Teklemariam Bekit Editor BBC Tigrinya and Yemane Nagish BBC Tigrinya October 9, 2025 Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a border war from 1998 to 2000 (AFP via Getty Images) Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of preparing to wage war against it in collusion with an opposition grouping, in the latest sign of escalating tensions between the two neighbours over control of the Red Sea. Ethiopia's accusation is contained in a letter sent by its Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos to UN chief Antonio Guterres, warning that the collusion had become "more evident over the past few months". Eritrea has not yet commented on the letter, but its relationship with Ethiopia has become increasingly strained in recent months. Ethiopia has been rallying support to regain access to the Red Sea, causing alarm in Eritrea as it took control of the coastline at independence in 1993. If Gedion's allegations are true, it means that Eritrea is waging a proxy war against Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government, to prevent it from launching a military incursion into Eritrea to seize ports along the Red Sea. Ethiopia and Eritrea fought for control of the border town of Badme from 1998 to 2000, causing the deaths of tens of thousands of people. After Abiy took office in 2018, he ended tensions by building a strong alliance with Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki. However, relations between them have since soured, with access to the Red Sea becoming a major flashpoint. In the letter seen by AFP news agency, Gedion alleged that Eritrea and a hardline faction of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) were "funding, mobilizing and directing armed groups" in Ethiopia's Amhara region, where militiamen known as Fano have been battling the federal government. "The hardliner faction of the TPLF and the Eritrean government are actively preparing to wage war against Ethiopia," AFP quoted the letter as saying. BBC Amharic has contacted the Ethiopian foreign ministry to confirm the authenticity of the letter, but it has not yet responded. The letter is widely circulating on social media among Ethiopian government supporters. A TPLF faction, led by Debretsion Gebremichael, controls the government in Ethiopia's Tigray region, which borders Eritrea. It accuses Abiy's government of failing to fully implement a peace deal reached in 2022 to end conflict in Tigray, and says another TPLF faction, led by Getachew Reda, is colluding with Addis Ababa. Eritrea fought on the side of the Ethiopian army in the conflict, but was not part of the deal and is now accused of forming an alliance with the Debretsion-led TPLF faction. In his response, Debretsion said the foreign minister's letter contained "fabricated stories and smear campaigns" intended to divert attention from the federal government's failure to honour the peace agreement. 'No-one can handle another war' - Tigrayans fear fresh Ethiopian conflict Joyful Ethiopians and Eritreans embrace at rare border reopening 'I lost my leg on the way home from school' At the same time, Ethiopia has been hit by an increasingly brutal conflict in its Amhara region, after the Fano militias - previously allied with Abiy's government against the TPLF - rejected moves to disarm them and said they were defending the Amhara ethnic group from government atrocities. The Fano appear to be expanding their agenda to topple Abiy's government, and are carrying out more deadly operations. Ethiopia's privately owned Addis Standard newspaper reported that the foreign minister's letter accused Eritrea and TPLF hardliners of supporting Fano's efforts to capture the town of Woldiya in the Amhara region in September. TPLF commanders and fighters participated directly in the operation, the newspaper quoted the letter as saying. Debretsion said the claim was "entirely unfounded", and the federal government was, in fact, training new militias to destabilise Tigray. "The letter issued by the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs represents a dangerous inversion of history - an attempt to portray the aggressor as the victim and the victims as the aggressor," Debretsion added. For his part, Ethiopia's foreign minister said Eritrea was attempting to destabilise Ethiopia as it felt threatened by Addis Ababa's bid to gain access to the Red Sea, the newspaper reported. Since October 2023, landlocked Ethiopia has been pushing for renewed access to the Red Sea, arguing that it had erred in relinquishing control of ports to Eritrea at the time of its independence. In Ethiopia's parliament on Monday, President Taye Atske Selassie described the Red Sea and River Nile as "great water resources, which are essential to our country's existence". This led to a sharp rebuke from Eritrea's Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel, who dismissed the rhetoric as "too crass and pathetic to sell". He added that the Ethiopian ruling party's "obsession" with the Red Sea and River Nile was "bizarre and mind-boggling by all standards". © BBC 2025. All rights reserved.

Genocide Watch’s Michał Jagielski speaks with Wojciech Jagielski, a Poland-based war correspondent and author, and an expert on African and Central Asian affairs, including Sudan and South Sudan. Over a career spanning more than thirty-five years, he has traveled repeatedly to Sudan, witnessing its many wars: the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005), the ongoing conflict in Darfur (2003–present), and the Eastern Sudan Insurgency (1994–2006).   A Darfur conflict survivor moves past temporary shelters near Sudan-Chad border. [Zohra Bensemra/Reuters] Historical comparison:   - Given your extensive experience in the field, how would you compare the current acts of genocide and military operations to past episodes of violence in Sudan?    WJ : In terms of brutality, the conflict has not changed much; however, its scale has. Over two million people have died during the South Sudan Independence War in the second half of the 20 th  century. During the first Darfur War, at the beginning of the 21 st  century, the number of casualties was estimated to be around 250,000. In the ongoing war, which began almost three years ago, tens of thousands of casualties have been reported, and more recently, the number has exceeded 100,000. These are general estimates that can change at any time.    In any case, the brutality of the ongoing war in Darfur has not changed much compared to that at the beginning of the century. There is one difference – then the violence was employed by Khartoum to subjugate Darfur; today, Arabs from Darfur, the ones that rebelled against the historic leadership of Arabs from Khartoum, are murdering everyone who challenges their claim to control of the entire country. Today’s war is more about who will rule in Khartoum, while the previous conflict aimed to stifle the rebellion in Darfur.     - How does the international community’s response to the ongoing genocide compare to previous wars and acts of violence in Sudan and Darfur?    WJ : The difference could not be more striking. Then the case was picked up by the International Criminal Court (ICC), which charged then-President Omar al-Bashir with war crimes and issued international arrest warrants. The crimes and violence in Sudan were widely spoken about and criticized by American celebrities such as George Clooney and institutions, including the White House. Thanks to their efforts, the war crimes in Darfur became a talking point in the entirety of the Western world and were covered extensively by international newspapers. It was proclaimed the first genocide in the 21st century, while the last one, at the end of the 20th century, had been the genocide in Rwanda, which the West ignored for geopolitical reasons. The war in Darfur gave the United States a chance to compensate for its silence in Rwanda.    Today, nobody cares about Darfur and Sudan aside from their neighbors and humanitarian aid organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières. The traditional media, which has grown poorer over the years, simply cannot afford to send their journalists into the field or even dedicate their columns to cover the war, while the digital outlets are not interested unless something startling occurs. The Western world and its media are exclusively preoccupied with the wars in Ukraine and Gaza.    Darfur Crisis:   - What do Sudanese civilians feel about the people from Darfur? If the guns fall silent tomorrow, will those from Darfur still live under the shadow of suspicion, discrimination, or even renewed violence from other ethnic and religious communities?    WJ : The essence of the Darfur war is more about the conflict between the military and the civilian population. The military, which —excluding brief moments of attempted civilian rule —has been ruling the country since its independence, has gotten accustomed to viewing Sudan as its own private property. It is enjoying the perks of being in power, accumulating wealth, and does   not want to waste its time and energy on wars.   Whenever an armed rebellion or insurgency took place in Sudan, the military did not engage itself; instead, it delegated the fighting to the various militias it supported. That was the case in the South, where Khartoum sent its air force to deal with the insurgency; however, on the ground, fighting was done by Arab militias from the borderlands that were trained, armed, and paid for by the military. Similarly, in Darfur, the non-Arab Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa rebellion was dealt with by sending the Janjaweed, Arab militias from the region.  In 2019, the military generals, in collaboration with the Janjaweed, overthrew the military Dictator because his rule was wavering because of street protests in Khartoum, and there existed a real chance of civilians taking over the country. In the spring of 2023, the military generals and the Janjaweed began competing for power, sparking the ongoing war. The army, for the first time, fought along the Nile and in Darfur, but recently, after the front line has stabilized (with the army controlling the Nile, and the Janjaweed controlling Darfur), both sides have once again returned to the old habit of backing ethnic militias. The military is now supporting the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa militias, the same groups that it fought 15 years ago alongside the Janjaweed, in their fight against the Janjaweed. The war is engulfing new regions. In Kordofan, the army is supporting local Arab militias against the Darfuris, while the Darfuris, in turn, are supported by black rebel groups that had fought Khartoum for decades during the South’s secession war, but whose lands, after the border was drawn, ended up in the North. Because of this pattern, wars in Sudan only inflame ethnic and neighbor conflicts over land and access to water. After the war, the division between Arabs living along the Nile, who have ruled Sudan since its independence, and Arabs from Darfur, who have long been regarded by Khartoum as backward and primitive relatives, will only deepen.    - How is the genocide in Darfur viewed by neighboring countries (Chad, South Sudan, Central African Republic)? Given their ethnic allegiances, what is your opinion on the possible impact that neighboring governments could have on the conflict?    WJ : The Sudanese war has forced almost all of the neighboring countries to get involved. South Sudan is in the most perilous situation. Its only source of income is exporting oil, and the pipelines required to do so go through Kordofan into the terminal in Port Sudan. For the pipeline to function, South Sudan needs to have a good working relationship with both Khartoum and Darfur, as the oil infrastructure is in the regions controlled by the two parties. The Darfuris have allied themselves with black militias from Kordofan, who previously fought against Khartoum alongside today’s South Sudanese leadership. It would be unseemly for South Sudan not to support its former allies. This, in turn, enrages the Khartoum elites, who at any time can cut off South Sudanese oil from the Port Sudan terminal and are currently supporting the opposition to the government in Juba. The struggle for power in South Sudan has been ongoing since the country’s independence in 2011 and overlaps with the old ethnic conflict between the Dinka and Nuer communities. Since the spring of this year, clashes between the ruling Dinka and the opposing Nuer have resumed. The war in Darfur increases the risk of the violence spilling over to South Sudan.   Chad is also wary of the war in Darfur. The country is the main recipient of refugees from Darfur and the Chad-Sudan border, which splits Darfur into two, separating the Zaghawa, Fur, Masalit, and Arab communities from the province. For close to 50 years now, Chad has been ruled by the Deby family, members of the Zaghawa community. The previous ruler, Idriss Deby, had aided his compatriots in Darfur; however, after his death (he was killed in a clash with rebels in 2021), power passed to his son, Mahamat, who now mainly sides with his mother’s people, the Gorane, has distanced himself from the Zaghawa and is quietly supporting the Darfuri Arabs in the war. It is a dangerous game, as through alienating his fellows, the Zaghawa, he is risking a coup, losing power, and his life. However, Mahamat needs money to stay in power, and ever since he broke ties with France last year, the only party willing to fund his rule is the United Arab Emirates. The Sheikhs are the core allies of the Darfuris (in exchange for access to the regional gold mines). The Sheikhs are utilizing Chad to deliver weapons to Darfur (using airports, hospitals, and camps supposedly built for refugees).  Another beneficiary of the Emirati sheikhs is Darfur’s neighbor, eastern Libya, which is controlled by the warlord Khalifa Haftar. Through the airports under his control, the Emirates supply the Darfuris with weapons, while the Russians provide both arms and mercenaries—originally from the Wagner Group, and now from the Africa Corp.  