An influential committee of MPs has criticised the Government for an “unacceptable” failure to respond to the plight of the Rohingya people in Myanmar. The House of Commons International Development Committee said ministers had not acted quickly enough in sending experts to help prevent sexual violence against the Muslim minority group in Myanmar’s Rakhine province. Despite “substantial evidence” of rape, sexual violence, torture and mutilations being carried out against the Rohingya, the committee said, barely any UK experts have been dispatched to the area. The UK Government’s 2012 Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI), established a group of 73 experts who can be sent to conflict areas around the globe to help prevent sexual violence and bring perpetrators to justice. However, just two of them have been sent to Myanmar and refugee camps in Bangladesh. The UN estimates that more than 650,000 Rohingya have fled into neighbouring Bangladesh since last August, while charities say more than 10,000 people have been killed in the violence. International observers have accused the Burmese military of carrying out widespread attacks against the civilian Rohingya population. The International Development Committee said rape and sexual violence had been been used continuously in Myanmar as “weapons of war”. In a damning report, the MPs said: “Given the airplay that the UK’s ‘Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative’ has been given by the Government, we are disappointed that it took so long to send any of its specialist resources on sexual violence to advise on dealing with the experiences of the Rohingya in Rakhine State. The committee’s chair, Labour MP Stephen Twigg, added: “The UK has 70 experts ready to deploy to Bangladesh to assist with this situation and yet we haven’t sent them. This flies in the face of the UK’s commitment to deter gender-based violence, championed by William Hague in 2012. “It is unacceptable that it is taking the UK so long to send any specialist resources on sexual violence to advise on the experiences of the Rohingya in Rakhine State. Previous reports from our committee (2006 and 2014) reported the high incidence of rape in conflicts in Burma. The UK Government should have expected this and prepared accordingly. As an international community, we should consider what message this conveys to other regimes.” The committee also expressed “grave concern” over plans to repatriate 100,000 Rohingya from Bangladesh to Myanmar without adequate guarantees about their safety. The MPs said: “We are concerned by the emphasis on returning refugees to the Rakhine by the Bangladesh and Burmese government when the situation still seems fraught and very far from safe, dignified and durable.” “It is unacceptable to propose that the Rohingya be returned to live in Burmese-run internment camps; inevitably to be faced with further privations, potential abuses and uncertain access for outside agencies; and likely only to be displaced once again if there is further violence.” UK Government ministers have previously called on the Burmese authorities to conduct a “thorough and transparent” investigation into allegations of violence against Rohingya civilians. However, previous such reports have cleared the military of wrongdoing – a conclusion the UK Government called “simply not credible”. The International Development Committee criticised the UK’s approach, saying: “We seriously doubt the efficacy of urging the Burmese authorities to investigate the conduct of its own forces personnel in a “thorough and transparent manner”. “The Burmese internal inquiry has already cleared its forces of any wrongdoing in a way which the UK Government describes as “simply not credible”. We urge the UK Government to seek other paths to a resolution of this issue.” It added: “The UK Government should reflect on why so much evidence of discrimination, marginalisation and abuse of the Rohingya people within Rakhine State in Burma was seemingly ignored for so long, rather than translated into effective action by the international community. “We recommend that the UK, and like-minded states, should reflect on how to establish a more proactive approach to atrocity awareness and prevention.” Kate Allen, Amnesty International’s UK Director, said: “MPs are right to express concern about the proposed returns of Rohingya to Myanmar (Burma), we share their alarm. ”Amnesty has declared what's happening in Myanmar to be apartheid - both the civilian and military authorities in Myanmar need to dismantle that, before any of its victims can be expected to decide whether to return. “If Rohingya people do choose to go back to Rakhine State where they faced such appalling discrimination and violence, then Amnesty and other monitors must be allowed access.” A Government spokesperson said “The UK has led the international response to the Rohingya crisis and this report recognises our swift action. We are providing lifesaving UK aid to victims of ethnic cleansing, calling on the Burmese military to stop the violence and pushing the international community to step up their support. “We have been clear in our condemnation of the terrible atrocities that have occurred in Rakhine State; we have now raised Burma five times at the UN Security Council to keep the international community’s attention focused on this crisis and we continue to engage with the Burmese authorities at the most senior levels to urge the inhumane violence to end. “As the International Development Secretary has said today and when she visited Bangladesh in November, the conditions for a safe, voluntary and dignified return of Rohingya people to Burma are a long way from being met. We continue to push for returns to be in line with UN principles and for international oversight on both sides of the border.” https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/myanmar-crisis-uk-government-slow-response-rohingya-burma-international-development-committee-a8161061.html (c) 2018 The Independent

Dozens of gravestones were toppled and broken in a Jewish cemetery in Eritrea. The damage at the cemetery located in the capital of Asmara is believed to have happened in recent days, according to two Jewish news outlets that received photos of the vandalism. The Israel-based Haaretz published photos of the smashed gravestones, reported to be the first time that the Jewish cemetery has been targeted. “The cemetery suffered vandalism and a large number of graves were defaced,” Danny Goldschmidt, from the Aden Jewish Heritage Museum located in Tel Aviv, told Haaretz. He said that the police have not made any arrests in the incident. The London-based Jewish Chronicle also was sent photos of the damage by an unnamed reader in London of Eritrean descent, who did not want his name published for fear of retribution against family members who remain in Eritrea. In addition to cemetery, the site in Asmara site is home to a now-defunct synagogue. The last Jewish family left Eritrea more than ten years ago. There reportedly is one permanent Jewish resident left in the city, who has been identified as Sami Cohen and who reportedly takes care of the cemetery and the synagogue. The last grave was dug in the cemetery in 1996, Ynet reported in 2006. There are about 150 people buried in the cemetery. The Jewish Photo Library blog featured a visit and an interview with Sami Cohen in 2015, when he was 67. Cohen, often called “the last Jew of Eritrea,” said he maintains the synagogue, including caring for its two Torah scrolls and Jewish books in the hopes that the Eritrean market will open up, bringing Israeli and Jewish businessmen to the area. Asmara’s Jewish community numbered as many 500 people in the 1950s, made up of Jews who came from Yemen in the late 19th century due to Italian colonial expansion, and by Jews who fled Europe before and during World War II. Some Jews left Eritrea when Israel became a state, and others left when Eritrea’s 30-year-long fight for independence from Ethiopia reached Asmara. By 1975 the community had shrunk to 150 and by 1993 when Eritrea gained independence Cohen was one of the only Jews left. Cohen’s wife and children left in the late 1990s. He divides his time between Rome, Tel Aviv and Asmara, according to the blog. Though he was born in Eritrea, Cohen also retains British citizenship. https://www.jta.org/2018/01/16/news-opinion/world/gravestones-vandalized-in-jewish-cemetery-in-eritrea?utm_source=JTA%20Maropost&utm_campaign=JTA&utm_medium=email&mpweb=1161-2543-196488 (c) 2018 Jewish Telegraphic Agency

“Just stand with us, be a voice for us, and stand for us when we are in pain.” That is the call to the American church from Benita,* a Christian woman from India who has been persecuted for her faith. On Thursday, Open Doors released its annual World Watch List. The list helps activists, policy makers and those interested in international religious freedom acknowledge the crisis of religious persecution around the world as Christians experience it. The World Watch List - which goes through an independent audit before publication - ranks the 50 worst perpetrators of Christian persecution and categorizes countries as high, very high or severe oppressors. According to the research, three trends are driving the current levels of persecution: Rogue Nations: These use police state and security structures to stamp out any identity or meaning outside of the country’s leadership. Oppression of Women: Forced marriage, rape, and sexual harassment are being deployed as tactics and added forms of oppression against females. Spread of violent extremism within Islam: Suicide bombings, executions and marginalization of non-conforming people and groups continue to grow. The data help us understand the importance and breadth of the issues. Some countries on the list are in the news almost every day. North Korea (#1) and Iran (#10) are two examples. With missile launches from North Korea and protests in Iran, both countries are vitally important to U.S. foreign policy. But these challenges do not come out of a vacuum; they are supported by repressive policies that harm people by denying their political, economic and religious rights. The World Watch list helps show how religious freedom is part of the constellation of rights and how their diminution contributes to some of the greatest geopolitical challenges we face. But the Watch List, perhaps more importantly, brings to light the atrocities committed in places we might not hear about in major headlines. Sudan (#4) is a country that several years ago was often in the news, but today is rarely mentioned. Yet church destruction is continuing despite governmental assurances that the country is improving its human rights record. In tiny Eritrea (#6), the government continues to deny the ability of religious leaders to shepherd their flocks. It also tortures and detains prisoners who are held simply for trying to live out their faith. David Curry, CEO of Open Doors USA, dedicated the event to “a 47-year-old nun, who, like Mother Teresa (did), works with the poorest of the poor in India.” She has faced many threats on her life from Hindu extremists for working with the poor in Jesus’ name. She was attacked, raped and tied to her bed. Rather than helping, police destroyed evidence. “Today … that is what justice is like for Christians in India” added Mr. Curry. Mr. Curry called for leaders around the world to pursue justice so that all people have “the right to decide for themselves, in their own hearts and own minds, what they believe. Or if they want to have no faith at all.” There are actions that can be taken today for the sake of persecuted people around the world. And our leaders should leverage these opportunities. When U.S. Vice President Mike Pence goes to Egypt he should raise the issues of the second class of citizenship that Christian Egyptians face. It also means that there are things we can do as ordinary citizens. Christian Egyptian woman Tabitha* asked us all to pray. “When you pray with us, you feel our pain,” she said. Nathan Wineinger Director of Government Relations Take Action: 1. Read the World Watch List and pick a country to pray for throughout 2018: https://www.opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution/world-watch-list/?display=list 2. Read the full report on the country you choose: https://www.opendoorsusa.org/2018-world-watch-list-report/ 3. Write to the White House and ask Vice President Pence to raise persecution issues with the leadership of the countries he visits on his Middle East tour. *Names changed due to security concerns. (c) 2018 Wilberforce Initiative

