Rohingya refugees waited to board boats to flee to Bangladesh, on the Myanmar side of the Naf River in September 2017. Credit...Adam Dean for The New York Times She could have stayed home. Once a champion for human rights, she is now expected to argue at The Hague that the world has been deceived by report after report of atrocities against Rohingya Muslims. Nobody is forcing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi — she of the Nobel Peace Prize and fragrant flowers in her hair — to stride into the International Court of Justice on Tuesday at The Hague, where she will lead Myanmar’s defense against accusations of genocide. After all, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi spent decades battling the same military generals accused of perpetrating mass atrocities against Myanmar’s minority Rohingya Muslims. Just a few years ago, the onetime democracy activist, who serves as Myanmar’s foreign minister and de facto civilian leader, visited the halls of power in Western Europe to preach the virtues of nonviolent resistance against a military dictatorship. This time, her mission is very different. From Tuesday to Thursday, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi will represent Myanmar in public hearings at the International Court of Justice, where the country is being accused of trying to “destroy the Rohingya as a group, in whole or in part, by the use of mass murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, as well as the systematic destruction by fire of their villages, often with inhabitants locked inside burning houses.” The three days of public hearings at The Hague, which opened on Tuesday, will not address the merits of the case, which was brought by Gambia on behalf of the 57-nation Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Instead, the court proceedings are focused on whether the court should issue urgent orders to protect the half a million Rohingya still living in Myanmar. The court could issue such “provisional measures” in a matter of days, long before the international legal system rules on the charge of genocide, a process that could take years. Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi, dressed in black, sat motionless in the front row on Tuesday, facing 17 judges of the United Nations’ highest court, as lawyers for Gambia began making their case that hundreds of thousands of Rohingya still in Myanmar urgently needed protection. Philippe Sands, a specialist in international law who is a member of Gambia’s legal team, told the judges that the Rohingya remained the targets of “ongoing genocide” and were vulnerable to more atrocities to come. “You are called upon to act now,” he said. “This court is the ultimate guardian of the Genocide Convention,” he told the court. “It is on you that the eyes of the world are turned.” For many outside Myanmar, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi’s evolution from imprisoned opposition leader to apologist for some of this century’s worst ethnic pogroms is a cautionary tale of how power corrupts. But her turn as the generals’ protector has only cemented her popularity at home, where her party, the National League for Democracy, faces elections next year. “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi always handles problems with love,” said U Saw Phoe Kwar, a well-known reggae singer and peace activist in Myanmar. “Everyone should be united as she faces the problem at The Hague.” For days, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi’s fans have gathered across Myanmar for rallies of support. A billboard in Hpa-an, Myanmar, last month showing Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi with three grinning military ministers in front of the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Credit...Agence France-Presse — Getty Images To them, the expulsion of Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine State in far western Myanmar, a campaign so vicious that United Nations officials have said that it had genocidal intent, simply did not happen. “Western opinion seems to be against Myanmar in the Rakhine case because the information they get from the international news has led to a misunderstanding,” said U Myo Nyunt, a spokesman for the National League for Democracy. “They need to know more about the real situation on the ground and the history of the country.” Mr. Myo Nyunt said no mass atrocities had taken place against the Rohingya, apart from isolated bouts of killings in two villages. Instead, he said that the international community has ignored the deaths of dozens of Hindus in Rakhine State at the hands of what the Myanmar authorities say were Rohingya insurgents. International human rights groups estimate that thousands of Rohingya have been massacred by the military and mobs of Buddhist villagers since 2017. “We are trying our best not to harm anyone in the country just because of their religion,” Mr. Myo Nyunt said. In Myanmar, the international effort to punish those responsible is viewed by many as a plot by oil-rich sheikhs to upend a peaceful Buddhist nation. Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi’s supporters hope that she, with her Oxford University pedigree and crisp English, can clear up any confusion and persuade the judges at the International Court of Justice to reject the case against Myanmar, just as she once rallied foreign resistance to the country’s repressive military junta. “There is no one better than Aung San Suu Kyi in terms of wisdom and experience,” said U So Bhi Ta, a Buddhist monk in the city of Mandalay. “I believe that she will bring the real news to overcome the fake news from the Western media,” he added. Since becoming the de facto civilian leader of Myanmar after the 2015 elections, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi has avoided criticizing the generals for an orchestrated campaign of violence that has compelled more than three quarters of a million Rohingya to flee for neighboring Bangladesh since 2017. She has blamed Muslim “terrorists” and a “huge iceberg of misinformation” for the Rohingya crisis. Her office’s social media feeds have labeled the military’s sexual violence against Rohingya women as “fake rape.” The Rohingya are considered illegal immigrants by most people in Myanmar, formerly called Burma. Most have been rendered stateless, even though their homes are in Rakhine. Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi’s surprise announcement last month that she would lead the team of lawyers presenting Myanmar’s case at The Hague unleashed a frenzy of public displays of support back home: billboards urging her luck in Europe, contemporary art exhibits dedicated to her heroism, blessings from Buddhist monks who see her as a defender of a faith besieged by Islam. Her boost in popularity is well timed for the National League for Democracy, facing its first re-election campaign since its landslide victory four years ago. Economic overhauls have stalled. Fighting with various ethnic groups has flared in the nation’s borderlands. Representatives of the Shan ethnic group, which is battling Myanmar’s military in the north, released a statement on Monday saying that they “strongly support the international legal cases being brought against Burma’s military leaders, who have authorized atrocities against the country’s ethnic peoples for decades with impunity.” “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s trip to The Hague is definitely related to the 2020 election,” said Khun Gamani, a social researcher. “I think she is desperate to get the Burmese Army’s recognition and deference.” “This aggressive populism will render sustainable peace and reconciliation inside Myanmar even more impossible,” said Sawangwongse Yawnghwe, an artist and activist whose grandfather was the country’s first president. “It’s all for short-term gain and winning next year’s election, but the impact of what her government is doing now will be felt for generations to come.” Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi’s supporters said that she was not necessarily walking in lock step with the nation’s military, known as the Tatmadaw. Myanmar’s delicate power-sharing structure means that any contrary move by the pro-democracy camp could push the military further out of the barracks, they said. “She is not going to The Hague because she is on the same side as the Tatmadaw,” said Mr. Myo Nyunt, the National League for Democracy spokesman. “It’s more like a parent taking responsibility for his or her kid’s problems.” But critics said that had Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi used her moral eloquence to defend persecuted ethnic minorities, virulent hatred of the Rohingya in Myanmar would not have become as acceptable as it now is. “The military and Aung San Suu Kyi’s denials are not only crude attempts to cover up atrocities but the ugly rhetoric does harm to survivors,” said Matthew Smith, a co-founder of Fortify Rights, an advocacy group. “It contributes to the destruction as a group. This is all by design.” Most Rohingya remaining in Myanmar are interned in camps or confined to their villages, without access to basic services. In its court submissions, Gambia said this population faced “grave danger of further genocidal acts.” Elsewhere, the Rohingya who now live in the largest refugee settlement in the world, a sprawl of mud and shacks in Bangladesh, have been told that their encampments will soon be enclosed by barbed-wire fencing. Internet access has slowed since local telecommunications firms were ordered by the Bangladeshi government not to provide coverage to those without proper papers. In their flimsy shelters, the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh can do little but depend on judicial deliberations a continent away. “We are quite sure that Aung San Suu Kyi will not tell the truth at the court and will try to protect herself and the military,” said Alam Shah, a Rohingya refugee in Bangladesh. “We trust the international lawyers and we hope they will not join hands with the perpetrators.” Hannah Beech reported from Bangkok, and Saw Nang from Mandalay, Myanmar. Marlise Simons contributed reporting from The Hague. Copyright 2019 The New York Times Company

Ro Nay San Lwin and Maung Zarni tell Al Jazeera they fear for their lives but will not be 'silenced' by online abuse. Lwin, left, and Zarni have been in exile outside Myanmar for the past 18 and 30 years respectively [DW News/Anadolu] Two prominent Rohingya campaigners say they are facing increased online abuse, including death threats, for their work, with the latest warning coming from the grandson of former Myanmar ruler Ne Win who called for their abduction. Ro Nay San Lwin, a prominent Rohingya activist based in Germany, and Maung Zarni, an academic living in exile in the United Kingdom, have told Al Jazeera that they fear for their lives but will not be "silenced" by the online harassment. Accusations and threats The latest threat posted by Myanmar millionaire Aye Ne Win last month has Lwin and Zarni worried. Ne Win, one of Myanmar's most well-known entrepreneurs, has demanded that the activists be abducted and brought back to Myanmar in a video interview posted on YouTube. Win told local media outlet AkonThi that it was "high time" the Myanmar military launched an "Israeli-style kidnap operation" against the exiled activists - similar to the capture of Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann in Argentina. "These creatures should not dare to come to our country. They scream foul from abroad but they need to be tried here [In Myanmar]," Win said in the interview. Lwin and Zarni said they had alerted authorities in Germany and the UK respectively about the latest threats. "I shouldn't take this threat lightly. I am very much concerned," said Lwin, adding that, while he had been receiving threats since 2016, largely from ordinary people, this was different because Win still had strong ties with the country's government, military and intelligence services. On why the prominent businessman would specifically target them, Zarni - who is a Buddhist - told Al Jazeera he had "provided the first-comprehensive study of Rohingya persecution using Lemkin's genocide framework, and have helped maintain the genocide argument through international conferences in 7 years". "If your anti-genocide activism is sustained and effective, you get singled out ... our activism naturally angers Myanmar genocidaires," Zarni said. Lwin said that he had received online messages insinuating he should be assassinated in a manner similar to the late Ko Ni - a prominent Myanmar lawyer who had criticised the country's nationality law, which rendered the Rohingya stateless. "They called me a master of fake news, traitor and all the swear words they can use," Lwin, cofounder and coordinator of the Free Rohingya Coalition (FRC), told Al Jazeera. Zarni told Al Jazeera he had been accused of receiving millions of dollars from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). During a teaching stint in Malaysia in 2013, Zarni said he was informed by the Special Branch (SB), the intelligence arm of the country's police, that he was the target of a possible attack by a group of individuals with links to the embassy of Myanmar in Kuala Lumpur, forcing him to move to a safe house. "I would not go anywhere without texting the SB," said Zarni, who is also associated with the FRC. Nevertheless, Zarni and Lwin have stood firm and continue unapologetically in their campaign to highlight the suffering of the Rohingya people. More than 750,000 Rohingya now live in cramped refugee camps in neighbouring Bangladesh following a 2017 crackdown by Myanmar's military, which UN investigators said demonstrated "genocidal intent". The Myanmar government has come under intense criticism from human rights groups for stifling dissent in recent years and over its treatment of Rohingya people. Sectarian violence in 2012 forced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya to take shelter in refugee camps in Myanmar's Rakhine state, dubbed "concentration camps" by the New York Times. In September last year, two Reuters journalists were sentenced to seven years in prison for investigating the massacre of nearly a dozen Muslim Rohingya men by Myanmar security forces and Buddhist civilians in Rakhine state during a military operation in August 2017. Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo were released in May this year under a presidential amnesty following an international outcry. Zarni said the threats against him and Lwin needed to be taken in the context of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case on the Myanmar state's role in the persecution and illegal killing of Myanmar's Rohingya community in August 2017, set to begin this month in The Hague. The lawsuit was lodged by The Gambia, a Muslim-majority West African nation, after garnering support from the OIC. Myanmar has denied the charges and said its crackdown was in response to an armed attack by Rohingya rebels. Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar's de facto ruler who has been criticised for her silence on the Rohingya issue, will lead the country's legal defence team at the ICJ. The hearings will commence on December 10. "The specific threats against Maung Zarni and Nay San Lwin are dangerous not just to the personal security of these men and their families," Katherine Southwick, international legal expert and visiting scholar at George Mason University's School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, told Al Jazeera. "These threats also create a climate of fear and intimidation against any individual or non-governmental group that might call for, support, or cooperate with justice efforts like the ICJ case," she added. Southwick said attempts to intimidate the activists could undermine the search for "accountability and justice that is so clearly needed in Myanmar". Zarni and Lwin will be attending the hearing at The Hague. "This hearing is the first ever. It is historic. We have been victims of genocide for more than 40 years. This is first time at international court," Lwin noted. "I'm concerned for my safety, but I can't skip." Copyright 2019 Al Jazeera

Rohingya refugee camp in Bangladesh 2016 credit: UN OHCHR Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016 FLASH REPORT Originally published: 3 February 2017 For PDF of the UN OHCHR Report see: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/MM/FlashReport3Feb2017.pdf Contents 1. Introduction and methodology 3 2. Context 5 3. Geographic scope 7 4. Statistical analysis of the interviews 9 5. Security forces and other armed elements operating in the area 11 6. Extrajudicial and summary executions or other killings 13 6.1. Death due to random firing 14 6.2. Death due to shooting at close range 15 6.3. Death due to stabbing by knife 16 6.4. Death by burning 16 6.5. Beating to death 17 6.6. Killings of children 18 7. Enforced disappearance 19 8. Rape and other forms of sexual violence 20 8.1. Gang rape and rape by an individual 21 1.1. Sexual violence other than rape 24 9. Physical assault including torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 25 9.1. Beatings and death threats 25 9.2. Stress positions 27 9.3. Psychological torture 28 10. Arbitrary detention, inhumane conditions and ill-treatment in detention 29 11. Lack of emergency medical care 31 12. Destruction of property 31 12.1 Destruction of homes and other buildings 31 12.2. Destruction of food and food sources 33 13. Looting and occupation of property 34 14. Ethnic and religious discrimination 35 15. Analysis of patterns in specifically targeted villages 37 16. Conclusions 40 Footnotes are in italics 1. Introduction and methodology At the request of the High Commissioner, an OHCHR four-member team was granted access to Bangladesh from 8 to 23 January 2017 to interview Rohingyas who had entered Bangladesh from northern Rakhine State (nRS) in the aftermath of the 9 October 2016 attacks. As per its terms of references, the team focussed exclusively on gathering testimonies on events and incidents that had occurred in nRS since 9 October, in order to carry out an assessment of potential human rights violations taking place there since then. The human rights situation in nRS prior to 9 October has been analysed and described in the High Commissioner’s June 2016 report to the HRC (A/HRC/32/18), and is therefore not covered by this report. The team gathered testimony from more than 220 persons who had fled nRS, conducting interviews from 12 January to 21 January 2017 in the district of Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. The team was assisted by four full-time interpreters (one female, three male), in addition to three part-time interpreters (two female, one male). The team’s two female members prioritised interviews with women, assisted by the female interpreters. The interviews were conducted in 8 different locations where many of the estimated 66,000 newly arrived Rohingya have temporarily settled (see also the below map provided by IOM of where recent arrivals are located): 1. The Kutupalong and Nayapara registered camps, where some 14,000 newly arrived reside alongside long-standing registered refugees. 2. The makeshift settlements in Kutupalong and Leda. 3. In host communities (villages) where many newly arrived people reside entirely outside any organized camp or settlement. These communities were located in the areas of Leda, Hnila, Balikhali, Teknaf and Shamlapur. In the registered camps, the makeshift settlements and in Shamlapur, the interviews were conducted indoors (e.g. in food distribution centres, health clinics, other offices), to ensure full confidentiality and privacy. In the other locations, the interviews were conducted in the interviewees’ makeshift shelters constructed out of bamboo sticks and plastic sheets. The interviewees were selected by the team either through contact with local organizations on the sites or through random identification of residents on the sites, without providing any prior information on the team’s arrival. In addition to gathering testimony, the team also collected audio-visual material – including photographs of bullet and knife wounds, burns, and injuries resulting from beatings with rifle butts or bamboo sticks.1 The team did not use or consider any photographic evidence that it had not taken itself. 2 The team also considered three independently prepared satellite imagery analysis reports, provided by UNOSAT, Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), and reviewed recent reports from December 2016 on the situation since 9 October in nRS.3 The team did not consult any recent traditional or social media reports or other reports on the situation, except for updates produced by the UNCTs of Myanmar and Bangladesh. 2. Context The general situation in nRS, including the legal framework and the long-standing human rights challenges, have been extensively described in the High Commissioner’s recent report to the Human Rights Council (HRC), A/HRC/32/18. To understand the general context, only a brief summary follows: Rakhine State is one of the poorest states in Myanmar, with limited access to basic services and few livelihood opportunities for the entire population. It has one of the lowest rates of literacy in the country. Muslim communities face additional barriers owing to protracted displacement, restrictions on freedom of movement and discrimination, and access to education. Many Rakhine contest the claims of the Rohingya to a distinct ethnic heritage and historic links to Rakhine State, viewing the Rohingya as “Bengali” (connoting them as non-indigenous or “illegal immigrants”), with no cultural, religious or social ties to Myanmar. Since 2012, incidents of religious intolerance and incitement to hatred by extremist and ultra-nationalist Buddhist groups have increased across the country. The Rohingya and other Muslims are often portrayed as a “threat to race and religion”. Against this backdrop, tensions have occasionally erupted into violence.4 There are long-standing grievances in Rakhine State between Rohingya Muslims (population of just over 1 million of which perhaps 800,000 live in nRS) and Rakhine Buddhists (the 1 In cases of injuries caused by attacks by the army, police, and/or Rakhine villagers, it should also be mentioned that the interviewees’ description of weapons used (rifles, grenades, bamboo sticks, rifle butts, long knives) match the analysis of medical experts from different organizations, who have provided aid to injured persons in Bangladesh and who spoke with the OHCHR team about the kinds of weapons that may have been used to inflict injury as well as on the frequency of cases of injuries and sexual- and gender-based violence from Myanmar referred to their clinics since 9 October. 2 The team was given photographs and videos by victims, witnesses and other interviewees (including humanitarian organizations), but has not yet been able to prove their veracity and therefore they were not used for this report. 3 The HRW report of 13 December, Amnesty International report of 20 December (AI report ASA 16/5362/2016), and ICG report nr 283, released on 15 December 2016, plus a Lancet article published online December 1, 2016, see http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)00646-2. 4 A/HRC/32/18 and CRC/C/MMR/CO/3-4, paras. 96–97, A/70/412, para. 36 and A/HRC/28/72, para. 55. “Rakhine”) (around 2 million); and between each community on the one hand and the Bamar-majority-led central Government on the other.5 The Rohingya face severe restrictions on their freedom of movement. In nRS, they require official authorization to move between, and often within, townships (for example, a village departure certificate is required to stay overnight in another village.). The procedures to secure travel are onerous and time-consuming, and failure to comply with requirements can result in arrest and prosecution. Restrictions routinely lead to extortion and harassment by law enforcement and public officials. Since the outbreak of violence in Rakhine in June 2012, a curfew was imposed in nRS, which offers broad discretionary powers to the authorities, including with regard to limitations on assembly and prohibiting movement between dusk and dawn. This curfew remains in place, having been extended in the wake of the 9 October events referred to below.6 The team received many testimonies about such restrictions. As a result of such barriers, a Rohingya can find it easier to flee to Bangladesh than to other parts of Rakhine State or another region of Myanmar. It is therefore not surprising that an estimated 66,000 Rohingya7 have crossed the border with Bangladesh (pictured below) since 9 October, either by boat (for those who can afford the exorbitant fees charged by smugglers and boatmen) or by trying to float across by holding onto a plastic container or barrel (for those who cannot): Many of those interviewed reported having been first internally displaced within a limited, sealed-off area north of Maungdaw in nRS, sometimes moving between up to five villages, before trying to cross the border into Bangladesh (having realised that the Myanmar 5 A/HRC/32/18. The most recent major outbreak in June and October 2012 led to hundreds of cases of injury and death, the destruction of property and the displacement of 140,000 people (see A/67/383, paras. 56–58, and A/HRC/22/58, paras. 47–48). Around 120,000 individuals remain in camps for internally displaced in central Rakhine State, with ongoing segregation between Rakhine and Rohingya communities. 6 A/HRC/32/18 para 28-30 and Amnesty International report nr ASA 16/5362/2016 of 20 December 2016. 7 IOM Cox’s Bazar Situation Report of 5 January 2017 reported 65,000 while an OCHA update on 20 January reported 66,000. security forces were heavily present in all villages in the area). An estimated 22,000 people remain internally displaced as at 20 January,8 which means that nearly 90,000 people are estimated to have suffered internal or cross-border displacement since 9 October. In addition to experiencing multiple displacement (both internal and cross-border), the vast majority of those interviewed also had experienced multiple violations. As is visible from the statistics produced by the team, families may have had members killed, beaten, raped and/or taken away to an unknown location, while at the same time their homes were burned and looted. For most interviewees, separation from their families is a major concern. Many of the interviewees were severely traumatized by the events they had experienced or witnessed, and many broke down and cried during the interviews, including men. Some others were visibly hungry, thirsty or sick. 3. Geographic scope Of the people interviewed by the team, all except two had fled from the so-called security operation zone (or lockdown area) primarily located in north Maungdaw in nRS (see map further below).9 All persons interviewed by OHCHR had fled the area after 9 October. The Myanmar security forces have been heavily present in this area ever since several hundred men reportedly attacked three border guard posts located in the area on 9 October 2016 - the Border Guard Police (BGP) headquarters in Kyee Kan Pyin close to Wa Peik, the BGP sector headquarters at Nga Khu Ya in Maungdaw and a BGP outpost in Koe Dan Kauk, in Rathedaung.10 According to a press conference held by the Government of Myanmar on the same day, nine police officers were killed in the attacks, while eight attackers were killed and two captured.11 On the same day, the area was reportedly sealed off and people’s movement restricted. . Humanitarian agencies were denied access to this lockdown area12, 8 OCHA update on 20 January 2016. 9 All names of village tracts and villages used in this report correspond to those used by the Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU, see http://www.themimu.info/), in particular in their map of Maungdaw Township - Rakhine State (Map ID: MIMU154v04, Creation Date: 3 May 2016, A1, Projection/Datum:Geographic/WGS84) 10 AI report ASA 16/5362/2016 of 20 December 2016, ICG report nr 283 of 15 December 2016, HRW report of 13 December, Global Light of Myanmar, 10 October 2016. 11 Global Light of Myanmar, 10 October 2016. This was reportedly followed by additional skirmishes on 12 November near Pwint Hpyu Chaung in which one soldier was killed, Global Light of Myanmar 13 November 2016 and ICG report nr 283 of 15 December 2016. 12 OCHA reported on 29 December that access to almost all locations in northern part of Maungdaw had been re-suspended on 28 December with immediate effect. At the time of writing, access remained restricted for most actors, although WFP national staff were in January authorized to access 43 villages and UNHCR two villages in Maungdaw north in January 2017, according to an OCHA update on 20 January. Prior to that, reportedly only one-off food deliveries on 8, 9 and 10 November to a handful of villages had been authorized, in which the military indicated that it was conducting “area clearance operations” which are further described below.13 Extract of map from the Myanmar Information Management Unit. Map ID: MIMU154v04, Creation Date: 3 May 2016, A1, Projection/Datum: Geographic/WGS84.14 Testimonies gathered by OHCHR indicate that the security forces continued their operations in the area into January 2017, although possibly with less intensity and frequency. The team interviewed people who had fled the lockdown area and crossed the border as recently as early January 2017. UN officials in Bangladesh have confirmed that, at the time following a visit by an international mission comprising UN and diplomatic representatives on 2-3 November to those same villages. 13 ICG report nr 283, 15 December 2016. 14 The full original map is available here: http://www.themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Tsp_Map_VL_Maungdaw_- _Rakhine_MIMU154v04_03May2016_A1.pdf of writing, people continue to cross into Bangladesh, although the numbers may have reduced compared to the peak of the influx at the end of 2016. 4. Statistical analysis of the interviews The OHCHR team interviewed more than 220 victims and witnesses, in addition to numerous representatives of UN system agencies, NGOs, health professionals and other experts in Dhaka and Cox’s Bazar. The team conducted in-depth interviews with 204 victims and witnesses. Of the 204 individuals, 77 were men, 101 were women and 26 were children.15 All except for two are from Maungdaw township. All interviewees from Maungdaw township are specifically from the lockdown area.16 The only two who were not from Maungdaw were from Buthidaung. Some 66% are from nine of the most affected villages of the lockdown area.17 The team has carried out a basic statistical analysis of the violations reported or experienced by 204 individuals interviewed, and can present the following picture: Testimonies of witnesses (including victims): Of the 204 persons interviewed: - 134 (65%) reported killings. - 115 (56%) reported disappearances (including persons having been “taken away” by the security forces and not heard of since). - 131 (64%) reported beatings. - 88 (43%) reported rape. - 63 (31%) reported sexual violence. - 131 (64%) reported burning or other destruction of property. - 81 (40%) reported looting/theft of property. Testimonies of victims: Of the 204 persons interviewed, many reported having been personally victim of a violation: - 26 (13%) reported having been personally shot or stabbed (the OHCHR team has photographic evidence on file). - 91 (45%) reported that a family member had disappeared. - 96 (47%) reported that a family member had been killed. 15 “Children” being defined as persons below the age of 18 years, in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 16 The team has yet to determine the precise Burmese translations for three Rohingya village names from that area. 17 Namely Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son, Kyet Yoe Pyin, Nga Khu Ya, Pwint Hpyu Chaung, Ngar Sar Kyu, Myaw Taung, Dar Gyi Zar, Kyar Gaung Taung, Wa Peik (listed in descending order of number of interviewees from village). - 89 (44%) reported having been beaten. - 26 (13%) reported having been raped, of whom 2 were girls. Among the 101 women interviewed, 24 (24%) reported having been raped. - 33 reported having suffered other forms of sexual violence, of whom 5 were girls. Among the 101 women interviewed 28 (28%) reported having suffered other forms of sexual violence. - Taken together, 52 (52%) of the 101 women interviewed reported having been raped or subjected to other forms of sexual violence. - 102 (50%) reported that their own property had been burned or destroyed. - 76 (37%) reported looting or theft of their own property. It should be mentioned here that the above numbers likely represent an under-estimation of the violations that the 204 interviewees witnessed or experienced, for the following reasons: - The data above only represents the violations that the witnesses and victims reported during the interviews. Many victims of severe violations (rape, killings or disappearances of close family members) were less likely to discuss other violations (for example, destruction of property, looting) during the in-depth interviews. - Regarding rape, it is not easy for a woman from a conservative culture to share information with others about having been raped, due to both embarrassment and stigma. It cannot be ruled out that some women who reported having been subject to sexual violence may in fact have also been raped, but may have refrained from saying so. The majority of women were interviewed by the team’s two female members assisted by the team’s female interpreter, but given the large number of female victims some had to be interviewed by a female or male team member assisted by a male interpreter. It should also be mentioned that some of the victims and witnesses that the team interviewed may have experienced or witnessed more violations on average than others who have fled the lockdown area (i.e. a possible over-estimation in comparison with the other 66,000 and 22,000 who remain displaced in Bangladesh and Myanmar respectively at the time of writing), for the following reason: During the interviews that the team conducted in five of the eight locations it visited, some of the interviewees that the team selected had been previously informed about the OHCHR team’s arrival and purpose. On the other hand, during the interviews that the team conducted in three of the eight locations it visited, the team selected interviewees in an entirely random manner among residents who had been given no prior warning about the team’s arrival and purpose. The testimonies gathered in these three locations were not significantly qualitatively or quantitatively different from those gathered in the other five locations. 