What’s new? The Tajik government’s control of its eastern territory, Gorno-Badakhshan, is tenuous at best. Irregulars loyal to local powerbrokers known as the Authorities have clashed with government forces in the past and may do so again if challenged. China has a growing security presence in the region. Why does it matter? Gorno-Badakhshan sits at the nexus of security problems including Uighur unrest in China’s Xinjiang region; Afghanistan’s war and opium trafficking; and jihadists’ potential return from Iraq and Syria to China, Central Asia or Russia. A rocky transition when President Emomali Rahmon steps down could provoke further instability in the region. What can be done? Rahmon’s government resists outside advice, but Moscow and Beijing, which have some influence and fear upheaval in Tajikistan, could perhaps nudge the president toward a transition that minimises risks of violence. China also should communicate more clearly its concerns and interests in the region, to both Russia and local inhabitants. I.Overview Gorno-Badakhshan is one of the most strategically sensitive areas in Central Asia. Situated high in the Pamir mountains, this autonomous region (or oblast) of eastern Tajikistan is bordered to the south and west by Afghanistan and to the east by China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Beijing’s security presence in the region appears to be increasing, likely motivated by concerns about Uighur militants operating across the border in Afghanistan or returning from the Middle East. Since the 1990s, Gorno-Badakhshan has sought to strengthen its self-rule, including through armed struggle. For now, it is relatively quiet, but that could change without warning. At some point soon, perhaps as early as 2020, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon is expected to hand over power to a younger family member. A rocky transition could lead Gorno-Badakhshan powerbrokers to seek a more influential role in the new dispensation. Their track record suggests they may be willing to use force to achieve their ends. In advance of the planned power transfer, President Rahmon is tightening social and political controls, and suppressing criticism from civil society, across the country. But results in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) have been mixed as Dushanbe tiptoes around the key threat to internal security: well-armed local powerbrokers (known as the Authorities) who sit astride politics, law enforcement and organised crime, and whose personal clout in GBAO often surpasses the government’s. Indeed, many residents view them as philanthropists, providers of basic services, and protectors of local interests and values. Government representatives – whether high-ranking officials from Rahmon’s home province of Kulob in southern Tajikistan or locals working for the GBAO regional administration – treat these informal powerbrokers with caution. The Authorities’ irregular forces have inflicted bloody losses on government troops in recent years, underscoring the limits to Dushanbe’s power in the oblast. Today, GBAO residents say these forces are better armed and organised than ever before; many assume another confrontation with Tajik security forces is a question not of whether but of when, given the tenuous nature of the accommodation between the Authorities and the regime. The Afghan-GBAO border is a source of concern for China, Russia, the United States and other foreign powers. Tajikistan is a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation and home to Russia’s largest base abroad. It is an important transit point for Chinese goods destined for Afghanistan, Pakistan and further afield. The Taliban and fighters affiliated with the Islamic State-Khorasan Province operate along the Afghan side of the frontier, though they have yet to show any interest in crossing it (and in the case of the Taliban, a movement focused only on Afghanistan, are unlikely to do so in the future). Afghan opiates, on the other hand, flow freely into Tajikistan and onward to Russia, China and the West. Beijing appears to have established a security presence in GBAO. Local officials and residents say China has built an installation in a remote corner of the oblast, near both Xinjiang and the Afghan border. The location is not surprising, given China’s concern about Uighurs fighting in Iraq and Syria, some of whom could return through Afghanistan or Central Asia. Yet Beijing’s presence has provoked some local concern, and increasing Chinese influence in the region could needle Russia, which traditionally has stronger ties to Tajikistan. Any measures the government takes to curtail the Authorities’ influence in Gorno-Badakhshan could well make things worse; previous attempts to crack down have provoked violence. But an orderly post-Rahmon transition would at least mitigate the danger of a more serious escalation. While Western powers’ ability to shape such a transition is limited, Moscow and Beijing, which have more clout in Dushanbe and share an interest in Tajikistan’s stability, could perhaps push in that direction. China also could take steps to diminish potential friction caused by misunderstanding about its role, particularly through further information sharing with Moscow. It should take seriously fears among the local population about its role in Gorno-Badakhshan, communicate clearly its interests and strategy in the region, and engage the local labour force, rather than imported Chinese workers, in its economic endeavours. II.Mountainous Badakhshan GBAO is the poorest part of the poorest former Soviet republic in Central Asia. It makes up about half of Tajikistan’s territory and three per cent of its population. Much of eastern GBAO is empty, 3,000-4,000 metres above sea level, with roads largely unrepaired since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 300km journey from the largest eastern settlement, Murghab, to the region’s main city, Khorog, in western Badakhshan, takes at least eight hours. The region was first described as an autonomous oblast in the 1924 Tajikistan constitution. That designation bestows no legal or practical privileges. The majority of GBAO’s 200,000 inhabitants are Pamiris whose culture, language and religion are distinct from those of the Tajik majority. Pamiri languages belong to a branch of the Iranian language group different from the Tajik spoken across most of Tajikistan. While most Tajiks are Hanafi Sunnis, Pamiris are Ismaili Shiites who recognise the Aga Khan as their spiritual leader. Straddling Tajikistan and Afghanistan, Badakhshan is rich in gemstones, as well as rare and precious metals. The government touts the economic potential of mining and tourism but has done nothing to develop these sectors. Residents can be seen panning for gold outside Murghab. With the economy barely functioning, the Aga Khan Development Network fills significant social welfare gaps, including in education, housing and health. The government makes little effort, in GBAO or elsewhere, to address the politically explosive issue of youth unemployment. For the youth of GBAO, and for their peers across Tajikistan, post-schooling options are limited: emigrate, mostly to Russia, or eke out a grim existence on the economic fringes. Some join the Authorities’ irregulars in clashes with Tajik government forces. A few become smugglers. GBAO has produced a disproportionately large segment of Tajikistan’s educated elite, many of whom work in universities, foreign missions and the private sector. This group is tiny, however, and mostly excluded from political power, which is the preserve of Rahmon’s relatives or others from Kulob. Central government representatives in GBAO are preoccupied with Rahmon’s top priority: maintaining an appearance of serenity in keeping with the president’s self-styled persona as “founder of peace and national unity” and “leader of the nation”. Gorno-Badakhshan, however, has a habit of knocking holes in this façade. III.Crackdown Asked about government priorities in GBAO, a regional official answered with unusual candour, “we’re tightening the screws”. The instructions came from Dushanbe, he said, and were “connected with recent events in the capital”, referring to what most consider the first signs of a gradual handover of presidential power. For twenty years, Rahmon has worked to clear Tajikistan of political rivals. In 1997, after prevailing in the five-year civil war, the president commenced removing not only opposition leaders but also senior figures from his own side whom he thought disloyal. In 2015, the government banned the country’s best organised opposition party, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). Nearly all IRPT leaders are now jailed or have sought exile in Europe. Some members of the opposition reportedly have been assassinated or forcibly returned to Tajikistan for trial. Defence and human rights lawyers have also come under pressure, as have their families. Rahmon’s aim at present appears to be to eliminate any opponent who might impede the transfer of power. Officials routinely contrast the current situation with the civil war, warning that any opposition to the state could start another round of deadly violence. In GBAO, one recent exile says, the government is pressuring “inconvenient intellectuals and critics who might damage the leadership’s reputation or cast doubt on the president’s achievements”. This person, a prominent Gorno-Badakhshan politician, sought asylum in Europe in early 2017 after being warned of impending criminal charges. In Khorog, a once lively intellectual scene has evaporated. Many academics, journalists, opposition politicians and civil society activists are intimidated. A number of former Crisis Group interlocutors have left the country, or are planning to leave, usually citing the repressive environment as the main reason. Others are aware of the dangers of being accused of disloyalty by the regime. IV.Breaking the Silence GBAO has rarely stuck to the government’s script. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Gorno-Badakhshan politicians won an increase in their representation in the country’s leadership. During the 1992-1997 civil war, the region was a stronghold of Rahmon’s main adversaries, the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), a broad coalition of opposition forces. After the war, Rahmon built a narrow power base of relatives and residents of his native region of Kulob. Most other regions are still politically cowed and economically neglected. In contrast, Gorno-Badakhshan has seen large-scale protests, mostly organised by the Authorities and their supporters, at several junctures in the last decade. In 2008, a mass demonstration occurred in Khorog. It was a rare event for Tajikistan, where protests are usually swiftly dispersed. Officially, demonstrators were protesting Dushanbe’s cession of GBAO territory to China. But at least one of the Authorities was among the speakers who addressed the crowd; participants and some organisers said the demonstration had been sparked in part by reports that security forces had been flown into the city, allegedly to launch operations against the Authorities. In 2012, clashes in Khorog between Tajik military and security forces, on one side, and well-armed locals, on the other, killed at least 50. In 2014, residents angered by a clumsy police operation in central Khorog burned state security headquarters and other government buildings. The ensuing unrest claimed numerous lives – again, how many is difficult to say, given the government’s secrecy and the opposition’s tendency to exaggerate. All clashes appear to have been sparked, in one way or another, by the central government’s efforts to break the Authorities’ power. No attempt was successful; most ended in uneasy truces that embarrassed Dushanbe and enhanced the Authorities’ standing. Indeed, after the 2012 confrontations with Tajik government forces, leaders of the Authorities were involved in negotiations aimed at calming tensions, which strengthened their position. Since the violence, some reports have suggested that security forces have at times shown reluctance to become involved in Badakhshan. In 2016, officials were forced to deny reports that an elite unit had refused posting to Khorog and that some soldiers had deserted. Many observers claim that the Authorities’ irregulars control the city streets after dark. This contention is almost certainly an exaggeration, though another well-connected local added that police “are very careful when they enter certain districts of Khorog at night”. V.Authorities The paymasters and commanders of GBAO’s irregulars are men widely known as the Authorities (Авторитеты). These men participated in the civil war on the side of the UTO and, pursuant to the 1997 peace agreement, received senior posts in the police, border guards and security services. They style themselves as defenders of Pamiri traditions and culture and, given the suppression of political opposition, are virtually the only actors who can claim to be protecting Gorno-Badakhshan’s separate regional identity. The distribution of jobs to UTO commanders after the civil war was widely viewed as a way to placate them until they could be neutralised or co-opted. In GBAO, however, the Authorities have proven resilient, bringing many of their old fighters into quasi-official positions. They thus operate as shadow authorities, sitting atop networks that are partly integrated into local institutions. They pay little heed to Dushanbe despite receiving government salaries. “They ignore us”, said a government official. Most GBAO observers speak of three or four key Authorities. Each has his own social base, usually a district in the region’s largest town, Khorog, as well as a political and paramilitary apparatus. When all is quiet, the bosses compete for cross-border business. When the central government flexes its muscle, “they