Activist Nyo Tun spent 10 years as a political prisoner locked away by Myanmar’s military in the notorious Insein prison, where he endured beatings and other cruelty for his efforts to bring democracy. “The military government was so brutal for many years,” he said of the former junta, which ruled the country for decades until 2012 and then by proxy four more years — and still has a final say on security matters. “All they knew was how to torture anyone who was against them.” Myanmar, long isolated both by choice and by international sanctions, has undergone a transformation in recent years. Another former political prisoner, Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, was elected the head of a civilian government, which led to the easing of most sanctions and an influx of foreign investment. Yet the most striking change may be the majority Buddhist Burman population’s view of its military: An institution once despised has seen its popularity surge alongside a rise in nationalism that has accompanied a crackdown on Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine state in western Myanmar that has left thousands dead and more than 650,000 displaced. While most of the outside world is appalled by what U.N. and U.S. officials have called “ethnic cleansing” that has grown into Asia’s worst refugee crisis in decades, many in Myanmar support it. They see the Rohingya as illegal migrants from Bangladesh who are a threat to national security and bristle at international condemnation of rights abuses. That includes Nyo Tun, who says he was beaten, slapped, denied food and water and access to the toilet for days during his interrogation. “The military dictatorship was in the past and the new military institution is much different,” he said, adding it was unlikely that the military was committing crimes in Rakhine. They are “defending the country and that’s how they get the support from people because it’s all about the national spirit for everyone.” Thousands have rallied in cities across the country in support of the troops, known locally as the Tatmadaw. Commander-in-chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, who remains constitutionally beyond the control of Suu Kyi’s government, is regularly praised by the public on his official Facebook page. The military said in November an internal investigation has absolved its forces of allegations of atrocities. However, citing credible evidence of mass killings, rapes and villages being burned, the U.S. announced last month it had sanctioned Maj. Gen. Maung Maung Soe, who until recently was chief of the army’s Western Command responsible for security operations in Rakhine. “Long live the army and commander in chief,” said one recent Facebook comment. “The army has done well for the country, we are very proud of it,” said another. “Thank you for clearing all the Bengali terrorists,” read another. Such praise was not only unheard of under the former junta, but it would have been practically impossible. The junta sealed off the country from outsiders for decades and its citizens were not allowed to watch international news let alone have access to the internet. People were prohibited from speaking about politics and rallies were banned. The military has been locked in civil wars with ethnic rebels fighting for self-determination and indigenous rights. On the rare occasions when frustrations boiled over into attempted pro-democracy uprisings — such as in 1988 and 2007 — the military responded with overwhelming force that left hundreds dead or imprisoned. “The Tatmadaw has gone from the most reviled institution to enjoying a renaissance, at least amongst the ethnic Burman population,” said David Mathieson, an independent political analyst who formerly worked with Human Rights Watch. “This curious adulation comes from a dark place though.” Following its trouncing in the 2015 election, when voters sent a clear message that they would no longer tolerate military rule, the army has focused on a “winning formula of violence and vilification of the Rohingya and ethnic rebels,” he said. They also have a “thin veneer” of democratic credibility provided by Suu Kyi’s government. The transition to democracy is “working beautifully for them, as remembrance of repression past fades within the general population,” he said. Most alarming to many observers is the support the military has gained from the very activists and former political prisoners who once campaigned for the international community’s help in removing the generals from power. They now preach a gospel of nationalism and sovereignty. “Because of the international pressure and criticism, people inside Myanmar are even more united under nationalism and people start to get stronger national spirit because this is not just a normal case, this is about the history and politics of our country,” said Ko Ko Gyi, another former political prisoner. Rather than find solidarity with the oppressed Rohingya, some have been caught up in bigotry against them. They consider international reports of widespread rape and killings as “fake news.” “Look at the appearances of Bengali people and their language and their religion and their facial appearance, how could rape be possible?” Nyo Tun said. “And now the world is pressuring us to accept more than a million of them. This is nationalism. How can we accept these people? We cannot do that.” Some former political prisoners believe their colleagues have lost their way. “Many people are being used by the army,” said Sithu Maung, a former student activist who spent more than four years in prison. “We have complexity of defining ethnic minority groups and the existence of minorities and these problems cannot be solved overnight. But any human rights activist should never be silent on any human rights violations no matter what kind of people are suffering.” Mathieson said the military could find its newfound popularity to be fleeting. “When people slowly realize that the military has still not budged on any democratic or constitutional reform, or that their ultra-violent behavior in Rakhine state has isolated the country and driven Myanmar back into the arms of China, resentment could return,” he said. Copyright 2018 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/myanmar-army-enjoys-popularity-surge-amid-rohingya-crackdown/2018/01/16/39e36f88-fb24-11e7-9b5d-bbf0da31214d_story.html?utm_term=.94aa32bc11f2 (c) 2018 The Washington Post

What’s the issue? The 2015 Iran nuclear accord is as successful as it remains fragile. President Trump has warned he will scuttle it unless Congress, in coordination with Europe, unilaterally alters its terms, an outcome which is unlikely and a violation of the deal. Meanwhile, friction between Iran, the U.S. and their regional rivals is growing and could undermine the deal’s implementation. Why does it matter? Iranians are frustrated by problems with sanctions relief, international banking ties and a hoped-for economic upsurge. Washington is frustrated by Iran’s regional activism, prompting more militarised U.S. responses and possible new sanctions. The resulting frictions have fuelled domestic Iranian protests, U.S.-Europe tensions, dangers of the deal’s unraveling, and conflict in the Middle East. What should be done? Attempts to renegotiate the deal through brinksmanship or unilateral demands are unlikely to work. The deal’s other signatories need both to persuade the U.S. not to renege on its commitments and to preserve sufficient incentives for Tehran to remain in the deal, even if Washington reneges on it or if U.S. actions continue to eat away at Iran’s economic benefits. Executive Summary It could have been worse. President Trump’s 12 January decision to waive sanctions while threatening to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – the July 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (the P5+1) – unless Congress and Europe agree to unilaterally alter its terms, leaves the deal in the state of limbo it acquired shortly after his election. Still, given his unpredictability, manifest hostility to the deal, abhorrence at the thought of validating anything that bears his predecessor’s mark and the unrest that has shaken Iran, speculation had been rampant that he would announce the agreement’s demise. But celebration is premature. The White House decision constitutes little more than a reprieve: taken at face value, the standard Trump insisted be met by May in order for the U.S. to remain in the deal is inconsistent with the JCPOA. The accord’s other signatories should use this period to encourage the U.S. not to withdraw while considering ways to sustain the accord regardless of U.S. actions. Its collapse would reignite a crisis that could deepen tensions in a tumultuous region and strike a hard-to-reverse blow to multilateral diplomacy and the non-proliferation regime. As it enters its third implementation year, the JCPOA continues to serve its essential purpose: last year, Tehran scrupulously adhered to its nuclear obligations, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), rendering an undetected dash toward nuclear weapons impossible. This apparently is only of marginal interest to the Trump administration, which continues to denounce the accord as flawed because some of its nuclear restraints expire between 2026 and 2031 and because it fails to address Iran’s broader policies, including its ballistic missiles program and support for non-state actors in the region. Trump took a first major step toward undermining the JCPOA in October, when he refused to certify the accord on the grounds that the sanctions it suspended were not proportionate to Iran’s nuclear steps. Pressed by most of his cabinet members, who argued that withdrawal from the deal would be diplomatically costly, he has continued to waive the sanctions. But the administration has both imposed other economic penalties and discouraged international business with Iran, thereby putting Tehran in the uncomfortable position of having to comply with the deal’s nuclear restrictions while only partially benefiting from its economic rewards. Trump also tasked Congress with passing legislation that would unilaterally alter the terms of the JCPOA. As some of his backers put it, his message was plain: either fix the deal, or I will nix it. By the time Trump once again had to decide whether to waive the sanctions, his approach had not borne fruit. This in no small part is because unilateral alteration of the JCPOA would constitute a violation and thus would isolate the U.S., something even many Republican members are loath to do. Congress to date has been unable to find a compromise that simultaneously placates the White House, complies with the deal and is acceptable to the Europeans. So this time he upped the ante: he made clear he would pull the plug on the JCPOA if over the next 120 days Congress and Europe failed to meet his demands. For its part, and for the time being, Tehran has complied with the deal, focused on winning the international blame game and ensuring continued European economic dealings. But patience could be wearing thin. Iran’s favourable diplomatic posture hasn’t helped inside Iran, where the accord’s dividends have been slow to materialise, dashing popular expectations and contributing (alongside deeply rooted dissatisfaction at mismanagement, endemic corruption, and political and socio-economic deprivation) to unrest and protests in several cities. Should those dividends further erode as a result of U.S. actions – more uncertainty, more sanctions, or pulling out of the deal – Iran could respond in damaging fashion. Europe, with which Iran’s trade has nearly doubled in the past year, arguably holds the key to the deal’s survival: it needs both to persuade the U.S. not to renege on its commitments and to preserve sufficient incentives for Tehran to remain in the deal even if Washington does so or if its actions continue to eat away at Iran’s economic benefits. But here too there is uncertainty over how effective Europe can be. The Trump administration would like to act in unison with its European partners, but not at all costs; it could decide to go its own way notwithstanding European opposition. And the imposition of U.S. secondary sanctions on European companies doing business in Iran would confront them with the choice of either scaling back their (still relatively modest) Iranian trade and investment or risk jeopardising access to the far larger and more lucrative U.S. market. Fear that the president might keep his word and walk away from the deal likely will motivate European actors and members of the U.S. Congress to seek ways to mollify Trump without endangering the JCPOA. Several Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress already have been floating draft legislation that would meet the White House half-way. For their part, France, Germany, the UK and the European Union (EU) have been debating how to signal greater concern about Iran’s ballistic-missile program and regional activities, considering what to do once some of the nuclear restrictions expire and weighing their reaction to passage of the above-mentioned U.S. legislation. How Trump’s bombastic 12 January ultimatum will affect their calculus – and whether his tough rhetoric still leaves room for compromise – remains uncertain. There was some ambiguity in the president’s language that it is worth testing, but only up to a point. Should Congress pass legislation or Europe agree to U.S. measures that constitute JCPOA violations – for example by threatening automatic sanctions snapback if Iran engages in activity permitted under the deal – they would be complicit in the deal’s breakdown. This in turn would render it virtually impossible to keep Iran from taking reciprocal measures of its own. In other words, steps designed to forestall a U.S. pullout from the deal could end up killing it. Neither the U.S. Congress nor Europe should have anything to do with them. If the