The United Nations Security Council should refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court to investigate genocide and other atrocity crimes against Rohingya Muslims, Fortify Rights said today. The Security Council will convene today at the U.N. Headquarters in New York City for a briefing on the situation of the Rohingya. “It’s not too late for the Security Council to respond with action,” said Matthew Smith, CEO of Fortify Rights. “The civilian and military leadership in Myanmar are ensuring complete impunity for ongoing, heinous crimes, and that’s precisely why international action is warranted and overdue.” In response to violent assaults on security forces by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army in October 2016 and again in August 2017, the Myanmar Army led a brutal attack on the Rohingya civilian population, forcing more than 775,000 refugees to flee to Bangladesh and causing a humanitarian situation that U.N. Secretary General Gustavo Guterres described as “catastrophic.” In a report published in November 2017, Fortify Rights and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum documented Myanmar Army-led massacres, mass gang-rapes, and arson attacks against Rohingya since October 2016. Based primarily on hundreds of testimonies from eyewitnesses and survivors collected during a yearlong investigation since October 2016, the report found “mounting evidence” of genocide. On November 24, 2017, the U.N. special envoy on sexual violence Pramila Patten said the Myanmar Army’s widespread use of sexual violence against Rohingya women and girls was “a calculated tool of terror aimed at the extermination and removal of the Rohingya as a group,” adding that she, too, documented the basis for characterizing the crimes as genocide. In a statement during a Special Session of the Human Rights Council on December 5, 2017, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra‘ad al-Hussein referred to the crime of genocide with regard to the attack on Rohingya, saying, “[C]an anyone rule out that elements of genocide may be present?” In a BBC film that aired later that month, High Commissioner Zeid said that members of the military as well as the civilian government in the country may be liable for genocide. More recently, at a press conference on February 1, U.N. Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee said the situation of Rohingya in Myanmar “bears the hallmarks of genocide.” In 2015, a legal analysis prepared for Fortify Rights by the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School found “strong evidence” that the government of Myanmar was responsible for genocide against Rohingya Muslims. “Understanding the crime of genocide is not the exclusive domain of international courts,” said Matthew Smith. “If we can ever hope to prevent genocide, we have to be able to diagnose it when we see it. Enough is enough. It’s time to stop tip-toeing around terminology and move towards holding perpetrators accountable.” The governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar recently made preparations to repatriate Rohingya refugees back to northern Rakhine State, Myanmar. The governments did not consult Rohingya or the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees about the plan. The repatriation was scheduled to begin January 23, but has been delayed. Donor governments and humanitarian agencies should not support the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar under the current conditions, Fortify Rights said. Donor governments and the U.N. should instead ensure that any repatriation in the future is voluntary, safe, and dignified in accordance with international standards. Rohingya families continue to arrive in Bangladesh, fleeing persecution and ongoing human rights violations in Myanmar. The Myanmar authorities also continue to confine more than 120,000 Rohingya to dozens of internment camps in eight townships of Rakhine State—mostly survivors of violent attacks in 2012—while denying all Rohingya in Rakhine State equal access to citizenship, marriage, education, and employment and systematically restricting their freedom of movement. The authorities also continue to deny the existence of Rohingya. Since August 2017, the Government of Myanmar has denied lifesaving humanitarian aid to tens of thousands of Rohingya in need, particularly in the three townships of northern Rakhine State—Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung townships—creating conditions of life designed to be destructive, Fortify Rights said. The U.N. Security Council met in September and again in December 2017 to discuss the Rohingya crisis, failing each time to issue action-oriented resolutions. In addition to a referral to the International Criminal Court, the Security Council should also implement a global arms embargo on Myanmar and targeted sanctions against those responsible for mass atrocity crimes, Fortify Rights said. “The inexcusable international response to this crisis borders on complicity,” said Matthew Smith. “The Myanmar authorities took their cues from international inaction and committed several rounds of mass atrocities. We can’t let this continue.” (c) 2018 Fortify Rights International

The headline in a dispatch from Radio Dabanga obliges us to ask about the issue of international humanitarian access in Sudan, one that has been little discussed since the preliminary (January 2017) and permanent (October 2017) lifting of U.S. economic sanctions by the Obama and Trump administrations respectively: MPs call for “declaration of famine” in North Darfur | Radio Dabanga, February 11, 2018 | EL FASHER https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/mps-call-for-declaration-of-famine-in-north-darfur [The dispatch in its entirety appears below] In January 2017 the Obama administration laid out its justification for the lifting of U.S. economic sanctions on the Khartoum regime, one of the only sources of leverage remaining to the international community. Various highly inaccurate claims were made, most dismayingly by Obama administration UN Ambassador Samantha Power, who asserted in her last press conference that there had been a “sea change of improvement” in humanitarian access in Sudan, which of necessity meant Darfur as well as the Two Areas (South Kordofan and Blue Nile). The Trump administration accepted this characterization with its decision to lift sanctions permanently. It was at the time, and remains, a gross inaccurate and destructive characterization of humanitarian access in Sudan, and not merely in Darfur. To be sure, the tendentiousness and inaccuracy of Power’s claim was matched elsewhere: Charge d’Affaires Steven Koutsis, still the senior U.S. diplomat in Khartoum and evidently angling for a position as ambassador, declared in response to those expressing grave concern about Khartoum’s long record of repression, violent suppression of political dissent, religious intolerance, its abysmal human rights record, and its continuing deployment of brutal militia forces in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan: “None of these other issues were the point of sanctions, and none of these other issues, therefore, should be linked to the lifting of sanctions.” (Agence France-Presse (El Daien, East Darfur | June 24, 2017) This was of course deeply false. The 1997 sanctions imposed by President Clinton began with the following preface: But lying and disingenuousness had long been hallmarks of the Obama administration Sudan policy, a fact that became incontrovertible with the claim by former Obama administration Special Envoy for the Sudans Princeton Lyman: “We [the Obama administration] do not want to see the ouster of the [Khartoum] regime, nor regime change. We want to see the regime carrying out reform via constitutional democratic measures.” (Interview with Asharq al-Awsat, December 3, 2011 | http://english.aawsat.com/2011/12/article55244147/asharq-al-awsat-talks-to-us-special-envoy-to-sudan-princeton-lyman ) But for the moment we should focus not on Obama administration dishonesty and bad faith but on what lies behind the Radio Dabanga headline: “MPs call for ‘declaration of famine’ in North Darfur.” And the question forces itself: if there is legitimate cause for concern about “famine” in North Darfur, how can humanitarian access be adequate? Are we to assume that international relief efforts are so without capacity that they cannot mitigate the acute food shortages and unaffordable prices for food that are referred to in the dispatch? Or should be assume that denial of access—by myriad methods that the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime has perfected over the past fifteen years of conflict—continues, and that if there has been a reduction in capacity, it is precisely because of this denial and obstructionism, coupled with Khartoum-sanctioned insecurity in much or North Darfur (and elsewhere in Darfur)? Donor fatigue and the sheer duration of conflict and humanitarian need in Darfur explain a good deal; but there is also a highly developed humanitarian network, at least it were allowed to be utilized. On the basis of my own conversations with humanitarian workers in and back from Darfur, there is simply no way to conclude that if humanitarian operations were allowed to work unimpeded we would be seeing the levels of malnutrition reported in North Darfur. Insecurity grows, of course, in part because of the massive drawdown of the UN/African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID), which was renewed for a year by the UN Security Council in June 2017, but only after acceding to Khartoum’s demands for this drawdown: 44% of military personnel and 30% of police personnel are being withdrawn. But the main reason North Darfur remains so insecure, both for civilians and humanitarians, is the free rein given to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—now Khartoum’s primary militia force and officially incorporated into the armed forces (though not subject to the command authority of the regular Sudan Armed Forces/SAF). Other organized militia forces, as well as only loosely organized groups of armed Arab herdsmen, also contribute to intolerable levels of insecurity. But this is ultimately Khartoum’s responsibility, and the regime’s failure to control either its militia or regular forces is a deliberate means of making humanitarian access—even where it is not denied outright or by bureaucratic means—impossible. Recent History of Malnutrition in Darfur Certainly we have long known that food insecurity and severe malnutrition are critical issues in North Darfur. Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times reported (September 5, 2014) on a leaked malnutrition assessment produced by the UN’s children organization, UNICEF (the document has never been officially released by UNICEF because of fear of Khartoum’s response). The data presented were and are shocking, utterly shocking, and I will largely let them speak for themselves, urging readers to bear in mind the headline of today from Radio Dabanga: [The report was evidently prepared in 2013 or 2014; the date on the document Kristof has posted is 9 June 2014 and has as its title: “Malnutrition Defined”] • Sudan has very high numbers of malnourished children; malnutrition exists in both acute and chronic form: Under-nutrition Acute (wasting) Chronic (stunting) Severe Moderate • Global Acute Malnutrition [GAM] Arm muscle wasted to a circumference < 11.5cm A graph is presented at this point, bisected by the World Health Organization emergency threshold for acute malnutrition: > =15 percent [The report indicates in a subsequent section that this threshold figure drops to a 10 percent threshold in areas of armed conflict such as Darfur; particular results for North Darfur include—ER] • Acute malnutrition rates for children in Sudan among the highest in the world: North Darfur: 28 percent acute malnutrition among children South Darfur: 18 percent acute malnutrition among children East Darfur: 15 percent acute malnutrition among children South Darfur: 13 percent acute malnutrition among children West Darfur: 8 percent acute malnutrition among children Source: S3m Survey, 2013 • Chronic malnutrition among children is widespread and pervasive A second graph reports the following figures for chronic malnutrition among children in Sudan: North Darfur: 35 percent Central Darfur: 45 percent East Darfur: 40 percent West Darfur: 35 percent South Darfur: 26 percent The report indicates that the World Health Organization cutoff point for “high” prevalence of chronic malnutrition is 30 percent, and for “very high” prevalence > = 40 percent. Source: S3m Survey, 2013 • A third chart indicates: “% of under-fives moderately or severely wasted in the 10 most affected countries” [Sudan ranked 4th from the bottom in this category in 2010—ER]: Wasting prevalence for country population under five: Moderate or severe wasting: 16 percent Severe wasting: 5 percent [Emphasis added here: two percent is the “emergency” threshold for Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) among children; in developing countries, even in hospital settings, some 20 – 30 percent of all children suffering from SAM die—ER] *************************' These are the shocking data we should bear in mind in assessing today’s Radio Dabanga dispatch: MPs call for “declaration of famine” in North Darfur | Radio Dabanga, February 11, 2018 | EL FASHER Members of the North Darfur Parliament have urged the local government to declare famine in the state. They criticised the authorities for their silence about the deteriorating living conditions and the growing corruption in the region. About 1,000 people died from hunger and tuberculosis in El Hara and Ein Bassar, north of Jebel Meidob, during the past few months, MP Mahasin Abakar told reporters in the North Darfur capital of El Fasher last week. She explained that in addition to bread, most people in El Malha locality cannot afford to buy sorghum any more, as the price of the native staple food reached SDG 2,000 ($110 [Central Bank of Sudan exchange rate) per 100 kg. According to MP Hari Khamees Arbab schoolchildren in a number of localities go to the valleys in the morning to eat wild berries for breakfast. Food gap The MPs held a press conference on Thursday after discussing statements of the North Darfur Minister of Finance, Mohamed Yahya Hamid on the economic crisis and the measures taken by the Ministry to support the poorest in the state. They called on the North Darfur government to immediately intervene to face the threat of famine in a number of localities, and take action to stop the corruption concerning the distribution of food. In particular people in the northern and eastern parts of the state are hit by a food gap, they said. They further mentioned the shortage of electricity and fuel, and a significant decrease in services. Suleiman Mukhtar, MP for El Taweisha constituency, pointed to the poor sorghum and millet harvests in the areas of Koraya Laban, Um Katkut and Jabir. He told the press in El Fasher they had notified the state government already in September that the agricultural season failed because of the poor rainfall. MP Ali El Siddig stressed the rapid decrease in services in North Darfur, especially water and electricity. He accused the North Darfur government of being “too weak and too late to tackle the current economic crisis and ease the burden of living for the Sudanese.” Corruption The MPs further complained about the considerable manipulation and corruption by employees of the state Ministry of Social Affairs and members of the committees distributing relief goods. This means that most of the poor are not supported by the Ministry, they said. Most of the sugar is sold on the black market. The measures taken by the state government to ease the burden of living is “only ink on paper,” they commented. They called on the Ministry of Finance to control the prices of the basic commodities on the markets. Price hikes In early January, the Sudanese government implemented new austerity measures. In addition to increased levies and taxes imposed on traders and citizens, the customs rate of the US Dollar was raised from SDG 6.7 to SDG 18. The prices of the main consumer goods immediately doubled or even tripled. As the government completely cut its wheat subsidies, the price of flour increased with 233 per cent. Bakeries began to sell smaller loaves of bread for double the price. The rapid plummeting of the Sudanese Pound on the Khartoum parallel forex market continues. The US Dollar rate on the black market increased from SDG 28 (January 3) to SDG 42 (February 4). Agricultural season In December last year, members of Sudan’s federal Parliament warned for a food gap in the country. Poor rainfall in El Gedaref, Blue Nile, Darfur, and Kordofan states that year caused poor sorghum and millet harvests. In addition, 25 per cent of the country’s strategic crop stocks were damaged last year because of poor storage techniques. MP Mahmoud Abdeljabar called for a stop on the export of strategic sorghum stocks, as “Consumers will not be able to afford the food prices. “A sack of millet costs SDG 1,200 and is expected to amount to SDG 1,500 in the coming months,” he said. [All emphases in bold have been added–ER] ********************************** Additional country-wide data from UNICEF concerning children in Sudan, now further imperiled by the economic catastrophe—including massive increases in food prices—that has descended on Sudan because of the NIF/NCP’s gross mismanagement of the economy and equally gross self-enrichment: Number of wasted children, 2011 (moderate and severe): 817,000 Source: UNICEF Global Nutrition Database, 2012, based on MICS, DHS, and other national surveys 2007 – 2011 (except for India)] • The next graph shows Sudan as far “off track for meeting the MDG1 target” [The first phase of the Millennium Development Goals has as its Target 1.C: “Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger”—ER] The MDG1 benchmark is 10 percent; various surveys included in the report show Sudan at 32 percent, 33 percent, 43 percent, 35 percent, and 35 percent; • The next chart represents: “Total number [of] malnourished [children]” Total number malnourished children over a year = prevalence x incidence Prevalence = measure at a single point in time Incidence = expected new cases over a year (2.6 percent incidence rate) 2013 S3M prevalence = 773,438 children x 2.6 (incidence rate) = Total malnourished annually: 2,010,939 Moderate: 1,455,735 Severe: 555, 203 Global total: 2,010,939 [The rest of the UNICEF document is given over to “The Strategic Response Plan,” which has only one statistic of significance for present purposes—ER] http://sudanreeves.org/2018/02/11/humanitarian-access-in-darfur-revisited/ (c) 2018 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

They marveled at her barely-there makeup and her lack of bling. They commented on her plain black outfits and simple purse. They noted the flower-shaped clip that kept her hair back in a no-nonsense style. Here she was, a political princess, but the North Korean “first sister” had none of the hallmarks of power and wealth that Koreans south of the divide have come to expect. In looks-obsessed South Korea, many 20-something women list plastic surgery and brand-name bags as life goals. Most of all, Kim Yo Jong was an enigma. Just like them, but nothing like them. A woman with a sphinxlike smile who gave nothing away during her three-day Olympic-related visit to South Korea as brother Kim Jong Un’s special envoy. “I thought Kim Yo Jong was going to be so serious, but she smiled all the time, so she made a good first impression,” said Kwon Hee-sun, a 29-year-old South Korean woman attending the women’s ice hockey match at the Winter Olympics on Saturday night. The Korean teams had been combined — three North Koreans were playing during the game that night. Kim is “the Ivanka Trump of North Korea” because of her family connections and her ability to be a compelling saleswoman, said Sue Mi Terry, a former Korean analyst at the CIA who is now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. South Korean television drew that exact parallel, noting that Kim Jong Un had sent his sister to the Opening Ceremonies of the Olympic Games, while President Trump was sending his daughter to the closing. Very little is known about the generation that runs North Korea: leader Kim Jong Un and his glamorous wife, Ri Sol Ju; his reclusive older brother, Kim Jong Chul; and his younger sister, Kim Yo Jong. We know that the Kims, the children of second-generation North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and his Japanese-born ethnic Korean wife, Ko Yong Hui, all spent several years at school in Switzerland. We know Kim Jong Chul likes Eric Clapton because he’s been spotted at concerts around the world, most recently in London. We know Ri used to sing in a propaganda band. But that’s about it. We don’t even know Kim Yo Jong’s age. The South Korean intelligence service says she was born in 1987; the U.S. government thinks it was 1989. So when she arrived in South Korea on Friday afternoon, becoming the first member of North Korea’s ruling Kim family to visit the South since the Korean War broke out in 1950, South Koreans were enthralled. Kim Jong Un’s smiling younger sister has surprised South Koreans with her low-key approach during her three-day Olympic-related visit as her brother’s special envoy. The wall-to-wall coverage began even before Kim stepped off her brother’s private jet at the Incheon airport, west of Seoul, on Friday afternoon. Television cameras broadcast footage of the runway, waiting for her to arrive. They noted that the plane had been given the flight number 615 — a reference to June 15, the final day of the first inter-Korean summit in 2000. In the VIP room upon arrival at Incheon, television cameras showed a smiling Kim gesturing to Kim Yong Nam, the 90-year-old who is technically North Korea’s head of state and was in theory leading the delegation. Both Koreas are bound by Confucian hierarchical rules that prize age and maleness and stipulate who should sit where according to seniority. Those rules mean, without question, that a 90-year-old male head of state should sit in the best seat. But South Korean papers marveled at Kim Yo Jong’s “humbleness.” “Kim Yo Jong is the closest figure to Kim Jong Un, since she also shares the blood of Kim Il Sung,” the Dong-A Ilbo newspaper reported, referring to the North Korean regime’s claim to legitimacy through divine bloodline. “Some analysts find it impossible to believe that Kim Yo Jong would yield a seat to Kim Yong Nam,” the paper said. [ Photo of historic handshake between North and South Korea goes viral] Then, from the moment she stepped out of the airport, there was a media scrum around her — well, around the four North Korean bodyguards who surrounded her as she walked through train stations and Olympic venues. When she arrived at the presidential Blue House for a meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in on Saturday morning, the cameras zoomed in on her high cheekbones and fine ears. No detail was too trivial to be noticed, to be commented on. “Analysts say that she looks very much like Ko Yong Hui, her mother, when she was younger,” the Dong-A noted. Look at her posture, the commentators said. She sat so upright — maybe she’d been a dancer like her mother — and was so well mannered. Look at her unusual handwriting, they said after Kim Yo Jong wrote a message in the guest book at the Blue House, which — of course — then appeared everywhere. The cross strokes were all angled, making her handwriting look like a kind of calligraphy. “I hope Pyongyang and Seoul will become closer in the hearts of Koreans and will bring unification and prosperity in the near future,” she had written. Somehow, Kim managed to pass the whole visit without uttering a word in public. Moving through the crowds, she kept her Mona Lisa face on and her mouth closed. When local journalists asked her how she felt to be in South Korea, she didn’t respond. She just smiled. Footage from the meetings she had with Moon showed her again smiling and relaxed, but the cameras didn’t catch a single word. “I thought she was really pretty,” said Moon Jin-young, a 19-year-old student. But she wasn’t sure how humble the visitor was. “She didn’t look nice, because she kept her chin up all the time, so it looked as if she was always looking down on others.” Certainly, Kim, who is under U.S. sanctions for human rights abuses related to her role in censoring information, was treated like royalty during her visit. The government provided a Hyundai Genesis, a luxury car that the media noted could be made bulletproof, to ferry her around. She stayed in the five-star Sheraton Grand Walkerhill hotel on the outskirts of Seoul, which markets itself as “the ultimate place to relax and unwind.” For lunch with Moon, the North Korean delegation was served grilled flatfish, soup with dried fish balls, buckwheat crepes with persimmon sauce and two types of kimchi. There was dried persimmon and walnut cake for dessert. Then for dinner, her South Korean hosts took her to a fancy restaurant in Gangneung, on the east coast, before the hockey game. Vice President Pence, who was also in South Korea for the opening of the Winter Olympics but studiously avoided Kim, had worried in advance that North Korea would “hijack” the Olympic Games with its “propaganda.” Pence and his staff were alarmed by news last month that South Koreans were dazzled by the arrival of Hyon Song Wol, a singer in North Korea's all-female Moranbong Band and a rising political star in Kim’s regime. His worries were well founded. Those who saw Kim at the hockey game were puzzled by the mismatch between the gruesome stories they’d heard and the slight young woman before them. “Kim Yo Jong kept smiling, and she seemed nice,” said Lee Ryoon-ryong, a 25-year-old man at Saturday’s match. “I was surprised because she looked different from the image I had about North Koreans.” He figured, however, she must have a strong personality behind that smiling face. Indeed, CSIS’s Terry warned against being sucked in by Kim’s good-cop routine. “Kim Yo Jong is totalitarianism with a human face,” she said. “She is acting as a goodwill ambassador for a country that has earned no goodwill.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-ivanka-trump-of-north-korea-captivates-people-in-the-south/2018/02/10/d56119fc-0e65-11e8-baf5-e629fc1cd21e_story.html?utm_term=.328394c0378d (c) 2018 The Washington Post

