulnerable to a period of capital flight,” it said. Many African leaders have congratulated Mr. Ruto on his election victory, but most Western governments have been relatively quiet. The U.S. embassy in Kenya, in a statement late on Monday, said the official results were “an important milestone in the electoral process” and urged all parties to refrain from violence and settle any disputes through existing mechanisms. Charles Michel, president of the European Council, congratulated Mr. Ruto and referred to him as president-elect in a tweet on Tuesday, in a sign that the European Union accepts the official results. There was no statement on the Canadian government’s social-media accounts. © Copyright 2022 The Globe and Mail Inc.

Women hold a protest in Mullaitvu, Sri Lanka, demanding the return of those who were disappeared during the war. Photograph: KUMANAN/Kumanan In 2009, the armed forces of the Sinhalese majority government defeated the Tamil separatists of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The UN estimated that the civil war cost over 80,000 lives. Sri Lanka remains deeply divided ethnically and politically today. The root causes of the conflict can be traced back to the differential treatment of Sinhalese and Tamils under British colonial rule and then under the Sinhalese dominated government. In 1948, the Ceylon Parliament passed the Ceylon Citizenship Act, which stripped over 700,000 Tamils of their citizenship. 300,000 Indian Tamils were deported to India. In 1956, Parliament passed the Sinhala Only Act, which made Sinhala the only official language. Tamil was finally added as an official language in 1987. In the 1970's the Policy of Standardization discriminated against Tamils in university admissions. Tamil separatists formed the LTTE in 1983, demanding creation of Tamil Eelam, a separate state for Tamils in the North and East. The 26-year civil war witnessed atrocities by both sides. The LTTE used human shields, recruited child soldiers, and forced girls to blow themselves up in suicide bombings. The Sri Lankan army, under Defense Minister Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his brother President Mahindra Rajapaksa, tortured and murdered civilians suspected of being LTTE supporters. Near the end of the war, government troops shelled areas where Tamils had fled, killing tens of thousands. Michelle Bachelet, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, has been authorized to collect evidence of war crimes committed in Sri Lanka during the civil war. However, like its predecessors, Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s government refused to cooperate with any accountability. President Rajapaksa marked May 18, the day the war ended, as National War Heroes Day. Many Tamils commemorate the day as Tamils Genocide Day. Rajapaksa’s regime promoted extremist Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. Tamil Hindu and Muslim minorities continue to face systemic discrimination and police brutality. Muslims were forced to cremate bodies of Muslim Covid-19 victims. Government officials proposed banning Madrasas (religious schools) and the Niqab (face veil). Since 2017, towns such as Digana and Ampara have witnessed anti-Muslim mob violence. Anti-terrorism laws, including the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), have been perverted to arbitrarily target and detain Muslims without charge. In 2022 the country is going through one of its worst economic crises. It defaulted on a multi-million pound foreign debt payment. Petrol stations ran out of gasoline. Annual inflation hit 70 percent. The crisis sparked mass protests against Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s government. In July 2022, thousands of protesters stormed Sri Lanka's presidential palace and Parliament and ousted both Rajapaksa brothers. Very few Tamils participated in the protests due to a divergence in goals from Sinhalese protestors. Sri Lanka remains ethnically segregated. Genocide Watch recognizes the discriminatory laws and hate campaigns against Sri Lankan minorities as Stage 3: Discrimination, Stage 5: Organization, stage 6: Polarization, and Stage 8: Persecution. President Rajapaksa’s appointment of polarizing war criminals to his cabinet promoted impunity and Stage 10: Denial. Genocide Watch recommends the following: Sri Lanka should cooperate with the United Nations Human Rights Commission’s investigation of war crimes during the civil war, and domestic courts should prosecute crimes committed by all sides. Sri Lanka should reform enforcement of its Prevention of Terrorism Act and stop targeting its Muslim population. Future leaders of Sri Lanka should work with the Tamil National Alliance to overcome ethnic divisions. NGOs should focus on local peacebuilding to unite the Sri Lankan people across ethnic divisions.

