December 3, 2018 I By Clark News & Media Relations Thousands of materials, including ‘killing orders,’ available online After the 1915 Armenian Genocide, Krikor Guerguerian, a priest and genocide survivor, traveled the world collecting evidence to document the atrocities. Taner Akçam, the Robert Aram and Marianne Kaloosdian and Stephen and Marian Mugar Professor in Armenian Genocide Studies at Clark University’s Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, recently collaborated with Turkish experts and graduate students on a digital repository that makes Guerguerian’s vast collection of incriminating documents available to scholars worldwide. The newly launched Krikor Guerguerian Archive comprises thousands of original Ottoman documents and Guerguerian’s extensive, unpublished writings. It includes the long-missing handwritten memoirs of Naim Bey, an Ottoman bureaucrat stationed in Aleppo who actively participated in the deportation and massacres of Armenians; documents from the Jerusalem Armenian Patriarchate containing first-hand information about the Armenian genocide; and critical papers from the Istanbul perpetrator trials held from 1919 to 1922 that were long assumed vanished. Among the most noteworthy materials are ciphered telegrams that the Ottoman Interior Minister Talat Pasha, army commanders, and the chief of the government’s paramilitary sent to governors throughout the Empire. Some of these telegrams, written on government letterhead stamped with the official Ottoman seal, clearly outline the Ottoman government’s planning and execution of the genocide. These “killing orders,” considered the “smoking gun” of the Armenian Genocide, formed the basis of Akcam’s groundbreaking book “Killing Orders: Talat Pasha’s Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide,” released earlier this year. Professor Akçam was granted access to the unpublished collection in 2015 by Dr. Edmund Guerguerian, nephew of Fr. Guerguerian, and he has worked diligently to ensure that other scholars of the Armenian Genocide have access to these important documents. He engaged his doctoral candidates Ani Ohanian, Anna Aleksanyan, and Burçin Gerçek, and former students Ümit Kurt, Ph.D. ’16 and Emre Can Dağlıoğlu in an effort to create and launch the digital archive. The group collaborated with others in Paris and Istanbul to translate materials into English. “Access to these materials has the potential to change scholarly and political discourse as well as to destroy Turkish denial,” wrote Professor Akçam. “It is my duty to make this evidence accessible for the world to see.” Professor Akçam, whom the New York Times referred to as “The Sherlock Holmes of the Armenian Genocide,” was one of the first Turkish intellectuals to acknowledge and openly discuss the Armenian Genocide. His book “The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire,” was co-winner of the Middle East Studies Association’s Albert Hourani Book Award and one of ForeignAffairs.com’s “Best Books on the Middle East.” Among his many honors, Akçam received the 2018 Outstanding Upstander Award from the World Without Genocide organization; the Hrant Dink Spirit of Freedom and Justice Medal from the Organization of Istanbul Armenians and the Hrant Dink Freedom Award from the Armenian Bar Association (both in 2015); and the Heroes of Justice and Truth award at the Armenian Genocide Centennial commemoration in May 2015. Funding for the creation of the Krikor Guerguerian Archive was provided by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, the Jirair Nishanian Foundation, the Armenian General Benevolent Union, the Knights & Daughters of Vartan, the National Association for Armenian Studies and Research (NAASR), and the Dadourian Foundation. Original materials included in the Guerguerian Archive were donated to NAASR in Belmont, Mass., where they will become part of NAASR’s Mardigian Library. Researchers will be able to access original materials included in the digital archive following the opening of the NAASR headquarters’ building in the fall of 2019. For more information about the online archive, call 508-793-8897. Copyright © 2019 Clark University

16 January 2019 I Human Rights The UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR) said on Wednesday that at least 890 villagers were reportedly killed in the western Democratic Republic of the Congo last month, following brutal inter-communal clashes. Human rights reports suggest that the apparent massacre took place between 16 and 18 December in four villages in the Yumbi territory, Mai-Ndombe province, in what appear to have been clashes between the Banunu and Batende communities. Most of the area’s population has reportedly been displaced, and voting in the December 30 presidential poll for the Yumbi area, was postponed due to violence and insecurity. In a statement, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned the “shocking violence” and highlighted the importance of “investigating and bringing the perpetrators to justice”. Michelle Bachelet added that it was essential to “ensure justice for the victims of these horrific attacks, but also to prevent new episodes of intercommunal strife, and to address the anger and feelings of gross injustice that may otherwise lead to repeated cycles of violence between communities.” At least 82 people were also injured in the attacks, according to the “credible” reports received by OHCHR and some 465 houses and buildings were burned down or pillaged, including two primary schools, a health centre, a health facility, a market, and the local office of the independent electoral commission, known by its French acronym, CENI. Both the OHCHR and national judicial authorities, have launched investigations into the reported attacks. At the beginning of January the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR reported that 16,000 people from DRC had arrived in neighbouring Republic of the Congo – also known as Congo-Brazzaville - after fleeing deadly intercommunal clashes. According to UNHCR, this represents the largest influx of refugees in over a decade, since 130,000 people were forced to seek shelter amid ethnic clashes in DRC’s former Equator Province, in 2009. COPYRIGHT © UNITED NATIONS All rights reserved.

“We were hunted every minute, every second – people dying all around us. Rwanda looked like a big, open graveyard at one point. There were bodies everywhere.” Photo courtesy of Jeanne Celestine Lakin Jeanne Celestine Lakin survived the Rwandan genocide in 1994. She says that as a child, her life in the east-central African country was a good one. She was one of ten siblings, and says she was spoiled by all the love she received. But she saw the seeds of the eventual genocide planted in her school and community. Members of the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority populations were segregated in schools. “The neighbors, those we considered our extended family – many of them started telling us that we would actually die,” Lakin says. “But then it all happened very fast.” When the killing began, her family split up. Her infant brother remained with her mother, while Lakin and her three-year-old twin sisters stayed with her father. “We lived in the bushes, moving from one bush to another, hiding in the swamps,” Lakin says. “We were hunted every minute, every second – people dying all around us. Rwanda looked like a big, open graveyard at one point. There were bodies everywhere.” By the time of the genocide, some 1 million people had been killed. “At one point, there was this misleading propaganda on the radio,” Lakin says. “They said that they [had] forgiven women and children. I went to the mayor to confirm, and the mayor sent me to a village were he said we would actually be safe. He actually sent me into a killing squad.” Lakin was sexually abused by the leader of the killing squad, and was taken by him to a refugee camp in Congo. She escaped and returned to Rwanda, where she could find no services or shelter because the orphanages were full. The experience led her to create One Million Orphans, a nonprofit that raises money to provide counseling to orphans worldwide. Lakin has also written a memoir, “A Voice in the Darkness,” about her experiences. “It’s very amazing how so many people can relate, not just like the sexual abuse, the heartbreaking experience watching my family die, but also just as simple as really being able to walk through the forgiving process,” Lakin says. Written by Shelly Brisbin.