come together again”. If clashes erupt, the Authorities can muster dozens of unemployed youth from Khorog and its environs, in addition to their regular gunmen. They also mediate local disputes and help the needy, supplanting Dushanbe’s appointees, who are viewed as corrupt and dismissive of Pamiri traditions. The informal provision of services by GBAO’s Authorities is described by residents and political analysts of the region as largely self-serving, aimed at maintaining a criminal enterprise, particularly in narcotics. At the same time, the Authorities often fill in the gaps left by an underpaid, underfunded and under-skilled local administration. This fact, combined with the distrust with which residents view Dushanbe and its appointees, is one important reason why the Authorities enjoy considerable, albeit ambivalent, public legitimacy. Many inhabitants see the Authorities as guarantors of Gorno-Badakhshan’s autonomy. As one local said: “We are aware they are violent criminals, and we do not like this. But when they protect our region from Dushanbe, they are at that moment performing a service to our people”. Others admit to grudging admiration for what they see as beating the government at its own game. Should the Rahmon succession plan falter, the Authorities would be poised to carve out greater autonomy for themselves and the region. VI.China’s Rising Profile China’s security presence in the region appears to be increasing. This is a new development, presumably motivated by Chinese security concerns about the return of Uighur fighters from Iraq and Syria or potential spillover from Afghanistan. The prospect of returning fighters worries Tajikistan, too: any jihadist attack could blow a hole in President Rahmon’s carefully crafted narrative of calm. Officials in GBAO and Dushanbe confirmed Beijing’s security presence in the oblast. “There are quite a lot of Chinese soldiers here”, one said, adding that they keep a low profile. Another spoke of some form of Chinese security installation in the settlement of Shaimak, near the border with Xinjiang and the Wakhan corridor, a high mountain valley in Afghanistan separating Tajikistan and Pakistan. He described the installation as “a joint counter-terrorism centre” housing Tajik forces as well. Neither the Tajik government nor the Chinese Embassy in Dushanbe responded to further inquiries. (The Chinese defence ministry did not provide answers to Crisis Group queries before our publication date.) A Western diplomat in another Central Asian republic confirmed that his own embassy was aware of the increased Chinese security presence in GBAO, including the installation. Russian sources indicate that the growing Chinese presence in Central Asia is a source of sensitivity for Moscow. Tajikistan, a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation, is home to the 201st Motor Rifle Base, Russia’s largest base on foreign soil.Only a few years ago, Russian analysts and officials were wont to describe Central Asia as Moscow’s “backyard”, making it clear that Beijing should closely coordinate any activity in Central Asia with Russian counterparts. A Russian expert with extensive experience in Tajikistan expressed indignation that Chinese officials would not have informed their opposite numbers in Moscow of plans for an installation in GBAO. The Chinese, he noted, are Russia’s “strategic allies [in Central Asia but] they do not always tell us what they are doing. They are very self-confident”. China already has an advantage over Russia in the region, namely, the money and, perhaps, willingness to fund the massive infrastructure and other projects that Tajikistan desperately needs. In 2016, China set up a “quadrilateral cooperation and coordination mechanism” with Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan for sharing information and counter-terrorism training. The Tajik government subsequently approved plans allowing China to finance and build eleven border outposts and a training centre. Russian influence remains strong, especially with regard to security cooperation. Russian-Tajik relations are bolstered by well-established business and personal connections between the two countries’ elites. But the balance could shift should China’s security presence continue to grow. Regardless of how such dynamics evolve, improved coordination among the Tajik, Russian and Chinese governments and, where appropriate, security officials could address areas of mutual concern, such as reinforcing the Tajik-Afghan border. China’s presence in GBAO also has raised some local concern. The predominantly ethnic Kyrgyz population of eastern GBAO is wary of Beijing’s intentions. The central government’s sale of land to China, ratified by parliament in 2011 but done without local consultation, sowed sharp resentment because it cut off access to ancestral graves. “My heart still weeps”, as one interlocutor put it. Other ethnic Kyrgyz Tajik citizens expressed suspicions that China would cooperate with the ruling elite to expropriate the region’s mineral resources and would use Chinese, not local, labour to do so. These fears echo criticism of Chinese behaviour in other parts of Central Asia. Government critics, both in Khorog and in exile, also worry that Beijing’s cooperation with Dushanbe will reinforce the Tajik government’s repression of its rivals. Some Crisis Group interlocutors accused China of supplying surveillance technology to state security forces in GBAO and elsewhere. Regardless of whether such claims are true, Beijing would benefit from taking into account fears that China is starting to assist the government’s security organs. Even as Beijing deepens ties to Dushanbe, it could consider communicating to Russia and others more clearly its strategy toward Central Asia, particularly toward sensitive regions like GBAO. Where it is economically involved, it should do everything possible to draw on the local labour force, rather than importing Chinese workers. VII.Conclusion GBAO is in many ways a microcosm of Tajikistan. The regime’s policies in the region reflect its leadership’s determination to hold on to power and apparent unwillingness to rein in systemic corruption, even when the venality weakens its own military and security structures. Whenever possible, it will opt for the appearance of reform rather than real action, while institutions continue to erode. Should Rahmon stumble when handing over the presidency, politicians from excluded regions could make a violent play for a greater share of central power, or at least more local autonomy. If this transpires in GBAO, the regime’s security forces will be stretched thin. For now, little suggests that the government could curb the influence of the Authorities in Gorno-Badakhshan without risking another bout of violence. But at least it should avoid a disorderly transition – if indeed Rahmon seeks to hand over power in the years ahead – that could provoke further instability in the region. Given Beijing’s and Moscow’s leverage in Dushanbe, and that both share an interest in averting turmoil in Tajikistan, both should use their influence behind the scenes to nudge President Rahmon toward a transfer of power that as best as possible minimises prospects of violence. They also should seek better information sharing to avoid potential misunderstandings, particularly in light of China’s growing security presence. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/tajikistan/b87-rivals-authority-tajikistans-gorno-badakhshan?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=c2e9684cca-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_03_14&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-c2e9684cca-359909997 (c) 2018 Intentional Crisis Group

Terrorists continue to attack northern Nigeria, and Christians are in the crosshairs. During the evening hours of February 19, Boko Haram raided the Government Girls Science and Technical School in the rural community of Dapchi in Yobe state, kidnapping 110 young women. Even though the Nigerian government declared victory over Boko Haram in late 2015, calling the group “technically defeated,” the nation is reeling once again from attacks like this latest one in Dapchi. It is reminiscent of the kidnapping of 276 women from the Chibok Government Girls Secondary School by Boko Haram in 2014. In that incident, the world cried out on behalf of the missing girls. Even the White House joined the social media campaign, #BringBackOurGirls. The outcome of that effort was mixed at best: more than 100 girls remain missing, presumably still in the clutches of Boko Haram terrorists. And now, more lives have been stolen in Dapchi. The situation in Nigeria is complex and the solutions difficult. With a population of more than 190 million, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and one of its largest economies. Stability there means stability for the region. Except Nigeria is anything but stable. It is a country steeped in longstanding religious and ethnic violence, government control is weak, education is limited, poverty is extreme, and the country remains economically underdeveloped despite a rich cache of natural resources. Although provisions in Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution protect freedom of religion and belief and prohibit religious discrimination at the federal level, 12 of the northern states have adopted the Sharia law into their criminal codes. These conditions have contributed to the rise of violent extremist groups like Boko Haram and the Fulani Militants. Terrorism in Nigeria has a religious undertone. Boko Haram, for example, an avowed affiliate of ISIS, seeks to eradicate western education and bring Nigeria under an Islamic caliphate. The group targets Christian minorities (comprising about one-third of northern Nigeria) and moderate Muslim communities that do not hold to its extremist ideologies. The persistent barrage by Boko Haram, coupled with a weak response by the Nigerian government, have been devastating: Tens of thousands killed and more than two million people displaced. Destruction at the hands of Boko Haram is causing famine-like conditions, putting one million hard-to-reach individuals at risk. The crisis in Nigeria has become an international problem, with violence spilling into neighboring countries and tens of thousands of Nigerian refugees fleeing to Europe. The international community needs to take action to help stabilize Nigeria and prevent destabilization in neighboring countries and throughout Europe. The U.S. could lead that effort. According to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USIRF), “Nigeria is the second-largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance in Africa; and the United States is the largest bilateral donor to Nigeria.” The U.S. could leverage its strategic resources to pressure the Nigerian government to take stronger action against Boko Haram and other extremist groups. Likewise, the U.S. Department of State should designate Nigeria a Country of Particular Concern (CPC), which would enable the U.S. to assist Nigeria with necessary reforms to respond more swiftly and decisively to cases of sectarian violence. Stopping Boko Haram and fostering stability for Nigeria will take more than a hashtag campaign. If the international community does not lean in, there will be more Chibok and Dapchi girls — more lives stolen. Elisabeth Doherty Office Director Take Action: 1. Pray for the communities devastated by Boko Haram and for decisive government action that promotes civilian safety, develops good governance, and strengthens religious freedom within Nigeria 2. Visit Stand With Nigeria to learn more about what is taking place in Nigeria and how you can help 3. Contact your legislators at www.house.gov and ask them to make Nigeria a priority; likewise, contact the State Department and request that Nigeria be designated a CPC (c) 2018 Wilberforce Initiative

