Cholera was first reported in Sudan in August 2016, during an outbreak in Blue Nile State. The deadly disease spread to nearly all Sudan’s eighteen states and continues to be reported in Darfur, where the number of cases has risen and fallen for months. As recently as March 15, 2018 Radio Dabanga reported: After a few days of showing a downward trend, 12 new cases of “acute watery diarrhoea,” suspected to be cholera, have been reported in Central Darfur. (“12 new cases of suspected cholera reach Central Darfur centres,” Radio Dabanga, March 15, 2018 | NIERTETI ) [See also Appendix A: “An Open Letter to Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director General of the UN’s World Health Organization, from American physicians”] The cholera bacterium (Vibrio cholerae) almost certainly remains in significant reservoirs in Sudan, and the upcoming rainy season poses extraordinary dangers of an explosive resurgence. That the disease is cholera is beyond dispute, as Radio Dabanga has repeated reported (most recently March 21, 2018): In spite of numerous independent confirmations (conducted according to World Health Organisation (WHO) standards) that the disease which broke out in Blue Nile State in August 2016 was cholera, the Sudanese authorities and several international organisations still call it “acute watery diarrhoea.” That the UN’s World Health Organization is one such “international organization,” that the WHO refuses to name the disease for what it is—out of deference to the sensibilities of the brutal Khartoum regime—is disgraceful. Such silence not only sets a terrible precedent in yielding to a country’s desire to avoid the “stigma” associated with cholera, but prevents the deployment of medical resources that could be used to control the ongoing cholera outbreak in Sudan. The failure of WHO to name the disease has clear and deadly consequences; this is made clear in the conclusion of a recent article from the distinguished New England Journal of Medicine (February 8, 2018): “Single-Dose Cholera Vaccine in Response to an Outbreak in Zambia,” New England Journal of Medicine, February 8, 2018 [378:6 | www.nejm.org/] Our results show the short-term effectiveness of a single dose of Oral Cholera Vaccine (OCV) during an outbreak. Previous studies measuring the protection provided by a single dose of OCV were conducted in areas with recent exposure to cholera, which raises the possibility that single-dose regimens might act to boost natural immunity [footnotes 2, 3, 5]. Our results indicate that single-dose regimens provide protection in populations with less exposure to cholera, such as those in in Lusaka [Zambia] and much of sub-Saharan Africa, where multiyear lull periods are punctuated by explosive outbreaks Authors: Eva Ferrera, M.Pharm., M.Sc. (Epicentre | Paris, France) Elizabeth Chizema-Kawesha, M.D., Ph.D. (Ministry of Health | Lusaka, Zambia) Marc Poncin, Ph.D. (Médecins sans Frontières | Geneva, Switzerland) Francisco J. Luquero, M.D., Ph.D. (Epicentre | Paris, France) and Others This is clear evidence that the populations at risk in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan could be protected from what all evidence indicates is cholera. Yet continued silence by WHO—and thus continued refusal to begin an OCV campaign in areas where there have been many very recent reports of cholera—simply adds to a disgraceful performance to date. Moreover, a WHO mission to Central Darfur in mid-February was confirmed to me by several high-level officials in the UN and U.S. government; and yet even now WHO refuses either to confirm or disconfirm the presence of Vibrio cholera in Sudan (see the Washington Post, “As the death toll climbs in Sudan, officials shy away from the ‘cholera’ label,” September 14, 2018). The Khartoum regime is destroying—by way of uncontrolled inflation—the ability of ordinary Sudanese to purchase inordinately expensive (because imported) medicines. It is especially disgraceful that Khartoum’s fear of being stigmatized by the presence of cholera in Sudan is paralyzing a feckless leadership at the UN’s World Health Organization and preventing the deployment of critically necessary medical resources, including Oral Cholera Vaccines. This UN treatment of the people of Darfur and Sudan is an outrage. APPENDIX A: An Open Letter to Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director General of the UN’s World Health Organization, from American physicians September 11, 2017 Concerning Cholera in Sudan: An Open Letter to Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director General of the UN’s World Health Organization, from American physicians Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, United Nations Office at Geneva | Palais des Nations, 1211 | Genève, Switzerland The mandate of the UN’s World Health Organization (WHO) could hardly be clearer; in the words of the Organization: Our primary role is to direct and coordinate international health within the United Nations’ system. Our goal is to build a better, healthier future for people all over the world. Working through offices in more than 150 countries, WHO staff work side by side with governments and other partners to ensure the highest attainable level of health for all people. And yet this impressive mandate is daily made a mockery of by WHO’s refusal to refer to the cholera epidemic raging in Sudan by name. Neither your organization nor the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs will refer explicitly to the fact that what you continue to call “Acute Watery Diarrhea” is in fact cholera, Vibrio cholera—a fact established by laboratory tests in Sudan. What is most troubling in the present crisis is WHO’s failure to confirm or disconfirm the findings of Sudanese labs tests in Geneva, using stool samples appropriately transferred from Sudan. As you well know, this is entirely practicable; cholera is easily diagnosed unequivocally in stool samples by bacterial culture. Laboratories across the world can readily do this using a samples shipped to them. If this requires special conditions for shipping (e.g., specimen has to be collected and stored in a special fluid called transport media to keep the bacteria alive), the effort seems nonetheless unsurpassably urgent, given the spread of what all evidence indicates is cholera, now rampant in most of Sudan. By failing to conduct such laboratory tests, you are conspicuously failing in fulfilling your mandate as Director General of WHO. Of more immediate consequence, you are failing the people of Sudan, who have suffered so much at the hands of the current regime. We are forced to ask: why has such an “unequivocal diagnosis” not been rendered by WHO, given the massive spread of cholera in Sudan since August 2016? To be sure, the Khartoum regime has made clear that it will punish Sudanese journalists and health officials who dare to use the word “cholera,” and no doubt threats have been issued to WHO, demanding that you be complicit in silence about this terrible disease. The regime’s motive is transparently a desire that the “reputation” of Sudan not be compromised by associations the regime perceives would inhere in any accurate designation of a disease that is clearly out of control. But the effect of WHO’s silence is to ensure that Sudan has not received international medical resources necessary to combat cholera—preeminently massive supplies of re-hydration equipment; medical epidemiologists as well as specialists in treating cholera epidemics; and water/sanitation equipment and engineers. By yielding to the Khartoum’s regime’s threat, you are complicit in the failure to respond to a disease that currently threatens many hundreds of thousands of Sudanese civilians—and is currently active in at least twelve Sudanese states. As you are no doubt aware, the current National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime—which came to power my means of a military coup in June 1989—is guilty of continuous assaults on its own people for almost three decades. Among the most barbaric means used in serial genocidal counter-insurgencies has been the thoroughly documented denial of humanitarian assistance to desperately need civilians—in Darfur, in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan, in Blue Nile, and in South Sudan during the long civil war. Eastern Sudan has also been systematically denied critically needed humanitarian resources. Equally well-documented are the Khartoum’s military assaults on humanitarians—most recently and notoriously, bombing of hospitals in South Kordofan (Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)—twice—in Frandala, as well as the repeated bombings of Mother of Mercy Hospital near Kauda in the center of the Nuba Mountains). Bombings and assaults on humanitarian sites were commonplace during the North/South civil war (see http://wp.me/p45rOG-Pv/). Your silence about what is clearly a massive cholera epidemic in Sudan daily becomes more reprehensible. Your failure to transport stool samples from victims in Sudan to Geneva for official confirmation of cholera makes you fully complicit in the terrible suffering and dying that continues to spread, out of control, with daily new reports confirming that this is indeed a cholera epidemic. The inevitable history that will be written of this epidemic will surely cast you in an unforgiving light. Signatories, Richard B. Brown, M.D., Senior Clinician, Infectious Disease Division, Baystate Medical Center, Springfield, Massachusetts | Professor of Medicine, Tufts University School of Medicine Joanne Levin, MD, specialist in infectious diseases, Northampton, Massachusetts William Swiggard, MD, specialist in infectious diseases, Northampton, Massachusetts Karen Abrashkin, MD, Westbury, New York Julia De Almeida, MD, Easthampton, Massachusetts Peter A. Elsea, MD, Northampton, Massachusetts Elizabeth Feuer, M.D. Colts Neck, New Jersey Aisling Gaughan, MD, Lunenburg, Massachusetts Samuel Gladstone, MD, Amherst, Massachusetts Jay Holtzman, MD, Belchertown, Massachusetts Mordechai Kamel, JD, MD, Easthampton, Massachusetts Ellen Kaufman, MD, Northampton, Massachusetts James Kirchhoffer, MD