A Turkish-owned oil tanker that recently visited a Russian port was heavily damaged by explosions off the coast of Senegal last Thursday. While Kyiv has not claimed responsibility for the attack, the bombing follows a campaign targeting ships accused of belonging to Russia’s “shadow fleet” – raising suspicions that the Ukraine war has spread all the way to West Africa. By: Sébastian SEIBT Dec. 3, 2025 The oil tanker Mersin was hit by a series of explosions off the coast of Dakar, Senegal on November 27, 2025. © Studio graphique France Médias Monde Does the long arm of Ukraine’s intelligence services stretch all the way to Senegal ? Kyiv has come under suspicion of pursuing the fight against Moscow all the way to Africa's Atlantic coast after a series of explosions ripped through the Mersin oil tanker  – accused of belonging to Russia’s “shadow fleet” – off the shores of Dakar last Thursday. The Turkish-owned Mersin , which was sailing under a Panamanian flag and carrying nearly 39,000 tonnes of fuel, was hit from outside by four explosions, the ship’s operator Besiktas Shipping confirmed on Monday . No one on board was hurt. A legitimate target? “The situation was immediately brought under control, and we confirm that all crew members are safe; there are no injuries, no loss of life and no pollution,” Besiktas Shipping said in a statement. The company added that the cause of the explosions remained unclear. Suspicion immediately fell on Ukraine , which has not claimed responsibility for the attack. Kyiv’s silence is unsurprising – the oil tanker is not on any list of sanctioned vessels. “Under the law of armed conflict, belligerents must distinguish between civilian and military targets,” said Basil Germond, a specialist in international and maritime security at the University of Lancaster. “That said, historically, in total wars such as the two world wars, commercial shipping was often targeted as part of economic warfare. So, energy exports can be considered as strategic objectives – similar to Russia's attacks on Ukraine's energy grid or Ukraine's attacks on Russian refineries.” Be that as it may, Ukraine claiming official responsibility for the explosion would likely be controversial in the case of the Mersin, a commercial freighter without any official links to Russia. Dirk Siebels, a specialist in maritime security at the Risk Intelligence consulting firm, said the tanker would likely be a legitimate target in Ukraine's eyes. The Mersin has been identified stopping at Russian ports on several occasions since the start of the year, including Novorossiysk and Tuapse on the Black Sea and Ust-Luga in the Gulf of Finland, according to Russian investigative outlet The Insider . Bloomberg has reported that the Mersin has a history of transporting Russian oil . “From a Ukrainian point of view, of course, that's still something that finances the Russian government – and therefore the Russian war effort in Ukraine,” Siebels said. Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ under fire The explosions off Senegal’s coast come during a mounting campaign of attacks against commercial ships suspected of belonging to Russia’s “shadow fleet” – ageing commercial oil tankers with often opaque ownership structures used by Moscow to export its oil and gas and slip through Western sanctions . The EU, US and UK have largely banned Russian oil imports, and companies based in G7 countries can only provide critical services such as insurance and transport for Russian oil being sold to third countries under a fixed price cap . “This fits into the pattern of these vessels that have been attacked in a very similar fashion earlier this year,” Siebels said. FRANCE 24’s Observers team has recorded seven vessels linked to Russia that have either been damaged or sunk following “mysterious” explosions off the coasts of Russia, Spain,  Libya ,  Turkey  and  Italy since December 2024. None of the ships were under Western sanctions at the time of the attacks. “Even though the Ukrainians never actually admitted to being involved in any of these incidents individually, they have communicated in relatively certain terms that they wanted to send a signal with these particular incidents,” Siebels said. “And in all these cases, they targeted tankers specifically, and they targeted tankers which were involved in transporting Russian oil and oil products.” In the days after the Mersin was wracked by explosions, two other freighters suspected of belonging to Russia’s “shadow fleet” were attacked in the Black Sea. This time, Ukraine claimed full responsibility. Sea Baby naval drones inflicted heavy damage against two ships off the Turkish coast last week. The Kairos and the Virat – both flying Gambian flags of convenience – were headed to Russia’s Novorossiysk oil terminal. Both ships were empty at the time of the attacks. It was the first time that Kyiv explicitly took credit for using naval drones against civilian ships. Unlike the other tankers rocked by explosions in recent months, both the Kairos and the Virat were on a list of ships sanctioned for facilitating illegal exports of Russian oil. But while these targets may seem more legitimate, Siebels said the operations remained fraught with risk. “When you're targeting vessels in an area with a relatively good amount of maritime traffic, then yes, definitely things can go wrong,” Siebels said. “They may actually end up hitting the wrong vessel … there's always the risk of something going wrong. You're definitely running the risk of injuring or even killing seafarers.” This is likely the reason why Ukraine has used its most advanced naval drones to carry out the attacks, said Patrick René Haasler, an analyst specialising in the post-Soviet space at the Verona-based International Team for the Study of Security. “The Ukrainian Sea Baby drones are remotely controlled in real time via Starlink satellite connections and use high-resolution front cameras and thermal sensors,” he said. “Since the 2025 upgrades, AI-based object recognition and automatic target tracking have been added, increasing accuracy to less than 10 metres.” Despite this, he said, it was vital that such attacks did not target tankers that were currently transporting oil. “Despite their high precision, Sea Baby drones pose a significant potential for collateral damage in the Black Sea,” he said. “Their 850kg explosive payload can cause oil spills and create wave effects on neighbouring ships or coastlines if they miss their targets or hit loaded tankers.” High risk, high reward Despite the risks, Haasler said that Ukraine’s attacks made sense given Russia’s increasing reinforcement of its own energy infrastructure against Kyiv’s ongoing assaults. “Against this backdrop, it seems reasonable to assume that Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian energy facilities could be less effective in the future,” he said. “Kyiv could therefore focus on supposedly easier targets in order to achieve success at least on an operational level in times of crumbling front lines.” Germond said that the clandestine nature of Russia’s shadow fleet made it a tempting target. “These vessels, by design, operate independently and covertly, leaving them vulnerable to attack in the 'grey zone' with limited options for protection or for claiming liability following an attack,” he said. Moscow, which does not acknowledge the existence of a shadow fleet of oil tankers tasked with shipping Russian oil, is unlikely to provide the vessels with a naval escort or station troops aboard. If Ukraine’s intelligence services were in fact behind the blasts that targeted the Mersin last week, it would mark a significant extension of the Russia-Ukraine war beyond the waters of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. So how would Ukraine have been able to launch such an attack more than 5,000 kilometres from Kyiv? For Siebels, it was not such a stretch. “The Ukrainians have also been involved in other land-based operations in Africa , targeting Russian mercenaries or Russian personnel in Mali and Sudan , for example,” he said. He said that the attacks on ships involved in shipping Russian oil seemed to be a calculated risk.   “If you can actually make a dent in the number of companies that are willing to engage in transporting Russian oil and oil products, and then I would say it's definitely worth it. Because that is, to a large extent, the Russian government budget and by extension, the Russian military budget,” he said. “So for Ukraine, as a long-term strategy, that makes a lot of sense.” This article has been adapted from the original in French . © 2025 Copyright France 24