I.Overview The meeting on 9 March 2018 between Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta and opposition leader Raila Odinga was as unanticipated as it is significant. In their joint statement issued after the talks, they promised to address the “deterioration of relationships between communities” and “aggressive antagonism and competition” that has blighted repeated electoral cycles in Kenya. This pledge is welcome: the warm words between the two men should help end the protracted crisis provoked by last year’s disputed presidential election, while raising prospects for some form of national dialogue and reforms to avert a repeat. But now comes the hard part. The two leaders, together with other politicians, business leaders, clerics and diplomats, must now ensure the next phase is a consensual, inclusive process yielding meaningful change. Priorities include an investigation into police killings and police reform; a reopening to civil society and the media; and political reforms that aim to reverse Kenya’s winner-takes-all politics, perhaps including provisions that widen representation in the executive. While changes to rules are important, in themselves they will not temper the country’s zero-sum ethnic politics without a broader shift in the behaviour of Kenyan leaders. A.Historical Feud, Contested Polls The presidential election, held on 8 August 2017, pitted the incumbent Kenyatta against veteran opposition leader Odinga. Both are scions of prominent political families – Kenyatta senior was the first president and the elder Odinga was vice president at independence. The pair fell out in the 1960s and the two families have dominated political competition for decades. Ahead of the 2017 election, the younger Kenyatta and Odinga headed the tickets of alliances cobbled together largely along ethnic lines. The election commission pronounced Kenyatta the victor, but Odinga rejected the results. The Supreme Court annulled the vote on 1 September, finding widespread irregularities and illegalities in the tallying, tabulation and transmission of results, and ordered a fresh election. Odinga boycotted these polls, which were held on 26 October, citing insufficient reform of the electoral authorities. Kenyatta won with 98 per cent of the vote (although turnout in opposition areas was extremely low) and was declared president. After that second election, Kenyatta and Odinga both took escalatory steps that deepened social divisions and triggered violence, leaving dozens dead, mainly at the hands of security forces. Odinga defied pressure from allies and foreign diplomats, and staged a mock inauguration on 30 January at which he was declared “people’s president”. This show not only compounded the political crisis but also sowed discord within Odinga’s own National Super Alliance. Kenyatta initially drew praise for pulling the security forces away from the venue of the Odinga ceremony to avoid a confrontation with opposition supporters. But he subsequently ordered several private TV stations off the air for days (and ignored a court order declaring this action illegal). He has led a crackdown on civil society and dismissed calls from the opposition, religious leaders and diplomats for a national dialogue. Last week’s talks between the two leaders were thus an important turnaround in a situation that appeared headed toward prolonged stalemate. It seems that back-channel contacts between aides culminated in the surprise one-on-one meeting in Nairobi. The two leaders would both benefit from reconciliation. Kenyatta’s second-term agenda – focused on growing the economy – would be imperilled if a significant proportion of the electorate continued to question his legitimacy. Reaching out to Odinga, who enjoys particularly strong support in western Kenya and along the coast, is one way to overcome those challenges. Odinga, too, has much to gain. In recent weeks, key opposition allies seemed to be abandoning him, as they positioned themselves for the 2022 election. The latest move puts Odinga back at the centre of Kenyan politics. Aides say the veteran opposition leader, who has long championed reform and was a supporter of Kenya’s progressive 2010 constitution, seeks to claim a place in history by pushing further change to the winner-takes-all political system. B.Three Critical Steps Kenyatta and Odinga have formed a committee of close aides to spearhead the campaign for national unity and propose possible constitutional amendments. To succeed, they need to ensure that any reforms are adopted only through an inclusive dialogue that consults as wide a cross section of the population as feasible. Important allies of both leaders appear to have been excluded from the talks and could seek to undermine reform efforts. Both Kenyatta and Odinga need to rally militant supporters behind the rapprochement to achieve wider buy-in for any prospective deal. Moreover, a settlement negotiated exclusively by politicians would clearly contravene Article 118 of the Constitution (which demands public consultation before major decisions are made). The committee devising the reforms should host meetings with grassroots and other civil society organisations, as well as clerics and business leaders, to discuss any proposed changes. Three areas will be vital in shaping reform if Kenya is to avoid further cycles of polarising and destabilising elections: 1. Lowering the stakes. In their joint statement, Kenyatta and Odinga conceded that polarisation and all-or-nothing contests for power have turned elections into “a threat to lives, our economy and our standing as a nation”. Many politicians believe that the narrow structure of the executive, in particular, with only the posts of president and deputy president up for grabs, leaves little room for accommodation of a wider cross section of elites. Some politicians suggest amending the constitution in favour of a Tanzania-style system to include a prime minister and possibly a deputy prime minister nominated by the parties that won the most parliamentary seats. Pursuant to this structure, both would govern under the supervision of a directly elected president. Such a move, proponents argue, would have several positive implications: broadening the executive, checking presidential power and, crucially, beginning to address the question of “exclusion and, ultimately, animosity” that Kenyatta and Odinga raised in their statement. Finding ways to spread power around different positions and institutions, and to widen representation in the executive, could lower the high stakes of elections. But such an overhaul, particularly after the exhaustive constitutional reform undertaken less than a decade ago, should not be entered into lightly. It would require a process as consultative and inclusive as that which preceded the adoption of the 2010 constitution. Alternatively, a proposal from the leadership of Kenyatta’s Jubilee Party, which commands a majority in parliament, to create a formal role for the leading opposition figure in presidential elections – with a special budget and specific mandate – might be less controversial and achieved through legislative rather than constitutional change. Kenya’s political elite and civil society ought to be cautious in assuming that rule changes alone will transform the culture of winner-takes-all ethnic politics and fierce electoral competition. The 2010 constitution in principle strengthened checks and balances and independent institutions, and thus should have achieved those objectives. That these reforms failed to avert last year’s crisis is a testament to the manner in which Kenyan politicians contest power. Political culture – the behaviour of Kenyan leaders, particularly the distribution of resources along ethnic lines – needs to change as much as formal rules of the game. 2. Probe rights violations. Human rights groups found that the police were responsible for by far the largest number of deaths, including of several infants, during protests over the electoral crisis. A judicial commission of inquiry should investigate these killings. It should go beyond identifying culprits – who should face prosecution – and issue binding recommendations, potentially including retraining officers and a review of police codes. The government also should reinvigorate efforts to reform the police and strengthen civilian oversight, including by empowering the Independent Policing Oversight Authority. Wider police reform, including through implementation of existing constitutional provisions that protect the security forces’ leadership from interference by the executive, remains key to addressing Kenya’s poor human rights record. 3. Civil liberties and media freedom. Kenya has a deserved reputation as one of the continent’s more open societies. Its free-wheeling private media and debate of public issues on social media as well as its robust civil society help promote transparency and accountability. Those freedoms are in danger, both from an intensified government campaign against civil society and from government pressure on private media firms, including threats to selectively withdraw government advertising, a crucial source of revenue. Odinga should use his place at the table to persuade Kenyatta that the country would gain more by maintaining its culture of openness. C.Conclusion Kenyatta and Odinga deserve praise for their recent show of statesmanship in agreeing to hold talks to try and end the crisis and help unite the country. Together with civil society, religious groups, business leaders and the diplomatic community, they should now turn to the hard work of ensuring this chance for meaningful change is not wasted. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/b136-after-kenyas-leaders-reconcile-tough-path-ahead?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=19f05f8bd4-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_03_13&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-19f05f8bd4-359909997 (c) 2018 International Crisis Group

'I’m afraid that Facebook has now turned into a beast.' Protest against Facebook in Jakarta-Indonesia on January 12, 2018. [Anadolu] UN human rights experts investigating a possible genocide in Myanmar have said that Facebook had played a role in spreading hate speech against the majority-Muslim Rohingya minority. The UN's Special Rapporteur on Myanmar also said that the Rohingya crisis in the Rakhine State "bears the hallmarks of genocide". More than 650,000 Rohingya have fled Myanmar's Rakhine State into Bangladesh since a military crackdown last August. Many have provided harrowing testimonies of executions and rapes by Myanmar forces, but Myanmar's national security adviser demanded "clear evidence" for the potential acts of genocide. Facebook role Marzuki Darusman, chairman of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, told reporters that social media had played a "determining role" in Myanmar. "It has ... substantively contributed to the level of acrimony and dissension and conflict, if you will, within the public. Hate speech is certainly, of course, a part of that. As far as the Myanmar situation is concerned, social media is Facebook, and Facebook is social media," he said. UN Myanmar investigator Yanghee Lee said Facebook was a huge part of public, civil and private life, and the government used it to disseminate information to the public. "Everything is done through Facebook in Myanmar," she told reporters, adding that Facebook had helped the impoverished country but had also been used to spread hate speech. "It was used to convey public messages but we know that the ultranationalist Buddhists have their own Facebooks and are really inciting a lot of violence and a lot of hatred against the Rohingya or other ethnic minorities," she said. "I'm afraid that Facebook has now turned into a beast, and not what it originally intended." Yeehang Lee's comments follow the release of images by the human rights group Amnesty International. Facebook response Facebook said there is "no place for hate speech" on its platform. "We take this incredibly seriously and have worked with experts in Myanmar for several years to develop safety resources and counter-speech campaigns," a Facebook spokesperson told the BBC. "Of course, there is always more we can do and we will continue to work with local experts to help keep our community safe," Facebook spokesperson has said. © 2018 Al Jazeera Media Network

The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, told the Human Rights Council on Monday she was increasingly of the opinion that the events in Rakhine State bear the hallmarks of genocide and called in the strongest terms for accountability. Lee, who was informed late last year that her access to the country was denied, also expressed serious concern that “the repressive practices of previous military governments were returning as the norm once more” in Myanmar, describing the situation faced by civil society across the country as “increasingly perilous”. Delivering her report to the Council in Geneva, Lee said that to date accountability for the crimes committed in Rakhine State following 25 August 2017, and 9 October 2016, was elusive, adding that this must now be the focus of the international community’s efforts to bring long-lasting peace, stability and democratization to Myanmar. “This must be aimed at the individuals who gave the orders and carried out violations against individuals and entire ethnic and religious groups,” said Lee. “The Government leadership who did nothing to intervene, stop, or condemn these acts must also be held accountable.” Lee called for a thorough, impartial and credible investigation to be conducted without delay and perpetrators to be held responsible for the alleged crimes that were committed in Rakhine State since 9 October 2016 and 25 August 2017, and for the violations that continue today. She called for the establishment of a UN structure, based in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, for a duration of three years to investigate, document, collect, consolidate, map, and analyze evidence of human rights violations and abuses. The Special Rapporteur added that the investigative body should maintain and prepare evidence in a master database to support and facilitate impartial, fair and independent international criminal proceedings in national or international courts or tribunals in accordance with international criminal law standards. Additionally, Lee called for a comprehensive review of actions by the United Nations system in the lead-up to and after the reported attacks of 9 October 2016 and 25 August 2017 regarding the implementation of its humanitarian and protection mandates and within the Human Rights Up Front framework. “The external review should assess whether the UN and international community could have prevented or managed the situation differently that occurred regarding the Rohingya and in Rakhine State, and make recommendations for accountability if appropriate,” she said. Lee also expressed concerns that as the world’s attention was drawn to the recent crisis in Rakhine State, scant attention had been afforded to continued and escalating violence in Kachin, Shan and other conflict affected States in Myanmar. She said against this background, the peace process appeared to be losing its momentum. “Ethnic armed organizations have complained that the reason for this is largely due to the failure of the Government and the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) to take steps to earn the trust of stakeholders,” Lee said. The Special Rapporteur said she hoped to make official visits to India and China as part of her preparation to report to the General Assembly later this year, and said she remained hopeful the Myanmar Government would revisit its decision and grant her access. ENDS Yanghee Lee (Republic of Korea) was appointed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2014 as the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. She is independent from any government or organization and serves in her individual capacity. Ms. Lee served as member and chairperson of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (2003-2011). She is currently a professor at Sungkyunwan University, Seoul, and serves on the Advisory Committee of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea. Ms. Lee is the founding President of International Child Rights Center. The Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Special Procedures, the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, is the general name of the Council’s independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms. Special Procedures mandate-holders are independent human rights experts appointed by the Human Rights Council to address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. They are not UN staff and are independent from any government or organization. They serve in their individual capacity and do not receive a salary for their work. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22793&LangID=E (C) 2018 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner

Experts of the UN Fact-finding Mission on Myanmar called on Myanmar authorities Monday to stop dismissing reports that serious human rights violations have been committed in Kachin, Shan and Rakhine states. “The body of information and materials we are collecting is concrete and overwhelming,” the three experts of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar noted in their interim, oral report to the 37th Session of the UN Human Rights Council. “It points at human rights violations of the most serious kind, in all likelihood amounting to crimes under international law.” Marzuki Darusman, former Indonesian Attorney-General and chair of the Fact-Finding Mission, delivered the oral report. He was joined on the podium by fellow experts Radhika Coomaraswamy of Sri Lanka and Chris Sidoti of Australia. The interim report was based on information gathered from a series of missions to Bangladesh, Malaysia and Thailand, where teams of investigators conducted over 600 in-depth interviews with victims and witnesses of reported human rights violations and abuses. The teams have also collected and analysed satellite imagery, photographs and video footage of events. “The events we are examining in detail in Rakhine, Kachin and Shan states are products of a longstanding, systemic pattern of human rights violations and abuses in Myanmar,” report said. “Any denial of the seriousness of the situation in Rakhine, the reported human rights violations, and the suffering of the victims, is untenable,” the experts said. “We have hundreds of credible accounts of the most harrowing nature.” The report listed eight major findings in relation to allegations in Rakhine State where so-called “clearance operations” of the Myanmar security forces, in response to ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) attacks, have driven nearly 700,000 Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh since August. “Credible accounts are rife of the State’s various security forces having committed gross human rights violations in the course of these operations,” the experts said. “These operations resulted in a very high number of casualties,” the report said. “People died from gunshot wounds, often due to indiscriminate shooting at fleeing villagers. Some were burned alive in their homes – often the elderly, disabled and young children. Others were hacked to death.” Satellite imagery shows that at least 319 villages were partially or totally destroyed by fire after the “clearance operations” began on 25 August 2017. “We have hundreds of eyewitness accounts. We have seen unsettling photographs and satellite images of Rohingya villages flattened to the ground by bulldozers, erasing all remaining traces of the life and community that once was,” Darusman said on the margins of the Council meeting, “not to mention destroying possible crime scene evidence.” “All the information collected so far points to violence of an extremely cruel nature,” the report said. “We have ample and corroborated information on brutal gang rapes and other forms of sexual violence against women.” “We have numerous accounts of children and babies who were killed, boys arrested, and girls raped.” “The widespread and systematic nature of the State-led violence,” the report added, “points to prior planning and organisation, which we are examining in detail.” “We are analysing the respective roles and command structures of the security forces and the involvement of others… We will attribute responsibility where it is due.” The report highlighted the Fact-Finding Mission’s concerns over a spike in reported human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law in Kachin and Shan states. These resulted in significant displacement of population, further exacerbating a “longstanding humanitarian crisis.” “Regarding the Myanmar military, we are receiving credible reports of indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearances, destruction of property and pillage, torture and inhuman treatment, rape and other forms of sexual violence, forced labour, and the recruitment of children into armed forces,” the report said. Appointed by the UN Human Rights Council last March, the Fact-Finding Mission accepted a mandate to “establish the facts and circumstances of alleged human rights violations by military and security forces, and abuses, in Myanmar.” Their focus is on the States of Rakhine, Shan and Kachin since 2011. The Myanmar Government has refused to give the Fact-Finding Mission access to the country and it has blocked attempts to mount an independent and impartial investigation. Darusman noted that the representative of Myanmar has alluded to a suppression of the “Myanmar narrative.” He responded that the Fact-Finding Mission is ready to hear that narrative, but regardless “we have no shortage of credible information.” The final report of the Fact-Finding Mission will be presented to the Human Rights Council in September. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22794&LangID=E (c) 2018 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner

The Human Rights Council in its midday meeting held an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, and the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. Yanghee Lee, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, presenting her report, said that the Government of Myanmar had refused to further cooperate with her mandate and to allow her access to the country. There were now more Rohingya people outside Myanmar than within. Ethnic minority groups in other areas of the country, such as Kachin, Shan and Kayin, were much like the Rohingya, victims of the military campaign. While Myanmar said it had constructed facilities to receive verified returnees from Bangladesh, there appeared to be a policy of forced starvation in place, designed to make life in northern Rakhine unsustainable. Considering that crimes against humanity had been occurring since 2016, Ms. Lee recommended a comprehensive review of actions by the United Nations system regarding the implementation of its humanitarian and protection mandates. Marzuki Darusman, Chairperson of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, said that over 600 in-depth interviews with victims and witnesses of alleged human rights abuses had been conducted, although the Mission’s request for a visit had been denied by the Government. The escalation of violence had magnified the longstanding humanitarian crisis in Kachin and Shan states. Credible reports had been received of indiscriminate attacks, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture and inhumane treatment, and rape and other forms of sexual violence. Turning to the situation in Rakhine state, Mr. Darusman reminded that credible accounts were rife of the State’s various security forces having committed gross human rights violations in the course of those operations. In all likelihood, those violations amounted to crimes under international law. Myanmar, speaking as the concerned country, said the present Government had been able to make progress in the peace process and implement the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine state for a sustainable solution. The terrorist attacks in Rakhine state in August 2017 had abruptly changed the state of affairs; restoring law and order to provide security had become a priority for the Government. Most of the ethnic groups and their villages remained intact in Myanmar, as witnessed by the United Nations entities in their recent visits. In the ensuing discussion, speakers strongly condemned the use of violence that had led to the mass expulsion of hundreds of thousands of civilians from Rakhine state, but also from other regions. They urged the Government of Myanmar to cooperate fully with the Special Rapporteur and the Fact-Finding Mission and to ensure unimpeded access for humanitarian aid. Speakers welcomed the signing of the arrangement on the return of displaced persons from Rakhine state between the Governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh, and the recommendations of the Kofi Annan Advisory Commission. Several speakers noted that there should be accountability for violations of international humanitarian law, and those had to be referred to the International Criminal Court. They asked the Special Rapporteur to further elaborate on how the international community could assist in the creation of a structure that would document human rights violations for future criminal proceedings. Speaking were European Union, Philippines on behalf of Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Lichtenstein, Germany, Finland, Russia, Norway, Croatia, Estonia, Denmark, Belgium, Canada, Belgium, Canada, Spain, Switzerland, Czechia, Japan, Viet Nam, Poland, Australia, France, China, Qatar, Sweden, Greece, Venezuela, Iraq, Mexico, United States, Maldives, Iran, Lithuania, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Thailand, Indonesia, Netherlands, Algeria, Luxembourg, Turkey, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, United Kingdom, Ireland, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Belarus, Iceland, Slovakia and Republic of Korea. The Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation also took the floor. The following civil society organizations also spoke: Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Human Rights Watch, Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Amnesty International, Plan International, Inc, International Federation for Human Rights Leagues, International Commission of Jurists, Presse Embleme Campagne, Article 19, Asian Legal Resource Centre, Human Rights Now, Maarij Foundation for Peace and Development, International Organization for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination EAFORD, Child Foundation, and International Educational Development, Inc. The Council has a full day of meetings scheduled today. It will next hold an enhanced interactive dialogue on the human rights situation in Eritrea. Documentation The Council has before it the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar (A/HRC/37/70) Presentations by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar and the Chair of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar YANGHEE LEE, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, presenting an oral update, said that while before she had been the only Special Rapporteur to have access to Myanmar, during the last few visits tactics of the military past had been adopted and last September the Government of Myanmar had refused to further cooperate with the mandate holder. Thus, the Special Rapporteur was declared as unwelcomed and accused of being unfair and biased. There were now more Rohingya people outside Myanmar then within. The alleged August attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and ensuing attacks by security forces led to record numbers of people fleeing Rakhine state in the weeks that followed. Speaking with over 100 refugees in Cox’s Bazar who had fled the violence in Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathidaung townships in northern Rakhine, the Special Rapporteur heard first hands of attacks in which homes had been set ablaze by security forces and entire villages had been razed to the ground. The repatriation process for the refuges had to be voluntary. While Myanmar said it had constructed facilities to receive verified returnees from Bangladesh, it seemed that Myanmar had been also engaging in large-scale development projects in former Rohingya villages and there appeared to be a policy of forced starvation in place, designed to make life in northern Rakhine unsustainable. Ethnic minority groups in other areas of the country such as Kachin, Shan and Kayin had been, much like the Rohingya, victims of the military campaign. Information on a new ground offensive was received last week in an area controlled by the Karen National Union, which was a nationwide ceasefire agreement signatory. There had been no progress on legal and judicial reform. The Special Rapporteur had also been a target of hateful and violent threats on social media. The Council had been notified four years ago about the possible commission of crimes against humanity regarding the Rohingya and the High Commissioner had made the same warning about war crimes in other parts of the country in 2016. The Council had established the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar in March 2017, yet this had not stopped the ongoing persecution. The crimes committed in October 2016 and August 2017 bore the hallmark of genocide. He recommended the establishment of a structure in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh under the auspices of the United