Another debtor of the UAE is Sudan’s eastern neighbor, Ethiopia. A few years ago,  Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was able to stop the rebels from Tigray from advancing towards Addis Ababa, only thanks to the drones and operators provided by the Emirates. It will have to pay back its debt on the Sheikh's demands, especially since its main competitor in the Horn of Africa, Egypt, is allied with the government in Khartoum and is supporting Ethiopia’s enemies – Somalia and Eritrea.  Sudan’s southern neighbor, the Central African Republic, does not have to worry about the war spilling over to its territory, but it has for years been the main bridgehead for Russia’s operations in Africa. Mercenaries from the Wagner Group first landed in the Central African Republic, and the country now serves as a supply hub for Russia’s allies in Darfur. The Wagner Group, for years, has supplied the Darfuri Arabs with weapons in exchange for access to Darfur’s gold, from which the ore was shipped to Abu Dhabi and Dubai, while the profits went on to Moscow.      The role of journalists in preventing genocide and reporting on it:   - What are the biggest obstacles to reporting accurately and safely in a context where genocide is taking place? Did you ever face pressure from editors or governments to tone down or alter your coverage of Sudan?    WJ : The main and most difficult obstacle is the inability to access Sudan, and even if one manages to get in, there are serious logistical problems. Sudan is an enormous country; it was the biggest African country before the division into South and North in 2011. It is almost completely devoid of roads, especially in the underdeveloped desert of Darfur. Getting the news that something important is happening and getting there, particularly in Darfur, is an incredibly difficult task. My agency never put pressure on me in regards to my reports from the field. Neither did the Sudanese government, probably because for them I came from an obscure country and wrote for a newspaper they had never heard of. I suspect that if I were writing for the BBC, Reuters, or the Guardian, people in Khartoum would read my articles with scrutiny, and they would protest if they deemed them to be putting the country in a bad light, to be too critical. But even I, a journalist for “Gazeta Wyborcza”, found that whenever I was accompanied by an official, especially in Darfur, they would present and explain reality in a way that tried to convince me of a version of events favorable to Khartoum.     - In your view, how effective is international media coverage in shaping the political will to intervene in conflicts such as Darfur or the 2023 civil war?     WJ : Yes, I do believe that. However, in the case of the ongoing war in Sudan and Darfur, I remain skeptical. Due to the twilight of the liberal West’s global domination and global crises in Gaza and Ukraine, nobody pays attention to Sudan and its wars, which appear to be exclusively localized issues that do not pose a threat to international peace. It is a false assumption because the dozen million refugees from Sudan, who are now residing in neighboring countries devoid of humanitarian aid —mainly due to US aid cuts —will eventually embark on a journey to Europe. Their movement will be aided by hostile to the West Russia, which, thanks to its mercenaries, has established bridgeheads in Africa. Their allies control Sahel, and most importantly, Eastern Libya, which might serve as the main migration corridor for the refugees to get to Europe and potentially become weapons for Russia’s hybrid war against the West. OR Their movement may be facilitated by Russia, which, through its mercenaries, has established footholds across Africa. Russia’s allies control the Sahel and, most importantly, eastern Libya, which could serve as the main migration corridor for these refugees. In such a scenario, they risk being instrumentalized as part of Russia’s hybrid war against the West.  Personal insights and Experiences:   - Was there ever a time when you doubted the value of what you were doing — either because of limited impact or overwhelming brutality?    WJ : No, I never doubted that, but I also never believed that it was a journalist’s role to change the world. I believed that a journalist’s task is to inform the world about all of the most important events from all aspects of life, including the geopolitical situation, economy, politics, culture, and sport. We do not have a say in how the information we have provided will be used, if at all. But if we do our job correctly, nobody will be able to say that they did not know what was happening. I tried my best to fulfill my role in the best way that I could, but I do have to admit that returning to refugee camps, meeting with people, war victims whom I have met during my previous visits, was incredibly difficult. I knew they hoped that the presence of journalists and us telling their stories would change or improve their fate, and when nothing changed, and we journalists met them again, you could sense their resentment—they were disappointed in us.

At least 24 killed as army paraglider bombs Myanmar Buddhist festival Two dozen people in the Sagaing region were killed in the airstrike BBC Burmese , Koh Ewe and Jonathan Head South East Asia correspondent At least 24 people were killed and 47 wounded while protesting against Myanmar's military government after an army motorised paraglider dropped two bombs on the crowd, a spokesperson for the government-in-exile told BBC Burmese. The military attacked on Monday evening as around 100 people gathered in Chaung U township in central Myanmar for a national holiday. Thousands have died and millions have been displaced since a military coup in 2021, which triggered a civil war with armed resistance groups and ethnic militias. After losing control of more than half the country, the army is making significant gains again, through an especially bloody campaign of airstrikes and heavy bombardment. Monday's attack is just one of hundreds of similar air strikes that have been carried out this year by Myanmar's armed forces. The military government has in recent months augmented its air force with new drones acquired from China - which is now fully supporting the junta - as well as technical assistance from Russia. That, coupled with the fact that Beijing has been putting pressure on rebels along its border with Myanmar to stop supplying weapons to opposition groups, means the military tables have turned and insurgents are having to give up many of the territorial gains they made over the past two years. The attack on Monday targeted a township in the Sagaing region, where people had gathered on Thadingyut, a full moon festival, to hold a candlelight vigil. It had been organised as a peaceful protest against the junta's military conscription and an upcoming national election. It also called for the release of political prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi, the democratically-elected leader who was deposed in the coup and jailed. The Sagaing region has been a key battleground in the war, with large parts of it under the control of volunteer militias. These groups, known as the People's Defence Force (PDF), also run the local administration. An official in the local PDF told BBC Burmese that they had received information about a potential airborne attack during Monday's gathering. They tried to end the protest quickly, but the paramotors - as paragliders are known locally - reached the scene earlier than expected, he said. It all happened in seven minutes, he said. He says the explosion injured his leg, but some people near him were killed. Locals said it was hard to identify the bodies in the aftermath. "Children were completely torn apart," another woman who had helped to organise the event told AFP news agency. She was not at the scene but attended funerals on Tuesday, and added that they were still "collecting body parts". In a statement on Tuesday, Amnesty International said that the junta's use of motorised paragliders to attack communities was part of a "disturbing trend". BBC Burmese recently reported that the junta were increasingly opting for paramotors amid a lack of aircraft and helicopters, as well as jet fuel. International sanctions over the past few years have made it harder for Myanmar's rulers to procure military equipment - though the recent influx of technology from countries like China and Russia seems to have helped turned the tide. Joe Freeman, Amnesty International's Myanmar researcher, said the attack "should serve as a gruesome wake-up call that civilians in Myanmar need urgent protection". He also called on Asean, the South East Asian regional bloc due to convene later this month, to "increase pressure on the junta and revise an approach that has failed the Myanmar people for almost five years". Myanmar is scheduled to hold general elections in December , the first vote since the 2021 coup. Critics, however, say the vote will not be free and fair and is aimed at trying to legitimise military rule. Many opposition parties have been banned, and voting is likely to take place in only about half the country, in the areas the military controls. Copyright 2025 BBC News

Former lieutenant-general Roméo Dallaire is still haunted by the memories of the horrors he witnessed in Rwanda. Photograph: Christopher J. Morris/Corbis COULD THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 1 By Dr. Gregory H. Stanton Founding President Genocide Watch 2 In 1994, 800,000 to one million Rwandan Tutsis along with thousands of moderate Hutus, were murdered in the clearest case of genocide since the Holocaust. The world withdrew and watched. To borrow a Biblical metaphor, we passed by on the other side. Samantha Power, in her searing article in The Atlantic Monthly, “Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen,” and in her book, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide 3 , says, “The story of U.S. policy during the genocide in Rwanda is not a story of willful complicity with evil. U.S. officials did not sit around and conspire to allow genocide to happen. But whatever their convictions about ‘never again,’ many of them did sit around, and they most certainly did allow genocide to happen.”4  Dr. Power concludes that her extensive research, including interviews with most of the U.S. policy makers who made the decisions, “reveals that the U.S. government knew enough about the genocide early on to save lives, but passed up countless opportunities to intervene.”5 _________ 1 The first version of this article was published in the Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 2004, 211- 228. The article was updated in 2023 to include the previously classified fact that thousands of US Marines were on ships just off the coast of East Africa with helicopters and vehicles at the beginning of the genocide. But President Clinton decided not to send them to Rwanda to respond to General Dallaire's request for reinforcements for UNAMIR. This fact refutes assertions by Kuperman and other apologists for US non-intervention that US and other foreign troops could not have been transported to Rwanda in time to save hundreds of thousands of Rwandan lives. This revised version is Copyright 2023 Gregory H Stanton. 2  President, Genocide Watch. Fellow, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. president@genocidewatch.com  The original version of this paper was presented on 27 January 2002 in London, England at a conference, “Generations of Genocide,” sponsored by the Institute of Contemporary History and the Weiner Library. 3 Power. Samantha, A Problem From Hell. America and the Age of Genocide, New York: Basic Books, 2002.– 108. 4 Power, Samantha, “Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen,” The Atlantic Monthly,September 2001, p. 86. 5 Power (cf. note 3), p. 84. ______ Early Warnings There were plenty of “early warnings” of the Rwandan genocide, but they were systematically ignored. The best book on the Rwandan genocide, Linda Melvern’s superb A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide sets them forth in detail. To list just a few, in the spring of 1992, the Belgian ambassador in Kigali, Johan Swinner warned his government that the Akazu , a secret group of Hutu Power advocates organized around the President’s wife, “is planning the extermination of the Tutsi of Rwanda to resolve once and for all, in their own way, the ethnic problem….” 6  In October 1992, Professor Filip Reyntjens organized a press conference in the Belgian Senate in which he described how Hutu Power death squads were operating and named their leaders, including Colonel Théoneste Bagasora, who later coordinated the genocide.7  In March 1993, four human rights groups led by Human Rights Watch and the International Federation of Human Rights issued a report on mass killings in Rwanda. Although the word “genocide” was excised from the final report, the press release announcing it, written by Canadian law professor William Schabas, used the word genocide to describe the mass killings of Tutsis.8 The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Summary, Arbitrary, and Extrajudicial Executions, René Dégni-Ségui, conducted a mission to Rwanda in April 1993 and reported to the U.N. Human Rights Commission in August 1993 that the trial massacres of Tutsis, already begun by then, constituted genocide under the Genocide Convention.9 ________ 6 Belgian Senate, Commission d’enquête parlementaire concernant les évenéments du Rwanda, Rapport, 6 December 1997, p. 493. Quoted in Melvern, Linda, A People Betrayed. The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, Zed Books, London, 2000, p.49. 7 Prunier, Gérard, The Rwanda Crisis 1959 – 1994, History of a Genocide, London, Hurst and Company, 1995, p. 168. 8 International Federation of Human Rights, Africa Watch (Human Rights Watch), Inter-African Union of Human Rights, and International Centre of Rights of the Person and of Democratic Development. Report of the International Commission of Investigation of Human Rights Violations in Rwanda since October 1, 1990 (January 7 – 21, 1993), New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993. 