What’s new? Protests across Sudan flared up as the government cut a vital bread subsidy. Economic grievances are fuelling demands for political change, with protesters calling on President Omar al-Bashir, in power since 1989, to resign. Authorities have responded with violence, killing dozens and arresting many more. Why does it matter? In the past, President Bashir and his government have been able to ride out popular demonstrations. But these newest protests, demanding Bashir resign because of economic mismanagement and corruption, have spread to loyalist regions and coincide with rising discontent in his party. What should be done? Foreign governments influential in Khartoum should continue to publicly discourage violence against demonstrators, with Western powers signalling that future aid and, in the U.S.’s case, sanctions relief are at stake. They should seek to improve prospects for a peaceful transition by creating incentives for Bashir to step down. I.Overview Protests engulfing Sudanese towns and cities have seen dozens killed in crackdowns by security forces and could turn bloodier still. Demonstrators express fury over subsidy cuts and call for President Omar al-Bashir to resign. Discontent within the ruling party, the depth of the economic crisis and the diverse makeup of protests suggest Bashir has less room to manoeuvre than before. He may survive, though likely by suppressing protests with levels of violence that would reverse his recent rapprochement with Western powers and deepen Sudan’s economic woes. Another scenario would entail his ouster by parts of the security apparatus, though this could also prove destabilising. Better would be for Bashir to negotiate his exit, perhaps induced by some form of conditional immunity. Outside powers should keep discouraging crackdowns, with Western leaders underscoring that continuing to use violence against protestors will scuttle aid and sanctions relief. They should also create incentives for Bashir to resign and signal to Sudanese elites the economic lifeline on offer were that to happen. Protests broke out in mid-December in Atbara, a mid-size town 350km from the capital Khartoum, and quickly spread to towns and cities across the country. People from all parts of Sudanese society initially took to the streets to protest the rising cost of staples, particularly bread; anger had been bubbling for years but heightened when the government lifted wheat subsidies in January 2018 without putting in place social protections to offset deteriorating living conditions. Now, many protesters focus their ire on the president himself and demonstrations feature chants calling on him and other top officials to step down. President Bashir has weathered many such protests in the past, but a number of factors this time around are different. Protesters have gathered in Bashir’s strongholds, mostly in the wealthier centre of the country, and attacked several ruling party offices. The police and other security agencies, including the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), have at times responded brutally but the army has shown greater restraint than before and, noting this, the opposition has urged generals to remove Bashir. The feared Rapid Support Forces, a government militia renowned for its brutal counterinsurgency tactics, has been active, particularly in Khartoum, but less prominent than during previous protests, when they were responsible for many deaths. Within the ruling party and security elites, ever-louder voices question whether the country can escape its economic doldrums with Bashir at the helm, given that his presidency is the greatest obstacle to obtaining foreign aid or loans. Three scenarios appear possible. One is that the president survives, though without funds to offer protesters significant reforms, he will likely have to subdue them by force. This in turn would slow Western re-engagement with Khartoum and almost certainly end prospects of the U.S. lifting its remaining sanctions, including its designation of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism, which in effect bars Sudan from international debt relief or bailouts. A second scenario could see protests gathering pace and prompting the president’s ouster by elements within his party or security elites. This might usher in a new government and fresh direction, though it could also trigger further instability. To insulate against coups, Bashir has regularly shuffled security chiefs, marginalised rivals and kept the security forces factionalised. A takeover by another senior figure could prompt infighting among divided security factions. A third scenario would see Bashir resign. This would allow for a leadership change that could mollify protesters. Many see Bashir as emblematic of an unaccountable and self-interested elite that has led the country into long-term economic crisis, isolated Sudan and stubbornly refused to implement substantial reforms to resolve these problems. Some of Bashir’s allies and former senior officials are encouraging him to step down in 2020; the president pledging not to contest the 2020 vote would be positive, though this carries a risk that he later reneges. For now, he shows few signs of stepping down. Indeed, the president has strong incentives not to do so, fearing the next government would hold him accountable for corruption at home or, if he leaves Sudan, delivery to the International Criminal Court, which has indicted him for atrocities in Darfur. For outside powers, the first priority should be to minimise bloodshed on the streets. Foreign governments with sway in Khartoum should publicly discourage violence against demonstrators and call on the government to maintain forces, especially the Rapid Support Forces, in check. Western powers should continue to signal that future cooperation, aid and, in the U.S.’s case, normalisation of ties, are at stake. They should warn commanders of the various security forces that they could face travel bans, asset seizures and prosecution abroad for indiscriminate violence against demonstrators. More broadly, those governments should seek to improve prospects for a peaceful transition; doing so is as critical as taking immediate steps to deter violence. Behind the scenes, they should press the president to step down or at least pledge not to seek re-election in 2020. They might also signal to Sudanese political and security elites that greater aid and investment would likely be forthcoming without Bashir. The UN Security Council might also offer to request the ICC defer investigation or prosecution of Bashir’s case for one year, pursuant to the Rome Statute’s Article 16, were he to resign or to leave office in 2020; the deferral could be extended provided Bashir stayed out of – and did not interfere in any way with – Sudanese politics. The downsides to deferring his case would be enormous, but without a pledge along these lines, Bashir is unlikely to step down. II.Protests Spread Across Sudan Protests broke out on 19 December in Atbara, a town about 350km from the capital Khartoum and the historic home of Sudan’s once-powerful national labour movement. This followed a cut that same month in the government subsidy on bread in River Nile state, where Atbara is located, which tripled its price. Demonstrations quickly spread across the country to at least 28 towns and cities, including major centres such as Port Sudan, El-Gadarif and, eventually, the twin cities of Khartoum and Omdurman, the country’s political and economic centres. Videos posted on social media, circulating despite the government’s attempt to shut down the internet, showed protesters calling for Bashir to step down from power.Unusually, protests are taking place in riverine areas, which are close to Sudan’s wealthier centre and traditionally loyal to Bashir, making them all the more threatening to his rule. Protesters have attacked offices of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in a number of towns, ransacking and sometimes burning the buildings; rarely in the past have such attacks occurred outside Darfur or Sudan’s other conflict zones. Protesters come from mixed political and economic backgrounds. They include members of Sudan’s longstanding leftist movements, the Sudanese Communist Party and the Sudanese Congress Party (whose members are particularly active on social media) and a number of other political parties, along with professional trade unions, notably doctors, who are currently on strike. The newly-formed Sudanese Professionals Association – an umbrella group encompassing several professional unions – organised a march on the presidential palace on 25 December and again on 31 December demanding Bashir’s resignation. The association is coordinating with Girifna, a loose coalition of youth movements formed by anti-regime university students in 2009 to agitate for reform in Sudan and a change in the country’s leadership. The bulk of the protesters, however, are ordinary Sudanese with no strong political affiliation and who blame their dire economic plight on the NCP’s economic mismanagement and kleptocracy. So far, the Sudanese government’s response has largely involved deploying its four security organs: the police, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and Rapid Support Forces militia. Those forces, accustomed to violent tactics, have shot into crowds and hurled teargas at protesters. Amnesty International stated on 24 December that it had “credible reports” that 37 people had already been killed. That said, security forces have not yet unleashed the level of brutality witnessed in 2013, when militias indiscriminately killed almost 200 protesters then opposing the removal of a fuel subsidy. Bashir has labelled the protesters “vandals and looters” and in a speech, delivered in the NCP’s stronghold of Gezira state, just south of Khartoum, describing them as “traitors, mercenaries, agents and heretics”. But at the same time, he has urged the police not to use “excessive force”.Reportedly, some senior security officials have counselled against using indiscriminate violence, fearing this could provoke a larger public backlash and weaken the government’s relationship with Western countries, who have already condemned the violence. Encouraged by the army’s reticence, a coalition of political parties including some Islamists previously allied with Bashir, has urged the military to seize power. Although protesters favour the wholesale fall of the government, many would welcome a transition that sees Bashir leave, offers a chance for economic relief and opens the way to political reform. Responding to calls for a military intervention, Bashir declared 8 January that he was open to handing over to the military but not, in words he uses to describe the political opposition, to “traitors”. III.Economic Grievances at a Tipping Point President Bashir’s government has weathered protests and contended with economic discontent in the past. But entering 2019, it has fewer options for generating the revenue necessary to assuage protesters. It has faced a severe economic crisis since the start of 2018, consistently refused to cut exorbitant state spending in the security sector and lost potential investment due to sanctions, international isolation and a failure to develop an attractive environment for investors. The country’s already-high levels of debt mean that it will be difficult to borrow funds to finance its deficits, and its chief financial backers in the Gulf are less generous than in the past. Sudan’s economic crisis originates in part from South Sudan’s secession in 2011, which led to the loss of nearly three quarters of Sudan’s oil reserves. Previously, oil production generated around half of all tax revenues and two thirds of Sudan’s foreign exchange earnings. The secession agreement sought to cushion the impact of South Sudan’s independence through a series of lump-sum payments from the now oil-rich Juba to Khartoum amounting to some $3 billion. But this arrangement only went so far in compensating for fundamental damage to the Sudanese economy and, in any case, Juba has been unable to pay up since South Sudan’s civil war broke out in December 2013. While the economic shock of South Sudan’s secession was inevitable, Khartoum also failed to prepare for it. Long-term economic mismanagement, pervasive graft and high military expenditure have contributed to unaffordable levels of spending. International isolation caused by U.S. sanctions, introduced in the late 1990s, inhibited attempts to diversify the economy through foreign investment, leaving Sudan with a crippling lack of foreign-exchange reserves, which has resulted in shortages, particularly of fuel. A small gold boom since 2011 has not made up for the loss of oil revenue, in part because traders avoided selling to the Central Bank and instead smuggled gold out of Sudan to countries where prices were higher. Furthermore, Sudan’s $55 billion in external debt prevents the government from accessing new foreign credit, except ad hoc loans mostly from Gulf allies. Sudan would normally be eligible for debt relief under the joint International Monetary Fund (IMF)-World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC), but cannot gain that while it remains on the U.S.’