Easthampton, Massachusetts Jeffrey Korff, MD, Northampton, Massachusetts Joel Rosen, MD Northampton, Massachusetts Henry Rosenberg, MD, Northampton, Massachusetts Carl Saviano, MD, Northampton, Massachusetts Ellen Senghas, MD Southampton, Massachusetts http://sudanreeves.org/2018/04/01/memo-to-the-world-health-organization-your-silence-on-the-presence-of-cholera-in-sudan-prevents-the-deployment-of-oral-cholera-vaccines-to-areas-at-continuing-risk/ (c) 2018 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Dear Friends: This is my third update on the situation in Northern Syria (and Iraq), including Afrin. It was beyond alarming to read in the Wall Street Journal this morning that President Trump said at a rally in Cleveland Ohio yesterday: "President Donald Trump suggested to a crowd in suburban Cleveland that the U.S. would withdraw its more than 2,000 troops from Syria. The forces have been working with local fighters to defeat Islamic State, which remains lodged in the eastern half of that country. “We will be coming out of Syria, like, very soon,” Mr. Trump said. “Let the other people take care of it now.” These comments were tucked into an article about the first meeting between Secretary of Defense Mattis and newly appointed National Security Adviser John Bolton. https://www.wsj.com/articles/defense-secretary-mattis-greets-john-bolton-with-jest-i-heard-youre-the-devil-incarnate-1522358765?mod=ITP_us_0&tesla=y If this actually is proposed US policy, it is important that its impact is fully understood. It will surely mean an end to the preservation of minority communities in Northern Syria and in Northern Iraq, including Christians (Assyrians, Syriacs, Chaldeans, etc.), Kurds, and Yazidis. It will surely bring about the failure of our long war against Middle East terrorism. It will also extinguish the expectation that the US would have a real foothold within Syria from which to maintain military, diplomatic, and strategic strength in the region. It will also mean the likely loss of the model government structure and commitment to freedom and democracy now in operation within the Federation of Northern Syria—a potential source of resolution of the Syrian conflict or, at the very least, an island of pluralism, freedom of religion, rights for women, etc. in the Middle East. This should be a cause for great alarm within the Administration, the Congress, NGO’s, and religious groups that are concerned about the survival of Christianity and other minority religions and ethnic groups, notably including Kurds and Yazidis, in the Middle East. It should also alarm those who wish to see our anti-terrorism and anti-ISIS strategy succeed. Simply put, pulling out US troops from Syria will give ISIS a free hand to regroup and join with Turkey and its newly empowered jihadi militias (26,000 strong) to resume efforts to take over both Syria and Iraq. Who will “take care of it now”? The Turks, the Russians, the Iranians, and the Assad regime. Without a US/SDF presence in the Deir as Zhour area, Iran and Russia will take over, and Iran will get its long sought highway to the Mediterranean. Alternately, Turkey and Iran will fight over that the territory. The Syrian territory that should be a platform for the US, militarily, strategically, and diplomatically in the region — the Federation of Northern Syria—will be quickly gone. The US will have no real basis for playing a significant role in peace talks or the final resolution (if possible) of the Syrian conflict. The consequences for the FNS will be horrifying, as they already have been in Afrin. There is literally no place for displaced Christians, Kurds, and Yazidis to find safe havens in the area. Neither Turkey nor Iran are real options. Possibly they can go to Iraqi Kurdistan. This apparent, or hopefully only proposed, plan for US troop withdrawal follows a pattern of apparent indifference to the suffering of the people groups that fielded the SDF and that are the primary conquerors of ISIS—with US support. It also shows a complete indifference to the future of Christians, Yazidis, Kurds, and other minorities in both Syria and Iraq, which are supposedly great concerns of this Administration. Christians in Iraq are leaving at a record breaking pace, as predicted, because the combination of a US policy failure to support self-defense and rebuilding efforts in the Nineveh Plains plus the US allowing Iranian backed militias to occupy half of the Nineveh Plains leads Christians to lose hope for their future in Iraq. If Turkey is allowed to invade some or all of the FNS, Christians in that part of Syria will follow suit. Christians in Western Syria will see that there is no end to war in Syria and that the alternative outcomes are continuation of Assad’s dictatorship or Islamist rule. The same is true for Yazidis, who have just seen their sanctuary in Afrin be destroyed and who face further ethnic cleansing by Turkey in Sinjar. The attached Syria war map shows the epic scale of the areas liberated from ISIS by the SDF—at least one third of Syria and most of its productive farmland and oil fields. This territory is secured with US support (minimal in comparison to US support and troop presence in Iraq and Afghanistan). The SDF took on the challenge of fighting ISIS beyond the initial boundaries of the FNS solely at US request. It did not have to lose thousands of lives taking Raqqa and could have stayed in place defending its own people. Had it done so, it would have been better equipped to fight back at Turkey. It might have gotten more Russian support against Turkey. The FNS has the only non-sectarian, pluralistic, democratic government structure in the Middle East. (Even Israel is a religious, Jewish, state). The FNS gives full freedom of religion to all religious groups, full rights to women and all ethnic groups. It is the only place in which Christians have full civic and political rights as well as real freedom to practice their religion in Syria or Iraq. Even Kurdish and Arab Christian converts can worship freely. Nonetheless, the US allowed Turkey to invade Afrin. This has caused the ongoing fight against ISIS in Southeastern Syria (on both sides of the Euphrates near Deir Azour and its rich oil fields) to almost ground to a halt. Turkey acted in clear violation of the February 24, 2018 UN Ceasefire Resolution 2401, which applied to Afrin as well as Ghouta. Turkey told the UN to “go to hell” with its ceasefire resolution and completed its invasion of Afrin as of March 18. This week, Ambassador Nikki Halely, spoke out forcefully against the violation of the Ceasefire Resolution violations by the Assad regime and the Russians in Ghouta. However, nothing was reported as being said about Afrin. Turkey threatens to invade the remainder of the Syrian border stretching to the east from Afrin, including Manjib, Tel Abyad, and Quamishli, the most significant cities for the FNS. It also said that it would invade Sinjar in Northern Iraq and reportedly already has done so. There are continuing reports that the US is negotiating with Turkey about withdrawing our forces from Manjib, which would give Turkey a free hand to invade Manjib and possibly continue east. In all cases, Turkey has stated that its goal is to “cleanse” these areas of their current inhabitants and replace them with “rightful residents” by which it means Arab Sunni Muslims sympathetic to Turkey and its expansionist goals. The pretext for Turkey’s aggression is alleged cross border security threats from SDF and YPG fighters. However, as a BBC study recently showed (see below), there were at most 15 cross border incidents resulting in any damage within Turkey, while Turkey has killed many people on the Syrian side of the border through relentless shelling. There were no instances of actual invasion of Turkey. So the entire premise for Turkey’s aggression is groundless. Turkey is using jihadi mercenaries as ground troops. These are the same forces that formerly fought with ISIS and other enemies of the US, that sought to impose a radical Islamist religious state in Syria, that possess a fatwa against the SDF and civilian populations that support them. These forces have already shown their true nature in Afrin, killing, looting, and destroying the once peaceful agricultural province. Turkey is moving quickly. It has already expelled at least 170,000 Afrin residents, who are trapped in an SDF controlled area surrounded by Turkish forces and regime forces. Turkey is refusing to allow Afrin legal residents to return to their homes and is jubilantly reporting the return of Afrin’s “rightful residents” sympathetic Arab Sunni Muslims who never set foot in Afrin before. The Assad regime’s forces are demanding extortionate bribes to allow people to cross the border into Alleppo Province. Turkey is shelling and apparently getting ready to invade the area where the refugees are trapped. Many families are sleeping in the open without even minimal blankets or shelter, food, health care or other provisions. This CNN video released yesterday shows the heartbreaking situation: https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2018/03/29/afrin-displaced-caught-in-limbo-wedeman-pkg.cnn One alternative for the FNS/SDF if the US pulls out is to turn to Russia and/or the Assad regime for protection. Turkey invaded Afrin only after Russia decided to allow them to do so. Turkey would not have invaded had it had to face Russian anti-aircraft weapons and warplanes. This would not be a good outcome for US foreign policy or Middle East strategic interests, but it would be a better outcome for Syrian Christians and other minorities. The simple fact is that the SDF is no match for the Turkish army with its seemingly endless supplies of warplanes, tanks, drones, and other sophisticated weaponry, probably mostly purchased from the US. With a US presence, it can be hoped that Turkey will refrain from trying to invade the FNS and do to its residents what it has done in Afrin. It should be noted that the US is gaining nothing strategically by backing Turkey’s aggression inside Syria. Instead, it is fostering its slide toward using Islamism as an ideology and basis for an increasingly dangerous dictatorship with aspirations to attack other neighbors, notably Greece. Abandoning the SDF and the FNS can only result in a loss of all we have expended in Syria and abandonment of it to Russian, Iranian, Assad regime, and Turkish/Islamist interests. I urge all of you to work toward these goals through letters to the President, Congressional resolutions, raising awareness in the media and religious groups: 1. Stop Turkey’s plans to invade the FNS from Manjib to the Iraqi border; stop Turkey’s invasion and “cleansing” of Sinjar. 