What happened? The de-escalation zone in north-western Syria is on the brink of collapse. Boosted by Russian air support, Syrian regime troops are advancing toward the Idlib region. Amid obstruction by the Syrian regime and Iran-backed militias, Turkish troops took up positions near the front lines in early February. Why did it happen? The area is controlled by the jihadist alliance Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which until now has rejected de-escalation. Russia, Iran and Western powers consider HTS an irreconcilable terrorist organisation that must be defeated militarily. Turkey has a more nuanced view, but it has been preoccupied with its fight against Kurdish forces. Why does it matter?  A regime offensive into the heart of Idlib may be imminent. It would likely involve aerial bombardment and a battle against thousands of militants in densely populated areas, creating another humanitarian catastrophe and prompting an exodus toward the Turkish border, further straining Turkey’s ability to cope with large numbers of Syria refugees. What should be done?  Turkey should deploy along the front line in cooperation with Russia, which should press the Syrian regime to delay, or even desist from, its assault. This would buy time for renewed Turkish efforts to curtail transnational jihadist influence within HTS in favour of militants more open to de-escalation and compromise. I.Overview Idlib, a province in north-western Syria, together with slices of territory in adjacent provinces, is the country’s largest remaining rebel stronghold. It is also a humanitarian catastrophe waiting to happen, if the Syrian regime and its allies launch an all-out assault to retake it. Tens of thousands of battle-hardened fighters, including many jihadists, are entrenched in a densely populated area. Tackling the militants head on will come at a massive human cost. Regime advances further east and Russian bombardment of infrastructure in the area have already led to significant displacement. If fighting reaches towns along the Aleppo-Hama highway and further west, the outcome will be many times worse. All options for Idlib are bad, but cooperation between Ankara and Moscow might permit Turkish troops to deploy further along the front line between rebels and regime forces. For Ankara, it is a risky last-minute gambit, but almost certainly the only means of averting an assault on Idlib that, as in Aleppo, would wreak havoc upon the inhabitants and propel an exodus toward the Turkish border. On 14-15 September 2017, at the sixth round of the Russian-led Astana talks geared toward ending or at least containing the Syrian war, Russia, Iran and Turkey agreed to demarcate a “de-escalation zone” in Idlib and adjacent slices of territory in other provinces. Yet the three “guarantors” of this accord faced an immediate conundrum – the domination of the area by the armed movement Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the core of which is al-Qaeda’s former Syria affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra. Russia and Iran (as well as Western countries) consider HTS a terrorist group that must be destroyed. While Turkey has a more differentiated view of the group, it nevertheless signed up to the “joint statement” that commits all parties to fight the jihadists. In turn, HTS rejected the de-escalation scheme. The dilemma is particularly acute for Turkey, which reportedly agreed to take charge of the de-escalation zone’s western sector, where the bulk of its population lives. Turkey also is concerned that fleeing civilians and fighters will head toward its border if the situation deteriorates. In mid-October, Turkish forces deployed near the rebel-held area’s northern fringe. That limited engagement, which was facilitated by an understanding between Ankara and HTS, allowed Turkey to address its principal objective in Idlib: containing a potential southward advance of PKK-affiliated Kurdish fighters in the enclave of Afrin, further north. But if Turkey wants to achieve its secondary objective – preventing a new intensification of the Syrian refugee crisis – it will need to influence events across the front separating the HTS-dominated rebels and the Syrian regime. To this end, Ankara needs to deploy deeper into rebel-held territory. In late January 2018, it ramped up efforts to do just that. In an attempt to replicate the October agreement with HTS, Ankara ordered a large military convoy to take up positions just beyond the Aleppo-Hama highway, right at the front line separating rebel and regime forces. The troops were twice forced to turn around, however, by regime shelling of the road ahead. Another convoy dispatched a week later did reach its destination; it returned fire when it came under attack, reportedly from Iranian-backed militias. The deployment of Turkish forces, which ideally would continue down the front line, now offers the only – albeit slim – hope of averting a no-holds-barred regime offensive. It incurs significant risks for Ankara, requiring it to strike tacit deals with HTS leaders, on one hand, and Russia, on the other. The former would have to accept Turkey’s deployment (which they appear to have done), prevent HTS dissidents or other militants in Idlib from attacking Turkish forces (which could prove harder), and deter similar attacks on the regime (which is likely to be harder still). It is unclear whether HTS leaders could enforce such an understanding with Turkey without the movement fracturing. But the alternative for HTS is clear: a regime offensive will mean the loss of its territorial control and the death of many HTS leaders. For those in the movement who may aspire to some form of political role in the post-conflict dispensation – there are signs that some do – it would also be the end of such ambitions. In return, Russia and regime forces would put the offensive on hold. The regime, bent on recapturing the whole country, will likely show little enthusiasm for a pause in combat. Moscow, on the other hand, might be keen on the prospect, particularly if it meant extending Turkish backing for the Astana process. Russian pressure, combined with Turkish forces’ presence along the front line, might dissuade the regime and its allies from an immediate assault. Ankara would need some form of Russian pledge along these lines. Turkish deployment also could provide civilians and civilian infrastructure with a modicum of protection from airstrikes. Taken together, these developments could avoid a military showdown and gradually reduce the scope and intensity of confrontations between rebels and the regime. It would also buy time for Turkey to accelerate efforts, already underway for some months, to encourage shifts within HTS by isolating factions loyal to al-Qaeda and transnational jihadism from those that might be amenable to compromise. As yet, those efforts have progressed slowly, if at all, partly because Turkey has been preoccupied with its fight with the Kurds in Afrin, partly because it has hedged amid the lack of international buy-in and probably, too, because HTS leaders can only go so far without jeopardising their grip on the movement. Were the Turkish deployment to bring diminished levels of violence, that could create popular pressure in Idlib that might shift calculations within HTS further. With regime forces encroaching on rebel-held areas, Turkey’s deployment represents a long shot at saving the de-escalation plan and one which for Ankara is fraught with perils. Reorienting HTS would likely prove a tougher challenge still. But given the suffering and displacement the alternative would entail, any option, however slim its prospects, is worth pursuing. II.Turkey’s Gambit According to the final communiqué of the sixth round of the Astana talks, the three guarantors – Russia, Iran and Turkey – were to deploy “de-escalation control forces” to a “security zone” in Idlib and surrounding areas, based on an unpublished map agreed upon in Ankara the week before. The statement remained silent on how exactly these forces would fulfil their mandate, or how the guarantors would deal with the fact that the territory in question is under near complete HTS control. But the statement reiterated the guarantors’ commitment to continue the fight against Jabhat al-Nusra (the Nusra Front) and other groups associated with al-Qaeda (alongside the Islamic State, or ISIS). Since HTS is an alliance of Nusra’s successor organisation and other groups, the implication appeared to be that the guarantors, including Turkey, had resolved to dislodge it by force. Even before the end of the Astana meeting, media outlets close to the Syrian opposition and the Turkish leadership published maps that suggested a division of the Idlib de-escalation zone into three sectors, with the western part (extending from the Syria-Turkey border to the Aleppo-Hama highway) assigned to Turkey. Shortly after the Astana meeting, media reports about a Turkish military build-up near the Bab al-Hawa crossing with Syria, and the arrival there of Turkish-sponsored Syrian rebel groups from areas north of Aleppo, sparked speculation that Ankara was indeed getting ready to confront HTS. For their part, HTS leaders made it clear they did not intend to cooperate with any de-escalation scheme. On 7 October, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that a “serious operation in Syria’s Idlib” was underway. When the Turkish army began demolishing fortifications on its side of the border the next day, provoking artillery duels with HTS, it prompted premature reports that an invasion by the Turkish army and allied Syrian rebels had begun. Yet, that same day, HTS fighters were seen escorting a small Turkish reconnaissance party that had crossed the border, and surveying terrain near Daret Izzat, an elevation overlooking Afrin district to Idlib’s north, which is controlled by the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey. On 12 October, a convoy reportedly including 30 armed vehicles followed the same trajectory, again protected by HTS fighters. Turkish troops took up positions in a sliver of territory bounding about half the front that separates rebel/HTS-held from YPG-held territory. These developments and subsequent debates on jihadist social media suggest that HTS acceded to Turkish demands for access to positions overlooking the front with the YPG on condition of non-interference in HTS’s local affairs. On 18 October, Turkey reopened the Bab al-Hawa border crossing it had closed in July after HTS had taken over the Syrian side, providing the movement with a first “cooperation dividend” in the form of customs and transit fees accruing to the local civil administration, which is under the group’s control. Between mid-October 2017 and late January 2018, Turkey made no attempt to deploy anywhere close to actual fighting between Syrian rebels (mostly HTS) and regime forces. With the fight against ISIS in eastern Syria all but over, the regime could turn its attention and manpower to other areas outside its control. Since late October 2017, its forces have borne down on sections of the front in southern Aleppo and northern Hama. By late December, the offensive yielded the first significant gains, when rebels lost Abu Dali and adjacent areas to the north of Hama. After this breakthrough, a three-pronged attack from the north, east and south won back further territory for the regime. It prompted the Turkish president to ask his Russian counterpart to rein in his ally, lest Astana collapse, and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım to implicitly threaten that Turkey would withdraw support for the Russia-sponsored talks. At the end of January, with its offensive against Afrin further north in full swing, Turkey finally moved to deploy observer forces near the reported de-escalation line east of Idlib. On 24 January, a Turkish reconnaissance party reached the area of al-Eis, some 7km east of the Aleppo-Hama highway, and only 3km from the front. Five days later, on the first day of the Russian-sponsored peace conference in Sochi, a convoy of around 100 Turkish vehicles travelled toward the area in an apparent attempt to set up an observation post. Yet, some 10km before reaching the presumed destination, the line of vehicles was halted by regime shelling targeting the road ahead. Another sortie the next day met with the same result, after which the convoy turned around and headed back to Turkey. On the way back, the convoy was hit by a car bomb while passing through