The youth-led “Gen-Z 212” movement demands reforms in education and healthcare, as well as stronger anti-corruption measures.   By: FEDERICA SAINI FASANOTTI Dec. 3, 2025 Protesters gather in Rabat, Morocco, on Oct. 18. © Getty Images In a nutshell The Gen-Z 212 movement represents the grievances of Morocco’s youth  They demand the prioritization of social services over tourism projects  Mobilizers are trying to communicate directly with the king. Since late September, Morocco has witnessed a wave of protests not only in its major urban centers, such as Rabat, Casablanca and Marrakesh, but also in medium-sized towns and smaller municipalities across the country. Moroccan youth are leading this so-called Gen-Z 212 mobilization, a generational cohort of individuals born between 1997 and 2012, with the national telephone code +212 emphasizing their rootedness in the Moroccan context.   This is a digitally-native, loosely coordinated and mostly peaceful youth collective that first emerged on September 18 via Discord, a messaging app that serves as the movement’s logistical and organizational hub. It rapidly gained traction through TikTok, and currently reports between 120,000 and 150,000 members, composed largely of students and young workers from working-class neighborhoods and mid-sized cities. Their participation reflects widespread frustration with limited economic and employment opportunities and structural inequalities that persist within the country. Despite Morocco’s image as a rising regional power, the Gen-Z 212 movement reveals it to be a nation still marked by deep socio-economic contradictions.  Five-star stadiums, one-star hospitals  Although initially peaceful in nature, the protests have escalated into violent clashes, with several fatalities and injuries reported . The unrest began in major cities before decentralizing toward regions such as Oujda, near the Algerian border, and Agadir, a coastal city that became a symbolic epicenter of national outrage following the deaths of eight women after cesarean procedures in a local hospital.   What began as vigils and sit-ins quickly transformed into broader demonstrations across the country, fueled by public anger not only at health sector failures but also at perceived governmental misallocation of national priorities. In particular, criticism has been directed at the state’s significant investment in infrastructure for international sporting events – most notably the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations and the upcoming 2030 FIFA World Cup, cohosted by Morocco (along with Portugal and Spain).   The government has allocated approximately 890 million euros to renovate six stadiums and an additional 469 million euros for the construction of a new stadium in Casablanca. Protest slogans such as “The stadiums are ready – but where are the hospitals?” encapsulate a broader demand for public service equity and redistribution.  In analyzing this youth-led mobilization, observers have drawn parallels to Morocco’s own iteration of the Arab Spring, namely the “February 20 Movement” of 2011. That earlier protest wave – also youth-driven – eventually expanded to include political parties, trade unions and civil society actors, with demands centered on constitutional reforms and limitations on monarchical authority. It resulted in a new constitution and some reforms, but its momentum eventually declined. By contrast, Gen-Z 212 is non-partisan, decentralized and does not articulate explicit political or institutional demands. Its focus lies instead on social justice, equality of opportunity and universal access to essential public services, reflecting a shift from political contestation to socioeconomic grievance.  Direct confrontation with state institutions  Facing the current movement, authorities permitted public demonstrations on October 1, during which protests unfolded in a relatively peaceful manner. However, they intensified the following day, spreading across 13 cities and assuming a more confrontational and violent character. This escalation was evidenced by over 400 detentions in a four-day span and hundreds of injuries. The most tragic episode occurred in Lqliaa, a city of 80,000 near Agadir, where, on October 1, three individuals were killed as a result of intervention by security forces.  Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch, leader of the liberal National Rally of Independents (RNI) and in office since 2021, is widely viewed as a symbol of Morocco’s rising economic oligarchy. According to Forbes, he ranks among Africa’s top 20 billionaires, with an estimated net worth of $1.6 billion. During the 2021 electoral campaign, he pledged the creation of 1 million jobs – a promise that he is struggling to fulfil in light of current socioeconomic realities.  After the Lqilaa incident, the prime minister expressed regret for the casualties and injuries, affirming his willingness to engage in dialogue. He acknowledged the legitimacy of the youth movement’s demands, particularly in areas such as education, healthcare and the right to a dignified standard of living. Nevertheless, he emphasized the necessity of maintaining institutional protocols and public order.     In response to his statements, the Gen-Z 212 movement bypassed the prime minister altogether, directly addressing King Mohammed VI in an open letter. It articulated eight explicit demands , including: the dissolution of the current government, the eradication of corrupt political parties, the initiation of impartial judicial proceedings against individuals involved in corruption and misappropriation of public funds, and the implementation of concrete structural reforms.  The decision to appeal directly to the monarch – a figure who continues to enjoy widespread respect and who emerged unscathed from the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, unlike other Maghreb leaders – is a clear indicator of the prevailing atmosphere in the country. It signals a growing perception among younger generations that executive leadership and traditional political parties no longer serve as credible interlocutors for their concerns and interests.  Facts & figures How power works in Morocco Morocco is a constitutional monarchy and nearly all of the country’s citizens are Sunni Muslims. King Mohammed VI is both head of state and “Commander of the Faithful,” giving him control over political, military and religious spheres. His decrees ( dahirs ) carry the force of law, and his legitimacy rests on a blend of religious authority, dynastic continuity and perceived modernizing leadership.    Strategic plans, from renewable energy to infrastructure megaprojects, originate in the royal palace. Aziz Akhannouch, as prime minister, manages day-to-day administration and parliament – but all major policies, appointments and reforms require the King’s approval. The government’s role is primarily to implement, not design, policy.   