Burkinabe army soldiers in the Soum region of northern Burkina Faso on Nov. 12, 2019. - © Africanews MICHELE CATTANI/AFP or licensors. Two human rights organizations have denounced the "summary and extrajudicial executions" of "more than 40" people" carried out in early August in Tougouri, in northern Burkina Faso, involving, according to them, the Burkinabe armed forces, in two statements published Sunday. The government "refuted" these "allegations" while indicating that the army had initiated "an investigation to verify the veracity and accuracy of these allegations. "The Collective Against Impunity and Stigmatization of Communities (CISC) has been informed since Monday, August 8, by several witnesses and relatives of victims in the Tougouri commune, specifically in the village of Taffogo in the Centre-North region, of several cases of abductions followed by summary and extrajudicial executions," the human rights organization said in a statement. "In total, more than 40 bodies were later found along the Taffogo-Bouroum road," CISC said, adding that "all of the people killed had their hands tied and were blindfolded". According to the organization, corroborating testimonies describe "the alleged perpetrators of these abductions followed by systematic executions as elements of the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) dressed in black and hooded". Estimating, for its part, that "more than fifty unarmed civilians" were "abducted in Tougouri and summarily executed on the road to Bouroum by the FDS," the Observatory for Human Dignity (ODH) "condemned with the utmost energy these barbaric acts, unworthy of our time". According to the ODH, citing local sources, "almost all the victims were Fulani, including women and children". Some of the victims were arrested at the Tougouri market and others at home. "The authorities are being strongly challenged about the resurgence of these iniquitous, barbaric practices, unworthy of a republican army and which have contributed to plunging Burkina Faso into this situation of security crisis," the organization said. The collective called on "certain elements of the FDS to stop the practice of kidnapping civilians with their bare hands followed by summary and extrajudicial executions under the false pretext of fighting terrorism". He called on the head of state to "reframe the action of those soldiers who summarize the fight against terrorism to a simple extermination of villages occupied by a specific community". "The government refutes and condemns, with the utmost energy, these allegations which discredit the army which remains republican and resolutely committed to the fight against terrorism and to guaranteeing the peace and security of the population," its spokesman, Lionel Bilgo, told AFP. "The army has already launched an investigation to verify the veracity and accuracy of these allegations. If, however they are founded, the army (...) will draw all the consequences", assured Mr. Bilgo, who is also Minister of National Education. In a statement issued at the end of June, the army had "reminded some of its elements, including volunteers for the defense of the country (civilian auxiliaries), to respect the principles of the army," Mr. Bilgo said. Regularly accused of extrajudicial executions, the Burkinabe army has always denied this, sometimes pointing to armed groups that use military equipment. © 2022 Africanews

By Sarah Dadouch A Saudi man carries his coffee pot as he walks past a banner showing Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman outside a mall in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, in February 2020. (Amr Nabil/AP) BEIRUT — Saudi Arabia has executed 120 people in the first six months of 2022, according to a rights organization, nearly double the number put to death in all of last year despite its promises to reduce capital punishment. As early as 2018, Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, spoke of curtailing the death penalty, one of a string of public promises made by the young prince as he ramped up efforts to modernize the kingdom. After a major drop in 2020, 65 people were put to death in 2021; then in just the first six months of this year, the number of executions nearly doubled. By June, the numbers for this year had exceeded those of 2020 and 2021 combined, according to a statement from the European Saudi Organization for Human Rights (ESOHR) sent to media Aug. 9. “If Saudi Arabia continues to execute people at the same pace during the second half of 2022, they will reach an unprecedented number of executions, exceeding the record high of 186 executions in 2019,” the report stated. The year 2020 saw a dramatic decline in executions: The government-run Human Rights Commission said only 27 took place that year, compared with a record number the year before. Rights groups and activists treated the news with caution, with the ESOHR and Reprieve saying in a joint statement in early 2021 that the decline could be partly be attributed to the lockdown in 2020 from February to April, during which “the government carried out no executions due to restrictions to control the virus.” Most of the executions in 2022 took place on one day in March when 81 men were put to death in the single largest mass execution in years. New York-based Human Rights Watch quoted activists as saying that 41 of those killed belonged to the Shiite sect of Islam, whose adherents are largely