9 Ndiaye, B.W., Report by Special Rapporteur on his mission to Rwanda from 8 to 17 April 1993, Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Economic and Social Council document E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1, 11 August 1993, p. 23. _______ During the months prior to the Rwandan genocide, General Roméo Dallaire, commander of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), warned the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) that Hutu extremists were planning a campaign to exterminate Tutsis. In a now famous cable to New York on January 11, 1994, which DPKO authorized him to share with the U.S., French and Belgian Embassies, General Dallaire asked for authority to search for and seize the caches of machetes and other weapons that had been shipped into Rwanda for the Hutu militias, the Interahamwe .10  Iqbal Riza, deputy to then Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping Kofi Annan, in a letter signed by Annan, denied him permission to act, as exceeding UNAMIR’s mandate, and instructed him instead to take the information to the Rwandan government, many of whose members were planning the genocide. DPKO’s refusal to authorize action was confirmed on January 14 by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali himself.11 General Dallaire’s early warning of genocide was corroborated by the assassinations and further trial massacres of January to March 1994, which were also reported in cables to the U.S. State and Defense Departments.12  On January 21-22, UNAMIR seized a planeload of Belgian arms (shipped on a French plane) purchased by the Rwandan Armed Forces, which were then kept in joint UNAMIR/Rwandan government custody.13 At the request of DPKO, Dallaire provided confirmation of arms shipments and was finally authorized by the DPKO on February 3, 1994 to "assist the government of Rwanda" in recovering illegal arms. In mid-February, the Rwandan Minister of Defense requested landing authorization for three planes carrying arms, but General Dallaire refused. On February 27, General Dallaire repeated his request to DPKO for authorization to seize the caches of weapons the Interahamwe militias had hidden all over Rwanda. (General Dallaire had sent a Senegalese UNAMIR soldier to see some of the arms caches with his own eyes.) But U.N. authorities, including his direct superior, Canadian General Maurice Baril, again refused, referring privately to General Dallaire as a “cowboy.” Belgium explicitly warned the U.N. Secretary General of impending genocide on February 25, 1994, but Belgium’s plea for a stronger U.N. peacekeeping force was rebuffed by members of the U.N. Security Council, particularly the U.S. and the United Kingdom.14 ______ 10 Dallaire, Roméo, Cable to General Baril, UNDPKO, 11 January 1994, in Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (eds.), The Path of A Genocide. The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, London: Transaction Publishers, p. xxi. 11 Des Forges, Alison, Leave None To Tell The Story, Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch & FIDH, New York, 1999, p. 154. 12 Des Forges (cf. note 10), pp. 159 – 171. 13 Des Forges (cf. note 10), pp. 156 – 157. 14 Alan J. Kuperman, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention. Genocide in Rwanda, The Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2001: p. 85. _________ The Eight Stages of Genocide In a paper I prepared at the State Department in 1996, I suggested that there are Eight Stages of Genocide, and that each stage has distinctive warning signs. There are also specific strategies at each stage to prevent and stop the genocidal process. I hope that a better understanding of the genocidal process will help policymakers prevent future genocides. Each of the eight stages was manifest in Rwanda. In 2012, I recognized two more stages, Discrimination and Persecution. Both were also present in the Genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda. This essay was written before they were added to the model. 15 1. Classification: At this stage, social groups are classified into “us versus them.” Classification is a fundamental operation in all languages and is present in every culture. It does not necessarily lead to genocide. But without classification, genocide could not happen. Traditional Rwandan society was already classified into three groups, Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa. A Tutsi royal clan, the Ganwa, ruled the country. Although many African historians have pointed out that the groups did not fit the normal definition of ethnic groups, since they shared the same language, culture, and religion, there was nevertheless preferential endogamy, marriage within the group, a key characteristic of ethnic groups as well as of castes. In this strictly patrilineal society, a person took the group identity of his or her father. Mixed marriages did not result in mixed children. Des Forges says these groups came to be seen as “castes,” by their German and Belgian colonial rulers, who ruled indirectly through the Tutsi elite.16 Germans and Belgians developed the “Hamitic hypothesis” that Tutsis were the lost tribe of Ham and had migrated from Ethiopia. The racist theories of the colonial era attributed superiority to Tutsis because of their aquiline noses and other “white” features. Tutsis were given preference in education, the church, the economy, and the government service. Colonial rulers thus exacerbated the traditional classification divisions. Ironically, the Hutu Power movement adopted these same theories, in order to portray Tutsis as foreign invaders who had dispossessed Hutus of rightful control over Rwanda. The most notorious expression of the Hamitic hypothesis was in the famous speech by Léon Mugesera on November 22, 1992, when he said the Tutsis “belong in Ethiopia and we are going to find them a shortcut to get them there by throwing them into the Nyabarongo River [a source of the Nile.]”17 ___________ 15 Stanton, Gregory, “The Ten Stages of Genocide,” https://www.genocidewatch.com/tenstages 16 Des Forges (cf. note 10), p. 38. 17 Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 47 ___________ 2. Symbolization: At this stage, the classifications are symbolized. Groups are given names and other symbols (yellow stars, for example) and are required to wear them either by cultural tradition or laws. In Rwanda, Belgium began to issue identity cards (ID’s) around 1926 and required them in the 1933 census. The identity cards included each individual’s group identity, Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa. They thus reified group identity for each person and made changes from one group to another much more difficult. Having studied the genocidal process and the history of genocidal massacres in Rwanda, I recognized the danger of the ethnic ID cards during my first stay in Rwanda in 1988, when I did a study of judicial administration for the Rwandan Ministry of Justice. I had dinner with Joseph Kavaruganda, President of the Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court), and we agreed that the designation of ethnicity had to be removed from the ID cards. I met with President Habyarimana several weeks later and urged him directly to issue new ID cards without the ethnic designation. “Someday they will be used for genocide,” I told him. He remained impassive and non-committal. At the end of our meeting, I told President Habyarimana, "If you do not take action to prevent it, Mr. President, Rwanda will have a genocide within five years." Others had also urged abolition of the ethnic ID’s, and that reform was included in the Arusha peace agreement signed in August 1993. New ID cards were even printed. But they were never issued. Hutu Power advocates wanted the ethnic designation retained. We now know why. During the genocide, ID cards became facilitators of killing, because they permitted the killers to quickly determine who was Tutsi. Those who refused to show their ID’s at Interahamwe roadblocks were presumed to be Tutsi unless they could quickly prove otherwise. Nearly all Tutsis were immediately murdered. 3. Dehumanization: This stage is where the death spiral of genocide begins. The victim group is dehumanized. It is called the names of animals or likened to a disease: vermin or rats, cancer or plague, or in Rwanda, “ inyenzi” – cockroaches. The reason this stage is necessary is that it gives ideological justification to the genocidists, who claim they are purifying the society. It overcomes the normal human revulsion against murder. If the other group is not human, then killing them is not murder. In Rwanda, the dehumanization of Tutsis had already been a feature of genocidal massacres in 1959, 1962, and 1972. In December 1990, the Hutu Power hate newspaper, Kangura , published the “Ten Commandments of the Hutu.” They included the injunction, “The Bahutu should stop having mercy on the Batutsi.” The Ten Commandments called for continuation of the Habyarimana government’s policy that the army be exclusively Hutu, and that officers be prohibited from marrying Tutsi women. Cartoons and articles in Kangura referred to Tutsis as cockroaches and snakes, and regularly expounded the myth that they had invaded from Ethiopia. Tutsis were “devils” who ate the vital organs of Hutus. Twenty other extremist newspapers also published regular hate propaganda against Tutsis.18 Radio Télévision Libres des Milles Collines amplified the hate propaganda from 1993 onward and brought it to every corner of Rwanda using repeater antennae provided by Radio Rwanda, the government network. David Rawson, the U.S. Ambassador, said RTLMC’s euphemisms were subject to various interpretations, and he defended its right to broadcast as “freedom of speech.” 19 This same misunderstanding of constitutional law was still prevalent in the State Department when I began work on Rwanda in July 1994. The public affairs officer responsible for U.S. policy on Rwanda explained that this was why the U.S. opposed jamming RTLMC. I explained, as a former law professor, that incitement to commit genocide is not “protected speech.” Indeed, if there were ever a case that met the “clear and present danger” test of U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence, this was it. ________ 18 Kakwenzire, Joan and Kamukama, Dixon, “The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda 1990 – 1994,” in: Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (eds.) (cf. note 9), p. 76. 19 Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 71. _______ 4. Organization: All genocides are organized. At this stage, hate groups are organized, militias are trained and armed, and the armed forces are purged of members of the intended victim group as well as officers and others who might oppose genocide. Propaganda institutions, such as the hate newspapers and radio station, are also strengthened and funded. After the RPF invasion in October 1990, the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armées Rwandaises or FAR), the all-Hutu government army, expanded almost overnight from 5,000 to 28,000 men.20  It got considerable assistance in training and arms from the French government. President Mitterand’s son, Jean-Christophe, headed the Africa office at the Elysée Palace, and was a close friend of President Habyarimana. He was reputed to own a plantation in Rwanda and to be personally involved in the arms trade.21 600 French paratroopers secretly took control of the counter-insurgency campaign.22 The Egyptian government, with the intervention of Foreign Minister Boutros Boutros- Ghali, sold $5.9 million in ammunition, rifles, mortar bombs, rockets, and rocket launchers to Rwanda on 28 October 1990.23  South African arms dealers were also a major source. Between 1990 and April 1994, Rwanda spent an estimated $112 million on arms, making it the third largest arms purchaser in Africa, after oil-rich Nigeria and Angola.24 The purchases were likely made with money diverted from loans by the World Bank.25 It was the organization of extremist militias, however, that marked the organizational turn toward genocide. In 1992 the Interahamwe , the militia of the ruling MRND party, was organized. It was soon followed by the Impuzamugambi, the militia of the CRD, an extreme Hutu Power party organized by the Akazu elite to make the President’s MRND seem moderate by comparison. These militias were secretly trained in camps run by Rwandan army officers, armed with machetes, Kalashnikovs, and grenades from arms shipments to the government. 5. Polarization: Moderates are targeted and assassinated. Hate propaganda emphasizes the “us versus them” nature of the situation. “If you are not with us, you are against us.” There is no middle ground. Moderates who attempt to negotiate peace are denounced as traitors. Rwandan moderates had formed several opposition parties and had won seats in the National Assembly. On 6 April 1992, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a moderate Hutu, was named Minister of Education. When she proposed ending the quota system that restricted Tutsi access to higher education, she was attacked in her home by twenty armed men.26 In November 1993, after she had been named Prime Minister in the government formed after the signing of the Arusha Accords, Radio Télèvision Libre Des Milles Collines publicly called for her assassination. She was one of the first officials to be murdered during the genocide on April 7. Her ten Belgian UNAMIR guards were also slaughtered. Kangura and RTLMC called anyone who opposed Hutu Power an “accomplice” of the Tutsis and a secret ally of the R.P.F. __________ 20 Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 33. 21 Kakwenzire, Joan and Kamukama, Dixon, in: Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (eds.) (cf. note 9) , p.83. 22 Melvern (cf. note 5), p.31. 23 Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 31. 24 Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 32, 67. 25 Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 67-68. 