Protests as the tip of the iceberg  The recent wave of demonstrations, while highly visible, is only the tip of the iceberg; just below the surface is a deeper and more systemic crisis. At the root of the unrest lie persistent failures in public health − the very sector where the protests initially began − and structural weaknesses in the national education system. Large segments of the population consider school quality to be severely lacking both in terms of geographical access and overall quality.  Morocco’s social fabric is under strain. Youth unemployment has surged to a record 37 percent in 2025, with over 1.5 million individuals actively seeking work without success. This means that more than one-third of the country’s working-age youth are jobless – an alarming figure with serious implications for social stability and economic sustainability.   The employment crisis affects both university graduates and those lacking formally recognized or market-relevant qualifications. In response, the government launched several initiatives in 2024, including a $1.3 billion plan aimed at supporting private sector hiring and promoting rural development. It also increased the minimum wage by 5 percent, bringing it to approximately $300 per month in most sectors and slightly less in agriculture. However, this increase remains largely insufficient to meet the cost of living, particularly for those paying rent in urban areas. Labor market precarity remains a defining feature in Morocco: Only 6.5 percent of employed individuals hold permanent contracts, indicating widespread informal or unstable employment.   These are not temporary or cyclical issues, but rather deeply entrenched structural problems. A key indicator of systemic distress is the steady rise in both internal and external migration, particularly among the youth. While Morocco continues to receive some inflows, emigration rates have consistently outpaced immigration. In 2010, an estimated 2.7 million Moroccans were living abroad; by 2020, that number rose to 3.3 million, and by 2024, it reached 3.6 million.   The primary destinations remain France, Italy and Spain, though increasing numbers are relocating to North America. Recent data indicates that those who emigrate tend to possess higher educational levels than those who remain, with 33.5 percent of migrants having completed higher education.   This selective migration of skilled professionals – the “brain drain” phenomenon observed in other Maghreb countries, such as Libya – significantly undermines the development potential of already fragile emerging economies. Compounding the issue is the growing mismatch between education and labor market needs, a disconnect increasingly emphasized by young Moroccans themselves. This is a domain where time is a critical factor – yet it appears the government is running out.   Scenarios Highly likely: Further public discontent in Morocco  Youth unemployment remains one of the most pressing internal challenges facing the Kingdom. Short-term economic projections offer cautious optimism, contingent on continued growth. The International Monetary Fund forecasts an expansion of gross domestic product by approximately 3.5 to 4 percent for 2024-2025, which, if coupled with a sustained recovery in the agricultural sector, may translate into job creation. However, without structural reforms to stimulate investment in labor-intensive industries and improve education-to-employment pathways, both unemployment and underemployment are likely to persist, fueling social discontent.   An additional, and increasingly decisive, variable must also be considered: climate change. Between 2018 and 2023, Morocco experienced one of its most severe droughts in recent history, with devastating consequences for cereal production and a subsequent rise in prices of basic goods. While the government has made significant investments in climate resilience infrastructure and planning, results are necessarily long-term and unlikely to provide immediate relief. As such, while current tensions may subside in the short term, it is highly likely that grievances will remain latent, ready to resurface unexpectedly in response to future shocks – whether economic, social or environmental.  Unlikely: Outbreak of large-scale civil conflict  The trajectory of events will depend largely on the government’s near-term responses. The lessons of the Arab Spring have demonstrated that violent repression rarely yields stability, and that protest movements – particularly those with broad social bases – require recognition and engagement rather than denial.   This is especially true in the Moroccan context, where King Mohammed VI continues to enjoy high levels of public legitimacy. In his annual address on October 10, he reaffirmed the need for social reforms, but did not acknowledge the protests directly. His decision to take no public position on the current wave of unrest means he is likely reserving the prerogative to intervene only should the situation demand it.   Much will depend on the performance of Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch’s administration in the coming months. His current strategy includes initiatives such as the Awrach public works program, the Forsa entrepreneurship fund and a new youth employment roadmap, all aiming to create several hundred thousand jobs by 2030 and reduce unemployment to single-digit levels. The effectiveness of these programs will be critical over the coming years.   © 2025 Copyright by Geopolitical Intelligence Services AG

Analysts say U.S. diplomacy paused escalation of fighting in eastern Congo but failed to resolve core issues. President Donald Trump at the signing ceremony of a peace deal with Rwandan leader Paul Kagame and Democratic Republic of the Congo President Felix Tshisekedi. Andrew Caballero-Reynolds / AFP - Getty Images Fighting raged in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo on Friday, a day after President Donald Trump hosted Congolese and Rwandan leaders in Washington to sign new deals aimed at ending years of conflict in a region rich in minerals. Congo‘s President Felix Tshisekedi and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame on Thursday reaffirmed commitments to a U.S.-brokered deal reached in June to stabilise the vast country and open the way for more Western mining investment. “We’re settling a war that’s been going on for decades,” said Trump, whose administration has intervened in a string of conflicts around the world to burnish his credentials as a peacemaker and advance U.S. business interests. On the ground however, fierce fighting continued with the warring sides blaming one another. The Rwandan-backed AFC/M23 rebel group, which seized the two largest cities in eastern Congo earlier this year and is not bound by the Washington agreement, said forces loyal to the government were conducting widespread attacks. A soldier with the Rwandan-backed rebel group M23, watches over a group of fighters from the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in May. Jospin Mwisha / AFP via Getty Images A Congolese army spokesman said clashes were ongoing and Rwandan forces were bombing. Analysts say U.S. diplomacy paused escalation of fighting in eastern Congo but failed to resolve core issues, with neither Congo nor Rwanda fulfilling pledges made in the June agreement. Videos shared online on Friday showed dozens of displaced families fleeing on foot with their belongings and livestock near the town of Luvungi in South Kivu province in eastern Congo. Reuters was not immediately able to authenticate them. “Numerous homes have been destroyed, and women as well as children have tragically lost their lives,” wrote Lawrence Kanyuka, the spokesperson for AFC/M23, which is not bound by the terms of any Congo-Rwanda agreement. Forces loyal to the Congolese government “continued their relentless attacks on densely populated areas of North Kivu and South Kivu, using fighter jets, drones and heavy artillery,” he wrote on X, without giving an overall casualty toll. A Congo army spokesperson confirmed to Reuters that clashes were ongoing Friday along the Kaziba, Katogota and Rurambo axis in the South Kivu province. “There is population displacement in Luvungi due to Rwandan Defence Force bombardment. They are bombing blindly,” he said. Rwanda’s army and government spokespersons were not immediately available for comment. A senior AFC/M23 official told Reuters rebel forces had retaken the town of Luberika and shot down a Congolese army drone. He requested anonymity as he was not authorized to speak to media. “The war continues on the ground and has no connection with the signing of the agreement that took place yesterday in Washington,” he said. © 2025 NBCUniversal Media, LLC