5. Security forces and other armed elements operating in the area The testimonies gathered indicate that four types of Myanmar security forces and two types of other armed elements were involved in the operations being conducted in the lockdown area since 9 October: From left to right: Uniforms of the Myanmar Police Force, Tatmadaw and Border Guard Police. Credit: EPA Photos. The Myanmar armed forces (Tatmadaw) They are typically dressed in plain green uniforms (pictured above), according to testimonies gathered, carry long rifles and long knives, in addition to heavier weaponry. The Border Guard Police Force of Myanmar (BGP) They are typically dressed in camouflage-patterned uniforms (pictured above), which several victims identified as similar to the uniforms of the Bangladesh Border Guard (BGB).18 Witness testimonies indicated that the armed forces19 (or army, military or Tatmadaw – these terms are used interchangeably in this report) often operated jointly with the BGP.20 This is consistent with reports of “joint operations” between the Tatmadaw and police forces both by the GoM and other sources. In practice, though joint BGP-army patrols take place, the army reportedly has authority over the security response, under its western commander.21 18 E.g. interview with woman from Wa Peik: “When I came here [to a camp in Bangladesh] and I saw the BGB’s uniforms I was really scared because their uniforms are very similar to those of the armed men that came to my village - greenish camouflage with something light/white on the sleeves. They had long rifles; they were pointing them at us.” 19 Unit 205 was mentioned specifically by victims and witnesses from Nga Khu Ya. 20 E.g. interview with woman from Kyet Yoe Pyin: “The armed men were wearing green uniforms, some with plain patterned pants, and some with camouflage pattern, like leaves. They had the same colour as the helicopters.” 21 ICG report nr 283, 15 December 2016. Police forces of Myanmar Non-border police forces were also engaged in operations in nRS. They are typically dressed in uniforms with grey shirts and dark trousers (also pictured above). They feature in the disturbing video footage of Myanmar Police personnel beating men – and children – who were rounded up during the security operations.22 Rakhine villagers recently integrated into the security forces Several testimonies were gathered from interviewees who claimed to have been attacked by Rakhine villagers23 dressed in security force uniforms, indicating that the villagers had recently been provided with such uniforms and weapons. When asked how they could distinguish a uniformed Rakhine villager from a regular, long-standing officer, many witnesses – including several women - stated that the Rakhine villagers would have longer hair (without a military style hairstyle) and were less likely to be shaved. Others had recognized their own Rakhine neighbours in military uniforms: “I know Buddhist boys in my village who have been given military uniforms and weapons. We can distinguish them from the regular military, even when they wear uniforms. There are Buddhist villages next to our village. They had a marketplace there, where both we Muslims and Buddhists went, we used to see them there every day. I know many of the young boys, those of my age, I used to talk with them.”24 These testimonies are consistent with statements by the Government, the media and others about the recruitment of local non-Muslims. Reportedly, the GoM has clarified that it has an “accelerated BGP training program with loosened admission criteria and trainees deployed as regular BGP”.25 Rakhine villagers joining/supporting the security forces in civilian clothing Several interviewees also testified about having been attacked by Rakhine villagers who were dressed in civilian clothing, but were assisting and supporting the security forces. Sometimes Rakhine villagers would join the security forces in whatever they were doing; on 22 https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2017/jan/02/rohingya-police-beating-footage-myanmar- government-investigate-video. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar reports in her press statement of 20 January that Myanmar acknowledged this video’s veracity and responded by arresting some of the police officers featured in the video. 23 Rakhine villagers were occasionally called “Buddhists” or, pejoratively, “Mogh” by the interviewees. These terms have been retained in the original interview reports where they were used, but are not used in this report. 24 Interview with a 22-year old man from Doe Tan. 25 ICG report nr 283, 15 December 2016 and http://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/18/11/2016/id-9208 which quotes Lwin, the chief of the No. 1 Border Guard Police Force, saying that “every Rakhine national wishing to protect their state will have a chance to become part of the local armed police” and that “healthy Rakhine women and wives of the members of Rakhine State Police Force also have received basic military training”. other occasions, Rakhine villagers would engage in looting, beating or sexual abuse on their own initiative (but in the presence of security forces who did nothing to stop it).26 Other armed elements According to the Government of Myanmar27 and a recent International Crisis Group report28, Rohingya insurgent elements have also been operating in nRS during the period, and were allegedly responsible for the attacks on the three BGP sites that occurred on 9 October and involved in skirmishes on 12 November. Of the witnesses and victims OHCHR spoke with, no one reported having witnessed or having been subjected to any abuse by these alleged insurgents. Testimonies received in relation to these armed elements instead mainly referred to statements made by Tatmadaw or BGP during their “area clearance operations", in which soldiers or police officers stated to villagers that they were searching for members of the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO). Other testimonies similarly referred to the security forces having blamed the Rohingya villagers for having sheltered “bad people” or “terrorists”, although without any reference to any concrete group. Assessment All eyewitness testimonies the team gathered referred to violations allegedly perpetrated by the Myanmar security forces or Rakhine villagers acting jointly with security forces (or at least with their acceptance). A description of these follows below in the chapters on the types of alleged violations. 6. Extrajudicial and summary executions or other killings Many victims and witnesses interviewed by OHCHR claimed that several of their immediate and/or extended family members, neighbours and other Rohingya civilians in the nRS were killed in different circumstances and by different methods by the Myanmar army, police and Rakhine villagers. 26 Some interviewees referred to the Rakhine villagers as members of the so-called 969 movement. 27 SR Lee reported the following on 20 January in her end-of-mission press statement concerning those attacks: “What has been said to me over and over by Government representatives regarding the 9 October attacks is that this was not an inter-communal violence or crisis; that this was a calculated attack against the sovereignty of Myanmar and that the Government rightly launched a security response. The Government described to me how the attacks occurred and I saw the three Border Guard posts concerned. I deplore these attacks carried out in a brutal manner and I convey my deepest condolences to the families of those killed.” 28 ICG report nr 283, 15 December 2016. The ICG refers to an armed group (known as Harakat al-Yaqin (HaY)), as having been responsible for three attacks on BGP posts that occurred on 9 October. 6.1. Death due to random firing Many victims reported that several of their family members and friends were killed by random firing and the use of grenades29 by the army, and provided their names to OHCHR. Many other eyewitnesses also stated that many innocent civilians were killed on the spot due to the random firing of bullets and use of grenades. Similar testimonies were received from victims from across the lockdown area, indicating the systematic, widespread and coordinated nature of such indiscriminate attacks by the army, the police and Rakhine villagers. The allegations of the random nature of shootings were corroborated by witness testimonies that showed that people were shot either while fleeing, when they were working on their farms, shopping in markets, or while fishing. Some of those interviewed mentioned that they did not know from which direction bullets or grenade splinters hit them. Many attacks were reportedly conducted by the security forces in early hours of the morning around Fajar prayer time, when it was still dark and the visibility was poor, making it difficult for the security forces to see who they were firing at and for the innocent civilians to flee. A man from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son stated: “The day the army attacked my village, my father and I had just come out of prayers, when we heard sounds of shooting. We had just walked to a farm, where we were sitting and talking to the owner of the farm. While the firing was still going on, my father stood up, which is when a grenade came and exploded close to us, killing my father, the farm owner’s son, and severely injuring me and the farmer.” (OHCHR picture of victim’s injuries on file.) In another case, a man from Kyar Gaung Taung reported: “The day the army attacked, it was 3 a.m., and I was sleeping. After hearing the firing, I woke up and to save my life I wanted to run and hide. All of a sudden a projectile hit my body, and I was hurt”. Similar attacks occurred in Doe Tan, as reported by a 25-year old male interviewee: “The military came to our village on 10 October in the morning. First they started shooting into the air, people were scared and came out of their homes, and then they started killing people. They were shooting at people. We were all trying to flee, I was running and at that point I was shot and fell into the paddy field. Since I was running I am not sure on which side the bullet entered and where it exited. My cousin helped me and brought me home and treated my wound. My father was killed at the same time as I was shot.” (OHCHR picture on file of his lower back and side, where a bullet entered and exited.) The use of helicopters for firing bullets and dropping of grenades also confirm the indiscriminate and random nature of the attacks. Witnesses from Dar Gyi Zar and Yae Khat 29 In testimonies, victims and witnesses would describe projectiles and explosions seemingly caused by grenades but possibly also by mortars. Chaung Gwa Son recounted to the OHCHR team the horror, destruction and casualties that helicopter attacks caused in their villages. One eye witness from Dar Gyi Zar explained: “Two helicopters were deployed to our village. The helicopters flew over the village for over 20 minutes, firing randomly at the villagers. The first round of attack was carried out from a higher altitude, but in the second and third rounds, they flew just over the rooftops of the houses. Seven members of my brother’s family in-law were killed in the helicopter attack.” A young teenager from Yae Twin Kyun stated: “They were shooting from a helicopter when I was in Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son, visiting my grandmother. I was in front of her house, playing with some other boys when the helicopter came. I was shot from the helicopter, other boys were too. Six or seven of us were hit by bullets from the helicopter.” (OHCHR picture on file, taken of three different gunshot wounds, on each arm plus in armpit.) Many of those interviewed reported having lost one or more family members, friends or neighbours due to shooting while fleeing such attacks. Some recalled that bullets “rained” on them when they were fleeing their villages, along with hundreds of others. OHCHR photographed and documented injuries on victims that were either still fresh or had left scars on their body, due to surgeries performed on them to remove bullets/grenade splinters. 6.2. Death due to shooting at close range Influential and respected members of the community, particularly teachers, imams, religious scholars and community leaders were reportedly specifically targeted. In several cases, the army entered houses, shops or villages and shot and summarily executed them with a rifle shot at close range. While describing the situation, several victims mentioned that the army and Rakhine civilians, sometimes up to 400 individuals, would arrive in a village, and between six and 10 of them would then go from house to house attacking Rohingyas. In some cases, prior to the killing, victims were reportedly questioned about “infiltrators” or “people from Bangladesh” or arms, while in other cases, they were simply executed by shooting from close range. A man from Nga Khu Ya said: “The military had locked us down for almost 10 days. I ran out of food and my three children were starving to death. The situation became desperate and unbearable, so I went to the nearby canal to fish. When I reached the canal, I found two other villagers fishing. Suddenly, two police officers approached us and pointed their guns at us. We were asked to kneel down and were then hit with rifle butts. After a few minutes of beatings, the police shot the two other villagers from close range. Both died on the spot. They continued kicking and punching me and yelling ’call your Allah to come and save you’. After about 10 minutes of beatings, they aimed at me. I was hit by a bullet in my back and fell into the water. They continued shooting at me. I received a second bullet in my shoulder. I pretended to be dead and the police left.” (OHCHR pictures of bullets wounds on file.) 6.3. Death due to stabbing by knife Testimonies were also collected from witnesses and victims whose family members were killed when their throats were slit by knives carried by the army or by other long knives which are usually used for slaughtering livestock. Many such killings have been committed in presence of family members, friends and immediate neighbours (see also the section on killings of children below). A 14-year-old girl from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son, who had already been raped by soldiers, saw her mother beaten to death and her two sisters killed in a knife attack. “When my two sisters, 8 and 10 years old, were running away from the house, having seen the military come, they were killed. They were not shot dead, but slaughtered with knives.” An 18-year old girl from Kyet Yoe Pyin lost her mother in a knife attack: “My mother is rather old, over 60, so when the military came she could not run very well, so we saw them catching her and cut her throat with a long knife.” When the police, army or civilian Rakhines arrived in their homes, family members usually fled in different directions, separating from each other. In the ensuing chaos, fear and confusion, some family members were captured by the army, while those who managed to flee hid in nearby hills, villages or paddy fields. Those who managed to return to their villages once the army had left the village reported that they found the dead bodies of their captured relatives, killed either by shooting or stabbing. A woman from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son: “My father, who was also living with me, was slaughtered with a knife. He was a religious person.” 6.4. Death by burning Another major cause of deaths was due to burning of houses. Numerous testimonies collected from people from different villages such as Kyet Yoe Pyin, Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son, Dar Gyi Zar and Pwint Hpyu Chaung village tracts confirmed that the army deliberately set fire to houses with families inside and in other cases pushed Rohingyas into already burning houses. People of different age groups who managed to escape the fire also died later due to burns. Testimonies were collected of several cases where the army or Rakhine villagers locked an entire family, including elderly and disabled people, inside a house and set it on fire, killing them all. An eyewitness from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son stated: “The army set fire to my house, burning my elderly mother-in-law and a sister-in-law, who was mentally disabled, alive. We were unable to carry them with us, when the military attacked the village.” In another incident from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son recorded by OHCHR, elderly people were dragged out of their houses and set on fire in open spaces: “The military dragged my grandmother and grandfather out of their house. First they were severely beaten, then tied to a tree. The military then put dried grass, woods around them and set them on fire.” In some cases, the army also burned bodies of people who had already died of bullet or stab wounds. Pictures and videos of charred bodies, which were beyond recognition in many cases, were shared with OHCHR (although the team has not yet had a chance to confirm their veracity at the time of writing). Family members claimed that in several cases the bodies were so badly burnt that the only way of recognising them was by identifying the personal belongings on the remains, such as bangles and watches. An 18-year-old girl from Ngar Sar Kyu recounted: “It was at around 3 a.m. in the morning; we were sleeping, when military attacked our village. We ran outside in panic, leaving my five-year-old brother behind in the house. The military came and set fire to the house, burning my brother alive. We found his burnt body in the morning, after the military had left the village.” The concerted and coordinated efforts by the army, police and Rakhine villagers to burn people and property (see also the below section on destruction) seem to indicate that these acts were deliberate and intentional. An 11-year-old girl from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son explained: “After entering our house, the army apprehended us. They pushed my mother on the ground. They removed her clothes, and four officers raped her. They also slaughtered my father, a prayer leader, just before raping my mother. After a few minutes, they burnt the house with a rocket, with my mother inside. All this happened before my eyes.” 6.5. Beating to death Reports of deaths due to beating by the security forces and Rakhine villagers were also recorded. A number of men, women and children were beaten to death with sticks, gun butts and metal rods, or kicked to death with boots. They were hit on the back of their head, the chest and face, causing fatal bleeding and other severe injuries. Some of the victims mentioned that they were severely beaten either by the army or Rakhine villagers and then dumped by the roadside as the alleged perpetrators took them for dead. A resident of Laung Don informed OHCHR: “The military rounded me and some 85 other villagers up. They tied our hands behind our backs. We were taken to an open space, where we were forced to sit in a stress position, with our body bent and looking down towards the ground. They were hitting us with rifle butts, wooden sticks, kicking and punching us, inflicting severe injuries. An elderly villager was beaten to death by five army officers in front of our eyes.” 6.6. Killings of children Several testimonies gathered by the OHCHR team concern the killing of children - boys and girls of different age groups ranging from newborns to teenagers - by the security forces. Children were killed by live ammunition or stabbed while at home; while fleeing to safety; or while in the farms or fields. In several particularly disturbing cases, mothers witnessed the killings of their children by knife attacks: A 25-year old woman from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son: “They beat and killed my husband with a knife. They went into my house. Five of them took off my clothes and raped me. My eight-month- old son was crying of hunger when they were in my house because he wanted to breastfeed, so to silence him they killed him too with a knife. I thought I would die, but I survived.” A mother of four from Pwint Hpyu Chaung: “I fled together with my four children. I was holding and carrying the two youngest. My two oldest children, my daughter who was six years old and my son who was 10, were behind me. When the armed men were running after me, I hid behind some trees and bushes. The men caught my two oldest children and killed them. They used a knife of the kind we use to slaughter goats. I saw this from where I was hiding.” A mother of three from Kyet Yoe Pyin: “They held me tight and I was raped by one of them. My five-year old daughter tried to protect me, she was screaming, one of the men took out a long knife and killed her by slitting her throat.” In one case, witnessed by a 19-year old woman from Ngar Sar Kyu, a new-born baby was killed: "In Kyet Yoe Pyin I saw the military killing a newborn baby of a distant relative. She was about to deliver the baby just after military entered the village. We were all inside the house and the military made us come out. My relative could not come out as she was in labour so they dragged her out and hit her stomach with a big stick. They killed the baby by stomping on it with their heavy boots. Then they burned the house." Several children also reportedly died when their houses were set on fire by the army while they were inside, some having been prevented from coming out by the security forces. Children also drowned in the river between Myanmar and Bangladesh, when escaping the attacks in nRS and crossing into Bangladesh. In most cases, it was reported that the Myanmar border guards opened fire on them, resulting in the sinking of their boats. A 46 year old inhabitant of Yae Twin Kyun stated the following: “I, along with my family and other Rohingyas boarded two fishing boats one night to cross into Bangladesh. We were in the middle of the river, when the Myanmar Border Guards approached us, and opened fire at us, hitting our boats. The boat sank and we all fell into the river. Three of my cousins between two and four years of age drowned in the river. A number of children in the second boat also sank. Bangladeshi border guards and fishermen came to our rescue.” 7. Enforced disappearance Since 9 October 2016, hundreds of Rohingyas have been “picked up or rounded up” by the Myanmar security forces. Of the 204 people that OHCHR interviewed, 91 (45%) reported family members – often several - who were still missing after having been taken away by the security forces. In addition to family members, many interviewees also named and listed many neighbours and distant family members who were taken away and who are still missing. In all, 115 (56%) of interviewees reported disappearances. Men were rounded up by the police and army in local schools, mosques, madrasas, police stations and open fields and transported to unknown destinations. Some were also taken away from their homes, farms, roadsides and around villages. Boys and men between the age of 17 and 45 were particularly targeted, as they are considered to be strong and seen as a potential threat to the army and authorities. Men would typically have their hands tied behind their backs or behind their heads during these round ups. Women and girls of fertile age were also rounded up, separated and taken away. Before being transported in vehicles (ranging from smaller minibuses to large open military trucks in witness testimony), those rounded up were body searched for money and valuables, which, if found, were kept by the security forces. The groups of people rounded up varied in numbers from village to village, from small groups of 10-15 to larger ones of 70 to 150. Many interviewees cited dozens of family members and neighbours, usually men, who were missing after having been rounded up and taken away in this way. One of the victims, a man from Yae Twin Kyun who was injured while escaping the army said: “They took women, girls and men to a large playing field in our village. They kept almost the entire village on the field, and then picked 17 people who are respected by the villagers and took them away to an unknown destination. To date, we have no information about them. They also took six beautiful women and girls.” Cases of individual disappearances were also presented to the OHCHR team. Several victims from different villages in Rakhine mentioned that the army and police targeted and picked up influential individuals such as imams, teachers, preachers, rich business men, chairmen or village leaders and respected elders. Such influential people were targeted, as they were potential sources of information for the army and police about insurgents or could be involved in resisting the authorities’ operations. No information was available on the current whereabouts of these individuals. A majority of the interviewees believed that those who were picked up by the army or police may no longer be alive. Lists of names were shared with OHCHR. A victim from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son informed the OHCHR team that: “The military arrested my son, a Mullah and religious teacher in our mosque. He was taken to an unknown location and his whereabouts remains unknown. We don’t know if he is still alive.” The number of persons missing after having been taken away by the security forces is difficult to estimate, but could potentially exceed several hundred. According to the testimonies gathered, most are men and boys. OHCHR spoke with many women and children whose husbands, brothers and fathers are missing, and whose remaining families in Bangladesh now consist entirely of women, or are at least headed by women. Humanitarian workers in Bangladesh confirmed this and informed the OHCHR team that the vast majority of the estimated 66,000 Rohingyas who have crossed the border since 9 October are women and children. Not knowing the fate of a loved one is a particularly difficult burden to bear, and many interviewees broke down during the interviews when this issue was mentioned. Most interviewees were in desperate need of services to help trace family members. 8. Rape and other forms of sexual violence 52 (52%) of the 101 women the team interviewed reported having survived rape or experienced other forms of sexual violence. The team interviewed 26 survivors of rape, of whom 2 were girls. An additional 28 women and 5 girls reported having suffered other forms of sexual violence. Nine of the rape survivors were from the same village. Some women were raped or sexually abused in a village other than their own, following the displacement caused by the violence and burning of houses. The perpetrators have been identified as mainly military in green or black/green camouflage uniforms, with red scarfs, carrying rifles, knives and wooden sticks, although rapes by police and Rakhine villagers were also reported. The victims reported that the perpetrators usually spoke in Burmese while committing the acts of rape or otherwise sexually assaulting them and thus the majority of victims did not understand what they were saying. The accounts of those who understand Burmese or who were assaulted by perpetrators who also used, at least in part, words they could understand suggest that the women were targeted as a punishment for: (a) not revealing or knowing where their male relatives and/or the “insurgents” were hiding or (b) allegedly supporting the “insurgents” e.g. cooking for them or (c) simply for being Rohingya. This suggests that rape was being used as a form of torture. “The one who raped me asked me where my husband was. I said ‘I do not know, my house burned’. He said: ‘Tell the truth and we will release you. Then he beat me and raped me.” 22- year-old woman from Dar Gyi Zar. “When they were raping me, they were saying that I am cooking for the RSOs but I never did it”, woman, 25, from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son. “I only understood one word “khalar” that they were repeating, which means Bengali people from Bangladesh,” 30 year-old woman rape-survivor from Nga Khu Ya. 8.1. Gang rape and rape by an individual The majority of interviewed rape victims were raped by more than one soldier, usually three to four but even up to eight officers. Rape by an individual soldier would typically occur alongside a gang rape – i.e. several women would be targeted for rape within a particular house, school or mosque and the majority of them would be gang raped while some were raped by only one individual. While the majority of interviewed rape victims were aged 20- 30, the team interviewed several girl victims of a gang rape, with the youngest one being only 11 years old. In some cases pre-adolescent girls were targeted. In the case of the 11 year-old victim of a gang rape from Kyein Chaung, the military caught her and her mother alone in the house. The soldiers locked the mother outside the house and then gang-raped the girl. “The next time the military came, there were eight to 10 of them, they were asking where my father and sisters were. They were also saying that they were searching for people from Bangladesh. They removed all my clothes and all my mother’s clothes and kicked us with their boots. Then they left. I do not know why. But the next day they came again. This time there were seven of them. They dragged my mother outside the house and locked themselves in the room with me. I do not know if they all abused me, I lost consciousness at some point. My mother woke me up with water. I was bleeding a lot.” Pregnant women were also raped. The team interviewed pregnant survivors of rape, including gang rape, one of whom was raped in her 9th month of pregnancy. Penetration by objects such as rifles or bamboo sticks has been alleged in second hand accounts but was not reported by any of the rape victims met by the team. Penetration by hand was rare. Only in one case was sodomy and penal penetration of the mouth reported by the victim. The rapes usually took place following one of these scenarios: In the first scenario, women and girls would be rounded up by military and several of them would be taken to nearby schools, mosques, houses or the forest/jungle to be gang raped. The remaining women (not targeted for rape but rounded up) were made to sit in the heat of the sun for several hours or in some cases all day. The terror of being made to witness (albeit from a distance and without actually seeing, although in some cases hearing) the rape of others in combination with the physical discomfort of being forced to sit in the sun was in itself traumatizing for those who experienced it and whom the team interviewed. In some cases, the gang rapes and rapes took place in a common room/space and in some cases each girl or woman was taken to a separate room, toilet or other area. In the second scenario, military would follow women and girls fleeing to individual houses and rape or gang rape them there. In the third scenario, military unexpectedly attacked women in their homes or the homes in which they were taking shelter. In several cases, one or two soldiers usually held the victim, often crushing/pinning her legs and hands, while another penetrated her. This was the case also for some cases of rape by only one soldier; the perpetrators would not take turns in this case. Often the perpetrators held rifles against the victim’s face, chest or belly or a knife to their neck and threatened to stab or kill her, while the others raped her. Some victims also reported having been grabbed by their throats, having their hair pulled, being punched, including on lips and face, being kicked, and being severely beaten with rifle butts on their breasts, stomachs, lower abdomen and on their vaginas as well as other parts of the body, including eyes. One of the victims had a stitched up 8-10 cm long scar in the proximity of her vagina, having been stabbed when trying to defend herself against rape (picture on file with OHCHR team). Another victim was burned on her leg with a burning piece of plastic (picture on file with OHCHR team). Many women reported that the soldiers were “pressing their breasts very hard” before and during the rapes. Some of the victims lost consciousness during the rapes. The victims of rape would often be left without clothes or with torn clothes, at times unconscious, in public spaces such as the schools, mosques, yards or the jungle. and some had to flee to nearby villages in search of clothes and help or return naked from a faraway place to which they were taken. In one case in which several girls were raped in a school, one of the victims reported that the military took photos of the naked victims with their mobiles before raping them. Most victims of rape that the team have spoken to expressed distress and were visibly upset and crying during the interviews. Some have explicitly reported severe mental consequences such as insomnia, depression, fainting, persistent fear, and getting startled at any noise. “I get counselling once a week and prenatal checks. I cannot sleep properly. I am depressed. I faint sometimes. My husband is trying to help me but it’s hard.” 32 year old woman from Kyet Yoe Pyin, raped in the fifth month of pregnancy. “I feel very nervous and scared all the time. Every noise startles me. I am afraid to even go to the bathroom by myself.” 