26 Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 46-47. ______ Joseph Kavaruganda, President of the Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court), another moderate Hutu, was also targeted by the extremists. In January 1994, the head of the Interahamwe in Rugendo. threatened Kavaruganda, and the judge complained to the President on January 15. On February 21, thugs broke into the Supreme Court building and did considerable damage. On March 19, 1994, Captain Pascal Simbiyangwa warned Justice Kavaruganda’s guards that the judge was a “cockroach” whose days were numbered and that the group who would kill him had already been chosen. On March 23, 1994, an Interahamwe, Enoch Kayonde told Justice Kavaruganda he could be killed at any time. On the same day, Kavaruganda wrote a letter to President Habyarimana informing him of these death threats and asking for protection against the Presidential Guard.27  Justice Kavaruganda's pleas were to no avail. Justice Joseph Kavaruganda, my personal friend, was murdered on the first day of the genocide. It is significant that General Dallaire’s famous cable warning to the UN Deputy Director of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Iqbal Riza about the coming genocide was entitled, “Request for Protection of Informant.” General Dallaire’s informant asked to be evacuated from Rwanda, possibly after temporary asylum in a foreign embassy.28  The UN DPKO rejected the General’s plan. Thereafter, the informant, who was personally opposed to the extermination plan, understandably stopped informing UNAMIR about it. Physical protection of moderates is among the most important steps that can be taken to prevent genocide at this stage. The UN refused to do even that, although it was clearly within UNAMIR’s mandate. 6. Preparation: During the preparation stage, plans are made for the genocide. Death lists are compiled. Trial massacres are conducted, both as training for the genocidists, and to test whether there will be any response, such as arrests, international denunciations, or sanctions. If the murderers get away with their crimes, if there is impunity, it is a green light to finish the genocide. The trial massacres began in Rwanda soon after the Rwandan Patriotic Front invaded. Hutus slaughtered 300 Tutsi civilians in Kabirira in October 1990. In January 1991, 500 to 1000 Tutsi were murdered in Kinigi. In March 1992, 300 Tutsi were massacred by Hutu militias in Bugesera. No one was ever arrested for these crimes, and there were no demands from international diplomats for such arrests. But the diplomatic community knew about the crimes. Cables from the U.S. Embassy in February 1994 described the Interahamwe massacre of 70 Tutsis in Kigali between February 22 and 26. On March 1, 1994, the Belgian ambassador reported that station RTLMC was broadcasting “inflammatory statements calling for hatred – indeed for extermination.”29 ______ 27 Copies of this letter is in the Melvern archive at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth and with the Gregory Stanton, who may be reached at president@genocidewatch.org 28 Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (eds.), note 9. 29 Caplan, Gerald, Rwanda. The Preventable Genocide, The Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, Organization of African Unity, 1998. _______ 7. Extermination: At this stage, the killing legally defined as genocide begins. Those who do it often think they are “purifying” their society, by “exterminating” those who are less than human and are a threat to them. In Rwanda, the mass murder began within hours of the crash of President Habyaramana’s French plane on April 6, 1994. He was shot down after conferring with regional leaders about implementation of the Arusha Accords, which he had signed in August 1993. The Akazu Hutu Power elite saw the Accords as a direct threat to their power because the Accords called for sharing power with the Rwandan Patriotic Front. To this day, it is unclear who shot down the President’s plane. What is clear is that the Hutu Power genocidists were well prepared and began the slaughter immediately. That preparedness raises the suspicion that the Hutu genocidists knew in advance that President Habyarimana's plane would be shot down. 8. Denial: During and after every genocide, the perpetrators deny they committed the crime. They portray their murders as justified killing during war or repression of terrorism. They dig up and dispose of the bodies and try to minimize the number of victims. They try to blame the victims, often claiming that the victims’ own behavior brought on the killing. They portray the murders as spontaneous outbreaks in response to the victims’ depredations, or as the actions of rogue army commanders, rather than as intentional government policy. They challenge the veracity of the eyewitnesses and assassinate the character of their accusers. The perpetrators claim to have been powerless to prevent the killings by others, and even have the audacity to claim they assisted their victims. All these strategies of denial operated during and after the Rwandan genocide. The presence of the Rwandan government representative at the very U.N. Security Council meetings that considered the situation provided an ideal forum for such denial. Since the genocide, despite massive evidence against them, this denial by perpetrators has continued both at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and in Rwandan courts and prisons. When did U.S. diplomats and policy makers know the mass murder was genocide? Dr. Alan Kuperman, in his book, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda, challenges “the common wisdom” that simple political will could have stopped the Rwandan genocide. He argues that well-meaning mediations and dilatory promises to back them up (e.g., the Arusha peace agreement on Rwanda) can actually increase the likelihood of genocide as they threaten the interests of ruling groups.30 Dr. Kuperman takes aim particularly at those who blame the U.S. for its inaction after the Rwandan genocide began. The U.S. and United Kingdom played the leading role at the U.N. Security Council during the genocide. Dr. Kuperman argues that neither U.S. nor U.K. policy makers recognized the killings as genocide for at least three weeks, and that even if they had acted immediately thereafter, it would have taken three more weeks to send in U.S. reinforcements. He says that by that time, three-quarters of the killing was done. _______ 30  Kuperman, Alan J.,“False Hope Abroad: Promises to Intervene Often Bring Bloodshed,” in Washington Post, June 14, 1998, Outlook Section. Although the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (D.I.A.) recognized from radio intercepts as early as April 7 that centrally organized mass killing of Tutsis was underway, D.I.A. warnings went unheeded in the American government. Deputy Chief of Mission Joyce Leader and other U.S. diplomats in Kigali began calling the killings genocide on April 7, the first day, and directly communicated their views to the State Department in Washington, DC. Deputy Chief of Mission Joyce Leader has told me personally that she began using the word genocide in her daily telephone calls to the State Department from the start. It was clear to her that the Interahamwe and Presidential Guard were committing genocide.31 Dr. Kuperman questions whether Leader’s reports and the D.I.A. warnings were shared with top officials of the State and Defense Departments and the National Security Council. The answer is that these reports were shared with top officials, including Assistant Secretaries and other policy makers, at their daily inter-agency secure teleconferences about the Rwandan catastrophe. But other reports from the U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda and the C.I.A. contradicted them.31 Dr. Kuperman observes that although reports of the mass killing quickly reached mid-level officers in the U.S. State and Defense departments, the surfeit of information served to cloud rather than clarify the situation. Contrary to Kuperman's claim, every member of the Peacekeeping Core Group, George Ward, Susan Rice, Sarah Sewall, and Prudence Bushnell, the high-level interagency task force guiding US policy on Rwanda and UNAMIR, has told me personally that they were fully informed about the mass murders of Tutsis in Rwanda from April 7, 1994 onward.32 Refusal to invoke the G-Word Why did policy makers at the State Department and National Security Council refuse to recognize that genocide was underway in Rwanda? There are two primary reasons, both compelled by a prevenient group decision to avoid U.S. involvement. First, the facts were resisted.   The U.S. government was forewarned of the impending genocide. Communications were sent by cable, e-mail, and secure telephone from the U.S. embassy in Kigali informing the State Department about General Dallaire's warnings months before April 6. But in 1993, President Clinton had ordered U.S.forces withdrawn from Somalia after General Aideed’s militia (possibly trained by Osama bin Laden’s Al Queda) killed eighteen Army Rangers. Policy makers in Washington, D.C., especially Anthony Lake, Dick Clarke and Susan Rice at the National Security Council, George Ward at the State Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Defense Department, distrusted U.N. peacekeeping missions and did not want the U.S. to get involved in another African “civil war,” another “quagmire.  In response to Somalia, President Clinton had just signed Presidential Decision Directive 25, which the same policy makers had drafted, limiting U.S. involvement in U.N. peacekeeping operations. But it specifically allowed such intervention in cases of “genocide.” They therefore resisted the “cognitive dissonance” of reports of impending genocide in Rwanda, which might have created at least a moral duty to intervene. The anti-interventionists dismissed General Dallaire’s reports as “unconfirmed,” meaning that U.S. embassy staff or intelligence personnel had not independently written about the arms caches and reported them through official cable channels. They utilized cable reports from the American ambassador, David Rawson, in the early days of the genocide, to argue that this was just another episode of bi-lateral civil war, not a one-sided genocide. Ambassador Rawson had grown up in Burundi with the Tutsi – Hutu conflict and he spoke Kirundi, the language of Burundi, which is closely related to Kinyarwanda, the language of Rwanda. The Ambassador’s appraisal of the violence, however confused, therefore carried considerable credibility. After the entire U.S. mission left for Burundi on April 10, with Ambassador Rawson in the last car, no further official channels existed to “confirm” reports from Kigali. The first defense against action was denial of the facts. ______ 31 Joyce Leader lived next door to Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was murdered on the first day in a nearby UNDP compound after failing in her desperate efforts to scale the wall to Leader's compound. Members of the Presidential Guard invaded Leader's house searching for Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana. She was a moderate Hutu who opposed the Hutu Power conspirators. The Rwandan Army at Camp Kigali then murdered ten Belgian soldiers who had been dispatched to protect the Prime Minister. The murders were an intentional terror tactic to convince Belgium to withdraw its troops, a tactic that succeeded brilliantly. 32 All of the American policy makers who made the decisions during the Rwandan genocide, including the decision to order withdrawal UNAMIR troops, were later promoted. Dick Clarke became chief of counter- terrorism operations at the National Security Council. Susan Rice became Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and National Security Advisor. George Ward became Ambassador to Namibia and after being recalled from that job, became Director of Training at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Sarah Sewell became an Undersecretary of State. Prudence Bushnell became Amabassador to Kenya and Director of the Foreign Service Institute. The military personnel moved up the chain of command. But dissent in the State Department can be fatal. I was only a Junior Officer. I was denied tenure in the State Department at the insistence of George Ward, my boss, and my immediate supervisor, Ann Korky, because of my dissent from US policy during the genocide in Rwanda. Their 1995 evaluation said, "Stanton should be immediately terminated from the State Department. He apparently does not recognize that the State Department is a hierarchical institution." The American Foreign Service Assocation on the other hand gave me its 1995 W. Averell Harriman Award "for extraordinary contribution to the practice of diplomacy exemplifying intellectual courage and a zeal for creative accomplishment." Ward and Korky forbade all officers in the International Organizations bureau from attending my award ceremony. But Secretary of State Albright asked me to conduct interviews with everyone who had been involved in US policy during the genocide in Rwanda to "learn from our mistakes." This paper is the unclassified version of that study. _____ Refusal to call the mass murders in Rwanda Genocide The second reason for inaction was legal malpractice. On April 26, Carl Pendorff issued an intelligence estimate calling the Rwandan massacres genocide. The State Department Bureau of African Affairs asked the State Department Legal Advisor's office whether the massacres constituted genocide. At a crucial interagency meeting called by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Prudence Bushnell, she asked, “Is this genocide? And if it is, what are we going to do about it?” Ms. Joan Donoghue of the Legal Advisors Office gave her opinion that the word genocide should be avoided, because she questioned whether the killings possessed the requisite "intent" and because use of the G-word, “genocide,” would obligate the U.S. to take action to stop it.33  Her oral opinion was soon followed by a written opinion from the Legal Advisor saying the same things. Sadly, the lawyers were wrong on both points. Intent can be proven by direct statements, but it is more often inferred from actions, like the systematic pattern of killing 10,000 Tutsis a day in Rwanda. And unfortunately, the Genocide Convention imposes no legal requirement to take action to stop a genocide. It only requires passage of national legislation to outlaw genocide,34  and prosecution or extradition of suspected perpetrators.35  The Convention’s Article 8 states, “Contracting Parties may call upon the competent organs of the U.N.” to take action to suppress a genocide. But that is not legally required. For three months, the Legal Advisors told the American government not to call the Rwandan killings genocide. The State Department ordered the U.S. mission at the U.N. to vigorously oppose use of the term. The U.K. rewrote a Presidential Statement proposed on April 29 by New Zealand’s Colin Keating, that month’s President of the Security Council, to avoid use of the word. On May 4, the U.N. Secretary General declared a “real genocide.”36 The U.S. continued to avoid the G-word until June 10. In a now infamous press conference on June 10, State Department press spokesperson Christine Shelley, reading from talking points prepared by the Legal Advisors, declared that “acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda.” But when pressed by a reporter, she was unprepared to call it “genocide.” This false distinction was finally buried the same day by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, himself a lawyer, who knew that Article 2 of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as acts of genocide. An act of genocide is genocide , just as an act of rape is rape, or an act of murder, murder. The U.S. Secretary of State finally called it genocide on June 10, after most of the killing was over. 33  The State Department lawyers who gave this erroneous legal advice still work for the State Department with promotions and higher salaries. Joan Donoghue became President of the International Court of Justice. ________ 34 Genocide Convention, Article 5. 