Justice is finally making progress in the case of Hrant Dink, a prominent Turkish-Armenian newspaper editor who was gunned down exactly 11 years ago in Istanbul, but like most investigations into violence against journalists in Turkey, progress depends on the vagaries of political developments, which often obstruct the truth. Turkish civil society continues to bear the scars of Dink’s murder in the street outside his newspaper on 19 January 2007. He was a leading intellectual and tireless advocate of Turkish democratization and reconciliation between Turks and Armenians. After long denying the scale of complicity in order to protect the state, the justice system finally decided in recent years to move against former top security officials. Since late 2014, those questioned and detained have included Ramazan Akyürek, a former head of intelligence at the General Directorate for Security, Celalettin Cerrah, a former Istanbul police chief, and Ali Öz, a former gendarmerie chief in the northeastern city of Trabzon. But this dramatic change only happened after the government began purging senior officials who were members of the Gülen Movement, a former government ally and now sworn enemy. Dink’s murder was originally described as the work of a few individual fanatics. Then it was portrayed as the work of a secret network known as “Ergenekon”, as part of a wider investigation that was used as a pretext to persecute the secularist opposition. Now the judicial authorities are treating it as a Gülenist destabilization plot, while unprecedented purges are targeting alleged Gülenists. The trial will resume on 29 January. “The involvement of members of the security forces was clear from the start and the acceptance of this is a welcome step towards ending impunity,” said Erol Önderoğlu, who represents Reporters Without Borders (RSF) in Turkey. “But justice will not be rendered if blame is placed solely on scapegoats who are convenient at a given moment, without considering the state’s role. Ulterior motives and the lack of judicial independence too often prevent the truth from emerging and undermine public trust. The families of dozens of murdered journalists are still waiting to be rendered justice.” Politicized justice Around 40 journalists have been murdered or have disappeared in Turkey in the past 25 years. Complete impunity still prevails in about 20 murders that occurred in southeastern Anatolia from 1990 to 1996, at the height of the clashes between the Turkish army and the PKK Kurdish rebels. But the case of Musa Anter, a well-known Kurdish intellectual and columnist for the newspaper Özgür Gündem who was gunned down in Diyarbakır in September 1992, is an exception. After 20 years of inaction, the authorities saved the case from the statute of limitations at the last moment in 2012 in a gesture to the Kurdish political movement at the start of historic peace talks with the PKK. But the judicial process has faltered badly since the talks were cut short in 2015. One of the main suspects, former special agent Mahmut Yıldırım, cannot be found. The judges have still not managed to question another suspect, former double agent Abdülkadir Aygan, who fled to Sweden. The only suspect to have been arrested, former auxiliary Hamit Yıldırım in 2012, was released conditionally in June 2017. The trial is due to resume in Ankara on 4 April but, although the state recognized its involvement in Anter’s murder and expressed it regret in 1998, justice is still unlikely to be rendered. The judicial proceedings in a wave of shootings and bombings of well-known secular journalists and intellectuals such as Uğur Mumcu and Ahmet Taner Kışlalı in the 1990s no longer deserve the original label of “Umut” (Hope). Twenty-five years later, several Jihadi militants implicated in these murders are still on the run. After many twists and turns, the retrial of five suspects who were already convicted in an initial trial resumed on 9 November in Ankara, while the families of the victims continue to condemn the judicial system’s failure to identify and prosecute those in the “deep state” who masterminded these killings. The politicization of investigations continues to be the norm when the violence against journalists stops short of being fatal. The deliberate police violence against around 150 reporters covering the “Occupy Gezi” protest movement from May to September 2015 is still unpunished. The interior ministry has been ordered to pay damages to only two reporters and no police officer has been punished. And no measure has been taking against the ruling party activists who beat up four journalists – Sertaç Kayar, Mahmut Bozarslan, Veysi İpek and Hatice Kamer – on 8 June 2016 when they tried to cover the aftermath of a bombing in the southeastern city of Midyat. The journalists had to be hospitalized with serious injuries. But with good will... A few exceptions nonetheless show that, when the justice system is not subjected to political meddling or when there is sufficient civil society pressure, it is capable of shedding a great deal of light on murders of journalists. The leaders of a criminal gang in the northwestern city of Bandırma received long jail sentences for the murder of Cihan Hayırsevener, the publisher of the local newspaper Güney Marmara’da Yaşam, who was gunned down in December 2009. A court ruled that an influential local businessman, İhsan Kuruoğlu, had Hayırsevener killed for accusing him of corruption. Kuruoğlu was sentenced to 17 years in prison on appeal on 8 December 2017, while the gunman was given a life sentence. The case of Metin Göktepe, a young reporter for the newspaper Evrensel, is also exceptional. In 2000, seven policemen were finally convicted of beating him to death in January 1996 in the Istanbul sports centre where he was being held along with hundreds of other people. For a long time, the authorities insisted that he had fallen from the top of a wall, but they finally recognized the truth after a great deal of pressure from journalists’ organizations and civil society. RSF attended 28 of the 30 hearings in the case from 1996 to 2000, which were held far from Istanbul in an attempt to reduce the size of the protests. Of all the Turkish murder cases referred to the European Court of Human Rights, the Göktepe case is the only one in which the court finally ruled that the Turkish justice system had done what was necessary. New Syrian challenge Most of the journalists murdered in Turkey in recent years have been Syrian refugees. These cases pose additional challenges to Turkish investigators because the perpetrators may have fled to Syria and because the range of possible instigators includes the Syrian government and Islamic State. The double murder of Syrian activist Orouba Barakat and her journalist daughter Halla Barakat in Istanbul in 21 September has reinforced the climate of fear among Syrian dissidents living in self-imposed exile. A former employee arrested nine days later said he killed them because he had not been paid, but many doubt that this was the real motive. An alleged Islamic State member received a life sentence from a court in the southeastern city of Gaziantep on 9 June after being convicted of murdering the Syrian journalist Naji Jerf there in December 2015. But the trial was held behind closed doors and the Jerf family was not represented, so many key questions, including possible complicity, were left unanswered. There are also many unanswered questions in the murder of Syrian journalist Mohamed Zaher al-Sherqat, a Halab Today TV presenter who was gunned down in Gaziantep in April 2016, and the murder of Ibrahim Abdelqader, a Syrian citizen-journalist who was killed together with a Syrian friend, Fares Hammadi, in nearby Urfa in October 2015. Turkey is ranked 155th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index. The already worrying media situation has become critical under the state of emergency proclaimed after a bloody coup attempt in July 2016. https://rsf.org/en/news/fight-against-impunity-turkey-depends-political-vagaries (c) 2018 Reporters Without Borders