the town of Atareb. The attack claimed the life of one soldier and injured a second, in addition to a civilian employee. Authorship of the (unclaimed) attack remains unclear: the Turkish general staff blamed the YPG, while discussion on jihadist channels suggest that the perpetrators may have been HTS dissidents aiming to sabotage the group’s cooperation with Turkey. Presidents Erdoğan and Putin reportedly discussed the incidents the next day, when both agreed “to speed up establishing observation posts in Syria’s Idlib”. A week later, on 5 February, a second Turkish convoy finally managed to reach al-Eis, but was soon fired upon from regime-controlled territory, reportedly by Iran-backed militias. This time, Turkey returned the fire, reportedly with missiles launched from its own territory, and the skirmish died down by the evening. One soldier lay dead and another four, as well as a civilian employee, were injured. III.Idlib’s Importance to Turkey For Turkey, securing Idlib is important for several reasons. As its war with the PKK continues, Ankara views the ascendance of the organisation’s Syrian affiliate, the YPG, as a strategic threat. Turkey aims to limit or roll back the YPG’s expansion. From Afrin, the YPG could have exploited turmoil or a power vacuum in Idlib by spreading its control further south. By positioning Turkish forces in the hills overlooking these areas, Ankara could block such advances and prepare for its military campaign against the enclave. The move also provided a convenient economic pressure point against the YPG: until the Turkish offensive, Afrin’s population enjoyed access to Idlib’s HTS-dominated thriving market towns, resulting in commerce which benefited the YPG and HTS alike. From the positions it took up in October, Turkey was able to sever this economic lifeline at will. It promptly did so once the attack was launched. The deployment at the northern fringe of Idlib, perhaps augmented at a later point by buffer zones along other parts of the border, may also help address what Turkish officials identify as Ankara’s second major concern with regard to north-western Syria: preventing a new wave of refugees – among whom could be thousands of jihadists – from reaching Turkey. By controlling areas adjacent to the border, the Turkish armed forces could accommodate displaced people, guarantee their physical safety and provide access to humanitarian agencies on Syrian rather than Turkish territory. Yet it is unlikely that this deployment would be sufficient to deal with the humanitarian consequences of an all-out regime assault on western Idlib. Almost half of the estimated 2.65 million people currently living there are internally displaced persons (IDPs), who came to Idlib to escape regime attacks in other parts of Syria or as the result of evacuation deals. These people have reason to fear falling under regime control again. Prior experience – such as the Aleppo siege in 2016 – suggests that such an attack will be accompanied by a ferocious bombing campaign. If so, many local residents, who might otherwise let the offensive roll over them, are also likely to flee. All told, as many as one million people could pour toward the Turkish border, creating a humanitarian emergency that will make it difficult, if not impossible for Turkey to maintain its current policy of containing a new flow of refugees inside Syria. IV.(De-)Escalation Scenarios When and according to which scenario such an assault will come remains difficult to assess. With its recent gains, capped by the 20 January capture of Abu Duhur, which has an air base and sits at a strategic crossing of roads leading further west to Saraqib and Maaret Nu’man, the Syrian regime now controls most of the formerly rebel-held areas that the September Astana agreement reportedly assigned to Russian/Iranian control. The crucial question is whether the advance will continue toward the perimeter of the sector reportedly assigned to Turkey (the Aleppo-Hama highway). Taking the fight further west would quickly affect population centres: that moment is when casualties and displacement could be expected to spiral. Russian air cover would be critical to such an advance. Russian Syria experts interviewed in mid-December 2017 saw no appetite in Moscow for another campaign that could rival the siege of eastern Aleppo in terms of length, destruction and humanitarian fallout. Facing re-election in March 2018, President Vladimir Putin declared victory in Syria on 11 December and announced a partial withdrawal of Russian forces. Yet recent statements from high-ranking Russian officials, and the increasing pace of Russian air attacks on civilian infrastructure, suggest that Moscow’s patience has been taxed by Ankara’s apparent reluctance to take charge west of the highway. Even beyond a deliberate regime assault on rebel-held Idlib, an escalation could take other forms. Successful rebel operations targeting regime forces or allies, such as the 3 February 2018 downing of a Russian fighter jet, or high-profile jihadist attacks elsewhere will provoke responses that could set off an escalatory dynamic drawing in Russia and generating momentum to crush militants in the north west and restore the area to regime control, regardless of the human toll. From the positions the Turkish “de-escalation control forces” were holding until late January, some 30-60km from the front lines, they were unable to exert a real effect on the trajectory of such scenarios, much less arrest or reverse a slide into open conflict. To achieve de-escalation and consolidate a ceasefire, Turkey would need to deploy much deeper into the zone assigned to it – as it finally started to do on 5 February. Its deployment along the length of the Aleppo-Hama highwayrequired, first, some form of agreement with HTS. It is inconceivable that Turkey would have positioned its troops at close quarters with HTS without receiving assurances, at least in private, from HTS leaders that they would do what they could to halt offensive action in the area, either against Turkish forces directly or against the regime, which would risk putting Turkish forces in the crossfire. Already the first attempt to deploy in late January took place with an explicit security guarantee, setting a precedent for further steps. Moscow’s consent appears likely to have been a second prerequisite. Already the first attempt, on 29 January, was made in coordination with Moscow, which however proved unable to deliver the cooperation of its Syrian ally. The shelling that occurred during the second, eventually successful attempt on 5 February, highlights the challenge Moscow faces in ensuring the compliance of the Syrian regime and its other allies, whose decision-making does not always appear to be coherent. The risk of clashes likely remains, due to the lack of internal cohesion on both sides and the limited leverage that Turkey and Russia, respectively, have over each. Yet, if things do heat up, the physical presence of Turkish troops near potential zones of conflict and targets of attacks might at least militate against rapid escalation and improve the chances for mediation. It could buy time for advance warning to the civilian population. It could help deter regime/Russian military strikes on vital civilian institutions unrelated to the jihadists, such as hospitals and schools, which Turkey could protect implicitly by deploying in their vicinity. Turkish presence also signals to Moscow that Ankara is willing to play its part in the “shared responsibility” that reportedly underpins Russia’s understanding of the Astana agreement. Russian leaders would thus be less likely to sign off on a regime campaign to reconquer the entire rebel-held area any time soon, particularly if that meant risking direct confrontation between regime and Turkish forces, as well as prompting Turkey’s exit from Astana. Were the Turkish troop presence to become reliably connected to an end to or at least substantive reduction in airstrikes, popular pressure could mount in Idlib for HTS to accept Turkish deployment in additional areas, along the entire length of the Aleppo-Hama highway that bisects the de-escalation zone. While often acting with unrestrained violence against competitors, the groups now constituting HTS have in the past sometimes shown a preference for engaging with local populations through incentives, persuasion and alliance-building to establish control before resorting to violent imposition. On occasion, they have even retreated in the face of civic resistance. A growing popular demand for the de-escalation forces’ extended presence might alter the calculus of HTS’s leadership and strengthen the position of those prepared to cooperate with de-escalation, notwithstanding their public rhetoric to the contrary. If regime attacks abate, the combination of popular pressure and Turkish prodding could strengthen the position of those factions, enhancing their ability to enforce respect for the ceasefire in the ranks. Moreover, Turkey would enjoy an additional form of leverage over HTS: respect some form of de-escalation or lose Turkish protection, which would precipitate a regime offensive. V.Dealing with HTS By the letter of the Astana agreement, Turkey should be attacking and disarming HTS, rather than coordinating its deployments, as it did in October 2017 and again during the latest deployment to al-Eis. Yet it is doubtful that Ankara ever seriously considered such a move. Its reluctance was rooted not only in its focus on containing the YPG but also in the human and other costs of attempting to confront the militants. True, a Turkish operation backed by allied Syrian rebels might not inspire the unified resistance that is sure to greet a regime offensive backed by Russian airstrikes. Some groups that have become part of HTS did so because it is the strongest player in Idlib, as well as an important source of income and employment. They would likely part ways with the movement the moment they believed it faces defeat by a superior – non-regime – force. Others may stand down or switch sides because they do not consider Turkey an enemy. Yet if only a few thousand of the 10,000-15,000 fighters that HTS currently boasts decide to make a stand, the human toll of confronting them would be enormous, particularly if fighting breaks out in Idlib city and other densely populated parts of the western sector, where residents would effectively become hostages and human shields. Reports suggest that foreign fighters would resist any Turkish action against HTS particularly fiercely. These militants already expressed hostility to the limited Turkish deployment in October. Many are likely motivated by ideological commitment, but also by fear that a Turkish intervention would force them out of their Idlib sanctuary; unlike Syrian fighters, they cannot blend into the local population. Whereas ISIS militants whom Turkey fought north of Aleppo in late 2016 and early 2017 were able to withdraw eastward down the Euphrates valley, HTS fighters from Turkmenistan, Tunisia, Egypt or Jordan, for example, have no obvious escape route and would likely face persecution, detention and perhaps death. Furthermore, while a full-scale Turkish intervention might succeed in wresting territorial control from HTS, this development would risk inaugurating a stage of asymmetrical warfare that could boomerang on Turkey and reach its own cities. Rather than confronting the jihadists, the Turkish military foray in late January and early February 2018 unfolded after Ankara received explicit security guarantees from the HTS leadership. It thus replicated the deal that made the October deployment possible, and was likely based on at least some of the terms that applied then, such as non-interference with HTS’s governance. That may turn out to be a high price to pay, as it could turn Turkish forces into unwitting accomplices of HTS’s abusive rule. It also appears highly unlikely that the organisation would agree to hand over its heavy weaponry any time soon, as that would mean relinquishing its single bargaining chip for future relevance. On the other hand, facilitating a Turkish deployment to an active front does indicate tacit acceptance from HTS leaders that offensive action in the respective areas must be halted, as regime retaliation would put the Turkish troops right in the line of fire. Despite public statements to the contrary, its top leaders must be aware that a consolidated presence of Turkish forces in areas it controls will affect its margin of manoeuvre. Yet a major risk remains: hardliners who reject the scheme, within or outside HTS, could attempt to undermine it by attacking Turkish troops, as may very well have happened when the convoy returned from its abortive first mission to al-Eis. HTS is a motley crew including al-Qaeda loyalists. While no incidents were recorded during the first phase of the Turkish deployment since October, it is not clear that HTS leaders enjoy sufficient control to prevent those who refuse further compromise from taking potshots at Turkish monitors