2. Require Turkey to allow international observers, monitors, and humanitarian aid into Afrin. Force it to stop ethnic cleansing, ongoing summary executions of those it views as infidels, particularly Christians and Yazidis, looting and seizing of homes, farmland, and businesses. 3. Require Turkey to allow Afrin residents to return to and rebuild their homes and their lives. 4. Provide immediate assistance, shelter, and other humanitarian aid to Afrin refugees. 5. Censure Turkey in the UN for its misconduct in Afrin. 6. Develop a long term plan to secure the FNS and promote its governance model as a solution for the Syrian conflict. Thanks to all of you, Lauren PS: Some of you did not get the earlier updates. I have expanded the list due to the obvious emergency we are facing. LAUREN B. HOMER ATTORNEY AT LAW HOMER INTERNATIONAL LAW LAW AND LIBERTY TRUST 1900 Campus Commons Drive Suite 100 Reston VA 20191 USA TEL: 703-961-1177 CELL: 703-303-7350 FAX: 703-348-2176 EMAIL: HOMER@HIL.US.COM WWW.HIL.US.COM WWW.LAWANDLIBERTYTRUST.ORG WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/LAWANDLIBERTYTRUST #LAWLIBERTY1 NOTICE: The information in this e-mail is confidential and may contain material protected by the attorney-client privilege. This message is intended solely for the addressee and is not intended to provide legal advice to anyone who does not have a formal attorney-client relationship with the sender. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify us by replying to this message. Then delete it from your computer. E-mail transmission may not be secure or error free. Please notify the sender if you wish have e-mail messages encrypted or receive a different type of communication. Advice about federal tax matters is not a full “covered opinion” under IRS Circular 230. It is not intended and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding IRS penalties, and it may not be distributed to any person or entity other than the addressee or to support the promotion or marketing of any transaction or matters addressed. (c) 2018 Homer International Law

When North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on 26 March secretly rolled into Beijing on a private armoured train for unofficial meetings with President Xi Jinping, China moved decisively centre stage in the Korean peninsula drama. China also likely gave its truculent neighbour invaluable assurances and leverage for upcoming talks on its nuclear and ballistic missile program. For a few weeks in March, it appeared as though China, preoccupied with its own internal political wrangling and reforms, might have been sidelined by the whirlwind Korean Olympic diplomacy. Kim Jong-un’s sister descended upon the Pyeongchang winter games, envoys from Moon Jae-in dined with Kim himself in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) capital, and finally, those same South Korean envoys revealed that U.S. President Donald Trump had accepted an invitation to meet Kim Jong-un “by May”. But any illusion of China being bypassed vanished with Kim Jong-un’s visit. Before the meeting, Chinese officials and analysts had mostly been confident that China would have to be involved in any effort to resolve the Korean peninsula dispute. Some said Beijing could calmly observe and express support for negotiations and the implementation of the “freeze-for-freeze” approach it has advocated for some time (Crisis Group also supports a variant of freeze-for-freeze which de facto has been observed since the beginning of January). Any kind of negotiation seemed preferable to the chaos or war looming as alternatives. Even so, many worried privately that if China were excluded from talks, its interests could be disregarded. As news broke of the cabinet shake-up in Washington, there was a different kind of anxiety that hawks such as John Bolton, who have long advocated for war against North Korea, might set up talks to fail and create a predicate for kinetic solutions. Evidently, Xi Jinping wanted to take no chances and swiftly hosted Kim. But though diplomatic protocol required that China issue the invitation, it is debatable which side wanted it more. Consulting Beijing was in Kim’s interest, too. Meeting China’s leader before any other is a Kim family tradition that, as blanket coverage of the meeting on domestic North Korean television indicates, provides a wellspring of domestic legitimacy for a North Korean leader. In 2000, Kim Jong-un’s father Kim Jong-il took the same train journey to Beijing, marking the end of an often-violent process of power consolidation in Pyongyang, and the beginning of a period of energetic diplomacy that would include summits with the leaders of South Korea, then Russia, and finally Japan. Images of Kim meeting Jiang Zemin as an equal were publicised around the world. Appearing with Xi Jinping does the same for Kim Jong-un, burnishing his stature at home and providing momentum for meetings first with President Moon Jae-in at the Korean War truce village of Panmunjom on 27 April, and later, if it goes ahead, with President Trump. With one such meeting under Kim’s belt, that now looks more likely. North Korea’s ties with Beijing have frayed in recent years. By starting to repair them, Kim polishes his new charm offensive, potentially disrupts Sino-American and Sino-South Korean coordination, and might win economic inducements and quiet, partial relief from sanctions. From Kim’s perspective, China is the link in the sanctions enforcement chain that can be most easily broken. While the current South Korean government may be keen to give economic incentives to persuade North Korea to compromise, it faces much higher political hurdles to do so and does not have nearly such deep pockets. For China, the timing is opportune. There has been extensive, divisive debate in its policy circles about how to handle North Korea, leading to a degree of paralysis. Beijing went along with wave after wave of Security Council sanctions primarily because Pyongyang was flagrantly disregarding its security interests, but also because they were the logical continuation of a tolerable status quo and the path of least resistance under relentless American pressure. And President Xi has been preoccupied with a series of Communist Party and government meetings and manoeuvres that have formalised and perpetuated his grip on power and launched a massive government shake-up. Now Xi, with his authority unquestioned, his foreign policy team in place, and a DPRK-Republic of Korea (ROK) summit imminent, has seized the moment to reassert China’s pivotal role in managing inter-Korean tensions. Souring relations and a brewing trade war with the U.S. probably also shaped his calculus. North Korea is far from being China’s puppet, but it is an important card Beijing has to play in its intensifying strategic competition with Washington. In an unusually detailed report, China’s state news agency Xinhua said the meeting was “unofficial” and a “strategic choice”, and that Kim came to Beijing out of “moral responsibility” – signalling that relations are frosty but fixable. According to that report, Xi also told Kim what he now must do if he wants China’s help: meet regularly at the level of decision-makers, communicate early and often, prioritise economic development, promote people-to-people exchanges, and agree to denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula as a long-term goal. One Chinese proposal not in Xinhua’s report may have been to host some forthcoming meetings. Symbolically and practically, that would cement the Middle Kingdom’s position. If Xi gets his way, by year’s end Korean peninsula talks could be back in a dialogue framework shaped by China. North Korea would become a problem to be managed but not an imminent threat, denuclearisation again would be a distant political goal, and sanctions would evolve into an adjustable valve to manage pressure on Pyongyang. Order under heaven, from China’s perspective. But while that may be Beijing’s preferred route, the journey ahead is far less certain than that travelled by the train that brought the DPRK’s ruler to his first summit, and many factors could knock diplomacy off the rails, not least Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump themselves. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/china-moves-centre-stage-korean-peninsula-peace-efforts?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=3f0aca0dfe-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_03_30&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-3f0aca0dfe-359909997 (c) 2018 International Crisis Group