25 year old woman from Nga Sar Kyu village tract. Some reported the following physical and medical consequences of the rape: bleeding (in some cases severe) ranging from 2 hours to 17 days; symptoms of and treatment for severe urinary and vaginal infections; abdominal pain (in some cases severe); being unable to move or walk for several days; difficulties to walk because of bruising, and pain throughout the body from the accompanying punches. “After the rape I was struggling to urinate, but my baby inside me is still alive. I was bleeding from my vagina for 17 days. When I came here to Bangladesh, about 22 days after I was raped …at the clinic they inserted a small pipe into my urinary tract which helped me to urinate. But when it was removed I could still not urinate, so then I was brought to the hospital.. They tested me there and saw that the rape had caused an infection. I felt like I would die of the pain. They gave me a medicine that I must take for several months, and now I can fortunately urinate again.” 25-year old woman from Kyet Yoe Pyin. “When I woke up I found myself bleeding profusely from the vagina. I thought that I would die; it took four to five days to flee and to cross the forest with my children, for 10-15 days I was bleeding. It did not stop even after coming here. Doctors treated me and after that the bleeding stopped.” 37-year old woman from Kyein Chaung. “I have been bleeding a lot since the rape. The last time I had that type of bleeding was immediately after I had given birth to my second child.” 30-year old woman from Kyet Yoe Pyin. Women and girls who were raped, typically, did not have any access to health care in nRS, either because there were no doctors, because they could not afford such care or because they were worried about social stigma that would be attached to them in their communities. Even women with severe bleeding were usually given only herbal medicine by other villagers and properly treated only upon arrival in Bangladesh. Health clinic workers in Cox's Bazar confirmed to the team that they had treated significant numbers of Rohingya women who had been raped and who arrived since the 9 October attacks. Several interviewees mentioned cases of women and girls dying as a consequence of gang rape. While the team did not come across any direct eyewitness testimony of such deaths, it gathered several indirect accounts: A 27-year old old fisherman from Kyein Chaung: “During their operations, the army entered our house, where they found my mother, wife and sister at home. They took my 18-year-old sister to nearby bushes and gang-raped her. She was brought back after the rape. She was in a critical situation and died the same day. I was in the canal fishing and upon my return, I found her dead.” A 35-year old father from Kyet Yoe Pyin: “There were also many young women and girls who were abused. I know three of them. Two came with us when we crossed the border, although I don’t know where they are now. They were raped together with a third girl, Hasina. She is the one who was killed. She was from Kyet Yoe Pyin. She was my very close neighbour. She was 16.” Women and girls who were raped in their homes or other people’s homes were frequently raped in front of their children or siblings of all ages, or other female members of the household; men were usually in hiding when the rapes took place. Family members and others who tried to defend the victims were beaten with sticks, punched and kicked. One mother had her hand broken when defending her daughter; a boy aged two and a half who was trying to defend his mother was kicked by the military and had his shoulder dislocated; and a 15-year-old girl had a scar on her face from defending her mother. Another victim reported that all of her three children (two daughters, aged seven and 12 and one son, aged six) were beaten and pushed as the military raped her. In two of the most gruesome cases, a woman described how her five-year-old daughter, who was trying to stop soldiers raping her mother, had her throat slit and another mother recounted how her eight-month baby boy was similarly killed. (See also above under the section on killings.) 1.1. Sexual violence other than rape Sexual violence happened in similar scenarios to rape – when Rohingya were being rounded up, by unexpectedly attacking women in their own homes or in homes they were visiting or taking shelter in, be it in their own village or a village to which they had been displaced. While rapes were widespread, other forms of sexual violence were even more so, as reflected in this quote from a 30-year-old woman from U Shey Kya: . “You will not find a single house in our village where women were not subjected to this.” OHCHR’s interviews confirm that this was the case in many of the villages that the victims and witnesses came from. The most common form of sexual violence was invasive body searches during the round-ups or house checks during which women and girls of all ages, even toddlers, had their private body parts touched and/or exposed. The purpose of this form of sexual violence appears two-fold - a) to intimidate and humiliate the women and b) to loot any valuables that the women and girls might be hiding such as money and jewellery. Women frequently reported that during these checks the military would press their breasts very hard, pinch their nipples, press on their nipples with rifle butts, beat or slap those who did not want to remove their clothes and in some cases even put hands inside their vaginas to search for any objects they may be hiding. As with rapes, victims who protested or those witnesses trying to protect the victims were kicked or beaten with rifle butts and sticks. “They body-searched us all, one by one. They pressed my breast very hard with their hands and pushed hard on my nipple with a rifle butt. I dropped my baby when they did that. We were all scared, my mother-in-law was trying to hold my baby who was crying and another military man beat her repeatedly with a rifle butt on her neck.” Woman, aged between 20- 25, from U Shey Kya. These checks were often conducted in public, as exemplified in the two following testimonies: “They would also press our breasts and put hands in our vaginas in the name of searching for objects we were hiding. They did this to me, my daughter and my daughter-in-law. They did this in front of everyone in the paddy field, it was so embarrassing. They even touched my seven-year-old daughter on her chest and near her private parts.” 45-year-old woman from U Shey Kya. “Several men came into my house. They held me forcefully and they touched my breasts. It was so awful; there was a very young man, much younger than me, almost a boy. He touched my breasts in front of everyone.” 30-year-old woman from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son. In addition to these bodily intrusions, some women and girls were on the verge of being raped but managed to escape or were saved when others arrived or the military had to leave. Those women and girls reported having experienced similar violence as rape victims such as being punched and beaten in the abdomen and genital area with rifle butts. 9. Physical assault including torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment Rohingya were subjected to beatings, other forms of torture, cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by the security forces during “area clearance operations” in homes, mosques, and sometimes outdoors as well as in makeshift detention centres. Reference to torture, cruel or inhumane treatment can be found in other sections of this report. Testimonies provided to OHCHR included cases of rape, burning of plastic on different parts of the body, burning of beards, beatings on different parts of the body and administering stress positions. 9.1. Beatings and death threats Testimonies of victims and witnesses revealed that physical assault, including beating, was widespread. Hundreds of Rohingya men, women and children of all age groups were victims of severe beatings by Myanmar police, military and Rakhine villagers. While several victims were questioned about the presence and provision of shelter to ‘insurgents’, and accused of supporting the RSO, several others were simply beaten because they were Rohingyas, or were victims of mob attacks by Rakhine villagers. Many of them were threatened with being killed, told to leave Myanmar or told that they did not belong in the country. Random beatings in people’s homes during house to house attacks and searches or while fleeing were commonly used to threaten, intimidate, and instill fear among the Rohingya population. Several people interviewed claimed that the only reason they survived the beatings is because the mobs and army thought they were dead and so stopped beating them. Mass beatings were reported to have happened either during round-ups or when groups of Rohingyas were escaping attacks by the army and police. Bamboo sticks, gun butts, slingshots or catapults and metal rods were used for beatings but the attackers also resorted to using their bare hands. In numerous cases, a group of four to five soldiers, police or Rakhine villagers would use bamboos sticks and gun butts to inflict severe injuries on one single individual. Soldiers were also reported to often resort to kicking victims, including a boy aged two and a half who lost consciousness after being kicked and a six-year old boy whose arm was broken. (When OHCHR interviewed the boy, he still had a cast on his arm). Pregnant women were not spared beating and in at least one reported case this led to the death of the foetus: “Another time when we were made to sit outside the houses, the military asked my young sister who was heavily pregnant to walk. She was not well, she could not walk. They beat her on her back, stomach, waist and buttocks with rifle butts. Afterwards she had a lot of swelling and when they took her to the doctor, they found out that the baby was dead.” (30 year-old woman from U Shey Kya.) Scars and severe injuries were shown to the OHCHR team, as evidence of various forms of beatings. Many victims suffered broken arms, broken legs, and injuries to the back or other body parts. In one case, a victim lost the sight in his right eye due to severe injury caused by a marble launched by a sling shot. Several others were unable to walk or sit up due to severe external and internal injuries sustained due to beatings. A 55-year old from U Shey Kya recalled that the army surrounded his village at around Fajar prayer time: “They came to the mosque and rounded up 12 elderly people, including myself. They dragged us outside, tied our hands behind our backs and started beating us. They then took us to the village school building, where they again beat us with sticks and rifle butts. They were constantly asking, ‘Where are you hiding weapons? Where are the armed insurgents? Show us the weapons, or we will kill you all’. They beat us from Fajar to Asr prayer time30. We were then forced to take our own belongings to the Rakhine villagers. I had to carry a very heavy battery from my home to the other edge of the village. After we had delivered our things, the army again beat us and then let us go.” In a case from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son, the victim was caught by a Rakhine mob as he was trying to flee the attack on the village. He was then severely beaten with sticks and left 30 Morning prayer and late afternoon prayer time by the roadside for dead. When OHCHR met him, he was bedridden. While he mentioned that he no longer had pain in his legs, he is unable to move. Elderly people, persons with physical disabilities and pregnant women were also victims of beatings. An 80-year old woman from Nga Khu Ya was thrown onto the ground, while leaving her house. She said that the army kicked and stamped on her with boots. She was so severely beaten that she could barely move after the attack. She mentioned that while beating her, the military shouted “you don’t belong to this country, you are Bangladeshis, and you should go back”. The victim still suffers from pain and injury. Her daughter-in-law (interviewed separately), who was pregnant at the time of the attack, was in the kitchen cooking when the army arrived in the village and entered the house. She was held by her hair and thrown on the ground and kicked by the army. She mentioned that due to severe beatings, she lost consciousness for some time, and when she recovered, she fled. Many victims reported being stabbed with knives (OHCHR pictures on file). Sometimes the attackers were apparently intent on killing and at other times on getting information about hidden family savings such as money and valuables. Reports indicate that the army also beat children. OHCHR gathered a number of testimonies and information that showed that children ranging from 2 to 13 years old were subjected to beatings, slapping, kicking, hitting with sticks, and in some cases with metal rods. In most cases, children were beaten either while crying or while pleading with the security forces to spare their family members. OHCHR observed visible signs of severe beatings on several children’s bodies. A 12-year old boy from Gone Nar (Ngan Chaung village tract) explained his ordeal as follows: “I was at home with my 13-year old uncle, when the army broke into the house. They beat us with sticks, metal rods and kicks. We were crying, pleading for mercy. An army officer hit me hard with a metal rod on my right arm, causing severe injury.31 We were dragged out of the house, which was set on fire. My uncle, who attempted to flee was caught, beaten and thrown into a burning house.” 9.2. Stress positions A number of victims and witnesses informed OHCHR about the wide and systematic use of stress positions during the rounding-up of individuals in houses, open spaces and detention facilities. Individuals were forced to sit in stress positions for between one hour and three days. In many cases, interviewees and victims noted that villagers were taken to an open space, where they were put in groups and then forced to sit in stress positions, holding their hands on their heads and looking down at the ground. In most cases, victims were sitting in the sun and in stress positions for up to eight hours and without any food or water. Several 31 Photo of the injuries taken by OHCHR on file. victims informed OHCHR that the combination of beatings and sitting in a stress position for long periods resulted in internal injuries and also severe pain, particularly in the back. Some complained that the severe beatings and the accompanying stress positions severely affected their vision and hearing and they constantly have headaches and feel dizzy. A 45- year old inhabitant from Kyar Gaung Taung informed OHCHR that “I was held in a military camp for three days, where I was subjected to stress positions throughout my detention. We were not allowed to look up, and failure to comply with the order was met with violence and beating.” Several victims and witnesses claimed that they or their family members were severely beaten to extract information or sometimes merely because they were Rohingyas. In many cases torture victims were either tied to a chair or their hands were tied behind their backs or heads. Many victims were stripped fully or to their underwear and tied next to each other. 9.3. Psychological torture In several situations, psychological torture was also inflicted on Rohingyas. The army and its supporting Rakhine villagers forced victims, including small children, to watch their family members suffer. In certain cases individuals were beaten, sexually abused, raped or killed in front of their relatives, with the intention of inflicting severe mental torture, humiliating and instilling fear. A 22 year old resident of Myaw Taung informed OHCHR that “after entering our home, the army raped my two sisters, 14 and 17 years old, before the eyes of my elderly parents. They were raped collectively by at least eight army men. They had severely beaten my parents prior to raping my sisters.” A 54 year old inhabitant of Laung Don explained: “After rounding-up villagers, the army and Rakhine civilians separated 14 girls, who were beautiful and healthy. These girls were left naked for three hours. We were asked to look at them. The soldiers were playing with the girls’ sexual organs and mocking them. I could not tolerate this situation.” 10. Arbitrary detention, inhumane conditions and ill-treatment in detention Little information is available about persons picked up and taken away by the army or police, as most are still held incommunicado (see the above section on enforced disappearances). However, some victims who had either escaped or been released after detention mentioned that hundreds of men and some women were held in various detention centres around nRS. Those arrested were apparently neither officially charged nor allowed to contact their family members. The vast majority of those detained have so far not returned back to their families, who are very worried about their wellbeing and safety. Some family members speculated that they might have been killed by the security forces by now. Some of the few released detainees interviewed by OHCHR mentioned that they were ill- treated and kept in inhumane conditions. In one case of a female detainee who was released, the father of the detainee testified that his daughter was raped by the army before her release. In another case, a young man was stripped, tortured, and given no food or water, and beaten while in detention. Family members of detainees were unable mostly to provide exact information on conditions or places of detention, beyond saying their sons and daughters were detained in ‘military camps’. In several instances, individuals were held in schools in the villages which were converted into temporary detention centres, before being transported to unknown destinations. A 45-year old former detainee from Kyar Gaung Taung stated: “The army rounded up 46 Rohingyas from our village. We were taken to an army camp. We were all held in a big hall. After a while, military and police came and began interrogating us. They inquired if we knew where the members of the RSO are, who is affiliated with them, where the weapons and insurgents were sheltered. The interrogation was accompanied with severe beatings with sticks, kick and punches. We were forced to sit in a stress position, holding hands on our heads and looking down to the ground. We were only given some rice on the first day, and were not allowed to use the toilet or drink water. We had to defecate inside the hall in plastic bags. After spending three horrible days there, the Chief of the Camp released 14 detainees including me. No explanation was given about the arrest or release. An 85 year old religious scholar, who was released together with us, died of his wounds after 5 days. We don’t know about the status or whereabouts of the remaining 32 persons, including my elder brother.” A mother, also from Kyar Gaung Taung, was detained together with her eldest son while eight months pregnant (when the security forces found her mourning next to the dead body of her husband, a madrasa teacher, whom they had just before shot at close range). They were brought to the village police station and beaten for two days, before being released: “They were saying that my husband was sheltering people from Bangladesh, I said no, we are all Burmese but they did not believe me. They said that they would kill all Muslims. They beat us with wooden sticks and rifle butts. I struggled to stand straight or move my body because they beat me so badly. I was eight months pregnant at that time, I was really worried after being beaten.” Cases of extortion or bribery for release of those detained were also reported by victims. A 35 year-old businessman from Nga Khu Ya claimed that some people from the village were released after paying bribes to the police and army. Another victim from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son testified that his mother had to pay 400,000 kyat to the police for the release of his father and brother, who had been taken away from their house. Another victim from Kyet Yoe Pyin had to borrow money to be able to pay 500,000 kyat to a senior military officer to secure the release of his 70-year old father, who had been severely beaten. Another victim, a 27 year old man from Ye Twin Pyin stated: “On 19 October, I was fishing in the canal, when a boat with three army men approached me. They apprehended me and began beating me with a metal rod. They hit me on my head, knocking me down (OHCHR documented head injury). I was then taken to the military base in Zee Pin Chaung, where I was held for two days, before I was handed over to my father. My father paid the army 1 million kyat for my release. I lost a lot of blood and remained unconscious throughout my detention and the military thought that I was dead. Hence, they agreed to hand over my body to my family in return for money.” Throughout the lockdown area in nRS, schools and mosques became common sites occupied by the security forces, who used them either as outposts or as places of temporary detention. In reported cases where large numbers of men and women were rounded up, they were initially taken to schools to separate men and women and identify individuals of particular interest, such as potentially having information about RSO or arms. They were then transported using military vehicles to unknown destinations. While some suspected that they were taken to police or ‘military barracks’, none were able to definitively identify or name specific barracks. At the same time as the OHCHR team was interviewing those who have fled the nRS to Bangladesh, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar was given access to some locations in nRS where detainees are held. As per her press statement of 20 January she met with some of those who had been arrested and detained for allegedly playing a role, active or supporting, in the armed attacks against the security forces in early October and mid-November: “Except for one suspect whose family knew that the detainee had rights and sought a lawyer for him, the other prisoners did not have legal representation. They did not seem informed of the charges, if any, against them apart from being aware that they could be suspected of being associated with the attackers against the Border Guard posts on 9 October. Some had not been in communication with their family for the two to three months since they had been arrested. (…) The prison officials told me that there are more than 450 individuals detained in Buthidaung in relation to the attack.” 11. Lack of emergency medical care As indicated in the chapters above on violations, several victims and witnesses reported the near total absence in nRS of emergency health care, including for victims with critical injuries resulting from gunshots, knife attacks, burning, gang-rape and beatings. Several witnesses reported that family members and neighbours had died due to injuries incurred during attacks in combination with the lack of medical aid. The ongoing lockdown32 and movement restrictions33 in nRS made it impossible for those wounded to access medical treatment in other parts of Rakhine State. Some of the wounded also claimed to be unwilling to approach a medical centre or doctor due to fear of being arrested by the Myanmar authorities. Several interviewees with gunshot and knife wounds indicated that their wounds were untreated for days or even weeks, before they could receive treatment upon arrival in Bangladesh. The lack of immediate medical aid to some of those injured as a result of attacks using live ammunition may result in lifelong disability for some victims, who lost their limbs or eyesight. A victim from Dar Gyi Zar stated: “I, along with my two younger brothers, was running for safety, when I was hit on my left shin. I collapsed on the ground. My younger brother and four other villagers, who came to help, were also shot. My younger brother died on the spot. I lost my vision.” Many of the victims and witnesses the team met with were visibly severely traumatized, and likely suffering from acute psychological disorders, but had not received any treatment. “When they were taking my husband, the children were screaming. My 6 year-old son tried to defend his father, but the military kicked my son away and broke his arm. After this he was traumatized and did not speak for a couple of days.” 40 year-old woman from Yae Twin Kyun. 12. Destruction of property 12.1 Destruction of homes and other buildings Hundreds of Rohingya houses, schools, markets, shops, madrasas and mosques were deliberately burnt by the army, police and Rakhine mobs. 64% of those interviewed reported burning or other destruction of property. 102 (50%) reported that their own property had been destroyed, primarily house burnings. The testimonies suggest that the targeting of property was done on an ethnic and religious basis, as exemplified in a 32 On 20 January 2017, OCHA reported that health services had not yet resumed in Maungdaw north (having ceased since 9 October due to a lack of access). This prolonged disruption of health services further raises the risk of preventable deaths and complications resulting from non-violent causes. Even before 9 October, the health situation in Rakhine State was already critical as described in two recent reports, once by the Lancet (published online December 1, 2016 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)00646-2) and one by PHR from October 2016. 33 See the below chapter on persecution. statement from a woman from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son: "Only the Buddhist houses in our village were not burned. The Buddhist houses were not touched and the Buddhists were brought to a safe place." Almost all those interviewed were consistent in their claims that the army used rocket- propelled grenades (RPGs), hand grenades, firing from helicopters, petrol bombs, petrol and matches and gunpowder to set houses on fire. While petrol and gunpowder was poured on low roof houses and set ablaze, grenades were either launched using launchers or thrown on roof tops of houses with higher roofs. Setting fire to houses has been used systematically to destroy property, kill people, and drive them away from their dwellings and villages. Some victims also recalled how the fire that sometimes started in one house spread to neighbouring houses quickly due to the nature of materials used to construct the houses, which is dry leaves/grass and wood. Recent satellite imagery analysis provided to the team by three different independent sources – UNOSAT (report of 8 December 2016), HRW (report of 13 December 2016) and Amnesty International (report of 20 December 2016) – all point to extensive burning of homes having occurred during the months of October and November 2016 in the following ten locations in the lockdown area34: Kyet Yoe Pyin, Wa Peik, Ngar Sar Kyu, Pwint Hpuy Chaung, Myaw Taung, Kyar Guang Taung, Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son, Dar Gyi Zar, Thu U Lar and Hpar Wut Chaung. See also for more details the later chapter on the villages most affected by the “area clearance operations”. Several witnesses from the lockdown area reported that mosques in Pwint Hpyu Chaung, Kyet Yoe Pyin, Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son and Wa Peik were burnt down. Qurans, praying mats and other materials inside the mosques were also reportedly set ablaze in some other villages. Mosques that were not burned reportedly saw similar destruction inside. Kyet Yoe Pyin, Wa Peik, Pwint Hpuy Chaung, Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son and Dar Gyi Zar seemed to have faced the brunt of the burning. In Kyet Yoe Pyin witnesses estimated that 400 houses were burnt. In Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son and Dar Gyi Zar only 20-30 houses remained unaffected, according to witnesses. A witness from Pwint Hpuy Chaung reported that hundreds of houses were burned there, with only a dozen spared by the security forces because they used them to stay in, and in Nga Khu Ya, reportedly hundreds of homes were either burned or destroyed. Once the army had left the villages, several thousand people returned to find their houses completely burnt. This led to many families moving from village to village, and ultimately leaving the country to Bangladesh for safety. 34 All three sources of satellite imagery analysis (UNOSAT, HRW and AI) found destruction in all listed villages, except for the following exceptions: In Thu U Lar, both HRW and AI reported destruction but not UNOSAT; in Kyar Gaung Taung, only HRW has reported destruction; and in Hpar Wut Chaung, only AI reported destruction. Several shops privately owned by Rohingyas were also burnt or destroyed. In the case of a 35-year-old businessman from Kyet Yoe Pyin, three shops, two in the market and one in his house, with goods worth several hundred thousand Burmese Kyat, were burnt by the army. Another 45-year-old clothes shop owner from the same village reported that the security forces burned his shop as well as his house. Reports of burning and other destruction of shops and businesses were also received from Ngar Sar Kyu and other villages. Video clips and pictures of burnt houses, shops and other structures were shown by the victims to the OHCHR team. The army also forced homeowners to destroy their own houses or, in the case of Nga Khu Ya, barriers, walls and fences erected between houses. Forcing owners to destroy their own property appears to have been aimed at inflicting suffering, instilling fear, and forcing villagers to leave. While explaining his ordeal, a 55-year-old victim stated, “the local chairman convened a meeting with villagers, where he announced that the army had identified 150 houses for destruction by the owners. No explanation or reason was given for the order. The chairman warned us that non-compliance would be met with force by the army. The owners of the houses, including me, did not respect the order, because I had no other place to take my children. A week after the announcement, the army came to our village and forced the owners to destroy their houses. They severely beat us for not respecting the order. It was incomprehensible and heart-breaking to destroy my own house.” 12.2. Destruction of food and food sources Testimonies indicate that the security forces and Rakhine mobs (together and separately) deliberately targeted sources of food and food itself (burning paddy fields, confiscating farming and fishing tools as well as kitchen utensils, confiscating or destroying rice and other food stocks, including deliberately killing or confiscating livestock such as cows, goats and chicken)35. Several instances of food and food grains thrown on the ground, and mixed with mud to make it inedible were reported. Entire paddy harvests, both for personal consumption as well as for business, were deliberately set on fire. Victims believed that the destruction of property, particularly burning of houses and food was coordinated with the intention of driving the Rohingyas away from Myanmar. A man from Dar Gyi Zar said “after conducting intensive house search operations in Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son, the army came to our village. They first set fire to paddy-fields, rice stocks and bushes. They then left and stayed in the adjacent village together with the Buddhist community.” An 11-year-old girl from Pwint Hpuy Chaung describes what happened when the security forces came to where she and a group of other women and children were hiding in a field: “They took what they found, including our new cooking pots. Then they looked for bags of 35 See also the below chapter on looting. rice. They tore apart the bags on purpose so that the rice fell out. They also shot goats and cows if they found them. They made sure that we children there could not have any food. If they saw rice or cooked dishes, they threw soil on them or threw away the plates.” In addition to the direct destruction of food and food sources, the threat of extrajudicial killings and random shooting and severe restrictions on freedom of movement have prevented the Rohingya in the lockdown area from producing food, by limiting access to paddy fields, other farmland, fishing waters and markets.36 This risks not only affecting their right to food, but also their health.37 A 40-year-old man from Laung Don expressed worry about those who are still left in his village: “When the military came to my village, they entered houses, they destroyed many useful things, rice, oil… They threw it together and mixed it so we cannot eat it. The army did this to us so as to make us hungry, they want us to starve and die, and to move away from our village. Some people are still there, in the village. I have spoken with them. They are saying that the trouble is continuing. The fishermen cannot go to the sea, the farmers cannot go to the paddy field, those with livestock cannot tend to them, people are struggling and starving, they are running out of food. People are coming to Bangladesh to get something to eat. Checkpoints prevent us from going anywhere else.” 13. Looting and occupation of property Looting of property, both private as well as that belonging to the community, were commonly reported by witnesses and victims. The army and police, as well as Rakhine mobs, are alleged to have looted Rohingya homes, taking away money, gold, cattle, vehicles, clothes and anything of value. Such lootings often occurred in conjunction with killings, beatings, burning and destruction of property. Reports of looting were recorded from villages across the entire lockdown area. Men, women and children were body searched for money or valuables they may be hiding. Several women reported that the jewellery they were wearing was removed and taken away. Large numbers of cows, goats and other livestock were often loaded on trucks and taken away from villages. A 40-year-old woman from Nga Khu Ya, said: “I was in the kitchen cooking, some of our children were in the courtyard and the others were in the house, when the army arrived. I 36 Several testimonies were gathered by the team on this. In addition, longer term food security may be jeopardised given that the population are not able to conduct the rice harvest which would normally be starting during this period of the year, according to an OCHA update of 20 January. 