Myanmar was making final preparations to take back the first batch of Rohingya Muslims who had fled conflict in troubled Rakhine state, state media said on Saturday, despite growing doubts about the plan among refugees and in the United Nations. Rakhine state Chief Minister Nyi Pu “insisted on completion of the finishing touches on buildings, medical clinics and sanitation infrastructures” during a visit to repatriation camps in the state on Friday, the Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper said. It published a photo of his delegation standing by a long, wooden house that will be used to house returnees at the camp near the town of Maungtaw. A wire-mesh fence topped by barbed wire appears in the background of the photo. Over 655,500 Muslim Rohingya fled to Bangladesh after the Myanmar military cracked down in the northern part of Rakhine in response to militant attacks on security forces on Aug. 25. The United Nations described the operation as ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya, which Myanmar denies. Myanmar will start receiving Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh at two reception centers and the temporary camp near Maungtaw starting on Tuesday and continuing over the next two years, under an agreement the two countries signed this week. Bangladesh will provide an advance list of prospective returnees with forms attesting to their residency in Myanmar, the newspaper said. Some returnees will cross over by land and others via a river along the border, it said. Rohingya refugees at the sprawling Kutupalong camp in Bangladesh are balking at going back until Myanmar can guarantee their safety, among other demands listed in a petition drawn up by camp leaders and shown to Reuters. Even as Myanmar gets ready to start receiving the Rohingya next week, more of them are fleeing continued military operations in Rakhine, newly arrived refugees camp have told Reuters. Rohingya refugees line up for daily essentials distribution at Balukhali camp, near Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh January 15, 2018. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu More than 100 Rohingya Muslims from northern Rakhine fled into Bangladesh and scores more were waiting to cross the Naf river that forms the border, they said. Rohingya Muslim insurgents said on Saturday the repatriation plan was “not acceptable” and “the Burmese terrorist government is deceitfully and crookedly offering Rohingya refugees to settle down in so-called temporary camps”. Burma is the former name of Myanmar. “Repatriated Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh will never be able to settle down in their own ancestral lands and villages, rather than spending not only the rest of their lives but also the lives of their next generations to come in those concentration camps,” the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) said in a statement on Twitter. Myanmar has said it would build a transit camp that can house 30,000 returnees before they are allowed to return to their “place of origin” or “nearest to their place of origin.” Government spokesman Zaw Htay did not respond to requests for comment on the ARSA statement. Paul Vrieze, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) spokesman in Myanmar, cautioned that the returnees must not be rushed out of Bangladesh prematurely “without the informed consent of refugees or the basic elements of lasting solutions in place”. “Further measures are also required to ensure safe, voluntary and sustainable repatriation of refugees to their places of origin and to address the underlying root causes of the crisis,” he told Reuters. The UNHCR, which is helping to administer the refugee camps, is not involved in the repatriation exercise between Bangladesh and Myanmar. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-repatriation/myanmar-finalizes-rohingya-repatriation-preparations-as-doubts-mount-idUSKBN1F71GB (c) 2018 Reuters

Myanmar police on Thursday arrested a prominent Rakhine Buddhist MP for allegedly provoking ethnic violence, state media and his party said, after a deadly riot highlighted simmering tensions in the troubled state. The arrest came after seven people were killed and a dozen injured when police opened fire on a crowd of ethnic Rakhine Buddhists trying to seize a government office late Tuesday. The violence erupted as anger boiled over after the cancellation of a local ceremony in Mrauk U, a town just a few dozen kilometres from the epicentre of a military crackdown against the country's Rohingya Muslim community. State-backed media reported that charges have been filed against lower house MP Aye Maung following a speech on Monday in which the nationalist politican attacked the government for thinking the Rakhine are "slaves" and said it was the "right time" for the community to launch an armed struggle. "Dr Aye Maung was arrested and taken from his house about 1:00 pm (0630 GMT) this afternoon," Arakan National Party general secretary Tun Aung Kyaw, told AFP. Arakan is another name for Rakhine. Police have blamed the protesters for starting Tuesday's violence by throwing stones, barging into an administrative office and hoisting the Rakhine State flag. Myanmar's civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi expressed her condolences and has pledged to "probe the incident". Aye Maung, the first MP to be arrested since Myanmar's military-backed constitution was adopted in 2008, was charged under the Unlawful Associations act, which carries a maximum sentence of three years. The violence prompted an ethnic Rakhine rebel group in the state to promise "serious" retaliation for the deaths of the protesters. Unlike the Rohingya Muslims, the Rakhine are recognised by the government as an ethnic group but are often marginalised under a system that favours the dominant Bamar (Burmese). Rakhine mobs stand accused of aiding the military in using murder, rape and arson against the Rohingya -- 655,000 of whom have fled to Bangladesh since August -- in violence the UN and US have condemned as ethnic cleansing. Tuesday's riot came on the same day that a heavily-criticised repatriation agreement was signed between Myanmar and Bangladesh to start sending the refugees back. Observers are now concerned the conflict could now enter a new phase. "There's a risk this could become a lightning rod for Rakhine grievances and the situation could escalate," political analyst Richard Horsey told AFP. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-5283787/Myanmar-arrests-MP-Rakhine-riot.html (c) 2018 Daily Mail

Political leaders willing to fight for human rights principles showed that they could limit authoritarian populist agendas, Human Rights Watch said today in its World Report 2018, reviewing events of the past year. When combined with mobilized publics and effective multilateral actors, these leaders demonstrated that the rise of anti-rights governments is not inevitable. In the 643-page World Report, its 28th edition, Human Rights Watch reviews human rights practices in more than 90 countries. In his introductory essay, Executive Director Kenneth Roth writes that when leaders push back strongly against politicians who demonize minorities, attack human rights, and undermine democratic institutions, they can limit the advance of populists. But where mainstream politicians capitulate to a message of hate and exclusion, the authoritarian populists flourish. “The past year showed the importance of pushing back against the threat posed by demagogues and their abusive policies,” Roth said. “As we mark the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 2018, the best way to honor its principles is to vigorously defend them against those leaders who seek political advantage by depriving marginalized groups of the rights guaranteed for all.” Roth said demagogues have used economic dislocation and inequality caused by globalization and technological advances, the fear of cultural shifts in an increasingly mobile world, and the threat of terrorist attacks to fuel xenophobia and Islamophobia. They launched a frontal assault on the values of inclusivity, tolerance, and respect that are at the heart of human rights. These authoritarian populists seek to replace democracy – elected government limited by rights and the rule of law – with their self-serving interpretation of what the majority desires. France represented the most prominent example of successful resistance to xenophobic populism. In Austria and the Netherlands, by contrast, leaders of center-right parties competed by adopting xenophobic, anti-immigrant, and anti-Muslim positions, thereby mainstreaming abusive populist policies. President Emmanuel Macron took a different approach, embracing democratic principles and firmly opposing the National Front’s campaign of hatred against Muslims and immigrants. His resulting victory showed French voters reject overwhelmingly the National Front’s divisive policies. The challenge now for Macron is to govern according to the principles he preached. His first months in office showed a mixed record, both internationally and at home, with his counterterrorism policies and muted visit to China causes for concern. The election of President Donald Trump in the United States and his anti-immigrant, racially divisive, and pro-drug-war policies were met with a broad reaffirmation of human rights and widespread resistance against such policies by popular organizations, civic groups, journalists, lawyers, judges, and even elected members of Trump’s own party. In Central Europe, authoritarian populist governments have also encountered resistance. In Poland, large public protests and strong criticism from the European Union and Council of Europe met attempts to undermine the rule of law and judicial independence. In Hungary, the threat of EU legal action and international condemnation complicated the government’s plans to close Central European University, a bastion of independent thought that stands in opposition to the “illiberal democracy” championed by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. People also took to the streets to protest President Nicolás Maduro’s efforts to eviscerate Venezuela’s democracy and economy. Many Latin American countries shed their traditional reluctance to criticize a neighbor, raising the pressure for human rights reforms in Venezuela. The Women’s March in the US morphed into a global phenomenon, with millions gathering in support of women’s rights. Even before the #MeToo movement, Canada made gender equality a central part of its aid programs, and France announced new measures to combat gender-based violence and sexual harassment. Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon repealed provisions allowing rapists to escape punishment by marrying their victims. The Dutch, Belgian, and Scandinavian governments led efforts to establish an international fund to replace anticipated US funding cuts to reproductive health programs, and Sweden pursued a feminist foreign policy. By contrast, where governments repressed domestic resistance and international concern flagged, the populists and other anti-rights forces prospered, Roth said. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan decimated Turkey’s democratic system as the EU focused largely instead on enlisting his help to stem the flight of refugees to Europe and security cooperation. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi crushed public dissent in Egypt with little interference from the US or the EU, which accepted his claim that he was providing stability. In China, President Xi Jinping carried out an intense crackdown on independent voices with other nations afraid to jeopardize lucrative contracts by speaking out. Roth warned about the retreat of governments that might champion human rights, including the US, a UK preoccupied with Brexit, and European countries grappling with the influence of xenophobic populists. Their hesitancy has left a vacuum in which mass atrocities proceeded, often unchecked, in countries such as Yemen, Syria, Burma, and South Sudan. However, Roth noted that several small and medium-sized countries have jumped into the fray. When the major powers continued to support the abusive Saudi coalition in Yemen, where civilians pummeled by Saudi-led aerial attacks and a blockade faced cholera and acute malnutrition, the Netherlands stepped in to lead the demand for a UN investigation. Supported by Canada, Belgium, Ireland, and Luxembourg, they forced Saudi Arabia to accept an inquiry that will increase pressure for better behavior in the conflict. The Netherlands and Norway also imposed an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, respectively. Since Russia refuses to allow the UN Security Council to act for justice in Syria, Liechtenstein built a broad coalition in December 2016 to seek a resolution in the UN General Assembly. By a vote of 105 to 15, they established a mechanism to collect evidence and build cases for prosecution, an important commitment to see justice done for war crimes in Syria. “The central lesson of the past year is that human rights can be protected from populist challenge,” Roth said. “What’s needed is a principled defense rather than surrender, a call to action rather than a cry of despair.” https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/world-report-2018-fighting-rights-succeeds (c) 2019 Human Rights Watch

(c) 2018 The Sentinel Project

As the Ethiopian government prepares to release hundreds of detainees, including opposition politicians and political activists, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls on the government to add three imprisoned journalists to the list of those about to be freed. Two weeks after Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn promised on 3 January to release an unspecified number of detainees in order to “foster national reconciliation,” the authorities have announced that they will release more than 500 detainees on the 17th of January and drop charges against them. RSF urges them to include the following two journalists and a citizen-journalist, who were arrested and convicted simply for exercising the right to inform. Eskinder Nega, a reporter for the diaspora news website EthioMedia,was sentenced in July 2012 to 18 years in prison on a charge for plotting terrorist actions. Shortly before his arrest, he wrote an article criticizing the way the 2009 terrorism law was being used to imprison journalists. Woubshet Taye, the deputy editor of the weekly Awramba Times, was sentenced to 14 years in prison in January 2012 for allegedly planning terrorist attacks on infrastructure, telecommunications, and power lines. His last article criticized the ruling party’s methods. The justice ministry rejected his request for a pardon. Zelalem Workagegnehu, a blogger for the diaspora website DeBirhan, was sentenced to five years and four months in prison in 2016 on a charge of supporting terrorists. “These three journalists all fell victim to the 2009 terrorism law,” RSF said. “Ever since this law took effect, terrorism charges have been systematically used to sentence journalists to long spells in prison. The authorities must stop using this law to restrict press freedom and should instead begin its national reconciliation process by freeing these three journalists.” The prime minister’s announcement on 3 January that the government is also planning to close the Maekelawi federal detention centre has been widely hailed because Maekelawi has been notorious as a torture centre since the time of the dictatorship. Workagegnehuhas described being tortured, beaten and humiliated there. Nega says he was also the victim of harassment there. Ethiopia is ranked 150th out of 180 countries in RSF's 2017 World Press Freedom Index. https://rsf.org/en/news/rsf-wants-three-journalists-included-ethiopian-prisoner-release (c) 2017 Reporters without Borders

White supremacists in the United States killed more than twice as many people in 2017 as they did the year before, and were responsible for far more murders than domestic Islamic extremists, helping make 2017 the fifth deadliest year on record for extremist violence in America, a new report states. The report, “Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2017,” published Tuesday by the Anti-Defamation League’s Center on Extremism, said extremists killed 34 people last year. Twenty of those victims — or 59 percent — were killed by right-wing extremists, a designation that includes white supremacists, members of the so-called “alt-right” and “alt-lite,” and members of the anti-government militia movement. Of the 34 people killed, 18 were murdered by white supremacists, marking a 157 percent increase over the 7 people killed by white supremacists in 2016. That’s also double the number of people killed by domestic Islamic extremists in 2017. Nine people were killed by domestic Islamic extremists last year, according to the report, eight of whom died in a single attack in New York. In 2016, Islamic extremists were responsible for the bulk, about 71 percent, of domestic extremist murders in the U.S. This was largely an “aberration” however, the report states, due to the Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando, Florida, in which Omar Mateen killed 49 people and then pledged his allegiance to ISIS. 2017 marked a reversion back to the long-term trend in America, in which right-wing violence accounts for the majority of murders by domestic extremists. From 2008 through 2017, according to the ADL, right-wing extremists have killed 274 people. That’s 71 percent of the 387 murders committed by extremists over the past 10 years. “Americans do not have the luxury to ignore any extremist threat, including threats posed by white supremacists who are weaponizing social media and are more likely to take their actions into the streets,” Jonathan Greenblatt, the ADL’s CEO, told HuffPost in a statement. “Their actions fuel controversy and conflict and their racist rhetoric and hateful ideas can inspire violence.” The horror of right-wing extremism gained national attention in August, when more than a thousand white supremacists held a large rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. The assorted racists and fascists, emboldened by President Donald Trump’s election, weren’t ashamed to show their faces, nor did they shy away from violence. At the end of the rally, James Alex Fields Jr., a member of the far-right extremist group Vanguard America, allegedly drove his car into a crowd of protesters, injuring 19 people and killing 32-year-old Heather Heyer. Earlier that year in May, a right-wing extremist named Jeremy Christian allegedly stabbed two men to death aboard a train in Portland, Oregon, as they tried to stop Christian from harassing two teenage girls, one of whom was black and one of whom