Nations to investigate and document human rights violations, in order to facilitate independent criminal proceedings. In closing, the Special Rapporteur stressed that the international community had to ask itself whether it could have done more? To that end, a comprehensive review of actions by the United Nations system during the events of October 2016 and August 2017 was recommended regarding the implementation of its humanitarian and protection mandates and within the human rights up front framework. This was in line with the Secretary-General’s own priority on advancing a preventive approach to human rights. MARZUKI DARUSMAN, Chairperson of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, said that the Mission had made significant progress, undertaking missions to Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand and the United Kingdom. It had conducted more than 600 in-depth interviews with victims and witnesses of alleged human rights violations and abuses, and it had held numerous consultations with experts, activists, civil society actors and diplomats. The Mission had also received and analyzed satellite imagery, photographs and video footage of events. From the beginning, the Mission had reached out to the Myanmar Government to undertake dialogue with it and to conduct inquiries on the ground. But the Government had denied the Mission’s request to conduct a visit in February 2018. The reports of human rights violations and abuses in Kachin and Shan states that the Mission was examining in detail suggested certain patterns that were experienced across the country. While the intensity, scale and impact of the recent events in Rakhine had been of different order, the manner in which operations were conducted demonstrated marked similarities. Moreover, the recent intensification of the longstanding conflicts in Kachin and Shan states had led to a spike in reported human rights violations and abuses, and violations of international humanitarian law. The Mission was receiving credible reports of indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearances, destruction of property and pillage, torture and inhumane treatment, rape and other forms of sexual violence, forced labour, and the recruitment of children into the armed forces. The Fact-Finding Mission was deeply concerned about the escalating clashes between the Myanmar military and the Kachin Independence Army in recent months, including in the areas around the town of Tanai, displacing thousands of civilians. Large numbers of civilians had been trapped and displaced for several days without adequate humanitarian assistance. That escalation of violence and further wave of internal displacement had magnified the longstanding humanitarian crisis in Kachin and Shan states. Parties had to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects under their control against the effects of attacks, and to ensure safe access to humanitarian assistance. The Mission urged the authorities of Myanmar to lift all movement restrictions and to ensure that humanitarian actors could carry out their work in safety. Turning to the situation in Rakhine state, Mr. Darusman reminded that the longstanding conflict had radically intensified following the attacks in 2016 and 2017 by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and the Myanmar security forces’ so-called “clearance operations.” Credible accounts were rife of the State’s various security forces having committed gross human rights violations in the course of those operations. In all likelihood, those violations amounted to crimes under international law. Information collected so far regarding the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army activity in the region strongly suggested that the security forces’ response, and in particular its use of force, had been far in excess of the actual threat and in violation of international norms and standards. The Fact-Finding Mission called on the Myanmar Government and military to heed the Government’s promise not to condone impunity for serious human rights violations and abuses, no matter how senior those who were responsible. The Mission regretted that the steps taken so far had been utterly insufficient. At no point had the Myanmar authorities held genuine consultations with the people concerned to hear from them about their experience, understand their needs, and dispel their fears. Nor were the authorities allowing the international community to play a role in ensuring that the return of refugees was voluntary, safe and dignified. The displaced people should not be returned without adequate guarantees for human rights protection in place. Statement by the Concerned Country Myanmar, speaking as the concerned country, said the present democratic Government had been able to make progress in the peace process, laying democratic foundations. Implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine state for a sustainable solution was also progressing. While such efforts were well on track, the terrorist attacks in the Rakhine state in August 2017 had abruptly changed the state of affairs in Rakhine state. Restoring law and order to provide security for all was necessitated, while the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army terrorist attacks and their instigation had impacted the population. Daily lives and the future of all ethnic groups, including Rakhine, Daing-net, Mro, Thet, Mramagyi and people belonging to Buddhist, Muslim and Hindu faiths, had been adversely affected. This had also led to the displacement of people internally within Rakhine state, and beyond the borders. It was important to highlight, however, that the majority of ethnic groups and their villages still remained intact in Myanmar as witnessed by the diplomatic corps and United Nations entities in their recent visits. However, a less-than-objective approach by some had brought a paradigm shift in the perception and attitude towards Myanmar. Ultimately, history would be the judge. In conclusion, Myanmar stated it was unreasonable to assert that the leadership, whose mission had human rights at its core, remained indifferent to the allegations of grave human rights violations. The Government would never tolerate such crimes. State Counsellor Daw Aung Suu Kyi had been striving for freedom, democracy and human rights in Myanmar even before she assumed the responsibility of the State. Myanmar was prepared to work with any arrangement or mechanism which was in line with the national circumstances. The bulldozing of the ground was part of the preparing for the returnees. Interactive Dialogue European Union urged the Government to cooperate fully with the Fact-Finding Mission and grant full and unrestricted access to all areas and interlocutors, as well as to create conditions for voluntary and safe return of displaced persons. How could the international community assist in the creation of a structure in Cox’s Bazar which would investigate evidence of human rights violations to allow criminal proceedings? Philippines, speaking on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, welcomed the signing of the agreement on the return of displaced persons from Rakhine state between the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh, and condemned all acts of violence, including attacks against Myanmar security forces. The importance of increased humanitarian access to the affected areas was underscored. Liechtenstein called on Myanmar to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur and the Fact-Finding Mission and said that presentations had put a spotlight on the grave crimes that had led to forcible displacement of the Rohingya. What were the recommendations to the Security Council for ensuring justice for the grave crimes committed? Germany remained worried about widespread human rights violations in Rakhine state but also in several other regions, leading to the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of civilians. Was there a chance for national courts to use the findings on mass human rights violations in order to facilitate impartial and independent proceedings to guarantee accountability? Finland called on the Government of Myanmar to ensure free access and commended the Governments of Malaysia, Bangladesh and Thailand for their cooperation. What could be done to ensure access of victims of sexual violence to long-term health services and psycho-social support? Russia saw the mandates of the Special Rapporteur and the Fact-Finding Mission as examples of double standards and ineffective use of the budget. It was reiterated that all reports had to be distributed on time in all the United Nations languages Norway was deeply worried about the human rights and humanitarian situation in Rakhine state and encouraged the Government to resume its cooperation with the Special Rapporteur. There was a pressing need for the authorities in Myanmar to end all violence, ensure full protection of all civilians without discrimination, and fully observe international human rights and humanitarian law. Croatia deeply regretted that the Government of Myanmar had denied the Special Rapporteur’s subsequent visit in January 2018, and encouraged it to grant full, unrestricted and unmonitored access to all Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. It called upon the Government to uphold the right to freedom of religion and to prosecute those responsible for gross violations. Estonia said the grave situation of the refugees in Bangladesh remained disturbing. Any return needed to be voluntary. There needed to be accountability for all those responsible for violations and abuses of international humanitarian law, and these had to be referred to the International Criminal Court. Denmark regretted that the Government of Myanmar refused to collaborate with the Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar. It condemned in the strongest terms the human rights abuses and violations in Myanmar, including the recently increased control of the media, such as the case against Reuters journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, who uncovered abuses in Rakhine state. Belgium urged the Government of Myanmar to provide equal protection and treatment to people from all communities who suffered from attacks by extremists or excessive action from the military. All parties to the conflict must facilitate unrestricted humanitarian access to those in need. The ethnic cleansing continued, according to sources. Canada informed of its readiness to work closely with the international community and Myanmar under the auspices of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, presided by Kofi Annan. It was in this light that it had appointed the Honourable Bob Rae as a Special Envoy to Myanmar with a view to engage in the diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. The crimes against humanity could not go unpunished. Spain noted grave human rights abuses in Rakhine state, including extrajudicial executions. Spain urged an end to human rights violations and called for victims to be protected in line with international humanitarian law, especially Rohingya children. Switzerland called on Myanmar to cooperate with all relevant United Nations entities. Myanmar was reminded of the urgent need to carry out investigations of alleged violations as a means to ensure the accountability of those responsible. Czechia regretted that the Special Rapporteur was denied entry into Myanmar and stressed the need to put an end to all human rights abuses and military operations in Rakhine state. Those forced to flee their homes must be assured that they could return to their places of origin. Japan said it repeatedly urged Myanmar to expand access to humanitarian assistance, promote safe and voluntary return, and conduct reliable investigations of alleged violations. Japan asked how the credibility of information from the field could be increased. Viet Nam encouraged Myanmar to build people-oriented policies as part of an approach to resolve the situation in Rakhine state. Viet Nam stood ready to assist Myanmar in its nation-building process. Poland supported democratic and market economy reforms in Myanmar in the hopes that such approaches could bring stability to the country and asked what were the most pressing issues in Myanmar. Australia said that as a regional friend of Myanmar, it had been ready to help in addressing the underlying issues in Rakhine state, including through the implementation of recommendations of the Advisory Commission. How could the international community best cooperate with Myanmar to build on the recommendations of the Kofi Annan Advisory Commission? France said that the report was enlightening in showing the crimes against humanity which had been committed. Support for democratic transition in Myanmar was expressed but it was vital to combat impunity so the authorities were urged to cooperate with international investigative mechanisms. China supported the path chosen by Myanmar, in line with its national situation, and was hoping for a peaceful resolution of the situation. The international community had to respect the national sovereignty of Myanmar and its stability and provide constructive support as the Rohingya issue was a domestic one. Qatar expressed concern over the attacks against Rohingya Muslims and called for the respect of international humanitarian law. The Government of Myanmar was urged to cooperate and take all necessary measures to end the violence against Rohingya, including by ensuring their right to citizenship by amending the citizenship act. Sweden shared the deep concern expressed by the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner concerning Rakhine state and other reports of systematic and coordinated violence. Current conditions were not conducive for any large-scale return of refugees and Government efforts towards ending discrimination were