seen as heretics by many hard-line Sunni Muslims in Saudi Arabia. Shiites have long complained of marginalization in the country and are viewed with suspicion by many Sunnis, who often see them as sympathizers of rival Iran, the world’s largest Shiite country. The ESOHR found that in the March mass execution, which the group said was the largest in Saudi history, 58 of the 81 men were executed for nonlethal offenses, and 41 were executed for participation in pro-democracy protests. None of the bodies were returned to the families, the group added. Families typically push to retrieve bodies of those executed but are frequently faced with stonewalling from the government. One reason may be that public funerals could turn into protests or the graves could become rallying points. In a statement that announced the mass execution in March, the Interior Ministry said the order was to carry out death sentences for “those who had embraced deviant thought, and other deviant methods and beliefs.” It linked some of the men to terrorist activities. Last August, seven United Nations officials penned a letter to the Saudi government concerning the cases of two Shiite men, Mohammed al-Shakhouri and Asaad Shubbar, who had been sentenced to death. The letter — signed by the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, among others — said the trials of the two men “did not meet due process guarantees and [were] for crimes which do not appear to meet the ‘most serious crimes’ threshold as required under international law.” The two men were part of March’s mass execution. The ESOHR said this decision “exemplifies the opacity in Saudi Arabia’s criminal justice system.” According to the ESOHR’s data, collated from government announcements, 72 of this year’s executions were for “discretionary offenses,” crimes not specified in Islamic law, despite promises by Mohammed to end the use of the death penalty for such offenses. Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism law has long been criticized by the United Nations. To make matters murkier, punishments often depend on the judge’s discretion, leading to inconsistency and arbitrariness in verdicts. Saudi Arabia says it is in the process of codifying its laws. In February, the crown prince announced plans to approve a set of four new draft laws, including personal status law and the penal code for crimes whose punishments are not detailed in Islamic law. While no men have been executed so far this year for crimes committed as minors, human rights groups have been raising the alarm for a while about several cases, namely that of Abdullah al-Howaiti, who is on death row after being convicted of robbing a jewelry store of more than $200,000 in gold, wounding two employees and fatally shooting a police officer. He was 14 at the time of the crime. Another case is that of Jalal Labbad, who faces charges including participation in demonstrations when he was 15 years old. The ESOHR said Labbad was arrested and his house raided in 2017 without an arrest warrant nor an accusation before the raid, and was later denied his right to legal counsel and subjected to many forms of torture and ill-treatment. © 1996-2022 The Washington Post Link to article: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/15/saudi-arabia-executions-double-2022/

Violent Incidents and Reporting Bias in the South Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of Congo from 2017 to 2022 This report was published by The Journal of Political Risk on August 10, 2022. To fully view the data used and analyzed to produce this report, you can access the original version of the report via the link below: https://www.jpolrisk.com/why-the-un-fails-to-prevent-mass-atrocities/ Authors: Delphin Ntanyoma (Erasmus University) Fidele Sebahizi (Liberty University) Prosper Baseka wa Baseka (Bircham International University) A MONUSCO delegation in Fizi, one of the territories affected by recent violence, March 16, 2019. (MONUSCO/Jacob de Lange) 1. Introduction This study includes preliminary analysis of 324 violent incidents in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) recorded by Kivu Security Tracker (KST) and 29 reports of the United Nations Peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, known as Mission de Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation du Congo (MONUSCO).[1] Since its creation and deployment in 1999, MONUSCO is now facing unprecedented protests as local populations in Eastern DRC are demanding its immediate withdrawal. Between July 25 and July 26, 2022, protesters from the main cities in North Kivu and South Kivu stormed MONUSCO bases in Beni, Butembo, Goma, and Uvira to express their anger at the 22-year-long UN mission’s failure to stabilize the region. Following these incidents, including the one that took place at the Uganda-DRC border, it is believed that 32 civilians and 4 peacekeepers died. The demonstrations have raised concerns over when the mission will be successful in a region where armed groups keep growing in number from dozens to hundreds. Despite the presence of the largest peacekeeping mission, local populations in the Eastern DRC face daily violence either committed by non-state or state actors. We share the view that blame for the failure to stabilize the region lies primarily with the Congolese rulers/elite, and MONUSCO on a secondary level. Within this broad debate, this study (working paper) takes a step