in the much larger, more sensitive area where the organisation faces off against the regime. Sustained attacks with many casualties could well force the Turkish leadership to either withdraw or launch precisely the kind of full-fledged military invasion that officials say they would rather avoid. Turkish deployment should therefore proceed gradually, in close communication with HTS security and with an eye toward ensuring the local population sees a benefit in Turkish troops being there. VI.The Evolving Jihadist Landscape Internal resistance to cooperation with an extended Turkish deployment will not be restricted to HTS hardliners. The group’s clerics defended limited cooperation in early October 2017 as a tactical concession in areas abutting the territory of “the atheists” (ie, the YPG). They categorically rejected the idea that cooperation amounted to tacit acceptance of the Astana process. But sustaining such an argument while Turkish troops are taking up positions along the lines agreed upon in Astana will be difficult. Defections from HTS can be expected, and internal challenges to the leadership of Abu Muhammad al-Jolani and his lieutenants may mount. It is unclear whether Jolani could hold HTS together in such conditions. Nevertheless, HTS leaders apparently have seen compelling reasons for acquiescing in a deeper Turkish deployment. For one, Turkey’s current accommodating position could change, in particular as its relations with Russia evolve, if it reaches its goal of recapturing Afrin from the YPG or if Ankara concludes that only by invading first – and attempting to manage itself any resulting displacement – can it pre-empt an all-out regime assault that would foment a graver refugee crisis. With the recent military setbacks, HTS factions invested in building a society governed by their own interpretation of Islamic law and values may have realised that without an accommodation with Turkey their project is doomed. A third consideration also may have helped sway the decision: HTS’s desire to preserve its current power as the basis for a role in a post-conflict political order. Sources close to the movement’s leadership suggest that Jolani himself may seek some form of political future. For their part, Turkish officials express a clear preference for exploiting HTS’s inner contradictions, aiming to split off more pragmatic, mostly Syrian elements more open to cooperation, from what they view as a harderline jihadist minority dominated by foreigners. Cleavages run deep: since September, there have been at least three dozen unclaimed and unattributed assassinations of the group’s foremost religious scholars and military leaders, many of foreign extraction. On 27 November 2017, HTS detained several senior leadership figures considered loyal to al-Qaeda. Others have defected. Indeed, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has made a number of statements implicitly disapproving of the direction Jolani has taken HTS, notably rejecting the dissociation of HTS’s precursor Jabhat al-Nusra, also led by Jolani, from al-Qaeda that occurred in July 2016. Veteran jihadist ideologue and al-Qaeda supporter Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi has been equally critical. The latest decision to cooperate with a Turkish deployment to parts of the front suggests that the current within HTS that sought to distance itself from al-Qaeda and is more open to cooperation with Ankara has the upper hand, at least for now. On 26 January, the assassination of Atiyat-Allah al-Shami, the commander of HTS’s Aleppo front, removed yet another prominent opponent of such cooperation. Yet such an overt deal with Turkey could strengthen centrifugal forces in a movement that already appears divided and could cause it to fall apart, as well as infighting and a further deterioration of conditions for civilians. Even if a more pragmatic wing of HTS was prepared to permit some form of Turkish deterrence role along front lines, serious adjustment in jihadists’ ideological posture and behaviour would be required before any group or leadership emerging from the debris of HTS/Nusra could sell itself as a local interlocutor willing to play politics. Russia and Western powers will look in particular for credible evidence that Idlib will not become a safe haven and operational base for planning operations outside Syria. Russia would probably also expect Turkish efforts in Idlib to bolster the Astana process; yet the likelihood of militant leaders attending any form of peace talks any time soon appears a remote prospect. For Idlib inhabitants, HTS would have to moderate its behaviour locally, too. VII.Conclusion: Limited Options for Idlib There are no good options for addressing the deteriorating situation in Idlib. Military campaigns to subdue or dislodge HTS are likely to trigger an uncontrollable escalation with a devastating human cost, in particular if launched by the regime and its allies, causing rebel groups that are often at each other’s throats to unite against the common enemy. Even if successful in defeating these groups militarily and ending their armed control over territory, such operations are unlikely to resolve the jihadist challenge. The result may well be a prolonged phase of asymmetrical warfare, in Syria and perhaps beyond, as remnants of the defeated groups retreat to ungoverned areas and weak states across the region or return to Europe, Russia and Central Asia. Top al-Qaeda ideologues already for months have argued that HTS should abandon its attempt to hold territory and shift to an asymmetric campaign. Turkey’s deployment near the front line reduces the danger of escalation, but comes with high risks, as the difficulties in late January and early February demonstrated. If that first step of deploying along and holding the front line is likely to continue to prove challenging, the second – decoupling militants willing to contemplate a political role from al-Qaeda loyalists, as Turkey has been trying to do for some time – is likely to prove more difficult still. But with regime troops inching toward core rebel-held areas, those are the only options left for dissuading Moscow from supporting a regime offensive, and for averting the humanitarian disaster that would follow. Besides the risks involved, one major factor that deterred Turkey from investing fully in efforts to shift the internal balance within HTS was concern about the lack of international buy-in. Already, the unofficial, territorially limited, deal with HTS that made the first Turkish deployment back in October possible was met with apprehension in Western capitals. An expanded, even less deniable understanding with what a broad international consensus still designates as a terrorist organisation will expose the Turkish leadership to new accusations of covert collusion with jihadism both at home – where elections are due in 2019 – and abroad, potentially deepening the estrangement with its partners in the West.The latter, and in particular the U.S., currently appear too preoccupied elsewhere, such as with the south east and areas east of the Euphrates controlled by the YPG-affiliated Syrian Democratic Forces, with the competing international negotiating tracks (Geneva and Astana), and with controlling the damage of the Turkey-YPG confrontation, to expend effort on the apparently intractable situation in the north west. Yet the longer the situation festers, the more the perception will solidify that a military showdown is unavoidable. As the events in late January and early February suggest, HTS might be brought to cooperate with arrangements that reduce violence. Turkey’s partners in the West, as well as the Astana powers, should give Ankara time – even an implicit green light – to explore to what extent the organisation can be brought to accept arrangements on the ground that reduce the danger of escalation and lead to a gradual decline in fighting. Whether Russia, whose constraint on the regime would be critical, would accept such a scheme remains unclear. Notwithstanding Moscow’s pragmatism with other Islamist and Salafi rebels – some of which it long labelled terrorists before accepting their participation at Astana – the Russian position on Nusra and HTS has been consistent (as, indeed, has that of the U.S.). But for Moscow, the alternative to giving Turkey more time to pursue a diplomatic track is an ugly fight in Idlib, further international opprobrium at the inevitable devastation and a likely deterioration of relations with Ankara, even perhaps the end of the Astana process if the regime’s offensive provokes another refugee crisis in Turkey. Conversely, were Turkey able to nudge parts of HTS toward de-escalation, remnants of the movement that are genuinely irreconcilable would likely be easier to deal with. Certainly, a scheme along these lines would carry enormous risk. Even if it meets with a measure of success in terms of reducing violence, groups currently in control of Idlib are unlikely any time soon – if ever – to transform themselves into a variant of the “moderate Islamist rebels” that some supporters of the Syrian rebellion have attempted to cultivate before. Yet a Turkish deployment along the front and limited Turkey-HTS engagement should be seen as the best of the dismal options on offer. These steps would buy some time, remove the threat of an all-out regime offensive that would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences and create conditions for a more durable ceasefire. Few in Idlib would be satisfied with such stopgap measures, but at least in the coming months, they are better than the probable alternatives. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/b56-averting-disaster-syrias-idlib-province?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=2625214307-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_02_09&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-2625214307-359909997 (c) 2018 International Crisis Group

When compared to the rest of the continent, South Africa is leading the way in trying to deal with issues of hate crimes. On Thursday, the Hate Crimes Working Group (HCWG) released the first hate crimes report in South Africa. The report looked at 945 cases, the most in-depth report on the topic to date. Research professor of psychology at Unisa and leader of the research team under HCWG, Juan Nel, said while South Africa had issues it was doing better than other African countries when it comes to hate crimes. “I do think we are leading the way We have a draft hate crime bill and I don’t think that exists anywhere on the continent. Indeed, I don't think there are monitoring systems in other countries, as to get a sense of victimisations.” He said many South Africans were tolerant of intolerance and that was something that needed to be addressed. “There are arguments around fights for resources and that they are responsible for crime and all kinds of other aspects, which some people might not agree with. The point is South Africa is way too tolerant of intolerance.” Some of the findings in the report said 65% of the cases were perpetrated against individual victims and 35% were cases of hate incidents including hate speech, intentional unfair discrimination or hate crimes. The ages of victims ranged from infants to 81 years. “A further 2% of victims were older than 51 years. The majority of victims fell within the age ranges of 21 - 30 years (41%); and 31 - 40 years (35%); with 12% being aged 41-50 years. More than half of the victims (59%) were black/African. "A further 15% were of Ethiopian (8%), Somali (6%) and Eritrean (0.8%) origins - deemed to be race groups distinct from persons from other African nations. "In terms of hate crimes related to sexuality, 68% of victims were male; 32 were female, and two victims were male. Nearly two thirds (64%) of the reported crimes were committed against heterosexual victims, while 35% of cases involved crimes perpetrated against lesbian or gay victims and a further 1% against bisexual victims.” Triangle Project manager Sharon Cox said she felt the report was significant as many stories of victims were not covered in the media. “These kind of crimes are based on who you are, what you lose your life over and they affect people. Families lose brothers and sisters over it. We are glad when the media cover it, because so often cases just become case numbers and another judgment in the courts.” She said for cases of hate crime to be a thing of the past, people’s mindsets would have to change. “You have to think where is this starting and it’s starting from young. The policy and legislation is there, but it needs to be brought to schools and added to the curriculum,” she pointed out. https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/news/sa-leads-the-way-in-tackling-hate-crimes-13193020 (c) 2018 IOL