obviously not sufficient. Greece noted that the situation in Rakhine state was extremely serious and reiterated condemnation of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and grave human rights violations committed by Myanmar’s security forces. The continued deterioration of the situation in Kachin and Shan states and increased fighting had caused 100,000 internally displaced persons. Venezuela welcomed the measures undertaken by Myanmar. The report presented was biased and significantly unbalanced. The imposition of these politicized reports did not ensure genuine participation and dialogue. Remarks by the Special Rapporteur and Members of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission YANGHEE LEE, Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, referring to a question on the documentation structure, said this would be part of a larger effort. There needed to be significant funds to adequately submit this structure. Its establishment had to be expedited and the Mission had to be appropriately staffed – in terms of quality as well as quantity. What was important was for them to prepare cases for criminal proceedings and to ensure that accountability would take place later on. Regarding the Security Council, she strongly suggested that the Human Rights Council visit Cox’s Bazar and urged and pleaded with China and Russia to stand on the side of the protection of human rights of all people. The international community could best assist by providing technical assistance for psycho-social and health services for children, providing assistance to Bangladesh, continuing to cooperate with the mandate holder, and ensuring an amendment to clarify that the return to places of origin or choice had to also be integrated in the November 23 Repatriation Agreement. People in Cox’s Bazar needed to be interviewed, informed appropriately, and granted the right to an informed decision. Human rights monitors must be in the process of repatriation. Myanmar should abide by the Rabat Plan of Action. In order for the voluntary sustainable return process to happen in dignity, all the discriminative legislation, policies and practices in place in Rakhine state had to be dismantled. A list of laws that should be amended or repealed should be given to the Government. Unless this was done, then “according to the law” could mean something that the international community would consider unacceptable. For example, the 2013 disaster management law allowed the Government to take over and manage burnt land. On how to resume dialogue with Myanmar, the Special Rapporteur said despite her continuous efforts, she had not been granted access this time. She hoped that Myanmar would revisit this decision. MARZUKI DARUSMAN, Chairperson of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, acknowledged the presence of Myanmar’s delegation and ensured his willingness to cooperate with the Government. An international division of labour was established within the Fact-Finding Mission, he noted. Ensuring credibility of information obtained from the ground focused on conducting interviews and collection of multiple accounts from various villages. Satellite imagery was also used to confirm details of accounts. The Fact-Finding Mission was now moving to the evaluation and authentication phase of findings as it worked towards its final report. Turning to questions over ethnic cleansing, he noted that the Fact-Finding Mission would not use the term “ethnic cleansing” until its findings were confirmed. He noted that there was a continuous flow of people fleeing Myanmar into Bangladesh. The international community must support the work of the Fact-Finding Mission by continuing to spotlight issues in Myanmar. He appealed to Member States to reach out to Myanmar and encourage its cooperation with the Fact-Finding Mission. RADHIKA COOMARASWAMY, Member of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, noted the prevalence of reports of sexual violence in Rakhine state. She dismissed claims that sexual violence was not a common occurrence. CHRISTOPHER DOMINIC SIDOTI, Member of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, said it was premature to state what follow-up measures could be taken following the Fact-Finding Mission’s final report. The Fact-Finding Mission was not in a position to determine what mechanism would be most appropriate to address concerns identified in the report. He assured that the Human Rights Council would be advised on the Fact-Finding Mission’s views on follow-up activities in its final report. Interactive Dialogue Iraq shared the concern of the High Commissioner about the mass exodus of civilians from Myanmar to neighbouring Bangladesh. Bangladesh was commended for its efforts to contain the crisis of the displaced Rohingya persons and the international community was called on to invest efforts towards finding a peaceful solution. Mexico advised the Government of Myanmar to redouble its efforts to ensure freedom of expression and association as well as to eradicate statelessness by registering the birth of all children, including children of refugees or migrants. The Government of Bangladesh was commended for its efforts in housing over 1 million refugees. United States said that ethnic cleansing of Rohingya and violations against members of ethnic and religious minorities in Kachin and Shan states was appalling. The Special Rapporteur was asked to elaborate on her recommendation for the establishment of a structure that would collect evidence on human rights abuses. Maldives said that since 1992 United Nations Special Rapporteurs had documented numerous human rights violations against Rohingya. Myanmar’s security forces were facing allegations of rape, torture, murder and other extreme human rights and humanitarian crimes. Iran reiterated the need to avoid politicization and double standards in the Council, even as it regretted the deplorable human rights violations against Rohingya Muslims. The Government was called on to adopt appropriate policies to bring peace and stability. Lithuania was worried about the erosion of the freedom of expression and urged the authorities to free the two unlawfully detained Reuters journalists. Myanmar was called on to ensure a credible and independent investigation to bring the perpetrators to justice. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea noted that genuine dialogue and cooperation should be pursued for the promotion and protection of human rights, and the resolution of humanitarian issues. It welcomed the bilateral approach and agreement reached regarding the repatriation of refugees to Myanmar. New Zealand recognized and commended the efforts made by Myanmar to advance its broad political, economic, social and administrative reform agenda. But events in Rakhine state in late 2017 had caused serious concern and had cast a shadow on Myanmar’s commitment to protect the human rights of all its citizens. Thailand encouraged constructive dialogue between Myanmar and Bangladesh to expedite the repatriation process to avoid “a crisis within a crisis” due to the arrival of the monsoon season. It also encouraged Myanmar to continue making necessary preparations for an eventual voluntary, dignified and safe return and resettlement of those displaced from Rakhine state. Indonesia expressed deep concern about the ongoing humanitarian crisis faced by the Rohingya community, and welcomed various steps taken by Myanmar to address the underlying causes of the situation in Rakhine state. It encouraged the authorities to restore stability and security in that province. Netherlands strongly condemned the ongoing widespread and systematic human rights violations committed by the Myanmar military and security forces. Reports of grave violations needed to be thoroughly investigated and perpetrators had to be held to account. Algeria regretted the ongoing human rights violations against the Rohingya and other minorities in Rakhine state. It encouraged the Government of Myanmar to end impunity, protect all its citizens, and to pursue dialogue with all concerned countries in the region, namely Bangladesh, to promote a lasting political solution for the question of the Rohingya. Luxembourg urged civilian and military authorities to allow unrestricted access to all United Nations mandate holders. Violence against civilians was widespread and systematic and Myanmar authorities must accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Turkey said more Rohingya now lived in Bangladesh than Myanmar. The international community must assist in the implementation of the Bangladesh-Myanmar agreement on the return of the displaced persons to their places of origin. Afghanistan said Myanmar’s lack of cooperation and increased restrictions on journalism were encouraging ongoing ethnic cleansing. Myanmar and the international community must pursue genuine accountability processes to ensure justice for victims of human rights violations. Bangladesh said Myanmar was not cooperating with United Nations entities and violence and starvation were forcing Rohingya to flee Myanmar. Since the signing of a repatriation agreement with Myanmar, no credible efforts had been taken by that Government. United Kingdom said actions in Myanmar constituted ethnic cleansing and asked what could be done to protect the rights of children in camps in Bangladesh. Ireland expressed concern over recent reports of mass graves in Rakhine state and underscored the importance of urging Myanmar to cooperate with United Nations bodies. Ireland asked what recommendations must be made to address reprisals in Myanmar. Lao People’s Democratic Republic was closely following the developments in Myanmar as a neighbouring country and fully understood the complexity of the issue. The Government of Myanmar was commended for its efforts to find a sustainable solution and peace through constructive dialogue. Belarus in principle did not support country resolutions and country mandates as they were not universal nor did they fully facilitate an effective way to settle a crisis. Myanmar needed support in its difficult transition period and regional and bilateral formats of cooperation and assistance had to be used. Iceland said that the Council had held a special session in December to pass a resolution on the human rights situation of the Rohingya Muslim minority and other minorities in Rakhine state. If the High Commissioner was right and the genocide had been taking place since last August, all States had to ensure that the Government of Myanmar ended the violence. Slovakia was alarmed by the allegations of forced starvation which was used by the State authorities as a method of oppression against the Rohingya people. The Government of Myanmar was urged to refrain from recruiting child soldiers in its armed forces. Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s Permanent Human Rights Commission said it had visited Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh in January 2018 to meet with Rohingya refugees and obtain first-hand information. The Government of Myanmar was reminded that it could not get away with the denial of fundamental rights of its Rohingya population. Republic of Korea appreciated the progress made in the meantime, including signing of the agreement on the return of displaced persons from Rakhine state between the Governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh and the implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Rakhine state. Still an array of challenges on the ground required the reaction of the international community. Libya strongly condemned the events affecting the Rohingya in Rakhine state in Myanmar, and forced expulsions and displacements. It called for the end of impunity and racial discrimination affecting the Rohingya. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development welcomed the Special Rapporteur’s call for a field based structure in Cox’s Bazar to investigate and document violations, and noted that it was impossible for refugees to return in safety and dignity in the deteriorated conditions in Rakhine state in Myanmar. Such return would only be possible when full citizenship and identity of the Rohingya were recognized by law. Human Rights Watch noted that the Government of Myanmar had shown an increasing indifference to human dignity and basic rights, and it urged the Security Council to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court. The Myanmar Government’s attempts to bury the evidence of abuses showed the need for immediate international action to facilitate future prosecutions. Christian Solidarity Worldwide remained concerned about the rising Buddhist nationalism, which had created an atmosphere of religious intolerance. The violence against the predominantly Muslim Rohingya in 2017 followed decades of severe persecution and was now a humanitarian crisis involving ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Amnesty International reminded that in northern Myanmar the military had been responsible for serious violations of international law, adding that the overwhelming majority of those violations had gone unpunished. The civilian-led Government had proven itself unable and unwilling to hold those responsible to account. Plan International, Inc said life-saving humanitarian assistance in Myanmar must be the priority of the international community. Plan International urged Myanmar to allow access to humanitarian actors as a means to ensure all children in need could reach their full potential. International Federation for Human Rights Leagues said security forces had almost entirely emptied Rakhine state of its Rohingya population. Claims that the mass exodus was the result of terrorist activities were preposterous. International Commission of Jurists said Myanmar must fully cooperate with all United Nations bodies. While Myanmar requested evidence of violations it continued to deny