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. Authorities in Khartoum like to blame U.S. sanctions for all the country’s economic woes. But their own failure to encourage dynamism contributes significantly to economic dysfunction. Investors talk of encountering a sclerotic bureaucracy which insists on imposing byzantine rules for simple transactions, causing many to stay away. The security establishment’s overbearing control of economic policy, including in determining allocation of foreign currency, does little to improve conditions for business. The government’s limited attempts at belt tightening have both failed to address the economic crisis and fuelled discontent. In January 2018, its annual budget included a cut to wheat subsidies. The World Bank and IMF had encouraged such measures, seeing subsidies as a costly and ineffective method to help the poor, but recommended Khartoum offset these cuts by increasing spending on social protection, such as making cash transfers to needy families. The government did not do so. Moreover, because its efforts to reduce spending focused on eliminating subsidies rather than downsizing the military budget or recovering revenues lost to corruption, they hit the poor hardest. In response to the wheat subsidy cut, bread prices doubled and the cost of other staples, particularly sorghum and millet, increased as the market reacted to extra demand. At the same time, the government devalued the Sudanese pound from seven to eighteen pounds per U.S. dollar and then later to 30 pounds per dollar. Following the first devaluation in early January 2018, the illegal parallel market rate, which had fluctuated between eighteen and twenty Sudanese pounds per dollar, rapidly increased to 31 and later doubled to 60 pounds per dollar. The government then became concerned about the possibility of uncontrollable hyperinflation and, from February 2018, put in place limits on the amount of money Sudanese could withdraw from banks. In November 2018, the official inflation rate stood at 68.93 per cent, one of the world’s highest. Already in January and February 2018, the combined effects of the subsidy cuts and the currency devaluation stimulated a number of well-coordinated protests. Many demonstrators were committed anti-government activists and some were linked to established opposition political parties; the protests failed to attract the broader social base that has taken to the streets today and were not large enough to threaten Bashir. Still, security forces arrested over a hundred protesters and held them without charge for weeks. Newspapers that covered the events had entire print runs confiscated and some journalists were temporarily detained. The harsh measures the government used illustrated its nervousness about potential public anger at the economic downturn. While Sudan’s relations with Western powers, particularly the U.S. and European Union, have improved, they have yet to pay economic dividends. Over the past few years, Khartoum has skilfully used its advantages as a partner on counter-terrorism (particularly regarding jihadist groups in neighbouring Libya), its influential role in South Sudan and its cooperation with the EU on migration management to slowly build better relations with Western countries. Western diplomats also cite Sudan’s strategically important location and the need to prevent further economic decline that could lead to political instability and conflict as drivers of their gradual re-engagement. Though European concerns over migration attract the most press coverage, diplomats say they worry most about the economy’s structural fragility and the possibility of state collapse that could further destabilise the region. In October 2017, the U.S. lifted some economic sanctions, which had been in place since the late 1990s. As yet, however, this has not had a notable effect. Khartoum remains deeply in debt and considered a risky investment destination. The second phase of U.S. sanctions relief, the program for which was announced in November 2018 – requiring Khartoum to make improvements in six areas, including in its respect for human rights – should be more significant, potentially leading to Sudan’s eventual removal from the U.S.’s state sponsors of terrorism list. This could allow the country to secure debt relief or a full World Bank or IMF bailout.Sudanese officials also argue that the country’s continued designation as a state sponsor of terrorism has kept foreign investors and banks away. The country’s foreign minister has said Khartoum would quickly ask for a bailout by the IMF if the designation is lifted. In recent years, Khartoum has relied heavily on assistance from Gulf partners, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, to prop up its ailing economy. According to the IMF, Gulf monarchies deposited an estimated $2.5 billion into the Central Bank of Sudan in 2015-16. This was, in part, a payment for Khartoum’s 2014 decision to break off relations with Tehran and committing thousands of Sudanese forces to the Saudi-led war against the Huthis in Yemen. In return, Riyadh also lobbied the U.S. for the repeal of economic sanctions. These warming ties suffered a setback in June 2017 due to the Gulf crisis, which saw Saudi Arabia, the UAE and a number of their allies sever diplomatic relations with and impose an economic blockade on Qatar.Despite pressure from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, and unlike some other African governments, Sudan has not picked a side in the Gulf dispute, preferring maintain good relations across the board. That said, despite its nominally neutrality, Sudan is ideologically closer to the more Islamist-leaning administrations in Qatar and its main ally, Turkey. Though Khartoum has maintained cordial ties to Saudi Arabia and UAE (and retains troops in Yemen), financial assistance from those two powers has mostly dried up at a critical moment, in part, perhaps, because they view Khartoum as insufficiently loyal but also because they see investment in Sudan as risky. This has contributed to the vulnerable position in which President Bashir now finds himself. IV.Bashir’s Choices President Bashir has shown himself capable of weathering popular unrest in the past. This time around, however, he has fewer options to placate demonstrators and is widely seen, including by many within his own ruling party, as part of the country’s malaise rather than an antidote to it. Even so, the critical questions at this juncture are whether protests calling for Bashir’s resignation will gather force and, if so, whether this will change the calculations of the security forces and elites who still support him. Three different scenarios could unfold. The first, and seemingly most probable, is that the security services step up repression to disperse protesters, deter future demonstrations and crack down on the unions and associations organising them. As in the past, such a campaign could see protests dwindle without any immediate threat to Bashir’s hold on power. This would ensure Bashir’s short-term survival, but greater repression risks backfiring and prompting more public outrage. A crackdown would likely slow, if not halt, Sudan’s improving relations with Western powers and lifting of U.S. sanctions, thus blocking its path to debt relief or a World Bank or IMF bailout and leaving the government no good option to improve economic conditions. Bashir would simply store up more problems for the future, when unaddressed grievances could potentially trigger even greater protest. In this scenario, countries that remain friendly to Khartoum will almost certainly be unwilling or unable to provide the funds necessary to reverse the economic slide. Bashir may look to the Gulf, as he has in the past. But while Gulf leaders on both sides of the 2017 intra-Gulf spat (Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on one side, and Qatar on the other) can be described as allies and Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in particular want Sudanese troops to remain in Yemen, they will probably not provide game-changing support. An injection of cash from the Gulf – most likely from Qatar – might, in other words, buy Bashir time but would not address the country’s underlying economic challenges. While Turkey and Russia, both relatively new players in Khartoum, have growing business and diplomatic interests in the country, those interests are not sufficiently large or important to motivate a more serious, direct investment in the government. China’s involvement in Sudan, traditionally focused on developing the oil industry, has diminished since the south’s secession. A second scenario might involve the president’s removal by elements within his own security forces, particularly if protests continue to spread and Bashir still refuses to step down. This scenario might arise if protests grow in force, the economic crisis deepens and the situation threatens the survival of not only Bashir but also other top officials. Still, given Bashir’s repeated reshuffles of leadership positions in the security agencies, such a scenario could provoke infighting among security factions to determine the succession of leadership. For now, however, a successful coup appears a remote prospect. It is unclear that any figure could unite the factionalised security sector behind such a move. True, the military so far has shown less appetite to confront protesters than it has in the past. Some evidence suggests soldiers share protesters’ frustration over grim economic conditions. But no evidence suggests Bashir’s ouster is imminent. Senior generals issued a statement backing the president a few days after the protests kicked off in response to reports of divisions within their ranks. Many have engaged in war crimes and serious corruption themselves and worry about retribution were Bashir gone. Senior officials also express concern about the potential revival of insurgencies in Darfur were Bashir to depart. Bashir reportedly trusts his intelligence services, key members of which hail from his own riverine ethnic group, more than he does the army, which recruits from a wider pool and whose loyalty is more ambiguous. Salah Gosh, the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) chief, now seen as the second most powerful man in the country, was accused of coup-plotting in 2012, and spent six months in prison. But after Bashir restored him as security chief in February 2018, he played a key role in purging anti-Bashir elements from the NCP and NISS in 2018 and is likelier to be a central figure in suppressing protesters than taking up their cause. Nor do leaders of other security agencies