Sri Lanka has declared a state of emergency for ten days to rein in the spread of communal violence, a government spokesperson said on Tuesday, a day after Buddhists and Muslims clashed in the Indian Ocean island’s central district of Kandy. What are the reasons behind this latest communal violence in the country? There are many factors behind the recent upsurge of violence against Sri Lankan Muslims. The events of the last ten days have not been local “clashes” between Buddhists and Muslims, but organised and targeted attacks by national-level militant groups who are well known and have made their intentions clear through traditional and social media. The immediate cycle of violence began with the death on 3 March of a Sinhala Buddhist man in the central hill town of Teldeniya. He had been attacked ten days earlier by four local Muslim men, who were promptly arrested and detained. His death sparked anger and limited violence the next day by local Buddhists, 24 of whom were arrested and held by the police. Demanding the release of these men, leaders of radical Buddhist groups converged on the town with hundreds of their supporters from other districts, who later began attacking mosques and Muslim businesses and homes. Even after yesterday’s declaration of a state of emergency, violence continues against Muslims in the hills around the town of Kandy. The violence this week came just days after a mosque and Muslim businesses were attacked in the south-eastern town of Ampara. There are indications the attack was planned and carried out mostly by Buddhist militants brought in from outside Ampara town, supported through rumours spread on social media. Government officials have acknowledged that the damage was aggravated by the slow response of the local police. The ongoing violence marks the resurgence of militant Buddhist groups that first emerged in 2012-2014 with the support of Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government. Having ceased during the first two years of the current coalition government, attacks on Muslims began again over a six-week period in April and May 2017 and for two days in November 2017, with militants apparently emboldened by the government’s failure to prosecute those responsible for violence and hate speech under the Rajapaksa regime. Sri Lanka has grabbed international headlines in the past due to tensions between the Sinhalese and Tamils. But how do you describe the relations between Buddhists and Muslims in Sri Lanka? Muslims, who make up almost ten per cent of Sri Lanka’s population, live across the island, among both Sinhalese (75 per cent of the population and overwhelmingly Buddhist) and Tamils (about fifteen per cent and mostly Hindu). Relations between Muslims and Sri Lanka’s other communities are mostly harmonious. At the same time, there are longstanding and deeply rooted fears among many Sinhalese that the Sinhala and Buddhist character of the island is under threat and must be protected, even to the extent of using violence. While the threat has previously been seen as coming from colonial rulers and then Tamils, Muslims are now the primary worry for many Sinhalese. Narratives of insecurity, fed by global Islamophobic tropes, present Muslims as violent extremists, as increasing their population so fast as to pose a threat to the Sinhala Buddhist majority status, as misusing their economic power to weaken Sinhalese, and as using underhand means to reduce Sinhala Buddhist numbers such as secretly planting contraceptives in food eaten and clothes worn by Sinhalese. These fears and myths are widely promoted – along with calls for violence – through social media. The fears are also regularly encouraged by some Sinhala business interests to weaken their Muslim competitors. These rivalries play out at the local level with regular appeals to Sinhala Buddhist consumers to boycott Muslim shops, and with rioting that regularly targets Muslim-owned businesses. They also have a national character, with certain Sinhala business leaders widely believed to be key funders of Bodu Bala Sena and other militant groups. Criticisms of Muslims as gaining greater economic power through unfair means have particular resonance with Sinhalese facing economic difficulties, as the government struggles to control the cost of living and provide sustainable livelihoods, especially in rural areas and small towns. How vulnerable are Sri Lankan Muslims to being drawn to violence? Sri Lankan Muslims have been admirably restrained, disciplined and non-violent in their response to what is now five years of severe, sustained and often violent pressure. One can only hope that this continues to be the case, though continued violent provocations – and the failure of the police to protect Muslims – appears to be testing the patience of some, with reports of the first retaliatory violence against Sinhala businesses. Many in Sri Lanka now fear the current wave of militant Buddhist attacks may be designed in part to provoke a violent response from Muslims, which would then be used to justify wider-scale attacks on the community. How has the Sri Lankan government tried to quell the tensions between Buddhists and Muslims and promote communal harmony? The government has done very little to address either the underlying mistrust and misunderstandings between the two communities, or to rein in the small number of Buddhists who promote or use violence. Despite coming to power in January 2015 promising to end impunity for attacks on Muslims, the government has launched no proper investigations of past violence, and prosecuted no leaders of groups known to be involved in attacks on Muslims. Despite recent statements from the president, prime minister and other officials that the law will be strictly enforced and those engaging in violence will be arrested, key organisers of the ongoing violence remain free. Some of these have posted on social media information to help target Muslims for attack. Police, in a number of locations, have been credibly accused of siding with the mobs. While government leaders are not believed to be supporting the violence against Muslims, they appear to be afraid of taking action against the perpetrators, especially those Buddhist monks thought to be involved, for fear of alienating Sinhala Buddhist voters by appearing to favour Muslims. This fear has grown since the poor showing of government candidates in the 10 February local elections, in which former President Rajapaksa led a successful campaign rooted in a strongly Sinhala Buddhist nationalist platform. The increasingly deep divide between the president and the prime minister, who is battling to hold on to his job, appears to have further paralysed the government. What steps could or should the government take to curb further