4 8 Christians Gunned Down in Taraba State Nigeria. Residents Charge Military Complicity TruthNigeria December 5, 2025   Community leaders in Takum Holding a meeting with religious cleric telling explain the situation of things. Photo by TruthNigeria. Village Heads Bribe Soldiers with Cash, Fuel and Food to No Avail Southern Taraba is reeling from a wave of deadly attacks that have left more than 48 Christians killed and hundreds of homes reduced to ashes. Entire communities are fleeing as residents, and religious leaders accuse the Nigerian military of standing by—or even enabling—Fulani terrorists who now operate openly across Takum County. Community leaders who spoke to TruthNigeria lamented that despite repeated distress calls, soldiers either arrive late, ignore calls entirely, or respond with indifference. Their inaction, residents say, has emboldened Fulani ethnic militants who continue to kill, burn homes, and seize farmlands with little interference. [The militants linked to the Fulani tribe, claiming 10 million members, have been identified as Nigeria’s deadliest home-grown insurgency.] Fr. George Dogo. Photo by Mike Odeh James. Fr. George Dogo of Holy Family Cathedral, Takum, said the pattern of military behavior suggests military complicity. “The military have not killed any Fulani terrorists in Takum, Gboko, Igbum, Demave, Peeva, and yet the terrorists are attacking, killing and burning openly,” he said. “When my parishioners report ongoing or impending attacks, the military may not show at all. And if they come, they ask what kind of guns the terrorists are carrying—and afterwards disappear.” His account mirrors dozens of testimonies across the region. Fidelia Jeremiah, a student and farmer from Igbum village, recounted the night of November 29, 2025, when more than 30 armed Fulani attackers stormed the community. “We made calls to the Nigerian military, but the personnel refused to pick. Later they switched off their phones,” she said. Her uncle was murdered that night. “I hold the military responsible.” Community leader  Rikwensi Muri pleaded  on FB for local elected leaders to condemn the burning of houses in Takum and demanded that Nigerian army deploy units to push back the terrorists. He posted on Wednesday Dec. 3 the following demand: 1. Immediate and sustained deployment of security personnel to vulnerable communities in Chanchanji, Peva axis, and surrounding areas. 2.  A transparent investigation into the attacks, ensuring that perpetrators—whoever they are—are identified and brought to justice. 3. Public briefings and engagement from our political leaders, who must show solidarity with affected families and demand federal attention. The  Nigerian Army, on the other hand,  reports that in the last week troops in the same vicinity have  “smashed bandit strongholds in Southern Taraba and forced fighters to flee.” The army press release of Dec. 4 went on to say: “Nigerian troops have dismantled multiple bandit hideouts in Southern Taraba, pushing fleeing fighters across the border into Benue State, military sources confirmed Thursday. “The offensive, part of Operation Peace Shield and Operation Zafin Wuta, involved the 6 Brigade of the Nigerian Army and Sector 3 of Operation Whirl Stroke. Targets included a network of bandit enclaves in Shiid village, Tor-Tser, Likam Mountain, Agia, and Tyozua in Takum Local Government Area.” The military post explained that soldiers surrounded the bandit-terrorist camp yet did not kill or wound any of the criminals.  ‘We Pay the Military for Protection, Yet We Die Every Day’ The victims of the attacks by Fulani ethnic militia tell TruthNigeria that the Army has left them undefended even though villagers have bribed Nigerian army officers with cash, fuel and food to intervene on their behalf. Yet, they have been stiffed every time. Across Takum County—including Amadu, New Gboko, Demave, Peeva and Peeki—villagers say they contribute large sums of money, food items, and logistics support to soldiers for protection that rarely comes. Hyacinth Ilo, a Kutebe farmer in Peeki, said communities contribute ₦150,000 as mobilisation money for fuel “in case there is an attack.” They also supply food, yet soldiers fail to respond when violence erupts. “If they can’t help us, I will ask them to refund our money,” he said, “but they will shoot me if I dare ask.” A traditional leader in Amadu, Sam Isaiah, said villagers donate yams, rice, oil, and up to ₦10,000 per person to soldiers stationed nearby. Asked whether these contributions were voluntary, he replied: “If we don’t give them, they say they don’t have fuel. And their attitude toward us becomes hostile.” Despite these sacrifices, he said, “The Fulani are still attacking, and the Army is not doing anything to stop them.” Fulani Terrorists Also Pay the Military — Residents Claim Even more disturbing is the allegation that both victims and perpetrators are paying the military. Multiple residents told TruthNigeria that Fulani militants “settle” soldiers to ignore attacks or to allow militant herders to graze freely on local farms. Theresa Orkuma, a 31-year-old farmer and mother of two, said Fulani herders openly boast about having military backing. On November 1, 2025, she and her husband found nearly 60 cows grazing on their unharvested rice farm. When they confronted the herders, they were dismissed. “They told us we could report to the military or police, but nothing would happen.” Theresa did report. “The officer in charge said they were coming. Till now, we have not seen them. Nothing was done.” Weeks later, terrorists invaded her farm again. When she rushed to the military base, the commander was unavailable. Shortly after returning home, she received a chilling call from a Fulani herder: “He told me, ‘If you like, go to the governor and report. Nothing will happen. We have paid the military millions of naira.’” Her testimony matches similar accounts from residents across Takum who insist the militants operate with impunity because they have compromised the very forces meant to protect civilians. Priest Slams Government, Military Silence Fr. Moses Angyian another Catholic priest in Takum told TruthNigeria that Fulani terrorists have attacked communities in Chanchanji Ward—the largest and most populated in Takum—for more than a month, yet authorities remain silent. “This is happening despite a military barracks, a mobile police base, and multiple security agencies stationed here. Yet no government official has condemned the violence or moved to stop it. The silence is alarming. Something is clearly amiss.” He said the following villages have been taken over by terrorists: Demaavar, Imyande, Gboko, Dooshima Ate, and Tse Adekpe. Related Articles Hidden Genocide Against Christians in Taraba: Catholic Bishop’s Exclusive Account November 11, 2025 Brazen Attacks by Fulani Terrorists Kill 20 Christians in Taraba State November 11, 2025        Copyright 2025 TruthNigeria