As an estimated 1 million remaining migrant workers in Thailand rush to verify their citizenship before a looming March 31 deadline, Burmese nationals of South Asian descent widely report subjection to extra scrutiny in order to prove their ties to their homeland. The end of the month marks the date in which Thailand aims to have all of its nearly 4 million migrant workers registered. The process to do so accelerated in early February with the opening of 80 One Stop Service (OSS) Centres by the Ministry of Labour. Here, migrant workers must first obtain a Certificate of Identity (CI), or a confirmation of their nationality from immigration officials from their home country — in this case, Burma — before undergoing a health check and later applying for a work permit. Protocol requires that to obtain a CI, migrant workers must present officials with a letter of employment from their boss, proof of their residence in Thailand, and their temporary migrant worker identification card. Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) has learned that Burmese Muslims, as well as Hindu and Buddhist Burma-born Gurkhas of Nepali ancestry, are being required to prove their citizenship by presenting additional documents in order to get a CI. These can include a current Burmese ID card, household registration in Burma, and letters from both the local police and the section chairperson of their hometowns verifying their ties to the community. Only those who have the funds to travel back to Burma — and the necessary connections and resources in the country — are able to get the papers they are allowed under the country’s tiered citizenship law, which is implemented around ethnicity and excludes many those of South Asian descent from full citizen status. These documents are then further scrutinised at OSS centres in Thailand, without guarantee of acceptance. “Others don’t have to do this. It makes me feel small,” one Muslim migrant worker from southeastern Burma said after returning to his village and procuring the additional documents after being initially turned away and having his ties to the country questioned. “We just want equal rights,” he added. “Immigration officials accuse us of not being citizens of Burma,” explained one member of Burma’s Gurkha community who now lives and works in Thailand. “Here, I feel like I became a kalar,” he said of the way he was treated, referring to a derogatory Burmese term for people of South Asian descent used to imply foreignness. A Burmese Muslim man assisting others in applying for the CI told BHRN that the migrant documentation process “is always more difficult if you are Muslim,” and suggested that the associated costs with the process were much higher for members of this community. “The uncertainty created by this type of exclusion is very worrying. What happens to those who are unable to provide the extra documents needed to satisfy the authorities? How can they remain safely in Thailand — and what are the long-term implications for their citizenship status in Burma?” asked BHRN executive director Kyaw Win. “This pattern of behaviour contributes to greater insecurity among communities that are already marginalised,” he said. It should also be noted that BHRN staff witnessed particularly disturbing conditions on the ground at one OSS centre this week. Hundreds of ethnic Shan, Karen, Ta’ang, Burmans and Muslims were seen sleeping in tents, on mats, and on pieces of cardboard, waiting for their queue numbers to be called, some for more than two days. Garbage covered the area, and neither drinking water nor toilet access was provided free of charge. Those waiting — in temperatures that reached 36 degrees Celsius — included nursing mothers as well as children. At least one individual was seen passing out under the conditions. (c) 2018 BHRN

INVITATION The United Nations Department of Public Information would like to invite you to take part in a special multimedia event: “Second Generation - Things I Didn’t Tell My Father” Wednesday, 11 April 2018 10:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. Conference Room 1, United Nations Headquarter, New York Please RSVP HERE Meet Michel Kichka, award-winning caricaturist who will present his graphic novel, and tell you about the creative process which led him to write and draw his book as a second generation of a Holocaust survivor. The presentation is followed by a Q&A session. (c) 2018 The United Nations Department of Public Information

The undersigned international press freedom groups call on Turkish authorities to immediately release the 12 printworkers and staff arrested on March 28 at the premises and print works of the newspaper Özgürlükçü Demokrasi and the further 15 staff taken into custody after home raids on the morning of March 29, 2018. Authorities must also restore control over the paper and its premises to the rightful owners. The below-named organizations also denounce the fact that lawyers acting for those arrested have been denied contact with prosecutors or access to any written documentation in relation to the raids. Two officials purporting to be from the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) are in place at the print works and premises of Özgürlükçü Demokrasi, a pro-Kurdish daily, and claim to be holding the sites until they receive further instructions. For its part, the TMSF, now part of the Ministry of Finance’s Directorate of National Estates and formerly an independent banking watchdog under the auspices of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, has denied having received instructions to seize the newspaper’s assets. According to lawyers acting for the detained printworkers and Özgürlükçü Demokrasi’s principal signatory İhsan Yaşar and Kasım Zengin the owner of Gün Printing Advertising Film and Publishing Inc, where the newspaper is printed, a press crimes investigation into the paper was opened on February 7.This was followed by a separate counter-terrorism investigation that began on March 23. It is believed that both investigations, of which no written notification has been made to the paper, are in relation to Özgürlükçü Demokrasi’s coverage of Turkey’s incursion into Afrin, northern Syria. As the sole remaining Kurdish daily newspaper in Istanbul, Özgürlükçü Demokrasi is vital in maintaining the extremely fragile access to information that is not controlled by the state.Following the closure of other pro-Kurdish newspapers and television stations such as Azadiya Welat, IMC TV and Hayatın Sesi in 2016, Özgürlükçü Demokrasi is one of the last sources of pro-Kurdish daily printed news in Turkey. ‘The Turkish authorities must halt their sustained repression of Kurdish culture and language. We are highly alarmed by the onslaught on Kurdish and pro-Kurdish media outlets and journalists that has intensified dramatically since the crackdown on freedom of expression since the attempted coup of July 2016, and now reached a new low point with this takeover of Özgürlükçü Demokrasi’, said Carles Torner, Executive Director of PEN International. We, the signatories of this statement, strongly condemn the takeover of Özgürlükçü Demokrasi, which has taken place without any legal justification or documentation. We reject the denial of information and prosecutoral access to lawyers acting for Özgürlükçü Demokrasi’s arrested staff members. "The government's takeover of Özgürlükçü Demokrasi is extremely concerning” said Joy Hyvarinen, head of advocacy at Index on Censorship, “We urge European and other governments to condemn the obliteration of free media in Turkey." We call for the release of the arrested staff members and printworkers and official confirmation from the TMSF of the legal status of the alleged acquisition of Engin Publishing Print Inc. -- and the Gün Printing Advertising Film and Publishing Inc. Katie Morris, Head of Europe and Central Asia Programme at ARTICLE 19 said: "The takeover of Özgürlükçü Demokrasi restricts the space for freedom of expression even further in Turkey and curtails the right of the public to access information on issues of public interest, particularly in relation to the on-going conflict in the South East of the country. We call for the authorities to cease harassing this newspaper and restore much needed media freedom in Turkey." The takeover of one of the last remaining opposition newspapers follows the aqcuisition last week of Turkey’s largest media organization and newspaper distributor, Doğan Group, by Turkish conglomerate Demirören, whose media outlets are known for taking a pro-government stance.In the week prior to the purchase, an internet streaming bill was passed granting the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) sweeping powers to monitor, license and block online streaming channels and news providers. “This latest act against freedom press confirms that Erdogan wants to repress any free voice in Turkey. A firm position in Europe is needed to make pressure the Turkish government to restore the rule of law as soon as possible with the cessation of the state of emergency,” said Antonella Napoli member of Articolo 21 and coordinator of Free Turkey Media in Italy. International Press Institute (IPI)’s Turkey Advocacy Coordinator Caroline Stockford said, “IPI strongly condemns yesterday’s raid and the government’s tactic of shutting down Özgürlükçü Demokrasi in an apparently illegal manner in order to silence dissenting voices in the run-up to the presidential elections.Despite the opportunity presenting itself at this week’s Varna summit, Europe failed again to strongly condemn Turkey’s repression of free media and free speech.” The peoples of Turkey have a right to access informative opposition reporting in order to form a balanced opinion especially in the lead up to an election.We call on Turkey to respect the human right to freedom of expression and to refrain from its practice of stifling all opposition media and to release the Özgürlükçü Demokrasi workers from detention. We, the undersigned, call on European newspapers and governments to make clear statements to Turkey that access to balanced, critical reporting is essential to democracy and that the freedom of the press must be respected and maintained. https://rsf.org/en/news/turkey-17-press-freedom-groups-condemn-raid-against-pro-kurdish-daily (c) 2018 Reporters Without Borders