further to assess if the mission understands the complex nature of violence in this region. The following study includes a preliminary analysis of 324 violent incidents committed in Eastern DRC that were recorded by KST, and 29 reports that were recorded by MONUSCO. To give a rough idea of MONUSCO’s capacity, an example below indicates this challenge. From October 13 to 15 last year, a large and local coalition of Congolese armed groups, known as MaiMai/Biloze Bishambuke believed to ally with Burundian rebels, attacked Banyamulenge civilians and destroyed a dozen villages in an area called Bibokoboko (sometimes spelled Bibogobogo). During the attack, local sources have indicated that 25 people were killed, several properties damaged, and perpetrators took 52 civilians as hostages. The 52 civilians included 30 children, 18 women and 4 men who were mostly above 55 years old.[2] Instead of framing[3] this specific incident as an attack against Banyamulenge civilians, KST recorded that the local armed groups, known as MaiMai/Biloze Bishambuke,[4] attacked other Congolese armed groups known as Gumino/Twirwaneho. Moreover, rather than recording the 25 deaths, KST only recorded four killings . In lieu of the 52 Banyamulenge civilian hostages, KST recorded the civilian hostages as 40 Twirwaneho combatants. Three to four months after the Bibokoboko attack, and as a result of the authors’ discussion with KST’s representative, the latter reviewed and revised the report. As a result, KST reframed the attack by changing the number and the status of hostages: 40 combatants Twirwaneho to 52 civilians. Such framing, considering children and women as armed combatants, prompted our deeper analysis of these records. The Bibokoboko’s case is one of the many incidents which the findings discussed below were drawn from. MONUSCO, KST and the DRC government did not immediately respond to a request for comment. 2. Background MONUSCO is considered to be the largest UN mission across the globe. Deployed in DRC since 1999, there are still many concerns around the effectiveness of this mission because the DRC, and mostly its eastern part, has remained unstable. Besides the proliferation of armed groups, some of which are locally based, the Eastern DRC has seen the emergence of terrorist groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) operating in North-Kivu. Hundreds of local armed groups and others originating from DRC’s neighboring countries have been committing violence against civilians in Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, and Tanganyinka provinces. Specifically, the Eastern DRC region has been characterized by violence targeting some minority ethnic groups on the ground that they are not “real Congolese”. For instance, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) warned in 2020 that violence targeting the Hema of Ituri may constitute acts of genocide (see the report here, p.23). Despite UNJHRO’s warning, violence has continued against this ethnic group in Ituri while the Congolese security services, including the national army and police, have failed to put an end to these specific atrocities, regardless of MONUSCO’s support. Similarly, the Banyamulenge ethnic group in South Kivu are experiencing violence divergently interpreted as inter-ethnic confrontation or a slow genocide while the contestation of their nationality has been among core motives to attack members of this community. The Banyamulenge inhabit the Southern South Kivu, Fizi, Mwenga, and Uvira territories. Briefly, the socio-cultural context of this region indicates that it is inhabited by ethnic groups categorized, since the colonial period, into “native” and “newcomer” populations. This is part of a misclassification linked to the “Hamitic Hypothesis” [5]. Hence, Babembe, Banyindu, Bafuliro and Bavira ethnic groups are considered as “native/first occupants” while the Banyamulenge and Barundi communities are labelled as “newcomers/immigrants”. Following lengthy political manipulation, the “immigrant” communities ended up being viewed as “invaders” who had to be chased from “others’” territory/land. The protection of land and chasing invaders have been among the core motives to mobilize young men for the use of violence. As violence continues, each ethnic group has apparently established its own armed group, defined sometimes as self-defense groups. Therefore, MaiMai and Biloze Bishambuke are largely armed (“self-defense”) groups affiliated with, and having the aim to protect, Babembe, Banyindu, Bafuliro, and Bavira communities. On the other hand, Gumino and Twirwaneho are widely seen as groups affiliated and established to protect the Banyamulenge community. In a broad sense, the “native-immigrant” dichotomy determines the way armed groups coalesce as heterogeneous. MaiMai/Biloze Bishambuke groups coalesced to counter-attack the Banyamulenge, while Gumino/Twirwaneho is believed to counter-attack MaiMai/Biloze Bishambuke. Since 2017, Burundian rebels in South Kivu have however entered the battle and allied with MaiMai/Biloze Bishambuke to attack the Banyamulenge, whether civilians or their affiliated groups. As violence in this region revolves around the dichotomy and chasing Banyamulenge “invaders”, our analysis investigates the capacity of MONUSCO to understand this complexity of historical violence. 