Several Ukrainian children abducted by Russia forcibly sent to North Korea, expert tells US Senate. The Kyiv Independent By Dmytro Basmat December 4, 2025 Regional Center for Human Rights Legal Expert Kateryna Rashevska holds up a photograph of what she said are abducted Ukrainian children taken to North Korea as she speaks during a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee hearing on "The Abduction of Ukrainian Children by the Russian Federation" on Capitol Hill on December 3, 2025 in Washington, DC. (Andrew Harnik/Getty Images) There have been at least two instances of Ukrainian children abducted by Russian forces in eastern Ukraine having been forcibly transferred to a camp in North Korea, Kateryna Rashevska, a legal expert at Ukraine's Regional Center for Human Rights, told a U.S. congressional subcommittee on Dec. 3. "12-year-old Misha from the occupied Donetsk region and 16-year-old Liza from occupied Simferopol were sent to Songdowon camp in North Korea, 9,000 km from home," Rashevska testified . "Children there were taught to ‘destroy Japanese militarists’ and met Korean veterans who, in 1968, attacked the U.S. Navy ship Pueblo, killing and wounding nine American soldiers." The testimony came at the start of the U.S. Senate Appropriation's hearing on Russia’s mass abduction of Ukrainian children. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Pyongyang has strengthened its relationship with Moscow, supplying weapons and deploying North Korean troops to support Russia's war in Ukraine in 2024. In late 2024, Pyongyang sent roughly 11,000–12,000 troops to Russia in late 2024 to help repel Ukraine's advance in Russia's Kursk Oblast. According to Ukraine’s national " Children of War " database, at least 19,546 Ukrainian children have been abducted from Russian-occupied territories and taken to Russia or Russian-controlled areas since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022. While it is estimated that thousands of children have been forcibly adopted by Russian families, others, including orphans whose families were killed by Russian forces, have been confined to Russian militarization and re-education camps. "The Regional Center for Human Rights documented 165 re-education camps where Ukrainian children are militarized and Russified. These camps exist in occupied territories, Russia, Belarus, and North Korea," Rashevska added in her testimony. In a separate testimony provided by the Nathaniel Raymond, the Executive Director of the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab told congressional leaders that the organization now estimates that at least 35,000 remain in Russian custody, including those who have been sent to fight against their own country on the front line. Ukrainian officials estimate the real figure of abducted children could be far higher. Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets puts the number at up to 150,000, while Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Daria Herasymchuk has given a range of 200,000–300,000. An estimated 1.6 million Ukrainian children remain in territories occupied by Russia as of 2025, Kyiv Independent's recent investigation highlights. In 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for their role in state-sanction child abductions. On Dec. 1, President Volodymyr Zelensky said that only 1,859 Ukrainian children abducted by Russia have have been brought back thus far. Copyright © 2025 The Kyiv Independent

Apparent Military Drone Strike Kills Civilians The logo of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA), Bamako, Mali, February 15, 2025. © 2025 GOUSNO/AFP via Getty Images by Human Rights Watch | Ilaria Allegrozzi A quiet desert night in northern  Mali turned deadly when an apparent military drone launched its explosive munition on a tent, leaving an entire family dead. The strike was a recent example of Malian military operations killing civilians and may amount to a war crime. The November 13 strike at about 9:30 p.m. on the village of Tangatta, in Mali’s northern Timbuktu region, killed seven civilians, including five children ages 7 to 15, from the same ethnic Tuareg family, according to  media reports and a witness interviewed by Human Rights Watch. The attack displaced all surviving residents of the village. A 45-year-old teacher who survived the attack told me by phone about seeing the drone in the sky with a light and then hearing a loud explosion. He said he found the bodies of the parents and their five children. “Six of the bodies were charred,” he said. “The body of the father was not charred but had visible injuries in his face and left leg. We buried them in two graves, the mother with the children in one, and the father in another.” The teacher said the Malian military flies drones over Tangatta “every day,” as the Azawad Liberation Front (Front de libération de l’Azawad), a coalition of Tuareg armed groups, and the Al-Qaeda-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen, JNIM), operate in the area. No armed men were present at the time of the strike, he said. Hostilities in northern Mali have intensified since January 2023, when Mali’s military authorities  ended a 2015 peace deal with Tuareg armed groups. Meanwhile, JNIM has tightened their control across the country, laying siege to the capital, Bamako, and cutting off fuel supplies. This recent strike is not an isolated incident. Malian forces have previously   conducted   drone attacks that caused high civilian casualties. The day after the incident in Tangatta, another drone strike in the nearby village of  Albouhera reportedly killed two women and two toddlers.  Under the laws of war, civilians must never be targeted. All parties to an armed conflict need to take all feasible precautions to avoid harming civilians and civilian objects. Serious violations, such as attacks that do not discriminate between civilians and combatants, are war crimes if committed deliberately or recklessly. Malian authorities should urgently conduct an impartial investigation into the Tangatta strike and hold those responsible to account. They should promptly provide adequate compensation to the relatives of the victims. And they should stop carrying out unlawful drone strikes.  © 2025 Human Rights Watch

November 2025 | Issue No. 24 Our monthly newsletter aims to keep people informed of Genocide Watch’s operation, as well as the operations of the other members of the Alliance Against Genocide. Download our latest issue below or click the newsletter to open in a new window.

Analysts and a human rights group say Israel’s genocide in Gaza has not stopped, despite the ceasefire. By Justin Salhani Relatives of Palestinians Israel killed in airstrikes mourn at Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, 23 November 2025 [Mohammed Saber/EPA] On October 10, 2025, a ceasefire was supposed to have put an end to Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza. But two months on, Israel has violated the ceasefire more than 500 times, killing at least 356 Palestinians, and sending the total death toll in Gaza above 70,000 . Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made his position clear, saying that the war “has not ended” . Analysts say that while the rate of Israel’s killing of Palestinians in Gaza has slowed since the ceasefire, the war, for all intents and purposes, has continued. “If you break genocide down to its essence, it’s not only mass killing,” Muhammad Shehada, a visiting fellow with the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told Al Jazeera. “It is also destroying the population’s ability to exist together as a group, and that is being achieved by the mass destruction [of infrastructure], the killing, ethnic cleansing, and starvation,” he said. Political Theatre and Spectacle Analysts say that instead of coming as a reprieve for Palestinians, the ceasefire gave the international community an excuse to stop focusing on Israel’s actions in Gaza. The US-backed ceasefire agreement was meant to stop Israeli attacks on Gaza and kick-start aid deliveries to Palestinians in the besieged Gaza Strip, where famine had been declared. “At long last, we have peace in the Middle East,” US President Donald Trump declared from Egypt’s Sharm el-Sheikh, where a Gaza peace summit was being held. But Israel continued attacking. It has also failed to allow the entry of the amount of aid it agreed to, destroyed more than 1,500 buildings, and expanded deeper into Gaza, cutting people off from their homes. “It’s theatre because everyone was fed up with the genocide and keen for it to disappear and not solve it. And that’s exactly what we’ve seen,” Shehada said. In the weeks since the ceasefire began, Gaza has flickered in and out of media headlines. “The main difference, of course, is the reduced media coverage, which was one of the intended purposes of the so-called ceasefire,” Lebanese Palestinian researcher and writer Elia Ayoub told Al Jazeera. “There is far less pressure on Israel today than there was until October 10, with no sign of accountability on the horizon.” ‘Israel’s genocide is not over’ The ongoing harm to Palestinians in Gaza has also been noted by Amnesty International, which released a legal analysis last week of what it called the “ongoing genocide in the Occupied Gaza Strip”. “The world must not be fooled. Israel’s genocide is not over,” said Agnes Callamard, secretary-general of Amnesty International. The analysis cites the number of Palestinians killed since the ceasefire went into effect, Israel’s restriction of relief, humanitarian and medical supplies, and how Israel’s blockade and siege of Gaza led to a famine, and thus an increased vulnerability to illnesses. “So far, there is no indication that Israel is taking serious measures to reverse the deadly impact of its crimes and no evidence that its intent has changed,” Callamard said. Philippe Lazzarini, head of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), said on October 1, before the ceasefire, that 100 people were dying in Gaza a day, mostly from Israeli military operations or shootings at Gaza Humanitarian Foundation aid distribution points. Since the ceasefire, people are still dying from direct military operations, albeit fewer per day, and the foundations of Palestinian society in Gaza are still lying in ruins. “Israel is continuing its genocide in Gaza, but its pace is different; the destruction on the houses is continuing and the killing of Palestinians is continuing, and the Israeli yellow line of occupation in the Gaza Strip is part of the genocide,” defence analyst Hamze Attar told Al Jazeera. “The genocide is not only about killing people, but about restricting people from going back to their homes and creating a new reality in the Gaza Strip.” Simply Genocide One of the ceasefire’s main stipulations was for Hamas and other Palestinian groups to return the captives held in Gaza. Hamas has returned all living captives and all but two of the bodies of dead captives: an Israeli policeman named Ran Gvili and a Thai national named Sudthisak Rinthalak. One of the remaining bodies could be returned in the coming days, according to Israeli media. For months, Israel’s most fervent supporters claimed a return of the captives would end the war. Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem previously said the group has shown its “commitment to fully complete the exchange process and its ongoing efforts to finalise it despite significant difficulties”. As for Israel, it has released 2,000 Palestinian prisoners and returned the bodies of 345 more who died in its prisons. Many reportedly showed signs of torture, mutilation and execution. However, Israel has not eased its pressure on the people of Gaza. “As soon as ceasefires go into effect, nobody bothers with details, which gives Israel a free hand to do what it wants,” Shehada said. As for the United States, which helped pressure Israel into the deal, Shehada said Trump is more interested in the spectacle of peace than in “the dynamics on the ground”, adding that Israel violates the ceasefire systematically, making it difficult for mediators to keep up. The end goal, he said, was still the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in Gaza. In Gaza, as in Lebanon or in Syria , Israel has undermined peace agreements, analysts say. Netanyahu has claimed his goal is to destroy and dismantle Hamas, though analysts have repeatedly doubted his stated intentions. “It confirms what we already knew: that the goal is not to defeat an armed enemy, Hamas, but to make sure that life itself cannot be sustained in Gaza in the long-term,” Ayoub said. “It’s simply genocide.” © 2025 Al Jazeera Media Network

Natasha Booty and BBC World Service Newsroom Congolese envoy Sumbu Sita Mambu shook hands with M23 secretary Benjamin Mbonimpa at the signing in Doha. AFP via Getty Images Rwandan-backed M23 rebels and the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo have signed a framework for peace in the east of the country. The ceremony was held in Qatar, which, along with the US and the African Union, has been trying to mediate an end to decades of conflict in the resource-rich region. Earlier this year, the M23 captured the eastern region's main cities of Goma and Bukavu. Previous attempts to secure peace have failed. The US's Africa envoy Massad Boulos said the document covered eight protocols and that most still required work. He also acknowledged that prisoner exchanges and ceasefire monitoring had been slower than originally hoped. Kinshasa is demanding the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from its territory. Kigali says this can happen once the Congo-based FDLR rebel militia is disbanded. It is largely made up of ethnic Hutus linked to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The new framework also addresses humanitarian access, the return of displaced people and protection of the judiciary, Boulous is quoted as saying by the AFP agency. It builds on a declaration of principles signed by the two sides in Doha in July, as well as a deal made in the same city last month on the monitoring of an eventual ceasefire. Before that, in June, talks between Rwanda and DR Congo brokered by Washington resulted in the signing of a peace deal that was hailed by US President Donald Trump as "a glorious triumph" but was swiftly violated by the warring parties . The M23 is one of the biggest parties in this conflict, but was not directly involved in the US-brokered ceasefire deal. It has always favoured the talks mediated by Qatar, saying they will address "the root causes" of the conflict. Decades of conflict escalated in January when M23 rebels seized control of large parts of eastern DR Congo including the regional capital, Goma, the city of Bukavu and two airports. Since January, thousands of people have been killed and hundreds of thousands of civilians forced from their homes. After the loss of territory, the government in Kinshasa had turned to the US for help, reportedly offering access to critical minerals in exchange for security guarantees. Eastern DR Congo is rich in coltan and other resources vital to the global electronics industries. Rwanda denies supporting the M23, despite overwhelming evidence , and insists its military presence in the region is a defensive measure against threats posed by armed groups like the FDLR. Fighting between the Congolese army and Rwanda-backed M23 rebels escalated in January. AFP via Getty Images Copyright 2025 BBC. All rights reserved. The BBC is not responsible for the content of external sites.