37 NRS was characterized by protracted high rates of both acute (24,5-26,5) and chronic malnutrition even before the 9 October attacks, far exceeding the 15% rate of childhood malnutrition at which WHO considers the entire population to be in danger and in need of food aid (Lancet article published online December 1, 2016 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)00646-2). In addition, the suspension of humanitarian services since 9 October directly affected children in the area with severe acute malnutrition who have not received lifesaving treatment since then. was body searched for hidden cash or gold and was asked to untie the knot of my sarong, but they found nothing in the sarong. The army then searched the suitcase, and took some cash and gold away. I have heard that searches like this were carried in other houses as well, and where the military did not find anything, they beat the occupants of the house.” In many instances, the army occupied Rohingya houses for several days, after chasing the families out of their homes. Once the army left the villages, and the family returned, they often found all their food and livestock consumed by the army with nothing left for the family. A 40-year old woman, said: “The military camped in my house for 3 days, following which they attacked the next village, Ye Twin Pyin. When I returned home, I saw five goats, chilli and rice were all eaten up the military. I only found heads of goats lying in my backyard.’ Schools and mosques were frequently occupied by the army, who used them either as temporary outposts or as places of temporary detention (see also the chapter above on detention), to detrimental effect both on the right to education38 and freedom of religion. A number of Rohingyas also stated that the army confiscated their property as well as their personal identification documents. The army either asked Rohingya villagers to collectively hand over their identity documents or confiscated them during house raids. A witness informed OHCHR that three days prior to a full-scale attack on his village, Ngar Sar Kyu, the army gathered villagers in front of the school. They then asked them to bring ID cards and other documents and hand them over to the army. It was alleged that once the army confiscated them, they also looted their homes. 14. Ethnic and religious discrimination The violations described above in this report all targeted Rohingya Muslims, a group which already before 9 October suffered long-standing discrimination in Rakhine State.39 Given the team’s limited mandate, and the gravity and the extent of civil and political rights violations that every single victim and witness described to us, the interviews the team held did not focus on the ways in which the long-standing pattern of ethnic and religious discrimination intensified since the 9 October attacks. Nevertheless in some cases we managed to collect additional relevant information which is presented below. Several interviewees noted that following the 9 October incidents, restrictions already placed on their religious practices, movement and businesses were tightened. Religious practices and rituals - including offering burial services to the deceased persons, congregation in mosque, sermons, wearing Islamic caps and dresses, and maintaining long 38 OCHA reports that in some parts of Maungdaw north, as of 20 January 2017, classes had not yet resumed and children were not attending school since 9 October. 39 As explained in A/HRC/32/18. beards - were further restricted. Family members of deceased recounted that they were unable to offer proper burial and prayer, because doing so would prompt a strong reaction from the army. Some were detained or beaten for having mourned next to the dead body of a relative. As outlined in previous sections, testimonies recorded by OHCHR indicate that religious scholars, preachers, madrasa teachers and students were apprehended, taken away by the army and in some cases killed by indiscriminate firing or shot dead at point-blank range. Soldiers would accuse them of financing Muslim militants or providing them with training and moral support. Witnesses and victims also informed OHCHR that imams, who were arrested by the army, had their beard forcibly shaved or burnt by burning plastic. OHCHR has recorded visible marks of burns on the necks of religious scholars. “I was rounded up, along with 30 others villagers, who were mainly youngsters. They tied my hands behind with a rope. They burnt plastic and dropped melted plastic on my feet and neck. They also burnt my beard with burning plastic,” a religious preacher from Myaw Taung recounted. In another similar situation, it was testified that the army forcibly shaved the beard of the head of a madrasa in front of 200 students and teachers. Witnesses stated that the army occupied mosques, and used them as their bases or outposts. They desecrated Holy Qurans, collected Holy Qurans from homes and burnt them in open spaces, in front of the villagers, and burned them to cook food. Interviewees perceived that this was done deliberately to insult them and hurt their religious sentiments. Women and girls were also raped inside mosques. Some interviewees reported that following the recent attacks, authorities have started headcounts in certain villages, aimed at delisting Rohingyas, who are no longer in northern Rakhine. A 32-year old woman from Kyet Yoe Pyin recounted: “My brother-in-law the chairman, is still in our village and also my younger brother is there. We are in touch. They told us that the Buddhist army came, looted houses and burned all documents. The military is coming and taking pictures of family members, saying that they need to pay 5-6,000 per person. People who are absent are crossed from the list.” The authorities are aware that following the military operation, a large number of villagers fled to either Bangladesh or are internally displaced. There are villages where almost the entire population has been displaced due to large-scale destruction. Such delisting may mean taking away the residency status of Rohingyas who are now in Bangladesh. According to reports the authorities did not make any announcement about the recent survey. 40 40 These testimonies seem in line with an OCHA update of 20 January 2017, according to which an early start to the annual Government household survey in the three northern townships of Rakhine in December creates the risk that those who have been displaced may be forever removed from the household list. That household survey exercise was completed in mid January 2017, according to OCHA. 15. Analysis of patterns in specifically targeted villages Recent satellite imagery analysis provided to the team by three different sources – UNOSAT (report of 8 December 2016), HRW (report of 13 December 2016) and Amnesty International (report of 20 December 2016 – all point to extensive burning of homes having occurred during the months of October and November 2016 in 10 locations41. The eight most affected villages are listed here with their Rohingya name as well as with the amount (including percentage) of interviewees coming from and/or reporting violations from that particular location, with the villages with the most interviewees listed first: 41 All three sources of satellite imagery analysis (UNOSAT, HRW and AI) found destruction in all eight listed villages below, except for the following exception: in Kyar Gaung Taung, only HRW has reported destruction. (Note also that not featured in this list are Thu U Lar, where both HRW and AI reported destruction but not UNOSAT; and Hpar Wut Chaung, where AI reported destruction, but not HRW or UNOSAT.) AI’s analysis (presented in a 20 December report referred to above) dates from November and identifies 400 structures destroyed between 3-10 November and 850 structures destroyed between 10-23 November. HRW’s analysis identified at least 1,500 buildings destroyed on a number of different dates in October and November, see https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/13/burma-military-burned-villages-rakhine-state. 42 The approximate October dates come from HRW. The 8 December UNOSAT analysed images collected on 29 November (from WorldView-3) and compared them with earlier images dating back to spring 2016 and earlier (from WorldView-2 and GeoEye-1 among others), so as a result UNOSAT’s analysis does not distinguish damage done in October from damage done in November. The UNOSAT satellite image-based damage assessment identified a total of 1,414 damaged or destroyed structures. Due to vegetation cover, UNOSAT indicated that it's likely that some damaged structures have been missed or erroneously included in this analysis. AI’s analysis also dates from November (with 400 structures destroyed between 3-10 November and 850 structures destroyed between 10-23 November). 43 Note that due to the similarity between the Rohingya translations (“Boro Gozibil” and “Choto Gozibil”) of Dar Gyi Zar and Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son, two villages located right next door to each other in the lockdown area, it is possible that some interviewees from Choto Gozibil have been identified as from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son and vice versa. Taken together, 111 (54.5%) of all 204 interviewees came from and/or reported incidents from these eight villages. The 8 December UNOSAT report (see map immediately below) analysed images collected on 29 November (from WorldView-3) and compared them with earlier images dating back to spring 2016 and earlier (from WorldView-2 and GeoEye-1 among others). The UNOSAT satellite image-based damage assessment identified a total of 1,407 damaged or destroyed structures in seven different locations.44 44 Due to vegetation cover, UNOSAT indicated that it is likely that some damaged structures have been missed or erroneously included in their analysis. When the team analysed the 111 testimonies gathered from the most affected villages - Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son, Kyet Yoe Pyin, Pwint Hpyu Chaung, Dar Gyi Zar and Wa Peik - a clear picture emerges of how the Myanmar security forces’ so called “area clearance operations” are conducted, as well as of the violations they generate: Interviewees from these villages, as can be seen also in previous chapters, typically reported that large numbers of armed men (often from both the Tatmadaw and the police, sometimes accompanied by Rakhine villagers) would arrive at once in the village. As is confirmed by satellite imagery analysis, they would proceed to destroy many houses, mosques, schools and shops, typically by RPGs (that interviewees call “launchers”) but also by simply using petrol and matches as detailed above. Fields, livestock, food stocks would also be deliberately burned, destroyed or looted. They would separate the women from the men. Men who did not manage to flee would be severely beaten, often with their hands tied to their back, often with rifle butts or bamboo sticks, or kicked with boots. Many men, especially those in a specific age range (teenage to middle age) would also be taken away, with their hands still tied, by military or police vehicles and not heard of again. Women would be rounded up, and either told to stay inside a school or other building or outside in the burning sun. Many would be raped or experienced others forms of sexual violence, often during strip searches, either during round-ups or in homes. Simultaneously, those fleeing would be shot at with rifles and RPGs, and in Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son, Dar Gyi Zar and in Kyar Gaung Taung, also from helicopters. There were also many reports of summary executions, either by shooting at point blank range or by knife, including of babies, toddlers, children, women and elderly people. In some villages, only very few houses are reportedly still standing. According to testimonies, there are no or few men of working age left, and the women and children who could flee have done so. According to the testimonies the team gathered, some who were too old or too poor to flee are still trying to survive among the ashes and the wreckage, lacking food. Interviewees who were still in touch with relatives in their home villages reported that the “area clearance operations” continue, with continued regular presence of the security forces in the villages (although the burning of homes seems to have ceased since December, replaced in some cases by destruction by other means). This testimony from a woman from Pwint Hpyu Chaung is indicative of what the residents of the hardest hit villages experienced: “While we were sleeping, it was 2 or 3 a.m., I did not notice that the military surrounded my whole house. They suddenly entered. They carried both rifles and knives. One used a knife to cut some rope in my house. My brother and my sister-in-law’s husband had their hands tied behind their backs with that rope. They were first beaten with rifle butts. They were beaten so harshly that my brother was about to die, it was so horrible to watch. When they were beating my brother and my sister-in-law’s husband, we were close to them, we were also lying down. Whenever they were crying we were also crying. My oldest son and my (11-year old) daughter were beaten too. And then they shot and killed my brother and my brother-in-law. This happened just outside our house. When they were shooting, a bullet grazed my daughter’s skin too. Then they dragged their bodies away. We never found their bodies. I cannot tell you what I am feeling inside. The military was kicking us with their boots, my husband was lying down as if he was dead, spreading his hands wide. The military thought he was dead, so they brought bamboo sticks and threw them on top of him. We were very scared. We fled to my father’s house which is located just next door. But by this time another group of military came and they set the house on fire. All of us were trying to flee, but then they called my father out from all us women and children. We told our father, please don’t go, they will kill you. They asked us women and children to go away, so we left, and then they took our father from us. They took him, his hands were tied with a rope. Then they set the house on fire. Then we fled into the forest, by this time the house was burning. When we came back we were looking for our father, and then we found his body totally burned, together with three other bodies. It was my other brother who is alive and who is here in Bangladesh, he was the one who went to the house, and he found our father and our uncle lying on his shoulder, his uncle’s son was also there, burned. Maybe they held each other tight, that could be why they seemed to be hugging in their death, my brother said.”45 16. Conclusions Of the 204 persons with whom the team conducted in-depth interviews, all except two had fled from the so-called “lockdown zone” or the “area clearance operation zone” which is located in nRS, halfway between Taungpyoletwea and Maungdaw. According to the testimonies gathered, the following types of violations were reported and experienced frequently in that area: Extrajudicial executions or other killings, including by random shooting; enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention; rape, including gang rape, and other forms of sexual violence; physical assault including beatings; torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; looting and occupation of property; destruction of property; and ethnic and religious discrimination and persecution. 45 Interview with a mother of eight and her 11-year old daughter from Pwint Hpyu Chaung. The vast majority of those interviewed had experienced both multiple displacements and multiple violations. One same family may have had members who were killed, who were beaten, who were raped, taken away to an unknown location, at the same time as their family home was burned and looted. Many of those interviewed reported having been first internally displaced within the lockdown area, sometimes moving between up to five villages, before trying to cross the border into Bangladesh (having realized that the Myanmar security forces were heavily present in all villages in the area, and sometimes having experienced violations in multiple villages). All of the eyewitness testimonies the team gathered referred to violations allegedly perpetrated by either the Myanmar security forces (Tatmadaw, Border Guard Police and/or the regular police force, operating both separately and through joint operations) or by Rakhine villagers (either acting jointly with security forces or at least with their acceptance). Worryingly, the team gathered several testimonies indicating that Rakhine villagers from the area have recently been given both weapons and uniforms, which bodes ill for the future relation and trust between the two communities. While discrimination against the Rohingya has been endemic for decades in nRS, as described in a High Commissioner’s report to the Human Rights Council in 2016, the recent level of violence is unprecedented. The testimonies gathered by the team – the killing of babies, toddlers, children, women and elderly; opening fire at people fleeing; burning of entire villages; massive detention; massive and systematic rape and sexual violence; deliberate destruction of food and sources of food – speak volumes of the apparent disregard by Tatmadaw and BGP officers that operate in the lockdown zone for international human rights law, in particular the total disdain for the right to life of Rohingyas. The testimonies the team gathered from those fleeing the lockdown area and its most affected villages (Kyet Yoe Pyin, Wa Peik, Ngar Sar Kyu, Pwint Hpuy Chaung, Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son and Dar Gyi Zar) describe “area clearance operations” that seem to be in line with the Tatmadaw’s counter-insurgency “four cuts” strategy – a strategy developed in the 1960s to cut off rebel forces from their four main support sources (food, funds, intelligence, recruits), and largely unchanged since.46 This strategy is said to involve cordoning off territory for concentrated operations, a “calculated policy of terror”, to force populations to move, destruction of villages in sensitive areas and confiscation or destruction of food stocks. The Myanmar security forces lost 10 officers in the 9 October and 12 November attacks. However, the testimonies as well as the satellite imagery analysis from three independent sources indicate clearly that the security forces have deliberately targeted the entire 46 ICG report nr 283, released on 15 December 2016. Rohingya population in the area, instead of investigating those who may have been linked to the 9 October attacks on the three BGP locations. The “area clearance operations” have likely resulted in hundreds of deaths and have led to an estimated 66,000 people fleeing into Bangladesh and 22,000 being internally displaced. The testimonies gathered by OHCHR indicate that the attacks against Rohingya villages, and the associated serious violations affecting the right to life and physical integrity and the destruction of houses, food stocks and sources of food make it impossible for Rohingyas to live in their villages, thereby creating a coercive environment amounting to forced displacement. The “calculated policy of terror” that the Tatmadaw has implemented in nRS since 9 October cannot be seen as an isolated event. It must be read against the long-standing pattern of violations and abuses; systematic and systemic discrimination; and policies of exclusion and marginalization against the Rohingya that have been in place for decades in nRS, as described in the HC’s report to the HRC (A/HRC/32/18). Even before 9 October, widespread discriminatory policies and/or practices targeting them on the basis of their ethnic and/or religious identity had led to an acute deprivation of fundamental rights. The information gathered by OHCHR indicates that the victims of killings, rape and sexual violence, arbitrary detention, torture, beatings and other violations outlined in this report, were targeted based on their belonging to a particular ethnicity and religion. Many victims mentioned that soldiers and officers taunted them by saying that Islam is not the religion of Myanmar; that Rohingyas are Muslim Bengalis; and that Rohingyas would be eliminated from Myanmar. They were mocking their religion while beating and arresting them, saying things such as “call your Allah to come and save you”, “What can your Allah do for you? See what we can do?” This raises serious concerns that these acts amount to persecution against a particular ethnic and religious group. The attacks against the Rohingya population in the area (killings, enforced disappearances, torture and inhuman treatment, rape and other forms of sexual violence, arbitrary detention, deportation and forced transfer as a result of violence and persecution) seems to have been widespread as well as systematic, indicating the very likely commission of crimes against humanity (as the High Commissioner concluded already in June 2016). The forcible displacement of persons from an ethnic or religious group as a consequence of acts of violence committed against them such as killings, torture, arbitrary detention, rape and sexual violence and the destruction of houses and places of worship has been described in other contexts as ethnic cleansing.47 The information gathered by OHCHR raises serious concerns that what is occurring in nRS is the result of a “purposeful policy designed by one 47 Annex to the letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, dated 24 May 1994, S/1994/674 27 May 1994, presenting the final report of the commission of experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992) ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas”.48 An estimated 66,000 have so far been forced to leave the land they have lived in for generations. As one interviewee from Pwint Hpuy Chaung stated: “Now is the worst it has ever been. We have heard from our grandparents that there were bad things happening in the past too, but never like this.” *** 48 S/1994/674 para. 130.

Gambia, on behalf of Rohingya Muslims, opens an international dispute with Myanmar in an effort to have the country’s leadership tried for genocide. Rohingya refugees from Myanmar after crossing into Bangladesh in September 2017. Credit...Adam Dean for The New York Times PARIS — An arsenal of international laws has failed to confront the impunity of Myanmar’s government and security forces for their deadly purge of the country’s Rohingya Muslim minority, forcing hundreds of thousands to flee a campaign of rape, arson and killing. But on Monday, Gambia filed a lawsuit accusing Myanmar of genocide, summoning the case before the United Nations’ highest court in an effort to open a legal path against the country’s authorities. In the suit, filed at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Gambia requested that the court condemn Myanmar for violating the Genocide Convention with its campaign of “ethnic cleansing.” [Genocide Watch rejects the non-legal term “ethnic cleansing,” which is a euphemism for the crime against humanity of “forced deportation.”] Gambia, a small West African country with a largely Muslim population, was chosen to file the suit on behalf of the 57-nation Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which is also paying for the team of top international law experts handling the case. The filing amounts to a last-ditch effort to impose an international ruling against Myanmar: Despite a wide outcry over cruelty to the Rohingya, no other court has jurisdiction to pursue a genocide case against the country. Gambia also requested that the International Court of Justice issue an urgent temporary injunction ordering Myanmar to halt all actions that could aggravate or expand the existing situation. That could mean a demand to stop further extrajudicial killings, rape, hate speech, or leveling of the homes where Rohingya once lived in Rakhine State. “It is clear that Myanmar has no intention of ending these genocidal acts and continues to pursue the destruction of the group within its territory,” the lawsuit said, adding that the government “is deliberately destroying evidence of its wrongdoings to cover up the crimes.’’ The court’s 15 judges rarely deal with genocide. Based in the stately Peace Palace in The Hague, the Court of Justice was set up by the United Nations to rule on disputes between nations. It acts more like a court of appeal, focusing on questions of international law, such as disputes over borders or disagreements over international conventions. But that can also include disputes arising from the Convention for the Punishment and Prevention of Genocide, established in an earlier case when Bosnia sued Serbia for genocide. The convention covers “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.’’ In its suit, Gambia claims that applies to Myanmar. The novelty in this case, though, is that Gambia is not at war with Myanmar, as Bosnia and Serbia were. But the Genocide Convention treaty does establish a mandate for member nations to act against genocide, wherever they are. Experts say that if the court accepts the case, whatever the outcome, it will draw renewed attention to the immense suffering of the Rohingya people, most of whom fled to Bangladesh and now live in refugee camps there. It is not clear how Myanmar, which has always denied accusations of “ethnic cleansing” [“forced deportation”] and genocide and argues that it was defending itself against an insurgency, will respond to the case. “Myanmar will ignore this at its peril,’’ said John Packer, a professor of law at the University of Ottawa who has long studied the Rohingya’s plight. If the court hears the case, he said, “there will be a sort of public truth-finding exercise. Myanmar’s simple denials will not stand up to scrutiny.’’ A different body, the International Criminal Court, was specifically created to prosecute genocide and other atrocities. But that court has no jurisdiction over cases in Myanmar because the country has not signed on to the court’s treaty. (Neither have the United States, China, India, Israel and several other countries.) But the I.C.C. did set itself up to at least partly take up the case against Myanmar last year, when it ruled that it could prosecute for “deportation” and associated crimes against Rohingya who fled to Bangladesh, which is a court member. But judges have not yet approved a criminal investigation by the court’s prosecutor. Gambia’s lawsuit against Myanmar was born out of a series of meetings of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) at which the country’s attorney general, Abubacarr M. Tambadou, assumed a position of leadership because of his special expertise. He had worked more than a decade as a lawyer at the United Nations tribunal dealing with the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. In a telephone interview, Mr. Tambadou said he had been very moved by his visit to the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh.“The world failed Rwanda when the international community did not prevent the genocide while it was unfolding,’’ he said. “The treatment of the Rohingya is illustrative of the international community’s failure to prevent genocide in Myanmar. I thought this was not right. The world cannot stand by and do nothing.’’ The resulting lawsuit, seen by The New York Times, leans heavily on reports by United Nations fact-finding missions and what it calls other credible sources. Multiple United Nations investigations have underscored what they called a genocidal intent behind the campaign against the Rohingya. It says that all members of the Rohingya group in Myanmar are presently in grave danger of further genocidal acts because of Myanmar’s deliberate and intentional efforts to destroy them as a group. It also stresses that the remaining Rohingya communities and individuals in Myanmar continue to face daily threats of death, torture, rape, starvation and other deliberate actions aimed at their collective destruction, in whole or in part. The lawsuit notes that Rohingya Muslims have been subjected to persecution for decades in Myanmar, which denies that the Rohingya even exist as an established ethnic minority, despite hundreds of years of history in the country. But pressure increased greatly in late 2016, according to the lawsuit. It cites examples of “attacks in which homes were set ablaze by security forces, in many cases with people trapped inside, and entire villages razed to the ground.” One investigator documented cases where parents saw their young children being thrown into fires. The suit cites incidents of Myanmar’s “security forces calling families out of their homes, separating men and boys to be executed in front of their families or taken away.” It cites testimony about women and girls being raped and then killed.The suit says that so-called “clearance operations’’ were genocidal acts, “intended to destroy the Rohingya as a group, in whole or in part, by the use of mass murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, as well as the systematic destruction by fire of their villages, often with inhabitants locked inside burning houses.” It said that from August 2017 onward, such “clearance operations’’ intensified, and over 750,000 Rohingya refugees fled to neighboring Bangladesh. The case was promoted by Arselan Suleman, US State Department Representative to the OIC, now with the Washington, DC law firm, Foley Hoag. Paul Reichler, the lead lawyer on Foley Hoag’s Gambia team, said he hoped that the court would issue an injunction against Myanmar as soon as possible. “We are confident that genocide has been committed in this case, and we are very confident in the fairness of the court.’’ Copyright 2019 The New York Times Company Gambia's Application to the International Court of Justice in its case against Myanmar may be read at: https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191111-APP-01-00-EN.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0JNShQEjzvu2_TTqphNveCKtjy7qHlAnyREgWYscFfxpr9nppCXUZOB6Y