communal violence? The government needs to adopt a three-pronged strategy, beginning with enforcing the law, including against hate speech, and arresting and prosecuting offenders. While the state of emergency the government imposed on 6 March appeared at first to reduce the violence, attacks have resumed, with the police and army often failing to stop the rioters. Should the government act decisively with arrests of key figures behind the violence and hate speech and explain the necessity of its actions to the Buddhist religious leadership and the general public, it can likely win the necessary support for those policies. Over the mid- to long term, the government must also work actively to correct the lies and disinformation about Muslims that are spread by radical Buddhist groups, especially on social media, such as the allegation that Muslim restaurants regularly put contraceptives in their food to sterilise their Buddhist customers and reduce their population. The impact of such rumours and “fake news” could be significantly reduced if the government used its media and information channels to combat them. Finally, over the long term, but beginning now, the government needs to more actively promote a pluralist vision of Sri Lanka, in which the country belongs to all communities equally, while still protecting the country’s unique Sinhala and Buddhist culture. How do you see the security and communal situation evolving in the country in the coming weeks? Will the Sri Lankan government be able to bring the situation under control? The continued failure to make arrests of well-known Buddhist agitators and the instigators of recent attacks is not encouraging, and despite the state of emergency, the government still appears uncertain about how to respond to the violence. The chaos and infighting that has characterised the coalition government’s response to their defeat in the local government elections has continued and contributed to a sense of weakness that has been seized on by militant Buddhist groups. Strong, decisive and coherent action is urgently needed if Sri Lanka is to avoid tipping into a new and potentially crippling round of communal conflict. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/buddhist-militancy-rises-again-sri-lanka?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=a29d219832-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_03_07&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-a29d219832-359909997 (c) 2018 International Crisis Watch

Nine years ago today, on March 4th the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued the first arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan. The initial charges were for war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, on July 12, 2010, the ICC issued a second warrant this time inducing the added charge of genocide. The ICC cited Sudan’s genocidal campaign in Darfur, which has been ongoing for more than 14 years and continues unabated to this day. For more than 14 years, the Sudanese Government’s military forces and their allied militia (the Janjaweed) have carried out systematic attacks against the Darfuri people based on their ethnicity. They have bombed villages, abducted civilians, looted private property, and used rape as a weapon of war against women and girls. As a result, over 4 million Darfuris have been affected, and over 3 million have been forced to leave their villages and continued to live makeshift camps within Sudan and in Chad. To date, over 3 million people remain in these camps, with limited access to humanitarian assistance, education, healthcare and food. In addition to the tactics above, President al-Bashir has used chemical weapon against innocent civilians in Darfur according to a 2016 report by Amnesty International; the Sudanese Government dropped at least 32 chemical bombs on villages inhabited by civilians. As a result, between 200 and 250 civilians reportedly died of exposure to these agents, most of them children. Many others developed life-threatening symptoms, including severe gastrointestinal conditions involving bloody vomiting and diarrhea, blistering and rashes on the skin, loss of vision, and respiratory problems. The situation remains urgent, as the government shows no signs of changing its genocidal policy or stopping their unrelenting attacks. Throughout 2017, there were near constant reports of rape and attacks. Also, the Sudanese Government’s targeting of Darfuri students studying at the University of Khartoum was highlighted when over 1000 students were forced to abandon university as a result of the mass and systematic abuse. We write urge United Nations Security Council to fulfill its responsibility and support the International Criminal Court fulfill its obligation to hold al-Bashir accountable for his crimes. We are extremely concerned that during the last 14 years justice has been denied to the people of Darfur. Although the ICC has investigated and issued four arrest warrants for President al-Bashir and three members of his government, some states party to the Rome Statute have failed to meet their obligation to arrest al-Bashir. States party to the Rome Statute have not followed through with their duties to arrest and transfer President al-Bashir to The Hague for trial. Instead of holding Bashir accountable, The international community has begun to reward president al-Bashir ass example. In 2016, the European Union initiated a collaboration between them and Sudan in an attempt to curb the flow of refugees entering Europe. This collaboration entails the EU provided funding for the Sudanese Government, which Sudan has used pay its Janjaweed Militias, to continue the genocide in Darfur. In October of 2017, the United States even went so far as to lift sanctions on Sudan. These sanctions were initially introduced during the Bush Administration as the result of Sudan’s continued genocidal campaign in Darfur as well as Sudan’s sponsoring of terrorist organizations in Northern Africa, in hopes of destabilizing the region. These sanctions were not supposed to be lifted unless Sudan was no longer sponsoring terrorists and brought lasting peace to Darfur. However, despite the fact that neither of these conditions was met, President Trump lifted sanctions on Sudan. President al-Bashir has managed to escape accountability for his crimes for too long. We urge states party to the Rome Statute to act on their obligation to international justice and bring al-Bashir to The Hague to stand trial. Justice delayed is justice denied, and until the international community faces the reality of what is happening in Darfur, millions will continue to suffer at the hands of this man. We demand that the United Nations put in place a method for bringing international criminals to stand