Dr. Stanton in front of the International Criminal Court, the Hague, October 28, 2025 The Calling of International Law Dr. Gregory H. Stanton Founding President, Genocide Watch   During my first year at Yale Law School, Church World Service called me to become Field Director of its relief program in Cambodia. My roommate from Oberlin College was then the organization’s program director in New York and he knew that I had been a Peace Corps Volunteer and had just spent a year in India. I landed in Phnom Penh in June 1980. As I walked through the mass graves and talked with the survivors, I realized that the Khmer Rouge had violated every international humanitarian law on the books, including the Genocide Convention. I had studied with Professor Reisman in law school, and knew that law wasn’t law without authoritative decision, and compliance or enforcement. But the Khmer Rouge had gotten away with mass murder. There was no political will to capture them in Thailand, and no international court to try them.   Such impunity would only allow the Khmer Rouge to plague Cambodia for years to come. But there was a narrow opening for civil justice, the International Court of Justice. The Khmer Rouge no longer controlled Cambodia because of Vietnam’s intervention, so evidence could be gathered against them. If a case were taken against Cambodia to the World Court for violation of the Genocide Convention, the Khmer Rouge would have to respond, because they still held Cambodia’s seat in the United Nations. When I returned to Yale, I founded the Cambodian Genocide Project in order to gather the evidence to make that case possible. I thus began my career in public international law while still a student at Yale Law School. And I found my calling: the prevention and punishment of genocide.   When I started law school, my career objective was to teach international human rights law. Thus, after a judicial clerkship and two years with a corporate law firm (yes, I too, was seduced,) I became a law professor at Washington and Lee University. Law teaching is a good platform for working on international human rights law because it offers both financial security and freedom. However, demands of teaching and publishing and the location of most schools away from policy-making centers greatly limit the academician’s ability to create institutions or shape policy. I did get the Cambodian Genocide Project sponsored by the Young Lawyers’ Division Human Rights Committee of the American Bar Association that I chaired and got funding to gather evidence in Cambodia funded by Washington and Lee Law School’s research center and the U.S. Institute of Peace. But when it came to finding a government to take the case to the World Court, those of us working on the case struck out.   I learned a crucial lesson: human rights are not lost because of the absence of law, but because of the lack of political will to enforce it .   We needed to change the political will of crucial nations, notably the United States, which opposed pursuing the case because it might legitimize the Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom Penh.   A group of us set out to change the political will of the U.S. government. Prof. Ben Kiernan, Dr. Craig Etcheson, and many others formed a coalition called the Campaign to Oppose the Return of the Khmer Rouge, and I co-chaired its Justice Committee, which worked with Senator Robb to pass the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act. That act declared it to be U.S. policy to prosecute the Khmer Rouge leaders and mandated the opening of an Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigations in the State Department. By 1992, I had taken the Foreign Service examination and joined the State Department; I was assigned to the steering committee for the Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigations. We moved U.S. policy to support creation of a tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge.   Years of work followed, during which I left the State Department, went back into university teaching and became an advisor to the task force appointed by the government of Cambodia to negotiate with the U.N. and create the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, popularly known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT.) Using models from other tribunals, Cambodian legal procedure, and the International Criminal Court, I drafted the Internal Rules of Procedure for the Tribunal. They were revised by judges of the tribunal and became the rules of the KRT. Offices and a large courtroom were built for the KRT, and trials began. Over thirty years after they committed their crimes, the joint United Nations/Cambodian tribunal finally convicted three top Khmer Rouge leaders of crimes against humanity.   The lesson I learned from the Cambodian Genocide Project is that ideas that change the world often take many years and the work of hundreds of people to come to fruition.   Never hesitate to plant the seeds. Then ask for help to water them until they take root and are tended by many other people.   I joined the U.S. State Department in 1992 because I wanted to build international human rights institutions. I was fortunate that my assignments allowed me to do that. The Director General of the Foreign Service jumped me several grades to positions of responsibility. Most junior Foreign Service Officers would not have been so lucky. I arrived in Washington after my initial consular assignment (Bangkok) at the end of the Rwandan genocide. The Director General assigned me to be coordinator for U.S. policy for Africa in the United Nations Security Council. I was immediately lent to the U.N. Commission of Experts that investigated the Rwandan genocide, and helped write their report, which recommended establishing the Rwanda Tribunal. Back at the State Department, I then drafted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 955 and 978, which created that tribunal, and became the U.S. liaison and troubleshooter during its difficult start-up. I also initiated and wrote the resolutions that created the Burundi Commission of Inquiry and the U.N. Commission on Arms Flows in Central Africa. These were all institutional contributions to the punishment and prevention of genocide.   It became clear, however, that more lasting institutions are necessary to prevent genocide. What is needed is creation of an effective early warning system for the U.N. Security Council, standing regional or U.N. rapid deployment forces that can intervene to stop genocide, and an International Criminal Court. The U.S. government stood opposed to a U.N. force and to the International Criminal Court.   I left the State Department to become coordinator of the Washington Working Group on the International Criminal Court. We built a coalition of human rights, legal, veterans, and religious organizations that successfully lobbied the Clinton administration to sign the ICC treaty. President George W. Bush promptly unsigned it. The U.S. is increasingly cooperating with the ICC. However, the ICC still lacks a police force, which should be created by an Optional Protocol to the ICC Treaty.   In 1999, I founded Genocide Watch to build an international coalition of groups to fight genocide. At the Hague Appeal for Peace in 1999, The International Campaign to End Genocide was founded with Genocide Watch as its coordinator. Since then, the Alliance Against Genocide, as it is now called, has grown to 130 member organizations around the world, including such heavyweights as The International Crisis Group, the Minority Rights Group, Survival International, and the Aegis Trust. We proposed and lobbied successfully for the creation of the position of Special Adviser to the U.N. Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide.   We have campaigned to stop or prevent many genocidal situations from becoming worse, including East Timor where we were instrumental in getting intervention; Ethiopia, where we prevented further genocide against the Anuak people; the Côte d’Ivoire; and others through behind the scenes campaigns.   I returned to academia to earn my living as the James Farmer Professor in Human Rights at the University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, Virginia. In 2007, I became President of the International Association of Genocide Scholars. In 2009, I became Research Professor in Genocide Studies and Prevention at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution in Arlington, Virginia.   Genocide Watch is now launching several new initiatives, including an Optional Protocol to the Genocide Convention, which reasserts the authority of the U.N. General Assembly and Regional Organizations to take action to prevent genocide. We have founded a project to rewrite the UN Charter. We have launched a corporation to develop Artificial Intelligence to recognize and answer hate speech. The U.N. Special Adviser has been supportive of this effort. I now hope to turn Genocide Watch’s work over to the new generation that has built international criminal law into the profession it has now become.   I have this advice for those considering the calling of international law: At times you may feel intimidated, because you are taking a less traditional path than your colleagues or because the jobs you seek don’t pay well or are not well recognized among your family or friends. During those hard moments, seek out students and professors in similar positions. It is very likely that they have experienced the same fears and hesitations. But while you can get good advice from mentors, the ultimate decision is yours. At that time, evaluate whether your choice is compatible with your values and convictions. Make sure you are being true to the person you were when you came to law school and the person you aspire to be after you receive your degree.   Be ready to pursue your dreams into whatever jobs they may take you.  But never take a job from which you will not have the integrity to resign.   Never underestimate your own ideas. The world is governed by people with smaller ideas than your own. Yours may change the world.