WATCH THE ORAL ARGUMENTS HERE: http://webtv.un.org/live-now/watch/the-hague-icj-holds-hearings-in-the-case-the-gambia-v.-myanmar/5724217175001 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA v. REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR 11 November 2019 APPLICATION INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS AND REQUEST FOR PROVISIONAL MEASURES To the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, The undersigned, being duly authorized by the Government of the Republic of The Gambia, states as follows: 1. In accordance with Articles 36(1) and 40 of the Statute of the Court and Article 38 of the Rules of Court, I have the honour to submit this Application instituting proceedings in the name of the Republic of The Gambia (“The Gambia”) against the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (“Myanmar”). Pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute, the Application includes a request that the Court indicate provisional measures to protect the rights invoked herein from imminent and irreparable loss. I. Introduction 2. This Application concerns acts adopted, taken and condoned by the Government of Myanmar against members of the Rohingya group, a distinct ethnic, racial and religious group that resides primarily in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. These acts, which include killing, causing serious bodily and mental harm, inflicting conditions that are calculated to bring about physical destruction, imposing measures to prevent births, and forcible transfers, are genocidal in character because they are intended to destroy the Rohingya group in whole or in part. They have been perpetrated in manifest violation of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the “Genocide Convention”). 1 These acts are all attributable to Myanmar, which is thus responsible for committing genocide. Myanmar has also violated other fundamental obligations under the Genocide Convention, including by attempting to commit genocide; conspiring to commit genocide; inciting genocide; complicity in genocide; and failing to prevent and punish genocide. 3. In preparing this Application, The Gambia has taken care to pay close attention to the provisions of the Genocide Convention, including the circumstances of its adoption and its interpretation and application in the years following its entry into force on 12 January 1951. In 1 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951), 78 UNTS 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. this regard, particular attention has been paid to the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, as well as of other international courts and tribunals, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Court. 4. The Gambia is acutely aware that acts of genocide are distinct from other prohibited acts – such as discrimination, ethnic cleansing, persecution, disappearance and torture – but that there is often a close connection between all such acts. It is equally aware that acts of genocide are invariably part of a continuum, as Raphaël Lemkin recognised in his pioneering work,2 and for this reason it is important to place the acts of genocide in their broader context. Thus, when referring in this Application to Myanmar’s acts of persecution and other violations of international law that have been committed against the Rohingya, The Gambia’s case is based on those aspects constituting genocidal acts under the Genocide Convention. 5. The Gambia is cognisant of the Court’s important role as guardian of the Genocide Convention, especially in the absence of any international criminal tribunal with jurisdiction over individuals associated with the acts of genocide described in this Application. For this reason, and to assist the Court in the exercise of its grave responsibility, the Application provides a more detailed account of the relevant facts and their context than might otherwise have been necessary.3 6. Those facts are extensively documented by independent investigative efforts conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and corroborated by international human rights organizations and other credible sources. They establish that, against the backdrop of longstanding persecution and discrimination, from around October 2016 the Myanmar military (the “Tatmadaw”) and other Myanmar security forces began widespread and systematic 2 Raphaël Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (1944), chapter IX. 3 Myanmar is not a State Party to the Statute of the International Criminal Court. With the narrow exception of deportation and other crimes against humanity consummated on the territory of Bangladesh (a State Party to the ICC Statute), there is no basis for jurisdiction over crimes committed within the territory of Myanmar, including the crime of genocide. See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute”, No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18 (6 September 2018); ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh / Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15, No. ICC-01/19 (4 July 2019). In any event, the Court remains the sole basis for the attribution of State responsibility, which is distinct from other forms of accountability. “clearance operations” – the term that Myanmar itself uses – against the Rohingya group. The genocidal acts committed during these operations were intended to destroy the Rohingya as a group, in whole or in part, by the use of mass murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, as well as the systematic destruction by fire of their villages, often with inhabitants locked inside burning houses. From August 2017 onwards, such genocidal acts continued with Myanmar’s resumption of “clearance operations” on a more massive and wider geographical scale. 7. Multiple UN investigations have underscored the genocidal intent of these crimes. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Ms. Yanghee Lee (of the Republic of Korea), carried out extensive fact-finding in regard to Myanmar’s campaign against the Rohingya. She reported first-hand accounts of “attacks in which homes were set ablaze by security forces, in many cases with people trapped inside, and entire villages razed to the ground.”4 She documented parents “witnessing their young children being thrown into fires.” 5 She described Myanmar’s “security forces calling families out of their homes, separating men and boys to be executed in front of their families or taken away.”6 She further recounted the “testimony of women and girls being raped and then killed, some burned alive in their homes while unconscious or tied up.”7 8. The UN Special Rapporteur concluded: “I am becoming more convinced that the crimes committed [in Myanmar] bear the hallmarks of genocide.”8 She has since stated, without equivocation, that the commander-in-chief of Myanmar’s military and other responsible individuals “should be held accountable for genocide in Rakhine.” 9 These individuals were indisputably acting on behalf of the State. 4 UN OHCHR, Statement by Ms. Yanghee Lee, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar at the 37th session of the Human Rights Council (12 March 2018), available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22806&LangID=E. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 “Myanmar army chief must be prosecuted for Rohingya ‘genocide’: U.N. rights envoy,” Reuters (25 January 2019), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/myanmar-army-chief-must-be- prosecuted-for-rohingya-genocide-u-n-rights-envoy-idUSKCN1PJ1AK. 9. Similarly, the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, Mr. Adama Dieng (of Senegal), based on his own fact-finding activities, including interviews with survivors who had fled to Bangladesh, stated: “Rohingya Muslims have been killed, tortured, raped, burnt alive and humiliated, solely because of who they are. All the information I have received indicates that the intent of the perpetrators was to cleanse northern Rakhine state of their existence, possibly even to destroy the Rohingya as such, which, if proven, would constitute the crime of genocide.”10 10. The findings of the UN Human Rights Council’s Independent International Fact- Finding Mission on Myanmar (“UN Fact-Finding Mission”) are especially significant. The Mission was established on 24 March 2017 amidst escalating violence against the Rohingya, with the mandate “to establish the facts and circumstances of the alleged recent human rights violations by military and security forces, and abuses, in Myanmar, in particular in Rakhine State.”11 It was composed of three distinguished jurists: Marzuki Darusman (Chairman, from Indonesia), Radhika Coomaraswamy (Sri Lanka), and Christopher Sidoti (Australia). In carrying out its mandate, the Mission followed best practices established by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in its International Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law – Guidance and Practice.12 11. The Mission conducted over 600 interviews with victims and eyewitnesses as well as over 250 consultations with stakeholders, including intergovernmental and non- governmental organizations, researchers and diplomats.13 It “took care to diversify its sources of information”14 and, in selecting interviewees, “strove to only speak with persons who had not previously spoken with any other organization or media outlet, and confirmed this ahead 10 UN Secretary-General, Note to Correspondents: Statement by Adama Dieng, United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, on his visit to Bangladesh to assess the situation of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar (12 March 2018), available at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2018-03- 12/note-correspondents-statement-adama-dieng-united-nations. 11 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar (12 September 2018), UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64 [hereinafter UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report (2018)], para. 4; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (17 September 2018), UN Doc. A/HRC/39/CRP.2 [hereinafter UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018)], para. 4. 12 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 9. 13 Ibid., paras. 19, 23, 754. 14 Ibid., para. 19. of the interview.”15 The Mission also “obtained a large body of satellite imagery and analysis with the support of UNOSAT [the United Nations Operational Satellite Applications Programme], and received a vast amount of documents, photographs and videos – some clandestinely recorded or obtained by the source.”16 It “only used those materials that it was able to authenticate,” and “[a]ll information was checked against secondary information assessed as credible and reliable, including organizations’ raw data or notes, expert interviews, submissions and open source material.”17 12. Based on its meticulous collection and review of the evidence, the UN Fact-Finding Mission concluded in its September 2018 Report of the Detailed Findings to the UN Human Rights Council that “the factors allowing the inference of genocidal intent are present.”18 It thus urged that “named senior generals of the Myanmar military” be “investigated and prosecuted in an international criminal tribunal for genocide.”19 On 24 October 2018, the Chairman of the Mission, Mr. Darusman, stated that the situation in Myanmar is an “ongoing genocide.”20 Those who carried out the genocidal acts were officials and agents of the State of Myanmar, and were acting on its behalf. 13. The UN Fact-Finding Mission issued an additional report on its detailed findings in September 2019, based on further investigation, with a particular attention to events that transpired since September 2018. 21 It conducted additional interviews with victims and witnesses, both targeted and randomly selected, taking “special care to avoid re-interviewing victims and witnesses.”22 It also “obtained and analysed satellite imagery, photographs and 15 Ibid., para. 20. 16 Ibid., para. 22. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid., para. 1441. 19 Ibid., p. 1. 20 “Rohingya genocide is still going on, says top UN investigator,” The Guardian (24 October 2018), available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/24/rohingya-genocide-is-still-going-on-says-top-un- investigator. 21 UN Human Rights Council, Detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (16 September 2019), UN Doc. A/HRC/39/CRP.2 [hereinafter UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2019)], para. 1. 22 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2019), paras. 32-33. In total, the Mission conducted 419 interviews, some of which concerned situations elsewhere in Myanmar. Ibid., para. 32. videos and a range of documents,” and “cross-checked the information against secondary information assessed as credible and reliable.”23 14. The Mission’s September 2019 report confirmed its earlier conclusion that Myanmar is responsible for the “commission of genocide.”24 It found: “the evidence that infers genocidal intent on the part of the State against the Rohingya, identified in its last report, has strengthened.”25 Alarmingly, the Mission warned: “there is a serious risk that genocidal actions may occur or recur, and that Myanmar is failing in its obligation to prevent genocide, to investigate genocide and to enact effective legislation criminalizing and punishing genocide.”26 15. The Gambia, mindful of the jus cogens character of the prohibition of genocide and the erga omnes and erga omnes partes character of the obligations that are owed under the Genocide Convention, institutes the present proceedings to establish Myanmar’s responsibility for violations of the Genocide Convention, to hold it fully accountable under international law for its genocidal acts against the Rohingya group, and to have recourse to this Court to ensure the fullest possible protection for those who remain at grave risk from future acts of genocide. II. The Jurisdiction of the Court 16. The Gambia and Myanmar are both Members of the United Nations and therefore bound by the Statute of the Court, including Article 36(1), which provides that the Court’s jurisdiction “comprises … all matters specially provided for … in treaties and conventions in force.” 17. The Gambia and Myanmar are also parties to the Genocide Convention. Myanmar signed the Genocide Convention on 30 December 1949 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 14 March 1956. The Gambia deposited its instrument of accession on 29 December 1978. While the Genocide Convention entered into force on 12 January 1951, it became applicable between the Parties ninety days after 29 December 1978, pursuant to Article XIII of the Convention. 23 Ibid., para. 32. 24 Ibid., para. 9. 25 Ibid., para. 58. 26 Ibid. 18. Article IX of the Genocide Convention provides: Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.27 19. Neither The Gambia nor Myanmar has purported to enter any reservation to Article IX. 20. The Gambia has repeatedly expressed its concerns in respect of the conduct described in this Application. Because the prohibition of genocide has the character of a peremptory norm and the obligations under the Convention are owed erga omnes and erga omnes partes, 28 The Gambia has, in particular, made clear to Myanmar that its actions constitute a clear violation of its obligations under the Convention. In response to such statements, Myanmar has rejected and opposed any suggestion that it has violated the Genocide Convention. 21. Myanmar has been made fully aware of the grave concerns expressed by The Gambia and others as to its responsibility for acts of genocide. The latest relevant events include, inter alia, the following: • 12 September 2018: After a year documenting atrocities committed by Myanmar’s military and security forces against the Rohingya group, the UN Fact-Finding Mission presented its first report affirming that “[t]he crimes in Rakhine State, and the manner in which they were perpetrated, are similar in nature, gravity and scope to those that have allowed genocidal intent to be established in other contexts.”29 27 Genocide Convention, art. IX. 28 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, pp. 45-47, paras. 85-88 (citing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp. 110-111, para. 161). 29 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report (2018), para. 85. • 1-2 March 2019: The Gambia, through its membership in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (“OIC”), called upon Myanmar “[t]o honor its obligations under International Law and Human Rights covenants, and to take all measures to immediately halt all vestiges and manifestations of the practice of … genocide … against Rohingya Muslims.”30 • 31 May 2019: At the 14th OIC Summit Conference, The Gambia affirmed its support for the Ad hoc Ministerial Committee on Human Rights Violations against the Rohingyas in Myanmar and declared the urgency of “using all international legal instruments to hold accountable the perpetrators of crimes against the Rohingya.”31 • 8 August 2019: The UN Fact-Finding Mission submitted to the UN General Assembly its consolidated findings in an additional report confirming “[the] perpetration by Myanmar of genocide and the State’s failure to prevent and punish genocide.”32 • 16 September 2019: The UN Fact-Finding Mission emphasized before the UN Human Rights Council the need to hold Myanmar accountable for the crime of genocide.33 The UN Fact-Finding Mission also demonstrated that Myanmar “continues to harbour genocidal intent” and therefore that “the Rohingya remain under serious risk of genocide.”34 In doing so, the UN Fact-Finding Mission welcomed the efforts of “The Gambia … and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation to encourage and pursue a case against 30 OIC, Resolution No. 4/46-MM on the Situation of the Muslim Community in Myanmar, OIC Doc. OIC/CFM- 46/2019/MM/RES/FINAL (1-2 March 2019), available at https://www.oic- oci.org/docdown/?docID=4447&refID=1250, para. 11(a). 31 OIC, Final Communiqué of the 14th Islamic Summit Conference, OIC Doc. OIC/SUM-14/2019/FC/FINAL (31 May 2019), available at https://www.oic-oci.org/docdown/?docID=4496&refID=1251, para. 47. 32 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar (8 August 2019), UN Doc. A/HRC/42/50 [hereinafter UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report (2019)], para. 108; see also ibid., paras. 18, 90. 33 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2019), paras. 41, 220. 34 Ibid., para. 140; see also ibid., para. 213. Myanmar before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under the Genocide Convention.”35 • 26 September 2019: In response to the latest reports of the UN Fact-Finding Mission, Her Excellency Mrs. Isatou Touray, Vice-President of the Republic of The Gambia, stated during the general debate of the 74th Session of the UN General Assembly that “The Gambia is ready to lead the concerted efforts for taking the Rohingya issue to the International Court of Justice.”36 • 29 September 2019: Kyaw Tint Swe, Union Minister for the Office of the State Counsellor of Myanmar, reacted at the general debate of the 74th Session of the UN General Assembly to the latest reports of the UN Fact- Finding Mission, by denying the conclusions: “[The Mission’s] Reports, without exception, are biased and flawed, based not on facts but on narratives.”37 • 11 October 2019: The Gambia’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York transmitted to Myanmar’s Permanent Mission a Note Verbale concerning Myanmar’s ongoing breach of its obligations under the Genocide Convention. The Gambia expressed its concerns over the findings of the UN Fact-Finding Mission and Myanmar’s rejection of those findings. The Gambia also called Myanmar’s attention to OIC Resolution No. 4/46- MM of 2 March 2019. Finally, The Gambia urged Myanmar to take actions to return to compliance with the Convention, to make reparations to the victims and to issue assurances and guarantees of non-repetition.38 35 Ibid., para. 40. 36 UN General Assembly, 74th Session, 8th Plenary Meeting, Official Records, UN Doc. A/74/PV.8 (26 September 2019), p. 31. 37 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, State Counsellor Office, U Kyaw Tint Swe, Union Minister for the Office of the State Counsellor and Leader of Myanmar Delegation to the 74th Session of United Nations General Assembly Delivers Statement at High-Level General Debate (New York, 29th September 2019) (30 September 2019), available at https://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/2551, p. 11. 38 Note Verbale from Permanent Mission of the Republic of The Gambia to the United Nations to Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations (11 October 2019). 22. Despite all the evidence, and the calls on it to desist from further acts of genocide, Myanmar continues to deny any wrongdoing. It has not responded to The Gambia’s Note Verbale of 11 October 2019. 23. A dispute therefore exists between The Gambia and Myanmar relating to the interpretation and application of the Genocide Convention and the fulfilment by Myanmar of its obligations to prevent genocide and to desist from its own acts of genocide, as well as Myanmar’s obligation to make reparations to the victims and offer assurances and guarantees of non-repetition. 24. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 36(1) of the Court’s Statute and Article IX of the Genocide Convention, the Court has jurisdiction to hear the claims submitted in the present Application by The Gambia against Myanmar. III. The Facts A. Background 25. Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) is located in Southeast Asia. It is bordered by Thailand and Laos to the east, by China to the north, and by India and Bangladesh to the west. The Bay of Bengal lies to the south. Map of Myanmar39 39 UN Geospatial Information Section, Myanmar, Map No. 4168 Rev. 3 (June 2012), available at https://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/myanmar.pdf. 26. Myanmar is “inhabited by a large number of groups with various ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds.”40 The Bamar, who are predominantly Buddhist, are Myanmar’s largest ethnic group, estimated to comprise 60-70 percent of the population.41 The Rohingya, who are Muslim, are one of Myanmar’s ethnic and religious minorities. 27. Nearly all members of the Rohingya group reside in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, which is located in the westernmost extremity of the country, along the border with Bangladesh. The Rohingya are a minority within Rakhine State as well; the majority of the State’s population are ethnic Rakhine (also known as Arakanese), a group that is predominantly Buddhist. The Rohingya speak their own language, known as Rohingya. The ethnic Rakhine speak Arakanese, a regional dialect of Burmese. 28. Prior to the genocidal acts that began in 2016, most members of the Rohingya group lived in the townships of Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung, located in the northern part of Rakhine State. Until that time, the Rohingya lived predominantly in villages where all or nearly all the inhabitants were ethnic Rohingya. Some members of the Rohingya group also lived in ethnically mixed villages and towns. After the Myanmar military attacked and displaced ethnic Rohingya in 2012, many were confined by Myanmar’s security forces to enclosed camps which the Rohingya are still forbidden to leave without authorization. B. Myanmar’s Persecution of the Rohingya Group 29. Myanmar has subjected the Rohingya group to persecution for decades. As far back as October 1992, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief reported: since late 1989, the Rohingya citizens of Myanmar … have been subjected to persecution based on their religious beliefs involving extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrary detention, forced disappearances, intimidation, gang-rape, forced labour, robbery, setting of fire to homes, evictions, land confiscation and population resettlement as well as the systematic destruction of towns and mosques.42 40 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 84. 41 Ibid., para. 84. 42 Ibid., para. 100. 30. More recently, the UN Fact-Finding Mission’s September 2018 report found that: “The Rohingya are in a situation of severe, systemic and institutionalised oppression from birth to death. Their extreme vulnerability is a consequence of State policies and practices implemented over decades.”43 The Mission found that the “level of oppression faced by the Rohingya is hard to fathom” and that “[c]umulatively” the “rules, regulations, orders and practices” that Myanmar has imposed have “made life for the Rohingya in Rakhine State slowly but steadily unbearable.” 44 Myanmar has adopted these measures, the Mission concluded, “to implement a racist and exclusionary vision.”45 31. The Gambia describes below elements of Myanmar’s persecution of the Rohingya group that the UN Fact-Finding Mission determined are particularly indicative of genocidal intent, including its systematic denial of legal rights to members of the group and its support for, and participation in, pervasive hate campaigns designed to achieve the collective demonisation and dehumanisation of the Rohingya as a group.46 1. Denial of Legal Rights to Members of the Rohingya Group 32. The UN Fact-Finding Mission found evidence of genocidal intent in the “existence of discriminatory plans and policies,”47 including Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, a statute that remains in force, which makes citizenship and the legal rights associated therewith contingent upon belonging to one of the country’s predetermined racial categories – known as “national races.”48 Pursuant to this legal regime, the Rohingya are not a “national race,” and therefore have no rights. The Myanmar authorities even consider that “the Rohingya do not 43 Ibid., para. 458; see also ibid., para. 748 (referring to “[d]ecades of gradual marginalisation and eroding of rights, resulting in a State-sanctioned and institutionalised system of oppression affecting the lives of Rohingya from birth to death”). 44 Ibid., para. 622. 45 Ibid., para. 497. 46 ICTY, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement (14 January 2000), para. 636 (“[W]hen persecution escalates to the extreme form of wilful and deliberate acts designed to destroy a group or part of a group, it can be held that such persecution amounts to genocide.”). 47 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 1425. 48 See ibid., paras. 477-479. On 8 October 1982, Myanmar’s then Head of State, General Ne Win, declared that there should be “three classes of citizens,” with full citizenship reserved for “pure-blooded nationals,” and the remaining classes for those who “cannot [be] trust[ed] fully” and who therefore must be denied “full rights.” UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 476 (citing Online Burma/Myanmar Library, Translation of the speech by General Ne Win provided in The Working People’s Daily, 9 October 1982, available at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs6/Ne_Win%27s_speech_Oct-1982-Citizenship_Law.pdf). The 1982 Citizenship Law also permits citizenship through means not relevant here, including through naturalisation. belong in Myanmar” because they “are not considered a ‘national race.’”49 According to the UN Fact-Finding Mission, the Myanmar authorities “object” to the very “use of the name ‘Rohingya,’” insisting instead that they be referred to as “Bengali” so as to suggest they belong not in Myanmar but in neighbouring Bangladesh.50 33. Myanmar’s persecutory laws and regulations include measures that restrict the ability of the Rohingya to marry and bear children. Regional Order 1/2005 of the Maungdaw Township Peace and Development Council, adopted in 2005, includes a section – applicable only to those who marry “as per the Islamic religion,” i.e., the Rohingya – that mandates obtaining special marriage permission from the relevant government authorities. Those who manage to receive permission to marry “must limit the number of children.”51 34. Members of the Rohingya group are also subjected to “severe restrictions” on their “freedom of movement,” including their “ability to move between villages in the same township, between townships and outside Rakhine State”52 Rohingya must obtain “travel permits to leave their township.”53 In northern Rakhine State, “movement between villages is also restricted and curfews are imposed.”54 The restrictions are enforced through at least 160 security checkpoints.55 35. Since 2012, 128,000 members of the Rohingya group and the Kaman group (another Muslim minority) in central Rakhine State have been confined in displacement camps that are “effectively places of deprivation of liberty.”56 The members of the Rohingya group who reside in these camps are “cordoned off from the outside world … unable to move outside freely.”57 The Mission found: “In most cases, access is strictly controlled by checkpoints set up by the Myanmar Police Force. Moreover, many camps are surrounded by barbed wire fencing. There are also police checkpoints and military posts in the camp area, further limiting 49 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 460. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid., para. 590. 52 Ibid., para. 500. 53 Ibid., para. 525. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid., paras. 512, 517. 57 Ibid., para. 517. freedom of movement.” 58 In the town of Sittwe, approximately 4,000 members of the Rohingya and Kaman groups are confined to a quarter that the Mission describes as “effectively a closed ghetto,” guarded by “armed police, checkpoints and barbed wire.”59 There, “Muslims are trapped and have lived separately from the rest of the population since 2012.”60 Members of the Rohingya group “can only leave the quarter with special permission and in organized convoys with police escorts.”61 36. The UN Fact-Finding Mission determined that the restrictions which Myanmar has imposed since 2012 amount to a “policy of segregation” under which Rohingya are generally barred from moving to “ethnic Rakhine areas, including the main towns and markets.”62 The Mission concluded that this State-mandated segregation fosters a “conducive environment for dehumanization and hate campaigns.”63 2. Hate Propaganda Against the Rohingya Group 37. The UN Fact-Finding Mission found further evidence of genocidal intent in the Myanmar authorities’ “tolerance for public rhetoric of hatred and contempt for the Rohingya,” as well as in the “insulting, derogatory, racist and exclusionary utterances of Myanmar officials and others.”64 Such propaganda includes the Government of Myanmar’s incitement of anti- Rohingya hatred that portrays the group as a “threat, not only to the local Buddhist communities, but also to the nation and its Buddhist character as a whole.”65 The Mission determined that these hate campaigns employ “dehumanising language” and are undertaken with the “involvement of and condoning by State authorities and influential figures of authority.”66 This propaganda alleges that the Rohingya identity cannot be reconciled with 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid., para. 520. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., para. 525. 63 Ibid., para. 516. 64 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2019), para. 224. 65 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 606. 66 Ibid., para. 748. belonging to Myanmar. According to the Myanmar military: “Despite living among peacocks, crows cannot become peacocks.”67 38. The UN Fact-Finding Mission described the vast extent of Myanmar’s hate campaign against the Rohingya group: The Mission has examined documents, publications, statements, Facebook posts and audio-visual materials that have contributed to shaping public opinion on the Rohingya and Muslims more generally. The analysis demonstrates that a carefully crafted hate campaign has developed a negative perception of Muslims among the broad population in Myanmar. This campaign has been the work of a few key players: nationalistic political parties and politicians, leading monks, academics, prominent individuals and members of the Government. This hate campaign, which continues to the present day, portrays the Rohingya and other Muslims as an existential threat to Myanmar and to Buddhism. In the case of the Rohingya, it has gone a step further. It is accompanied by dehumanising language and the branding of the entire community as “illegal Bengali immigrants.”68 39. The systematic and sustained hate campaign against the Rohingya group has included, inter alia: • the fomenting of anti-Rohingya sentiment by the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion, an organization founded in June 2013 by the monk Ashin Wirathu, who, among other things, has likened Rohingya to an invasive species, claiming: “[t]he African catfish have a very great population and they eat each other and destroy nature” and that “[t]hese catfish are not allowed into the country to breed”;69 • the distribution of literature by monks in Rakhine State directing ethnic Rakhine not to “do business with” or “associate” with “Bengalis” and claiming that the “Bengalis who dwell on Arakanese land, drink Arakanese 67 Ibid., para. 85. 68 Ibid., para. 696. 69 Ibid., para. 90; Dr. Kjell Anderson, “The Enemy Next Door: Hate Speech in Burma,” The Sentinel Project (17 October 2014), available at https://thesentinelproject.org/2014/10/17/the-enemy-next-door-hate-speech-in- burma/. water, and rest under Arakanese shadows are now working for the extinction of the Arakanese”70; • the dissemination of the publication Fear of Extinction of the Race, which exhorts people to “protect their race and religion,” calls for not patronizing Muslim shops, an act it describes as akin to “watering poisonous plants,” and warns, using a racially charged slur used to denote dark skin or foreign ancestry, “[i]f we are not careful, it is certain that the whole country will be swallowed by the Muslim Kalars”;71 • the publication of the book Influx viruses – The Illegal Muslims in Arakan, which, among other things, refers to the Rohingya as “hairy with long beards” and to “Bengali Kalars … swallowing other races”72; and • the publication of the magazine Paccima zone, whose patrons and committee members include government and police officials, and which has published articles with such titles as “Black tsunami in a pitiful disguise” and “Slow invasion” that refer to the Rohingya as the “common enemy” of all Myanmar ethnic groups.73 40. This pervasive campaign of dehumanization has included appeals for extreme measures against the Rohingya. On 26 June 2012, for example, the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP), which at the time held the majority of seats in the Rakhine State legislature,74 called for a “final solution” to deal with the threat posed by what it referred to as the “present population of Bengali.”75 70 Human Rights Watch, “All you can do is Pray”: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State (2013), available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0413_FullForWeb.pdf, p. 25. 71 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 697 & n. 1510. 72 Ibid., para. 700. 73 Ibid., paras. 701-702. 74 The Rakhine Nationalities Development Party held 18 seats out of 35 seats in the Rakhine (Arakan) State parliament. See The Burma Fund UN Office, Burma’s 2010 Elections: A comprehensive report (January 2011), available at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs11/BurmaFund-Election_Report-text.pdf, p. 34, table 3. 75 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 713. 41. The UN Fact-Finding Mission observed that the RNDP “praised Hitler and argued that inhuman acts” are “sometimes necessary to maintain a race.”76 In November 2012, its magazine referred to the need to take “a decisive stand on the issue of Bengali Muslims” and warned that “if we do not courageously solve these problems, which we have inherited from several previous generations, and instead hand them over to the next generation, we will go down in history as irresponsible.”77 It stated: Although Hitler and Eichmann were the greatest enemies of the Jews, they were probably heroes to the Germans. America had to drop nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Why? If inhumane acts are sometimes permitted to maintain a race, a country and the sovereignty ... our endeavours to maintain the Rakhine race and the sovereignty and longevity of the Union of Myanmar cannot be labelled as inhumane.78 42. The Myanmar Government itself has spread, as well as condoned, similarly extremist anti-Rohingya propaganda. Myanmar’s Ministry of Immigration and Population (now the Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population) has employed the following slogan as its motto since 1995: “The earth will not swallow a race to extinction but another race will.”79 43. In August 2011, during parliamentary discussion of the issuance of registration cards to members of the Rohingya group, Myanmar’s Minister of Immigration stated: “Our Ministry is trying its best to uphold the slogan ‘Race is not swallowed by the earth but by another race.’”80 44. In June 2012, the spokesperson of the President of Myanmar posted a statement on his Facebook account warning of the arrival of “Rohingya terrorists” who the Myanmar military would “completely destroy.”81 He stated: We don’t want to hear any humanitarian or human rights excuses. We don’t want to hear your moral superiority, or so-called peace and loving kindness. (Go and look at Buthidaung, Maungdaw areas in Rakhine 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. (citing Rakhine Nationalities Development Party, Toe Thet Yay Journal, Vol. 2, No. 12 (2012)). 