35 Genocide Convention, Articles 5 – 7. 36 Kuperman (cf. note 13), p. 31. ________ State Department lawyers and policy makers did not want to use the G-word because they wanted to avoid a duty to act. So they chose another name for what was happening in Rwanda, one that would result in non-intervention: “civil war.” Civil wars are two-sided (or multi-sided.) The lesson the Clinton Administration learned from Somalia was, “Don’t get involved in African civil wars.” Policy makers, including U.S. Ambassador David Rawson in Kigali, saw the killing as a continuation of the civil war that had plagued Rwanda since 1990, a war the Arusha Accords were supposed to settle. What they missed was intentional genocide led by the Hutu Power movement. Because they did not understand the history or processes of genocide, they ignoredhe fact that most genocides have been committed during wars, including civil wars. Robert Melson has shown in Revolution and Genocide that it is precisely during wars that pariah groups are most likely to become identified as threats, and therefore objects of genocide.37  Genocide and civil war are correlative, not mutually exclusive. The second legal defense against action was "definitionalism" – denial that mass murder in Rwanda fit the legal definition of genocide. The press and human rights groups also failed to name the crime until two weeks into the genocide. French newspapers were an exception. The first newspaper that called it genocide was Libération in an article by Jean-Philippe Ceppi on April 11, 1994. Libération had also been the first to use the word “genocide” in an early warning article about death squads in Rwanda in February 1993. But the left-wing Libération is not given much weight by French foreign policy makers and is not read by anyone in Washington. Le Monde followed with a story by Jean Hélène on April 12. It, too, was ignored. Human rights groups held back until Ken Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, wrote Colin Keating, President of the U.N. Security Council on April 19. The Pope waited to call it genocide until April 27. Besides the misreporting of the Rwandan killing as "civil war", Dr. Kuperman notes that other factors contributed to inaction: “Second, after a few days, violence was reported to be on the wane when in reality it was accelerating. Third, most early death counts were gross underestimates, sometimes by a factor of ten…. Fourth, the initial focus was almost exclusively on Kigali, a relatively small city, and failed to note the broader scope of the violence.38 What the U.N. did and what it might have done The U.N. did not wait to intervene in Rwanda until the beginning of the genocide. Acting under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations had deployed 2,539 U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) troops to Rwanda by April 6, 1994.39  Dr. Kuperman claims they were too lightly armed to deter the Rwandan genocidists, who he says numbered 100,000, including the heavily armed Presidential Guard. He agrees with General Dallaire that UNAMIR needed heavier weapons, full deployment of its 2548 authorized troops plus an equal number of reinforcements, all of them well-trained and well- supplied, with a clear mandate giving them authority to forcefully stop killing. That could have been written into U.N. Security Council resolution 872 that created UNAMIR. But the U.S. and U.K. had opposed a robust mandate with the 4,500 troops recommended by General Dallaire because it would have been too expensive. 40 _________ 37 Melson, Robert, Revolution and Genocide, University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 273. 38 Kuperman (cf. note 13), p.24. 39 Melvern (cf. note 5), p.106. 40 Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 85. _____ When the genocide began, policy makers in Washington and at the U.N. believed that UNAMIR forces lacked the strength to arrest the spread of the conflagration, and they refused to consider sending in their own troops. In U.S. government parlance, that was a “non-starter.” When that word is used, it really means, “We don’t want to think about it.” Groupthink It is the product of what social scientists have called “groupthink.” Those who dissent are afraid to step forward to challenge the group assumptions. State Department policy makers who attended a crucial meeting in the International Organization Affairs bureau on UNAMIR’s future told me that after Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose, National Security Council Peacekeeping Advisor Susan Rice, and International Organizations Deputy Assistant Secretary George Ward had all agreed that UNAMIR could not fulfill its mandate and should be withdrawn, they felt as subordinates that they could not object or contradict them. They did not consider changing UNAMIR’s mandate because they assumed that troop-contributors had only committed to a peacekeeping operation, not an operation to stop genocide. No one suggested asking the troop-contributors if they would stay. No one suggested sending in U.S. troops. The U.N. Security Council’s earlier failure, because of U.S. and U.K. reluctance, to send a strong UNAMIR force created the self-fulfilling prophecy that nothing effective could be done. In the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. took an active stance against keeping the UNAMIR troops in Rwanda. Ambassador Karl Inderfurth announced that position on April 15 in "Informals", closed meetings of the Security Council, with the representative of the genocidal Rwandan regime present. Ambassador Inderfurth’s announcement of U.S. policy had fatal consequences. The next day, the Rwandan Interim Government met, and knowing it could now act with impunity, decided to extend the genocide to Southern Rwanda.41 In the first week of the genocide, General Dallaire asked for a change in UNAMIR's mandate that would authorize him to take action to stop as much killing as possible. But instead, on April 21, the Security Council, led by the U.S. and the U.K., ordered reduction of UNAMIR to a token force of 270 troops.42  Over eight hundred thousand Rwandan Tutsis were murdered while the U.N. “did a Pontius Pilate,” as General Dallaire told State Department officials in Fall 1994.43 ______ 41 Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 163. 42 U.N. Security Council Resolution S/Res/912 (1994), 21 April 1994. See also Des Forges (cf. note 10), p. 631. 43 Dr. Kuperman disputes the commonly accepted death toll of 800,000, claiming that Rwanda’s pre- genocide Tutsi population was only 650,000, 8.27 percent of the population, based on the 1991 census. Kuperman (cf. note 13), p. 20. However, the most recent count of the dead, carried out locality by locality, yields a figure of over one million dead from 1990 through 1994, with 800,000 dead during the genocide. Associated Press, “More Than One Million Rwandans Killed in 1990's,” NY Times Online News Report, 14 February 2002. ______ Would UNAMIR intervention have saved lives? Dr. Kuperman states, “Indeed, by my calculations, three-quarters of the Tutsi victims would have died even if the West had launched a maximum intervention immediately upon learning that a nationwide genocide was being attempted in Rwanda.”44  He concludes that although intervention during the Rwandan genocide would have been less effective than some think, saving 125,000 lives would have justified maximal intervention. He notes that even the belated, minimal response proposed in May 1994 by the U.S., which would have unrealistically expected Tutsis to walk through militia infested areas to reach “safe zones” outside Rwanda might have saved 75,000 lives.45  The cruel fate awaiting people who relied on weakly defended U.N. “safe areas” was demonstrated a year later in Srebenica, Bosnia. How many lives could have been saved? We will never know. But General Dallaire, the commander on the ground who knew the situation best, was and still is, convinced that a robust UNAMIR mandate plus reinforcements, demonstrating the international political will to stop further genocide, could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Dr. Kuperman argues that reinforcements could not have arrived in time to save most victims’ lives. But he only considers U.S. troops sent from the continental U.S.A. as reinforcements, a strangely self-defeating concept for a U.N. peacekeeping force. Perhaps the most telling refutation of his view is the fact that over 1000 heavily armed French and Belgian troops flew into Kigali by April 10 to evacuate their own nationals. If they had, instead, been used to reinforce UNAMIR, they might have had a powerful effect in deterring the spread of the genocide. An additional 500 Belgian reserves were available in Kenya, and 800 more French troops were stationed in central Africa.46  Two hundred and fifty U.S. Special Operations troops stood by in Burundi to assist, if necessary, with the evacuation of U.S. citizens. There were also tens of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in Europe, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and other places much closer to Rwanda than the continental U.S.A. The definitive refutation of Kuperman's argument that U.S. troops could not have arrived in time to save hundreds of thousands of lives was kept secret for years. But the Peacekeeping Core Group knew it. I knew it because I had Top Secret Codeword clearance. Thousands of heavily armed U.S. troops sat on U.S. ships just off the coast of East Africa when the genocide began. They were equipped with helicopters, armored vehicles, and all the weapons they would have needed to reinforce UNAMIR, as General Dallaire asked, and carry out his plan to surround and defend churches and stadiums where Tutsis had gathered. Even without these reinforcements, according to General Dallaire, the UNAMIR troops could have used the weapons they had, which were superior to the machetes of the Interahamwe , to take down the roadblocks by force, and protect Tutsis who had gathered in defensible places. The Ghanian unit in UNAMIR took a vote and made the heroic decision to disregard their UN withdrawal order and stay in Rwanda.The fact that the remaining 456 UNAMIR peacekeepers were able to save at least 25,000 lives by guarding people who had gathered in churches, stadiums, and hotels, leaves the question open whether the full 2,500-member force could not have saved many more lives had the U.N. Security Council immediately mandated it to do so. In places protected by the 456 UNAMIR volunteers who stayed, most people survived. Kuperman’s figures are similar. Even against the better-armed Presidential Guard, a robust response by UNAMIR might have deterred plans to extend the genocide. International outrage at attacks on U.N. peacekeepers might have also helped forge the political will necessary to obtain reinforcements. Instead, the U.N. Security Council, led by the U.S. and the U.K. decided to cut and run. As General Dallaire later told State Department officials, "A peacekeeping force that is trying to stop genocide must expect to take casualties, or it is worthless." _____ 44 Kuperman, (cf. note 13), p. viii. 45 Kuperman (cf. note 13), p. 77. 46 Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 147. The major problem from the beginning of UNAMIR was that all but one of the Western powers were unwilling to send troops to intervene, or even to provide airlift and financing for an international force. The result was that poorly trained troops from Bangladesh, lacking any equipment, were the largest contingent, followed by the Ghanaians, who arrived without a single vehicle. The Belgian force numbered only 420, and withdrew within days after the massacre of ten Belgian soldiers guarding the Prime Minister. 47 The attack was consciously planned to drive out the Belgians.48 The Hutu Power militants had learned the lessons of Somalia, too. If you kill them, they will leave. Late in the genocide, France, which had supplied the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) with arms and advisors and may have helped train Interahamwe militias, launched Opération Turquoise.49 After getting U.N. authorization, France sent in Senegalese and French troops on June 23.50  Opération Turquoise saved more than 10,000 lives in western Rwanda, but also permitted the leaders of the genocide to escape into Zaire.51 What finally stopped the genocide was the victory by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which took Kigali on July 4 and declared a ceasefire on July 18. From July 14 to 16, a million refugees streamed into Zaire, the fastest migration of people in history. Refugee camps quickly fell under the control of the Hutu Interahamwe. The RPF committed its own atrocities, such as the massacre of at least 1000 Hutu holdouts at Kibeho.52  The camps were not emptied until the 1997 invasion of Zaire by Rwanda, Uganda, and Laurent Kabila. During their march to Kinshasa, Kabila’s troops and the Rwandan Patriotic Army committed more genocidal massacres against Hutu refugees in the Kivus, south of Kisangani, and at Mbandaka. The war that ensued in the Democratic Republic of the Congo cost over two milion lives.53 ______ 47 Kuperman (cf. note 13), p. 40. 