3. Methodology and Research question Here, we seek to understand MONUSCO’s capacity to capture historical grievances and motives that drive violence against minority ethnic groups in Eastern DRC, particularly the Banyamulenge. The scope of the study focuses on violence around the Banyamulenge; hence, the analysis focuses on violent incidents that took place in Uvira, Mwenga (Itombwe), and Fizi territories. Territories were purposively selected based on the objective of this paper. As we could not access MONUSCO’s detailed accounts of incidents that back their summarized reports, the analysis relies on the mission’s quarterly reports covering the period between March 2015 and March 2022. The timeframe choice reflects a period of turmoil in the Africa Great Lakes region linked to either contested or delayed presidential elections in Burundi and the DRC. MONUSCO reports are supplemented by detailed accounts of violent incidents recorded by the Kivu Security Tracker (KST). Since 2017, KST has been recording violent incidents in Eastern DRC, including the region of interest, the Southern South Kivu.[6] In total, the analysis builds on 29 MONUSCO’s reports, and 324 incidents recorded by KST. The selection of violent incidents and reports was largely systematic. By systematic compilation, we intend to collect as many violent incidents recorded by KST during this period and in these specific territories, but also review the connection across different reports. [7] Broadly, the study aims to answer the following central question: “To what extent does the UN peacekeeping mission understand the complex nature of Eastern DRC violent conflicts including historical violence against minority groups portrayed as “invaders”? The material here includes content analysis methodology. The analysis departs from delving into the framing of violent incidents to understand why the inter-ethnic community perspective remains the dominant one. Next to the framing, we analyzed how KST identifies perpetrators and incidents, and in the process misconstrues or omits them for unknown reasons. While being reflexive [8] on our own positionalities as native of the region and members of one its communities, we believe that local knowledge and experience of being researchers have contributed to enhance the argument of this paper and provide alternative accounts. 4. Key Preliminary findings: Proxy Analysis In terms of perpetrators, the KST data we analyzed to reflect MONUSCO’s records of incidents are distributed as follows in Table 1. To see the results in Table 1, you can access the full article here: https://www.jpolrisk.com/why-the-un-fails-to-prevent-mass-atrocities/ KST’s incidents analyzed took place between 2017-2022. As table 1 shows, 119 of incidents were committed by Gumino/Twirwaneho-Makanika and their ‘allies’; 112 of incidents were committed by MaiMai/Biloze Bishambuke, in some cases associated with Burundian rebels, namely Red-Tabara; 61 of incidents were committed by perpetrators labeled “unidentified armed men”; 25 of incidents were committed by the Congolese national army (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo). The key preliminary findings shared here are from insights we gained by cross-checking MONUSCO’s reports with KST’s records of violent incidents. The findings can be summarized in the following arguments. Regardless of evidence that Burundian rebels operated in South Kivu since 2015 and have allied with local MaiMai and Biloze Bishambuke (affiliated to the Babembe, Banyindu, Bafuliro, and Bavira ethnic communities), the former groups were loosely referred to by MONUSCO reports as rather allied to Banyamulenge affiliated groups while KST has started to mention them at the end of the first quarter of 2021. From our local knowledge, 2021 coincides with the period when Red-Tabara released several communiques shared in social media. During this period, MaiMai/Biloze Bishambuke and Red-Tabara launched many attacks to destroy Banyamulenge villages in Uvira territory. On the other hand, our findings reveal that MONUSCO and KST have largely understated the destruction of villages, overshadowing how burning villages has forced thousands to flee their localities towards tiny areas where many civilians have been confined. In a few cases, only KST mentioned that houses were burnt down in a soft sense, and one might think of it as part of collateral damage next to armed attacks. However, experiences starting in 2017 have shown that burning villages was a largely systematic tactic and part of a larger strategy to wipe out the groups portrayed as “foreigners”, namely the Banyamulenge and Barundi communities. Moreover, the destruction of villages has pushed thousands to move into Internally Displaced People (IDP) sites or live in tiny areas where living conditions reflect besiegement. Those besieged and/or living in IDP sites have been regularly attacked and prevented from accessing their outside sources of livelihood, including farmland. Failing to acknowledge the intention, systematic nature, and effects of burning villages and subsequent encircling and besiegement of communities blurs the danger to civilians living under constant attack without protection. In the same vein, KST’s records and MONUSCO’s reports have paid little attention to cattle-looting, while this too is a military strategy to reward combatants. Next to the destruction of villages, forced displacement, besiegement and burning of crops, cattle-looting has become a widespread phenomenon in recent years. These phenomena