wore hijab. Also in May, a University of Maryland student named Sean Urbanski, who belonged to a bigoted Facebook group called “Alt-Reich Nation,” fatally stabbed Richard W. Collins III, an African-American student at Bowie State University. A prosecutor later stated that there was “lots of digital evidence” proving that the murder was racially motivated. In March, a white supremacist from Maryland named James Harris Jackson, who frequented the alt-right website The Daily Stormer, traveled to New York to kill black men. Using a sword, he fatally stabbed a 66-year-old black man named Timothy Caughman in midtown Manhattan. He then turned himself into police. And in December of last year, two young white supremacists on opposite sides of the country allegedly committed double homicides. In Virginia, 17-year-old Nicholas Giampa, who’d grown enamored with a neo-Nazi group called Atomwaffen Division, killed his girlfriend’s parents after they had convinced their daughter to break up with Giampa because of his racist beliefs. In Aztec, New Mexico, 21-year-old William Atchison, who frequented white supremacist sites like The Daily Stormer, and who had grown obsessed with school shootings, killed two students at a local high school. Atchison took his own life, and Giampa attempted to and remains hospitalized in critical condition. The increase in right-wing extremist murders helped make 2017 the fifth deadliest year on record for extremist violence since 1970, according to the ADL. The deadliest attack last year, however, wasn’t committed by a white supremacist, but allegedly by Sayfullo Saipov, an Islamic extremist accused of driving a truck into a bike path lane in lower Manhattan, killing 8 people. Although murders by extremists represent only a tiny fraction of the overall murder rate in the U.S. each year, “because of their nature they can have outsized impact, affecting entire communities — or even an entire country — in ways many deaths may not,” the ADL said in its report. Moreover, the ADL noted, the deaths described in its report represent “the tip of a pyramid of extremist violence and crime in the United States; for each person actually killed by an extremist, many more are wounded or injured in attempted murders and assaults.” Greenblatt, the ADL CEO, wrote an article in The Atlantic on Tuesday imploring the public to take the threat of right-wing violence more seriously. “In recent years, much of the public discussion and the federal government’s focus have been on the violent threat posed by extremists inspired by ISIS, while less attention has been paid to the reality of right-wing violence,” Greenblatt wrote. “There’s no doubt that Islamic extremism is a significant threat, but we shouldn’t ignore any forms of extremism — we must tackle them all.” On Tuesday, Sen. Kamala Harris (D-Calif.) said in a tweet that Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen “failed to mention” the threat of domestic terror by white supremacists during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing that day. The Trump administration last year revoked federal funding for a program aimed at de-radicalizing neo-Nazis. And after the deadly white supremacist rally in Charlottesville last August, the president defended the racists who gathered there, saying there were “very fine people on both sides” of that day’s demonstration. CORRECTION: A previous version of this story indicated Giampa had killed himself. He attempted to, and is hospitalized and in critical condition. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/white-supremacist-murders-2017-report_us_5a5f59b0e4b0ee2ff32c4bea (c) 2018 The Huffington Post

What’s the issue? African Union leaders meet at the end of January for their bi-annual summit. Vital institutional and financial reform will likely be at the top of the AU’s 2018 agenda, but the organisation must ensure that its implementation does not draw focus away from conflict prevention and resolution. Why does it matter? The African conflict landscape has changed: new threats, especially from transnational jihadist and criminal networks, aggravate more traditional forms of conflict. The geopolitical climate has become even harder to navigate. And elections, often the trigger for political crisis and violence, will take place in eighteen African countries in 2018. What should be done? The AU must pay particular attention to Africa’s most dire conflicts and those where it can have real impact: South Sudan, Central African Republic and Somalia. As a priority, it should advance preparations for elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo and deploy observations teams early in Cameroon, Mali and Zimbabwe. Overview 2018 could be a year of dramatic change for the African Union (AU) as it pursues an extensive program of institutional and financial reform. At the end of January, Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame – the author and chief supervisor of the process – takes over as chairperson of the AU Assembly, the organisation’s highest decision-making body, meaning that reform will rise to the top of the AU’s agenda. The changes are critical for the organisation’s long-term health, but driving them through will not be quick or easy. Kagame, working closely with AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, should ensure their implementation does not sap too much energy from the AU’s other vital work, especially continental conflict prevention and resolution. Faki himself, since taking office in March 2017, has focused squarely on peace and security, in strong contrast to his predecessor, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, who tried to reorient the organisation toward long-term development. During his first week in office, Faki visited Somalia, where an AU force is battling Al-Shabaab’s resilient insurgency. In his second, he travelled to South Sudan, scene of the continent’s deadliest conflict. These visits, together with subsequent ones to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the G5 Sahel states (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger), provide a strong indication of where Faki believes the AU’s gravest peace and security challenges lie. Additionally, he has worked to strengthen relations with the AU’s two most important strategic partners – the UN and the European Union (EU). In April, he signed the long-delayed Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Cooperation on Peace and Security, which should improve collaboration between the two organisations. Faki was instrumental in repairing relations with the EU, which had reached a low point in 2016 due to disputes over payments to troops in the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Discussions ahead of November’s AU-EU summit suggest a cooperation agreement, similar to that between the AU and the UN, is likely to be adopted in 2018. The joint AU-EU-UN task force on migration, born out of disgust with migrant slave auctions in Libya, is a positive development that capitalises on each institution’s strengths. As the AU re-evaluates its partnerships with other multilateral organisations and non-African states in 2018, it should build on these successes and not neglect relations with the EU and UN. The geopolitical climate, already challenging when Faki took office in March, has become still harder to navigate. Tensions between Gulf powers – notably between Saudi Arabia and its allies on the one hand and Qatar on the other – have spilled into the Horn of Africa, adding to instability in Somalia and exacerbating friction over the Nile between Egypt and Ethiopia, which have adopted different positions on the dispute. Divisions between major powers on the UN Security Council makes achieving consensus on crises, including those in Africa, ever harder. While U.S. President Donald Trump has largely ignored Africa, his administration’s escalating counter-terrorism operations risk further complicating crises in Somalia and the Sahel absent more comprehensive U.S. support for peace efforts. With many competing peace and security concerns, the AU should focus on Africa’s most dire crises and those where the continental body or its representatives have useful roles to play. With this in mind, this note lays out priorities for the AU in 2018. These include the important reform efforts; limiting any disruption to the institution’s work caused by friction between Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’s (SADR); helping resolve or avert election-related crises in the DRC, Cameroon, Mali and Zimbabwe; and managing conflicts in the Central African Republic, Somalia and South Sudan. Strategic Direction I.Build consensus on institutional and financial reform The AU has embarked on a potentially radical reform process, which if fully implemented could prove as significant as the 2002 transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union. Current reforms, spearheaded by Kagame at the behest of the Assembly, aim to