appear inclined to make such a move. On 25 December, chief of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – a pro-government militia recruited mainly from the Darfur and Kordofan regions – Mohamed Hamdan Daglo “Hametti” made a speech in Khartoum state to a unit recently arrived from North Darfur, in which he urged the government to provide more services to the people. Though his statement received wide attention and seemed an implicit criticism of the government, he has shown no sign of acting against Bashir. In any case, while the RSF are a major element of the security architecture, they remain mobile and relatively lightly armed, accustomed to counterinsurgency campaigns in Darfur. Those forces are not strong enough to take on the Sudanese army, assuming it remains loyal to Bashir. A third and optimal scenario would see the president resigning or pledging not to contest the 2020 election, with the encouragement and pressure of allies within the ruling party or security agencies and foreign governments. Bashir’s decision to seek another term had already divided the NCP and provoked some consternation within elements of the security services; this latest wave of protests has left him further weakened. Dissenters within the party, or those sidelined by the president, view him and his style of government – decision-making concentrated in the presidential palace and a small circle of advisors, with technocratic ministers marginalised – as a liability. A negotiated transition, in which Bashir himself agreed to hand over power to a new government, potentially including moderate NCP and military figures, would be the best way out of the crisis. It could set the country on a path to receiving emergency aid and undertaking necessary reforms to end repeated cycles of conflict. The odds of Bashir taking this route also appear slim. Nothing in his track record suggests he will give up power easily; the recent moves to amend the constitution and remove term limits suggest he already is manoeuvring to retain power beyond 2020. Moreover, he has strong incentives to hold on. Out of power, he would likely fear for his safety, whether at home or living in asylum in a friendly country. He could orchestrate a handover to a loyal general, but he and his family would still risk facing accountability for corruption or other crimes. His ICC indictment for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur narrows his options for seeking refuge abroad. Those Gulf countries that would be his most probable hosts, chiefly Saudi Arabia, are not parties to the Rome Statute. But settling there would still be a gamble for Bashir, as any shift in geopolitical winds or his host country’s domestic policy might leave him exposed to international justice. V.How Outside Actors Should Respond For Western and other outside powers, the immediate priority should be to avert further violence during protests. On 8 January, the Troika – the UK, Norway and the U.S. plus Canada – issued a strong statement demanding that Khartoum undertake political reform and warning that further indiscriminate violence against protesters would have consequences for future re-engagement between Sudan and the West. This was an encouraging first step. These parties should continue to press the Sudanese authorities to exercise restraint, release political prisoners and address the protesters’ legitimate demands. The U.S. should explicitly pin further sanctions relief on the government switching to a more measured response toward the protesters. More broadly, outside actors should do everything in their power to improve prospects for a peaceful transition. The optimal scenario would be some form of negotiated exit whereby Bashir steps down and Sudanese elites form a government more open to political and economic reform and that has less troubled relationships with key outside powers. Such a transition would open up the possibility of further re-engagement with the West and international financial institutions and could offer a lifeline to a population battered by the country’s economic decline. It might bring also benefits to non-Western powers. Many countries, including Gulf powers, eye Sudan’s agricultural potential and see the country as a potential bread basket, but are reluctant to invest given the volatility under Bashir. A fresh direction could improve prospects for investment and provide greater food security for those countries. The UN Security Council might consider offering to defer Bashir’s prosecution at the ICC if he steps down (an idea Crisis Group initially floated in 2012). Prominent Sudanese businessman and philanthropist Mo Ibrahim, who has also called for Bashir to step down, has echoed this proposal. A Security Council deferral would involve the Council requesting the ICC to put off investigation or prosecution of his case for one year, pursuant to the Rome Statute’s Article 16; the deferral could be extended provided Bashir stayed out of Sudanese politics. There would clearly be enormous downsides to doing so – for justice in Sudan and potentially for the ICC itself. The Council would have to insist on some alternative form of accountability for atrocities in Darfur. But without a pledge along these lines, it appears highly improbable that Bashir will step aside willingly. Bashir himself has cast the ICC issue as a matter of national pride so a deferral would also be face-saving; sources close to the president suggest that even though the indictment has inhibited his travel less over the past few years than previously, he still views it as a major burden. VI.Conclusion In three decades at the helm in Sudan, President Omar al-Bashir has survived Khartoum’s internecine politics, repeated wars in Sudan’s peripheries, his country splitting in two after South Sudan’s secession, indictment by the ICC and frequently hostile neighbours in a particularly rough neighbourhood. He has held on despite repeated predictions of his demise; indeed, his political manoeuvres in Khartoum over the past few years have done much to shield him from potential contenders. Vesting too much hope in the president stepping down any time soon would fly in the face of this record. Yet the president is running out of road. Unable to reverse the economic slide, he must rely on repression alone to contain a population increasingly enraged at deteriorating living conditions. But the harsher his repression, the more probable his relations with the West deteriorate again and the farther the funds necessary to turn around the economy slip from his reach. Bashir may well survive this round of protests. But if he does, it will almost certainly be at the cost of further economic decline, greater popular anger, more protests and even tougher crackdowns. At some point, his departure appears inevitable. Outside powers should do everything possible to prevent violence in the meantime, work for as smooth a transition as possible and find him an exit. Nairobi/Brussels, 14 January 2019 Copyright 2019 International Crisis Group

December 27, 2018 image: The New York Times President Trump’s unilateral decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria will embolden our adversaries, including Iran, Russia and Syrian leader Bashar al Assad, and weaken and betray our Kurdish and Arab partners in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). A withdrawal would also endanger the civilian population living inside the safe haven that is now under SDF control — approximately 35 percent of the country and home to some 6 million people. The inhabitants of this area are ethnically and religiously diverse, including Kurds, Arabs, Muslims and a Christian minority estimated to include some 100,000 people. If President Trump moves forward with the withdrawal of troops, we need to use all our leverage to persuade Turkey to not launch another assault on Syria because it would potentially endanger both our partners in the SDF and the civilian population. It could also bring Turkey into conflict with the Russian and Iranian-backed Syrian regime. This is not in Turkey’s interest. Although it may be difficult for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to admit publicly, the small U.S. presence in northern Syria may still be better for Turkey than the alternative. In order to avoid what the International Crisis Group describes as a potential “free-for-all” in northeast Syria, we could — in coordination with Turkey — establish a no-fly zone over Syria’s northeast to protect the 6 million people whose lives depend on maintaining the safe haven. This would be similar to the no-fly zone over parts of Iraq that protected Kurds and Shias from Saddam Hussein beginning in the early 1990s. The no-fly zone over Iraq was done in coordination with Turkey and enforced by American, British and French aircraft patrols. Ambassador James Jeffrey, special representative for Syria engagement, hinted at such a possibility and made a comparison to the no-fly zone over Iraq in a briefing at the State Department on Dec. 3. The Syrian Kurds are widely recognized as our most reliable military partners on the ground. They also deserve recognition for protecting the non-Kurdish civilian population, including Christians. On my last trip to Syria in the spring, I visited several churches in the region. The Kurdish forces in the SDF are predominantly Muslim but embrace secularism and have demonstrated they are willing to die to protect Christians and Yezidis. Unlike the regime, they have defended and promoted the religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity of the region. Signs in Qamishli now appear in three languages: Arabic, Kurdish and Syriac. This was unheard of under Assad. If U.S. troops are withdrawn and Turkey launches an assault, Kurds will become embroiled in a battle with Turkey. Who will then protect the civilian population? What will happen to the churches that are still left standing after almost eight years of war? The Syriac Military Council issued a statement Thursday, warning: "There is a serious risk of the end of the presence of Christianity in this region if we do not have security in place when the U.S. leaves." Trump’s withdrawal decision prompted General Mattis to resign his post — perhaps the first time in American history that a secretary of Defense resigned in protest over the president’s policies. Sources close to Mattis claim it was the very real possibility of a Kurdish bloodbath that triggered his decision. One day later, Brett McGurk also resigned, our top envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. McGurk made clear that he could not defend the withdrawal decision, much less execute it. Mattis and McGurk know all too well that the fight against ISIS was ineffective until we partnered with the Syrian Kurds. In January 2015, the Kurds helped deliver the first major victory against ISIS by liberating Kobani, a small town in northern Syria near the border to Turkey. By defeating ISIS inside Kobani, the Kurds thereby also protected Turkey from encroaching Islamic State militants. If Trump (and Erdoğan) have forgotten this, Gen. Mattis, McGurk and the U.S. military have not. Abandoning our Kurdish partners now would be a colossal betrayal and would endanger the civilian population. In light of a U.S. troop withdrawal, there are two ways we could continue to offer protection to the population on the ground: by pressuring Erdoğan to call off his assault in Syria, and through a coordinated no-fly zone over the region where U.S. troops are now located. Syrians deserve the same protection afforded to the Iraqis in 1991 with a no-fly zone. The Baathist regime in Damascus has been under the control of the Assad family since 1970. Since the Syrian conflict began in 2011, over 500,000 people have been killed. Over 11 million Syrians have been displaced internally or made refugees, half the pre-war population. And Assad is not done yet. Unless a deal is struck between Assad and the SDF, he will continue