have impoverished the Banyamulenge. For instance, in 43 incidents perpetrated by MaiMai/Biloze Bishambuke (sometimes associated with Burundian rebels), KST has recorded in specific terms only 3,227 cows looted. However, according to KST recorded incidents we analyzed, Gumino/Twirwaneho have stolen 470 cows in 2 incidents while unidentified armed men have stolen 463 cows. Local sources with reliable details have indicated that around 250-300,000 Banyamulenge’s cattle were plundered during this period and sold in different local markets. We question such understated figures about what constitutes a main source of income and livelihood for some local communities. Failing to understand this phenomenon can only harm those whose livelihood relies heavily on cattle. Failing to capture this phenomenon serves the interests of the perpetrators who have relied on cattle to mobilize resources to reward combatants. In this specific context, records and reports do not clearly refer to the ambiguous role played by security services, namely the FARDC. While 2017 violence took place in a highly volatile context, FARDC military officers and generals have played a role in fueling violence while instructing FARDC units to remain “neutral” in the face of the destruction of communities they have an obligation to protect. However, it is hard to capture this ambiguous role of the FARDC. Building on incidents we know, in which we suspect FARDC elements were involved in attacks, KST records tend to describe perpetrators as unidentified armed men. Failing to name or identify perpetrators has sometimes occurred to blur victims’ identity (we base this common assumption on the fact that MaiMai/Biloze Bishambuke would attack Banyamulenge while Gumino/Twirwaneho would attack Babembe, Banyindu, Bafuliro, and Bavira).The two following examples (among others) can give an idea of the argument above : On 30.06.2021, KST recorded that “An unidentified armed man killed a man in Madegu [Minembwe] village in Fizi territory. The victim did not obey the order to stop”. On one hand, the framing is questionable because it blames the victim as someone who refused to obey an order while unable to identify who was giving the order. Secondly, local sources and authors’ records corroborate the fact that the incident happened midday, the perpetrators were FARDC soldiers and the victim, whose name we know, was a member of the Banyamulenge community. [9] On this specific date and in the same village of Madegu, FARDC also killed 4 Banyamulenge women involved in a peaceful protest. [10] Similarly, KST recorded on 05.02.2022 that “The FARDC attacked unidentified armed men who were trying to rustle cattle at the village of Mikenge in Mwenga territory. The FARDC chased away these assailants”. On this incident, local sources and authors’ records can show that the attack targeted primarily Banyamulenge civilians who live in an IDP site of Mikenke. Since 2019, the IDP site has been attacked more than 5 times as perpetrators killed or wounded displaced Banyamulenge inside the site. Meanwhile, there have been more than 20 attacks targeting their cattle, almost entirely decimated now. [11] Perpetrators are groups of MaiMai/Biloze Bishambuke (sometimes allied to Burundian rebels), a situation which cannot be considered new to KST. Violence in this region has largely revolved around hate speech propaganda. Prominent political figures and members of civil society invite people to commit violence and thereby mobilize combatants using hate speech. While hate speech intends to dehumanize victims, and is thus important to understanding whether the crime of genocide is being committed, there has been little attention paid to this by either MONUSCO or KST. As largely documented, hate speech discourse has intended to harm mostly the Banyamulenge community. In such contexts where the Banyamulenge are largely targeted by hate speech and propaganda, we found rather systematic biases towards negating their civilian status. Our preliminary findings show that 57% of MaiMai/Biloze Bishambuke attacks are described by KST as clashes between armed groups (against Gumino/Twirwaneho) while 13% are framed as attacks against civilians. Meanwhile, more than 80% of these attacks perpetrated by MaiMai/Biloze Bishambuke have taken place in villages inhabited by mostly civilians. On the other side, 23% of Gumino/Twirwaneho attacks are described as clashes between groups (against MaMai/Biloze Bishambuke) while 47% are succinctly described as attacks against civilians. On top of that and next to other loopholes, we found that victims of attacks perpetrated by MaiMai/Biloze Bishambuke are largely painted as “men” or “people” while victims of attacks perpetrated by Gumino/Twirwaneho are described in disaggregated forms as men, women, children, and elders. We believe that Gumino/Twirwaneho are presented as more violent and likely to target civilians, as compared to MaiMai/Biloze Bishambuke groups. This comes from KST’s systematic framing of the Banyamulenge community. 