access to organizations seeking to assess the situation. Presse Embleme Campaign drew attention to the arrest of two Reuters journalists in Myanmar. The detention of the journalists was just one approach being taken by Myanmar to censor information about the humanitarian catastrophe taking place in Rakhine state. Article 19 – The International Centre Against Censorship said Myanmar’s attempts to control the free flow of information must be considered a major obstacle to resolving the ongoing crisis in the country. Asian Legal Resource Centre said the Special Rapporteur’s report accurately reflected facts on the ground. Noting ongoing abuses by Myanmar’s security forces, the Asian Legal Resource Centre stressed that evidence pointed to ongoing genocide in Rakhine state. Human Rights Now said it had visited refugee camps and surrounding areas in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, and had spoken with numerous Rohingya who had fled from the violence in Myanmar since August 2017. It had heard multiple accounts of atrocities witnessed and experienced by Rohingya at the hands of Myanmar’s security forces, including killings, rape, arbitrary detention, torture and arson. Maarij Foundation for Peace and Development said the Rohingya were among the people whose rights were most denied in the world. The State of Myanmar was exercising terrorism on its own citizens in Rakhine state. The perpetrators had to be brought to justice in order for them to be able to go back to their villages. International Organization for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination EAFORD shared the Special Rapporteur’s concern regarding the Bangladesh-Myanmar repatriation agreement, which would force Rohingya refugees to return from camps in Bangladesh to so-called “temporary accommodation”, expected to be prison-like camps in Myanmar where Rohingya had previously been returned to. It called upon all relevant actors to ensure that returns should take place only under the supervision of international human rights monitors. Child Foundation said with the current situation, immediate action had to be taken to help the Rohingya by the international community. It called upon the Council to focus negotiating efforts on ensuring the clear passage of humanitarian aid into Myanmar. In order to assist those who faced the reality of deportation, the Council should issue a statement asking the Bangladesh Government to cease its participation in the repatriation plan. International Educational Development, Inc had addressed the situation in “Burma/Myanmar” since the 1990s and had focused on ethnic nationalities. It reminded that “Burma/Myanmar” was not a unified country and the ethnic nationalities all had armies and controlled vast tracts. A “stand alone” session on this, with reference to the Geneva Conventions and all universally recognized rules of armed conflict, would be very useful. Concluding Remarks YANGHEE LEE, Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, stated that the structure for addressing human rights violations in Myanmar should follow the timeline of repatriation, while the mandate of the Fact-Finding Mission should be renewed. Expediency was key, in light of the upcoming monsoon season. As for facilitating access to the country, Ms. Lee noted that countries should reach out to Myanmar and try to urge the Government to cooperate with the international community. Turning to humanitarian assistance, Ms. Lee reminded that some 58 per cent of the Cox’s Bazar refugee population were children who needed long-term psycho-social assistance due to the serious human rights violations they had experienced, including rape. Those children also needed educational assistance. As for ensuring accountability, Ms. Lee noted that it should be remembered that there had been communities that had suffered from the attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. On universal birth registration, the Government of Myanmar had declared that it would pursue it. However, that could be difficult in non-Government controlled areas, Ms. Lee stated. CHRISTOPHER DOMINIC SIDOTI, Member of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, said there were concerns over the archiving of the evidence being collected on Myanmar. He noted that there were budgetary constraints that limited the Fact-Finding Mission’s ability to archive evidence. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22802&LangID=E (c) 2018 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner

Myanmar’s military is razing emptied Rohingya villages in northern Rakhine state and building bases on the rubble, raising fears that evidence of atrocities may be destroyed, according to a new report by rights watchdog Amnesty International. Drawing on satellite image analysis and interviews with Rohingya eyewitnesses, Amnesty said that Rohingya mosques and homes have been bulldozed “at an alarming pace,” and new infrastructure, including roads, helipads, and military bases, are being build in their place. “What we are seeing in Rakhine state is a land grab by the military on a dramatic scale,” Amnesty’s Crisis Response Director Tirana Hassan said in a statement. “New bases are being erected to house the very same security forces that have committed crimes against humanity against Rohingya. The report follows previous accounts by Amnesty and other rights groups who have documented the demolition of Rohingya villages at the epicenter of recent violence, prompting concerns that evidence of human rights abuses are being concealed before they can be properly documented. “Myanmar’s authorities are erasing evidence of crimes against humanity, making any future attempts to hold those responsible to account extremely difficult,” Hassan said. Since Aug. 25, more than 671,000 Rohingya have fled Myanmar for Bangladesh, after the military launched a campaign of violence on the Rohingya population that the U.N.’s top human rights official strongly suspects includes “acts of genocide.” Myanmar’s government, which argues that the operations were a legitimate response to attacks by Rohingya militants, has requested “clear evidence” that atrocities have occurred. According to Amnesty’s report, satellite images reveal that Myanmar’s military is flattening Rohingya villages and building new security infrastructure, including three military bases. One base is allegedly being built in Inn Din township, where a Reuters special report revealed a massacre of 10 Rohingya men and boys in September by military forces and local Buddhist villagers. The new developments also include a “transit center” intended to house returning Rohingya refugees, that was built on top of a burned-out village, Amnesty said. Myanmar and Bangladesh signed a repatriation agreementin January that would see hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees returned within two years. But rights groups have criticized the deal as “alarmingly premature” and raised concerns that repatriated Rohingya will be detained in interment camps similar to those in the center of the state, where some 120,000 Rohingya have been confined since waves of sectarian violence in 2012. “This makes the voluntary, safe and dignified return of Rohingya refugees an even more distant prospect,” Hassan said. “Not only are their homes gone, but the new construction is entrenching the already dehumanizing discrimination they have faced in Myanmar.” http://time.com/5195201/myanmar-military-bases-rohingya-amnesty/ (c) 2018 Time

As hopes for an early, voluntary, safe and dignified repatriation of the Rohingya refugees to a protected homeland in Arakan fade, as Myanmar authorities persist in a “systematic,” lower-intensity persecution and violence in northern Arakan, and as new batches of expelled Rohingyas continue to cross the border into Bangladesh, the demand for bringing the perpetrators of the heinous crime to justice, including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and her military cohorts, gains traction. On Friday, Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein, the United Nations human rights chief, called for allegations of atrocities committed against the Rohingyas to be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for prosecution. Earlier, he informed the Human Rights Council that he strongly suspected that “acts of genocide” might have taken place against Rohingyas in Rakhine since August last year. He construed reports of bulldozing of alleged mass graves as a “deliberate attempt by the authorities to destroy evidence of potential international crimes, including possible crimes against humanity.” The rights chief urged UN General Assembly to establish a new independent mechanism to expedite criminal proceedings in courts against those responsible. Earlier, Prof Yanghee Lee, the UN's human rights envoy to Myanmar, expressed the view that there were grounds for bringing the country's de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, before an international tribunal for failing to intervene in the “clearance operation” the military had launched in Arakan following alleged militant attacks on several police posts and army base on August 25. In another move, three female Nobel peace laureates urged Bangladesh, the UN and other state parties to refer Myanmar military and other perpetrators to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the “genocide” against the Rohingyas. “Alternatively, the ICC prosecutor should open an independent investigation into the crimes against humanity and genocide perpetrated in Rakhine state,” they observed, after visiting Rohingya refugee sites in Bangladesh. One of the three laureates and an eminent legal expert, Shirin Ebadi, stated that as Myanmar was not a state party to the Rome Statute, the UN Security Council can recognise Myanmar's crimes against humanity and then refer that to the ICC. “We want this case to be discussed at the UN Security Council and there is sufficient evidence for this to take place,” she asserted. Denouncing the Myanmar army's “bald-faced lie” against the “mountains of evidence,” Phil Robertson of the Human Rights Watch noted that “they've been covering up their human rights atrocities for decades.” Referring to absurd claims of the Myanmar military leadership, Robertson observed, “Statements like these indicate why the international community must prioritise hauling Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and other Burmese military commanders up in the international criminal court to stand trial for the crimes against humanity they've ordered or committed.” Addressing the Berlin conference on Myanmar Genocide on February 27, 2018, Ambassador David Scheffer, who played a critical role in establishing the ICC, reminded the audience that “the age of impunity is over.” He stated that one cannot commit crimes on people and assume that he could get away doing so with impunity, as one could twenty-five years ago. When a state thrusts a million people on a neighbouring state, the argument of non-interference in domestic affairs becomes irrelevant. Such a context demands international actions, and judicial option remains one among those. Scheffer argues that ideally justice for Rohingya against Myanmar military and political leadership needs to be pursued in the national court as jurisdiction resides there. That option is improbable in the short term, though under a changed political dispensation in Myanmar, perhaps in 15-20 years' time, it could be a likely scenario. After weighing in several options including those of the International Court of Justice, universal jurisdiction of other national courts, and hybrid war crimes tribunals such as those set up in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, East Timor and Kosovo, Schaffer informs that a referral under the Rome Statute is perhaps the best option. If such a reference is made, then the ICC will enjoy the full jurisdiction. Invoking the Rome Statute by the Security Council to bring perpetrators of the Myanmar genocide to justice may not be an easy task. Thus far, states such as China and Russia remain committed to the wrong doer. The challenge remains two-fold. On the one hand, engage in diplomatic efforts to make those countries abstain from voting when such a resolution is passed. On the other hand, exert moral pressure by building international public opinion against the Myanmar genocide demanding accountability of the perpetrators and shaming their supporters by putting them on record. It is true that Myanmar, the site of crimes, is not a state party to the Rome Statute, and the perpetrators, the country's civil and military leadership, are not nationals of a state party. But that does not absolve them from facing justice. This is because, as Scheffer persuasively argues, “the crime scene does not stop at the border; it very purposively and intentionally flows over into Bangladesh in a massive way.” In their act of “ethnic cleansing,” the Myanmar leadership removed Rohingya population from one part of their territory. Its intent was not to move them to another part, but to banish them to Bangladesh. Thus, its intent, purpose and strategy were very clear. It made Bangladesh experience the impact of commission of all sorts of crimes of mass murder, gang rape, rampant torture, and destruction of livelihoods, dwellings, villages and townships. Thus, as an affected party, Bangladesh can self-refer to the ICC. The question is whether Bangladesh has the political will. Any other state party can refer as well. The state concerned does not have to be an affected party. The other recourse lies with the ICC prosecutor. Her office can also make the argument of the crime scene and move the ICC. So far, states appear unwilling to move in that direction. This necessitates a concerted engagement of the global civil society with the issue as it engaged to end the American occupation of Vietnam or in dismantling the apartheid regime in South Africa. Thus, building international solidarity through mobilising various quarters including poets, artists and singers is crucial in moulding international public opinion. Care must be taken so that such a campaign remains victim-driven. The Rohingya voices remain absolutely crucial. Appropriate training in documentation must be imparted so that along with capturing the survivors' testimonies, evidence on how the command structures operated is collected. Those engaged in the campaign must have the unflinching faith that “the bubble of security and impunity is now getting tighter and tighter, and therefore, demanding justice; documenting cases certainly are not exercises in futility.” At a time when the world community celebrates the 70th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the framing of the Genocide Convention, the Rohingyas' call for justice go unheeded. The international community must ensure that they are delivered on that account. http://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/perspective/icc-referral-need-the-hour-1546246 (C) 2018 The Daily Star