reduce the AU’s focus to just four areas: peace and security; political affairs; the establishment of a continental free trade area; and voice and representation in global affairs. Integral to this process, which should make the organisation leaner and more efficient, is increased financial self-sufficiency. In 2012, when the AU was at its most dependent, member states funded just 3 per cent of its programmatic budget. By 2017, this had increased to 14 per cent, still well short of member states’ July 2015 commitment to finance 75 per cent of the AU’s programs by 2020, plus 25 per cent of its peace and security activities and all of its spending on operations. Extra resources are to be raised through a 0.2 per cent levy on “all eligible” goods imported to the continent under a plan drawn up by Donald Kaberuka, the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund. 2018 is a pivotal year for these reforms. At the end of January, Kagame takes over from President Alpha Condé of Guinea as Assembly chairperson, and is widely expected to use his year at the helm to push through the agenda he developed, endorsed by his fellow leaders at the January 2017 AU summit. Member states, the Commission and the regional economic communities (RECs) have expressed disappointment with the process to date, however, citing a lack of consultation. Reforms could be derailed without a more inclusive and collaborative approach. In particular, Kagame must allay the apprehensions of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which has laid out a comprehensive list of concerns including the practicality of the 0.2 per cent import tax, the reduced role of the Permanent Representatives Committee comprising member states’ ambassadors to the AU, and the establishment of a troika of current, outgoing and incoming Assembly chairpersons to represent the AU at summits with partners. He must also win over the five biggest contributors to the AU budget – Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa – all of which have serious doubts about the financial reforms, among other proposals. To do this, Kagame will have to build and mobilise a coalition of supportive states, drawn from each sub-region, to win over sceptics. He and Faki should consider joint visits to the secretariats of each AU-recognised REC or attend their respective summits to explain the benefits of reform. Member states will need time to undertake domestic consultations, particularly regarding the 0.2 per cent levy on imports, which will require ratification by parliament or other local authorities in many countries. As part of the reform process, the AU should undertake a wholesale review of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The continental conflict landscape has evolved dramatically since APSA was designed and developed in the early 2000s. New challenges have emerged, including the expanding influence of non-state actors, especially jihadist movements and criminal networks that operate across borders and often exploit and aggravate more traditional forms of conflict. The AU has endorsed the ad-hoc forces that groups of states have mobilised in response – the Multinational Joint Task Force to combat Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin and G5 Sahel Joint Force – but exercises little, if any, oversight over their mandate or operations. A review of APSA would consider whether these forces should be brought into continental structures and, if so, how. II.Limit disruption caused by tensions between Morocco and SADR Morocco rejoined the AU in January 2017, after 33 years of self-imposed exile, a protest against the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Algeria and several other states strongly opposed Rabat’s return on the grounds that its “occupation” of SADR contravenes AU principles. Many believe Morocco will attempt to isolate and eventually expel SADR from the AU and fear its presence could be disruptive: before rejoining, Morocco staged walkouts during several international meetings attended by SADR representatives. In his debut speech to the AU Assembly, King Mohammed VI attempted to reassure fellow leaders. “We have absolutely no intention of causing division, as some would like to insinuate”, he said, adding: “[The Kingdom’s] action will, on the contrary, help bring about unity and progress”. Despite his assurances, tensions between Morocco and SADR have already disrupted the AU’s work, delaying or derailing both internal meetings and those with external partners. In August 2017, during a ministerial meeting of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development in Maputo, Mozambique, the Moroccan foreign minister was prevented from taking part after he protested against SADR’s inclusion, a dispute that degenerated into a physical altercation. During preparations for November’s AU-EU summit, a great deal of time and political goodwill was expended convincing Morocco to take its seat, though the king eventually participated fully, in large part because of the importance of the partnership with the EU to both Morocco and Africa as a whole. Member states and AU Commission staff are increasingly frustrated with both sides; they will need to exercise deft diplomacy to ease frictions. Faki should work with allies among member states to persuade Morocco, SADR and their respective supporters to allow the AU to work unhindered. Warmer relations between Pretoria and Rabat may help; the two countries agreed to exchange ambassadors after King Mohammed VI and President Jacob Zuma met on the sidelines of the AU-EU summit. Contested Transitions III.Help advance preparations for elections in the DRC In 2017, President Joseph Kabila extended his tenure in power at least until the end of 2018, despite the December 2016 Saint Sylvester agreement, which required elections to be held in December 2017. The opposition and civil society, meanwhile, continue to struggle to forge a credible popular movement in the face of continued repression. Kabila retains the upper hand, controlling the government, the security forces and the electoral commission. For now, there is no guarantee or discernible commitment to the effective organisation of elections. The deadly 31 December crackdown on protesters demonstrates that political repression continues unabated, reinforcing concerns that electoral preparations are a smokescreen. The Congolese economy is in crisis, however, and the government’s writ is weak in large areas of the country. A number of provinces suffer local insurrections or intercommunal conflict, resulting in one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. The danger that violence could escalate further remains high: the experience in Kasai, where politicisation of a local chief’s installation led to conflict affecting several provinces, illustrates how quickly unrest can spread. The recent killing of fifteen UN peacekeepers in Beni is also a stark reminder of the dangerous dynamics in eastern DRC. International engagement has been lacklustre and incoherent, even as Kabila’s government has wilfully broken the Saint Sylvester provisions. The U.S. and the EU have been more critical, imposing targeted sanctions on key officials. The AU, meanwhile, like many of its member states, denounces sanctions. Some African leaders express frustration with Kabila in private, but their tacit public support has given his government breathing space. The electoral commission has rescheduled presidential, legislative and provincial polls for 23 December 2018. This provides an opportunity for concerted and coordinated Western and African diplomacy based on strict adherence to the new timetable, a credible vote, an opening up of political space and a guarantee that the constitution will not be amended to allow Kabila another term. The opposition should actively engage in the electoral process. The AU, which has stepped-up its diplomacy on the DRC in recent months, could use the new electoral calendar as the basis for sustained engagement to bridge divides between Africa and the West. Together with regional actors (in particular SADC, South Africa and Angola) and the wider international community, the AU should monitor the electoral commission’s progress to avoid further delays and uphold the key principles of the Saint Sylvester agreement. A small but representative envoy group, comprised of Western and African nations and organisations, including the AU, could help forge international consensus and limit Kabila’s opportunities for forum shopping. This group should establish and monitor benchmarks for the electoral process and connect initiatives at the local, regional and international levels. Finally, the AU should use its own influence and legitimacy, especially that of the Peace and Security Council, to nudge the Kabila administration toward a transition and the opposition toward engaging in the electoral process. IV.Deploy observation teams well in advance of other critical elections In addition to the