to kill his own people in order to retake the third of the country currently under SDF control. A no-fly zone would contain the regime and pressure Assad to enter into a deal with the SDF. The United States already coordinates with Russia regarding access to the airspace over Syria in order to avoid hostile encounters. A no-fly zone would be the next logical step. In the State Department briefing on Dec. 3, Ambassador Jeffrey hinted at this possibility, saying: “Remember we were present not in northern Iraq but over northern Iraq in Operation Northern Watch for 13 years. That can be a UN force. Under [UN Security Council Resolution] 2254 there is language on a UN-managed and operated ceasefire. That can be partner forces.” Erdoğan has repeatedly threatened to attack the Syrian Kurds. Starting in late January, Turkey launched an assault on Afrin, west of the Euphrates. He now wants to go after the Kurds to the east of the Euphrates. In justifying the intervention, Erdoğan insists that the Syrian Kurds are identical to the militant Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). However, the Afrin operation went beyond targeting the Kurdish forces. It also endangered and displaced the civilian population. In research I’ve conducted on the ground in Syria and Iraq since 2015, I found that many Kurdish women and men joined the SDF for reasons that have nothing to do with the PKK. Many joined the SDF (or its predecessor the YPG) because that was their only way of defending themselves from the Islamic State. Numerous Kurdish women told me they joined because they suffered gender discrimination in their own society and felt empowered by the training they received in the SDF. Erdoğan chooses to ignore these distinctions, but we should not. We decided to partner with the Syrian Kurds, who risked everything to defeat ISIS and ensure the safety of their homeland. This helped protect Europe and the United States from terrorist attacks. Four years of partnership should not be tossed aside because of an impetuous presidential tweet. If we withdraw U.S. troops as Trump recklessly tweeted and fail to protect our partners and the civilian population, this is what will happen next: The Islamic State will have an opportunity to regroup and could once again pose a terrorist threat to Syria and Iraq. Assad will continue slaughtering his own people, and Putin will help him. Turkey will attack the Kurds, and Iran will entrench itself in Syria long-term. Civilians will flee, adding to the millions of Syrian refugees already in neighboring countries and Europe. A coordinated no-fly zone could limit the damage of a troop withdrawal and protect the safe haven in northeastern Syria. Amy Austin Holmes is an associate professor at the American University in Cairo, a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Weatherhead Scholars Program and a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. You can follow her @AmyAustinHolmes. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL Copyright 2018 The Hill https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/422990-us-withdrawal-from-syria-will-endanger-kurds-arabs-christians

August 1, 2018 Afrin residents detained and tortured, with houses and businesses looted and confiscated, and schools destroyed or taken over. 'I saw men being beaten in front of me … just for fun’ - detained man from Afrin ‘Turkey is the occupying power in Afrin, and is responsible for the welfare of the civilian population’ - Lynn Maalouf Turkish forces have been giving Syrian armed groups free rein to commit serious human rights abuses against civilians in the Syrian city of Afrin, Amnesty International said today, following an in-depth investigation into life in Afrin under Turkish military occupation. Amnesty’s research shows that Afrin residents are enduring widespread human rights violations, mostly at the hands of Syrian armed groups equipped and armed by Turkey. Violations include arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances and confiscation of property and looting to which Turkey’s armed forces have turned a blind eye. Some of these groups, and Turkish armed forces themselves, have also taken over schools, disrupting the education of thousands of children. In January, Turkey and allied Syrian armed groups launched a military offensive in Syria against the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the military force of the autonomous administration led by the Syrian Kurd Democratic Union Party (PYD). Three months later, Turkey and its allied forces seized control of Afrin and its surrounding areas, forcibly displacing thousands of people who fled and sought safety in the nearby al-Shahba region where they are now living in dire conditions. According to several Afrin residents, Turkey’s armed forces have a significant presence in the centre of the city, and in several surrounding villages. On 1 July, Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that its armed forces will stay in Afrin to continue working on the development of the area. Between May and July, Amnesty interviewed 32 people, some of whom were still living in Afrin and others who had fled to other countries or different areas of Syria. Interviewees named pro-Turkey armed groups - including Ferqa 55, Jabha al-Shamiye, Faylaq al-Sham, Sultan Mourad, and Ahrar al-Sharqiye - as responsible for serious human rights violations. On 16 July, Amnesty communicated to the Turkish government a summary of its preliminary findings, requesting a response. On 25 July, the Turkish government responded questioning Amnesty’s impartiality without providing a concrete response to the findings. Lynn Maalouf, Amnesty International’s Middle East Research Director, said: “We heard appalling stories of people being detained, tortured or forcibly disappeared by Syrian armed groups, who continue to wreak havoc on civilians, unchecked by Turkish forces." Turkey is the occupying power in Afrin, and is therefore responsible for the welfare of the civilian population and maintaining law and order. So far, its armed forces have failed utterly in these duties." “It cannot evade responsibility by using Syrian armed groups to carry out its dirty work. Without further delay, Turkey must end violations by pro-Turkish armed groups, hold perpetrators accountable, and commit to helping Afrin residents rebuild their lives." “The Syrian government and YPG are exacerbating the suffering of people who have been displaced from Afrin, by trapping them in the al-Shahba region for no apparent reason and depriving them of adequate access to education, food and medical care." “We are calling on Syria and the YPG to respect the freedom of movement of civilians, and to facilitate the safe and voluntary return of the displaced.” Arbitrary detention and torture Amnesty interviewed several residents and internally displaced people who reported that armed groups had arbitrarily detained civilians for ransom, as punishment for asking to reclaim their property, or on baseless accusations of affiliation to the PYD or YPG. Local sources told Amnesty of at least 86 instances of arbitrary detention, torture and enforced disappearance. A woman displaced from Afrin told Amnesty that her uncle had been taken away by members of a pro-Turkey armed group after he’d returned to his village three months earlier. She said: “We don’t know where he is. He was head of the local committee. He is not affiliated with the PYD or YPG. He went back to Afrin because he was afraid he would lose his house. He stayed with his wife in another house because our village became a military base for the Turkish forces. One night he decided to ask the armed groups to take him to check on his home. The armed group escorted him to his house, but he hasn’t returned since then. They wouldn’t tell his wife where they took him.” Two former detainees Amnesty interviewed said they had been held by Sultan Mourad and accused of being affiliated with the YPG. They told Amnesty they’d seen journalists, teachers, engineers, activists, as well as former employees of the PYD and YPG fighters in the prison in Azaz where they were held. One said: “I was taken to the al-Ra’i prison in Azaz operated by Soultan Mourad. I wasn’t tortured, but I saw men being beaten in front of me by members of Sultan Mourad just for fun, and at night the sound of men screaming echoed through the building. I was released without seeing a judge. I thought I would never make it out of there.” Property confiscation Since March, when Turkey and allied armed groups seized control of Afrin, hundreds of people have been returning to the city by foot through a mountainous route, as the YPG has blocked the official routes into the city, deliberately preventing displaced people from returning to Afrin. Many of those who managed to return found that their properties had been confiscated and their possessions stolen by armed groups allied with Turkey. Ten people told Amnesty that Syrian armed groups had confiscated properties and shops in Afrin. Displaced residents said they were informed by their relatives and neighbours that their homes were either being used by the pro-Turkey armed groups as military headquarters, or occupied by displaced families from Eastern Ghouta and Homs. One teacher displaced in a camp in the al-Shahba region told Amnesty that his house in Jenderes had been confiscated by Faylaq al-Sham. He said: “My neighbour told me that my home was confiscated. He sent me images that clearly show the name of Faylaq al-Sham written on the wall of the entrance door.” Amnesty also interviewed three displaced residents who reported that armed groups had confiscated their shops. A man and his son, a graphic designer, who owned three shops in Afrin, said a relative had told them their home had been confiscated by the Ferga 55 armed group. They also received photos showing one of their shops converted into a butcher shop by a family from Eastern Ghouta. An owner of a supermarket in a village near Afrin told Amnesty that a relative had told him recently that his supermarket was first looted, and was now being run by family from Eastern Ghouta. One woman told Amnesty: “The families from Ghouta are not to be blamed. They have been displaced like us, and are maybe in an even worse situation than us.” Looting of homes and businesses Twelve people told Amnesty they’d witnessed or been victims of looting. Several displaced people were told by their relatives that their home had either been completely looted or were missing expensive appliances such as their TV sets, computers, washing machines or refrigerators. In April, a representative of the military court claimed in a media interview that there had been looting incidents during the military operation, by both armed members and civilians, but that the court had begun to return the belongings to their owners. The court representative explained that, in coordination with the military police in Azaz and Turkey’s armed forces, the individuals responsible for the looting had been arrested and referred to court. But one person who returned to Afrin in May told Amnesty: “I went to my parents’ home and it was empty. They stole every piece of furniture, appliances, and everything else. The neighbours saw the Free Syrian Army packing all the furniture in trucks. There are at least four armed groups in control of the village, so they don’t know which one was responsible.” A resident from Afrin who sought refuge in Germany, told Amnesty: “I have five apartments in Afrin city and a commercial shop. My friend told me that two of my homes are now occupied by displaced families. I managed to get the phone number of two families, one from Harasta and another from Eastern Ghouta. I called them to ask them to take care of the house but they told me that the house was already looted when they moved in. I had just renovated the house. My problem is not with the families living in the house, but with the armed groups.” Schools taken over