The surprise announcement on 8 March that U.S. President Donald Trump would meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un by May has overshadowed analysis of talks in Pyongyang between North and South Korean officials earlier in the week. But those talks were of deep significance. They positioned South Korea as a conduit to Trump, and set the stage for him to accept Kim Jong-un’s proposal. Moreover, the way the talks in Pyongyang progressed offers clues as to prospects for the forthcoming talks between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the U.S. When Kim sat down to dinner with the delegation from Seoul, he took the inter-Korean Winter Olympics rapprochement another step forward. Simply by attending, he ensured that the visit would greatly exceed South Korean expectations. The meeting was the first such event to take place in the central Korean Workers’ Party building; alongside Kim’s own presence, the gesture showed the South Koreans they were being feted. Kim’s decision to use South Korea as a conduit for his message to Washington reaffirmed Seoul’s centrality to any process. Caution is warranted, but continued talks among the three parties could create a stable forum for longer-term dialogue on critical issues related to security and stability on the Korean peninsula, potentially including Pyongyang’s weapons program. At the very least, we can be reasonably confident that talks will extend the current détente through the traditional period of spring tensions. Too early for optimism South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in was right, however, when he said that it is too early to be optimistic. The dramatic announcement of the forthcoming Trump-Kim meeting, close on the heels of news of the first inter-Korean summit in a decade, gives the impression of major progress. But it is still mainly at the level of symbolism; for now, little suggests Pyongyang will change its strategic course, and thus far the positive signs from all sides are in the form of statements rather than action. Pyongyang has not embraced a state of permanent, peaceful coexistence with Seoul, nor is it likely to. Nor will it forego its newly enhanced nuclear capabilities any time soon. Moreover, much of what the North Koreans agreed to at the meeting in Pyongyang, even according to positively spun South Korean readouts, is not new. The DPRK reportedly showed a willingness to discuss denuclearisation with the U.S., but its bottom line – that it will give up its nuclear weapons program only if the “hostile policy” of the U.S. against the North disappears, incorporating the removal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from South Korea – remains the same. Similarly, Kim’s reported acknowledgement that he understands why South Korean-U.S. military exercises will go ahead in late March and April is welcome, but not unprecedented. Kim is pragmatic; he knows there is little he can do to stop the exercises. Some joint manoeuvres – those conducted on North Korean holidays or in harvest season, for example, or “decapitation drills” – do irritate Pyongyang. Certainly, Kim is quick to condemn these exercises as belligerent when it serves his interests to do so. But evidence suggests he does not believe they pose a major threat to his regime. By escalating its missile and nuclear tests in 2017, North Korea gambled with its security and spent an enormous amount of money, but made big strides in the military sector. Now, however, the law of diminishing returns is in effect, and there is an emerging consensus among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan that sanctions are starting to bite. Pyongyang cannot bear indefinitely the costs of the standoff with Washington. It must replenish its cash reserves. Though few people believe North Korea has accomplished everything it set out to achieve militarily, it may have reached a point in its weapons development where it stands to gain less from further tests than from a bold diplomatic initiative. Unlike his methods, however, Kim’s mid-term goals are unlikely to have changed. The North Korean government has always sought the legitimacy conferred by equal treatment on the world stage. Also, it seeks to inflame tensions between left and right in South Korea, and to defang some of the sanctions arrayed against it. Kim’s charm offensive – of which the Pyongyang dinner was the latest showpiece – serves all these purposes. By making some conciliatory signs, the North Korean government doubtless hopes to erode the international consensus behind sanctions that the U.S. has worked hard to build. Relatively simple gestures could, perhaps, prompt Beijing to enforce sanctions less rigorously, and induce Seoul to seek new ways to engage North Korea economically. Even if UN sanctions remain in place, these steps would provide the Kim regime with significant breathing room. Clear-eyed, not cynical Being clear-eyed about the events of recent days should not mean being cynical. There are reasons, beyond President Trump’s apparently off-the-cuff pledge to meet Kim, to view the talks in Pyongyang positively and the unexpected openings as opportunities to be seized. That the talks took place at all indicates that the North’s engagement strategy, whatever its motives, has a longer shelf life than seemed likely back in January when it began. Kim’s freeze on nuclear and missile testing, and apparent acceptance of the upcoming round of South Korean-U.S. military exercises mean that he is giving space for diplomacy. The rapprochement will almost certainly continue as the drills recommence on 31 March, after the end of the Paralympics. Long before Trump and Kim’s purported meeting, Seoul and Pyongyang are supposed to establish a new hotline, and hold an inter-Korean summit – their third – at the Korean War truce village of Panmunjom in late April. Previous summits, in 2000 and 2007, took place in Pyongyang, resulting in vituperative criticism of the South Korean government from the opposition and the public in Seoul, especially in 2007. Meeting at the Peace House on the southern side of Panmunjom, where a series of blue (managed by the UN command) and silver (DPRK) buildings straddle the inter-Korean border, obviates the optics problem. Using that location also means that neither side need devote too much time and resources to planning – security is already assured, and the whole thing can be done in an afternoon if desired. Kim also appears to have said North Korea is ready to freeze nuclear and missile testing during talks with the U.S. True, but top U.S. officials believe that Kim’s weapons development would continue even were testing suspended. Nor is it clear that Kim was actually planning tests for this year. And he has made such statements before. That said, it has been several years since the last such effort, and the pledge to freeze tests presents an opportunity that direct U.S.-North Korea talks can build on. Kim’s hosting of the dinner for the South Korean delegation undoubtedly served – like the dispatch of his sister Yo-jong to the Winter Olympics in early February – to signal seriousness of purpose. The country’s personalist political system makes decision-making surprisingly transparent at times; the DPRK’s bureaucracy must now follow through on the statements attributed to Kim in a way that would not hold for any other official. Broadcasting a full ten-minute film about the meeting, as North Korean television did, while doubtless motivated by casting Kim in a flattering light, also raised the cost of failure for the North Korean side. Leaving senior government officials to deal with the South Korean visitors would have given North Korea wiggle room, even more so if the whole thing had been kept out of the public eye. Kim’s very public involvement conveys the message (be it sincere or not) that Pyongyang’s engagement is real. An opportunity in the months ahead? Overall, therefore, while exuberance is unwarranted, the inter-Korean meeting in Pyongyang represents a positive sign for the trajectory of North-South relations in 2018. For its part, Washington has to this point focused on devising and rolling out the economic component of its maximum pressure strategy. Even when accepting Kim’s offer of talks, the White House made clear this strategy would continue. But with a Kim-Trump meeting suddenly looming, it needs to shift gears and prepare to take advantage of an opening that has been created in part by that pressure, though rather more so by Moon’s sensitive mediation. If he is serious about changing North East Asia for the better, Trump must quickly appoint an experienced, knowledgeable team, one that can lay the groundwork for talks between the two leaders that ideally set the stage for longer-term negotiations aimed at resolving the nuclear crisis. Concrete steps – even small ones – can be the ballast of symbolic gestures. For the U.S. and South Korea, it should be easy to agree to ensure that any joint military exercises go ahead in a manner that maintains force readiness without unnecessarily antagonising – and thus empowering – hardliners in Pyongyang and potentially imperilling both North-South and DPRK-U.S. engagement. Avoiding decapitation drills or exercises on particularly sensitive dates would be a low-cost concession, as would keeping nuclear assets out of the vicinity for the duration. South Korea and the U.S. could even take a step further. Seoul could invite personnel from the North Korean People’s Army to observe these exercises. This move would pose little risk to South Korea or the U.S. – but the DPRK’s acceptance of the invitation would have outsize significance, and any lingering fear that the exercises could disguise preparations for a genuine attack would dissipate. The U.S. must determine its agenda and priorities in consultation with South Korea. On direct talks, Washington would do better taking its cue from Seoul as to when such talks make sense rather than setting preconditions. Both countries will have to bring along China and Japan, who are deeply invested in avoiding a crisis on the Korean peninsula. There are many good reasons for caution. But if the U.S. can pair its maximum pressure with diplomacy, its DPRK strategy could find considerable convergence with the policies of Asian powers. Combined with North Korea’s outreach, this possibility makes conditions for nudging Pyongyang in a more positive direction particularly propitious. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/modest-diplomatic-promise-north-koreas-charm-offensive?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=23a945e40f-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_03_11&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-23a945e40f-359909997 (c) 2018 International Crisis Group

(c) 2018 African Affairs Committee

In 1941, history’s largest, most horrific war ever broke out, between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Some 55 million people were killed worldwide in WWII, half in the Soviet Union. Who was Joseph Stalin? Who was Adolf Hitler? Why did they clash? This lecture, based upon a book of the same name, uses a vast array of once secret documents to trace the rise of Soviet Communism and its deadly rivalry with Nazism. It analyzes why Great Powers go to war against each other, delivering lessons for today. Stephen Kotkin is the Birkelund Professor in History and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Princeton University, where he directs the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies and co-directs the Program in the History and Practice of Diplomacy. He is also a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He was the business book reviewer for the New York TimesSunday business section for a number of years. His essays and reviews appear in Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, and other publications. Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941, is his sixth book. The Washington History Seminar thanks the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute for their co-sponsorship of this event. The Washington History Seminar is co-chaired by Eric Arnesen (George Washington University) and Philippa Strum (Woodrow Wilson Center) and is sponsored jointly by theNational History Center of the American Historical Association and the Wilson Center's History and Public Policy Program. It meets weekly during the academic year. The seminar thanks the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and the George Washington University History Department for their support. Monday, March 12, 2018 4:00pm-5:30pm 6th Floor Moynihan Boardroom Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania, Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20004 Phone: 202.691.4000 WHS@wilsoncenter.org Privacy Policy (c) 2018 Wilson Center