A missile attack this week on Riyadh has raised the risk of an escalation in the Yemen war in a region riven with interwoven conflicts, but a direct confrontation between arch-foes Saudi Arabia and Iran still appears unlikely. Saudi Arabia’s powerful Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, now touring the United States, must balance animosity toward Iran with the need for stability as he pitches the kingdom’s economic transformation plan to foreign investors and drums up support for containing Iran’s regional influence. However, Iranian authorities - facing the prospect of a more hawkish U.S. administration with Donald Trump’s appointments last week of John Bolton and Mike Pompeo as national security adviser and secretary of state - might crank up pressure in the Yemen war as a form of deterrence, diplomats and analysts say. Saudi Arabia sharpened its rhetoric against Tehran after Saudi forces shot down a flurry of missiles launched by the Iran-aligned Houthis on Saudi cities late on Sunday. One of the missiles caused the war’s first casualties in the Saudi capital Riyadh when falling debris struck a home and killed an Egyptian man and injured two others. Saudi King Salman, in comments carried by state media, pledged on Tuesday to “firmly and decisively thwart any hostile attempts” targeting the kingdom’s security and stability. A day earlier, the spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthi movement accused it of using Iranian-made missiles and said that Saudi Arabia reserved the right to respond to Iran when and how it deemed appropriate. The coalition intervened in Yemen in March 2015 in a campaign to restore its internationally recognized government after it was driven into exile by Houthi forces. “Iran is the appendicitis in the body of the world and should fix itself or else the world will fix the Iranian situation,” spokesman Colonel Turki al-Malki said. Iran has repeatedly denied giving missiles to the Houthis. Few Military Options Analysts said that in the short term, the Saudi leadership is unlikely to respond aggressively amid increased international scrutiny of the three-year-old Yemen conflict, which has given rise to the world’s most urgent humanitarian crisis. “Prince Mohammed would like to be viewed as a more restrained and composed leader” while touring his closest Western ally, the United States, according to Ehsan Khoman, Head of Research and Strategist for MENA at MUFG. “(He) may leverage the recent Houthi missile attacks to strengthen his narrative that Iran’s encroachment is undermining regional stability and that a more concerted international effort is needed to contain Iran.” The Yemen conflict pits a coalition of Western-friendly states led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates against the Houthis, who are sympathetic to Iran but deny being a pawn of its Shi’ite Muslim theocracy. Yemen’s war fits into a broader decades-long struggle for supremacy between Middle East powerhouses Iran and Saudi Arabia, which fund and train proxy forces in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and accuse each other of backing terrorism. Military escalation in response to the latest rocket salvo could mean more coalition air strikes - which have been widely criticized for killing civilians - or mobilizing the Saudi National Guard from a mostly static position along the border to undertake a concerted ground assault inside northern Yemen. Diplomats and analysts say that the coalition has few other options short of direct action against an Iranian target, something that remains unlikely unless a Houthi rocket takes out a valuable Saudi asset. Last year, when the Houthis fired missiles at Riyadh that were intercepted, the coalition responded by shutting Yemen’s airports and ports. The United Nations said that blockade raised the danger of mass starvation, and it was partially lifted. “They may make similar moves in order to be seen to be doing something, but it won’t really change the dynamics of the conflict,” said Jane Kinninmont, Middle East expert at Chatham House in London. “My concern is that they could be tempted to take some action directly against some Iranian target, and that any such course of action could escalate further.” Consultancy Eurasia Group said that a successful Houthi strike on a prized Saudi target would probably prompt a firm military response from Riyadh to try to deter Iran. Analysts said that while a direct Saudi-Iranian showdown is unlikely, miscalculation remains a risk. Mediation Efforts Western countries have urged Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab allies to protect civilians and find a quick end to Yemen’s war. But they also support Riyadh’s argument that it needs to defend itself from cross-border strikes and limit the spread of Iran’s imprint in territory overlooking important trade routes. The United Nations says more than 10,000 people have died in the war, and 22.2 million Yemenis - three-quarters of the population - need relief aid. More than 1 million cholera cases have been reported, the worst outbreak in modern history. Analysts said that while Saudi Arabia will probably double down on its military campaign in Yemen to oust the Houthis from the capital Sanaa and reinstate President Abd Rabbu Mansour al-Hadi, it may continue to support mediation efforts. However, the appointments of Bolton and Pompeo in Washington could encourage Iran to ramp up activities in Yemen to signal its ability and willingness to undermine the United States and its partners, Eurasia Group said. Economists have played down the impact of the Houthi attacks on the Saudi economy, which Prince Mohammed is trying to wean off oil exports with a slate of reforms that include cutting energy subsidies and expanding the private sector. Investors may have already largely priced in risks from Houthi missile strikes. But an intensification of the Yemen conflict and certainly an escalation to direct conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia could scare off foreign investors. (Fixes misspelling of analyst’s name in paragraph 11, adds title.) (c) 2018 Reuters

On Sunday March 25, Ethiopia’s opposition Blue Party held a luncheon for recently released political prisoners. The attendees list featured leaders of multiple political parties, activists, journalists and bloggers — nearly all of whom had run-ins with the law over the past few years. After the luncheon, the former prison mates gathered at the home of journalist Temesgen Desalegn for tea and to socialize with other colleagues. The gathering was wrapping up at Temesgen’s private residence on the outskirts of the capital Addis Ababa when police swooped in and arrested the newspaper editor and 10 of his guests. They are being held at the city’s Gotera police station. The crackdown capped a string of weekend arrests across Amhara and Oromia states. Nearly 20 scholars and journalists were rounded up on Saturday in Bahir Dar, the Amhara state capitol, as they met to oversee the formation of a new political party. Among the detained are Amhara academics, university professors and journalists from the state-run Amhara Mass Media Agency. The list includes Belete Molla, an assistant professor of Philosophy at Addis Ababa University, and Desalegn Chane, a professor at Bahir Dar University, according to journalist Belay Manaye. That is some 30 people arrested from two private events alone in a span of 48 hours. Targeted arrests continue across the restive Oromia state as well. Hundreds of people, mostly reformist leaders of the ruling Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (OPDO), a member of the ruling coalition, have been arrested since the emergency came into effect last month. It is not yet clear whether the military-run Command Post will charge the detainees for violations of the emergency decree, release them promptly or hold them indefinitely. Journalist Eskinder Nega and opposition politician Andualem Aragie, who were taken from the Addis Ababa gathering, are among a wave of high-profile prisoners released last month through a government amnesty that was meant to jumpstart a national dialogue. Whisked off with them were Blue Party member Woinshet Molla, as well as Zone 9 bloggers and outspoken activists, Befekadu Hailu and Mahlet Fantahun, all of whom were former political prisoners. Police or government officials have not commented on what provoked the raids. At the gathering in Addis Ababa Temesgen Desalegn’s house, police reportedly cited the presence of an outlawed version of the tricolored Ethiopian flag without the official emblem —a blue disk emblazoned with a yellow star— inscribed in the middle of it. It is unclear why police arrested the academics and activists in Bahir Dar. Prior to meeting, the congregants obtained permission from the government to finalize the founding of the new political party. Regional officials okayed the initiative four months ago, according to Christian Tadele, a member of the founding committee for the yet to be named party. Christian, who was not at the meeting in Bahir Dar during the arrest, said several detainees were beaten before they were taken into custody. The regime in Addis Ababa has repeatedly promised to open up the political environment and widen the democratic space. On Feb. 15, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn abruptly quit vowing to pave the way for reforms. But his pledge was eclipsed by the declaration of a nationwide emergency decree a day later. The Command Post overseeing the decree has since suspended the constitution and effectively closed off the political space. Gatherings of all kinds are banned; public criticism of the regime in the press and on social media is forbidden. For example, on March 15, the Command Post arrested Taye Dendea, an official at the Oromia Justice Bureau, after he questioned during media interviews and on Facebook the military’s narrative that the killing of civilians in Moyale was a mistake. Another notable critic and university professor Seyoum Teshome, was similarly jailed for speaking out against the unlawful decree. In a shocking announcement in early January, EPRDF leaders announced a blockbuster prisoner amnesty and the closure of the notorious Maekelawi prison. However, some of those arrested by Command Post, including Taye and Seyoum, are being held at that same torture chamber. Locked in a bitter and very public succession battle, Ethiopia’s top leaders have yet to initiate the long-promised dialogue with the opposition. In fact, there is no indication that such a plan is forthcoming. The lack of progress on these crucial reform promises is raising a lot of questions about EPRDF’s sincerity in its pledge to change tack. The heightened crackdown comes days before the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) names its next leader and the country’s new prime minister. Regardless of who ascends, Ethiopia’s next leader faces a difficult task to convince a skeptical public about the party’s candor. EPRDF has broken too many promises. It lacks popular legitimacy and public trust. That some of the very people who were pardoned barely a month ago now find themselves behind bars does not scream confidence. Arresting prominent dissidents and defaulting to a military rule is not by any stretch the best way to open up of the political space and initiate much-needed national dialogue and healing. https://www.opride.com/2018/03/27/massive-crackdown-overshadows-political-reform-and-new-prime-minister-election-in-ethiopia/ (c) 2018 Opride