Today’s report from Radio Dabanga is at once harrowing and deeply revealing (see below). The Central Bank of Sudan, which has only an exceedingly small amount of foreign exchange currency (Forex), has banned any non-governmental agent or business from using its own Forex for imports. One way or another, in other words, the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime is determined to arrogate to itself all Forex (also known as “hard currency,” currency not subject to the massive inflation rates presently ravaging Sudan). This is, as the Radio Dabanga headline suggests, “disastrous”: it means that even food (i.e., flour for bread) and medicines cannot be imported, commodities desperately needed by the people of Sudan. And it means even greater inflation for the price of bread, the staple food for many Sudanese families. Having already suffered a 300% increase in the price of bread with the promulgation of the 2018 budget (in late December 2017)—and another 25% increase this past weekend—prices are set to skyrocket even further upwards. And the ban on use of private Forex to import even the most critical medicines will certainly cost lives, and put many medicine beyond the financial reach of millions of Sudanese. The rapacious effort to deny the use of Forex for imports reflects a desperate attempt by the regime to halt the precipitous slide in the value of the Sudanese Pound, which continues to lose value at an extremely rapid rate because it is not backed by hard currency. Black market trading in the U.S. dollar, the benchmark hard currency, reveals that there is no bottom to the decline (see details in Radio Dabanga dispatch below). Professor Hamid Eltigani, the head of the Department of Public Policy and Administration at the American University (Cairo) accurately notes that these “‘economic measures will have disastrous consequences in a matter of days.’ He stressed that “with these measures the government will force the flight of investors, exporters, importers, and halt trade.” This will be a catastrophe of the first order and certainly generate more popular protest, almost certainly on a larger scale, with a corresponding increase in violent repression by the regime. The lifting of U.S. sanctions, hailed by so many foolish observers, has simply proved to be the starting point for utter disaster in the Sudanese economy. The root issue was never sanctions, but decades of gross economic mismanagement and equally gross self-enrichment by the NIF/NCP regime—a fact that the international community simply refused to acknowledge. The most spectacular example remains that of Edward Gemayel, speaking as the IMF’s Mission Chief for Sudan: “Mr. Edward Gemayel, the IMF’s Mission Chief for Sudan noted that ‘Sudan has a long track record of implementing sustainable economic policies.'”(IMF press release, October 12, 2013) This was cynical mendacity on the part of Gemayel, but had no effect on his career and gave cover to those who wished to ignore the policies we see culminating in the present catastrophe. But this looming catastrophe was there for all to see at the very time Gemayel was serving as dissimulator-in-chief for the Khartoum regime. See | “Watching the Bubble Burst: Political Implications of Sudan’s Economic Implosion,” Eric Reeves for the Enough Project Forum, 17 September 2014 | http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/enough-forum-watching-bubble-burst “Kleptocracy in Khartoum: Self-Enrichment by the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party,” Eric Reeves for the Enough Project Forum, December 2, 2015 | https://enoughproject.org/blog/enough-forum-release-kleptocracy-khartoum It was simply not in the perceived self-interest of various international actors to acknowledge the scale and consequence of Khartoum’s immensely destructive economic policies or the extent of the kleptocracy that lies at the very heart of the regime, and generates most of its “political support” from corrupt cronies. Now the people of Sudan will suffer terribly, one way or another, as a consequence of this self-serving myopia. Further demonstrations and popular protests are inevitable—but so, too, is violent repression by the regime and its ruthless security forces. Newspapers will continue to suffer extreme censorship, especially when it comes to the topics of the economic crisis or protests; demonstrations will be met with increasing violence—excessive and indiscriminate use of tear gas, beatings, incarceration and torture (especially of political leaders and activists); and ultimately, if génocidaire-in-chief Omar al-Bashir determines it necessary for his survival, the use by the police of live ammunition accompanied by “shoot to kill” orders, as was the case in September 2013. Will the army continue to be quiescent in the face of the slaughtering of Sudanese civilians? There were signs in September 2013 that many in the army were appalled, and at least one officer, a major, left the army in protest. The National Intelligence and Security Services, Military Intelligence, and other intelligence organizations will undoubtedly stay loyal to al-Bashir and his cronies: their lives and livelihoods depend upon it. But the army will survive regime change as an institution, if one thoroughly corrupted by 29 years of purges and re-shaping by the NIF/NCP regime. Its mid-level officers—especially colonels and majors—may well decide that the only way to regain any favor among the people of Sudan is to support them if they again face “shoot to kill” orders issued to the police and security services. But in the short term, only increasingly hardship and violence loom for the people of Sudan—hardship and violence that the international community ignores and refuses to address in its relations with the Khartoum regime. “Disastrous consequences” predicted as Central Bank of Sudan bans imports | Radio Dabanga, February 8, 2018 | KHARTOUM | https://www.dabangasudan.org/en The Central Bank of Sudan (CBoS) has banned any import operations by banks without obtaining its prior approval. On Wednesday a CBoS circular banned any agent from importing resources using their own foreign currency. Professor Hamid Eltigani, the head of the Department of Public Policy and Administration at the American University, described the decision as “a police security measure that has nothing to do with economic measures that will have disastrous consequences in a matter of days.” He stressed that “with these measures the government will force the flight of investors, exporters, importers, and halt trade.” He stressed that the CBoS circular will lead to more failure and scarcity in building materials, fuel, medicines, and commodities such as flour. Cheques unpaid Customers in Khartoum said that many banks have failed to pay cheques on the pretext of lack of liquidity. Faisal Islamic Bank customers have complained that they could not withdraw the amounts they wanted to withdraw from their accounts. They pointed out that the highest amount to be paid is between SDG 2,000 and SDG 3,000 (*$100-$160). The former director of the CBoS, Sabir Mohamed El Hasan has warned at a seminar held by the economic committee of the Parliament of the country’s reaching stage of economy of scarcity. Indicative rate On February 5, the CBoS raised the indicative exchange rate of the US Dollar from SDG 18 to SDG 30. Last week the Dollar price rose by two Pounds within two days on the parallel forex market, to SDG 42. The US Dollar has increased in less than three months by 125 per cent, and sharply increased in the last week. In November 2017, the Dollar traded at SDG 28. On Sunday, currency dealers crowded near several Sudanese banks against the backdrop of the unprecedented scarcity of the national currency, increasing public demand for the Pound. On Monday, a large number of ATMs of commercial banks in the capital city Khartoum went out of service, either owing to the network being inactive, or as there is no cash available. This included ATMs in Sharj El Nil and Bahri. See also very recent Tweets/commentary on economic collapse: Eric Reeves‏ @sudanreeves Feb 7 In Darfur, in White Nile State, in Khartoum and elsewhere: inflation rages on, accompanied by growing shortages. Lines for bread make clear these shortages are affecting the lives of all ordinary #Sudan/ese. The NIF/NCP regime remains squarely in cross-hairs of popular protests: Eric Reeves‏ @sudanreeves Feb 6 More popular protests in the making as economic crisis continues to deepen in #Sudan. Fueled by bread shortages in Khartoum & new spike of 25% in bread prices (on top of previous 300% increase). Rapid withdrawals of savings from banks become inevitable, thus deepening the crisis: Eric Reeves‏ @sudanreeves Feb 5 Khartoum regime resorts to fantastic explanation of new round of explosive inflation in #Sudan—“psychological diseases”! What could be a more desperate response to hard economic realities crushing ordinary people with unsustainable prices for basic goods, including bread and oil? http://sudanreeves.org/2018/02/08/economic-collapse-in-sudan-is-rapidly-accelerating/ (c) 2018 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

North Korea’s decision to dispatch Kim Jong-un’s younger sister Yo-jong to South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) as part of a delegation to the PyeongChang Winter Olympics has opened up the possibility for the past month of sports diplomacy to garner something more substantive and lasting. With all parties to the Korean peninsula conflict sending senior delegations to South Korea for the Games, everyone should take a moment to give diplomacy a chance. Kim Yo-jong’s visit is one outcome of high-level talks between the two Koreas during January, a process that started with Kim Jong-un using the annual North Korean leader’s address on 1 January to call for a successful New Year for both Koreas. This year sees not only the Winter Olympics but also the 70th anniversary of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) founding as a separate state (it is also the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), but predictably Kim didn’t mention that). The DPRK high-level delegation will be led by Kim Yong-nam, the nominal head of state, who also attended the Beijing Summer Olympics in 2008 and the Winter Olympics in Sochi in 2014; as such his leadership of the delegation is unremarkable. It will also include Choe Hwi, who chairs the DPRK National Sports Guidance Committee, and Ri Son-gwon, the chair of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country who led the North Korean talks delegation on 9 January. However, it is Kim Yo-jong who will have the greatest degree of authority, despite her young age. The situation is reminiscent of a 2002 visit to South Korea by an economic delegation from North Korea. Though nominally led by the head of the ruling party’s finance and planning department, Pak Nam-gi, the power on the delegation was clearly in the hands of Jang Song-taek, an authority that stemmed primarily from his marriage to Kim Jong-il’s sister. Jang was judged in need of political re-education upon his return; he had supposedly gone weak at the knees in the face of South Korean capitalism. If he isn’t careful, Kim Yong-nam could face a similar charge. Indeed, so could any other North Korean official. But immunised by her bloodline, Kim Yo-jong need fear no such thing. As Crisis Group laid out in two January reports, cynicism about North Korean motivations is understandable. Pyongyang’s strategic goals centre on disrupting the ROK-U.S. alliance and the international consensus on sanctions against North Korea, as well as sowing division in South Korean society over how best Seoul should cope with its northern neighbour. The decision to designate 8 February as the founding day of the North Korean armed forces and commemorate it with a military parade through the streets of Pyongyang was partly motivated by domestic considerations. But it shows that despite North Korea’s participation in the Winter Games, Pyongyang will only go so far in accommodating President Moon Jae-in’s desire to host a “Peace Olympics”. There is also a domestic political motivation for the forthcoming visit, which mirrors the sudden arrival of a North Korean delegation in the South Korean city of Incheon at the culmination of the 2014 Asian Games. There, when the dust settled, it became clear that the delegation’s primary goal was propaganda: Kim Jong-un had sent senior regime officials to cheer on North Korea’s athletes, and nothing more. Sports and sporting achievement is a key plank in legitimising the Kim Jong-un regime. The North Korean delegation will seek to use its visit to Pyeongchang to score political points not only abroad but also at home; that much is obvious. Yet the visit of such a senior delegation to South Korea cannot be dismissed. This is the kind of political move that South Korea has been working to bring about, and Seoul won’t want to waste it. The biggest challenge will be the transition from symbolic gestures around the Olympics to addressing North Korea’s nuclear and weapons program or other issues of interest to Seoul and its allies. Korea has seen more than a few false starts before; joint marches of North and South Korean athletes at