trial and face the reality of what they have done, and we urge all members of the UN to support such a mechanism. We cannot let a convicted genocidaire get away with slaughtering innocent people. Nine years of impunity must end! President al-Bashir’s continued impunity is a threat to the values we hold in high esteem. When Syrian President Assad was said to have used chemical weapons against his own people, the international community lets it be known that they do not condone that behavior. Yet, when President al-Bashir was rumored to have done the same thing, the international community did nothing, not a single word of condemnation was uttered against the Sudanese Government. The world has been complacent in genocide for too long. Now is the time to speak up and demand action! We must let it be known that when we say “Never Again” we mean never again. We must speak up, continue to expose al-Bashir’s crimes and hold our leaders accountable for ignoring it. We urge the United States Government not normalize relations with Sudan. Normalizing with a genocidaire will normalize genocide. Thank you for your continued support! Sincerely, Niemat Ahmadi President and Founder www.darfurwomenaction.org (c) 2018 Darfur Women Action Group

The Arab Coalition forces pushed forward a large military force closer to the border of Haradh city in Hajjah province, northwest of Yemen. According to military sources, the Saudi unit has pushed a military brigade into the Haradh axis as part of a military operation aimed at ending the control of the Houthi militias over the city. The arrival of the Saudi forces coincided with the launch of a military operation against the militias in the city with limited participation of Sudanese and Yemeni forces from the fifth military zone. Saada and Hajjah fronts witnessed clashes and artillery shelling from the forces of the National Army, supported by the Joint Saudi Forces, which targeted the positions and the defenses of the Houthi militias. The bombing coincided with the flight of the coalition aircrafts, and carrying out a number of raids targeting the militias in the internal roads in Saada and Jouf. On the eastern front of Saada, engineering teams from the National Army, were able to extract about 150 mines and explosive devices planted by the Houthi militias, with the technical support of the coalition forces. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2018/03/06/-Yemen-Saudi-military-force-heading-closer-to-Haradh-border.html (c) 2018 Al Arabiya English

The new Ramaphosa Cabinet is one of promise and compromise. The Gordhans, Nenes and Hanekoms indicate that something new is possible on the economic front. The markets have also taken note, and the Rand is stronger than it was before Nene was fired. On the other hand, the Mabuzas, Dlaminis and Gigabas show that the struggle against state capture, corruption and poor governance and management is far from over. After the recent vote on expropriation without compensation many South Africans feel discouraged and betrayed. Many thought the ANC-decision of December 2017 would never be implemented. Others were skeptical about Ramaphosa from the beginning - he, after all, inherited a divided and rotten ANC. The question is: should ordinary South Africans give the new government a chance? My answer is: Yes, BUT ... The “yes” part is easy. Ramaphosa is a big improvement on Zuma. He’s a good businessman who knows the principles of economics. He is eloquent, presidential and has a good grasp of large numbers. He has proven himself as an excellent negotiator and strategist. He deserves a chance - he has been waiting a long time for the opportunity to become President. However, the BUT part (with capital letters) is just as important. There are serious questions about Ramaphosa’s ability to fix the ANC and get the party on the right track. Even formerly ardent ANC supporters, like Sipho Pityana, think it’s too late. Add to that the ANC’s divisions and the ability of Zuma faction to bounce back. The appointment of David Mabuza and Bathabile Dlamini testify to that. As has often been said, President Ramaphosa has to consolidate his power base and operate between two polarities. On the one hand, there is the directive from Nasrec 17 to build unity and reconciliation within the ANC, in order to ensure victory in 2019. On the other hand, there are his own convictions and the slogan of his election campaign - to ensure good governance and eradicate state capture and corruption. In almost every decision he will face these two contradictory goals. When the Cabinet decides on economic policy, he will also have to counteract the socialist and populist influences that still reside with his colleagues. Economic growth and investment will not be achieved through vague ambiguities. When he and his close colleagues want to rescue Eskom and other state-owned enterprises, he will have to make brave decisions about partial or total privatisation - and have to convince or ignore his hostile colleagues. And throughout, he will have to work against the devastating consequences of racial transformation and cadre deployment in the public service. The consequences of this, especially as seen in an almost complete lack of capacity and integrity (think of SASSA and Esidimeni), stand like a mountain between him and success. At the moment, however, the biggest BUT is expropriation without compensation (EWC). Less than 24 hours after the Cabinet of hope was announced, the motion of madness followed. Led into a trap by the sly EFF, the ANC caucus voted by consensus for the motion, commissioning the Constitutional Review Committee to review section 25 and any other necessary clauses, and to suggest the necessary constitutional amendments so that the correct future “land tenure regime” can be established. The motion quotes President Ramaphosa’s State of the Nation Address (SONA), which acknowledged the original sin of land dispossession, and bound him to the commitment that government will continue with a land reform programme that includes EWC, while use is made of all mechanisms at the disposal of the state. It should be rolled out in a manner that increases agricultural production, improves food security and ensures that the land be returned to those from whom it was taken under colonialism and apartheid. Well, talk about contradictions. Anyone who believes that agricultural land can be expropriated without compensation on a large scale (with the associated uncertainties and banks that must write off billions in debt) and that agricultural production will increase and food security will be improved, lives in la-la land. This is compounded by the way in which the whole motion was passed - in an emotional manner, based on the false facts and lies of the State’s so-called