78 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 713. 79 Ibid., paras. 698-699. 80 Ibid., para. 699. 81 Ibid., para. 705. State. Our ethnic people are in constant fear in their own land. I feel very bitter about this. This is our country. This is our land.)82 45. Investigative reporting by The New York Times disclosed in October 2018 that the “Myanmar military were the prime operatives behind a systematic campaign on Facebook that stretched back half a decade and that targeted the country’s mostly Muslim Rohingya minority group.”83 This involved “hundreds of military personnel who created troll accounts and news and celebrity pages on Facebook and then flooded them with incendiary comments and posts timed for peak viewership.”84 The head of cybersecurity policy at Facebook said the company had found “clear and deliberate attempts to covertly spread propaganda that were directly linked to the Myanmar military.”85 46. Myanmar has specifically sought to instil hatred of the Rohingya among its military recruits. The UN Fact-Finding Mission reported that in October 2012 soldiers received training on the “expansion of Islam” and the consequent “extinction of Buddhism.”86 They were also given an anti-Muslim presentation entitled “Fear of extinction of the race” that referred to the need to “protect our race and religion as much as possible.”87 C. The Commission of Genocidal Acts Against the Rohingya as a Group 47. As set out below, and as will be described in greater detail over the course of these proceedings, Myanmar’s persecution against the Rohingya population as a group escalated dramatically in October 2016, when its military and security forces commenced so-called “clearance operations” against Rohingya villages, leading to the genocidal acts that are the subject of this Application. 82 Ibid. 83 “A genocide incited on Facebook, with Posts from Myanmar’s Military,” The New York Times (15 October 2018), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 716. 87 Ibid. 1. The “Clearance Operations” that Began on 9 October 2016 48. In the early hours of 9 October 2016, a small number of Rohingya, armed mainly with sticks, knives and a few firearms, reacting to Myanmar’s persecution of the group, attacked three Border Guard Police posts in northern Rakhine State.88 Just hours later, the Tatmadaw, operating in coordination with the Myanmar Police Force and Border Guard Police, commenced what they called “clearance operations” targeted at Rohingya villages in a designated “lockdown zone” in central Maungdaw Township. 89 During these operations, Myanmar forces systematically shot, killed, forcibly disappeared, raped, gang raped, sexually assaulted, detained, beat and tortured Rohingya civilians, and burned down and destroyed Rohingya homes, mosques, madrassas, shops and Qur’ans.90 As they committed these crimes, the perpetrators called their victims “people from Bangladesh,”91 “Bengali,”92 and “Kalar.”93 49. The first such “clearance operation” was conducted at Wa Peik village. 94 Six military vehicles entered the village and began systematically killing Rohingya villagers.95 One survivor recalled: “When the soldiers entered the village, they started shooting. … I saw them shoot at people as they fled.”96 Another recounted: “The military would go in a house, 88 Ibid., paras. 1009, 1011, 1020, 1036, 1069. UNGA, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, UN Doc. A/HRC/34/67 (14 March 2017), para. 64. At the time, the group of Rohingya attackers did not have a name. After the attack, the group called itself the Faith Movement (Harakah Al-Yaqin). In March 2017, the group rebranded itself as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). See UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), paras. 1010-1012. 89 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), paras. 1069, 1072; UN OHCHR, Report of OHCHR mission to Bangladesh: Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016: FLASH REPORT (3 February 2017), available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/MM/FlashReport3Feb2017.pdf [hereinafter UN OHCHR, Flash Report (2017)], p. 7. 90 See generally UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of Detailed Findings (2018), paras. 1069-1095; UN OHCHR, Flash Report (2017), pp. 13-40. 91 UN OHCHR, Flash Report (2017), p. 15. 92 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of Detailed Findings (2018), para. 1075. 93 Ibid. 94 Human Rights Watch, Burma: Military Burned Villages in Rakhine State (13 December 2016), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/13/burma-military-burned-villages-rakhine-state. 95 Matthew Smith, “Bringing Burma Back from the Brink,” Wall Street Journal (15 February 2017), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/bringing-burma-back-from-the-brink-1487181031. 96 Ibid. then it would set on fire, then they went to another house, and fire would start. Everywhere they went a fire would start and smoke would rise.”97 50. The next day, 10 October 2016, Myanmar security forces carried out a “clearance operation” at Doe Tan, a village located in Maungdaw Township.98 A survivor recounts: The military came to our village on 10 October in the morning. First they started shooting into the air, people were scared and came out of their homes, and then they started killing people. They were shooting at people. We were all trying to flee, I was running and at that point I was shot and fell into the paddy field. Since I was running I am not sure on which side the bullet entered and where it exited. My cousin helped me and brought me home and treated my wound. My father was killed at the same time as I was shot.99 51. In some villages, the military used helicopters to shoot members of the Rohingya group.100 Survivors describe how bullets “rained” on them whilst they tried to run away.101 52. During these operations, the military carried out mass executions of Rohingya men and boys. The UN Fact-Finding Mission reported that at the village of Dar Gyi Zar, “Tatmadaw soldiers captured a group of up to 200 men, women and children, and took them to a paddy field, where they were told to kneel.”102 After beating them and ordering the men to remove their shirts, the military “separated from the group” the “men and boys of approximately 12 years or older.”103 53. The women and children were taken to a house where they “heard repeated gunfire and the screams of the men and boys outside.”104 When they emerged from the house after the 97 Amnesty International, “We Are at Breaking Point”: Rohingya: Persecuted in Myanmar, Neglected in Bangladesh (19 December 2016), available at https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1653622016ENGLISH.PDF, p. 29. 98 UN OHCHR, Flash Report (2017), p. 14. 99 Ibid. 100 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 1084; UN OHCHR, Flash Report (2017), p. 15. 101 UN OHCHR, Flash Report (2017), p. 15. 102 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), paras. 1085-1086. 103 Ibid., para. 1086. 104 Ibid. soldiers had left, the women saw “[t]he bodies of the men and boys had been put in a pile, or series of piles, and burned using hay, harvested rice, and the removed shirts.”105 54. The Myanmar military proceeded to systematically burn and destroy entire Rohingya villages, with an intention to destroy the group in whole or in part. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”) concluded, based on analysis of “testimonies as well as the satellite imagery analysis from three independent sources,” that Myanmar security forces had “deliberately targeted the entire Rohingya population in the area.”106 These findings were corroborated by evaluations conducted by international human rights organizations. Amnesty International concluded: “Satellite images demonstrate widespread destruction of homes and other civilian properties – in some cases, entire villages have been destroyed.”107 This included the destruction by fire of at least 1,262 buildings across 12 villages from October to November 2016.108 Human Rights Watch’s separate analysis concluded that approximately 1,500 buildings in Rohingya villages were burned between 10 October and 23 November 2016.109 55. A “major cause of deaths was due to burning of houses.”110 The OHCHR reports that “[n]umerous testimonies collected from people from different villages” have “confirmed that the army deliberately set fire to houses with families inside.”111 In some cases, the military “pushed Rohingya into already burning houses.” 112 The OHCHR also reported instances where “the army or Rakhine villagers locked an entire family, including elderly and disabled people, inside a house and set it on fire, killing them all.”113 105 Ibid., para. 1087. 106 UN OHCHR, Flash Report (2017), pp. 41-42. 107 Amnesty International, “We Are at Breaking Point”: Rohingya: Persecuted in Myanmar, Neglected in Bangladesh (19 December 2016), available at https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1653622016ENGLISH.PDF, p. 25. 108 Ibid. 109 Human Rights Watch, Burma: Military Burned Villages in Rakhine State (13 December 2016), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/13/burma-military-burned-villages-rakhine-state. 110 UN OHCHR, Flash Report (2017), pp. 16-17. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid. 56. In one such case, an 11-year old girl from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son village reported: After entering our house, the army apprehended us. They pushed my mother on the ground. They removed her clothes, and four officers raped her. They also slaughtered my father, a prayer leader, just before raping my mother. After a few minutes, they burnt the house with a rocket, with my mother inside. All this happened before my eyes.114 57. In some instances, the military tied Rohingya to trees and burned them alive.115 A survivor from Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son village recounts: The military dragged my grandmother and grandfather out of their house. First they were severely beaten, then tied to a tree. The military then put dried grass, woods around them and set them on fire.116 58. Children, including infants, were deliberately targeted. According to the OHCHR, victims ranged in ages “from newborns to teenagers.”117 They included children who were “killed by live ammunition or stabbed while at home; while fleeing to safety; or while in farms or fields.”118 59. A mother of four from Pwint Hpyu Chang reported: I fled together with my four children. I was holding and carrying the two youngest. My two oldest children, my daughter who was six years old and my son who was 10, were behind me. When the armed men were running after me, I hid behind some trees and bushes. The men caught my two oldest children and killed them. They used a knife of the kind we use to slaughter goats. I saw this from where I was hiding.119 60. Another survivor recounted: In Kyet Yoe Pyin I saw the military killing a newborn baby of a distant relative. She was about to deliver the baby just after the military entered the village. We were all inside the house and the military made us come 114 Ibid. 115 See, e.g., UN OHCHR, Flash Report (2017), p. 17. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid., p. 18. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. out. My relative could not come out as she was in labour so they dragged her out and hit her stomach with a big stick. They killed the baby by stomping on it with their heavy boots. Then they burned the house.120 61. A survivor from the same village recounts: “They held me tight and I was raped by one of them. My five-year old daughter tried to protect me, she was screaming, one of the men took out a long knife and killed her by slitting her throat.”121 62. Myanmar military and security forces committed sexual violence on a massive scale, including rape, gang rape, forced nudity, and sexual assault.122 The OHCHR reported that the majority of the rape victims it interviewed were “raped by more than one soldier, usually three to four but even up to eight officers.”123 It also found: “Rape by an individual soldier would typically occur alongside a gang rape – i.e. several women would be targeted for rape within a particular house, school or mosque and the majority of them would be gang raped while some were raped by only one individual.”124 63. At Kyet Yoe Pyin village, in Maungdaw Township, one survivor estimated that more than 100 females were raped.125 64. A survivor from Dar Gyi Zar village encountered 13 women: “They could not speak, they were just crying. They all had injuries. Their clothes had blood on them, around their private parts... they had marks on their necks from where they were held.”126 65. A mother who survived her village’s “clearance operation” gave the following account, as summarized by the UN Fact-Finding Mission: One survivor described eight to ten Tatmadaw soldiers entering the house she was in and taking two young girls to the toilet. She held a child in her lap so that the Tatmadaw would realise that she was a mother and would not rape her. The soldiers threw the child aside; five to six 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), paras. 1091-1092. 123 UN OHCHR, Flash Report (2017), p. 21. 124 Ibid. 125 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 1111. 126 Amnesty International, “We Are at Breaking Point”: Rohingya: Persecuted in Myanmar, Neglected in Bangladesh (19 December 2016), available at https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1653622016ENGLISH.PDF, p. 25. men raped her. She said that she had pain everywhere afterwards and bled until she reached Bangladesh. She heard that the two girls who were taken to the toilet died.127 66. A 14-year-old female survivor of a clearance operation described her experience as follows: We were hiding in the forest and the soldiers took my sister, who was 12-years old, and eight other girls. Four of them were raped and killed. Then the soldiers took me. There were around 40 women and girls in the forest. I remember the first man who raped me, feeling all the pain. I became numb to the next three men and then I went unconscious. They were raping most of the women and girls.128 67. On 16 February 2017, after four months of systematic atrocities against members of the Rohingya group, the Myanmar Government declared an end to the “clearance operations.”129 Thereafter, a Government Investigation Commission, led by Myanmar’s Vice- President, absolved the security forces of any wrongdoing and endorsed the “lawfulness and appropriateness of the response.”130 To date, Myanmar has taken no steps to hold those responsible for these atrocities accountable.131 68. Despite the official end to the “clearance operations,” widespread persecution of the Rohingya – through the same tactics employed in those operations – continued. The humanitarian crisis faced by the Rohingya was further exacerbated by the Government’s prohibition of humanitarian assistance to the lockdown zone.132 The worst was yet to come. 2. The Resumption of “Clearance Operations” on 25 August 2017 69. Six months after the official end of the Myanmar State’s “clearance operations” against members of the Rohingya group, they were formally resumed. On 10 August 2017, 127 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 1093. 128 Ibid., paras. 1091-1092. 129 Ibid., paras. 1069-1070. 130 Ibid., para. 1071. 131 Ibid., para. 1564. 132 Ibid., para. 573; UNGA, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, UN Doc. A/HRC/34/67 (14 March 2017), para. 66; Amnesty International, “We Are at Breaking Point”: Rohingya: Persecuted in Myanmar, Neglected in Bangladesh (19 December 2016), available at https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1653622016ENGLISH.PDF, pp. 7, 32. Myanmar airlifted to Rakhine State more than 1,600 members of the Tatmadaw’s 33rd and 99th Light Infantry Divisions (“LID”) from northern Myanmar.133 National media in Myanmar contemporaneously reported that these military forces were “going to northern Rakhine to carry out area clearance.”134 Other military units were also re-deployed to northern Rakhine State, and stationed in areas normally only guarded by Border Guard Police units.135 These forces were accompanied by tanks, armoured personnel carriers, heavy artillery, helicopters and naval vessels.136 70. One survivor of the resumed “clearance operations” recounted: My Rakhine neighbour said to me, “Now you Rohingya are doomed because the government is sending military from Yangon who are coming here to kill every Muslim. Someday in Rakhine State there will be no Rohingya Muslims at all.”137 71. During these renewed “clearance operations,” the Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar’s armed forces, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing, confirmed that this was indeed the objective of the operations: “The Bengali problem was a long-standing one which has become an unfinished job despite the efforts of the previous governments to solve it. The government in office is taking great care in solving the problem.”138 72. Myanmar’s pretext for resuming “clearance operations” on 25 August 2017 was attacks on a military base and various security outposts by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (“ARSA”), carried out largely by untrained individuals wielding sticks and knives, with a small number bearing arms and improvised explosive devices.139 73. Immediately following these incidents, Myanmar launched a coordinated second wave of “clearance operations” across northern Rakhine State, far more brutal and expansive than had been carried out previously. The UN Fact-Finding Mission concluded: 133 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 1151. 134 Ibid., para. 1151. 135 Ibid., para. 1153. 136 Ibid., paras. 1152, 1156. 137 Ibid., para. 1153. 138 Ibid., para. 753. 139 Ibid., para. 750. The security forces’ response was immediate, within hours, brutal and grossly disproportionate. Ostensibly to eliminate the ‘terrorist threat’ posed by ARSA, in the days and weeks that followed it encompassed hundreds of villages across Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung Townships. The operations targeted and terrorised the entire Rohingya population. 140 74. The UN Fact-Finding Mission concluded that the level of coordination of the attacks against members of the Rohingya group evidenced that it had been pre-planned by senior Government officials: This level of build-up, both in quantity and nature, would have required significant logistical planning over a considerable period. It would have required decisions at the most senior levels of the Tatmadaw. The Mission has concluded that this preparation, the joint nature of the operations, and the deployment of the [Light Infantry Divisions] indicate that the “clearance operations,” or at least the ability to carry out a large and widespread operation, was planned and ordered well in advance of 25 August 2017.141 75. The Myanmar military’s modus operandi was similar to, but more extensive and brutal than, earlier “clearance operations.” 142 Tatmadaw soldiers, accompanied by other security forces, entered Rohingya villages early in the morning whilst most villagers were asleep, 143 and fired rocket launchers, mortars, and bullets into Rohingya homes. 144 The Government forces then tortured, raped and killed the inhabitants, including those who tried to flee, before burning their homes to the ground, often with members of the Rohingya group inside.145 76. The UN Fact-Finding Mission determined: Many Rohingya were killed or injured by indiscriminate shooting. Rohingya villages were approached without warning, usually from more than one direction, and often in the early morning, by armed Tatmadaw soldiers. They were often accompanied by other armed security forces, including the BGP, the Myanmar Police Force and riot police (known 140 Ibid., para. 751. 141 Ibid., para. 1157. 142 Ibid., para. 752. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid., paras. 752, 961. 145 Ibid., paras. 884-911. as Ion htein), and frequently by ethnic Rakhine civilians. Members of the security forces, primarily Tatmadaw soldiers of the Western Command and the 33rd and 99th LIDs, shot assault rifles towards the Rohingya villages from a distance, not targeting any particular military objective or making any distinction between ARSA fighters and civilians. Men, women and children were all shot at. Many victims referred to the volume of gunfire, with some describing it as “raining bullets.” Many were shot and killed or injured while attempting to flee.146 77. The UN Fact-Finding Mission documented “detailed accounts” of “corroborated mass killings” in which “hundreds, of men, women and children were killed” in “targeted attacks.”147 Soldiers “shot individual persons, including at point blank range, and executed people, including those injured, by slitting their throats using long knives.”148 In some places “these targeted killings occurred as Tatmadaw soldiers and other security forces systematically moved from house to house, pulling people out of their homes and executing them, or shooting then inside their houses, or as they left their houses, often in front of family members.”149 78. In Min Gyi, the Myanmar military “separated women and children from the men” and “systematically killed the men.”150 At Chut Pyin, the soldiers “dragged people from houses and shot some of them at point blank range.”151 Others were “killed by having their throats slit with large knives.”152 At Maung Nu, the military seized the village’s male inhabitants and tied them up. The soldiers then “opened fire on the men and boys” and “slit their throats with knives.”153 79. As before, the Myanmar military and security forces did not spare Rohingya children. The UN Secretary-General’s annual report on children reports that during a “clearance operation” in Buthidaung Township, both “[m]en and boys were taken from 146 Ibid., para. 884. 147 Ibid., para. 892. 148 Ibid., para. 893. 149 Ibid., para. 893. 150 Ibid., para. 766. 151 Ibid., para. 783. 152 Ibid. 153 Ibid., para. 808. houses.” 154 They “had their hands tied and were forced to lie down on the ground.” 155 Witnesses saw “the men and boys being killed one by one.”156 At least “28 boys between the ages of 8 and 17 years old were killed.”157 80. At Koe Tan Kauk, in Rathedaung Township, escapees who returned to the village after the clearance operation found “bodies with throats cut and decapitated heads, including those of children.”158 One survivor testified: “I found my six-month old son’s body lying next to my wife’s body. She had been shot. My baby son was stabbed in his stomach and his intestine and liver were coming out.”159 81. A woman from Kyein Chaung village, in northern Maungdaw Township, described how soldiers killed two of her children, while a third survived multiple stab wounds to her head: Soldiers took to me into a house and beat me and my youngest child. He was one and a half years old, and he died as a result of the beating. My four year old son’s hand was being held by my daughter, who was also stabbed in the head. He started crying and then the military stabbed him and he died. It was with a long knife, the length of a forearm.160 82. Another witness described the killing of women and children in Kyet Yoe Pyin, in Maungdaw Township: “A pregnant woman in labour was being assisted by a midwife as well as a number of other female relatives. I saw approximately five soldiers enter the house and heard a few gunshots.” She recounted: “Later I went back and saw the dead bodies of an elderly woman, the mother, a two-year old girl, and another girl who was 16 to 18 years old and the new-born baby.”161 83. A survivor from Kha Maung Seik village, in Maungdaw Township, described how: 154 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Myanmar, UN Doc. S/2018/956 (29 October 2018), para. 15. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid. 157 Ibid. 158 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 837. 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid., para. 894. 161 Ibid., para. 895. When their parents were killed, and the children were standing alone, they [soldiers] threw the children in the river . . . We were watching from the other side of the riverbank. Even the newborns and the ones who could barely walk, they threw them in the river. It was not far from where we were hiding.162 84. Entire Rohingya villages were set afire and destroyed as part of the second wave of “clearance operations,” often with their inhabitants locked inside burning homes. By “analysing satellite imagery and witness accounts,” the UN Fact Finding Mission documented the “widespread, systematic, deliberate, organized and targeted destruction, mainly by fire, of Rohingya-populated areas” in the three northern Rakhine State townships of Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung. 163 Satellite imagery from August 2017 to March 2018 demonstrates that approximately 392 Rohingya villages were partially (214) or totally (178) destroyed by fire, during this period.164 85. The Mission identified approximately 37,700 individual structures as having been destroyed, the “vast majority” of which were “Rohingya homes.” Other buildings, including “markets, religious schools (madrassas) and mosques,” were destroyed as well.165 Myanmar accomplished this immense level of destruction both “manually using flammable liquid and matches” and by using “launchers,” i.e., “weapons firing a munition that explodes upon impact.”166 86. The UN Fact-Finding Mission “verified a pattern of Tatmadaw soldiers intentionally forcing people into houses that were either burning or about to be set alight, and even locking them inside.”167 A witness from Ngan Chuang, in northern Maungdaw Township, who managed to escape, reported: “The military came into my village and burned the houses 162 Fortify Rights, They Gave Them Long Swords: Preparations for Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity Against Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine state, Myanmar (July 2018), available at https://www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/Fortify_Rights_Long_Swords_July_2018.pdf, p. 67. 163 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 959. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid., para. 960. 166 Ibid., para. 905. 167 Ibid., para. 908. with launchers. I was inside my house with my children when they locked the door from the outside.”168 87. Similarly, at Min Gyi, in Maungdaw Township, “soldiers took women and children to houses where they were raped and gang raped, after which the doors were locked and the houses set on fire.”169 Most victims, including “young children who had accompanied their mothers, were unable to escape and burned to death.”170 88. The Mission obtained accounts of “people, including babies and children, being pushed or thrown into burning houses by soldiers.” For example, at Myin Hlut, in Maungdaw Township, a witness saw “two young children, six or seven years old, running out of a burning house, only to be pushed back in by soldiers.”171 89. At Kyauk Pan Du, in Maungdaw Township, a survivor witnessed a “group of approximately 10 women, children and elderly persons trying to escape a burning house, but being pushed back inside by soldiers.”172 The same witness saw a soldier “stabbing a child, and then pushing the child inside the burning house.”173 The entire Rohingya family was burned alive in the house.174 90. Tellingly, satellite imagery reveals that wherever the Tatmadaw carried out a “clearance operation” on a mixed ethnicity village or village tract, only the Rohingya settlements were targeted. Ethnic Rakhine people and habitations remained untouched.175 91. Widespread rape and sexual violence were again a hallmark of Myanmar’s “clearance operations.” The UN Fact-Finding Mission concluded that “[r]ape and other sexual and gender-based violence,” including gang rapes, sexually humiliating acts, sexual slavery and sexual mutilations, were “perpetrated on a massive scale.”176 It determined that the “main 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid., para. 909. 170 Ibid. 171 Ibid., para. 910. 172 Ibid. 173 Ibid. 174 Ibid. 175 Ibid., paras. 972-973. 176 Ibid., para. 920. perpetrators were the Tatmadaw, although other security forces, and sometimes ethnic Rakhine men, were also involved.”177 92. The UN Fact-Finding Mission identified as a “notable pattern” the perpetration of “mass gang rape, involving multiple perpetrators and multiple victims in the same incident.”178 These crimes were “commonly perpetrated in open public spaces, in front of family and neighbours, within forested areas near the village; in large houses within the village; and during detention in military and police compounds.”179 During these attacks, “up to 40 women and girls were raped or gang raped together.”180 The victims were “commonly raped by more than one perpetrator, frequently by many perpetrators, sometimes as many as ten.”181 93. One victim – eight months pregnant at the time – testified about the crimes committed by the Tatmadaw, some of whom she recognized from the local military camp: “They stamped and kicked my stomach with their boots, and then stripped me naked…. I was blindfolded and hung by my wrists from a tree. I was raped nine times, both anally and vaginally. I counted all of them.”182 94. She then states: “Whilst they were raping me, they bit me on my breasts and neck. They left me tied to the tree. My mother found me in the evening. My unborn baby died.”183 95. The UN Fact-Finding Mission reported that “[m]any victims were killed after being raped,” with most having had their throats slit or burned to death.184 It observed: “A large number of interviewees saw dead bodies of women and girls en route to Bangladesh who they thought had been raped, because the bodies were naked and large amounts of blood were visible between their legs.”185 177 Ibid. 178 Ibid., para. 921. 179 Ibid. 180 Ibid. 181 Ibid. 182 Ibid. 183 Ibid. 184 Ibid., para. 927. 185 Ibid. 96. The Mission concluded: “Death may have been caused by genital trauma, especially when a woman had been gang raped, or women and girls may have been raped with instruments, such as knives or sticks, which caused internal organ damage, leading to death.”186 97. One rape victim, who had been gang raped with her sister, heard a member of the Tatmadaw say: “We are going to kill you this way, by raping. We are going to kill Rohingya. We will rape you. This is not your country.”187 98. The UN Fact-Finding Mission concluded: “the widespread sexual violence and the manner in which it was perpetrated was an intended effort, at least in part, to weaken the social cohesion of the Rohingya community and contribute to the destruction of the Rohingya as a group and the breakdown of the Rohingya way of life.”188 The use of rape and sexual violence as an instrument of genocide – to destroy a group in whole or in part – is well-established in international law.189 3. Ongoing Genocidal Acts and Threats of Genocidal Acts Against the Rohingya Group 99. Although Myanmar claims to have ended its most recent wave of “clearance operations,” the UN Fact-Finding Mission’s September 2019 report to the UN Human Rights Council found that the Rohingya “remain the target of a Government attack aimed at erasing the[ir] identity and removing them from Myanmar.”190 100. According to an analysis performed by UNOSAT, between November 2018, that is, after Myanmar claimed to have ended its “clearance operations,” and May 2019, 30 villages – located primarily in central Maungdaw and Buthidaung Townships – were destroyed 186 Ibid. 187 Ibid., para. 932. 188 Ibid., para. 941. 189 ICTR, Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (2 September 1998), paras. 732-734. 190 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2019), para. 2. “mostly by burning.”191 UNOSAT estimates that by April 2019 the number of destroyed structures had risen to approximately 40,600 across 416 settlements.192 101. On 10 July 2019, the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights stated: “In a continuation of attacks, it was reported that on 2 May and 9 May 2019 Rohingya homes and shops were burned in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships.” 193 The Deputy High Commissioner also stated that “on 28 May 2019, reports alleged that the remaining Rohingya houses in Taung Bazar, Buthidaung township, were also burned to the ground.”194 She further observed: “Our information suggests that the authorities have taken no steps to investigate these attacks.”195 102. Myanmar’s continuing attacks on the Rohingya group and ongoing destruction of Rohingya villages are accompanied by other efforts to make life for the Rohingya impossible. These include denying access to food. According to the UN Fact-Finding Mission, “[s]ince the ‘clearance operations’ began on 25 August 2017, the Government has severely restricted access to food for Rohingya in Rakhine State.”196 103. In March 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar reported that “there appears to be a policy of forced starvation in place, designed to make life in northern Rakhine unsustainable for Rohingya who remain.”197 This is still the case. In 2019, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women found that the remaining members of the local Rohingya group were “experiencing conditions of forced starvation, with security forces denying access to the remaining rice fields and markets.”198 In 191 Ibid., para. 128. 