Genocide Watch Annual Report 2025   Genocide Watch had the most productive year in its 26-year history in 2025. Genocide Watch is now a fully virtual organization, which allows us to have a worldwide staff at low cost. A former Executive Director of Human Rights Watch has said, "Genocide Watch gives the most bang for the buck of any human rights organization."    Personnel Genocide Watch has an all-volunteer staff of 35 persons . Genocide Watch has fifteen teams that meet weekly. We have an all staff meeting every Friday. We have staff from every continent.   Reach Our reach has increased dramatically in the past two years. The hits on our website regularly reach over 10,000 per day, and our social media (Facebook, X. and LinkedIn) each reach over 10,000 people daily. Genocide Watch  ( www.genocidewatch.com ) is one of the most visited websites on the internet for news that is focused on events that indicate threats, prevention, perpetration, and prosecution of genocide and crimes against humanity.   Genocide Watch’s Methodology A primary purpose of Genocide Watch is the prediction and prevention of genocide. Our Ten Stages of Genocide  model of the processes of genocide is the most widely taught and utilized predictive model for genocide prevention. Genocide Watch is usually the first antigenocide organization to predict genocide. We don’t wait until mass killing is underway to issue Genocide Watches, Warnings, and Emergencies. The Ten Stages model is event based and continuous. It is the only model that prescribes specific tactics for stopping each stage in the genocidal process.   Country Reports and News On the Genocide Watch website, www.genocidewatch.com , dozens of updated country reports were posted this year. We posted hundreds of news articles that indicate risks of genocide in scores of countries. We posted numerous Special Reports on aspects of genocide on  https://www.genocidewatchblog.com/  .   Monthly Reports: Genocide Watch sends monthly reports on the activities of its Advocacy Teams and Alliance Against Genocide members to subscribers to our newsletter. Examples: August 2025 , September 2025 , and October 2025 .   The Alliance Against Genocide 130 NGOs in 31 countries are member organizations  in the Alliance Against Genocide , the first and largest international coalition of anti-genocide organizations. Members of the Alliance Against Genocide have hundreds of employees worldwide, including many in countries at risk. Each Alliance member sets its own goals and does its own fundraising. New organizations apply to join the Alliance every month.   Joint projects with Alliance Against Genocide Members With Rwanda’s Aegis Trust and the Pan African Lawyers Union , Genocide Watch co-sponsored a training conference for 100 African Lawyers in Arusha, Tanzania in March 2025. Genocide Watch wrote the Training Manual  for the conference.   Rwanda’s Aegis Trust is constructing the African Centre for Genocide Prevention  near Kigali. It will be led by former UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Alice Nderitu. Genocide Watch has been invited by Dr. Nderitu to sign a Memorandum of Understanding to establish a formal relationship with the Centre.   Genocide Watch’s Ukraine Team raised $20,000 for Alliance Member Truth Hounds, which is gathering evidence of Russian genocide and crimes against humanity in Russian occupied areas of Ukraine.   International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) Genocide Watch is an institutional member of the IAGS. Dr. Stanton served as IAGS Vice President and President from 2005 – 2009. Five members of the Genocide Watch team attended the biennial meeting of the International Association of Genocide Scholars conference in Johannesburg October 21 - 25, 2025. Genocide Watch gave two panels at the conference. [1] Dr. Stanton also chaired a memorial panel for Dr. Israel Charny. [2]     Genocide Watch's Current Campaigns Genocide Watch's Artificial Intelligence Project: Using AI to recognize and answer hate speech Genocide Watch has a Memorandum of Understanding with the Office of the UN Special Adviser on Genocide Prevention to work with AI companies to develop software to recognize hate speech and answer it. It will be integrated into AI programs and social media. Dr. Stanton has incorporated a Public Benefit Nonprofit Corporation in Virginia, The Word Institute LLC that will receive investments from AI companies with the funds and personnel to carry out the project. Dr. Stanton introduced the Genocide Watch-UN AI project on June 18, 2025 at the UN International Day for Countering Hate Speech . Over 50 nations sent their UN Ambassadors and other officials to the meeting. The Genocide Watch - UN project was warmly received.   A UN General Assembly Resolution on Sudan Genocide Watch’s Sudan and Legal Teams have drafted a UN General Assembly Resolution on Sudan  that: ·       Demands an immediate ceasefire by all sides in the Sudan civil war; ·       Demands unhindered access to food and medicine for all persons in El Fasher and elsewhere in Sudan; Condemns ethnically targeted attacks and starvation as acts of genocide and war crimes; Calls for accountability throughout Sudan and cooperation with the International Criminal Court; Establishes an independent investigative commission on Sudan to report to the General Assembly; Urges the re-establishment of a UN mission to protect civilians and support aid delivery. The resolution is proposed under the United Nations  Uniting For Peace Procedure, which empowers the UN General Assembly to recommend collective action by UN Members when UN Security Council action is blocked by a veto by any of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council.   Genocide Watch's Sudan and Legal Teams are meeting with UN Missions in New York and with Foreign Ministries seeking co-sponsorship of the resolution.   A New United Nations Charter Genocide Watch's Legal Team is drafting a new Charter for the United Nations. Article 109 of the UN Charter  provides that with a majority vote by the UN General Assembly and seven members of the UN Security Council, a General Conference can be called to amend or rewrite the UN Charter. Such a conference has never happened. It is time to release the UN from the shackles placed on it by the colonial powers in 1945, including the Perm-5 veto that allows Perm-5 nations to commit genocide and crimes against humanity with impunity, and that gives nations allied with Perm-5 members immunity to commit such crimes without any restraint by the UN Security Council.   Budget Genocide Watch spent $5000 per year for its first fifteen years. We currently spend $15,000 per year. We received $12,000 in 2025 from three foundations. A church gives us $2000 per year. We receive about $1000 per year in donations through our website.   Since 1999, Genocide Watch has never borrowed money or gone into debt. We have had a balanced budget every year. We hope that our donors will donate what Genocide Watch needs to continue through 2025 and 2026.   Respectfully submitted,     Dr. Gregory H Stanton Founding President, Genocide Watch Chair, Alliance Against Genocide [1]  IAGS Panel 1 was on "The Rhetoric of Genocide." It included presentations by: Dr. Stanton on Genocide Watch's Artificial project with the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide to work with Artificial Intelligence companies to develop AI software to recognize hate speech and immediately answer it; Dr. Frankie Condon, Professor of Writing, University of Waterloo, Canada, Lead Editor, "Historical Perspectives on the Discourse of Genocide"; Ms. Emily Mullin, Osgood Hall School of Law, Toronto, Ukraine Team Leader, on "The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Historical Roots of Russia's Genocidal Rhetoric"; and Ms. Brenda Salazar Lamar, of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on "Israel, Israeli Media, and Genocidal Rhetoric."   IAGS Panel 2 was a virtual panel on "From Theory to Practice: Conceptual Frameworks for Genocide Prediction, Intervention, Justice, and Prevention." It included presentations by: Dr. Stanton on "Genocide Watch: The Theoretical and Legal Frameworks that Guide our Work;"  Dr. Bhaswati Bhattacharji, Senior Research Fellow at Dr. Harisingh Gour Central University, India, on "Of Bodies and Race: Examining Genocides in Sudan from a Biopolitical Perspective;" and Ms. Sandrine Mugenga Irankunda, of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), on "Genocide Denial Across Generations: The 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi and the Struggle for Truth." [2] Dr. Stanton chaired an IAGS memorial plenary session on the Life and Work of Professor Israel Charny, a founder of the field of genocide studies. It included presentations by Prof. Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen of Ariel University, Israel, Dr. Tessa Hoffman of the Free University of Berlin, Mr. Marc Sherman of the Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide, Jerusalem, Israel, and Dr.Stanton, followed by moving tributes and remembrances from the audience.