land audit. To believe that black South Africans only own 2% of rural land and only 7% of urban land, one must also believe in fairy tales and has surely lost one’s grip on reality. There is abundant evidence (also in the Motlanthe report presented to Parliament) that government should almost exclusively be held responsible for poor land reform. Why are those shortcomings not even addressed? How are things going to improve if the land is taken without compensation? How are black farmers suddenly going to become more successful? It was shown in the Parliamentary debate that the government owns about 4 000 farms, which lie fallow. It should further be noted also that there are millions of hectares of land in the possession of ANC-run Municipalities that could be made available for housing, but no action is being taken. In addition, there are millions of hectares of communally-owned land, which are still controlled with an iron fist by traditional leaders, and where agricultural production is not nearly optimal. People who think that EWC is only targeted at a few farmers should think again. The EFF and much of the ANC would like the ability to expropriate all property. This includes houses, cars and shares. Secure ownership of private property lies at the heart of any successful economic system and country. It’s not a scientific law devised by white monopoly capital, it is internationally accepted and proven worldwide by successful countries. One cannot be halfway pregnant. In the same way, one cannot halfway protect property rights. Either your property rights are fully protected, or they are not protected at all, and disappear. Despite all these rational arguments, the motion in favour of EWC was accepted by a large majority - including Ramaphosa supporters. One wonders whether the President knew about this, or whether the ANC was caught unawares by the EFF? It would surely have been possible to simply say “we will not allow the EFF to dictate to us, we will first conduct our own investigations and then table our own motion”. President Ramaphosa himself has already suggested that there should be an investigation into the causes of government's failed land reform efforts. It seems that the ANC and its president have mounted an EFF tiger that they will not be able to ride until the very end. The conclusion is: give the Ramaphosa government a chance, but if they go through with EWC, all other promises and plans are doomed to fail. http://www.fwdeklerk.org/index.php/en/latest/news/745-article-give-ramaphosa-government-a-chance-but (c) 2018 FW De Klerk Foundation

To mark International Women’s Day (March 8), Reporters Without Borders (RSF) is publishing a report entitled “Women’s rights: Forbidden subject” which sheds light on the difficulties that journalists – both men and women – can encounter when they cover women’s rights. Covering women’s rights does not come without risks for reporters. RSF has established Women’s rights: Forbidden subjectREAD THE REPORTthat from 2012 to 2017, the rights of at least 90 journalists in around 20 countries were seriously violated because they dared to cover or talk about women’s rights or gender issues. Several months of research has yielded the following chilling breakdown of these cases: 11 of these journalists were murdered, 12 were imprisoned, at least 25 were physically attacked, and at least 40 others were or are still being threatened on social networks. In India, Gauri Lankesh, the editor of the secular and feminist weekly Gauri Lankesh Patrike, paid with her life for articles that criticized the woman’s place in the caste system. She was gunned down on September 5, 2017. In Iran, many feminist journalists have been subjected to judicial harassment and imprisonment in connection with their writing. They include Mansoureh Shojaee, who now lives in exile, and Narges Mohammadi, who is still detained. However, it is not just women journalists who are persecuted by the enemies of women’s rights. In Somalia, Abdiaziz Abdinur Ibrahim was arrested and sentenced to a year in prison on a fake news charge after he interviewed a rape victim. “Journalists should not have to risk their lives in order to cover women’s rights in 2018 but unfortunately they do in many parts of the world,” RSF secretary-general Christophe Deloire said. “In this report, we show how press freedom’s predators obstruct investigative reporting and coverage of women’s rights by journalists, both men and women. And we offer very clear recommendations for ensuring that both halves of humanity enjoy the right to equal treatment by the media everywhere, without which we cannot talk of journalistic freedom and pluralism.” Predators with many faces Who are the people who prey on women and journalists? RSF’s report initially identifies extremist religious groups such as the Taliban and Islamic State. In the United States, journalists who cover abortion rights receive death threats from pro-life groups. Criminal organizations often seek to silence reporters. In Mexico, covering the many murders of women in the northern state of Chihuahua is particularly risky. Authoritarian regimes – led by those in China, Turkey, and Egypt – are also opposed to letting women’s issues become a subject of public debate. In France, Canada, and many other countries, hordes of enraged Internet users unleash cyber-harassment campaigns against journalists. When the victims are women, the attacks become even more virulent and usually acquire a sexual dimension. In response to the persecution, some reporters have had no choice but to flee into exile, some have stopped reporting, and others have chosen to resist. In this report, RSF pays tribute to all of these journalists and offers recommendations to governments, international organizations, online platforms, and news organizations so that women’s rights are no longer regarded as a taboo subject and journalists who want to cover this issue can do so freely. https://rsf.org/en/news/rsf-shines-light-forbidden-coverage-womens-rights (c) 2018 Reporters Without Borders