In a move reflecting the government’s desire to fill the few remaining gaps in its control of news and information, Turkey’s parliament has passed a law placing online video services under the control of the broadcast media regulator, the High Council for Broadcasting (RTÜK). Reporters Without Borders (RSF) deplores this latest sign that, after bringing the traditional media under full control, the Turkish authorities are now completing their mechanisms for censoring the Internet. When the law that was approved on 21 March takes effect, online video services will need to obtain a licence in order to continue operating and, before the licence is issued, an investigation that could involve the police and Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) will be necessary. The RTÜK will be in charge of monitoring content and imposing sanctions in the event of “irregularities.” It will also be able to go to a judge to get websites blocked within 24 hours if they continue to operate without a licence. The law still needs to be signed by President Erdoğan but that should be just a formality. Aside from video-on-demand services such as Netflix, the new law will affect alternative news websites such MedyascopeTV (a recipient of the 2017 RSF Press Freedom Prize), Evrensel WebTV and ArtiTV, as well as platforms such as YouTube, Periscope and Facebook, which many censored media outlets use to circulate their content. Resources based abroad or using a language other than Turkish are concerned by the new law as much as any other. Individuals posting videos online should not be affected but some of the law’s wording is vague. An implementation decree is supposed to fill the holes within six months. “This anti-democratic legislation, rushed through parliament without consulting civil society, just reinforces the government’s grip on the Internet,” said Erol Önderoğlu, RSF’s Turkey representative. “The government is thereby closing one of the last gaps in its control of news and information in the run-up to the 2019 general elections.” With its members appointed by parliament, the RTÜK has become increasingly politicized in recent years and is now dominated by the ruling AKP party and its nationalist ally, the MHP. Only the opposition CHP’s presence has maintained a vestige of pluralism since the pro-Kurdish HDP’s ouster in the summer of 2017. The Internet is already highly censored in Turkey. Legislation passed in recent years has repeatedly extended the powers of the authorities to block websites without reference to a judge. Aside from the leading outspoken Turkish news websites, the authorities have repeatedly blocked Twitter and YouTube, while Wikipedia continues to be inaccessible. Year after year, Turkey has continued to be the country that requeststhe removal of the most content on Twitter. Censorship circumvention tools (such as VPNs and the Tor Network) are also increasingly blocked. It is no longer possible to keep count of the Internet users who have been jailed because of their shares on social networks. The already worrying media situation in Turkey has become critical under the state of emergency proclaimed after a coup attempt in July 2016. Around 150 media outlets have been closed, mass trials are being held and Turkey now holds the world record for the number of professional journalists detained. It is ranked 155th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index. The already worrying media situation has become critical under the state of emergency proclaimed after the July 2016 coup attempt. Around 150 media outlets have been closed, mass trials are being held and the country now holds the world record for the number of professional journalists detained. It is ranked 155th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index. https://rsf.org/en/news/new-law-reinforces-turkish-governments-control-internet (c) 2018 Reporters without Borders

Burma's military "remains deeply embedded in the country's economy, including the ruby industy." That is the conclusion of a recent report by the Natural Resource Governance Institute. Tne report further notes that the largest Burmese military-affiliated corporations hold significant shares of ruby mining licenses. And yet many jewelry retailers, like Bulgari, continue to buy Burmese genocide gems. That's why this week, we are working with people like you all over the world to hold protests outside Bulgari stores. Sign the petition to tell Bulgari: Don't buy Burmese genocide gems! We need your help to ramp up the pressure on Bulgari to stop funding Burma's army and its brutal violence against the Rohingya. Tens of thousands of people have joined the cause and signed petitions demanding that Bulgari stop buying gems that help fund Burma's army. Butwe still need your support! By acting together, we have the power to cut off the Burmese military’s money. Let's use the power of our "citizens sanctions" to stop the big jewelry retailers, such as Bulgari, from buying gems that profit Burma's military. Sign the petition to tell Bulgari: Don't buy Burmese genocide gems! Follow up your action by contacting Bulgari directly. Call Bulgari toll-free at 1-800-BULGARI (1-800-285-4274) Contact Bulgari directly through its website. Like Bulgari's Facebook page and post messages. Call Bulgari out on Twitter @Bulgariofficial. Thanks to your tremendous response to our request last week, this week you have organized leafleting outside Bulgari's stores in half a dozen cities. But we'd like more, particularly for future weeks. To hand out leaflets outside your local Bulgari store, please contact me at simon.billenness@rohingyacampaign.org. Thank you for your support! With your help, we will end the Burmese army's reign of terror in part by ending their business in Burmese genocide gems. Simon Billenness, Executive Director For the International Campaign for the Rohingya: Joseph K. Grieboski, Olivia Dulmage, Mariane Leite, Michael DeLong, Hana Manadath, and Akriti Panthi. Our work is only possible with your financial support. Would you help support the Rohingya with a sustaining monthly gift of $10, $25, $50, or $100? Please click here to make a sustaining monthly gift today. More Information: "No Genocide Gems! Burmese Military Takes a Hit From Citizens Sanctions," International Campaign for the Rohingya blog "Natural Resource Federalism: Considerations for Myanmar," Natural Resource Governance Institute, January 2018 Taint of Burma's Genocide Gems, The Sunday Times (UK), December 10, 2017 Jade and the Generals, Global Witness, May 17, 2017 Some Bulgari items featuring Burmese gems: Divas’ Dream Eleganza ring, Bulgari Il Magnifico necklace, Bulgari Reign of Terroir, Town and Country, October 2017 (c) 2018 BHRN

21Wilberforce was shocked and saddened at the sudden death of Chinese human rights defender Dr. Li Baiguang. Dr. Li has been a long-time friend and a stalwart voice for religious freedom in China. His untimely death is shrouded in suspicion. Dr. Li died shortly after returning home from a visit to the United States in February, where he and a delegation from ChinaAid met with U.S. officials to advocate for human rights and religious freedom in China. The official word is Dr. Li died of liver failure, but many believe the Chinese authorities are responsible. The death of Dr. Li coincides with China’s newly revamped Regulations for Religious Affairs, formally implemented at the start of February. The revised policies are an attempt at the “sinicization” of China’s religious communities — a forced effort to eliminate Western influence by requiring the nation’s religions to align with Chinese culture. Consequences of violating the new policies include arrest, confiscation of property, large fines, closure of unregistered churches — and in the case of Dr. Li, perhaps death. China’s revisions to its religious policy foreshadow intense persecution of not only Christians, but other minority groups as well, including Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetan Buddhists, and Uyghur Muslims. According to a recent Freedom House report, Falun Gong members have been targeted and “killed extra judicially to provide organs for China’s booming organ transplant industry.” More than 130 Tibetan monks have self-immolated in protest of persecution at the hands of the Chinese government. And one Uyghur grandmother told us directly that the government had rounded up every one of her grandchildren and sent them to a “re-education” camp. In the Chinese Christian community, unregistered churches have been demolished, crosses have been torn down, homes raided, and church leaders arrested. According to a recent ChinaAid report, some 2,400 church leaders were detained or arrested in 2016, and that number continues to rise. Why an increase in persecution now, especially among China’s Christian community? Many would argue it is because Christianity is flourishing in China; it poses a threat to the stability of the Communist regime. Speaking in an interview with Premier radio, ChinaAid founder Bob Fu (also a close friend and associate of Dr. Li) noted that just 70 years ago less than one million Christians lived and worshipped in China. Today, there are over 100 million believers, despite non-stop persecution. “The number of Communist party members is less than 90 million,” said Fu. “There are more Christians than these atheistic party members, and it’s a political threat, in their eyes.” The frequent and unrestrained persecution of Chinese citizens of all faiths demonstrates China’s blatant disregard for the freedoms of its