192 Ibid., para. 116. 193 UN OHCHR, Update on Myanmar at the 41st Session of the Human Rights Council: Statement by UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Kate Gilmore (10 July 2019), available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24811&LangID=E. 194 Ibid. 195 Ibid. 196 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2019), para. 156. 197 UN OHCHR, Statement by Ms. Yanghee Lee, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar at the 37th session of the Human Rights Council (12 March 2018), available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22806&LangID=E. 198 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2019), para. 158 (quoting CEDAW, Concluding observations on the exceptional report of Myanmar (advance unedited version), UN Doc. No. CEDAW/C/MMR/EP/CO/1 (8 March 2019)). July 2019, the FAO and WFP warned that food security in northern Rakhine State had become “precarious.”199 104. To implement its policy of forced starvation of the Rohingya group, Myanmar has engaged in widespread confiscation of agricultural lands on which the Rohingya grow subsistence crops essential to their survival. The UN Fact-Finding Mission determined that Myanmar is undertaking “a concerted effort” to “confiscate” these “lands from which it forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya.”200 The ongoing land confiscations extend beyond the Rohingya villages that Myanmar destroyed during the “clearance operations.” The Mission reported that “Rohingya-owned and cultivated land” has now been “confiscated in areas of northern Rakhine State where Rohingya remained.”201 According to the Mission’s findings, members of the Rohingya group are “no longer allowed to consume products from their own lands following the confiscation.”202 105. The UN Fact-Finding Mission reported that Rohingya farmers living in the village of Ah Lel Chaung in Buthidaung recounted that “security forces began harvesting Rohingya fields to the west of the village and took the crops away in trucks.”203 The Mission further noted that Rakhine State’s Minister of Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry and Mining stated that an enterprise controlled by the Myanmar Government had overseen the harvesting and sale of 45,000 acres of what the Minister cynically described as “ownerless Bengali land.”204 106. To the same end, Myanmar security forces and members of ethnic Rakhine communities under their protection “routinely visit Rohingya villages to confiscate food, including crops and even humanitarian aid.”205 The UN Fact-Finding Mission found that the Tatmadaw and ethnic Rakhine “deliberately kill[] or confiscate[] livestock, including cattle, goats and chickens, without permission or payment.”206 An interviewee from Buthidaung 199 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2019), para. 159. 200 Ibid., para. 139. 201 Ibid., para. 123. 202 Ibid., para. 126. 203 Ibid., para. 123. 204 Ibid. 205 Ibid., para. 161. 206 Ibid., para. 163. Township stated: “the army would often come to the village, search houses for food and steal anything they could find.”207 107. Another Rohingya who was forced to flee Buthidaung Township reported: Military, police and members of ethnic Rakhine constantly came to the village and looted everything including food items. The military took away my seven cows that I was grassing in the hillside. I cultivated rice in my land, when it was ready for harvesting; members of ethnic Rakhine snatched the harvest. I was left with nothing except two goats, which I had to offer to the military for my release, as I was unable to pay them 100,000 Kyat. I was arrested at my home and after beating, they demanded 100,000 Kyat.208 108. In some areas, the military has “ordered villages not to cultivate their lands.”209 A survivor of the “clearance operations” stated that afterwards: “The military and ethnic Rakhine occupied most of our lands and residents were ordered not to cultivate their lands… residents were starving and were on the brink of famine.”210 109. Based on the UN Fact-Finding Mission’s evaluation of the evidence that it had collected over the preceding year, its September 2019 report concluded that “many of the factors that contributed to the killings, rapes and gang rapes, torture, forced displacement and other grave human rights violations by the Tatmadaw and other government authorities that the Mission documented in its 2018 report are still present.”211 The Mission found that “grave violations against the Rohingya continue” and that there is a “real and significant danger of the situation deteriorating further.”212 110. This recent report, submitted in mid-September 2019, leaves no doubt that the approximately 600,000 Rohingya who remain in Myanmar are in “real and significant danger” of further genocidal acts at the hands of the Myanmar State. According to the report: “there is a serious risk that genocidal actions may occur or recur, and that Myanmar is failing in its 207 Ibid., para. 162. 208 Ibid., para. 164. 209 Ibid., para. 165. 210 Ibid. 211 Ibid., para. 2. 212 Ibid., para. 58. obligation to prevent genocide, to investigate genocide and to enact effective legislation criminalizing and punishing genocide.”213 The risk to the Rohingya is especially grave because “the State continues to harbour genocidal intent.”214 As a consequence, “the Rohingya people remain at serious risk of genocide under the terms of the Genocide Convention.”215 IV. The Claims of The Gambia 111. Based on the above, as well as the voluminous evidence to be presented over the course of these proceedings, The Gambia considers that Myanmar—through its State organs, State agents, and other persons and entities acting on the instructions of or under the direction and control of Myanmar—is responsible for violations of its obligations under the Genocide Convention, including Articles I, III, IV, V and VI. Violations of the Genocide Convention include, but are not limited to: • committing genocide in violation of Article III(a); • conspiracy to commit genocide in violation of Article III(b); • direct and public incitement to commit genocide in violation of Article III(c); • attempting to commit genocide in violation of Article III(d); • complicity in genocide in violation of Article III(e); • failing to prevent genocide in violation of Article I; • failing to punish genocide in violation of Articles I, IV and VI; and • failing to enact the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the Genocide Convention and to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any of the acts enumerated in Article III, in violation of Article V. 213 Ibid., paras. 9, 58. 214 Ibid., para. 238. 215 Ibid., para. 242. V. The Relief Sought 112. While reserving the right to revise, supplement or amend this Application, and subject to the presentation to the Court of the relevant evidence and legal arguments, The Gambia respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare that Myanmar: • has breached and continues to breach its obligations under the Genocide Convention, in particular the obligations provided under Articles I, III(a), III(b), III(c), III(d), III(e), IV, V and VI; • must cease forthwith any such ongoing internationally wrongful act and fully respect its obligations under the Genocide Convention, in particular the obligations provided under Articles I, III(a), III(b), III(c), III(d), III(e), IV, V and VI; • must ensure that persons committing genocide are punished by a competent tribunal, including before an international penal tribunal, as required by Articles I and VI; • must perform the obligations of reparation in the interest of the victims of genocidal acts who are members of the Rohingya group, including but not limited to allowing the safe and dignified return of forcibly displaced Rohingya and respect for their full citizenship and human rights and protection against discrimination, persecution, and other related acts, consistent with the obligation to prevent genocide under Article I; and • must offer assurances and guarantees of non-repetition of violations of the Genocide Convention, in particular the obligations provided under Articles I, III(a), III(b), III(c), III(d), III(e), IV, V and VI. VI. Request for Provisional Measures 113. In accordance with Article 41 of the Statute of the Court, and Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court, The Gambia requests that the Court indicate provisional measures. In light of the nature of the rights at issue, as well as the ongoing, severe and irreparable harm being suffered by members of the Rohingya group, The Gambia requests that the Court address the request as a matter of extreme urgency. 114. This Application describes a brutal and continuing campaign of sweeping genocidal acts and measures, imposed by Myanmar against members of the Rohingya group, intended to destroy the group in whole or in part. Myanmar has perpetrated acts of genocide that collectively target the Rohingya by, inter alia, killing members of the group, including women and children; committing rape and other forms of sexual violence and perverse cruelty against Rohingya women and girls; and burning their homes and villages and confiscating their lands and livestock in a manner intended to deny them access to food, shelter and other essentials of life. These acts are committed against members of the Rohingya group solely on the basis of their ethnical, racial, or religious origin, with the intention of destroying them as a group, as such, in whole or in part, constituting flagrant violations of Myanmar’s obligations under Articles I, III(a), III(b), III(c), III(d), III(e), IV, V and VI of the Genocide Convention. 115. Provisional measures are necessary in this case to protect against further, irreparable harm to the rights of the Rohingya group under the Genocide Convention, which continue to be violated with impunity. The Gambia requests that the Court indicate provisional measures to protect and preserve these rights, and to prevent aggravation or extension of the dispute concerning Myanmar’s genocidal actions, pending the determination of the merits of the issues raised by the Application. A. Compelling Circumstances Require the Indication of Provisional Measures 116. As described above, Myanmar has perpetrated, and is continuing to perpetrate, genocidal acts against members of the Rohingya group as such, solely on the grounds of their ethnical, racial or religious origin. Myanmar has acted with the intent to destroy in whole or in part the Rohingya as a protected group under the Genocide Convention by the following ongoing conduct, inter alia: • killing members of the Rohingya group; • raping and inflicting other forms of sexual violence on women and girls within the group; • subjecting Rohingya men, women and children to torture, beatings and other forms of cruel treatment for the sole reason that they are members of the Rohingya group; and • deliberately destroying or otherwise denying access to food, shelter and other essentials of life in a manner that is calculated to destroy the Rohingya group in whole or in part. 117. As set forth in this Application, Myanmar has denied any wrongdoing and resisted all calls by The Gambia and the international community to stop and alleviate the destruction and suffering of members of the Rohingya group, resulting from genocidal acts committed with the intent to destroy the group in whole or in part. It is clear that Myanmar has no intention of ending these genocidal acts and continues to pursue the destruction of the group within its territory. As the UN Fact-Finding Mission concluded as recently as mid- September 2019, all members of the Rohingya group who are situated today in Myanmar are at grave risk of further acts of genocide. 118. Instead of preventing these genocidal acts, or punishing the perpetrators as required by the Genocide Convention, Myanmar is deliberately destroying evidence of its wrongdoing to cover up the crimes. The UN Fact-Finding Mission documented that Myanmar has destroyed, buried and disposed of the remains of the Rohingya victims.216 It has concluded that “mass demolition and terrain clearance throughout northern Rakhine State raise serious concerns about the potential destruction of evidence and its effect on future investigation into crimes, including the gravest crimes under international law.”217 B. Prima Facie Jurisdiction 119. The Court “may indicate provisional measures only if the provisions relied on by the Applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which its jurisdiction could be founded, but need not satisfy itself in a definitive manner that it has jurisdiction as regards the merits of the case.”218 In order to determine whether the Court has prima facie jurisdiction, the acts complained of must be prima facie “capable of falling within the provisions of [the 216 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), paras. 1000-1003. 217 Ibid., para. 1242. 218 Alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 October 2018, para. 24. Convention],” such that “the dispute is one which the Court could have jurisdiction ratione materiae to entertain.”219 120. As explained above, the jurisdiction of the Court is based on Article 36, paragraph 1, of its Statute and Article IX of the Genocide Convention. The Gambia and Myanmar are UN Member States and parties to the Genocide Convention. Both have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court under Article IX without any reservation. As set out in this Application, there is an existing dispute between The Gambia and Myanmar concerning the interpretation, application and fulfilment of obligations under the Genocide Convention. Therefore, the Court plainly has prima facie jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures. C. The Rights Whose Protection Is Sought and Their Plausible Character 121. The Court has “the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.”220 122. Addressing the “objects” of the Genocide Convention, the Court explained in 1951 that it: was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that might have this dual character to a greater degree, since its object on the one hand is to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality. In such a convention the contracting States do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'être of the convention.221 123. On multiple occasions, the Court has acknowledged that “the norm prohibiting genocide [is] assuredly a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens)”222 and that “the 219 Ibid., para. 30. 220 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 41. 221 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23. 222 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 111, para. 161 (citing Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the rights and obligations enshrined by the Convention are rights and obligations erga omnes.”223 Therefore, all States “have a legal interest” in the protection of the rights involved.224 124. Addressing the admissibility of the claims presented by Belgium against Senegal on the basis of the Convention against Torture, and having underscored its similarities with the Genocide Convention, the Court concluded: The common interest in compliance with the relevant obligations under the Convention against Torture implies the entitlement of each State party to the Convention to make a claim concerning the cessation of an alleged breach by another State party. If a special interest were required for that purpose, in many cases no State would be in the position to make such a claim. It follows that any State party to the Convention may invoke the responsibility of another State party with a view to ascertaining the alleged failure to comply with its obligations erga omnes partes, such as those under Article 6, paragraph 2, and Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention, and to bring that failure to an end.225 125. Such finding applies mutatis mutandis to the Genocide Convention and to the legal entitlement of The Gambia under it to seek compliance by Myanmar with its obligations. 126. The Gambia seeks to protect the rights of all members of the Rohingya group who are in the territory of Myanmar, as members of a protected group under the Genocide Convention, from the genocidal acts prohibited under the Convention. At this stage of the proceedings, the Court does not need to establish definitively the existence of such rights; it is sufficient, for the purpose of indicating provisional measures, that such rights are plausible, i.e., “grounded in a possible interpretation of the Convention.”226 Protection of the rights that are the subject of the present request for provisional measures – which include the rights of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of 3 February 2006, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 32, para. 64). 223 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 11 July 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 616, para. 31; see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment of 3 February 2015, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 47, para. 87. 224 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) (New Application: 1962), Second Phase, Judgment of 5 February 1970, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32, para. 33. 225 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Merits, Judgment of 20 July 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 450, para. 69. 226 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Provisional Measures, Order of 28 May 2009, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 152, para. 60. Rohingya group to exist as a group – coincide with the very object and purpose of the Convention. 127. In addition to the rights of the Rohingya group and its members under the Genocide Convention, The Gambia also seeks to protect the erga omnes partes rights it has under the Convention, which mirror the erga omnes obligations of the Convention with which it is entitled to seek compliance. Considering the jurisprudence of the Court recalled above, such rights are entirely plausible and could be subsequently adjudged to belong to The Gambia. The Court has recognized “the universal character both of the condemnation of genocide and of the co-operation required ‘in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge.’”227 D. Risk of Irreparable Harm and Urgency 128. The Court “has the power to indicate provisional measures when there is a risk that irreparable prejudice could be caused to rights which are the subject of judicial proceedings …, or when the alleged disregard of such rights may entail irreparable consequences.”228 Especially, the Court has the power to indicate provisional measures “if there is urgency, in the sense that there is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice will be caused before the Court gives its final decision.”229 As the Court recently confirmed, “the condition of urgency is met when the acts susceptible of causing irreparable prejudice can ‘occur at any moment’ before the Court makes a final decision on the case.”230 129. The indication of provisional measures does not require the Court “to establish the existence of breaches of the Genocide Convention,” nor is the Court at this stage required to “make definitive findings of fact or of imputability.”231 The Gambia recognizes that, in 227 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23. 228 Alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Order of 3 October 2018, para. 77. 229 Ibid., para. 78. 230 Ibid. (citing Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2016, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (II), p. 1169, para. 90). 231 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 22, paras. 44, 46. deciding whether to indicate provisional measures, the Court is concerned “not so much with the past as with the present and with the future.”232 130. The Court previously indicated provisional measures when rights under the Genocide Convention were threatened by similar acts against a protected group.233 Where past violations have occurred, the Court has found provisional measures appropriate when it is “not inconceivable” that they might occur again. 234 The Court has also ordered provisional measures in circumstances that were “unstable and could rapidly change” due to “ongoing tension and the absence of an overall settlement to the conflict,” and where the affected group remained vulnerable to human rights violations.235 131. There is no doubt that these requirements for the indication of provisional measures are satisfied here. All members of the Rohingya group in Myanmar are presently in grave danger of further genocidal acts because of Myanmar’s deliberate and intentional efforts to destroy them as a group, and the remaining Rohingya communities and individuals in Myanmar continue to face daily threats of death, torture, rape, starvation and other deliberate actions aimed at their collective destruction, in whole or in part. Myanmar’s ongoing atrocities against the Rohingya group, which are well documented by highly credible UN reports, inter alia, constitute a grave threat to their existence and place them in urgent need of the Court’s protection. As the UN Fact-Finding Mission concluded, “the brutality with which the underlying acts were carried out provides further support for a conclusion that they were committed with genocidal intent.”236 In its September 2019 report, the Mission confirmed that “the Government continues to harbour genocidal intent and that the Rohingya remain under serious risk of genocide.”237 This is an urgent situation that literally cries out for the Court’s protection. 232 Ibid., p. 16, para. 25. 233 Ibid., pp. 24-25, para. 52. 234 Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2016, I.C.J. Reports 2016, p. 1169, para. 89. 235 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 October 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 396, para. 143. 236 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2018), para. 1433. 237 UN Fact-Finding Mission, Report of the Detailed Findings (2019), para. 140. E. Provisional Measures Requested 132. On the basis of the facts set forth above, The Gambia, as a State party to the Genocide Convention, respectfully requests the Court, as a matter of extreme urgency, to indicate the following provisional measures, which are directly linked to the rights that form the subject matter of the dispute, pending its determination of this case on the merits: (a) Myanmar shall immediately, in pursuance of its undertaking in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, take all measures within its power to prevent all acts that amount to or contribute to the crime of genocide, including taking all measures within its power to prevent the following acts from being committed against member of the Rohingya group: extrajudicial killings or physical abuse; rape or other forms of sexual violence; burning of homes or villages; destruction of lands and livestock, deprivation of food and other necessities of life, or any other deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Rohingya group in whole or in part; (b) Myanmar shall, in particular, ensure that any military, paramilitary or irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons which may be subject to its control, direction or influence, do not commit any act of genocide, of conspiracy to commit genocide, or direct and public incitement to commit genocide, or of complicity in genocide, against the Rohingya group, including: extrajudicial killing or physical abuse; rape or other forms of sexual violence; burning of homes or villages; destruction of lands and livestock, deprivation of food and other necessities of life, or any other deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Rohingya group in whole or in part; (c) Myanmar shall not destroy or render inaccessible any evidence related to the events described in the Application, including without limitation by destroying or rendering inaccessible the remains of any member of the Rohingya group who is a victim of alleged genocidal acts, or altering the physical locations where such acts are alleged to have occurred in such a manner as to render the evidence of such acts, if any, inaccessible; (d) Myanmar and The Gambia shall not take any action and shall assure that no action is taken which may aggravate or extend the existing dispute that is the subject of this Application, or render it more difficult of resolution; and (e) Myanmar and The Gambia shall each provide a report to the Court on all measures taken to give effect to this Order for provisional measures, no later than four months from its issuance. 133. The Gambia respectfully asks that this request for provisional measures be considered at the Court’s earliest possible opportunity, including the scheduling of a hearing. 134. The Gambia reserves its right to request additional provisional measures to prevent irreparable harm to the rights at issue in this case, or to prevent further aggravation of the dispute between the Parties, should they become necessary, during the course of these proceedings. VII. Appointment of Judge Ad Hoc 135. In accordance with Article 31 of the Statute of the Court and Article 35(1) of the Rules of Court, The Gambia appoints Judge Navanethem Pillay as judge ad hoc. VIII. Reservation of Rights 136. The Gambia reserves the right to revise, supplement or amend the terms of this Application, as well as the grounds invoked. IX. Appointment of Agent 137. The Gambia has designated as its Agent The Honourable Abubacarr Marie Tambadou, Attorney General and Minister of Justice of the Republic of The Gambia. 138. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, all communications relating to this case should be sent to: Consulate General of the Republic of The Gambia, Apollolaan 137, 1077 AR Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 139. I have the honour to assure the Court of my highest esteem and consideration. The Hague, 11 November 2019 PDF of Gambia's Application: https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191111-APP-01-00-EN.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0JNShQEjzvu2_TTqphNveCKtjy7qHlAnyREgWYscFfxpr9nppCXUZOB6Y Link to public documents in the case: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/178

Outline of Dr. Stanton's address to the 8th Symposium on Women and Genocide Washington, DC, October 26, 2019 When Genocide Watch and the Alliance Against Genocide were founded in 1999, there were no international organizations or international coalitions dedicated solely to the prevention of genocide. Genocide Watch and the Alliance have four goals: 1. Genocide education for policy makers, students, and the public; 2. Early warning communicated to engaged policy makers; 3. Rapid response by diplomacy, the UN or regional forces; and 4. Creation of courts and effective punishment of genocide. In the twenty years since 1999, we have made a little progress: • Genocide education has become part of school curricula in more states and countries and genocide studies have grown in universities; • Genocide Studies has become an established academic discipline and the International Association of Genocide Scholars promotes it. • More policy makers know the risk factors and processes of genocide; • More journalists inform the public of early warning signs of genocide and there is much more news coverage of genocidal massacres; • There have been several successful genocide preventions: Kosovo, East Timor, Macedonia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Burundi; • We have created several international tribunals and the International Criminal Court. (ICTR, ICTY, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Khmer Rouge tribunals; the ICC.) • Genocidists, and perpetrators of crimes against humanity and war crimes have been convicted. • The Genocide Convention has finally become international law, because it has finally been enforced. The law of genocide has been interpreted in international case law. • Mass rape is recognized as a crime of genocide. (ICTR – Akayesu). Genocide includes more than killing. It also includes other kinds of group destruction – “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,” and “imposing measures to prevent births within the group.” But there have been more failures: Darfur, South Sudan; D.R. Congo; Ethiopia; Central African Republic; Somalia; Syria; Iraq; Nigeria; Cameroon; Myanmar; Yemen; North Korea; China. What are the common factors for success? • A united UN Security Council and regional organization (NATO in Kosovo and Macedonia; ASEAN in East Timor); • Peacekeeping by a national or regional force (France in Côte d’Ivoire; Nigeria and ECOWAS in Sierra Leone and Liberia); • Popular opposition to ethnic violence (Macedonia, Kenya); • Political compromise between ethnic leaders (Macedonia, Kenya). “Success” is often partial or temporary (the UN, African Union, and European Union peacekeeping in Central African Republic, D.R. Congo, Sudan.) What are the common factors for failure? • A divided and paralyzed UN Security Council; • Protection of perpetrators by UN Perm-5 powers (Myanmar, China, North Korea, Syria, Yemen); • Regional organizations too militarily weak or politically divided to act forcefully (Libya, Yemen, Syria, North Korea); • No peace to keep – the ongoing civil war quagmires (Darfur, South Sudan, D.R. Congo, Syria, Myanmar); • Indifference by great powers or regional nations [no “national interest”: Syria, Burundi, Chad, Cameroon, Yemen, ASEAN non-interference in Myanmar] • Resistance by “sovereign” nations against “peacekeepers” (Darfur, Sudan, South Sudan, Myanmar, Nigeria, India, Pakistan). • Denial of genocide until prevention is too late. (Rwanda, Sudan, Myanmar, Syria, Yemen.) What must we do to prevent more failures? • Resist nationalism and racism. They defeat any interest in human rights in other nations. • Reform the United Nations genocide prevention office – by UN Security Council or General Assembly Resolution correct its false view that only courts may determine “genocide.” [An individual standard is “beyond reasonable doubt.” Genocide prevention must use a prosecutorial standard of “sufficient evidence.”] Let the Special Advisor brief the Security Council directly. • Reassert the authority of the General Assembly (Uniting for Peace Resolution authorizes force when Security Council is paralyzed) • Use the General Assembly and regional organizations to create mixed tribunals [KR Tribunal]; • Amend the ICC Statute to make genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity crimes of Universal Jurisdiction – this can be done by ICC Assembly of States parties without Perm-5 veto; • Amend the ICC Statute to establish an ICC police force to arrest perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Make agreements with national police forces for arrests. What must anti-genocide activists do to prevent more failures? • Campaign internationally for genocide education to be included in the curriculum of every secondary school in the world. • Create a cooperative, voluntary Alliance of NGO’s to pressure governments to take needed actions to prevent and stop genocide. • Make leadership of this Alliance cooperative and international, rather than centralized and hierarchical. Make sure leaders of the anti-genocide movement include a majority of women. • Raise substantial funding for this Alliance to do its work. [George Soros empowered Human Rights Watch by giving it one hundred million dollars. Alexa and Jeff Bezos are you listening?] • Recruit and mobilize a volunteer anti-genocide movement like the membership movement organized by Amnesty International. The best models for the anti-genocide movement are the Anti-Slavery Movement and the Women’s Equality Movement. • Mobilize the church and other religious institutions. They were the key to the Civil Rights Movement. • Make recruitment of government policy makers into this anti-genocide movement a priority. [Infiltrate foreign policy making.] • Take decision making out of the stove pipes. Open the process. Provide forums where government, international organization, human rights, humanitarian, church, academic, think tank, business, legal, and philanthropic leaders can meet often about situations at risk of genocide. (Burundi Policy Forum.) • Train university students in genocide prevention and encourage them to enter foreign policy making in governments, regional organizations and the UN. • Educate political leaders about the importance of genocide prevention for the national interest. Re-educate leaders that protection of life is the only “vital” national interest, not oil or power. • Raise genocide prevention as an issue in political campaigns whenever politicians appeal to narrow nationalism or isolationism. What must we do personally to prevent more failures? • Work for a cooperative anti-genocide movement, rather than one dominated by rivalry over funding sources and insider influence. • Personalize every appeal. Tell people that preventing genocide is about protecting particular people. Name them and introduce listeners and readers to their personal stories. We are in this struggle for love. • Avoid humanitarian narcissism. We are in this struggle not for ourselves, our own fame, or our own fortunes. We are in it for the future of the human race. We will win. • We are working for the Force that created the universe and made every person. We are channels for that Force. • Love is more powerful than Evil. Love is God’s Force personally expressed. • Justice is stronger than Genocide. Justice is God’s Force socially expressed. • Never lose faith that we will win this struggle. • Faith gives substance to things hoped for. • Hope is the assurance that Life will triumph over Death. • WE WILL WIN. Because it is God’s Work.