The attacks represent an alarming escalation for Burkina Faso in terms of organisation, lethality of armaments and length of engagement. The attacks were claimed on 3 March by the Group to Support Muslims and Islam, known by its Arabic acronym JNIM, which is part of a wider coalition in the Sahel linked to al-Qaeda. Operations were carried out by two groups of at least four to five assailants each. While the incidents were confined to the city center, they hit two symbolic targets at the heart of power in the country: the army headquarters and the French Embassy. The official death toll is sixteen, including nine assailants. Reliable sources indicated more than 30 dead. The number of wounded is around 85. At the army headquarters, it seems up to five men in a vehicle either used a grenade or rocket-propelled grenade to blast their way through the entrance gate, where they then shot at soldiers in the courtyard and detonated a vehicle full of explosives by the main building. This version is confirmed by two different French and Burkinabé security sources. At the French Embassy, a group of at least four men tried to force their way into the embassy. Unable to enter, they took up positions nearby and exchanged heavy fire with Burkinabé security forces. French soldiers, who have played a leading role in Burkina Faso’s security for decades, quickly reinforced the building with men lowered from helicopters. Shooting continued for several hours. Burkinabé forces relied heavily on French support to respond to the attacks. A French military source told Crisis Group: “Burkinabé forces were crushed at the beginning. We helped them”. Even so, compared to the previous two attacks in Ouagadougou in 2016 and 2017, the response time and organisation of the reaction seem slightly improved. Violence in the Sahel long seemed to spare Burkina Faso. How has Ouagadougou become a target? It is not only Ouagadougou that has become a target; so has the north of the country. Long spared by the Sahel’s armed groups, Burkina is now part of the wars of the Sahel. Since January 2016, the country has experienced several deadly attacks from regional and international terrorist networks. Nineteen people were killed and 25 others injured when suspected jihadists opened fire on a Turkish restaurant in central Ouagadougou on 13 August 2017. Thirty people were killed in similar circumstances in January 2016, not far from the Turkish restaurant, in an attack claimed by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Since 2015, northern Burkina Faso, which borders troubled Mali, has also experienced 80 attacks that are increasingly frequent and lethal. These attacks are mostly done by Ansarul Islam, a group founded in December 2016 that is locally rooted, albeit with ties to other groups in Mali. One reason why Burkina Faso has become an easier target may be the weakness of the country’s security apparatus. Since the departure of former President Blaise Compaoré in October 2014, the army is significantly less organised. The special forces unit known as Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) under Compaoré was dismantled after his departure, and no equivalent has replaced it. Intelligence gathering appears to be weak, judging by the failure to detect or disrupt the major attacks that happened on Friday. Two teams totaling at least eight men were able to cross the city center carrying heavy weapons and driving a car full of explosives without being spotted. Under Compaoré, intelligence capacities were based on strong individuals. Spymaster Gilbert Diendéré, Compaoré’s personal chief of staff, headed an impressive regional and international intelligence network. Those individuals have left. It is taking time to rebuild efficient institutions in their wake. Is the attack in Ouagadougou a purely domestic affair, or linked to broader violence in the Sahel region? The relationship between the Burkinabé government and the various armed groups of the Sahel has changed. From the mid-2000s to 2012, Compaoré’s regime cut deals with armed groups, allegedly providing them with logistical support in exchange for their neutrality. This evolved with the 2012-2013 Malian crisis. Thousands of Malian refugees fled from their homes to the Burkinabé border, raising fears in Ouagadougou that war would spill over. New armed groups appeared, with which Compaoré’s regime had less established relations. Compaoré therefore revised his strategy, slowly switching from arrangements with armed groups to more direct military intervention. Burkina Faso deployed 1,000 troops along the Malian border after January 2013, and 650 troops in Mali as part of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This may have put Burkina Faso in some jihadists’ firing line. In February 2013, a spokesperson for the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), one of the groups that controlled northern Mali for almost a year in 2012, said: “Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey are targets for our suicide bombers”. Where do the Ouagadougou attacks fit into the context of jihadist violence in the Sahel, and the regional response to it? This attack happened at a moment when the level of violence in the Sahel is very high. On 3 March, the Group to Support Muslims and Islam (JNIM) claimed responsibility for the Ouagadougou attacks. Part of a wider coalition linked to al-Qaeda, JNIM comprises several jihadist factions, including groups formerly known as Ansar Eddine, al-Mourabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front. It is headed by Iyad ag Ghali, a Malian Tuareg. JNIM said the attack was in retaliation for a French airstrike on 14 February, which killed several leaders, including Mourabitoun, deputy al-Hassan al-Ansari, and Malick ag Wanasnat, a close associate to Ghali. This French airstrike was part of a surge in military operations in neighbouring Mali, conducted by either the Malian armed forces (FAMA), the French counter-terrorism force known as Barkhane, or a combination of both together with the support of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The Malian and French operations aim to reverse a rising tide of jihadist attacks and jihadists establishing control of swathes of territory. They also aim to pave the way for presidential elections in Mali in July 2018. The main jihadist groups on their target list include: the JNIM itself; a faction of the JNIM previously known as the Macina Liberation Front, which operates in central Mali under the leadership of Hamadoun Kouffa; and a local affiliate of the Islamic State (ISIS) that operates in Menaka along the border with Niger, led by Adnane Abou Walid al-Sahraoui. At the same time, progress is being made toward the operationalisation of the G5 Sahel joint force, formed between Burkina Faso, four of its neighbours, and backed by France. Launched in February 2017 and analysed in a 12 December 2017 Crisis Group report, the G5 has secured funding, begun formal planning for its relationship with MINUSMA, and has now conducted two operations in the border areas between Mali, Niger and Burkina. According to the Burkinabé minister of security, a meeting on the G5 may have been in progress at the army headquarters when the attack happened. In its statement, JNIM wrote that it wants to discourage the “Burkinabé regime and others that raced to join the G5 and fight on behalf of the French”. With targets attacked including the army headquarters, is there a possibility that the attackers may have been