the opening ceremonies of the 2000 Olympics in Sydney and the Athens Games four years later did not lead to any discernible progress. Nevertheless, a conversation on issues not directly related to the nuclear crisis is an opportunity. As such, the biggest questions raised by the North Korean delegation are those for the U.S. Ever since North Korea launched its January diplomatic outreach, Washington has been walking a fine line between giving space for inter-Korean dialogue, keeping open the door to meetings with North Korean officials, and maintaining pressure on Pyongyang to bend to the will of the international community over its nuclear and missile programs. The result has been unedifying at best, and although the visit of Vice President Mike Pence to Pyeongchang is not necessarily a deliberate attempt to undermine inter-Korean dialogue, it increasingly is looking like one. Even as Pence and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson held out the possibility of meeting North Korean officials, Pence said he would use his presence at the Olympics to “make sure that North Korea doesn’t use the powerful symbolism and the backdrop of the Winter Olympics to paper over the truth about their regime”. He further revealed on 7 February that the U.S. would soon “unveil the toughest and most aggressive round of economic sanctions on North Korea ever”, and declared, somewhat predictably, that “all options remain on the table”. As an attempt to add fresh heft to a sanctions regime that may be succeeding at last in clamping down on North Korea’s inflows of hard currency, further economic sanctions are a logical extension of U.S. policy, but the timing is terrible. The symbolism of recent U.S. actions is also questionable under the circumstances. It is laudable that President Trump would invite the family of Otto Warmbier to his state of the union address on 30 January, and even more so that he would signal respect for the hundreds of brave people who escape North Korea annually by hailing a prominent defector, Ji Seong-ho, during his speech. Equally, the visit of a group of North Korean defectors to the Oval Office on 2 February sent a powerful signal to Pyongyang about the importance of curtailing its wanton abuses of human rights. However, sending the same message a second time by bringing Mr. Warmbier to the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympics could negatively affect any potential diplomatic opening. Equally, the Pence delegation’s decision to visit a memorial to the 46 sailors who died in the ROKS Cheonan, a South Korean naval vessel sunk by a North Korean torpedo in 2010, is hardly likely to put Pyongyang in the mood to compromise. Such a visit would ordinarily signal American respect for the loss of life incurred during a previous period of heightened inter-Korean violence, and as such would be welcomed. Yet the Moon administration does not really need American condolences at this particular moment. What it needs is a flexible partner in Washington that is willing to signal firm alliance resolve while giving Seoul space and allowing inter-Korean diplomacy run its course – with the plausible expectation that this may result in U.S.-North Korea dialogue later. This is the bare minimum for inter-Korean dialogue to bear fruit. To play the appropriate role in Pyeongchang, Pence should limit resort to symbolic steps that inevitably will provoke the North Korean regime, not intensify the pressure of sanctions, and open his ears to what North Korea has come to the Winter Olympics to say. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/sports-diplomacy-korean-peninsula?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=c0f4e7e6b3-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_02_08&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-c0f4e7e6b3-359909997 (c) 2018 International Crisis Group

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls on the authorities in Ruyigi province, in eastern Burundi, to allow local radio journalist Jean-Claude Nshimirimana to continue working after the governor threatened to have him jailed for 12 months on a charge of disturbing public order if he ever reported anything about the province again. Nshimirimana, who works for privately-owned Radio Isanganiro, was summoned and threatened by the governor yesterday, one day after the radio station carried a report by him about discontent among school principals and teachers in Ruyigi at being asked to pay an additional “voluntary” tax to help fund general elections in Burundi in 2020. “These threats are completely unacceptable,” RSF said. “The Ruyigi provincial authorities cannot censor a journalist on the grounds that his reporting does not suit them. Such action is clearly arbitrary because it aims to gag the media and deprive the public of its right to be informed. Journalists are not trouble-makers. They are just messengers, they provide information, and that is not a crime.” Nshimirimana said the governor and the head of the provincial branch of the National Intelligence Service (SNR) had also asked him to give them the names of the teachers opposed to paying the additional tax. When contacted by other journalists, the governor accused Nshimirimana of lying about what the authorities said and of “aiming to destabilize the country” in his reporting. Burundi is ranked 160th out of 180 countries in RSF's 2017 World Press Freedom Index. https://rsf.org/en/news/burundian-journalist-told-he-will-be-jailed-if-he-keeps-working (c) 2018 Reporters without Borders

We are glad to announce that the Siracusa International Institute for Criminal Justice and Human Rights - the new public name adopted by the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences (ISISC) – is organizing its 18th Specialization Course in International Criminal Law for Young Penalists on “International and Transnational Crimes”, dedicated to the memory of prof. M. Cherif Bassiouni (1937-2017). The course will take place from May 27 to June 4, 2018 in Siracusa (Italy). Professor William A. Schabas, Professor of International Law at Middlesex University, chairs and coordinates the course, assuring the highest quality of education administered by some of the most erudite academics and researchers in the field of international criminal law. This year’s confirmed instructors include Professor Roger S. Clark, Professor of Law at Rutgers University Law School, the Special Adviser on Gender to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Patricia Viseur Sellers, and the Emily and Ernest Woodruff Chair in International Law at University of Georgia School of Law and Special Adviser on Children in and Affected by Armed Conflict to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Professor Diane Marie Amann, amongst others. The Siracusa Institute will select 60 participants who should have a university degree, ideally in law or with some studies in law, and be 35 years of age or under. Provision may be made for auditors who do not fulfil these conditions. Furthermore, the Institute will offer 10 scholarships to applicants from Developing and Less Developed Countries. Applications should be submitted by March 27, 2018. All relevant information and the application form are available on our website www.siracusainstitute.org. You are kindly requested to fill out the application form directly on the webpage. Once you have submitted your application online, you will receive a confirmation. Please do not hesitate to contact the Siracusa Institute for any questions or concerns you may have at icl-course@siracusainstitute.org. We would appreciate if you would make this announcement available to those who might be interested in this Specialization Course. Thank you for your interest, and we look forward to receiving your applications. Best regards, Stefania Lentinello Program Officer The Siracusa International Institute for Criminal Justice and Human Rights (c) 2018 The Siracusa International Institute for Criminal Justice and Human Rights

Authorities in Myanmar have robbed, abducted and deliberately starved Rohingya men, women and children, in an effort to make life "so intolerable" for members of the minority group that they will leave the country, Amnesty International says. In a briefing released on Wednesday, the human rights group alleged that "ethnic cleansing continues" against the Rohingya, nearly 690,000 of whom have fled Myanmar since the state launched a violent crackdown in northern Rakhine state last August. Security forces have robbed Rohingya families at checkpoints as they attempted to flee to Bangladesh and abducted women and girls from their villages, prompting others to leave in fear, Amnesty reported. However, the Rohingya said the main reason they continue to flee the country is a shortage of food. "We weren't able to get food, that's why we fled," Dildar Begum, 30, from a village near the town of Buthidaung in Rakhine state, told Amnesty International. The food shortage has been caused in large part by the actions of Myanmar's security forces, who are blocking Rohingya from accessing their rice fields, markets and humanitarian aid, Amnesty said. "Deliberate actions by the Myanmar authorities ... are in effect starving out many Rohingya who have tried to remain in their villages," the group said. Amnesty based its findings on interviews conducted in Bangladesh with 11 Rohingya men and eight women who fled their homes in December and January. "Instead of terrorising the population through killings, rapes, and the widespread burning of Rohingya villages, security forces are today using mainly quieter and more subtle measures to squeeze people out, making life so intolerable that they have little option other than to leave," the group reported. Mass graves Earlier this month, The Associated Press uncovered evidence suggesting that hundreds of Rohingya had been massacred in late August by Myanmar authorities and buried in mass graves. Yanghee Lee, the United Nations special envoy on human rights in Myanmar, told reporters the killings and disposal of the bodies had all "the hallmarks of a genocide". The Myanmar army admitted in January that it killed 10 Rohingya, who were found in a mass grave late last year. The admission came after months of denials from Myanmar officials to any wrongdoing or mistreatment of the minority group. The army launched a bloody crackdown in Rakhine state last August in response to attacks on border posts by the armed group, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. About 688,000 Rohingya have fled Myanmar since that time, Amnesty estimates, amid reports of widespread killings, sexual violence, deportations and the burning of villages. Several hundred Rohingya continue to flee the country every week, Amnesty said in its report, adding that a plan to return Rohingya families to Myanmar "is clearly premature". Last month, Bangladesh announced it would delay the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of displaced Rohingya amid fears over their safety once they return. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/myanmar-starving-rohingya-rakhine-amnesty-180207141718699.html (c) 2018 Al Jazeera