Trump administration is determined to breach the JCPOA, better it do so on its own, and better Europe then do what it can to save it. Key would be to ensure sufficient diplomatic and economic dividends for Iran provided Tehran abides by its commitments and even though these dividends undoubtedly would fall short of the full realisation of what the JCPOA envisioned. For this to happen: Europe should move beyond rhetorical support and ensure the JCPOA’s survival by providing cover for its businesses in the event of unwarranted U.S. secondary sanctions. According to an exclusive Crisis Group survey of more than 60 senior managers at multinational companies actively pursuing opportunities in Iran, this could be achieved if Iran remains committed to its JCPOA obligations and European countries pre-emptively revive their “Blocking Regulations”, shielding their companies from U.S. extraterritorial sanctions. Europe so far has been wary of taking a step that could prompt a trade war with the U.S., but may now feel its own security is at stake. It should also reach agreements on a bilateral EU plan to invest in the Iranian economy and a long-term energy partnership with Tehran, while diplomatically engaging on its regional policies and human rights record. Iran should take several steps of its own. It should put its house in order by improving its banking standards and creating a less corrupt and more transparent business environment; this is not only essential to attract foreign capital and technology, but also to address popular grievances. To increase Europe’s confidence in its intentions, Tehran should bolster cooperation with the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) organisation, sign the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) against ballistic-missile proliferation, and release dual-nationals arrested in Iran on dubious charges. The U.S. Congress should refrain from altering the JCPOA’s terms by threatening to reimpose sanctions even if Iran abides by the deal. Such legislation might defer an immediate crisis, but it would violate a delicately balanced multilateral accord and undermine U.S. credibility as a reliable negotiating partner. Congress could reduce the president’s certification burden, strengthen sanctions’ snapback provisions tied to potential Iranian JCPOA violations, and express its sense that there needs to be a supplemental deal, but it must not be complicit in killing a deal that is working. That the JCPOA, despite Trump’s antagonism, has outlived other multilateral accords that he rolled back is a testament to its utility and possibly its strength: the agreement has put a lid on Iran’s nuclear program and opened the door to its economic rehabilitation. But its other signatories should not assume that it can withstand further blows. They ought to defend it proactively, before it gets too late. Washington/Brussels, 15 January 2018 I.Introduction The process that led to the 14 July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was long and torturous: it took more than a decade of diplomatic fits and starts and a perilous cycle of mutual escalation for Iran and the P5+1/E3+3 (the UN Security Council’s five permanent members plus Germany) to reach it. The accord received unanimous Security Council endorsement on 20 July 2015, and entered into force on 18 October 2015. This triggered Iran’s rollback of its nuclear program and cooperation to resolve longstanding questions raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about its past nuclear activities. Implementation Day occurred on 16 January 2016, after the IAEA certified that Iran had fulfilled its key commitments under the agreement, prompting sanctions relief. Since then, the JCPOA has transformed Iran from the most sanctioned country in the world to the one with the most rigorously monitored nuclear program. It also opened the door to Iran’s economic rehabilitation, even if the pace of recovery in the aftermath of sanctions relief has been more sluggish than anticipated. In last year’s status report, Crisis Group noted that implementation of the complex agreement was not flawless. Iran committed several technical violations and struggled to normalise its international banking ties. Implementation of Iran’s nuclear commitments has improved in the 2017-2018 period and the JCPOA’s Joint Commission (the seven negotiating parties, coordinated by the EU) has proven adept at problem-solving. Major financial institutions remain circumspect, however, hampering Iran’s re-integration into the global economy and dashing inflated public expectations of rapid economic recovery. The reasons for these delays in sanctions relief are manifold, ranging from concerns over a possible snapback, to the overall uncertainty created by the Trump administration, to internal deficiencies of the Iranian economic environment. A key question is what the business community, which plays a critical role in generating the deal’s economic dividends and makes autonomous decisions, will do. To better understand its calculus and possible response to key policy shifts, Crisis Group commissioned a survey of more than 60 senior managers at multinational companies actively pursuing opportunities in Iran (see detailed results in Appendix A). This survey’s results, in conjunction with interviews conducted with officials from Iran, the P5+1, and the IAEA over the past year, have informed our analysis and policy recommendations in this report. Another development occurred as year two reached its end: protests erupted across Iran in late December 2017, resulting in at least two dozen deaths and thousands of detentions. While not directly related to the JCPOA, the events nonetheless were connected. Polls show the deal remains popular, but hopes that it would lead to rapid economic recovery have been dashed, adding to disgruntlement over economic conditions, from chronic unemployment to endemic corruption and glaring income inequalities. President Hassan Rouhani over-promised and under-delivered, both because his government genuinely expected greater JCPOA returns and because it hyped anticipated benefits to sell the deal to domestic detractors. As the protests started waning, Rouhani admitted that the ruling elite was out of touch with the population and that dissent reflected widespread demands for a more open society and polity. Ayatollah Khamenei, however, while acknowledging economic problems, put the blame on a triangle of enemies: the U.S. and Israel, Saudi Arabia, and exiled Iranian dissidents. Left unanswered is whether the leadership can absorb the shock and implement much needed structural reforms, whether popular or not, that are key to fulfilling the JCPOA’s potential. Projecting the JCPOA’s trajectory as it enters its third year of implementation is impossible without understanding what it has achieved so far, where it has fallen short, and what this implies not just for its future but also for Iran’s relations with the West and its role in the region. This report analyses the second-year record of implementation, draws lessons and offers suggestions for improving and sustaining an accord that remains a net positive for non-proliferation. II.Delivering Results Two years after its implementation, the nuclear accord’s opponents and proponents continue to relitigate its merits, shortcomings, and linkage to other issues like Iran’s growing regional clout, ballistic-missile tests, and human rights record. Amid the noise, it is easy to lose sight of an important fact: the JCPOA’s two key components – restricting and rigorously monitoring Iran’s nuclear program and (to a lesser extent) sanctions relief – are working and delivering concrete results. A.Nuclear Commitments Since January 2016, the IAEA has verified on nine separate occasions, and the UN Secretary-General has attested four times, that Iran is fulfilling its JCPOA obligations. So far, the Trump presidency has neither altered the U.S. approach toward technical aspects of the deal’s implementation nor compelled Iran to change its level of cooperation with the IAEA.Though Iran overproduced heavy water on two occasions during the first year, it committed no technical infringements in the second. Tehran kept a comfortable distance from JCPOA thresholds for stockpiles of sensitive material – ie, 130 metric tons for heavy water and 300kg for low-enriched uranium. Although the Trump administration halted U.S. purchases of Iran’s heavy water, Iran was diligent in transferring its excess material to Oman and is seeking more domestic uses for it – eg, in oil exploration. Debates at the JCPOA’s Joint Commission over diverging interpretations of the accord, especially where its language is ambiguous, continued apace. But these were mostly over technical minutiae. For instance, Iran’s enrichment research and development plan indicated that it would test “roughly” ten advanced IR-6 centrifuges with uranium until 2019, whereas in practice it had deployed thirteen machines. After long debates at the Joint Commission, Iran accepted its Western members’ interpretation that “roughly ten” is eleven. By provisionally implementing the IAEA’s Additional Protocol (AP) to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), as well as all the supplementary enhanced safeguards and transparency measures outlined in the JCPOA, Iran’s nuclear program is under the most robust inspection regime that currently exists. In 2017, the IAEA had no problem inspecting any sites it needed to access. The fact that the agency did not visit military sites, which Iranian officials have publicly declared off-limits, became a political football. “If inspections of Iranian military sites are ‘merely a dream’, as Iran says, then Iranian compliance with the JCPOA is also a dream”, said U.S. ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley. Yet, in practice, there was no crisis, as the IAEA has the authority to visit any location it deems necessary; and benefits from a unique feature of the JCPOA – beyond the CSA/AP – that requires Iran to grant access to any suspect sites within 24 days or face activation of a dispute resolution mechanism and possible sanctions snapback. The IAEA apparently has had no grounds to request access to military sites; and, despite the rhetoric, has been granted access by Iranian officials to such sites in the past. It should be sufficient reassurance that the IAEA’s verification is iterative – going through repeated rounds of inspections and analysis – and that, without full access, the agency could never draw its so-called “broader conclusions”, which Iran deeply cares about because they imply that all nuclear material and activities in Iran are purely civilian. Politicising verification is sure to backfire – unless the goal is to find a pretext for undermining the JCPOA. One of the JCPOA’s most innovative elements became one of its most controversial in 2017: Section T, concerning activities that could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) fails to define what manufacturing a nuclear weapon entails. Section T closes that loophole by explicitly banning certain activities and dual-use material related to nuclear weaponisation. It is, however, the only section in the JCPOA’s nuclear section that neither explicitly names the IAEA nor specifies Iran’s commitments. The deal’s detractors charge that the agency is unable to verify Iran’s compliance under this provision. The fact that IAEA’s director general, Yukiya Amano, noted that “our tools are limited” and “more clarification would be helpful” reinforced these claims. But the push to do more to verify Section T seems aimed more at instigating an inspection crisis, which critics could then use to suggest Iran is in non-compliance, than at addressing a real verification concern: in fact, the IAEA has the authority under UN Security Council Resolution 2231 to monitor all of Iran’s nuclear commitments and has confirmed that it is doing so with regards to Section T. Its director general’s request for clarification stems from the lack of detail about the verification mechanism itself, rather than a lack of authority or access; but the Joint Commission has not been able to guide the agency on these issues because of its own internal divisions on how far the IAEA should go. Above all, Section T was devised primarily as a deterrent to ensure that weaponisation activities are unambiguously banned with no sunset provisions. These controversies notwithstanding, other members of the P5+1 demonstrated their commitment to the JCPOA by materially investing in Iran’s nuclear program: Russia started constructing a second nuclear power plant in the southern Iranian port city of Bushehr and continued conducting feasibility studies for transforming the bunkered Fordow enrichment plant into an international physics centre; China continued work on modernisation of the heavy-water reactor in Arak, a joint project between Iran, China and the U.S.; and the EU held two high-level seminars on nuclear cooperation with Iran and invested €20 million (about $24.4 million) in enhancing the country’s nuclear safety practices. While Iranian scientists have regained access to and even hosted IAEA’s technical workshops, nuclear cooperation with other countries beyond the P5+1 has lagged. The Trump administration’s hostility toward the agreement, and deliberate efforts to obstruct such cooperation, is one reason for limited progress on this front. The JCPOA’s procurement channel for Iran to access dual-use material and equipment, managed by the Joint Commission’s procurement working group, received and processed eighteen applications (compared to only six in the 2016-2017 period) related to export of dual-use technology to Iran. Critics pointed to a German intelligence report indicating that Iran is continuing illicit procurement of proliferation-sensitive material outside of the channel. The public version of that report, however, noted that it was mostly related to Iran’s missile program, which is not covered by the deal, and that the evidence “did not reveal any violation of the [JCPOA]”. B.Sanctions Relief Commitments During the reporting period, the impact of sanctions relief on the indicators of Iran’s macroeconomic performance became increasingly tangible, even though benefits failed to reach the general population, dashing expectations and contributing to popular unrest throughout the country. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Iran – buoyed by a post-sanctions resurgence of oil sales – achieved 12.5 per cent economic growth during the Iranian fiscal year (March 2016-March 2017) and is projected to grow 4.2 per cent in the 2017/2018 period. Inflation was contained at single digits. Iran’s trade with the EU grew by a factor of 1.6 in the first nine months of 2017 compared to the same period last year, reaching €14.8 billion (about $18 billion). Iran signed major investment contracts, including the symbolically significant $4.8 billion agreement with French energy giant Total to invest in an Iranian off-shore natural gas field. Overall, the country absorbed around $8 billion in foreign direct investment and secured lines of credit for projects in Iran by banks in Europe and East Asia. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain. The Rouhani administration clearly has over-promised and under-delivered, as Iran’s impressive growth figures flatter to deceive: unemployment has grown since the nuclear deal; poverty and income inequality have increased, and export figures for 2017 indicate that non-oil exports shrank.Persistent reluctance of first-tier international banks hampered Iran’s reintegration into the global economy by hindering clearing services and the financing of large contracts. The causes are manifold. There are legal or compliance risks, pertaining to possible violations of remaining (and in the U.S. case, new) U.S. and EU sanctions on Iran. In 2017, Congress enacted the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act of 2017, imposing sanctions on individuals and entities associated with Iran’s ballistic-missile program or the sale or transfer to Iran of military equipment and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Iranian parliament retaliated by enacting its own measure, entitled “Countering America’s Terrorist and Adventurist Actions”. For its part, the administration blacklisted nearly 100 Iran-related individuals and entities for their involvement in Iran’s ballistic-missile program, support for non-state actors and human rights violations. It also labelled the IRGC as a terrorist entity; the first time an official branch of a state’s armed forces has been designated as such, and significant because of the IRGC’s expansive role in Iran’s opaque economy, which in turn renders due diligence particularly cumbersome. The IRGC had threatened to retaliate by treating U.S. forces in the region as terrorists and warned against U.S. presence in the range of Iran’s ballistic-missiles, but so far has not taken any such measures. No less chilling for investment is the threat that sanctions suspended under the deal may be reimposed, given the Trump administration’s hostile rhetoric toward the JCPOA and repeated threats to walk away from it. Unilateral U.S. sanctions can be resumed by simple executive order; a snapback mechanism embedded in the accord can reinstate UN sanctions if one party contends that Iran has reneged on its commitments. There are also political or reputational risks – a lever that Trump reportedly employed to dissuade nations at the July 2017 G-20 summit from doing business with “nations that sponsor terrorism, especially Iran”. Iran blasted this, not without justification, as a JCPOA violation, even though the Trump administration did not see it as such. Some of Iran’s regional rivals have also pressed Western companies to choose between investing in Iran or doing business with them. Iran’s banking system is still designated by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which sets anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing standards for financial institutions worldwide, as a high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdiction. The Rouhani administration took substantial steps to improve transparency within the Iranian financial system and enhance banking standards. In response, the FATF suspended its counter measures requiring enhanced due-diligence in dealing with Iranian banks in June 2016, a decision it renewed in June 2017 and will reassess in February 2018 after the deadline for Iran’s implementation of agreed reforms lapses on 31 January. Some operational risk remains, however: rampant corruption and cumbersome regulations are among the myriad endemic challenges that make it difficult to do business in Iran. Crisis Group’s survey of senior managers with direct responsibilities for Iran business at multinational companies shows that 79 per cent of firms pursuing opportunities in Iran have delayed their plans since the JCPOA’s implementation. The overwhelming majority (57 per cent) indicate that the primary reason for the delay was fear of U.S. sanctions snapback, followed by Iran’s weak regulatory environment (11 per cent) and legal protections, among other risks (see graph 3 in Appendix A). When asked to name the primary obstacle to their market rollout in Iran, respondents again cited above all the risks associated with U.S. sanctions compliance (32 per cent), followed by lack of access to financing (21 per cent) and political and reputational risks (15 per cent). Most companies have clearly delayed major commercial decisions regarding Iran because of exogenous risks, though they acknowledge the internal deficiencies of Iran’s business environment, which a majority (79 per cent) believe Iran has failed to address adequately. An executive of a French insurance company summed up the prevailing sentiment: “Iran’s internal issues, from corruption to mismanagement, are not more or less complicated than any other frontier market. What’s different is the Damocles sword of sanctions hanging over the market”. III.The Year of Living Dangerously Since assuming office, President Trump has repeatedly excoriated the JCPOA as one of the “worst and most one-sided transactions”, and an “embarrassment to the U.S.”. Yet while the administration was conducting an inter-agency strategic review of U.S. policy toward Iran, of which the JCPOA was only one element, it held its end of the bargain by continuing to periodically issue congressionally mandated certifications of Iran’s compliance and extend sanctions relief. It did so reluctantly; the president and some of his close advisers publicly expressed deep scepticism. Each affirmative action to extend sanctions relief was, however, followed by fiery statements condemning Iran’s regional or domestic policies and adding new designations to the U.S. sanctions list. Finally, in October, despite a widely-shared view among Trump’s national security team that Iran was complying, the president refused to recertify the JCPOA on the grounds that sanctions relief had not been proportionate to steps Iran has taken. This option allowed the White House to signal its opposition to the deal; created doubts as to its survival without taking immediate responsibility for torpedoing it; and shifted that burden to Congress, which could use an expedited process by a simple majority – devised under the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) – to restore the suspended U.S. nuclear-related sanctions. The administration highlighted three main justifications for this decision. The first is the only one that relates to the JCPOA itself. It revolves around what the administration calls its “sunset provision”, a misnomer that refers to the fact that various – but not all – restrictions imposed on Iran’s nuclear program expire at some point and which critics say provides Iran with a patient pathway to building nuclear weapons. In reality, while some provisions restricting Iran’s nuclear program lapse between 2025 and 2030, other important ones are permanent. The second concerns Iran’s ballistic-missile program. And the third has to do with Iran’s regional policies, which the administration denounces as destabilising and expansionist, and as violating the spirit of the deal. The White House also announced a new Iran strategy that was long on what the U.S. deems Iranian wrongdoings and short on how Washington intended to address them. In the meantime, it declassified intelligence regarding Tehran’s past ties with al-Qaeda and provided information on Iran’s purported cooperation with North Korea and alleged provision of missiles to Huthi rebels in Yemen. The other countries that negotiated the deal all reacted to the administration’s failure to recertify it with expressions of continued support for the JCPOA. Iran shrugged off the decision. Rouhani said, “[Trump’s] speech tonight showed that the [JCPOA] is much stronger than what this gentleman thought during the presidential campaign. This is an international, multilateral deal. It is not a document between Iran and the U.S. that he can treat the way that he likes”. The administration and key lawmakers, their rhetoric notwithstanding, were disinclined to reimpose nuclear-related sanctions, which would be tantamount to a unilateral U.S. exit from the deal and thus a recipe for U.S. isolation and condemnation by its allies. Instead, they gravitated toward a more subtle but potentially damaging approach: they threatened to legislate an automatic snapback of sanctions that Congress previously had suspended if, among other things, Iran were to expand its nuclear program, as the agreement entitles it to, after some of the JCPOA’s restraints lapse. Depending on its precise language, such an attempt to force alteration of the JCPOA could well constitute a violation of the accord. But its enactment requires 60 votes in the Senate and thus buy-in from Democrats, who conditioned their support on compliance with the JCPOA and bringing European allies on board. Several weeks of intensive congressional consultations and discussions with France, Germany, the UK and the EU so far have not produced any concrete result. Consumed with tax reform and other legislative priorities, Congress delayed negotiations. What internal deliberations have occurred have yet to result in consensus on a bill that would tighten nuclear restrictions on Iran pursuant to the White House’s desire, end the Trump’s obligation to certify or decertify the deal every 90 days and secure buy-in from U.S. allies. In late 2017-early 2018, work was continuing on finding a legislative solution. Privately, European officials expressed willingness to work with the administration in order to ensure Trump waived the sanctions, while expressing concern that the drafts they had seen were inconsistent with the JCPOA. They also made clear their willingness to work more closely with the U.S. to curb Iran’s ballistic-missile program and counter its regional activities. But they refuse to hold the JCPOA’s fate hostage to agreement on such measures. As one official put it, “the best way for us to work more closely with Washington on issues of concern is for them to put the JCPOA aside and reassure us it will not be tinkered with. If the U.S. wants a common front, that’s the way to produce it”. Some of the deal’s critics have seized on French President Emmanuel Macron’s stated willingness to supplement the agreement by addressing ballistic missiles and extending the duration of some constraints on Iran’s nuclear program as a sign that Paris is open to a renegotiation. That appears to be a mistaken and self-serving interpretation. Macron, like leaders of all other P5+1 states, repeatedly has emphasised the primary importance of preserving the JCPOA. True, France and others wish to address other aspects of Iran’s approach, like its ballistic-missile program or regional activities, and see pressure and diplomacy as twin tools to that end. But they do not propose doing so by holding the JCPOA hostage or threatening to violate it in the event such a supplemental deal cannot be reached. While Trump, echoing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recommendation to “fix or nix” the deal, threatened that “in the event we are not able to reach a solution working with Congress and our allies, then the agreement will be terminated”, the risks associated with a go-it-alone U.S. policy of tanking the deal combined with the prospect of Congress coming up with a legislative answer led him to kick the can down the road once more. On 12 January, while again refraining