5. Conclusion Besides the key insights shared in section 4, our analysis indicates that violent incidents in the South Kivu region of the DRC are recorded in an ahistorical and biased manner that is largely disconnected from the socio-political context. Many of the incidents are reported as an armed group attack in which motives and history are unclear for almost the entire period covered in this analysis. Even in MONUSCO’s reports, it is mostly described as “renewed inter-community violence”, simply as such. Hence, official records indicate fighting for the sake of fighting, while leaving a vacuum in terms of local grievances, causes, tactics, strategies, and goals of the violence. For instance, 2019 attacks in Minembwe were largely motivated by the contestation of the Minembwe Rural Municipality due to how MaiMai/Biloze Bishambuke consider beneficiaries of the Municipality as being Banyamulenge “foreigners”. However, MONUSCO’s reports and KST’s records have failed to sufficiently focus upon these motives to help readers, including key decision-makers, understand the root causes of conflict. Readers who are unfamiliar with the area could conclude that its combatants simply enjoy fighting, which is far from the truth. Whether legitimate or not, armed groups have claims when fighting. Though the two groups discussed throughout the paper, MaiMai/Biloze Bishambuke and Gumino/Twirwaneho, claim to defend their communities against each other, the root cause lies in the contestation of the Banyamulenge as Congolese citizens. As previously mentioned, the former believe to be “native,” entitled with specific rights to manage land and local authorities. They accuse the Banyamulenge of being “foreigners” or “immigrants”. Twirwaneho/Gumino, on the other hand, claim to be “native” and contest other ethnic communities on the basis that they are “foreigners” or “immigrants.” Within such a complex violent setting, coupled with other motives, violence in this region is largely motivated by the desire to equally belong to the Congolese state. This explains the basis of the above community-based armed groups to defend their respective causes. This is an on-going analysis. Many of the issues analyzed here have consequences for vulnerable groups, including Banyamulenge civilians. Failing to account for the presence of foreign armed groups, consequences of forced displacement coupled with besiegement, the risks associated with cattle-looting and impoverishment, as well as the portrayal of Banyamulenge civilians as combatants, will have massively harmful impacts on this community. These consequences could inevitably worsen the future of additional vulnerable groups in the area. Decision-making should be based on a proper assessment of the socio-cultural, security, and political context. Our preliminary findings shed light on challenges facing the UN peacekeeping mission and how its intervention can fail to prevent mass atrocities. Delphin Ntanyoma holds a PhD degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from Erasmus University Rotterdam/Institute of Social Studies (Netherlands). Delphin’s research focuses on micro-level violent conflicts in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). He is the author of Behind the Scenes of Banyamulenge Military’: Momentum, Myth, and Extinction, (Harmattan 2019), co-author of Expressive violence and the slow genocide of the Banyamulenge of South Kivu (Ethnicities, 2022: Vol. 22(3) 374 –403) and other articles, including in The Eastern Congo Tribune, which he edits. Fidele Sebahizi is a PhD student at Liberty University, Virginia, United States, with a focus on criminal justice and homeland security. Fidele has a master’s degree in Criminal Justice and was born and raised in the village of Bijombo, Uvira territory, Democratic Republic of Congo. Prosper Baseka wa Baseka is currently doing his PhD studies in Anthropology at Bircham International University. Born and raised in Minembwe, South Kivu, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Prosper has a master’s degree in museology. He has worked as a curator and archivist, and has extensive experience in memorial and ethnography museums. Footnotes [1] Conference of the International Network of Genocide Scholars (INoGS), held in Mexico City from June 26 to June 28, 2022. We thank those who provided comments and suggestions. [2] Anonymous interviews, 2022. [3] By framing, this paper refers to the selection of some features within a complex setting to attract the attention of a given audience (see Entman, 1993; Papacharissi and De Fatima Oliveira, 2008; Autesserre, 2012 among others). In this discussion, we consider that the framing has attracted (or not) and influenced largely the decision-making of the UN Security Council. [4] The group changed its name from Biloze Bishambuke being a local defense to Forces Armées Biloze Bishambuke (FABB), implying that its nature has roughly changed. [5] The “Hamitic Hypothesis” refers to the legacy of colonialism that polarized local communities in the Africa Great Lakes region into “Bantu” and “Hamitic/Nilotic”. The former were allegedly considered as “first occupants” who are agriculture oriented while the latter, cattle-herders mostly, were misclassified as “immigrants” (see details in Edith Sanders, 1969). Specifically, in the Africa Great Lakes region and the Banyamulenge, see among others Nigel Eltringham (2006), and Delphin R. Ntanyoma (2020). [6] Many of these incidents are accessible on the KST’s website”: https://kivusecurity.org/. For details on how KST collects, analyzes, and crosschecks information, see ― verify its information shared on its website, follow this link: https://kivusecurity.org/static/KST_Methodology_Nov2017.pdf. [7] As part of our future triangulation and integration of the data, we are considering the incorporation of UN group of Experts’ reports on DRC (2015-2022)into the analysis. [8] By reflexivity, the article refers to situating oneself and being conscious of how one’s position can influence the outcome of the research during the process of knowledge production. For details on the meaning of reflexivity and positionality, see for instance Jonathan Harvey (2013), Hervik (1994) among others. [9] Anonymous interviews, 2022. [10] While we are still working to find out how the killing of women was recorded, our analysis has also shown that the killing of Banyamulenge women was possibly recorded late as authors raised this debate. [11] Anonymous interviews, 2022. © The Journal of Political Risk