by armed groups Since January, access to education has been nearly impossible for people in Afrin. Residents told Amnesty that since March, children had been able to access only one school in Afrin city, while Afrin University has been completely shut down after it was destroyed and looted. According to former teachers displaced to the al-Shahba region, Turkish forces, alongside allied Syrian armed groups, are using Amir Ghabari School in Afrin as a military headquarters. Amnesty reviewed satellite imagery from April showing several armoured vehicles and a recently built-up structure. These vehicles and structure were not present before Turkish forces and armed groups gained control of Afrin in March. According to local media sources and residents, Turkish forces and the armed groups converted the public school in Shara to a police headquarters in June. Turkish forces are also using another school in Jenderes as a field hospital, according to residents. Violations by the Syrian government and YPG Following the offensive in January, thousands of people fled to the nearby al-Shahba region. At least 140,000 people are now living in camps or damaged houses without proper access to services, especially medical care. The injured and chronically ill have to wait for government permission to be allowed access into Aleppo city, the nearest place where they can receive adequate medical care. The Syrian government has also prevented any movement from the al-Shahba region to other parts of Syria with better living conditions. This has forced many people struggling to survive to pay large amounts of money to smugglers to counter these movement restrictions. In addition, the YPG has blocked the roads from the al-Shahba region to Afrin, deliberately preventing displaced people from returning to their homes. Since the end of the military operation in March, hundreds have returned to Afrin after walking through a long and arduous mountain route. A woman who returned to Afrin in early April told Amnesty: “My aunt, who is 60 years old and suffered from a severe type of diabetes and other health conditions, died on the way back to Afrin from severe dehydration. The YPG didn’t let us take our cars through the official road so we walked for around five hours. She ran out of water halfway through. Her daughter went to find a spring to get her water but she didn’t make it back in time.” According to several people, including members of the Kurdish Red Crescent, the Syrian government has restricted the medical evacuation of sick and wounded civilians from the al-Shahba region to Aleppo. The Kurdish Red Crescent and medical staff told Amnesty that there is only one hospital and two clinics providing basic medical care and medicine in the al-Shahba region. They said that they lack both the medical expertise and equipment to perform surgeries or treat chronic diseases. At the time of writing, around 300 people suffering from chronic diseases and serious injuries had been waiting for their medical evacuation to be approved by the Syrian government. Since mid-March, only 50 people have been allowed to travel to the national hospital in Aleppo for treatment. Copyright 2018 Amnesty International

A priest leads a small Christmas mass in the embattled northern Syrian city of Kobani, Dec. 25, 2018. (Photo: Kurdistan 24/Wladimir van Wilgenburg) January 5, 2019 ERBIL (Kurdistan 24) - A joint statement by Syriac Christian organizations in Syria, Europe, and the US on Thursday demanded the establishment of a no-fly zone to stop a possible Turkish attack following an announced US withdrawal, fearing it could effectively end Christianity in northern and eastern Syria. “We urgently need protection from Turkey’s threats to invade and ‘cleanse’ our territory from Christianity, religious freedom, and democracy. US President Donald Trump's sudden decision to withdraw US troops, leaves us powerless and open to be destroyed by either Turkey, or other regimes scrambling to see our demise in the vacuum this will create.” Turkish senior officials have threatened that their military would cross the southern border to attack areas in Syria east of the Euphrates, both before and since the announcement of Trump's decision in late December. A significant population of Christians lives in the territory that Turkey has said it will attack, now under the control of the Self-Administration in Northern and Eastern Syria (NES). According to the statement made by groups which include the Syriac National Council of Syria, the American Syriac Union, and the European Syriac Union, “Turkey committed war crimes and ethnic cleansing against the religious minorities [in Afrin].” “All the Christians had to flee the area as Turkey’s jihadi troops conducted door to door searches to hunt the Christians down, to kill them and destroyed all of Afrin’s churches. They had to flee with nothing, and take refuge in the area that Turkey is now threatening to invade; north and east Syria.” Before Turkey attacked Afrin in January, around 500 Kurdish Christian families were living in Afrin. The organizations say that "when President Trump gave Turkey’s Recep Erdogan the permission to replace the US forces this means Turkey will crush the multi-religious democracy that is happening in north and east Syria.” Experts, such as Political Science Professor at Missouri State University Dr. David Romano, told Kurdistan 24 that if Ankara attacks the areas in question, “Turkey’s Islamist rebel proxies simply cannot be expected to treat Syrian Christians and Yezidis kindly either.” “We saw the kind of abuses and looting they committed in Afrin,” he added. “To expect anything different in Kobani or Jazira would be naive in the extreme.” A priest known as Zani from Afrin who fled to Kobani and now leads prayer in a newly opened church there told Kurdistan 24 after holding Christmas mass that the community has grave fears about what could happen if Turkey attacks the town. "We're in Kobani now, but there are threats and we are very concerned about them. Our church in Afrin was destroyed, and so we came to this one," he said. The Syriac organizations fear that the effects of a new Turkish invasion could end up being similar to what Christians experienced under the Ottoman Empire. "It was our great grandparents that fled Turkey due to the 1915 genocide to Syria’s North East region. We, the descendents of the survivors are at risk of reliving a genocide of the proportions our ancestors told us about, and by the same oppressor: Turkey.” Therefore, the Syriac organizations called on the West to stop a possible Turkish attack. "Without your support we fear that when Turkey invades we will see the end of Christianity in north and east Syria." As a result, they call for creation of a “no-fly zone for North East Syria to protect us against Turkey.” Over the past few years, the Trump administration has pledged to protect religious minorities in Syria and Iraq, a common demand of Christian conservatives that backed the president. Evangelical leader Franklin Graham, an outspoken supporter of President Trump, wrote on his Facebook page on Dec. 26 that he received a “letter from Syrians who share a deep concern for their country.” “I’m sure President Trump remembers that during the 2016 Campaign he promised to protect the Christians. Pulling out troops to quickly has the potential to put many in danger.” In an interview with Newsmax on Thursday, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the US leader would ensure that religious minorities in Syria will be protected. Editing by John J. Catherine Updated.January 5, 2019. Copyright 2018 Kurdistan 24

Kurds, Christians, and Yezidis in Northeast Syria are at grave risk of genocide by the armies of Turkey and Syria. The genocide will be supported by Russia and Iran. Turkey and Iran have sizable Kurdish minority populations, which they consider threats to ethnic and national unity. 100,000 Christians live in the area Turkey will invade. Turkey and its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, have a century old history of genocide against Christians. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has announced his intention to create a “twenty-mile buffer zone” in northeastern Syria, an area now controlled by the Kurdish and Arab Syrian Democratic Forces. He has conducted a diplomatic offensive to get promises of non-interference from Russia, Iran, and the US for his invasion of Syria. Turkey has already stationed tens of thousands of troops, tanks, and heavy artillery along the Syrian border. When President Trump announced that US troops would withdraw from Syria, he did so after a call from Erdoğan. Turkey began its invasion of Syrian Kurdish territory a year ago on January 20, 2018 when the Turkish Army launched cross-border military operations into Afrin in northwestern Syria with the code name "Operation Olive Branch," The mission aimed to oust Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (or YPG) from the district of Afrin. Turkey considers the YPG to be an extension of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), which has been waging an insurgency within Turkey since 1984 to achieve Kurdish human rights and regional autonomy. The YPG denies being an extension of the PKK and has been allied with the United States and other countries in the fight against the Islamic State/Da'esh since 2014. The Turkish Armed Forces conducted their invasion of Afrin with no concern for the laws of war, dropping bombs and shelling towns indiscriminately. Hundreds of civilians around Afrin, including Christians, Yazidis, and other religious minorities displaced by the Syrian war and by Da'esh, were killed. Turkish forces intentionally targeted civilians, a war crime, and forceably displaced most of Afrin’s population, a crime against humanity. The Turkish government has characterized the YPG as a "terrorist organization," casting its invasion of Syria as an anti-terror operation. It has also referred to its aggression against Syria as "jihad," echoing language used by ISIS. The term "terrorist" is used in Turkey as a term to dehumanize Erdoğan opponents and legitimize the suppression of human rights and freedoms. Turkey has become a police state. Since the attempted coup of 2015, the Turkish government has dismissed over 100,000 civil servants and jailed thousands of teachers, professors, journalists, politicians, and civil society leaders. for being suspected supporters of "the coup." Many of these detainees have been charged with terrorism.; The term "terrorist" has been used to justify torture and murder of Erdoğan opponents. The Afrin operation is similar to "anti-terror" operations conducted in Kurdish towns in Southeast Turkey for many years. In towns like Cizre, Turkish troops displaced the population, imposed harsh curfews, cut off water and electricity supplies, killed thousands of civilians, destroyed churches and mosques, pillaged homes, and bombed towns into rubble. In Cizre -- as in Afrin -- the bodies of killed female fighters were mutilated, videotaped, and shared widely on social media by Turkish soldiers. The Turkish military and the other forces under its leadership, including Al Qaeda and Da'esh fighters, declared total control of Afrin on March 25, 2018. They have pursued a policy of "demographic change" in Afrin by settling villages with Turkmen and Arab families originally from outside of the area. Reports from occupied Afrin tell of dozens of girls and young women being kidnapped by Turkish and jihadi forces and subjected to systematic rape. Erdoğan has vowed to continue the Turkish invasion further east to Manbij and Kobane in Syria as well as to the Sinjar and Nineveh regions of Iraq, ostensibly to destroy the PKK, but actually to drive Kurds out of all Syrian border areas with Turkey. Turkey's aggression into neighboring states threatens the long-term security of all Kurdish, Christian, and Yezidi populations in the region. Turkey’s intention is genocide.