48 Dallaire, Roméo, Cable to General Baril, UNDPKO, 11 January 1994, in Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (eds.) (cf. note 9), p. xxi. 49 U.N. Security Council Resolution 929 (S/PV.3392) 22 June 1994. 50 Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 213. 51 Prunier, Gérard, “Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape,” in Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (eds.) (cf. note 9), p. 303. 52 Kuperman (cf. note 13), p.20. 53 International Crisis Group, Disarmament in the Congo, http://www.crisisweb.org , Nairobi/Brussels, 14 December 2001, p. 2. ____ Why did the US and the UN Pass By On The Other Side? The major Western governments did know from the first days that mass killing was underway. The U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission used the word genocide in her calls to the State Department from the beginning. Much of the communication was done by secure phone calls, since both Joyce Leader and Ambassador Rawson were cut off from access to the U.S. Embassy for long periods. Classified documents confirm this very early recognition of mass killing. The information did reach the top levels of government. Denial The real problem was genocide denial, first through denial of the facts, and then through denial that the mass murder was genocide. State Department and Defense Department lawyers who were opposed to intervention, either because of their own personal views or to please their anti-interventionist superiors, denied that the mass murders constituted genocide. That this denial was intentional can be seen from the fact that they continued to deny the genocide for three months, until long after it was obvious to nearly everyone else that one of the worst genocides of the twentieth century was underway. General Dallaire and a panel of military experts assembled by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict concluded that it would not have taken weeks to put troops in place who could have significantly reduced the killings. 2539 UNAMIR troops were already in Rwanda. Dr. Kuperman dismisses this stubborn fact because they were only lightly armed. But over 1000 heavily armed airborne troops from France, and Belgium were immediately available and did arrive by April 10. Another 1550 Belgian, French, and U.S. troops were in nearby African countries, rendering Dr. Kuperman’s lengthy calculations of airlift capacity from the mainland U.S. irrelevant. The Carnegie Commission panel concluded that prompt international denunciation of the genocide, accompanied by forceful military resistance by UNAMIR and Western troops could have saved many lives, as Colonel Scott Feil argues convincingly in his book for the Carnegie Commission, " Preventing Genocide: How The Early Use Of Force Might Have Succeeded In Rwanda. "54 Dr. Kuperman’s most valid point is that for intervention to be effective, it must come before genocide begins, not after it has begun. Early warning must be coupled with early preventive action months before genocide. Dr. Kuperman comments: “I have argued in previous writings that if UNAMIR [the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda] had been reinforced several months before the outbreak of the violence, as Belgium’s government urged at the time, genocide might have been averted. Such a reinforcement was justified by the flood of warning signs from Rwanda – available primarily to Belgium and France but often shared with the UN and United States – which indicated that extremist elements were seeking to provoke renewed civil war and massive civilian killing, if not necessarily genocide.”55 The problem is that early warnings of “mere” civil war and massive civilian killing seldom result in international intervention, whereas early warnings of genocide might. But in Rwanda, except for a few who used the sacred “G-word,” none dared call it genocide – until it was too late. The Rwandan conflagration burned so fast, that reacting after it started would, for most of its victims, have been too late. Within three weeks, at least 300,000 lives had been consumed.56 _____ 54 Feil, Colonel Scott,“Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda,” Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, New York, April 1998. 55 Kuperman (cf. note 13): p. 97; See also Alan J. Kuperman, “The Rwanda Failure,” in Washington Post, December 29, 1998, op-ed. 56 Kuperman (cf. note 13), p. 122. Conclusion: The Rwandan genocide could have been prevented. The early warning signs were clear. UNAMIR troops were already on the ground in Rwanda, though with inadequate training and material support. But in a failure of political will, the U.S., the U.K., the U.N. Secretariat and the U.N. Security Council refused to act to prevent or stop the genocide. At least 800,000 people perished. Two questions remain: Why, with all the early warnings, did the U.S., U.K., France and the U.N. not do what needed to be done to prevent the Rwandan genocide? Why, once the genocide began, did the U.N. Security Council order UNAMIR to withdraw, rather than sending reinforcements to stop the genocide? Lack of political will is at the heart of the answers to both questions. But to muster political will, governments must perceive and understand the crisis and have realistic options to resolve it. 1. The early warnings were ignored. In Rwanda, the U.N. DPKO and the U.S., as well as other governments, refused to discern the signs of genocide. Because they did not understand the genocidal process, they missed the early warning signs. There was, at the time, no systematic understanding among policy makers of how genocide develops so that the warning signs could be noticed. That is why I wrote and circulated in the State Department in 1996 and now around the world through Genocide Watch The Eight (now Ten) Stages of Genocide , to provide a powerful explanatory model of the genocidal process, along with specific policy recommendations for what can be done to prevent and stop the process at each stage. Misplaced hopes for the Arusha Accords led the U.S. Ambassador and diplomats to ignore the planning for genocide within the Rwandan government and the Hutu Power militias. 2. After the genocide started, policy makers resisted and misconstrued the facts. In the post-Somalia era, policy makers did not want to get involved in another African “quagmire,” so they minimized the facts. The first cables from the U.S. Ambassador treated the killings as a bilateral continuation of the Rwandan civil war, rather than as a one-sided genocide. The number of deaths in the early weeks was grossly under-estimated. Closure of embassies and withdrawal of personnel and press prevented adequate reporting on the genocide, especially “confirmed” reporting in official cables from embassy staff. Generally, policy makers require “confirmed” fact-finding before they will take action. 3. State Department and UK Foreign Office lawyers did not understand the law of genocide and refused to call the ethnic massacres in Rwanda Genocide. Lawyers at the U.S. State and Defense departments and at the British Foreign Office had little training in the law of genocide. What knowledge they did have, they misapplied. They created conceptual uncertainty among policy makers who relied upon them for advice. Their power to block policy determinations, press guidance, and instruction cables saying that genocide was underway in Rwanda meant that for three months, the U.S. and U.K. refused to call the Rwandan genocide by its proper legal name: Genocide . This State Department legal malpractice, led by Joan Donoghue, also meant that the U.S. and U.K. refused to permit the U.N. Security Council to declare that genocide was being committed in Rwanda. Words, especially legal words, have consequences. During the Rwandan genocide, refusal to name the crime genocide meant that policy makers in denial could continue to obstruct action because they could argue there was no imperative to intervene. The lawyers even misconstrued the law on the duty to intervene, when they argued that the Genocide Convention creates a legal, rather than simply a moral duty to prevent genocide, which they believed would force the U.S. to send U.S. troops into an African civil war. 4. Groupthink ruled out effective options for intervention. When policy makers finally recognized the facts, they thought they had no acceptable options to prevent the genocide. In the interagency policy meetings in the U.S. government, dispatch of U.S. troops was ruled out as a “non-starter,” and was never seriously considered. UNAMIR was perceived as too weak and undersupplied to stop the rapidly spreading killing. U.S. or British airlift for UNAMIR re-supply and reinforcement was also ruled out because of danger to American and British personnel and because of fear that such a step would lead the U.S. and U.K. into another African “quagmire.” Policy makers had not considered options available when the genocide started. They believed that UNAMIR’s Chapter 6 mandate would have to be changed to Chapter 7 to permit intervention without the permission of the Rwandan interim government. General Dallaire has always rejected this contention because he asserts that UNAMIR’s Chapter 6 rules of engagement already authorized the use of force to protect civilian lives. US and UK policymakers also ruled out asking UNAMIR troop contributors whether they would agree to keep their troops in Rwanda under a changed mandate. Unfortunately, the U.S. and U.K. did not consider it feasible to change UNAMIR’s mandate and place UNAMIR troops at risk, though there was little chance of a veto by any of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council. Those who engaged in Groupthink policy making also believed their responsibility would never be known. Because policy memos and cables were classified, and because all personnel evaluations in the State and Defense departments are top-down, they might be right. This paper is one small crack in the wall of bureaucratic irresponsibility. Books by Linda Melvern, Alison des Forges, Samantha Power, and Michael Barnett have done even more. Eventually, policymakers need to know they will be held responsible for their decisions. 5. The U.S. was unwilling to financially or militarily support a reinforced UNAMIR. Despite the heroic Ghanaian contingent's decision to keep its troops in Rwanda, along with offers from several other African states to reinforce UNAMIR, the U.S. was unwilling to make the financial commitment to support an expanded operation. The U.S. and other military powers were unwilling to risk the lives of any of their own citizens. Instead, they sacrificed the lives of over 800,000 defenseless Rwandans. This U.S. position led the ever-realistic U.K. to conclude that because U.S. approval in the Security Council would be necessary for such an intervention force, there was no possibility it would be approved. Hence, an endangered, undersupplied UNAMIR force should be withdrawn. 6. Rwandan lives were not worth saving. Although the U.S. and U.K. were willing to commit billions to save lives in Bosnia, where people are white, and the war was close to the interests of the European community, they were unwilling to risk American and British lives to save the lives of Africans in Rwanda, where people are black, and neither country has strategic or economic interests. This racist double-standard was pointed out repeatedly by Nigeria’s Ambassador Gambari in the U.N. Security Council. Our circle of moral concern excluded people of a different race in a continent far away. We ignored our common humanity. Ultimately the failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide was not just a political failure. It was a moral failure. Those with power failed to protect the powerless. The world still lacks the international institutions and the political will to stop genocide. To address this fundamental problem, as I suggested at a conference on genocide held in London in October 2000, a global movement is needed in the twenty-first century like the anti-slavery movement of the nineteenth century. To launch that movement is the purpose of Genocide Watch and The Alliance Against Genocide.58 Endnotes Dr. Gregory H. Stanton is the Founding President of Genocide Watch and the Founding Chairman of the Alliance Against Genocide. He was a Foreign Service Officer in the State Department, Law Professor at Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia, James Farmer Professor in Human Rights, Mary Washington College, Fredericksburg, Virginia, and Research Professor in Genocide Studies and Prevention at George Mason University. Arlington, Virginia. He was a Fellow, 2001 – 2002, at The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He was President of the International Association of Genocide Scholars 2007 - 2009. His contact email is: president@genocidewatch.org This paper was presented on 27 January 2002 in London, England at a conference, “Generations of Genocide,” sponsored by the Institute of Contemporary History and the Weiner Library. ©2002 Gregory H. Stanton 2. Power. Samantha, A Problem From Hell. America and the Age of Genocide, New York: Basic Books, 2002.– 108. 3. Power, Samantha, “Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen,” The Atlantic Monthly, September 2001, p. 86. 4. Power (cf. note 3), p. 84. 5. Belgian Senate, Commission d’enquête parlementaire concernant les évenéments du Rwanda, Rapport, 6 December 1997, p. 493. Quoted in Melvern, Linda, A People Betrayed. The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, Zed Books, London, 2000, p.49. 6. Prunier, Gérard, The Rwanda Crisis 1959 – 1994, History of a Genocide, London, Hurst and Company, 1995, p. 168. 7. International Federation of Human Rights, Africa Watch (Human Rights Watch), Inter-African Union of Human Rights, and International Centre of Rights of the Person and of Democratic Development. Report of the International Commission of Investigation of Human Rights Violations in Rwanda since October 1, 1990 (January 7 – 21, 1993) , New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993. 8. Ndiaye, B.W., Report by Special Rapporteur on his mission to Rwanda from 8 to 17 April 1993, Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Economic and Social Council document E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1, 11 August 1993, p. 23. 