By RFE/RL's Turkmen Service Atamurad Saparov was one of the activists trying to deliver a letter at the consulate in Istanbul on August 16. (Source: Turkmen Helsinki Foundation) Five Turkmen rights activists say they were attacked on the grounds of the Turkmen Consulate in Istanbul as they tried to hand in a letter addressed to President Serdar Berdymukhammedov to protest the human rights situation in the extremely isolated and tightly controlled Central Asian state. The Turkmen Helsinki Human Rights Foundation (THF) said on August 16 that the activists, two women and three men, accompanied with their Turkish lawyer, Gulden Sonmez, came to the consulate that day and told the security that they had come to deliver a letter from exiled Turkmen rights activists to the president. After being allowed to enter the consulate grounds, they say they were attacked by six men, identifying one of the attackers as consulate employee Merdan Mustakov. Two of the activists, Dursoltan Taganova and Atamurat Saparov, who sustained serious head injuries during the confrontation, were taken to the police. Turkmenistan is one of the most repressive countries in the world. Serdar Berdymukhammedov took over the former Soviet republic in March after his authoritarian father, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, ruled the country with an iron fist from 2006. Last year, dozens of Turkmen activists residing abroad held protests in Turkey, the United States, and the European Union calling on the international community to pay more attention to the situation regarding human rights and civil freedoms in Turkmenistan. © 2022 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty RFE/RL, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Milica Stojanovic - Belgrade - BIRN - August 3, 2022 Bozidar Delic, who commanded the Yugoslav Army’s 549th Motorised Brigade, which was involved in large-scale killings during the Kosovo conflict, was elected as one of the seven vice-presidents of new Serbian parliament. First sitting of the new Serbian parliament in Belgrade on Monday. Photo: EPA-EFE/ANDREJ CUKIC. Bozidar Delic, a retired Yugoslav Army general who was commander of the 549th Motorised Brigade, which was involved in some of most notorious attacks on villages in Kosovo in 1999, was elected as one of seven vice-presidents of the Serbian parliament late on Tuesday night. Delic was proposed for the position as the right-wing opposition NADA (Hope) coalition’s candidate. He is one of three opposition vice-presidents and was elected with 197 votes, which included votes from ruling and opposition parties. The Humanitarian Law Centre NGO published a file in 2013 containing the most comprehensive documentation so far of the eight military offensives involving the 549th Brigade of the Yugoslav Army in Kosovo villages in March and April 1999, which resulted in a total of 885 deaths. In an attack on the villages of Meja and Korenica on April 27, 1999, troops, police and paramilitaries, including soldiers of the 549th Brigade, killed at least 377 civilians, 36 of whom were under 18 years old. The Serbian war crimes prosecutor’s office told BIRN in 2013 that Delic has been under investigation more than once. He was never indicted. He has never denied being commander of the 549th Brigade, but has denied committing war crimes. “I know what was happening in my area of responsibility. I was always in the first line of attack,” Delic told the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugsolavia, claiming however that he had “no knowledge of the mass killings of Albanians”. Spaeking about another Yugoslav Army assault on the village of Landovica on March 26, 1999, Delic told the Serbian Commission for Cooperation with the ICTY that the attack was launched in response to the Kosovo Liberation Army’s killing of his soldiers. “I ordered the engagement of an entire army squadron… and ordered Major Nikolic to send one tank,” Delic wrote in a statement to the commission, explaining that the village was a base for “terrorists”. Delic retired in 2005 and later a become member of the nationalist Serbian Radical Party. When Tomislav Nikolic and Aleksandar Vucic, who were both later to serve as president of Serbia, left the Radical Party and set up the Serbian Progressive Party, Delic was one of the people who joined them. However, he left the Progressive Party in 2011 and returned to the Radical Party, but then left again in 2020. He has been a Serbian MP multiple times since 2007, and he has twice served as parliamentary vice-president. While in office, President Slobodan Milosevic honoured the 549th Brigade for its role in the war in Kosovo, giving the brigade a People’s Hero medal for the “heroic defence of the country”. Copyright BIRN 2015