from recertifying Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA, and “despite [his] strong inclinations”, Trump extended the waivers suspending U.S. nuclear-related sanctions as required by the deal. But he warned that this was the last extension he would implement unless Congress and Europe “fix[ed] the deal’s disastrous flaws”. Of Congress, he demanded bipartisan legislation that would do the following: “demand that Iran allow immediate inspections at all sites requested by international inspectors”; “ensure that Iran never even comes close to possessing a nuclear weapon”; “contain no expiration date” for these provisions, and link automatic snapback of U.S. nuclear sanctions to Iran’s refusal to oblige by them; and finally, “explicitly state that long-range missile and nuclear weapons programs are inseparable, and that Iran’s development and testing of missiles should be subject to severe sanctions”. Simultaneously, Trump insisted that the Europeans agree “to fix the terrible flaws of the Iran nuclear deal” in such a manner that new multilateral sanctions would be imposed if Iran at any time “develops or tests long-range missiles, thwarts inspections, or makes progress toward a nuclear weapon”. In parallel, the Trump administration levied a new set of sanctions against Iran, targeting fourteen officials and institutions involved in repressing the protesters in early January, in weapons proliferation and cyber activities. The statement is somewhat fuzzy in several substantive aspects. The conditions required of Congress are not strictly identical to those demanded of Europe; the latter is asked to agree to fix the deal, not to fix it; and some of the requirements addressed to both actors are somewhat vague and, perhaps, open to interpretation. This could leave some wiggle room for negotiations. But substantive imprecision was matched by tonal clarity: “this is a last chance”, Trump said, asserting that absent a fix, and Europe’s agreement he would “not again waive sanctions”. And, haziness aside, it is hard to escape the conclusion that by fix he means making the accord’s constraints everlasting and subjecting Iran to new, automatic U.S. and multilateral sanctions for activity permitted by the JCPOA. That is both unrealistic and plainly at odds with the deal A year into the Trump administration, questions continue to surround its ultimate objective with regard to the JCPOA – or whether it even has one. It often argues that the JCPOA is flawed because it only delays Iran’s nuclear capabilities, has insufficient inspection authorities, provided Iran with excessive upfront sanctions relief, and failed to curb Iran’s ballistic-missile program and regional clout. But its opposition to the JCPOA stems less from the accord’s technical details, or scope, or implementation record than from its narrow nature as an arms-control agreement that allows an adversary to come in from the cold and normalise its nuclear program without altering its policies more broadly. Senator Tom Cotton, an ally of the administration, put it unambiguously: “Let’s understand the Iranian threat. It’s not the deal’s technical flaws, though there are a lot of those. The threat is not the nature of Iran’s weapons; it’s the nature of Iran’s regime”. Questions over whether arm-twisting as opposed to diplomatic engagement (with Europe, but also Iran and other JCPOA co-signatories) would produce better results, or whether derailing the accord would strengthen or weaken U.S. ability to negotiate a better one or address other outstanding concerns often appear mere afterthoughts. Moreover, if the objective was, as a senior White House official put it, “to prevent the nuclear tail from wagging the rest of the Iran-policy dog”, as it accuses its predecessor of doing, its refusal to recertify the deal has brought the JCPOA and its future back into the spotlight, overshadowing most other debates. IV.Candle in the Wind? The Trump administration’s simultaneous decisions not to recertify the JCPOA, extend sanctions relief, and impose new sanctions while threatening to kill the deal next time – which a prominent critic of the deal dubbed “decertify, waive and slap” – has bought four additional months for Washington to decide what it will do. Legislation that partly addresses White House concerns over the JCPOA might still be within reach, but several risks exist: such a bill might violate the deal’s plain language (eg, by unilaterally extending the time horizon of certain constraints, or by tying sanctions snapback to activities not covered by the JCPOA, such as Iran’s ballistic-missile program) and thus potentially trigger a parallel Iranian violation; no such bill might emerge and Trump could decide to reimpose sanctions in May; the U.S. and Europe could fail to concur on a so-called “supplemental agreement”, again provoking resumption of U.S. sanctions; a clash could occur involving the U.S., Iran and their respective allies; and continued imposition of U.S. sanctions – such as those announced on 12 January – could be viewed by Tehran as inconsistent with the deal and, by incrementally eroding its economic benefits, lead Iran to question the JCPOA’s value. The mere prospect of one of these outcomes, let alone their realisation, could seriously destabilise the JCPOA and threaten its survival. The White House might welcome this, as it would allow the U.S., as a senior Iranian official said, “to have its cake and eat it, too”: either by ensuring that Iran complies with the agreement’s nuclear provisions without enjoying its economic benefits, or by pushing Iran to exit the deal. Already, failure to issue the certification in October, which had no immediate practical consequence and, in the words of a Trump administration official, was a “big nothing-burger”, adversely affected future plans of half the companies surveyed by Crisis Group – a dynamic that could have a snowball effect, as 67 per cent report that “the apparent movement of other companies in the market” is somewhat or very important to their company’s decision-making (see graph 2 in Appendix A). One potentially damaging measure already could be in the works: an attempt to derail Iran’s ability to purchase civilian aircraft by claiming Iran uses these to ferry weapons and military personnel to Syria. Boeing, Airbus and ATR (a Franco-Italian aircraft manufacturer) have signed contracts to sell around 300 jetliners to Iranian airlines worth nearly $40 billion. Since coming to office, the Trump administration has not issued any new licenses for delivering aircraft to Iran; scuttling these deals would violate a U.S. commitment under the JCPOA to facilitate these sales. Iran’s strategy, absent a blatant U.S. violation that would render the political costs of remaining in the deal unbearable and the economic advantages insufficient, is to play victim, blame Washington and hope to erode new U.S. sanctions by driving a wedge between the U.S. and its partners. As a senior Iranian official said: The Trump administration wants to turn the JCPOA into an empty shell by creating uncertainty around it and depriving us of its economic dividends. By not playing into their hands, remaining committed to the deal, and refraining from provocations, we will isolate them and turn their sanctions into an empty shell. This is Iran’s strategic patience at play. Although some hardline voices in Tehran advocate retaliation by resuscitating Iran’s nuclear program and reducing cooperation with the IAEA, there seems to be a consensus within the senior leadership that Iran should not be the first to violate the JCPOA. What is less certain is how Iran would respond should the U.S. patently violate or withdraw from the deal, enshrine the deletion of the JCPOA’s various expirations dates in law or if the accord’s benefits were to diminish to the point where preserving it becomes indefensible in Iran. Some Iranian officials have indicated that under such circumstances, Iran would ratchet up its nuclear program beyond the threshold permitted by the JCPOA. Ultimately, Tehran’s decision likely will be guided both by political interests (such as the desire to maintain robust relations with Europe and isolate the U.S.), and commercial considerations, ie, maintaining trade and business relations with the rest of the world. Developments not directly related to the JCPOA also could strain it beyond breaking point. As detailed and explained in Crisis Group’s Trigger List, escalation on one front could provoke escalation on another: perceived or real U.S. JCPOA violations could prompt Iran to respond asymmetrically by targeting U.S. forces in Iraq or Syria, in turn provoking a U.S. military response; another Huthi missile launch against Saudi Arabia could result in U.S. or Saudi retaliation against Iran; an Israeli airstrike against a target in Syria could trigger Hizbollah retaliation, in turn engulfing Lebanon.Rising tensions also could push Iran to double down on its ballistic-missile program. Any of these could prompt tighter U.S. economic retribution and eventually make it impossible for Trump to continue waiving sanctions – or politically easier not to do so. Dialogue that could alleviate the growing sense of impending crisis seems unlikely. The Trump administration has closed the small diplomatic openings crafted with Iran during the nuclear talks. Ayatollah Khamenei feels vindicated in his habitual mistrust of the U.S. Iran sees no justification or need to initiate the first de-escalatory move toward its regional rivals, while Saudi Arabia is convinced that only after it has restored strategic balance might dialogue be useful. This is a recipe for a precarious standstill that could deliberately or inadvertently descend into direct conflict. V.Hoping for the Best, Preparing for the Worst In short, if the U.S. currently has decided not to walk away from the deal, there is little room for complacency. Trump has put himself in a rhetorical corner and other U.S. steps or regional events could endanger the JCPOA’s survival. It is not too soon for other co-signatories, and Europe in particular, to think of measures that would ensure Tehran remains compliant in the face of diminishing economic returns or, worse, a full-fledged U.S. pullout. For now, Washington’s European allies likely will continue to explore whether there is a viable path to placate the White House. This will be a tough balancing act, as dealing with U.S. concerns in the way the White House has suggested most probably would entail a violation of the very deal European engagement is designed to salvage. The same holds true for Democrats and some Republicans in the U.S. Congress, who will look to Europe’s assessment before concluding whether legislation designed to “fix” the JCPOA in fact contravenes it. Discussions in Congress and between the administration and its European allies have focused in particular on the so-called sunset clauses; they also have touched upon other, non-nuclear topics including Iran’s ballistic-missile program. Optimally, these would have been addressed in renewed negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran aimed at forging a follow-on agreement. But if President Trump truly sought such a better-for-better agreement, along the lines Crisis Group recommended before his inauguration, it would have taken a starkly different route: building trust by implementing the JCPOA in good faith and then exploring mutually-beneficial arrangements that would strengthen some of the JCPOA’s nuclear provisions or add non-nuclear ones in return for positive incentives, such as relief from U.S. primary embargo. That road seems foreclosed, at least for the time being: Iranian leaders have made plain they will not renegotiate a just-concluded deal under pressure from a co-signatory that is threatening to walk away and whose compliance with the agreement’s provisions they already question.Even the more pragmatic among the Iranian leaders believe that renegotiation with an administration that is seeking maximalist objectives, such as indefinite limits on Iran’s nuclear program, through a pressure-centric approach is bound to fail and could bring down the JCPOA with it. As a close confidante of Rouhani put it, “there will be no negotiations with the U.S. before 2020. If Washington believes it can negotiate with the same government it says it wants to topple, it is deluding itself. Moreover, Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif have exhausted their political capital on the JCPOA and don’t have much to show for it”. Instead, the administration has resorted to the threat of unilaterally altering the existing accord. As seen, Trump has insisted on tying the reimposition of sanctions to Iranian steps that would be compliant with the JCPOA after certain constraints lapse. This is risky. While, in the words of a senior European official, it would constitute a “crisis deferred”, sanctions imposed for such reasons likely would represent a JCPOA violation to which Iran could react, setting in motion a dynamic that eventually could unravel the deal. Tying the reimposition of sanctions to Iran’s ballistic-missile activities, would also conflict with the JCPOA. It would make no sense for Europe (or Congressional Democrats for that matter) to try to save the deal in a manner that risks killing it – only