helped by some Burkinabé army members? Burkinabé authorities declared that they suspect some army members of helping Friday’s attackers, leaking key information. Attackers at the army headquarters wore Burkinabé military uniforms and most of them were Burkinabé nationals. As a retired colonel of the Burkinabé army put it on Friday in a local TV interview: “Terrorism is a multi-facetted issue and we shouldn’t rule out any hypothesis”. The retired colonel noted that 566 members of the army and air force were summarily dismissed in 2011. Some of these men, who have been barred from rejoining the army for the rest of their lives, became bandits or joined Islamist groups in Mali, including Malian al-Qaeda offshoots, as discussed in Crisis Group’s 22 July 2013 report Burkina Faso: With or Without Compaoré, Times of Uncertainty. Also, other members of the former Presidential Security Regiment have been sacked or dispersed to other units, and they are very frustrated. Many Burkinabés, including some senior members of the current government, privately suspect that former collaborators of Compaoré could be behind these terrorist attacks due to the links those individuals built with armed groups. There is, however, no direct evidence to support those suspicions. In its statement, JNIM referred to those past good relations. It said the previous Burkinabé government’s position of non-interference meant it avoided “falling into a swamp of blood". Some former Compaoré allies, who allegedly built and maintained those relations, are now living abroad. Others, accused of supporting a short-lived 2015 coup against the current post-Compaoré order, should have been on trial in Ouagadougou last week. The trial was suspended after their lawyers protested it would not have been impartial. No direct evidence supports accusations of their involvement in Friday’s attack. How does Friday’s attack affect Burkina Faso’s stability? If information of possible help from security forces to the attackers is confirmed, it will further divide and disrupt an already fragile army. This will also harm popular confidence in the government and military. Relations between current authorities and the former Compaoré-era political elite will become tenser and increase the climate of suspicion in the country. The attacks could, in any event, have significant economic and social consequences. The more Burkina Faso is under attack, the more the government will be tempted to spend on the military. As Crisis Group pointed out in its 12 October 2017 report on The Social Roots of Jihadist Violence in Burkina Faso’s North, the less the government spends on development, the less it is able to answer strong social demands for better public services and governance that emerged after Compaoré’s departure. Its continued failure to meet those demands risks provoking street protests and perhaps even riots. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/burkina-fasos-alarming-escalation-jihadist-violence?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=e0238ce0fa-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_03_05&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-e0238ce0fa-359909997 (c) 2018 International Crisis Group

UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, is concerned about the safety of a group of vulnerable Rohingya women, men and children from Myanmar, who have been living in a so-called “no man’s land” near the border between Myanmar and Bangladesh since the end of August 2017. UNHCR is closely following the developments after they were reportedly ordered to vacate the area by the Myanmar authorities. UNHCR underscores that everyone has the right to seek asylum, just as they also have the right to return home when they deem the time and circumstances right. People who have fled violence in their country must be granted safety and protection and any decision to return must be voluntary and based upon a free and informed choice. UNHCR also reiterates that conditions are not yet conducive to the return of Rohingya refugees. The causes of their flight have not been addressed and we have yet to see substantive progress on addressing the denial of their rights. Pursuing the conditions that will address these causes and enable their voluntary and sustainable return is critical. In this regard, UNHCR continues to request to the Government of Myanmar to allow humanitarian access to UNHCR and partners throughout Rakhine State. This will be essential to promote coexistence among all of communities; to support the government towards their commitment to implement the Rakhine Advisory Commission’s (RAC) recommendations; and for UNHCR to monitor protection conditions, provide independent information to refugees, and accompany returns as and when they take place. In Bangladesh, the Government and people continue to generously receive refugees and to provide them with protection and support. Nearly 700,000 refugees have now sought refuge in the country since violence broke out in the northern part of Myanmar’s Rakhine State in late August of 2017. http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/3/5a9d80944/unhcr-appeals-protection-rohingya-currently-trapped-myanmar-bangladesh.html (c) 2018 UNHCR

Yemeni forces have made advances in the Arhab directorate, northeast of Sanaa, after fierce clashes with Iran-backed Houthi militia, Saudi state-news channel Al-Ekhbariya reported. A Yemeni fighter loyal to President Abedrabbo Mansour Hadi stands on an armed pick up truck near Kahbub, on a mountainous area overlooking the strategic Bab al-Mandab Strait at the entrance to the Red Sea. (AFP) A military source said that the army was able to advance to the region of Oran and assumed control of key positions on roads leading to the areas of Al-Jouf, Naham and Arhab. The source said that three Houthi militia leaders and 17 militants were killed in the clashes, while the rest fled from their positions towardSanaa, leaving behind weaponry and equipment. In the Naham district east of Sanaa, Yemeni forces reclaimed strategic positions from the Houthis after clashes that resulted in the death of 13 militants, including two prominent field commanders. The army also launched an attack on militia positions on the Maimana Al-Maimana front ,north of Naham, which lead to the liberation of several strategic positions on the Al-Zilzal mountain range. The army continued its advancement to reclaim the remaining areas north of the province of Dboua, after more intense skirmishes took place with Houthi fighters. In Taiz, Yemeni forces liberated areas in the western corner of the province. http://www.arabnews.com/node/1258211/middle-east (c) 2018 Arab News

Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Didier Reynders has expressed concern about the continued violation of human rights of Rohingya community in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Reynders highly appreciated Bangladesh’s generous role in hosting a large number of displaced Rohingyas in Bangladesh. Bangladesh Foreign Minister AH Mahmood Ali held bilateral meeting with his Belgian counterpart at his office on Friday and discussed the issues. The Belgian Foreign Minister expressed condolence and sympathy at the death of Bangladeshi peacekeepers in Mali, according to the Bangladesh Foreign Ministry . In that context he appreciated Bangladesh’s contribution to global peace and security and both the ministers agreed to enhance cooperation at multilateral forum, including the UN Security Council. The Belgian deputy prime minister and foreign minister also emphasized the enhanced collaboration between Business communities of the two countries and in that context underscored the need for regular exchange of Business delegation. Foreign Minister Ali agreed to the proposed wider business engagements between the two countries and invited Belgian investments in sectors like pharmaceuticals, energy, dredging, infrastructure. Ali met with MEPs over dinner on Thursday at Bangladesh House and exchanged views with Members of European Parliament. The MEPs assured to continue keeping pressure on Myanmar and appreciated Bangladesh’s humanitarian approach towards the Rohingyas. Minister Ali sought their support for implementation of arrangements made so far, including full implementation of the Annan Commission’s report leading to citizenship Rohingyas. http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2018/03/03/belgian-rights-violation-rohingya/ (c) 2018 Dhaka Tribune

“You are our last hope” - “We need you” - “We are counting on you” - “Will this ever stop?” These are the messages that Reporters Without Borders (RSF) is sending to the European Court of Human Rights on behalf of Turkey’s arbitrarily imprisoned journalists, by means of a communication campaign launched on social networks today. For Turkish journalists who have been arbitrarily jailed, the European Court offers the last hope or being released. The proceedings against these journalists violate the European Convention on Human Rights, with which Turkey must comply as a member of the Council of Europe. In 2017, the European Court agreed to consider the 20 applications it had received from journalists imprisoned in Turkey, and to give priority to these cases. However, the applications are limited to the issue of their provisional detention and will have little effect after the Turkish courts have finished trying them and have passed sentences. So, this is urgent. The European Court needs to act quickly! Three well-known journalists, Ahmet Altan, Mehmet Altan and Nazli Ilicak, were already sentenced to life imprisonment on 16 February on a charge of “trying to overthrow constitutional order” for criticizing the government during a TV broadcast on the eve of an abortive coup d’état in July 2016. This month, the trial of the Cumhuriyet newspaper’s journalists is due to resume and a verdict is expected in the trial of 26 journalists accused of working for media that supported the movement led by Fethullah Gülen, the alleged instigator of the 2016 coup attempt. The two cases are emblematic of the arbitrary justice prevailing in Turkey’s courts. The net is closing fast on Turkey’s imprisoned journalists, so RSF urges the European Court to act before it is too late, before sentences are passed! Turkey is ranked 155th out of 180 countries in RSF's 2017 World Press Freedom Index. https://rsf.org/en/news/saveturkishjournalists-rsf-appeals-european-court (c) 2018 Reporters Without Borders

For the past three years, the U.S. has given military support to a Saudi Arabia-led coalition to fight an unauthorized war in Yemen, creating the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. For years, our government has provided intelligence, weaponry, and mid-air refueling support to Saudi Arabia, who has used this support to target millions of Yemeni civilians. We are closer than ever to ending U.S. involvement in this war - but we need your help! Yesterday, Senators Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Mike Lee (R-UT), and Chris Murphy (D-CT) introduced S.J.Res. 54, a resolution to end U.S. support for this unconstitutional war. The resolution invokes the 1973 War Powers Resolution, guaranteeing a vote on the Senate floor in a matter of days. STAND, in coalition with a bipartisan group of organizations including Indivisible, Common Defense, Win Without War, the Yemen Peace Project, and the Campaign for Liberty, is ready to stop America’s role in this man-made crisis - but rapid response is crucial. We only have a short period to ensure that our Senators are on board with this resolution, so today, we are urging you to contact your representatives. Sign our petition to ask your senators to co-sponsor and vote yes on this vital resolution to end the U.S. role in Yemen’s suffering. Thank you for standing up for Yemeni civilians. In solidarity, Savannah Wooten Student Director University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill '17 P.S. Ready to do more? Register for our webinar tonight at 8 PM EST to learn more about the U.S. role in Yemen and how you can take further action. Be sure to also join our Rapid Responders Facebook group to stay in the know about urgent action opportunities! (c) 2018 STAND

UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Pramila Patten, has called for an end to the ‘culture of denial’ following her week-long visit to Sudan and Darfur. In a statement following her visit, at the invitation of the government of Sudan, from February 18 to 25, Patten says that the objective was to gain first-hand knowledge of the situation, assess the challenges of addressing conflict-related sexual violence in Sudan, and establish constructive dialogue with national authorities in this regard. Patten points out that this was the first time that any Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict had visited the country since the office was established by UN Security Council resolution 1888 (2009). “In Khartoum, I met with senior government officials, parliamentarians and civil society representatives. I also met with the National Human Rights Commission and the Sudan Bar Association, and visited a women and child protection police unit.” Patten visited El Fasher in North Darfur and El Geneina West Darfur where she met with senior state-level officials and women at the Abushok and Alhujajj camps who had been displaced as a result of the conflict. “A key observation from my visit to Sudan is the existence of a deep-seated culture of denial which enhances and feeds the culture of silence about sexual