own people. With the removal earlier this month of presidential term limits, it would appear that President Xi Jinping’s grip on power — and his discriminatory policies — will remain indefinitely. Sadly, these stricter religious policies will mean even greater persecution in the days ahead. Dr. Li was not deterred by persecution. He was imprisoned and beaten. His life repeatedly threatened until ultimately it seems, he gave his life in the pursuit of freedom for the Chinese people. Over the years, Dr. Li visited the U.S. on numerous occasions, meeting with then-President George W. Bush and legislators including myself. In 2008, I presented Dr. Li with the Democracy Award from the National Endowment for Democracy, and I sat next to him this past February during his final visit to the U.S. Sadly, I spoke at his memorial service March 22. Though Dr. Li’s work has ended, his legacy must continue, and the church in America must play a role — not because we are driven by guilt, but because we are motivated by our faith. We must always speak out against oppression of people and on behalf of courageous leaders like Dr. Li. Frank R. Wolf Distinguished Senior Fellow Take Action: 1. Honor and support Dr. Li’s legacy by contributing to ChinaAid’s Li Baiguang Religious Freedom Defense Fund 2. Ask members of Congress to recommit to Charter 08, an open statement calling for political reform and greater protection of human rights in China 3. Read here how you can join 21Wilberforce as we stand in solidarity with China’s faith communities (c) 2018 Wilberforce Initive

The victories over ISIS in Mosul and Raqqa pose a dilemma for states whose citizens travelled to join the Islamic State’s (ISIS) ranks and who may now seek to return home. These states include Russia, and in particular its republic of Chechnya. On the one hand, Chechen authorities fear the return of insurgents who fought for ISIS. They worry those militants, most of whom are mortal enemies of Ramzan Kadyrov’s heavy-handed regime, will renew the attacks they mounted some years ago in Chechnya. As has been the case in the past, authorities might not stop at jailing returnees, and might also go after their families, friends or associates, potentially hardening hatred of the regime among a wider circle of people. On the other hand, some officials and activists in Chechnya are spearheading efforts to bring back women and children stranded in the Middle East after the death or imprisonment of their insurgent husbands and fathers. Those efforts, alongside limited attempts to rehabilitate some former fighters, offer a ray of hope that at least some returnees who renounce ISIS can be reintegrated into Chechen society. Chechens in Syria Chechens are fighting on both sides of the war in Syria, due in part to the assertive role of Ramzan Kadyrov, head of the Chechen republic, in the Russian Federation’s foreign policy. In 2015, as Russia launched an air campaign to bolster Bashar al-Assad’s embattled regime, Kadyrov professed his enthusiasm for sending ground forces from Chechnya to fight ISIS. His motives for doing so partly related to the particular threat ISIS posed in Chechnya. The republic had been ravaged by two separatist wars in the 1990s and 2000s, the second of which pitted the government against an insurrection increasingly dominated by jihadists. By the mid-2000s, Kadyrov’s ruthless counter-insurgency campaign had shifted much of the violence to other North Caucasus republics. But when, in June 2015, ISIS declared its Vilayat Kavkaz (Caucasus province), it proclaimed Chechnya part of that province. The declaration, while largely symbolic, suggested a growing affinity for ISIS among North Caucasus insurgents, some of whom, by 2016, were nominally fighting under ISIS’s banner. Russian officials estimate that as of 2016 some 3,500 Russian citizens had gone to Syria or Iraq to fight for ISIS, though the numbers cited vary, with some sources suggesting the actual figure exceeds 5,000. Reports vary as to how many of those citizens are ethnic Chechens, though figures sourced to Chechen law enforcement agencies run as high as 4,000. These may include non-Russian citizens, as some appear to be members of the Chechen diaspora who embarked from other countries, not Chechnya itself. Some Chechens served in ISIS’s top ranks. Kadyrov saw a chance to eliminate potentially dangerous opponents in Syria, while at the same time demonstrating his loyalty to the Kremlin, which has lavished subsidies upon the republic he leads. He told President Vladimir Putin he would lead men into battle himself to “wipe out ISIS”. For most intents it was a boast – and in fact Kadyrov’s forces mostly ended up not fighting ISIS but policing areas recaptured from rebels by the Syrian regime. But the idea of deploying Chechens was an opportunity for Moscow, which was cautious about sending large numbers of Russian soldiers to Syria due to public relations concerns, and the Kremlin saw “outsourcing” the work to Kadyrovites as an attractive option. The Kremlin and Kadyrov still needed to manage the optics of a regional leader getting embroiled in a conflict abroad. Hence the official line has varied as to who from Chechnya is serving in Syria and in what capacity. Kadyrov first denied media reports that some 500 Chechens were fighting for Assad, but in January 2017 he acknowledged that “young men from Chechnya are serving” in the Russian Defense Ministry’s military police battalion in Syria. As is often the case with Kadyrov, he made the admission over Instagram, just after two Chechen parliamentarians met with Bashar’s brother, Maher al-Assad, the powerful commander of the Republican Guard, and visited the battalion in question. The “young men” were likely members of the Chechen National Guard “on loan” to Moscow and under federal command. Putin may have urged Kadyrov to use his loyalists to back Russia’s military campaign. The degree of Kadyrov’s involvement is significant. Chechen authorities now have connections in Syria, which appear in some cases to have enabled them to use novel approaches in dealing with the threat of returning ISIS fighters and in facilitating the return of women and children that joined ISIS. The first quandary authorities face is what to do with insurgents who do return: apply the indiscriminate long-term incarceration that in the past has shown short-term results but risks feeding anger at the authorities over time; or take a more nuanced approach, filtering out militants who could potentially be pulled away from ISIS and jihadism, monitoring them closely, giving them shorter sentences and attempting to reintegrate them into society. It is difficult to assess how many Chechen militants survived in Syria and, of those who did survive, how many will return to the North Caucasus, rather than remain in the Iraqi or Syrian desert with other ISIS remnants or move on to other war zones. According to Russian sources, at least several hundred Russian citizens have returned from Syria. The Dagestan government places the exact number of Dagestani returnees from jihad in Syria or Iraq at 108 since 2014, with 86 under criminal investigation. Chechen officials said in December 2017 that 93 women and children had been returned to Russia, but it is unclear how many of these were ethnically Chechen or resident in Chechnya. Kadyrov’s government, meanwhile, in contrast to neighbouring Dagestan, has proclaimed a “safe corridor” for women returning from Syria. That, of course, is not the case for male insurgents, and there are no official figures for male returnees. Jean-Francois Ratelle, a Canadian scholar who has studied the North Caucasus insurgency on the ground, estimates that several dozen Chechens have returned, while Akhmet Yarlykapov, a Caucasus specialist at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) cited by the Kommersant newspaper, gave an estimate of 40-50. But Ratelle believes that more are likely to return to Russian republics via Turkey and countries of the South Caucasus. Russian federal and North Caucasian authorities worry that as fighters return, they could resume their jihad in Chechnya and other republics. In 2015, Russian Security Council chief Nikolai Patrushev outlined the threat and urged preventive measures. In Chechnya’s case, the Kadyrov regime’s heavy-handed response is a particularly complicating factor. An illustration is the sequence of alleged events reported in August 2017 by the independent Moscow-based daily Novaya Gazeta: in December 2016, Chechen authorities claimed they liquidated a suspected ISIS cell in Grozny. Ramzan Kadyrov said that a group of militants who had joined an ISIS cell attacked police in Grozny on 17 December 2016, and as a result of a special operation that he headed seven were killed and four arrested. Three policemen had been killed in the attack, according to state media. Novaya Gazeta disputed the official version and alleged that over the next month, authorities swept up some 200 other people, including friends and relatives of the alleged ISIS members. At least 27 of these people, according to Novaya Gazeta’s sources, were executed on the night of 25 January 2017. Survivors reportedly said they were tortured to extract false confessions. Chechnya’s Minister for National Policy, External Relations and the Press Dzhambulat Umarov called Novaya Gazeta’s earlier report of 27 executions “lies” and claimed the paper’s journalists had no basis or proof for the allegations. According to Novaya Gazeta’s report, following the raids dozens residing in Krasnaya Turbina, a Chechen town outside the capital Grozny, reportedly sent a letter to Russia’s federal Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika alleging mass raids and the torture of two men suspected of planning to go to Syria. Novaya Gazeta alleged in August 2017 that residents who appealed to Chaika were being pressured and beaten by police, but Chechen authorities denied this claiming the signatories said they had signed the letter by mistake and were remorseful. The remorse, however, may be indicative of a climate of fear: public apologies from Kadyrov’s critics after going public with