For three days last week, thousands of Guatemalans blocked roads and major highways to protest the Central American country's slide toward a constitutional crisis. The protest organizers included groups that have long demanded justice: indigenous communities and campesinos, as rural and farm workers are called. Indigenous citizens, many dressed in colorful traditional clothing, came out partly to protest the Guatemalan president's recent expulsion of a United Nations-backed commission investigating corruption in the country. Since 2007, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, known by its Spanish initials CICIG and funded by the U.N., the United States and the European Union, has worked with Guatemalan justice agencies to target corrupt officials. In the highly unequal society that is Guatemala, many Maya believe any strengthening of the justice system will protect indigenous rights granted under the country's constitution and peace accords.The country's indigenous people therefore have a strong motivation to lobby for the rule of law. Maya communities bore the brunt of almost four decades of a civil war that ended in 1996, leaving over 200,000 casualties, the majority indigenous Guatemalans, according to the United Nations. Now the mostly Maya organizations and many human rights groups worry that the violence is making a comeback: In just the last year, 26 members of mostly indigenous campesino organizations have been killed."Guatemala is on the verge of a major human rights catastrophe," says Jo-Marie Burt, a professor at George Mason University in Fairfax, Va., and a senior fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America, an independent research and advocacy center. According to Burt, the Guatemalan Union of Human Rights Defenders has tallied over 200 attacks against human rights defenders in Guatemala in the last year.Burt believes Guatemala is close to falling into the violence that gripped the country 30 years ago, which the United Nations and some Guatemala courts say led to a genocideof the country's indigenous citizens.One of the killings took place in July, in the province of Quiché, one of the areas hardest hit by the civil war.A 25-year-old Ixil Maya nurse, Juana Raymundo, was delivering paperwork related to her job as a community health worker near the city of Nebaj. Her father told Guatevisión TV that she called to say she'd be home after that errand, but they never heard from her again. "She was kidnapped," he says, "and we had no other word from her."Her body was found days later, showing signs of torture, in a river covered by brush. To many in the area, her death was reminiscent of the massive atrocities committed during the long civil conflict.According to numerous media articles, Raymundo was a rising young political leader, active in various indigenous and human rights organizations. She had been recently elected to head an indigenous civic committee with plans to become a political party.Hundreds attended her wake and funeral, where a leader of the Campesino Development Committee said the organization would not be intimidated. Indigenous, human rights and international organizations expressed outrage for Raymundo's murder.Indigenous scholar and commentator Irma Alicia Velásquez Nimatuj wrote in her column in the newspaper El Periódico, "After having lived through a genocide, we should have learned the lesson that no one in Guatemala, regardless of ethnicity, gender or class, should be killed for thinking differently ... or for dreaming of a different future."According to Velásquez, Guatemala has entered "a new stage of repression" — one focused on "assassinating community leaders who defend their territories from invasion by transnational companies bent on depriving indigenous peoples of the resources they have in the soil and the subsoil."Numerous conflicts over land and mineral rights have surfaced in indigenous communities throughout Guatemala.Guatemala's human rights ombudsman Jordán Rodas told NPR that as the number of killings reached alarming proportions — nearly 20 last summer — he attempted to set up a meeting between the heads of indigenous groups and members of the administration of President Jimmy Morales."They refused to meet with the indigenous leaders," said Rodas. "One feels a certain indignation that there's no public condemnation of these acts. ... I don't have much faith in this government ... hopefully the Justice Department will take action on these cases and find the intellectual authors find who was behind [the attacks] ... because it's like going back to a past I had thought we had overcome."On Aug. 5, shortly after Raymundo's killing, the respected sociologist Edelberto Torres-Rivas provided historical context for the attacks on rural leaders in a long opinion piece for El Periódico. "Campesinos have always been manual labor and cannon fodder," Torres-Rivas wrote. He went on to warn that "In Guatemala there is a return of those who've carried out crimes in the recent past ... and if the authorities don't take care ... there could be a reaction."Meanwhile, Burt warns that the U.S. public should also be concerned about the situation in Guatemala: "It literally feels like it's on the edge of the precipice and just over that precipice, you're staring back at [in] the 1970s ... and you're staring at [a] massive violation of human rights.""It's no surprise," she adds, "that we see ... tens of thousands of Guatemalans fleeing the country going into Mexico trying to get to the United States to flee a country that is in free-fall — where there are no guarantees and there is no security." © 2019 npr

In The High Court, Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa February 6- 10, 2017 In my analysis of the processes that lead to genocide, I have developed a model of the genocidal process I call “The Ten Stages of Genocide.” (Stanton, GH, 2013) Genocide is not an accident. It develops in a predictable process. I have analyzed most of the genocides in recent history and have discovered a predictable pattern. Historians have established that governmental incitement and use of hate language is a recognized predictor, initiator, promoter and catalyst of genocide. Genocide begins with words. Words have consequences. Hate speech, repeated hundreds and thousands of times, becomes incitement to commit genocide. It creates a culture of genocide. Barbara Coloroso, in her book Extraordinary Evil, (Coloroso, B., 2007) likens such repetition of hatred to the bullying that is rampant in some schools, and that drives teenagers to suicide. For two thousand years, Jews have been the victims of a culture of genocide, which has motivated mass murder and finally the Holocaust. Jews are still targeted around the world. The stages at which hate speech is most prominent are “dehumanization” and “polarization.” They begin before actual killing and unless they are checked by law, they may lead all the way to genocide. The process of dehumanization has the effect and function of decommissioning normal human moral sentiments. Dehumanization is the systematic and organized process by leaders to remove the inherent natural inhibitions and human restraints of people not to murder, rape, and torture other human beings. Taking the life of a dehumanized person becomes of no greater consequence than crushing an insect, slaughtering an animal or killing a pest. After the process of dehumanization reaches its apex, members of the perpetrator group believe they can kill, torture, rape and exterminate the victims with government - sanctioned impunity. Some perpetrators even believe they are heroes because they have killed and exterminated a threat to the nation, a cancer in the body politic, a pest, or in communist terms an “enemy of the people.” Dehumanization has the effect of creating a hierarchy of humanity where the perpetrator group is considered human and normal and the victim group is considered abnormal or sub-normal and inhuman. Polarization mobilizes the “us vs. them” mentality. In South Africa this polarization is defined as the “White Settler Colonialist” group versus the indigenous Black peoples group. “Blame the victims” is one of the most effective tactics of denial of genocide. “They had it coming because they supported Apartheid,” is the South African version of this denial. (Stanton, GH, 2005) In fact, many Jews did not support Apartheid, but communist leaders of the ANC, EFF, and Cosatu nevertheless blame Apartheid on all whites, including Afrikaners and Jews. The communist party line is that Israel is responsible for the thousands of missiles used by Palestinians to bombard it, the wars of Arab countries to destroy it, and the hundreds of terrorist murders against Israelis. ANC, EFF, and COSATU leaders publicly incite followers using racial code words. Mr. Masuku exhorted South Africans who serve in the Israel Defence Force to permanently leave South Africa. Both Masuku and his audience knew that he was referring to Jews, who are the only South Africans who also hold automatic Israeli citizenship. By dehumanizing Jews as foreigners