violence. Unlike victims of other crimes where perpetrators are condemned, it is usually the victims of sexual violence who are shamed or stigmatised. As a result, victims of sexual violence are very often fearful of reporting the crime or seeking assistance, further compounding their suffering. Because sexual violence is so vastly underreported, the lack of reported cases cannot be equated with the absence of violence. It deeply saddened me to hear interlocutors in Sudan doubting and questioning victims as well as the appalling nature of these crimes. The pervasive culture of denial is the most serious obstacle to eradicating this heinous crime." Special Representative Patten observes in her statement that in many of her meetings, “senior government officials explained that there is no sexual violence in Sudan because such violence is strictly prohibited by the Islamic religion.” Patten argues, that “no religion or faith, however, is immune from sexual violence. Paradoxically, religious institutions can provide much needed emotional and social support, but may also perpetuate silence when they use religion to deny that sexual violence occurred in the first place. I therefore call upon religious leaders in Sudan to speak out on the need to protect and support survivors, and to hold perpetrators accountable.” ‘Commendable initiative’ Patten says that “the ongoing collection of weapons in Sudan is a commendable initiative, and there appears to be an overall improvement in the security situation as noted in UN Security Council resolution 2363 (2017). However, as the Secretary-General reported in December 2017 (S/2017/249), there remain serious concerns regarding conflict-related sexual violence in Sudan. “During my brief visit, I learned that women continue to be raped while collecting water or firewood, or when they leave camps to pursue livelihood activities. I also heard from women who are unable to return to their pre-war homes due to the absence of security and fears of being raped. In addition, women told me about sexual violence committed in the context of inter-communal conflicts over land and natural resources.” Criminal justice The Special Representative asserts that “in addition to ensuring security, states also have the responsibility to hold perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence accountable. This requires a criminal justice system which includes institutions willing and able to conduct investigations and prosecutions in accordance with international standards; the adoption and implementation of comprehensive legislation that guarantees equal protection of the law, prohibits all forms of sexual violence, and ensures the protection and well-being of victims and witnesses; public awareness initiatives to educate the population about their rights; and the allocation of adequate resources to criminal justice institutions and service providers. In this regard, recent amendments to the Criminal Code on the definition of rape as well as the establishment of Women and Child Protection Police Units are important steps forward.” “In El Fasher, I met with the Prosecutor General of the Special Court for Darfur, which has jurisdiction over conflict-related crimes committed in Darfur since February 2003. I was dismayed to learn that, to date, the Special Prosecutor’s Office has not investigated a single case of conflict-related sexual violence. In contrast, there continue to be references to conflict-related sexual violence in Security Council resolutions and reports relating to Sudan, including those of the Secretary-General, the International Commission of Inquiry established under UN Security Council resolution 1564 (2004), the Panel of Experts on Sudan established under UN Security Council resolution 1591 (2005) and the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women. I also learned that there are no female judges in any of the five states of Darfur. There is a need for female judges as well as more female police investigators and prosecutors.” “In Khartoum, I had the opportunity to meet representatives of NGOs, including women human rights defenders. I observed, however, that NGOs feel restricted from voicing their views or carrying out programmes on conflict-related sexual violence for fear of reprisal and other consequences. A society in which women human rights defenders have the freedom and space to be vocal and proactive is a society in which women flourish and participate in decision-making, and in which there is absolute intolerance for sexual violence.” Joint Communiqué As an outcome of her visit, it is Patten’s expectation that the government of Sudan will agree to adopt a Joint Communiqué between the United Nations and the government of Sudan. “The Joint Communiqué will reflect the government’s commitment to address conflict-related sexual violence, and provide a framework for United Nations support to be provided through my office (including the Team of Experts on the Rule of Law/Sexual Violence and the inter-agency network United Nations Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict); the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (Unamid); and the United Nations Country Team in Sudan. “It will also serve as a basis for mobilising the necessary resources for such support. I have proposed that the Joint Communiqué focus on five priority areas: survivors’ access to medical, psychosocial, legal and socioeconomic services; monitoring, analysis, documentation and information sharing on sexual violence; rule of law responses to conflict-related sexual violence; engagement with the security sector; and engagement with religious leaders and civil society. I have also proposed to deploy a United Nations technical team to Sudan to undertake a needs assessment and develop a plan to implement the Joint Communiqué.” ‘Sexual violence in conflict ruins lives’ Special Representative Patten underlines that “sexual violence in conflict ruins the lives of individuals, destroys families, breaks up communities and prevents societies from achieving sustainable peace. For too long, sexual violence in conflict has gone unacknowledged and unpunished. There must be no doubt that perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations will be held accountable. To this end, my office stands ready to support efforts to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual violence. However, we can only do so where governments are genuinely committed to combatting conflict-related sexual violence and are willing to translate that commitment into concrete actions and results,” Patten concludes. https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/un-special-representative-on-sexual-violence-in-conflict-calls-for-end-to-culture-of-denial-in-sudan (c) 2018 Dabanga