9. Dallaire, Roméo, Cable to General Baril, UNDPKO, 11 January 1994, in Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (eds.), The Path of A Genocide. The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, London: Transaction Publishers, p. xxi.10. Des Forges, Alison, Leave None To Tell The Story, Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch & FIDH, New York, 1999, p. 154. 11. Des Forges (cf. note 10), pp. 159 – 171. 12. Des Forges (cf. note 10), pp. 156 – 157. 13. Alan J. Kuperman, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention. Genocide in Rwanda, The Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2001: p. 85. 14. Stanton, Gregory, “The Ten Stages of Genocide,” https://www.genocidewatch.com/tenstages 15. Des Forges (cf. note 10), p. 38. 16. Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 47. 17. Kakwenzire, Joan and Kamukama, Dixon, “The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda 1990 – 1994,” in: Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (eds.) (cf. note 9), p. 76. 18. Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 71. 19. Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 33. 20. Kakwenzire, Joan and Kamukama, Dixon, in: Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (eds.) (cf. note 9) , p. 83. 21. Melvern (cf. note 5), p.31. 22. Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 31. 23. Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 32, 67. 24. Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 67-68. 25. Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 46-47. 26. Copies of this letter is in the Melvern archive at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. 27. Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (eds.), note 9. 28. Caplan, Gerald, Rwanda. The Preventable Genocide, The Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, Organization of African Unity, 1998. 29. Kuperman, Alan J.,“False Hope Abroad: Promises to Intervene Often Bring Bloodshed,” in Washington Post, June 14, 1998, Outlook Section. 30. Joyce Leader lived next door to Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was murdered on the first day in a nearby UNDP compound after failing in her desperate efforts to scale the wall to Leader's compound. Members of the Presidential Guard invaded Leader's house searching for Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana. She was a moderate Hutu who opposed the Hutu Power conspirators. The Rwandan Army at Camp Kigali then murdered ten Belgian soldiers who had been dispatched to protect the Prime Minister. The murders were an intentional terror tactic to convince Belgium to withdraw its troops, a tactic that succeeded brilliantly. 31. All of the American policy makers who made the decisions during the Rwandan genocide, including the decision to order withdrawal UNAMIR troops, were later promoted. Dick Clarke became chief of counter-terrorism operations at the National Security Council. Susan Rice became Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and National Security Advisor. George Ward became Ambassador to Namibia and then, after being recalled from that job, left the State Department and became Director of Training at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He joined the American occupation government in Iraq. Sarah Sewell became an Undersecretary of State. Prudence Bushnell became US Ambassador to Kenya and Director of the Foreign Service Institute. The military personnel moved up the chain of command. 32. The State Department lawyers who gave this erroneous legal advice still worked for years at the State Department with promotions and higher salaries. Joan Donoghue became President of the International Court of Justice. 33. Genocide Convention, Article 5. 34. Genocide Convention, Articles 5 – 7. 35. Kuperman (cf. note 13), p. 31. 36. Melson, Robert, Revolution and Genocide, University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 273. 37. Kuperman (cf. note 13), p.24. 38. Melvern (cf. note 5), p.106.39. Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 85. 40. Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 163. 41. U.N. Security Council Resolution S/Res/912 (1994), 21 April 1994. See also Des Forges (cf. note 10), p. 631. 42. Dr. Kuperman disputes the commonly accepted death toll of 800,000, claiming that Rwanda’s pre-genocide Tutsi population was only 650,000, 8.27 percent of the population, based on the 1991 census. Kuperman (cf. note 13), p. 20. However, the most recent count of the dead, carried out locality by locality, yields a figure of over one million dead from 1990 through 1994, with 800,000 dead during the genocide. Associated Press, “More Than One Million Rwandans Killed in 1990's,” NY Times Online News Report, 14 February, 2002. 43. Kuperman, (cf. note 13), p. viii. 44. Kuperman (cf. note 13), p. 77. 45. Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 147. Kuperman’s figures are similar. 46. Kuperman (cf. note 13), p. 40. 47. Dallaire, Roméo, Cable to General Baril, UNDPKO, 11 January 1994, in Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (eds.) (cf. note 9), p. xxi. 48. U.N. Security Council Resolution 929 (S/PV.3392) 22 June 1994. 49. Melvern (cf. note 5), p. 213. 50. Prunier, Gérard, “Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape,” in Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (eds.) (cf. note 9), p. 303. 51. Kuperman (cf. note 13), p.20. 52. International Crisis Group, Disarmament in the Congo, http://www.crisisweb.org , Nairobi/Brussels, 14 December 2001, p. 2. 53. Feil, Colonel Scott,“Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda,” Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, New York, April 1998. 54. Kuperman (cf. note 13): p. 97; See also Alan J. Kuperman, “The Rwanda Failure,” in Washington Post, December 29, 1998, op-ed. 55. Kuperman (cf. note 13), p. 122. Stanton, Gregory, “How We Can Prevent Genocide,” https://www.genocidewatch.com/articles-by-dr-stan proceedings of the Conference in Honor Raphael Lemkin, London, October 2000, Leo Kuper Foundation. 57. See www.genocidewatch.com and against-genocide.org

September 2025 | Issue No. 22 Our monthly newsletter aims to keep people informed of Genocide Watch’s operation, as well as the operations of the other members of the Alliance Against Genocide. Download our latest issue below or click the newsletter to open in a new window.

August 2025 | No. 21 Our monthly newsletter aims to keep people informed of Genocide Watch’s operation, as well as the operations of the other members of the Alliance Against Genocide. Download our latest issue below or click the newsletter to open in a new window.

By Mohammad Yunus Yawar Taliban fighters install a Taliban flag on a checkpoint in Kabul, Afghanistan, July 21, 2022. REUTERS/Ali Khara/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights KABUL, Sept 23 (Reuters) - In a dim home used as a small business in Afghanistan, women bent over bright cloth use needles to form intricate embroidery. But their fibre-optic network in Kandahar - their primary link to buyers - has now gone dark. Local government officials confirmed a ban on fibre-optic services in five northern provinces — Balkh, Kunduz, Badakhshan, Takhar and Baghlan. Officials said the ban is to prevent "immoral activities." Residents in other provinces, including Kandahar, Herat and Parwan have reported disruptions, though these have not been formally acknowledged by authorities. The loss of access to the fibre-optic network has stranded thousands of homes, businesses and schools and left them reliant on costly, patchy mobile phone connections. The measure is the first large-scale internet shutdown since the Islamist group seized power in 2021, though it is not nationwide. For Sabrinna Hayat, who runs Hayat Handicrafts with nine women breadwinners stitching firaq partug, the long embroidered dresses commonly worn by Afghan women, along with other handmade items, the outage has tripled internet costs. She said her group used to receive orders from Afghanistan and abroad but now must repeatedly activate mobile internet packages that cost three times as much as fibre, just to keep up with customers. "A complete ban has been imposed on fibre-optic cable … This action has been taken to prevent immoral activities, and an alternative solution will be developed within the country to meet necessary needs," Haji Zaid, a spokesman for the governor of the Balkh province said last week. The Kunduz provincial media office issued a similar statement. The Ministry of Communications in Kabul did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Across town, a tailor who asked to be identified only by her family name Dawrani, said her workshop employing widows and women in need has been gutted, given that sales and orders depend on connectivity. "If I cannot even earn this small piece of bread, I will be forced to leave this country," she said. CUT OFF FROM THE WORLD The internet has been a lifeline for students, especially girls barred from secondary schools and universities, but the shutdown has cut off even that option in northern Afghanistan. Dawrani said her daughters were no longer able to take their online English classes. Digital rights advocates say the Taliban's reasoning is less about morality than about control. Obaidullah Baheer, a Kabul-based academic, said the ban echoed earlier Taliban moves that used immorality as justification for restrictions, including on women's education, and were followed by promises of reform that never materialised. "It shows a very anti-modern version of the Taliban. Seems like their fight is against modernity and they're fitting the bill of people who used to call them draconian." For some women, the debate is distant. "Through this tailoring work, I managed to put food on the table. Without internet, even that may disappear," said Dawrani. ($1=67.57 Afghanis) Reporting by Mohammad Yunus Yawar in Kabul; additional reporting and writing by Ariba Shahid in Karachi; Editing by Neil Fullick. © 2025 Reuters. All rights reserved

This Training Manual on Genocide and Genocide Prevention was written by Genocide Watch for a Training Workshop for African Lawyers sponsored by the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU) in Arusha, Tanzania March 18 - 19, 2025. The Workshop was conducted in English and French. Over one hundred African Lawyers attended, both in person and virtually from across the African continent. The Training Manual is published here subject to revisions and additions by PALU for use in future Training Workshops on Genocide and Genocide Prevention. Genocide Watch is grateful to PALU for holding the Training Workshop, having Genocide Watch draft the Training Manual, and for bringing Genocide Watch staff to Arusha to help the distinguished Workshop faculty conduct the Workshop. The Training Manual is published under a Creative Commons copyright. It may be republished without charge so long as it is published with full credit to PALU and Genocide Watch and without alteration. The Training Manual may be downloaded here:

A boy is detained as youth led protests turned violent, in Sale, Morocco, Oct. 1, 2025 (AP photo by Mosa'ab Elshamy). At least two people have been killed and hundreds more arrested in Morocco amid ongoing youth-led protests against corruption and poor public services. Local authorities said security forces opened fire on protesters in the town of Lqliaa, in western Morocco, to prevent them from storming a police station. The demonstrations first broke out on Saturday with demands for improved education and healthcare services, and have since grown into the biggest popular uprising the country has seen in years. They are being organized by a group calling itself “GenZ 212,” a reference to the country’s telephone country code. As we wrote earlier in the week, Gen Z protests like the ones in Morocco have erupted all over the world this year, including in Nepal, Indonesia, the Philippines and Kenya. The young activists behind these movements have adopted some common symbols and tactics, such as using the gaming app Discord to plan rallies and discuss tactics. But each country also has its own political context and set of issues. In Morocco, the protesters have mobilized around opposition to the upcoming FIFA World Cup, which the country is set to host in 2030 alongside Spain and Portugal. That has spurred billions of dollars in public spending to upgrade the country’s roads, airports and arenas, even as the kingdom’s schools and hospital systems remains underfunded. Popular chants among the protesters include “Health first, we don’t want the World Cup” and “Stadiums are here, but where are the hospitals?” According to the World Health Organization , Morocco has fewer than eight doctors per 10,000 people—below the global average of 17 and far below the WHO’s recommendation of 25. Beyond the data, specific incidents have galvanized the protesters. Eight pregnant women reportedly died last month after receiving caesarean sections at a public hospital in the coastal city of Agadir. Morocco’s government was initially silent in the face of the protests but Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch on Thursday released his first statement on the matter, praising security forces’ response while acknowledging the protesters’ demands and saying he is ready for “dialogue and discussion” with them. This suggests GenZ 212 could now face the new and much more difficult challenge of translating their movement’s demands into tangible successes. Elliot Waldman is World Politics Review’s editor-in-chief. Copyright 2025 World Politics Review

This “Preventing Ethnic Genocide: Policy Guidance Note” was written by Professor Kimani Njogu, the Director of Twaweza Communications, a linguist, literary critic and cultural scholar; and Professor Gregory Stanton, founding President and Chair of Genocide Watch. In 2000, Professor Stanton published the proposal that led to the establishment of the Office for Genocide Prevention at the United Nations. This Policy Note was commissioned and supported by the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG). It was the Policy Guidance Note for a OSAPG Workshop on Preventing Ethnic Genocide held at the Aegis Trust Kigali Genocide Memorial in Kigali, Rwanda in November 2024. As a United Nations published document it is in the public domain. It may be be republished freely without alteration and with credit to the UN Office for Genocide Prevention, Professor Kimani Njogu, and Professor Gregory Stanton, its authors. The UN OSAPG Policy Guidance Note on Preventing Ethnic Genocide may be downloaded here: https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/un-special-adviser-publishes-preventing-ethnic-genocide