allegations of abuse are common. Such indiscriminate counter-insurgency tactics may have quelled jihadist violence in the 2000s, but over time, they risk inspiring further animosity toward the regime that local activists believe could be exploited by ISIS or local insurgents. The question of what to do with returning militants is clearly a complex one. Some may be impervious to efforts to persuade them to abandon ISIS and violence. But others, given the opportunity, might reintegrate into society and pose no further danger. This would require a more individual approach with regular assessment to establish whether former militants genuinely renounce violence. In some cases, their families might encourage them to do so and play positive supporting roles, according to local activists. Of course, such steps are far easier said than done, especially in Chechnya, which is notorious for indiscriminate repression and whose law enforcement authorities are not well equipped for a more selective approach. But efforts by Kadyrov’s human rights body suggest his government may be open to trying out newer, less repressive measures – at least in some cases. Repatriating Women and Children Alongside the worries above, Chechnya has tried to bring back relatives of fighters from Syria. Heda Saratova, a member of Kadyrov’s official Human Rights Council, has been involved both in repatriating women and children and, to a limited extent, in efforts to rehabilitate some returning militants. Saratova, with tentative support from local authorities, is working to build a rehabilitation centre in Grozny to apply a more individual approach to returning women from Syria that she hopes could later be applied to men as well. According to Chechens who have worked to bring these families home, some women were brought to Syria by their husbands, while others followed of their own free will and still others were themselves ISIS recruits. Grozny relatives of stranded women told Crisis Group they were “deceived” into travelling to Syria, though, given the aura of fear and taboo surrounding possible links with ISIS, the relatives declined to elaborate as to how. Some women took children with them, but in many cases, the children were born in Syria. As of December 2017, Saratova’s group, Objective, reports having helped, together with Chechen authorities, bring back 93 women and children. This limited success illustrates the ties that Kadyrov and his coterie have in Syria. Ziyad Sabsabi, a senator from Chechnya in Russia’s Federation Council and Kadyrov’s official representative in the Middle East, appears to be the main broker of repatriations of women and children from Chechnya and other parts of Russia. Women and children are also being evacuated with the help of the Chechen Republic’s Friends Association in Jordan, headed by Samih Beno, an ethnic Chechen and a Jordanian politician. “These women were taken there by force, by their husbands. The men went there to fight. [There was an online campaign] to recruit them. They became cannon fodder”, Saratova told Crisis Group in September in Grozny. “There were women whose husbands had died, and they had become hostages. They were in prison, and they had nothing to eat. And now these poor mothers [pointing to women in her office] are visiting various officials to at least try to bring back their grandchildren. Ramzan Akhmatovich [Kadyrov] said in his interview that he got an order from Vladimir Putin to use all his connections, all his resources, to get these children back”. The reality is more complex than simply men forcing women to travel, Saratova concedes. In some cases, women themselves chose to go. Some may return disillusioned by their experience with ISIS, but others may still share some of its beliefs and will need their own rehabilitation programs, even if not always quite the same as those of former fighters. According to Saratova, women would need to be monitored for several months after their return. There are also other complications: several women repatriated through Chechen efforts were incarcerated in Dagestan, even though Chechen authorities said in October that women could avoid criminal persecution if they turned themselves in. The incident, which Saratova described as “shocking”, highlighted the clash in policies between Chechnya, which had pledged a safe corridor for returning women, and Dagestan. In the past, Dagestan has made efforts to reintegrate insurgents, but this time showed little leniency to returning women. If such measures are to work, it will require coordination and compromise between the authorities of the various North Caucasus republics. A More Disaggregated Approach for Insurgents Saratova’s work in repatriating women and children from Syria, and closely working with their families, has equipped her with connections and skills that could be applied in reintegrating militants as well. In 2014, her organisation helped bring back Said Mazhaev, a Chechen insurgent, who was seeking to return home from Syria. After Mazhaev served a short prison term, he renounced ISIS, and Saratova, together with Chechen Deputy Interior Minister Apti Alaudinov, began involving him in meetings with Chechen youth to disabuse them of any allure the movement might hold. In a 2017 conversation with Crisis Group, Saratova described the effect of these meetings: The reaction of young people to his words was very interesting. When officials come out and say, ‘don’t go to Syria, it’s bad’, they are bored. They slept at those events. Said Mazhaev came out and said: ‘Guys, I’ve been there, and I understood it was all a lie – and I came back. Don’t let them lie to you’. The reaction was amazing. These young people followed him. They asked him questions. The whole auditorium came alive. I always say, ‘these guys that come back, why give them 10-15 years in prison? Who are they going to be when they come back?’ I always say, ‘let’s use these people. They have information. They can show that the ideology of ISIS is a lie’. You need rehabilitation. Of course, not all of them have reconsidered. It’s a lot of work. But there are tons of people coming back and we need to be ready to [rehabilitate]. We need to be ready to work with these people. Rights activists estimate that over 700 women and children of Chechen background are stuck in Syria and Iraq. There are likely many more from other Russian republics – some reports suggest camps full of stranded wives, sons and daughters of dead, incarcerated or escaped ISIS fighters. To be sure, Kadyrov may hope that people like Saratova will help build his own domestic and international reputation. Some of her work is public relations, an effort to put a kinder, gentler face on a regime known for systematic abuses. Nevertheless, a more differentiated approach for dealing with militants, with opportunities to reintegrate into society, has proven effective in other North Caucasus republics, such as Ingushetia and Dagestan, and should not be discounted in Chechnya. A Crack of Light in a Very Dark Tunnel Kadyrov has been harsher than any of his North Caucasus counterparts in dealing with the jihadist threat, and a major course correction seems unlikely any time soon. Indeed, in many ways it is a paradox that leniency and more nuanced measures may be tentatively tested in one of Russia’s most brutal regions. Saratova was once widely seen as independent, a regular interlocutor of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. But since she joined Kadyrov’s Human Rights Council, she is has been criticised for speaking in defence of a regime with an egregious human rights record. In the spring of 2017, she drew fire from human rights activists by claiming that she had not heard of gays in Chechnya, echoing remarks by Kadyrov, who said gays did not exist in his republic. (Kadyrov had said this by way of denying a reported purge of gay men in which over a hundred were jailed and allegedly tortured and several reportedly killed. Authorities have not confirmed the purge, but Crisis Group has spoken to a victim who claimed he had been imprisoned and tortured with electric shock.) When asked about her claim, Saratova said it had been taken out of context and that she meant that social norms in Chechnya were such that it was impossible for homosexuals to exist there. Saratova is often criticised and dismissed by activists who continue to risk their lives and freedom to work in Chechnya without government support, and some of whom fear Kadyrov’s approach may be an empty imitation of a genuine reintegration process. Moreover, Kadyrov’s leniency toward returning women could be seen as an extension of the republic’s often forceful promotion of rigid gender roles and patriarchal family values – which has, for instance, included government measures to persuade divorced couples to get back together. But as difficult as it may be, and without excusing the abusive actions of Kadyrov’s regime, efforts such as Saratova’s should be noted, closely watched and encouraged, in the hope that over time they could offer alternatives to the republic’s traditional repressive methods. Realistically, authorities in Chechnya will likely continue with indiscriminate crackdowns. But either way, they would be better off trying to reintegrate at least some returning insurgents and using those who have abandoned jihadism to deter others, as Saratova has described, from violence. Moscow could even consider assisting such efforts and sharing experiences in dealing with a problem that, in one way or another, will affect other regions of Russia and other countries. Recognising even small positive signs from official Chechen organs could eventually help move them in a more positive direction and shine a light on what is otherwise one of the most obscure and repressive corners of Russia. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/chechnya-russia/isis-returnees-bring-both-hope-and-fear-chechnya?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=923e7879c0-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_03_26&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-923e7879c0-359909997 (c) 2018 International Crisis Group