this time, with their imprimatur. Even as efforts to mollify Trump in a manner consistent with the deal continue, therefore, Europe should think of a Plan B: how to preserve the essence of the deal in terms of Iran’s obligations irrespective of Washington’s actions, just as members of the international community have sought to salvage the Paris Climate accord despite the U.S.’s withdrawal, or Pacific nations have put together an alternative trade pact despite Trump’s rejection of the Trans Pacific Partnership. Discussion in Tehran and European capitals has centred on whether Europe could effectively stand up to U.S. pressure and continue to engage in business transactions with Iran should U.S. secondary sanctions be reimposed. European businesses would face the choice of either scaling back their (relatively modest) Iranian trade and investment or risk jeopardising access to the far larger and more lucrative U.S. market. As U.S. officials see it, this is a no-brainer. In response, European officials publicly claim that as long as key European stakeholders remain united and Iran remains committed to the deal, they can guarantee Iran’s economic incentives and keep the deal from unravelling by protecting their businesses against U.S. sanctions – though in private many are far less sanguine. Europe’s determination to protect the deal stems less from economic than from political calculations – the fear that breaking the deal would heighten regional tensions, potentially unleash Iran’s nuclear program, and call into doubt the reliability of multilateral agreements. Even so, there is only so much Europe could do in the face of a reimposition of U.S. secondary sanctions or, should it come to that, a return of UN sanctions that they would feel bound to implement. An increasing number of companies inevitably will have cold feet and opt to either stay away from or leave Iran. The majority of respondents in our survey – 83 per cent – believe that if the U.S. unilaterally reimposed sanctions, European and Asian companies would be “very to somewhat” averse to trade and investment with Iran (see graph 6 in Appendix A). Still, even with shrinking economic benefits Iran might be better off complying with the deal and preserving business ties with Europe than walking away entirely. Many companies represented in the survey conducted compliant business in Iran in the face of past sanctions; 33 per cent did not cease trading with Iran between 2006 and 2015, when multilateral sanctions were at their peak. Executives used a combination of carve-outs, licenses, and de-risking (reducing their footprint in the U.S. market) to protect Iran business ties under those conditions. Moreover, some 54 per cent of senior executives indicated that “assuming Iran remains committed to the nuclear deal”, enforcement by Europe of blocking regulations – which protect companies from U.S. penalties – would “positively affect the decision to invest in Iran” (see graph 8 in Appendix A). So long as the U.S. reimposes sanctions unilaterally while Iran remains in compliance with its JCPOA commitments, Europe can help ensure that Iran fares better with than without a deal. Other JCPOA signatories would be in a position to work with at least some companies and ensure a modicum of economic engagement. Perhaps this is why a majority of respondents – 64 per cent – believe that the nuclear deal is “very/somewhat likely” to survive even if the U.S. were to withdraw from it (see graph 7 in Appendix A). This confidence, if cultivated, could help preserve the accord. Based on these considerations: France, Germany, the UK, Russia and China should clearly and publicly reiterate their position that they will neither alter the JCPOA nor comply with unwarranted unilateral U.S. sanctions on Iran and will continue to abide by their own obligations. European countries in particular should revive their “Blocking Regulations” prohibiting compliance with U.S. extraterritorial sanctions, thereby making clear that they will not give effect to U.S. judgments and administrative determinations pursuant to such sanctions, and that companies will be reimbursed for fines and other damages incurred for alleged sanctions violations. Although European officials are loath to resort to these measures, which have rarely been enforced and could lead to a transatlantic trade war, the costs arguably would be less than those incurred if Iran were to resume its nuclear program and prospects of U.S. or Israeli military action were revived. Europe could also negotiate a long-term energy partnership with Iran and/or a bilateral investment agreement, demonstrating its long-term commitment to the JCPOA and sending a strong signal to both Tehran and Washington. To overcome the banking bottleneck, a public European body could help smaller to medium size firms conduct due diligence in Iran to ensure their local partners are not targeted by the remaining EU or UN sanctions. This would be akin to the role played by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Eastern Europe after the Soviet Union’s dissolution, and elsewhere today. The EU could expedite the process of allowing Iran to become a European Investment Bank partner to support private sector and infrastructure development in the country. While protecting the JCPOA and bolstering trade with Iran, European countries should diplomatically engage Tehran to find options for deescalating tensions in the region and enhancing the country’s human rights record. To respond to and facilitate Europe’s proactive efforts, Iran should enact the FATF’s legal instrument against anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing before the FATF’s action plan deadline at the end of January 2018. Continued progress on these fronts would facilitate Iran’s reintegration into the global financial system by enhancing financial transparency and governance, thus encouraging greater economic investment in the country. Other steps could help both bolster Iran’s incentives to remain in the deal and international confidence that Iran’s nuclear program will remain strictly civilian, while reducing regional tensions – all of which would make it politically easier for Europe to remain economically and diplomatically engaged with Tehran. To that end: Various countries could increase their nuclear cooperation with Tehran, for example over nuclear safety and security, for which the JCPOA’s Annex III provides a good starting point. As a means of addressing concerns over the JCPOA’s sunset provisions, either existing enrichment consortiums, like Urenco, or regional governments could approach Tehran to start a multinational enrichment plant, which would allow peer scrutiny over Iran’s nuclear program even after its JCPOA limitations elapse. Iran could invite officials from the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) organisation to Tehran, start transmitting data from CTBT monitoring stations on its soil to the international data centre in Vienna and set a timeframe for ratifying the CTBT in accordance with Ayatollah Khamenei’s fatwa against nuclear weapons and the global Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that Iran signed in 2017. With regards to its missile program, Iran could sign the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) against ballistic-missile proliferation, which would commit Iran to providing pre-launch notifications for ballistic-missiles and space-launch vehicles and submission of an annual declaration of the country’s related policies. An even more significant and long overdue step would be to release dual nationals arrested in Iran on dubious charges, who are being held as virtual hostages – an issue that has poisoned relations with the West and could provide ammunition for those who advocate more sanctions. Finally, even as it seeks to mollify the White House, the U.S. Congress should be very careful about any legislation that would restore sanctions in response to Iranian actions either not covered or allowed by the JCPOA. Depending on how it is worded, such a bill could represent a clear-cut violation of the accord, giving license to Iran to act in reciprocal fashion. It also would set an unwelcome precedent of U.S. unreliability and thus further dim prospects for a diplomatic resolution of the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. The Trump administration already possesses all the tools required to sanction Iranian ballistic-missile activity, support for militant groups or human rights violations without contradicting the JCPOA. Congress could pass legislation that reduces the administration’s certification burden, bolsters the prospect of sanctions reimposition in reaction to Iranian violations of the nuclear deal that the JCPOA adjudication mechanism fails to remedy, and express its sense that the U.S. administration should seek a follow-on agreement to address concerns over the outer years of the existing one. But it should not be complicit in an effort to undo the deal by stealth. VI.Conclusion Successful implementation of the JCPOA unfortunately has done little to strengthen it despite the absence of any viable alternative mechanism for achieving its important goals. The deal is capping Iranian nuclear activity right now; it seems illogical to weaken or even abrogate it over fears about what Iran might do more than a decade from now; with the agreement unravelling, that growth could begin as soon as tomorrow. It seems equally irrational to unshackle Iran’s nuclear program while simultaneously seeking to roll back its regional influence and curtail its ballistic-missile program. Yet such is the mindset among some U.S. officials and some of their outside backers. If the White House subscribes to this warped logic, there is no reason for other JCPOA signatories to do likewise. Even as they continue seeking to persuade the Trump administration to stick to the deal, they ought to be prepared to move beyond the sterile and often counterproductive Washington policy debate and do their best to sustain the accord with or without active U.S. participation. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/181-iran-nuclear-deal-two-status-report?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=31367c2c53-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_01_16&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-31367c2c53-359909997 (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

Seven ethnic Rakhine Buddhists died after Myanmar police opened fire on a crowd trying to seize a government office, officials said Wednesday, in fresh violence in a febrile state already scarred by ethnic and religious hatred. The incident unfurled as around 5,000 Buddhists gathered late Tuesday for a nationalist ceremony in Mrauk U, a town that has so far remained unscathed by the military's crackdown on the region's minority Rohingya Muslim community. It was not immediately clear why the rally descended into violence. But ethnic Rakhine, many of whom are poor and marginalised, have a long-standing enmity with the Myanmar state which is dominated by ethnic Bamar. The clashes came on the same day that a repatriation agreement was signed between Myanmar and Bangladesh to start the return of some 655,000 Muslim Rohingya refugees from squalid camps over the border. Rakhine say the Rohingya are illegal "Bengali" immigrants to a Buddhist land. A police spokesman blamed the crowd for "starting the violence" by throwing stones and barging into a district administrative office and hoisting the Rakhine State flag. "Security forces asked them to disperse and fired warning shots with rubber bullets... but they didn't stop, so police had to use real bullets," spokesman Colonel Myo Soe told AFP. "Seven people were killed and 13 injured," he said adding more than 20 police were wounded by the crowd, who were calling for the "sovereignty of Rakhine state". A hospital in state capital Sittwe treated five of the wounded for gunshots, a doctor there told AFP. The shootings further raise the temperature in an already combustible area of Myanmar. "It's not forgivable that they used guns," Mrauk U lawmaker U Hla Saw of the Arakan National Party said, confirming the death toll and labelling the police action "a crime". Witness Nyi Nyi Khant, 29, said the clashes could have been prevented if the police had intervened earlier. "The police had time to prepare to stop the crowd before they reached the office," he told AFP. "They could have blocked the street but they did not do that." - Communal hatreds - Mrauk U, home to an ancient Buddhist complex of the last Rakhine kingdom, lies a few dozen kilometres from the epicentre of violence that saw Rohingya driven in their hundreds of thousands into Bangladesh since last August. The military led a brutal crackdown against the Rohingya after militant attacks against border posts killed around a dozen police. Rohingya say security forces, backed by hardline Rakhine mobs, torched hundreds of Rohingya villages and forced them to flee. Refugees arriving in Bangladesh have brought with them consistent testimony of murder, rape and arson in the violence justified by the army as a legitimate response to the militant attacks. Already shredded by communal hatreds, Rakhine state also has a Buddhist rebel group called the Arakan Army which is fighting Myanmar's army. The clashes garner little attention in a state dominated by violence against the Rohingya and in a country where several larger ethnic insurgencies are burning. Observers warned Tuesday's violence could open a new chapter of unrest in the febrile state. "I think there will be a risk for spillover into intercommunal violence," independent analyst Gabrielle Aron said. "The degree of risk will depend partly on how well or poorly security forces are seen to respond to the events of last night," she said, adding the situation "could deteriorate". http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-5277941/Seven-ethnic-Rakhine-killed-Myanmar-police-fire-riot.html (c) 2018 Daily Mail