Sudan Needs a Strategic Approach for Sustainable Change! Darfur Women Action Group (DWAG) has released a comprehensive strategy that was delivered to the interim government of Sudan, as well as to international and regional actors and stakeholders working on Sudan. DWAG’s Strategic Framework for Sustainable Change in the Republic of Sudan (the Framework), which was formulated by DWAG along with contributions from 37 experts and Sudanese civil society representatives (the Working Group) who are committed to promoting the interests of the Sudanese people, stresses the need for laying the proper foundation for sustainable transformation in Sudan. In the wake of the uprisings in Sudan and following the ouster of President Omar al-Bashir, DWAG began an initiative to develop this Framework. The development of the Framework was based on the belief that Sudan needs a strategic approach that promotes an in-depth understanding of the historical grievances that reflect the realities on the ground while also addressing the root causes of the problems by considering the multiple, long-standing crises throughout Sudan. The Framework emphasizes that the recent uprisings are consequences of the overall deterioration of human rights conditions across Sudan, coupled with the following crises in Darfur, South Kordofan. Blue Nile, the marginalization of the people of eastern Sudan, and the construction of dams that threaten the livelihood and historical heritage of indigenous Sudanese in the far North. It is imperative that a solution for Sudan’s problems are understood against this backdrop in order for the solution to be sustainable. Using a rights-based approach, DWAG and the Working Group recognized that solutions for Sudan must also be based on the principles of universal human rights and the multiple regional and international norms that guarantee the protection of these rights for all Sudanese citizens. Establishment of the rule of law must begin with accountability as directed by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes committed in Darfur. The development of the Framework relied heavily on the multiple lessons learned from the international community’s approach to Sudan. Accordingly, multiple steps and specific goals have been developed to meet the needs of the Sudanese people at each stage. The Framework includes three separate time frames: • First, matters of immediate concern, including the provision of unimpeded humanitarian access by inviting previously expelled aid agencies and international observers back into Sudan. This item includes a strong recommendation for the extension of the UN African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) throughout the interim period to guarantee the safety of all Sudanese citizens who remain internally displaced (IDPs). The Framework stresses that the protection of civilians must be an immediate priority and attacks on civilians must cease – particularly in Darfur and other crises affected communities in Blue Nile and South Kordofan. • In the short-term (3-6 months), the Framework recommended a selection process for a qualified interim government vetted against a set of proposed criteria. It also calls for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of multiple government militias into the national army and further inclusion of armed opposition groups via a genuine peace process. • The Framework further stresses the importance of both criminal and financial accountability: criminal accountability through the ICC for previous and ongoing crimes in Darfur and across the Sudan, and financial accountability as a crucial step for the restoration of the money and other resources stolen by the former regime’s representatives. In the long-term (upwards of six months), the Framework establishes a baseline in committing Sudan to the universal norms of human rights, rule of law, ratification of the Genocide Convention, recognition of the genocide committed in Darfur, restoration of property rights, fair compensation for losses, moral and psychological support, and development/reconstruction in the war torn areas. Most importantly, the Framework calls for creating an enabling environment at two levels, including: (1) enabling environments for IDPs in Darfur, Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains within the crises affected setting and (2) an enabling environment at the national level which includes freedom of press, expression, assembly, association, and the right to peacefully protest for all Sudanese, pursuant to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In addition, the Framework demands a strong measure of accountability for crimes committed against women, ratification of the Convention to Eliminate All Form of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), criminalizing any kind of harassment of women and must be made punishable by law according to international standards. “In order to transform Sudan, both Sudanese leaders and the international community must understand that a country with millions of genocide-affected victims in the presence of military rule needs a strategic and comprehensive approach, not an ad hoc approach that simply replaces one individual with another. Change needs to be institutionalized with inclusion and establishment of the rule of law that is compatible with international standards.” DWAG President Niemat Ahmadi For years, the concept of transformation in Sudan has been wrongly decided by the corrupt elites and the international community through a top-down approach. This new Framework takes into consideration that there is a need for a comprehensive approach that can engage all citizens and empower them to act together as agents of change at the grassroots and national levels. If implemented, the Framework is an important document that will help set the foundation for both the Sudanese leaders and the international community for effective resolution to Sudan’s multiple crises, while facilitating trust-building among the divided Sudanese community, eventually leading to the genuine transformation of Sudan. Thank you- Niemat Ahmadi, President Read the full document- English version: http://www.darfurwomenaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Strategic-framework-for-Sudan-English.pdf Arabic version: http://www.darfurwomenaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Strategic-framework-Sudan-Arabic.pdf Contact: Communication@darfurwomenaction.org Tel: +1 202.804.6749 ext.105

Perhaps a full history of the ongoing genocide in Darfur will one day be written. To be at all useful, it will necessarily include events from 2002 (and earlier) through the (potential) transition to civilian governance in Sudan in 2019. There is still little evidence that the dynamic new Prime Minister of Sudan, Abdallah Hamdok, will be able to rein in the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Darfur or halt the predations of armed Arab groups targeting non-Arab/African farmers and internally displaced persons. A role in the new Sovereign Council for RSF commander Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemeti”) seems to ensure that the RSF will remain the primary source of real power in Darfur; indeed, the Constitutional Draft ratified last month gives co-equal status to Hemeti’s RSF and the regular army, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), under the command of Sovereign Council head General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. This in effect legitimates Hemeti’s forces as a private army, an untenable situation in any truly civilian government. Beyond the continuing violence and insecurity in Darfur—which keeps more than 300,000 Darfuri refugees in eastern Chad, and leaves over two million displaced within Darfur—the truly vast resources necessary for reconstruction and restitution will have no adequate place in Sudan’s national budget, even if Prime Minister Hamdok reduces the exorbitant percentage of that budget devoted to the military and security services (including the RSF). Many thousands of farms and farmlands have been violently destroyed or seized by Arab militias and marauders; billions of dollars of livestock, crops, and possessions have been destroyed or seized; many thousands of villages have been wholly or partially destroyed, often including vital water sources and irrigation systems. Displaced farmers seeking to return to or work their farms are constantly subject to extreme violence, including murder, rape, and kidnapping. In short, a violent catastrophe that has continued for seventeen years cannot be subject to a quick fix, and even preliminary improvements in the lives of people affected by the long siege of violence cannot begin until there is security. The “development” projects touted by the al-Bashir regime don’t begin to address the issues raised here, and IDP camps seem destined either to be dismantled or turned into giant, slum-like ghettoes if they lie near major towns (Nyala, el-Fasher, el-Geneina, two or three of the larger towns in Jebel Marra). Many of those who have violently seized farmlands come not from the Arab groups of Darfur but neighbouring Chad, as well as nearby Niger and Mali. It will take a military commitment nowhere in sight to remove them and allow for the safe returns of the farms’ true owners. I have done what I can for more than twenty years to fight for a just peace in greater Sudan, including South Sudan, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and indeed all the areas that have suffered under the brutal tyranny of the al-Bashir regime. I vowed to myself that I would not quit these efforts until I had outlasted al-Bashir—and so I have. Since 2003 my efforts have concentrated on Darfur, as have my publications. For a period—roughly 2004 to the beginning of the Obama administration in early 2009—Darfur was an international human rights cause célèbre. There has perhaps never been a foreign affairs crisis not directly involving immediate U.S. national interest that has been so completely taken up by American civil society, and to a lesser degree the civil society efforts of Canada and Europe. During this period I found it relatively easy to publish my thoughts on Darfur in prominent venues, such as the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, Dissent Magazine, and many others. But as the genocide continued with an apparent endlessness, those working in the cause of ending it wearied and drifted away. Perhaps more importantly, the priorities of the Obama administration were such that Darfur became much less important than a “productive” bilateral relationship between Washington and Khartoum in which counter-terrorism intelligence was the chief desideratum. One senior State Department official of the Obama administration spoke explicitly in November 2010 of “de-coupling” Darfur from any negotiations with Khartoum about securing international terrorism intelligence. The second Obama administration Special Envoy for the Sudans, Princeton Lyman, declared with unsurpassable cynicism: “We [the Obama administration] do not want to see the ouster of the [Khartoum] regime, nor regime change. We want to see the regime carrying out reform via constitutional democratic measures.” (Interview with Asharq al-Awsat, December 3, 2011) This shameless dishonesty, suggesting that the regime of Omar al-Bashir could “carry out reform via constitutional democratic measures,” to this day shocks me: everyone in the Obama administration knew full well that this was a preposterous excuse for continuing business as usual with a man (and a regime) for which the International Criminal Court had issued an arrest warrant charging genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in Darfur. Today, I find it impossible to publish articles on Darfur in the prominent venues that once seemed to welcome my analyses; lecture invitations that were once more than I could possibly accept have ended entirely; broadcast interviews which I am sporadically invited to give have focused only on the events of the uprising, never on Darfur as a cause unto itself. In a sense, this means little: early on in my writing about Darfur I resolved to create what I considered to be a year-by-year archive of the genocidal violence; the results of this archival endeavour may be found on my website, and in more organized form in the publications (including longer “e-publications) that are listed below. This is my archive. It is difficult for me to imagine continuing this effort, although my Twitter account (@SudanReeves) is also an archive of more than 3,500 substantive Tweets since 2009, if with more discrete and focused commentary. I will continue to sustain this effort and give interviews as requested. But I no longer expect to publish in the more conventional sense. A decade of watching the world lose interest in the people of Darfur—mainly poor, Muslim, dark-skinned, and geopolitically irrelevant (and geographically extremely remote)—has been soul-destroying. Although I have received the most gratifying encouragement from my Sudanese friends and colleagues, as well as encouragement from many non-Sudanese friends and colleagues, I no longer believe I can contribute substantively, or at least in the ways I have in the past. My hope, of course, is that someday someone will indeed write a full history of the Darfur genocide, and that the spate of books that appeared while Darfur was a subject of international interest will be superseded by the work of a person(s) committed to telling the full story, giving a full reckoning. Such a history cannot but be extremely harsh in its judgment. If my work serves in any way in this cause, it will have been worth bearing witness as fully as I’ve been able to unfathomable human destruction and suffering. For full archive, see www.sudanreeves.org This article was originally published on sudanreeves.org Prof Eric Reeves is a Senior Fellow at Harvard University’s François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights. He has spent the past 20+ years working virtually full-time as a Sudan researcher and analyst, publishing extensively both in the US and internationally. He has testified several times before the US Congress, has lectured widely in academic settings, and has served as a consultant to a number of human rights and humanitarian organisations operating in Sudan. Working independently, he has written on all aspects of Sudan’s recent history. His book about Darfur (A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide) was published in May 2007. He has recently published Compromising with Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 — 2012 (available at no cost as an eBook)

Joint Statement by 97 humanitarian organizations active in North-East Syria On Unilateral Turkish Military Intervention in the Region As active representatives of local and regional actors engaged in supporting humanitarian work within North-East Syria, the 97 signatory organizations to this statement have closely followed the developments of the Turkish military operations in North-East Syria since 9 October 2019. The affected area is home to millions of people in addition to many IDPs from other areas of the country. With growing concern, we have witnessed significant displacement since the campaign began with cross-border bombardment, as well as the direct targeting of vital infrastructure including water sources and grain silos. We have received field reports about civilian casualties as the result of military operations instigated by the Turkish army accompanied by Syrian partner armed factions. Contrary to rhetoric of creating a “safe zone”, this operation risks escalating into wide-scale conflict, which will have disastrous humanitarian consequences for North-East Syria and beyond. The concerted attempts of the Turkish military and Syrian partners to invade villages, towns and cities in North-East Syria will cause devastating results, and we are concerned about the possible consequences for ethnic and sectarian conflict, as well as the reactivation and empowerment of ISIS sleeper cells, which will once again de-stabilize the region and endanger its stability and social coexistence. This troubling atmosphere could lead to the displacement of millions of civilians and emptying the region from its original residents. Turkish soldiers and Turkish-backed Syrian fighters outside the border town of Ras al-Ain Saturday during their assault on Kurdish-held border towns in northeastern Syria.Credit Nazeer Al-Khatib/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images We as actors engaged in humanitarian work in the area condemn the Turkish military attack which aims at invading these safe regions and we assert the following points: • The international community should exert pressure on Turkey to bring an end to its unilateral military operation in North-East Syria; • All actors should steer away from violence and apply the language of dialogue in resolving the conflict through international diplomatic mediation; • Mechanisms of internationally guaranteed humanitarian protection should be applied to the affected regions of North-East Syria; • We firmly oppose any Turkish action aimed at demographic change and threatening social cohesion in the region; • We call on international organizations and organizations operating in the region to assist in providing shelter and urgent humanitarian aid for IDPs. 1. Ashna Youth Organization 2. Ashti center for building peace 3. ASO Center for Consultancy and Strategic Studies 4. ASO Media Network 5. Assyrian Association for Aid and Development 6. ADEL CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 7. Ahmed Khani Association in the Netherlands 8. Al Furat Center for Studies 9. Al Jazeera Charity Association in Raqqa 10. Al Watan Charity Association 11. Amouda Charity Association 12. Arab National Commission 13. Ararat For Development 14. ARAS Charity 15. Avahi Civil Society Organization 16. Azura Al-Furat Organization 17. Baladna organization for civil society 18. Balsam Center for Health Education 19. Bayti Baytak Organization 20. Beginning organization 21. Ber Çav Organization 22. Better hope for Tabqa 23. Brotherhood Foundation for Human Rights 24. Chechen Society 25. Citizenship and National Peace Committees in Sweida 26. Common Ground Organization 27. Council of Women in Northern and Eastern Syria 28. Dan Relief and Development 29. Darbasiyah Charitable Society 30. SAM Development Organization 31. Dirna Association for Development 32. DOZ Organization 33. Eco mesopotamia organisation 34. Eridu center for civil society and democracy 35. Farah Organization for Rehabilitation and Development 36. Foundation of the Free Woman in Rojava 37. Furat Organization 38. Garaki Lagi Charity Association 39. Gav Organization for subsidy and development 40. Hevî Charity Association in Sere kanye 41. Hitma Organization for Cultural and Social Development 42. Human Rights Organization in Al-jazeera 43. Human rights organization in jazeera 44. Jiyan Charity Association 45. Joan Development Organization in Dohuk 46. Joan Organization for Awareness and Development 47. Jomard Charity 48. Kurdish Committee for Human Rights / RASID 49. Kurdish Red Crescent 50. Lawir For protection and development of livestock 51. Mahabad Organization for Human Rights MOHR 52. Mary Organization in Deir Ezzor 53. Metan Center for Civil Society Revival 54. Mezopotamya Development Studies- MDS 55. My Childhood Organization 56. Nabid Team 57. National Organization for Human Rights in Syria 58. NLP ORGANIZATION 59. Omid for development and revival of civil society 60. Organization of Emaar Mansoura 61. Peace and Freedom Center for Civil Society and Human Rights 62. PEACE SHE-LEADERS NETWORK 63. PÊL- Civil Waves 64. Psychiatrists Without Borders 65. Qandeel Al - Amal Charity Association 66. Ref Al-Yaurbiya Association 67. RojAva Organization for Relief and Development 68. SAMA Organization 69. Sanad for Peacebuilding 70. Sara organization to combat violence against women 71. Sanabel Euphrates Development Organization 72. Scoop Organization 73. Shams Al-Furat Organization 74. Shams Organisation For Rehabilitation And Development 75. Shar Organization for Development 76. Share center for development 77. Shawishka association for women 78. Slav Center for Civil Activities 79. SMART Center for Mental Health and Human Development 80. SREO for monitoring and evaluation 81. Stêr Development Organization 82. Syriac Union 83. Syrian Information Technology Club 84. Syrian Medical Relief 85. Syrian Women Council 86. Syrians for Truth and Justice-STJ 87. T Marbouta Foundation 88. Tamazight Women's Movement 89. Tender Without Borders Foundation 90. Tender Without Borders Organization 91. Tevîn Forum for Thought and Culture 92. Together for Amouda 93. Union of Syrian Kurdish Societies in the Netherlands 94. Women's Democratic Network 95. Yazidi House in Al-Jazeera region 96. Yazidi Union of Syria 97. Demo Solutions Organization

Genocide Warning: January 17, 2018, renewed October 8, 2019 Kurds, Christians, and Yezidis in Northeast Syria are at grave risk of genocide by the armies of Turkey and Syria. The genocide will be supported by Russia and Iran. Turkey and Iran have sizable Kurdish minority populations, which they consider threats to ethnic and national unity. 100,000 Christians live in the area Turkey will invade. Turkey and its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, have a century old history of genocide against Christians. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has announced his intention to create a “twenty-mile buffer zone” in northeastern Syria, an area now controlled by the Kurdish and Arab Syrian Democratic Forces. He has conducted a diplomatic offensive to get promises of non-interference from Russia, Iran, and the US for his invasion of Syria. Turkey has already stationed tens of thousands of troops, tanks, and heavy artillery along the Syrian border. When President Trump announced that US troops would withdraw from Syria in 2018, he did so after a call from Erdoğan. That announcement was met by a bipartisan Senate resolution against US abandonment of America's Kurdish allies in northeastern Syria. 1000 US troops remain there. After another call with Erdoğan in October 2019, President Trump has again announced a US pull-out from northeast Syria. Both Republican and Democratic leaders remain opposed to US withdrawal. Turkey began its invasion of Syrian Kurdish territory on January 20, 2018 when the Turkish Army launched cross-border military operations into Afrin in northwestern Syria with the code name "Operation Olive Branch," The mission aimed to oust Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (or YPG) from the district of Afrin. Turkey considers the YPG to be an extension of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), which has been waging an insurgency within Turkey since 1984 to achieve Kurdish human rights and regional autonomy. The YPG denies being an extension of the PKK and has been allied with the United States and other countries in the fight against the Islamic State/Da'esh since 2014. The Turkish Armed Forces conducted their invasion of Afrin with no concern for the laws of war, dropping bombs and shelling towns indiscriminately. Hundreds of civilians around Afrin, including Christians, Yazidis, and other religious minorities displaced by the Syrian war and by Da'esh, were killed. Turkish forces intentionally targeted civilians, a war crime, and forcibly displaced most of Afrin’s population, a crime against humanity. The Turkish government has characterized the YPG as a "terrorist organization," casting its invasion of Syria as an anti-terror operation. It has also referred to its aggression against Syria as "jihad," echoing language used by ISIS. The term "terrorist" is used in Turkey as a term to dehumanize Erdoğan opponents and legitimize the suppression of human rights and freedoms. This Turkish narrative is used as a "self-defense justification" for genocidal massacres of Kurds. Turkey has become a police state. Since the attempted coup of 2015, the Turkish government has dismissed over 100,000 civil servants and jailed thousands of teachers, professors, journalists, politicians, and civil society leaders. for being suspected supporters of "the coup." Many of these detainees have been charged with terrorism.; The term "terrorist" has been used to justify torture and murder of Erdoğan opponents. The Afrin operation is similar to "anti-terror" operations conducted in Kurdish towns in Southeast Turkey for many years. In towns like Cizre, Turkish troops displaced the population, imposed harsh curfews, cut off water and electricity supplies, killed thousands of civilians, destroyed churches and mosques, pillaged homes, and bombed towns into rubble. In Cizre -- as in Afrin -- the bodies of killed female fighters were mutilated, videotaped, and shared widely on social media by Turkish soldiers. The Turkish military and the other forces under its leadership, including Al Qaeda and Da'esh fighters, declared total control of Afrin on March 25, 2018. They have pursued a policy of "demographic change" in Afrin by settling villages with Turkmen and Arab families originally from outside of the area. Reports from occupied Afrin tell of dozens of girls and young women being kidnapped by Turkish and jihadi forces and subjected to systematic rape. Turkey has declared its intention to "resettle" millions of Syrian Arab refugees now in Turkey into Kurdish northeastern Syria. This forced displacement and refoulement of refugees is a crime against humanity and a violation of UN refugee conventions. It would "resettle" Syrian Arab refugees in a region that was not their former home. Turkey's goal is to forcibly displace a million Kurds on Turkey's southern border and replace them with Syrian Arabs, just as the Turks have done in Afrin. Turkey intends this demographic change to destroy Kurdish autonomy in "Rojava" a self-governing Kurdish region of northeastern Syria. Erdoğan has vowed to continue the Turkish invasion further east to Manbij and Kobane in Syria as well as to the Sinjar and Nineveh regions of Iraq, ostensibly to destroy the PKK, but actually to drive Kurds out of all Syrian border areas with Turkey. Turkey's aggression into neighboring states threatens the long-term security of all Kurdish, Christian, and Yezidi populations in the region. Turkey’s intention is genocide.

A recently revealed mobile malware campaign targeting Uyghur Muslims also ensnared a number of senior Tibetan officials and activists, according to new research. Security researchers at the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab say some of the Tibetan targets were sent specifically tailored malicious web links over WhatsApp, which, when opened, could have stealthily gained full access to their phone, installed spyware and silently stole private and sensitive information. The exploits shared “technical overlaps” with a recently disclosed campaign targeting Uyghur Muslims, an oppressed minority in China’s Xinjiang state. Google last month disclosed the details of the campaign, which targeted iPhone users, but did not say who was targeted or who was behind the attack. Sources told TechCrunch that Beijing was to blame. Apple, which patched the vulnerabilities, later confirmed the exploits targeted Uyghurs. Although Citizen Lab would not specify who was behind the latest round of attacks, the researchers said the same group targeting both Uyghurs and Tibetans also utilized Android exploits. Those exploits, recently disclosed and detailed by security firm Volexity, were used to steal text messages, contact lists and call logs, as well as watch and listen through the device’s camera and microphone. It’s the latest move in a marked escalation of attacks on ethnic minority groups under surveillance and subjection by Beijing. China has long claimed rights to Tibet, but many Tibetans hold allegiance to the country’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. Rights groups say China continues to oppress the Tibetan people, just as it does with Uyghurs. A spokesperson for the Chinese consulate in New York did not return an email requesting comment, but China has long denied state-backed hacking efforts, despite a consistent stream of evidence to the contrary. Although China has recognized it has taken action against Uyghurs on the mainland, it instead categorizes its mass forced detentions of more than a million Chinese citizens as “re-education” efforts, a claim widely refuted by the west. The hacking group, which Citizen Lab calls “Poison Carp,” uses the same exploits, spyware and infrastructure to target Tibetans as well as Uyghurs, including officials in the Dalai Lama’s office, parliamentarians and human rights groups. Bill Marczak, a research fellow at Citizen Lab, said the campaign was a “major escalation” in efforts to access and sabotage these Tibetans groups. In its new research out Tuesday and shared with TechCrunch, Citizen Lab said a number of Tibetan victims were targeted with malicious links sent in WhatsApp messages by individuals purporting to work for Amnesty International and The New York Times. The researchers obtained some of those WhatsApp messages from TibCERT, a Tibetan coalition for sharing threat intelligence, and found each message was designed to trick each target into clicking the link containing the exploit. The links were disguised using a link-shortening service, allowing the attackers to mask the full web address but also gain insight into how many people clicked on a link and when. “The ruse was persuasive,” the researchers wrote. During a week-long period in November 2018, the targeted victims opened more than half of the attempted infections. Not all were infected, however; all of the targets were running non-vulnerable iPhone software. The researchers said tapping on a malicious link targeting iPhones would trigger a chain of exploits designed to target a number of vulnerabilities, one after the other, in order to gain access to the underlying, typically off-limits, iPhone software. The chain “ultimately executed a spyware payload designed to steal data from a range of applications and services,” said the report. Once the exploitation had been achieved, a spyware implant would be installed, allowing the attackers to collect and send data to the attackers’ command and control server, including locations, contacts, call history, text messages and more. The implant also would exfiltrate data, like messages and content, from a hardcoded list of apps — most of which are popular with Asian users, like QQMail and Viber. Apple had fixed the vulnerabilities months earlier (in July 2018); they were later confirmed as the same flaws found by Google earlier this month. “Our customers’ data security is one of Apple’s highest priorities and we greatly value our collaboration with security researchers like Citizen Lab,” an Apple spokesperson told TechCrunch. “The iOS issue detailed in the report had already been discovered and patched by the security team at Apple. We always encourage customers to download the latest version of iOS for the best and most current security enhancements.” Meanwhile, the researchers found that the Android-based attacks would detect which version of Chrome was running on the device and would serve a matching exploit. Those exploits had been disclosed and were “obviously copied” from previously released proof-of-concept code published by their finders on bug trackers, said Marczak. A successful exploitation would trick the device into opening Facebook’s in-app Chrome browser, which gives the spyware implant access to device data by taking advantage of Facebook’s vast number of device permissions. The researchers said the code suggests the implant could be installed in a similar way using Facebook Messenger, and messaging apps WeChat and QQ, but failed to work in the researchers’ testing. Once installed, the implant downloads plugins from the attacker’s server in order to collect contacts, messages, locations and access to the device’s camera and microphone. A Google spokesperson said: “”We collaborated with Citizen Lab on this research and appreciate their efforts to improve security across all platforms. As noted in the report, these issues were patched, and no longer pose a risk to users’ with up-to-date software.” Facebook, which received Citizen Lab’s report on the exploit activity in November 2018, did not comment at the time of publication. “From an adversary perspective what makes mobile an attractive spying target is obvious,” the researchers wrote. “It’s on mobile devices that we consolidate our online lives and for civil society that also means organizing and mobilizing social movements that a government may view as threatening.” “A view inside a phone can give a view inside these movements,” they said. The researchers also found another wave of links trying to trick a Tibetan parliamentarian into allowing a malicious app access to their Gmail account. Citizen Lab said the threat from the mobile malware campaign was a “game changer.” “These campaigns are the first documented cases of iOS exploits and spyware being used against these communities,” the researchers wrote. But attacks like Poison Carp show mobile threats “are not expected by the community,” as shown by the high click rates on the exploit links. Gyatso Sither, TibCERT’s secretary, said the highly targeted nature of these attacks presents a “huge challenge” for the security of Tibetans. “The only way to mitigate these threats is through collaborative sharing and awareness,” he said. Updated with Google comment. © 2013-2019 Verizon Media. All rights reserved. Powered by WordPress VIP(opens in a new window). Fonts by TypeKit(opens in a new window).

“Repatriation” scheduled to begin August 22 (Cox’s Bazar, August 21, 2019)—The governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh should suspend any immediate plans to return Rohingya refugees to Myanmar, said Fortify Rights today. The authorities should ensure Rohingya have basic rights and protections in Myanmar and engage in meaningful consultations with Rohingya refugees before facilitating future refugee returns to Myanmar. Bangladesh and Myanmar authorities agreed to begin refugee returns tomorrow, August 22, 2019. “Repatriations now would be dangerous and reckless,” said Matthew Smith, Chief Executive Officer of Fortify Rights. “Governments should focus on ensuring accountability for mass atrocities, restoring Rohingya citizenship rights, and ending deprivations of basic human rights that are ongoing in Rakhine State.” Myanmar reportedly added 3,450 Rohingya to a “repatriation list” derived from a list of more than 22,000 Rohingya provided by the Government of Bangladesh. In 2016 and 2017, Myanmar Army-led genocidal attacks forced nearly 800,000 Rohingya to flee from Myanmar’s northern Rakhine State to Bangladesh. The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic minority, indigenous to Myanmar. “My house was set on fire and burned during the military operations [in August 2017],” a Rohingya refugee woman, 40, told Fortify Rights in Cox’s Bazar District, Bangladesh. “Before we go home, I want citizenship.” In November 2017, the governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar first announced a plan to return Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar, but Bangladesh authorities postponed the plan in January 2018, citing a lack of preparedness. In another attempt in November 2018, Fortify Rights documented how Bangladesh authorities in Cox’s Bazar District attempted to coercively collect biometric data from Rohingya refugees by assaulting and threatening refugee leaders, raising concerns about possible forced returns to Myanmar. The Government of Myanmar plans to house returnees in “transit centers,” where Rohingya will be required to accept National Verification Cards (NVCs), which do not confer rights nor citizenship and, through an NVC application process, effectively identify Rohingya as “Bengali” or more generally as “foreigners.” The situation in Rakhine State is unsafe for returns and Rohingya continue to cross into Bangladesh seeking safety, Fortify Rights said. From 1992 to 1995, the governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar and the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees forcibly repatriated an estimated 250,000 Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh to northern Rakhine State, and in 1995 Myanmar began issuing Temporary Resident Cards (“White Cards”) to Rohingya, which, like NVCs, did not confer rights. The Government of Myanmar should urgently amend the 1982 Citizenship Law to bring it in line with international laws and standards and to ensure equal access to full citizenship rights for Rohingya, said Fortify Rights today. “There’s a long history of abuse against Rohingya in the course of returns to Myanmar,” said Matthew Smith. “Rohingya need to be fully consulted and engaged in this process, and so far they’ve not been.” On September 3, Fortify Rights will publish a full-length report exposing new information on human rights violations and international crimes by Myanmar authorities related to NVCs and the denial of citizenship to Rohingya. © August 2019 Fortify Rights International. All Rights Reserved.