DRC, seventeen other African countries are scheduled to hold presidential, parliamentary or local elections in 2018. Of these, at least thirteen are embroiled in or emerging from conflict or have a history of recurrent electoral strife. Flawed or violent polls, or a series of votes that provoke political crises, could have wider implications for democracy and stability on the continent, parts of which already show signs of backsliding. The AU’s chronically understaffed and underfinanced Department for Political Affairs cannot effectively monitor all these contests; it should concentrate efforts on those most requiring scrutiny. In addition to short-term teams that monitor polling and counting, the AU should deploy long-term observers, ideally at least six months in advance, to keep track of broader conditions for elections and the campaign environment; unfair conditions are frequently created well in advance of polling. The AU could also consider combining its observation operations with those of regional economic communities. Three polls, aside from those in the DRC, merit particular attention in 2018: Cameroon faces a growing Anglophone crisis in the south west, which the government, already struggling with Boko Haram in the Far North and militias from the Central African Republic in the east, appears ill-equipped to defuse. Unrest in Anglophone areas shows signs of an incipient insurgency and could ignite a wider political crisis that risks disrupting elections scheduled for October. The AU and other international actors should push both the government and Anglophone militants toward dialogue and promote conditions for a credible vote. Presidential, National Assembly and regional elections are scheduled in Mali, but implementation of the June 2015 Algerian-brokered peace agreement remains slow. Armed groups have proliferated, clashing more frequently with Malian and international forces. The government remains largely absent across the north and jihadist groups are consolidating control across many rural areas. Unrest has also spread to central Mali, a region long-neglected by the state. Under these conditions, administering a credible vote in 2018 will be difficult. But the elections should go ahead: popular discontent with the current administration is high and any attempt to postpone them, especially presidential polls, could fuel protests, particularly in the capital Bamako. The AU should assist Malian authorities’ electoral preparations, including encouraging either the UN and EU to support an audit of the voter register. In Zimbabwe, the euphoria that followed President Robert Mugabe’s ouster subsided as his replacement, Emmerson Mnangagwa, consolidated the power of Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the military, appointing a cabinet filled with supporters and senior army officials rather than building a broader-based coalition. At his inauguration, President Mnangagwa pledged that elections, which must be held before September 2018, will be free and fair but said nothing about the reforms needed to ensure a credible vote. The AU, working in concert with SADC, should push the government to clean up the voters’ roll, establish independent oversight of the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission and create a political environment free from violence, intimidation and propaganda. The SADC Electoral Advisory Council should undertake an assessment of electoral conditions and the AU should deploy long-term observers immediately. Both institutions should also lobby the Zimbabwean government to allow regional and international groups to observe the elections. ZANU-PF and Mnangagwa have an interest in letting observers monitor the process: without scrutiny, a new government would struggle to prove it has the legitimacy needed for donors and international financial institutions to support Zimbabwe’s economic recovery. Major Crises V.Implement the new AU roadmap in Central African Republic The crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) worsened during 2017, with violence causing many civilian casualties and massive displacement. Outside of the capital Bangui, most of the country is in the hands of armed groups, fighting over resources in shifting configurations of alliances. In the north west, violence mostly revolves around competing armed groups and perennial conflicts over the movement of cattle, while in the centre and east, groups are waging guerrilla war over zones of influence and resources. Stabilisation is unlikely in the short term and a military victory over the armed groups even less so. Prospects for the resumption of a broader civil war cannot be dismissed. So far, the government and its international partners have been unable to stem the unrest or find lasting solutions to widespread violence. Effective mediation between armed groups and the state will require not only dialogue, but also pressure, particularly by squeezing income streams and exercising stronger military deterrence, including making cities weapons-free and arresting the organisers of major attacks. The national authorities must also rebuild trust in the peripheries, for example by addressing concerns of some communities over citizenship. Various international and regional actors or organisations launched parallel mediation efforts in 2016 and the first half of 2017. Yet divergent agendas, institutional rivalries and differing approaches sent inconsistent messages, notably regarding amnesties for rebel leaders, the integration of combatants into the army and the return to CAR of former presidents. Although the AU took the lead and produced a new Roadmap for Peace and Reconciliation in July 2017, intended to promote dialogue and establish an agreement to disarm combatants, little progress has been made since. If the initiative is to succeed, the AU Commission, the Peace and Security Council and Special Representative Bédializoun Moussa Nébié, as well as CAR’s neighbours, must step up their engagement, in particular by pushing armed group leaders and the government to negotiate. The AU should also commit the requisite human and financial resources, ensuring that its liaison office is fully staffed and equipped. The AU should also iron out points of disagreement – notably over amnesties and the appointment of rebel leaders to lucrative state positions – among CAR’s international partners, who have generally welcomed the recent AU initiative. Any eventual deal between the government and armed groups will require guarantors drawn from African and Western states, continental and regional organisations and the UN. A framework through which donors and others can lend political and financial support is also essential. Identifying options ahead of time would be useful. Central Africans’ ownership of the process is vital to its success, so the AU will also have to secure greater buy-in from the government. VI.Avert a precipitous withdrawal from Somalia 2017 was a turbulent year for Somalia. Euphoria and optimism followed the February election of Mohammed Abdullahi “Farmajo” as president, only for the country to suffer the deadliest terrorist attack in its history when twin truck bombings in Mogadishu killed at least 500 people in October. The bombings illustrate the challenges confronting Farmajo’s administration: national security forces are chronically weak while the Al-Shabaab insurgency shows continued potency and resilience, recently recapturing territory outside Mogadishu. Farmajo also contends with longstanding clan disputes and his government’s mounting friction with federal states, exacerbated by the Gulf crisis. Nor has his administration made much headway in tackling the chronic governance deficits that underpin Somalia’s instability. Little suggests Al-Shabaab will be defeated any time soon, despite the gathering pace of an AMISOM military offensive in southern Somalia, backed by U.S. airstrikes. The AU mission, itself underfunded, suffers from low troop morale and is scheduled to pull out by the end of 2020. That date poses an acute dilemma for the AU and Somalia’s other foreign partners. The drawdown, which started in December 2017 with the departure of 1,000 soldiers from all troop-contributing countries, is a political imperative. Yet a precipitous withdrawal would almost certainly open the door to Al-Shabaab gains, including its potential recapture of Mogadishu, given the Somali National Army’s chronic weakness and corruption. The AU Commission could consider convening a summit in early 2018 that would bring together troop contributors, donors, regional bodies and the UN with the aim of improving coordination, especially regarding security forces’ training and assistance. It is critical not to rush the drawdown and to coordinate with the Somali government and allies involved in security sector reform. The looming withdrawal comes at a time of heightened tension between Mogadishu and the Somalia’s federal regions. During the 2017 Gulf