The Siracusa International Institute for Criminal Justice and Human Rightsorganizes the Specialisation Course on “The Exercise of Defence Rights in International Investigations within the European Union”, which will be held between 15-17 March 2018 at the Institute’s headquarters in Siracusa, Italy (a UNESCO World Heritage Site). The course is designed for national lawyers, in-house counsel, and international legal practitioners appointed to defend clients in criminal cases that may be covered by legislation created or inspired by the European Union. This Specialisation Course is part of the International Defence Counsel Training Programme, the first globally-oriented programme specifically designed for international defence lawyers, in-house counsel and jurists dealing with cases related to international crimes before national and international jurisdictions. The Siracusa International Institute has convened an outstanding Academia of world-renowned experts who provide their haut patronage to the Programme. The Course will tackle the following main topics: The European Criminal Law Framework; Sources and Main Actors in European Criminal Law; Procedural Elements and Instruments of European Criminal Law; Defence Rights and the European Investigation Order; Defence Rights and the European Arrest Warrant; Defence Rights and the Execution of Decisions and Sentences; Eurojust, Europol, and the European Public Prosecutor Office; Registration Fees Early Bird Registration Fee: 700 euros up until 1 month before the Course begins Standard Registration Fee: 900 euros in the last month prior to the Course Certification A certificate of attendance will be issued to each participant who successfully completes the course modules, at the end of the course. *The Course will be presented in English and so a high level of proficiency in English is required. IN PARTNERSHIP WITH: Visit us at INTERNATIONALDEFENCECOUNSEL.SIRACUSAINSTITUTE.ORG For further details: info@siracusainstitute.org - idc@siracusainstitute.org Tel: +39 0931- 414515 (c) 2018 The Siracusa International Institute for Criminal Justice and Human Rights

Myanmar is building a camp to temporarily house 30,000 Rohingya Muslims targeted for repatriation after fleeing violence in Rakhine State, state media reported on Monday, as Myanmar and Bangladesh meet to discuss how to implement a repatriation deal. The crackdown has been described by the United States and U.N. as ethnic cleansing, which Myanmar repeatedly rejects. Officials from Myanmar and Bangladesh meet on Monday to discuss a repatriation deal signed on Nov. 23. The meeting in Myanmar’s capital, Naypyitaw, is the first for a joint working group set up to hammer out the details of the agreement. The state-run Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper said a camp in Hla Po Khaung in northern Rakhine will be a temporary transition camp for people who are to be “accepted systematically” for repatriation. “The 124-acre Hla Po Khaung will accommodate about 30,000 people in its 625 buildings,” the newspaper said, adding that some 100 buildings will be completed by end of January. Aung Tun Thet, chief coordinator of Myanmar’s Union Enterprises for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development, told Reuters that the camp in Hla Po Khaung will be a “transition place” for Rohingya refugees before they are repatriated to their “place of origin” or the nearest settlement to their place of origin. “We will try to accept all of those who are coming back to Myanmar,” he said, adding that to verify returnees’ residency, they will be sent to assessment camps in Taungpyoletwei or Ngakhuya before they are moved to the Hla Po Khaung camp. Soe Aung, permanent secretary of Myanmar’s Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, said returnees will spend “at least one or two months” in Hla Po Khaung before their new homes are built. It is unclear, however, how many returnees would qualify for citizenship in Myanmar. The authorities have said Rohingya Muslims could apply for citizenship if they can show their forebears lived in Myanmar. But the latest deal - like the one in 1992 - does not guarantee citizenship. Myanmar government officials have said the 1992-1993 repatriation deal, which followed a previous spasm of violence in Myanmar, would accept those who could present identity documents issued to the Rohingya by governments in the past. Buddhist-majority Myanmar has for years denied Rohingya citizenship, freedom of movement and access to basic services such as healthcare and education. They are considered illegal immigrants from mainly Muslim Bangladesh. Bangladesh officials have said it was unclear when the first refugees could actually return as the two countries need to work out how to jointly verify the identities of returnees. United Nations agencies and human rights watchers have voiced scepticism about the resettlement plans and demanded a more transparent process to safeguard the Rohingya’s voluntary return. https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-myanmar-rohingya-bangladesh/myanmar-says-temporary-camp-will-house-30000-rohingya-targeted-for-repatriation-idUKKBN1F40S8?rpc=401& (c) 2018 Reuters

Responding to an announcement by the Bangladesh Foreign Ministry today that it intends to repatriate all Rohingya refugees within two years, James Gomez, Amnesty International’s Regional Director for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, said: “With memories of rape, killing and torture still fresh in the minds of Rohingya refugees, plans for their return to Myanmar are alarmingly premature. “The timeframe announced today was made without any consultation with the Rohingya themselves, and offers no assurances that people will be able to return voluntarily. “The most recent campaign of violence against the Rohingya was preceded by years of entrenched discrimination and abuse, and for most of the 650,000 refugees who fled Myanmar last year returning so soon will be a terrifying prospect. “The Rohingya have an absolute right to return to and reside in Myanmar, but there must be no rush to return people to a system of apartheid. Any forcible returns would be a violation of international law. “Returns cannot be safe or dignified until there is a fundamental change in Myanmar, including accountability for crimes against humanity and an end to the apartheid system.” Bangladesh and Myanmar have announced that the repatriation process will commence on Tuesday 23 January. https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/bangladesh-returning-rohingya-myanmar-alarmingly-premature (C) 2018 Amnesty International

Amina Khatun, a 40-year-old Rohingya woman, was sitting in front of the door of her tiny shelter house with her two-year-old son Salam. She somehow managed to flee Myanmar along with her son but her husband Abdul Rashid was not so lucky. He was killed by the Myanmar army. She reached the shores of the Naf river safely. However, she is now passing her days in the camps in Bangladesh in utter oblivion, not knowing what lies ahead. There are other female-headed households in the camps going through the same thing—struggling alone with mouths to feed isn't the only problem Rohingya women are facing amidst one of the worst ongoing humanitarian crises in the world. During my visit this month to Rohingya makeshift settlements in Cox's Bazar, currently sheltering more than 800,000 forcefully displaced Myanmar nationals who have fled the brutality of the Myanmar army in Rakhine State, I found that Rohingya women are especially vulnerable to many forms of transgressions exclusively based on their gender. Among the newly arrived 655,000 Rohingyas, 60 percent are women. It is easy to understand the threats any crisis situation poses to women. Structural inequalities put these Rohingya women—who have just escaped unspeakable horror in their native country—in a more vulnerable position to all forms of violence. As I was passing through the narrow aisles of Kutupalong makeshift settlement, the largest of the camps sheltering Rohingyas, I gazed upon women and girls of different ages whose distress was palpable through the look of despair in their eyes. Like Amina, her neighbour Shahida is also running her three-member household alone after her husband left her to marry some other woman after coming to Bangladesh. Following their traditional norms, Amina and Shahida do not go outside of their huts, which is why they solely depend on the relief items for subsistence. It has been more than a month since they last received relief assistance. They have no rice or lentils left to cook. When I asked Amina how she is feeding her son and herself, she said she occasionally gets food from her neighbours and sometimes they go hungry. There are thousands of female-headed households in these camps who have lost the breadwinner of the family—typically a male. Along with countless other challenges that come with being alone, these women who have never stepped outside of their home to earn livelihoods are finding it difficult to provide for themselves and their children. I also found some pretty faces glimmering with hope—in their smile and eye-catching attire. Rashida, a teenage girl of 17 who lives with her mother, sister-in-law and three nieces and nephew, was one of them. Her elder brother is still in Myanmar trying to escape the brutal ethnic cleansing. When I went to their home, on the first day peeking through the curtain I found a man sitting in the hut who, Rashida said, was not her family member. She was not interested to talk to me that day. It made me curious so I went to meet her again the next day. She was all dolled up just like the day before and was standing in front of her hut. After getting to know her and the things she had gone through, I asked her how she was doing now—whether or not she was happy with her life since she looked much more joyful thanks to her makeup and colourful attire. She said she felt relieved but not happy. She said the ration they are getting is not nearly enough although her ten-year-old nephew occasionally works and brings in some money. When I asked her about her plans to get married, she blushed and said some men from the Rohingya community want to marry her but she wishes to marry a Bangladeshi man. She doesn't want to go back to Myanmar and wants to settle down here. The man who was sitting with her the other day was one of her many suitors, she said, denying any other prospect when I probed her. After bidding her farewell I went to one of her neighbours' hut who informed me that many Rohingya men frequent Rashida's place. At first Rashida would come to her place whenever someone approached their hut and wasn't willing to meet them but now she stays there. The woman, like many other parents, raised her concern about these “unusual incidents” as she has a daughter of almost marriageable age. She does not want a future like this for her daughter. Other parents are also concerned about the safety of their girls and are trying to marry off their daughters at a very early age considering it as their greatest chance of security and survival. These concerns are leading to an increase in child marriage in the camps which was already prevailing in the Rohingya community, as the anecdotal evidence suggests. Other forms of sexual violence like street harassment are also prevalent in these camps. Young girls do not go far from their huts as they are harassed by men and boys in their own community. They cannot even seek help as it defames the girl in the community. Young girls and boys are vulnerable to human trafficking as well. Domestic violence has been normalised to the point where Rohingya women are expressing relief for being beaten up by their husbands rather than being raped by the Myanmar army. These women whose rights have been trampled upon in their own country are now living in an environment where physical and sexual violence is pervasive. Old Rohingya women are at high risk of economic deprivation. Eighty-year-old Rabeya Khatun is now living with her son and daughter-in-law who have four mouths to feed along with her. Back in Myanmar she used to help them with the cattle and also had her deceased husband's property to support them. Here she is completely dependent on her son. The old woman does not even know what would be better for her—to go back to her own country or to live here in utmost insecurity. But she is certain that they are neither getting back the property they have lost nor can they go back to Myanmar to die. After living through the extreme trauma of losing their home and loved ones and being physically and sexually abused, these women and girls came here seeking shelter; yet they are going through sexual exploitation, “survival sex” for protection and money, domestic violence, economic adversity, stress and anxiety. For me, a member of the host community where these people have come to seek refuge, it is something worth thinking about. Like these Rohingya women, we too have no idea about what lies ahead in the future for them but we all have a collective and individual responsibility to act upon to make their lives a little easier and make them feel safer. http://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/human-rights/the-uncertain-fate-rohingya-women-1519819 (c) 2018 The Daily Star