in South Africa, he excluded Jews from the circle of moral obligation of his audience. It is the same tactic used against Jews for many hundreds of years. Masuku accused Jews of being loyal only to their own homeland, Israel, and disloyal to South Africa. Hitler used this same tactic, and literally stripped Jews of their citizenship in Germany. Masuku threatened supporters of Israel with physical harm. He cleverly masked his threats to avoid legal prohibitions on direct incitement of violence. But his audience knew his meaning. Anthropologists call this contextual communication, reference to “subtext.” Masuku warned “any South African family that send its son or daughter to be part of the Israeli defence force must not blame us when something happens to them with immediate effect.” “Anyone who goes to Israel and from Israel will face the consequences.” Masuku made it clear that his threats were for physical violence. At a rally at the University of Witwatersrand, he said openly, “No one must entertain the assumption he possesses monopoly for violence. So we don't want to warn anyone. We are just talking now because we can talk but when it comes to physical fighting no one must entertain the illusion, we have been there in the trenches against apartheid and we can still do it. So don't entertain the assumption that if someone has a different view let’s talk, but if someone wants to fight we will do that. Cosatu has got members here, even in this plenary….” It is not difficult to recognize and condemn the public dehumanization perpetrated by EFF racists like Julius Malema. Mr. Masuku’s threats are more subtle, but may be even more dangerous. The reason is that they have as subtext the long narrative of anti-Jewish rhetoric that has dominated world history for two thousand years and that culminated in the Holocaust. That rhetoric has now turned into “anti-Zionist” and anti-Israel propaganda. It is old poisoned wine in new wine skins. The current campaign is Boycott, Divest, Sanction, championed by Mr. Masuku at the rally at the University of the Witwatersrand. How do we overcome our own indifference to hate speech, one of the surest early warning signs of genocidal ideology? We must understand the psychology of dehumanization and polarization. We must enforce South Africa’s laws against hate speech. We must never again be bystanders to early stages of genocide. References: Coloroso, B, 2007, Extraordinary Evil, A Brief History of Genocide, Viking Canada. Stanton. GH, 2013, “The Ten Stages of Genocide,” http://www.genocidewatch.com/ten-stages-of-genocide Stanton, GH, 2005, “Twelve Ways to Deny Genocide,” in Apsel, ed. Darfur, Genocide Before Our Eyes, http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/12waystodenygenocide.html. Summary of the case: In March 2009, the South African Jewish Board of Deputies (SAJBD) lodged a complaint of antisemitic hate speech against one Bongani Masuku, International Relations spokesperson for the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The complaint was subsequently upheld by the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), which ruled that Masuku’s remarks against the Jewish community were indeed inflammatory and antisemitic and directed him to apologise. After Masuku, with the full backing of COSATU, refused to apologise, the SAHRC launched proceedings against him in the Equality Court with a view to getting its ruling enforced. The case will be heard in the second week of February. Masuku’s offending statements were made in response to and in the immediate wake of the three-week war that took place between Israel and Hamas in Gaza in late 2008-early 2009. Of particular relevance were those made in the course of speaking at an anti-Israel rally to students at the University of the Witwatersrand on 5 March 2009, which were held by the SAJBD tohave incited violence and anti-Jewish hatred amongst the students who were present. They included explicit threats to cause harm to Jews who continued to support Israel, with specific reference to families who had sons or daughters serving in the Israeli Defence Force. Masuku was also adjudged to be guilty of making various insulting and inflammatory comments in written correspondence with various Jewish community members around that time.

The National Commission for the Fight against Genocide (CNLG) has committed to carry out research and document testimonies about the Genocide across the country. The exercise will cover all the former 12 prefectures namely Butare, Byumba, Cyangugu, Gikongoro, Gisenyi, Gitarama, Kibungo, Kibuye, Kigali City, Kigali-Rural (Kigali Ngali), Ruhengeri and Umutara. Jean Damascène Bizimana, the Executive Secretary of the commission, revealed the plan during the launch of findings based on history and testimonies about the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in the former Ruhengeri prefecture. Ruhengeri covered the current Musanze District and surrounding areas. The 316-page book which was co-authored by two researchers at the commission, Faustin Mafeza and Donatien Nikuze – along with Bizimana – documents the torture and killings of the Tutsi in the area since 1959 up to 1994. Bizimana said that the first group of militia in Rwanda dubbed “ Amahindure” was formed to kill Tutsi in Ruhengeri prefecture in former Mukingo Commune, the birth place of Joseph Nzirorera, who was National-Secretary of the Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement (MRND) and other Genocide masterminds. The militia group, he said, was the model for the future Interahamwe militia largely responsible for the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. The other group was “Turihose” which was considered a special militia that received specialised training from military camps and then trained other militia to kill the Tutsi. Other militia groups that were formed in Ruhengeri Prefecture included Abazulu, Intarumikwa, Abadebande, Gashagari, Virunga Force and others. “The study shows how since 1959, Tutsi were gathered at Nemba and Janja parishes and some were expelled to DR Congo, others to Bugesera so they could be killed by Tsetse flies. In 1963, Tutsi were also tortured and killed and Ruhengeri was like the centre for detaining Tutsi,” he said. He also said that, in 1973, Tutsi women were tortured in schools such as Rwaza Girls’ School and Science College of Musanze. “We want to show uniqueness of the 1994 Genocide in each of the former prefecture. Last year, we presented findings from the former Gisenyi Prefecture, today we have presented those from Ruhengeri which was home to many politicians and high ranking military officers. We will soon present findings from Kibungo and by the end of the year, at the end of this year, we will have presented research findings from Butare, Gikongoro and Cyangugu,” Bizimana pledged. “68 per cent of Rwandans are under 30 years old, young people are the ones to build this country but they first have to understand its history of the Genocide,” he said. editorial@newtimes.co.rw © Copyright The New Times Rwanda 2007 - 2018

Wenceslas Twagirayezu, the genocide suspect who was recently extradited from Denmark will appear before Kicukiro Primary Court for formal charging and hearing on pre-trial detention. According to Harrison Mutabazi, the judiciary spokesperson, Twagirayezu will be appearing for the second time following his first appearance on December 27. “Twagirayezu could not enter plea because at the time, he had not secured a lawyer so he requested for more time to procure a defence council which court obliged, adjourning the hearing to January 14,” Mutabazi told The New Times on Monday. Twagirayezu, 50, was extradited to Kigali in December after his protracted battle against the decision that took him up to the European Court of Human and People’s Rights. He stands accused of having participated in the mass killing and extermination of Tutsi, where together with others, attacked various places of former Rwerere Commune in the current Rubavu District, killing thousands, according to prosecution. Among others, he is accused of commanding attacks on Busasamana Catholic Parish where more than 3,000 Tutsi had sought refuge and over 1,000 were murdered here, according to prosecution. Twagirayezu, who witness accounts indicate openly carried a gun during the Genocide, is also being pinned on killings at Mudende University where more 1,000 Tutsi civilians had sought refuge and others at the Institute Saint Fidele where teachers and students were forced to board a bus and transferred to Nyundo where they were killed. Twagirayezu is the second genocide suspect to be extradited from Denmark after Emmanuel Mbarushimana, who was extradited in 2014, something the prosecution says other countries should emulate. He is currently detained at the special transit facility at Nyarugenge Prison in Mageragere, according to Rwanda Correctional Services (RCS). The prosecution has guaranteed that rights in criminal proceedings would be fully observed in view of the suspect’s fair trial. © Copyright The New Times Rwanda 2007 - 2018