crisis Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) put intense pressure on Farmajo to pick sides by breaking diplomatic relations with Qatar. His attempts to steer a neutral course – the Saudis, Emiratis, Qataris and Qatar’s main international ally, Turkey, all provide critical aid to Somalia – led the UAE to ramp up support and appeal directly to federal governments, as a counterweight to Mogadishu, thus aggravating friction between those governments and Farmajo and fuelling political factionalism. VII.Help reshape South Sudan’s stabilisation strategy South Sudan’s failed Christmas cessation of hostilities was a stark reminder of how intractable the country’s conflicts remain. Although fighting has diminished from its height in early 2014, violence remains pervasive. Government forces have the military upper hand, but though fewer regions suffer active combat, much of the country still exists in a state between war and peace: poverty, violence and displacement are constant challenges. In 2017, the transitional government, led by President Salva Kiir, embarked on a disjointed stabilisation strategy that focused on: reshaping the 2015 regionally-mediated peace agreement in its favour; launching discreet negotiations with rebel groups coupled with military pressure to induce their acceptance of peace on Juba’s terms; and organising a national dialogue. Through this strategy, Kiir successfully shifted from an internationally-monitored forum to a government-led, domestic approach, free from unwelcome external oversight. Neighbouring countries have provided quiet support, largely ending their assistance to rebel groups, but Western governments remain opposed to what they see as Juba’s efforts to shape a victor’s peace. The limited gains from this strategy, which include peace agreements with more than 10,000 armed rebels, are now at risk. Under pressure from the Troika (Norway, the UK and the U.S.), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, the sub-regional body that mediated the 2015 agreement) began a revitalisation forum to resuscitate the peace accord through a renewed ceasefire and by amending agreed timelines, specifically delaying elections set for 2018. The government has responded to international pressure by elevating less compromising and more bellicose voices within its ranks. Preserving the few advances made and preventing further deterioration should still be possible, though it will require serious political engagement. Irrespective of other factors, the transitional government controls most of the country and must be encouraged to promote peace and improve living conditions. However, Western governments have been reluctant to engage Kiir and IGAD has focused on preventing regional conflict. This opens an opportunity for the AU to support, shape and transmit difficult messages to the transitional government – publicly and privately – about revising its stabilisation strategy and setting a realistic timetable for elections. Alpha Oumar Konaré, the AU’s High Representative, is perceived as neutral, has a good rapport with Kiir and is capable of delivering hard truths that could push him toward more moderate positions. But Konaré’s engagement has been inconsistent. Sustained involvement, including more frequent visits to Juba, would increase his ability to influence events in South Sudan. The AU is reviving its High-Level Ad Hoc Committee on South Sudan, known informally as the AU5, which comprises Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda and South Africa. The AU5 should engage closely with South Sudan’s neighbours in leader-to-leader talks, ensuring a balance between mitigating regional tensions and supporting peace in South Sudan. The AU5, in conjunction with Konaré, should also consider engaging Kiir on his government’s strategy. This would require them to connect high-level discussions abroad with local ones on the ground. To do this effectively both Konaré and the AU5 will need full-time staff able to travel frequently throughout South Sudan. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/b135-seven-priorities-african-union-2018?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=44a2f3e8c7-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_01_17&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-44a2f3e8c7-359909997 (c) 2018 International Crisis Group

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) firmly condemns yesterday’s Philippine government decision, announced by President Rodrigo Duterte’s spokesman, to revoke the operating licence of the country’s leading news website, Rappler, and today’s justice ministry announcement that it is bringing legal proceedings against the site. RSF regards these measures as an unacceptable attack on press freedom and supports Rappler’s decision to appeal. The grounds given by the government for rescinding Rappler’s licence is the website’s alleged violation of a constitutional provision under which only Philippine citizens can own media outlets. “Try pierce the identity and you will end up [with] American ownership,” President Duterte claimed, referring to Rappler, in his last state of the nation address six months ago. But this was just a rumour spread on social networks, according to Rappler, which says it can prove that it is Philippine-owned and will appeal on that basis. “The revocation of Rappler’s licence is the latest stage in President Duterte’s open war against independent media,” said Daniel Bastard, the head of RSF’s Asia-Pacific desk. “Rappler is highly professional and its journalists stick to reporting the facts, facts that apparently annoy the government and its supporters, who have waged a smear campaign against the website on social networks. Instead of seeking the truth, the authorities have now clearly demonstrated their desire to kill the messenger.” RSF supports the call issued yesterday by the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines, which appealed to journalists “to unite and resist every and all attempts to silence us.” Responding today in his typically crude manner, President Duterte said: “I don't give a shit.” The move against Rappler comes amid constant attacks on media outlets that criticize Duterte’s notorious “war on drugs,” in which around 4,000 people have already died, most of them the victims of extrajudicial killings. Last March, Duterte criticized the “sons of whore journalists” at the Daily Philippines Inquirer, one of the country’s leading dailies, and at ABS-CBN, the biggest TV network. “I'm not threatening them but someday their karma will catch up with them,” he warned. Four months later, a businessman linked to Duterte announced his intention to buy the Inquirer while the president himself threatened to block the renewal of ABS-CBN's licence, which has to be approved by the Philippine congress. Rappler founder and editor Maria Ressa is often the target of online harassment campaigns. In a Tagalog post in early 2017, a 22-year-old student wrote: “I want Maria to be raped until she dies. This would make me so happy.” Information about Rappler’s ownership structure is available in the report of a survey of Philippine media ownership that RSF carried out. The Philippines is ranked 127th out of 180 countries in RSF's 2017 World Press Freedom Index. https://rsf.org/en/news/philippine-government-attacks-leading-news-website-rappler (c) 2017 Reporters Without Borders

Bangladesh and Myanmar agreed on Tuesday to complete within two years the return of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims who had fled an army crackdown last year in Myanmar. The UN Refugee Agency, responding to the plan, raised a concern about forcibly repatriating over 650,000 Rohingya who fled to neighboring Bangladesh after a conflict erupted in western Rakhine state in August. Statements from both the Myanmar and Bangladesh foreign ministries said Bangladesh would set up five transit camps on its side of the border. Those camps would send Rohingyas to two reception centers in Myanmar. The repatriation process would start next Tuesday, the statements said. Myanmar said it would build a transit camp that can house 30,000 returnees. The Bangladesh statement said “Myanmar has reiterated its commitment to stop (the) outflow of Myanmar residents to Bangladesh”. Myanmar stressed the need for both sides to take preventive measures against possible Rohingya attacks and said it gave Dhaka a list with the names of 1,000 alleged militants. The crisis erupted after Rohingya insurgent attacks on security posts on Aug. 25 in Rakhine triggered a fierce military response that the United Nations denounced as ethnic cleansing. Some 650,000 people fled the violence. The military denies ethnic cleansing, saying its security forces had mounted legitimate counter-insurgency clearance operations. The Bangladesh statement called for repatriating orphans and “children born out of unwarranted incidence”, a reference to cases of rape resulting in pregnancy, said a Bangladesh foreign ministry