A Doctor in Sudan Described the Horror of War. Days Later, He Was Killed. The New York Times October 1, 2025 By Declan Walsh Dr. Omar Selik’s raw, urgent testimony from a besieged city cut through the fog of war and crystallized the depravity of the conflict. And then he was gone. Sudanese residents gathered to receive food in El Fasher, a city in Darfur that has been under a siege by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces since April 2024.Credit ...Agence France-Presse — Getty Images When Declan Walsh couldn’t reach the besieged city of El Fasher, he contacted residents using limited satellite internet connections, reporting from Nairobi, Kenya. Dr. Omar Selik wanted to be seen, literally. At the end of a harrowing, hourlong interview about life in the besieged Sudanese city of El Fasher, where he spoke via a rare satellite internet connection, he asked to switch on his camera. An exhausted, war-weary face appeared, then broke into an enormous grin. “This is a good day for me,” Dr. Selik said, relief washing across his features. “I feel like a human being again.” I found myself smiling too. That simple moment of connection was enough to provide him with fleeting relief after 500 days of horrific siege. Dr. Selik, 43, was one of the last health workers in El Fasher, a city of a quarter-million desperate residents in the western region of Darfur, where death fell from the sky and starvation was a constant companion. Moments earlier, Dr. Selik had been crying as he described how a pregnant woman had bled to death in his care for want of simple medicines. Now he tilted his camera down, inviting me to look at his lunch. I could hardly believe my eyes. He held a plate of lumpy brown mush; animal fodder normally fed to camels and cows. It had become the main source of food for most people in El Fasher, he explained — a disturbing sign of how both a doctor and the people he was trying to save had been stripped of their humanity. Dr. Omar Selik, top, spoke via a satellite internet connection with the journalists Declan Walsh, bottom right, and Abdalrahman Altayeb. Credit...The New York Times That was why it felt so good to speak with someone on the outside, he said: “People are dying, and nobody is even watching.” For me, it was also a moment of clarity. Since Sudan’s civil war started in April 2023, I had been unable to enter Darfur, ground zero of a nationwide famine and the site of a crushing siege. Now, through the fog of war, I had found someone whose raw, urgent testimony crystallized the depravity of the conflict. And then he was gone. Days later, Dr. Selik left his home to attend dawn prayers at a nearby mosque. A missile slammed through the roof , exploding among the worshipers and killing about 75 people. Dr. Selik was among them. It was the latest example of the toxic mix of technology, brutality and impunity that have come to characterize a war that has killed as many as 400,000 people, by some expert estimates . Witnesses said the missile was fired by a drone, one of many supplied by the United Arab Emirates  to the Rapid Support Forces, the paramilitary group laying siege to El Fasher. The Emirates denies backing either side in the war. For the city’s embattled residents, it was another devastating loss. “My heart is broken,” said Salwa Ahmed, a university lecturer who had taken shelter in Dr. Selik’s house. Like other residents, Ms. Ahmed said she felt abandoned by the outside world, and was skeptical that help would ever come. One faint glimmer of help, though, is on the horizon, led by President Trump’s senior adviser for Africa, Massad Boulos. For weeks, Mr. Boulos has been negotiating with the R.S.F. to allow international aid into El Fasher, and last week he told the Financial Times  an aid convoy could arrive “very, very soon.” A senior U.S. official, who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly, said the convoy would likely comprise about 45 U.N. trucks, and could set out as soon as next Monday. But the details are still being worked out, including, crucially, how any aid would be distributed once it reached the stricken city. The U.S. official said it was unclear if the R.S.F. would allow the aid to reach neighborhoods held by its enemy, the Sudanese military — the same areas that have borne the brunt of the siege. A State Department official declined to comment on the talks and referred to Mr. Boulos’s earlier statements about his efforts in Sudan. Volunteers prepared meals for residents of El Fasher, a besieged city in Sudan’s western Darfur region, in August.Credit ...Agence France-Presse — Getty Images The siege began in April 2024 as the R.S.F., whose fighters mostly come from Darfur, tried to drive Sudan’s military out of the sprawling region. It intensified in March after the R.S.F. was expelled from Khartoum , the capital of Sudan. As others fled, Dr. Selik stayed. “He said, ‘I can’t leave these people behind,’” said Omer Eltahir, a fellow doctor living in Ireland, who spoke to him in July. Dr. Selik took up at the city’s last functioning hospital, which had been bombed 30 times, where he quickly retrained as a combat medic. “Head trauma, chest trauma, punctured abdomens,” he told me, rattling off a list of typical injuries he treated. “Anything caused by a bullet or a bomb.” This summer, the crisis intensified after R.S.F. fighters built a high earthen wall around El Fasher that is now 42 miles long . Fighters shot dead anyone who tried to cross it at night. At the hospital, supplies of food and medicine ran out. Surgeons used mosquito nets as medical gauze to carry out operations. Cholera and malaria swept through wards. One day, at a small clinic he ran in the north of the city, Dr. Selik encountered a group of Colombian mercenaries fighting alongside the R.S.F. “They were speaking Spanish,” he said. Later, the bodies of Colombians killed in battle were brought to the hospital, he said. Dr. Selik sent his wife and children to Khartoum, for their safety. But his sister stayed behind, only to be killed with her three children in August, when a shell crashed into their home. “That’s just one story,” he told me. “In this city, there are so many like it.” A Starlink terminal, provided by a relative, offered a lifeline to the outside world. Yet even there, the conflict found him. On WhatsApp groups of Sudanese medics, Dr. Selik was dismayed by bitter disputes that erupted along political or ethnic lines, Dr. Eltahir said. “People were calling each other pigs,” he said. “Omar asked them to stop.” But the Starlink terminal also provided him a means of calling for help. What worried him most, Dr. Selik told me, was what would happen if the R.S.F. completely overran the city. “They will kill everyone,” he said. Aid workers and American officials have similar concerns. The city could fall to the R.S.F. within weeks or even sooner, the U.S. official said. Many worry about a repeat of the massacre in El Geneina , in western Darfur, in late 2023, where R.S.F. fighters killed as many as 15,000 people, according to the United Nations. “We fear that as the battle for the city intensifies, the worst is yet to come,” Mirjana Spoljaric, president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, said at the United Nations in New York last week. “We should not allow this to happen.”   Abdalrahman Altayeb contributed reporting from Khartoum, Sudan. Declan Walsh  is the chief Africa correspondent for The Times based in Nairobi, Kenya. He previously reported from Cairo, covering the Middle East, and Islamabad, Pakistan. A version of this article appears in print on Oct. 2, 2025, Section A, Page 4 of the New York edition with the headline: A Doctor Described Horrors in Sudan. Days Later, He Was Killed..   Copyright 2025 The New York Times Company

Protesters barricaded the Makurdi-Lafia-Abuja Federal Highway with corpses of the 3 victims earlier killed by Fulani terrorists on Saturday. Credit: Ekani Olikita. As Fulani Terrorists Kill Catholic Choir Master, 12 Christians By Ekani’s Olikita (Makurdi) Angry Protesters on Saturday, September 20, 2025, blocked the Makurdi-Lafia-Abuja Federal Highway over the killing of 13 Christians in Benue State. Similar killings a month ago compelled Yelewata women to block the same Federal highway, after 270 local people were brutally murdered by Fulani ethnic militia June 13-14. These incidents are also coming a week after similar killings of 11 Christians across Benue Communities by Fulani Jihadists. Benue State, populated by 4.3 million, is an agrarian and predominantly Christian State whose native residents reportedly are 95 percent Catholic, located in the Middle belt region of Nigeria. The state has come under frequent attacks, kidnappings and killings since 2013 by Fulani ethnic militia, whose leadership has never been identified by federal officials or by Nigerian media. The Fulani tribe is known across West Africa for cattle-herding and linkage to regional jihad wars. According to the Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa (ORFA), the Fulani ethnic militia have caused 55,000 deaths from 2019 to 2023. Renewed Violence Across Makurdi and Guma Counties New attacks in Makurdi and Guma counties of Benue State by armed Fulani Ethnic Militia (FEM took place between September 8 and September 20, according to residents speaking to TruthNigeria. Saturday Attack Sparks Protest Protesters, mostly women from Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Abagana IDPs Camp, blocking Makurdi-Lafia-Abuja Federal Highway on Saturday. Credit: Ekani Olikita. In the latest attack that ignited protest that shut down the Makurdi-Lafia-Abuja Federal Highway on Saturday, September 20, a choir master with Daudu Catholic Mission, identified as Francis Kulegwa, a Christian farmer, Tor Felafa and his son, Tersoo Felafa were ambushed and gruesomely slashed to death by a group 10 Fulani terrorists while on their way to their rice farms located in Makurdi near its border with Daudu in Guma county at about 8:30 local time (7:40 GMT). Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) stood or sat down blocking the Makurdi-Lafia-Abuja alongside three corpses of victims earlier killed earlier in the day. “Most of us here are internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) fromAbegana IDPs Camp. Every one of us here has lost at least a loved one and killing of our people is still continuing unabated,” according to Mrs. Ngunan Yina, a protesting woman and a mother of two in an interview with TruthNigeria. She angrily condemned almost daily killing of their people, saying she wouldn’t leave until Governor Hyacinth Alia would address them. “Apart from the endless killings, we are hungry,” Yina said. “We no longer get food supplies at the IDPs Camp,” she added. “We are tired of staying in the IDPs Camps, but we have nowhere to go because Fulani terrorists have destroyed everything in our community, and it is not safe to return home,” she went on to say. “We shall remain here until Governor comes and address us”, she said. “We Hear You” – Government Spokesman Emberga Alfred, Speaker of the Benue State House of Parliament assured the angry protesters on behalf of the State Government of quick end to the terrorist attacks ravaging the State. “Your message has been heard,” Alfred said. “The State government is also saddened by the relentless killing of our people and has already taken action to quickly end the killings. Other of your demands will also be attended to. Please, allow free vehicular movement!” The protesters were seen leaving after the state legislator’s speech. Other Ethno-Religious Cleansing Across Communities in Guma County Earlier on Friday, September 19, 2025, two Christian farmers were killed by 6 jihadists speaking Fulfulde (Fulani language) and chanting “Allahu Akbar” at Tse-Adaa village in Guma County (Local Government Area). Several residents were declared missing after the attack. In Tse-Asha, approximately 10 armed militants shouting “Allahu Akbar” attacked residents on September 16, slashing a middle-aged woman, Ngueren Akpela to death. Along the dreaded Ukpiam-Umenger road in Mbabai Council Ward on September 15, approximately 15 militants killed four Christian traders returning from Daudu market. Victims included Chiave Samson, Terngu Tersoo, Aondowase Kor, and Terhide Kaha, who was slashed beyond recognition. Fulani Jihadists Decapitate Farmer In Tse-Akor Gbatse on September 13, five militants decapitated Tachia Akor, a farmer. His wife and another resident, Mrs. Mbagbedi Tsetim, sustained life-threatening injuries and are receiving medical care at Adi Clinic in Daudu, according to a Facebook report. Earlier, on September 8, militants murdered Orbatule Adeor and his 10-year-old brother, Msughter Bokyaa Adeor, while they were harvesting pepper in Tse-Avine Village. Community Leaders Speak Out Tivta Samuel, Guma Youth Leader, described the attacks as part of a renewed campaign of ethnic and religious violence. “In just one week, eight people were killed across four communities. Residents in Yogbo, Udei, Yelewata, Ngban, Ukohol, Igyungu, Aze, Ukpiam, and nearby North Bank can no longer access their farms,” he said. Elder Avine Terna of Tse-Avine said the attacks had become a recurring nightmare. “The persistence of killings despite government assurances leaves our people feeling abandoned. Each time we are attacked, the killers return. Our people are dying every day.” Rising Death Toll and Lack of Prosecution Amnesty Internationalreports that 6,896 people have been killed in Benue and 2,630 in Plateau State during the first two years of President Bola Tinubu’s administration. “Massacres in the Middle Belt have continued for more than 14 years without prosecution or conviction. This is why the killers feel emboldened,” according to Franc Utoo, a human rights lawyer and Yelewata native, speaking to TruthNigeria. The attacks have displaced hundreds of residents, leaving communities with deserted schools, farms, and markets, and worsening an already dire humanitarian crisis. © Newspaper WordPress Theme by TagDiv