Over one week, as many as 130 people, the overwhelming majority civilians, were killed in twin attacks claimed by the Taliban in Kabul. On 20 January, five Taliban suicide bombers attacked the Intercontinental Hotel, killing at least 22 people, mostly foreigners, after breaching the security of the heavily guarded building. Almost half the dead were employees of Afghan airline carrier, Kam Air. Families and friends of civilians trapped in the fourteen-hour siege spent the night in the sub-zero temperature outside the hotel waiting for news of their loved ones. A week later the Taliban launched a deadlier attack, killing over 100 people, again mostly civilians. This attack, near an old interior ministry building, was carried out using an ambulance. Despite their reluctance to accept responsibility for such attacks in the past, the Taliban this time were quick to claim the attack, but denied civilians were killed. An International Committee of the Red Cross statement condemned the attack as “senseless”, noting that ambulances should be used “for saving lives, not destroying them”. A third suicide attack, this one claimed by the Islamic State’s local branch, Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS-KP) hit a military academy of the Afghan army on 29 January. The attacks have provoked widespread fury at the Taliban, prompting some Afghan political leaders and activists to press the government to crush the insurgency instead of pursuing peace talks. Some have even called for the execution of Taliban prisoners; government officials saidthey were considering the option. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani described the 27 January attack as “our 9/11” and vowed to order massive operations against the Taliban. Similar anger was directed by Ghani, other politicians and the public at Pakistan, which hosts Taliban leaders and is widely perceived as a key external enabler of the insurgency. The attacks have added to Afghans’ mounting frustration with their government. Many view the government as bogged down in micromanagement and too distracted by a power struggle against potential rivals ahead of the 2019 presidential elections to adequately protect against insurgent attacks. The attacks not only provoked rage among Afghans, but attracted sharp condemnation from abroad. On 29 January, U.S. President Donald Trump said: “They’re killing people left and right”. He appeared to rule out engaging insurgent leaders: “We don’t want to talk to the Taliban. We’re going to finish what we have to finish, what nobody else has been able to finish, we’re going to be able to do it”. The day after President Trump’s statement, Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan, visiting Kabul, appeared to walk it back, saying it was meant to highlight the depravity of the Taliban’s recent attacks and did not reflect a policy shift. Talking to reporters, Sullivan argued that the U.S. overall still hopes to move toward peace talks. Despite Sullivan’s recalibration, Trump’s words matter in Afghanistan and the region. His rhetoric should be seen in the light of a new U.S. strategy in Afghanistan that thus far has mostly involved committing further U.S. forces and an escalating military operation against the Taliban. U.S. signals on engaging the Taliban – or at least on encouraging the movement’s leaders to enter talks with the Afghan government – have been mixed. In principle, and notwithstanding President Trump’s 29 January remarks, top U.S. officials say the new approach includes both military and diplomatic efforts to achieve a political settlement with the Taliban. Yet U.S. diplomacy has clearly taken a back seat to military operations. U.S. contacts with insurgent leaders, which were ongoing, albeit limited, in the latter years of the Obama administration, appear to have petered out. A Wider Escalation The recent Taliban strikes take place amid a wider escalation of the war. The uptick in attacks is not the first such increase over the past few years. Nonetheless, Afghanistan is suffering more intense violence now than during any other winter – winters usually see a lull in fighting – since 2001. This comes alongside U.S. public messaging that its military posture against the Taliban will be increasingly aggressive, winter will offer no respite and spring will bring ever fiercer operations. Indeed, the Afghan security forces and U.S. military are already conducting record numbers of airstrikes and raids against the Taliban. Their stated intention is to gain the upper hand before the fighting season starts, undermine the insurgency and convince its leaders they cannot win militarily. Throughout December and January, airstrikes and ground raids appear to have affected the Taliban’s battlefield mobility across the country and have inflicted losses on the insurgency at a level unprecedented for a winter season. Facing increasing battlefield pressure, the Taliban seem to be shifting toward tactics that pressure the Afghan government, its security forces and the U.S. while reducing insurgents’ exposure. Recent Taliban statements warn of an increase in suicide strikes and attacks by insurgents that have infiltrated security forces or related security partners. Taliban sources also threaten further massive attacks against Afghan and U.S. troops. The lethality of the attacks has increased, in part thanks to sophisticated modern equipment such as sniper rifles, laser sights and night-vision goggles. Suicide attacks have long been part of the movement’s urban warfare. As military operations against the Taliban escalated over 2017 – even before the new U.S. strategy was formally announced – so too did suicide attacks. Last year saw a 50 per cent increase in the number of such attacks compared to 2016: 48 versus 32, according to the Taliban’s own records (this may exclude attacks it did not claim). As the movement faces further pressure this year, the pace of spectacular attacks and urban warfare may well continue as pressure on the battlefield is unlikely to radically undermine insurgents’ ability to stage them. The same week Kabul suffered the two Taliban attacks described above, the provincial capitals of Helmand and Kandahar provinces in the south were also struck by suicide bombers. The Kabul attacks suggest the Taliban is sending signals of its own: that the U.S. cannot fight its way to peace. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said in a statement that the movement “has a clear message for Trump and his hand kissers that if you go ahead with a policy of aggression and speak from the barrel of a gun, don’t expect Afghans to grow flowers in response”. By turning Kabul into a battlefield, insurgents gain wider attention, shake public confidence in the government, while showing their continued ability to strike hard. The U.S. military has stepped up airstrikes, raids and operations by U.S. Special Forces. In December 2017, U.S. and Afghan forces conducted 455 airstrikes, compared with just 65 in December 2016. Even in the same month in 2012, when nearly 100,000 U.S. troops were present in Afghanistan, barely 200 strikes took place. All told, 2,000 airstrikes were carried out between August and December of last year, nearly as many as in all of 2015 and 2016 combined. The increased battlefield tempo might have hurt the Taliban. But it does not yet appear to have translated into increased territorial control for Afghan forces, which the U.S. military has defined as a key metric for measuring progress (U.S. Defense Department officials reported in late January, with data from October 2017, that more territory had slipped from government to Taliban control). Increasing Civilian Suffering The escalation clearly has not improved security for the population – another critical metric for any campaign’s success, though not one referred to by the U.S. administration. The U.S. Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported in its quarterly report in late January that the number of civilian casualties (4,474) from 1 June to 27 November 2017 increased by 13 per cent compared to the same period during the previous year. Civilian casualties due to airstrikes have increased too. According to UNAMA, civilian casualties by airstrikes increased 52 per cent in first nine months of 2017, compared to the same period in 2016. The toll from airstrikes is mostly borne by rural populations, whose suffering receives considerably less attention than that of those affected by the Taliban’s strikes in Kabul. Indeed, a striking feature of the Taliban’s own propaganda is what they charge as the double standard in reporting by Western and Afghan media. Nor is it clear that a military build-up, despite its tragic costs, will necessarily make insurgent leaders more willing to talk. In fact, the opposite may be true: it risks empowering elements within the movement more resistant to reconciliation. The Taliban faces its own internal struggle. Those on the political-civil front, including parts of the leadership and representatives in the Doha political office, appear to have already accepted in recent years that they are unlikely to win the war militarily and have quietly signalled interest in peace talks. These leaders may not always be in sync with the mood on the battlefield. Although command and control within the movement is still fairly coherent, leaders outside the country find it increasingly hard to shape the daily decisions of their on-the-ground commanders, who in any case enjoy considerable autonomy and whose units are suffering high casualties. This could mean a gradual erosion of influence among insurgents who are more inclined toward talking and more power for harder line fighters on the ground. NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg reacted to the Taliban’s Kabul attacks by vowing that the alliance will continue and increase support to the Afghan forces. But he highlighted too the need to ramp up diplomatic efforts: “It is essential to redouble efforts to achieve peace and reconciliation”, he said. Notwithstanding the many difficulties peace talks would pose, he and the U.S.’s other allies should press Washington to do exactly that: keep channels of communication to insurgent leaders open and at least lay the ground for peace talks by continuing to test with Afghanistan’s neighbours and other regional powers what a settlement might look like. Absent that, U.S. strategy risks further increasing the intensity of violence across the country, with no foreseeable end in sight. Civilians on rural front lines will bear the brunt of much of the fighting, but those in the capital and other towns will suffer too if the Taliban continues to perpetrate horrific attacks like those last week. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/cost-escalating-violence-afghanistan?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=832a69aa02-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_02_07&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-832a69aa02-359909997 (c) 2018 International Crisis Group

A group of scholars and rights campaigners from different countries have blasted Oxford University Press (OUP) over the commissioning of controversial researcher Dr Jacques Leider to write a reference article on the persecuted Rohingya people in a forthcoming series of the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History. Head of the Bangkok-based Ecole Française de l’ Extrême-Orien, Dr Leider is an adviser to the Myanmar military’s Armed Forces Historical Museum in Naypyidaw, according to a statement issued by the scholars and activists on Monday. Their statement reads: “We…are disturbed by the fact that OUP’s Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History series has commissioned Dr Jacques Leider to write a reference article on the subject of the Rohingya people… “We find that positions taken by Dr Leider in interviews with the press, in public talks and in published articles raise serious questions about his objectivity regarding the Rohingya and their history. His well-documented pattern of denials that the Myanmar military-directed mass violence and scorched-earth military operations against the Rohingya community – the subject of his ORE article – is challenged by the growing body of legal analyses and human rights research reports…” It adds: “We believe that televised appearances by Dr Leider with military and government officials condoning state policies against the Rohingya give the appearance to the viewing public that he validates views that underlie the Myanmar military’s ousting in 2017 of 680,000 people and the massacre of Rohingya for which the military has recently admitted responsibility.” The statement further reads: “We note also that OUP appears only to have commissioned an article on the Rohingya and not on the Rakhine Buddhist community whose ethnic claims, we understand, are no stronger than those of the Rohingya. It is hard to interpret this as other than OUP’s taking a stand in favour of the Myanmar military and against the Rohingya for reasons unclear and that OUP supports, at least indirectly, the current ethnic cleansing which Dr Leider’s writings and media appearances are used to deny.” The scholars and rights campaigners urged OUP to reconsider their decision to commission Dr Leider to write the reference article, saying “if the article goes ahead, it includes a clear disclaimer that Dr Leider is not a distant observer and that the article should be considered as an opinion piece, not as an unbiased reference source.” The statement was signed by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, a professor at Columbia University in the United States; Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, national coordinator of Indonesia Legal Aid Association for Women; Noam Chomsky, an linguist, philosopher and activist based in the US; Mofidul Hoque, director of Center for the Study of Genocide and Justice in Bangladesh; Tapan Bose, a filmmaker, human rights defender in India; Richard Falk, a professor emeritus at Princeton University in the US; Barbara Harrell-Bond OBE, a professor emeritus at the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom; Barbara Harriss-White, a professor emeritus at the University of Oxford; Ritu Dewan, vice president of the Indian Society of Labour Economics; Prof Gregory Stanton, founding chairman of Genocide Watch in the US; Johan Galtung, founder of Peace Studies; Youk Chhang, chairman of Documentation Center of Camboda; Abdul Malik Mujahid, chair emeritus of Parliament of the World’s Religions; Karen Jungblut, director USC Shoah Foundation in Los Angeles; María do Mar Castro Varela, a professor at Alice Salomon University in Berlin, and CR Abrar, a professor at the University of Dhaka in Bangladesh. http://www.dhakatribune.com/world/2018/02/07/reference-article-rohingya-scholars-rights-activists-blast-oxford-press-controversial-writer/ (c) 2018 Dhaka Tribune