official who declined to be identified. The rape of Rohingya women by Myanmar’s security forces was widespread, according to interviews with women conducted at displacement camps by U.N. medics and activists. The military denies it was involved in any sexual assaults. A spokesperson from the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) said on Tuesday the Rohingya should only return voluntarily when they feel it is safe to do so. “Major challenges have to be overcome,” UNHCR spokesman Andrej Mahecic told a Geneva news briefing. “These include ensuring they are told about the situation in their areas of origin ... and are consulted on their wishes, that their safety is ensured.” Myanmar government spokesman Zaw Htay told Reuters last week the returnees could apply for citizenship “after they pass the verification process”. Myint Kyaing, permanent secretary at Myanmar’s Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population, told Reuters this month Myanmar would begin processing at least 150 people a day through each of the two camps by Jan. 23. The meeting that concluded on Tuesday in Myanmar’s capital Naypyitaw was the first for a joint working group set up to hammer out the details of the November repatriation agreement. Left out of the talks were the fears and concerns of the refugees themselves, “as if they are an inert mass of people who will go where and when they are told,” Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch, told Reuters in an email. “Where are considerations for protection of the Rohingya from Myanmar security forces who months ago were raping and killing them? How come the discussions ignore the deprivation of rights of people held in indefinite detention, which is what these so-called “temporary” accommodations may become?,” Robertson asked. A group of refugees at the Kutupalong Rohingya camp near Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh expressed doubt about the camps Myanmar has agreed to establish on its side of the border. Mohammad Farouk, 20, who arrived in Bangladesh following the Aug. 25 attacks, said exchanging one camp for another made little difference - except ”the camps in Myanmar will be far worse, because we will be confined there and there will be a risk to our lives.” Another resident of the Kutupalong camp compared the new transit camps to ones set up near the Rakhine state capital of Sittwe following bouts of violence in previous years ”where people are living like prisoners”. “First, ask the military to give those Rohingya their homes and property back, then talk to us about returning,” said the Rohingya refugee who did not want to be identified. Some said the kind of violence they witnessed toward their community in Myanmar made it hard for them to trust the military. “Even if I don’t get food or anything else here, at least there is safety. I won’t feel safe if I go back to Myanmar,” said Rashid Ahmed, 33. Noor Alam, 37, who came to Kutupalong five months back, wondered if he could ever get a job in Myanmar. “They don’t even call us Rohingya. Until they consider us citizens we won’t go back.” Some young men in the camp worried they might be arrested on accusations of terrorism if they returned to Myanmar. Camp conditions in Bangladesh are dire enough, but more than 520,000 Rohingya children are at even greater risk ahead of the cyclone season that generally begins in April, the United Nations Children’s Fund said on Tuesday. ”Hundreds of thousands of children are already living in horrific conditions, and they will face an even greater risk of disease, flooding, landslides and further displacement,” said Edouard Beigbeder, UNICEF Representative in Bangladesh. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-bangladesh/bangladesh-agrees-with-myanmar-to-complete-rohingya-return-in-two-years-idUSKBN1F50I2?il=0 (c) 2018 Reuters Nearly 1 million Rohingya live in Bangladesh, including those who came after previous displacements dating back to the 1990s.

Today’s scheduled and pre-announced demonstration in Khartoum, protesting catastrophic increases in the prices of basic commodities, including food and medicine, saw the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party unleash a fury of baton-wielding policemen, inflicting serious injuries it would appear from the video now circulating widely on Sudanese social media. (Notably, since similar protests in September 2013, Sudanese activists have been much more skilled and fluent in the use if various social media, helped in part by advances in mobile phone technologies readily available.) The demonstrations of September 2013 were quelled only when the regime gave “shoot to kill” orders to police and security forces, a fact established by both Amnesty International and the African Centre of Justice and Peace Studies. In the end, at least 200 people were killed in this brutal response—many more according to some reports (the demonstrations were spread widely across Sudan). Present massive price increases are much more severe than in September 2013, and the effect on the lives of ordinary Sudanese is much more profound. The international community has reported almost nothing of the economic and political developments leading to today’s demonstration, giving an implicit “green light” to the NIF/NCP regime. News reporting by non-Sudanese news organizations has been almost non-existent, with the notable exception of Al Jazeera | http://sudanreeves.org/2018/01/10/8407/. If protests continue, as seems inevitable, the Khartoum regime will not—without intense international pressure—refrain from again issuing “shoot to kill” orders. This will be blood on the hands of an acquiescent, expedient, and morally cowardly international community. Price hike protesters beaten by police officers (with video) | Radio Dabanga | January 16, 2018 | KHARTOUM Videos circulating on social media or sent to Radio Dabanga show the use of force by Khartoum’s riot police against peaceful demonstrators in the street. The demonstrators in the videos are marching or chanting slogans against the recent price increases following the implementation of the new annual budget. In the first video, a man is beaten by riot police with batons. http://sudanreeves.org/2018/01/16/our-first-glimpse-of-how-khartoum-intends-to-respond-to-organized-peaceful-demonstrations-over-catastrophic-price-hikes/ (c) 2018 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls for all charges to be dropped against Asaduzzaman Noor, a 25-year-old Bangladeshi blogger held for the past three weeks for blog posts allegedly critical of Islam, and meanwhile supports the request for his release on bail that his lawyer will make in court today. RSF also urges the authorities to provide protection for the young blogger, who is better known on social networks by the blog name of Asad Noor. Arrested on 25 December and accused of “mocking the Prophet Mohammed and making negative comments about Islam, the Prophet and the Quran on Facebook and YouTube,” Noor is facing up to 14 years in jail under article 57 of the Information and Communication Technology Act (ICT Act), which penalizes those who “hurt religious feeling.” “We call for the charges against Asad Noor to be dismissed because his only crime has been to express secular opinions,” said Daniel Bastard, the head of RSF’s Asia-Pacific desk. “The legal article under which he is accused has for too long been used by extremist religious groups to gag all independent voices. And, in view of the calls for his death, the authorities must provide him with specific protective measures.” Hounded by radical Islamist groups and fearing for his life, Noor has been living in hiding in Bangladesh and India for the past year. A religious leader filed a complaint on 11 January 2017 accusing him of violating article 57 of the ICT Act. Several Bangladeshi Islamist groups, including the biggest one, Hefazat-e-Islam, have said chaos will engulf Bangladesh if Noor is not sentenced to death. When his Indian visa expired, Noor flew to Dhaka on 25 December with a view to continuing to Nepal to seek refuge there, but border police arrested him at the airport and he has been held ever since. After the ICT law was amended in 2013, the police began arresting citizen-journalists for hurting religious feeling. Four bloggers were arrested in the space of four days on the grounds that they had blasphemed in comments posted online. At the same time, at least 30 journalists and bloggers were attacked for criticizing Islamic fundamentalism. Following calls for their deaths by extremist groups, a total of eight blogger and journalists were killed from February 2015 to April 2016. They include Niloy Neel, who was hacked to death in his Dhaka home in August 2015. In most of these cases, no one was ever convicted. Bangladesh is ranked 146th out of 180 countries in RSF's 2017 World Press Freedom Index. https://rsf.org/en/news/rsf-calls-release-bangladeshi-blogger-held-blasphemy-charge (c) 2018 Reporters Without Borders