Last week, one of France’s most prestigious publishing houses stirred a controversy when it announced its intention to release a 1,000 tome by Louis-Ferdinand Céline, a stellar novelist turned anti-Semitic crank and convicted of collaborating with the Nazis. The volume was to include some of Céline’s most vitriolic work, some of the gentler of which compared Jews to rats. After a weeklong media storm and the threat of a lawsuit from French Nazi-hunter Serge Klarsfeld, the publisher announcedyesterday he would not be pursuing the project after all. “I am suspending the project,” said Antoine Gallimard, “having judged that conditions were not right for ensuring a proper job in terms of methodology and history.” Gallimard had earlier stated that Céline’s later works, not reprinted since the end of World War II, would be put “in their context as writings of great violence and marked by the anti-Semitic hatred of the author.” Gallimard added yesterday that he “understood the feelings of readers who might find this re-edition shocking, hurtful or worrying for obvious ethical reasons,” but still believed that to censure the works “prevents light being shed on their ideological roots and only attracts unhealthy curiosity.” Born Louis Ferdinand Auguste Destouches in 1894 just outside Paris, Céline, as he soon became known, joined the French army to rebel against his parents and fought in World War I, where he was wounded. Upon returning to France after stints in England and Africa, he married, had children, and completed his medical education. No sooner did he become a doctor, however, than he abandoned both his profession and his family, transforming himself into a writer. His first novel, Journey to the End of the Night, a semi-autobiographical work rich with coarse slang and unsettling imagery, was considered an instant masterpiece, even though the author was denied France’s highest literary honor, the Goncourt, by an establishment too shocked by his innovative style. Another masterful novel, Death on the Installment Plan, soon followed, but Céline’s bigotry seemed to rise in tandem with his fame. By 1937, he was writing primarily virulently anti-Semitic essays, which were among the ones slated for reprinting in the now-aborted Gallimard volume. When the Germans occupied France, Céline enthusiastically wrote for a number of collaborationist publications, but his hatred of Jews was deemed too extreme even by the Nazis: Bernhard Payr, the Nazi superintendent of propaganda in France, praised Céline’s “correct racial notions” but judged his work to be “hysterical wailings” that would fail to move or convince readers. When the Allies landed in Normandy, Céline fled to Norway. He was tried in absentia, convicted of collaborating with the Nazis, and sentenced to prison. He served his one-year term in Norway before returning to France, receiving amnesty for his crimes, and again taking up writing. The Beat Generation, including Jews like Allen Ginsberg, was drawn to his raw and evocative language, and he died of an aneurysm in 1961, one day after completing his final novel. Before his death, he made it clear that he did not wish to have his hateful work from the 1930s reprinted, but his widow, now 105, recently agreed to have the work reissued, which is how the recent edition was conceived. And while Gallimard’s critical edition will never see the light of day, Céline’s missives are widely available online and in used book shops, giving these vicious essays a ghoulish afterlife that cannot be curbed. http://www.tabletmag.com/scroll/253194/after-controversy-gallimard-says-non-to-celine (c) 2018 Tablet Magazine

Just over a century ago this week, Turkish and Kurdish forces invaded land that the Assyrian people had inhabited since antiquity and began exterminating them. The slaughter that ensued lasted from 1915-1923, leaving 300,000 Assyrians dead and innumerable women abducted. Joseph Yacoub’s Year of the Sword: the Assyrian Christian Genocide, published in French in 2014 and translated into English in 2016, is the most accessible historical account of the events that composed the genocide, as well as a comprehensive case for those events as genocide. Yacoub, emeritus professor of political science at the Catholic University of Lyon, provides a distillation of sources in the languages used by both the perpetrators of and witnesses to the genocide. Year of the Sword is necessary for the breadth and depth of scholarship that informs that distillation, as well as the careful marshaling of it into analysis. The Assyrian genocide formed one distinct yet indivisible chapter of a program of eradication that also encompassed the coeval Armenian and Greek genocides. The purpose was to put an end to the presence of all three Christian peoples in the territory that became the Republic of Turkey. The politics of the genocide were not the outgrowth of a robust nationalist ideology or tradition. (Turkish nationalism has always struggled to reconcile the need for an atavistic sense of racial origins, usually placed somewhere within Central Asia, and the need to subjugate and cohere territories in Asia Minor.) The Republic of Turkey was instead founded upon the application of violent jihad to the territorial boundaries of the emerging Turkish state. The Islamization of Turkey was inseparable from the establishment of its national sovereignty. Yacoub discusses political developments in the decades prior to the genocide: the draconian centralization of power in the flailing Ottoman caliphate under Sultan Hamid II (1876-1909), and the nationalism of the Young Turks who supplanted him and ushered in an era of genocide. This background is not treated as an inductive source of understanding, but rather a context. Yacoub’s major focus is on detailing the act of killing. The methods of the Assyrian genocide were mass murder, pillage, and the rape and abduction of girls. Christian Pfander, the German-American Pastor of Urmia (in today’s northwest Iran), wrote that “in the villages, the Kurds killed everyone they could get hold of.” Assyrians were “hacked to death with axes and thrown into the river,” or left “half-executed … exposed to the sun,” wrote Hyacinth Simon, a French missionary and author, since, as “one Kurd said: Our soil is too pure to act as a tomb for Christian dogs.” Clergymen were subject to spectacular forms of torture: “The skin was flayed from another priest’s head before his throat was cut.” One priest was “tied to a pile of dry cow dung and burnt alive,” another “stabbed to death as [he] knelt in prayer.” In cities like Diyarbakir, sexual slavery meant being “passed from one Turk to another.” In more remote terrain—the killing fields of Urmia and adjacent Hakkari—gunmen would “even sometimes rape young women who were dying.” The American Medical Department in Urmia observed that “not a woman or girl above 12 (and some younger) … escaped violation.” Ascertaining the number of abducted Assyrian women has proved more elusive than establishing the death toll. Since “all the girls, women and children stolen by Turks were treated by them as Mahometans,” mass abductions served the symbiotic purposes of depleting the Assyrian population and its capacity for replenishment and reproduction and expanding the size of the conquering Muslim groups. Yacoub’s attention to evidence of central planning and orchestration—the most pivotal of the legal pillars of genocide recognition—is one of Year of the Sword’s strongest legacies. Yacoub specifies a widely observed repetition of process to the killings. Key elements included the removal of men “to an unknown destination” and the reading aloud of an edict from the Ottoman state prior to executions and (“as sworn on the Koran”) an injunction to remain silent about “acts committed by the executioners” and “the fate of those executed.” That “all observers and witnesses confirm that the conduct of the Turkish authorities was motivated by a premeditated, defined and criminal objective,” argues Yacoub, confirms that “the driving force was not in the mountains but in the capital.” Discussion of potential responses to the genocide accompanied the spreading of news. Yacoub is excellent in mapping the network of institutions and actors involved in deciding the fate of the surviving Assyrians. Soon after their emergence as a national political entity in the modern sense, Assyrians sought to overcome the circumscribing hostility of their neighbors through outreach to the West. They were met with the reality that whatever sense of geographically expansive Christendom still existed in Europe was rapidly dwindling, and would disappear forever with World War I. One of the most telling individual lines in Year of the Sword speaks of Assyrian authors writing in their native Assyrian Aramaic: “Every author, without exception, expresses a sense of shock that Germany and Austria, two Christian countries, could have found themselves on the same side as Turkey during the war.” A hope for Christian solidarity from the West—which in the 19th century formed the basis of external Assyrian political and institutional engagement—shaded into a prayer-like approach to the international community. From the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 to the present day, Assyrians have been entrapped within systems of appeal and recourse to western powers, fuelled by a deep and tragic belief that the moral legitimacy of the Assyrian cause will finally be rewarded. Calls for a “safe haven” and “international protection” dominated Assyrian activist and advocacy efforts following the 2014 Islamic State invasion of the Nineveh Plain in Iraq, the last nexus of substantial Assyrian demographic concentration in the Middle East. It is deeply significant that Raphael Lemkin explicitly linked his novel category of genocide (among whose victims he listed “Christian Assyrians”) with the notion of international protection. The nation-state had created a brand of group massacre particular to its form, whose redress had to come through the moral power and legislated interventions of international institutions. A lack of resources and state legitimacy following the genocide contributes to the ongoing failure (with some exceptions) by Assyrians to obtain recognition of it, a reward for its successful perpetration. The U.S. State Department, EU Parliament, and other bodies did, however, designate the more recent crimes of ISIS as genocide. In this case, the designation focused on the intention of the perpetrators and was not defined by the suffering of the victims, which consisted of an enumeration of religious groups, including Christians. No specific measures seeking to empower Assyrians followed the designation. Genocide aims to erase the past in order to open a future free of its burdens. In Hakkari, the perpetrators were almost entirely successful in this aim. After thousands of years of continuous settlement by Assyrians, Hakkari exists today predominantly in a state of wilderness. Scattered ruins of churches—some 250 Assyrian churches and monasteries were destroyed—are quiet monuments to a genocide intimately remembered by its sons and daughters in Europe, yet largelyunknown to the descendants of its perpetrators. Local Kurds often profess a lack of knowledge or curiosity as to why a Christian grandmother is listed on their ID cards. A local tradition of confusing crosses etched onto the stone of Assyrian churches with instructions to dig for treasure incites the exhumation of graves for personal enrichment, in a parody of excavation aimed at the recovery of the past. Turkey refuses to acknowledge any genocide on its own soil. President Recep Erdoğan, who recently described the persecution of Muslims in Myanmar as genocide, said in 2009 that “it is impossible for Muslims to commit genocide.” Kurdish nationalist leaders continue to persecute Assyrians while occasionally invoking the events of the genocide as a way to underscore the need for an independent Kurdish state, dominated by the particular leadership making the invocation. Yacoub makes it clear that Kurds responded “enthusiastically under the planned and concerted direction of the Turkish authorities” to the call of “holy war proclaimed in Kurdistan” a century ago. Yet in a part of the world where martyrs are stacked like currency for claims made on the present, it is no surprise that the legacy of the Assyrian genocide, like ownership of the land that hosted it, is still up for grabs. http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/252777/turkeys-genocide-of-the-assyrians (c) 2018 Tablet Magazine