The Michigan Governor’s Genocide Studies Council will pursue developing a curriculum to educate students about the genocide through starvation of the Ukrainian population in the early 1930s. Council Coordinator Judith Kovach said it will embark on developing lessons about the Ukrainian genocide once the council approves curricula for the Holocaust and the Armenia Genocide at its Jan. 9 meeting at the Holocaust Memorial Center in Farmington Hills. “It will happen,” Kovach said. Inclusion of the Ukrainian genocide, known as the “Holodomor,” in school lessons has been pushed recently by local Ukrainian-Americans as part of an overall national effort over the past 15 years to bring more attention to it. Establishment of a Holodomor memorial, advocated by U.S. Rep. Sander Levin, was dedicated in Washington, D.C., in 2015. Last month, the Michigan lawmakers last month passed a resolution recognizing the Holodomor introduced by state Sen. Steve Bieda of Warren and state reps. Patrick Green of Warren and Martin Howrylak. Other states have recognized it. “That is wonderful,” said Marie Zarycky of Warren, one of Ukrainian activists, of Kovach’s comments. “It is important because we don’t want this to happen again. We have to call attention to all wrongdoing against humanity, and we have to name them.” Kovach, a psychologist, agreed. “We want the curriculum to help children not be bystanders but stand up to genocide,” she said. “It goes beyond a history lesson and really teaches children how to use this information for moral development.” The Holodomor resulted in the death by famine of 3 million to 5 million Ukrainians under Soviet Union leader Joseph Stalin to break the resistance to Soviet totalitarian rule and destroy Ukraine as a nation. Zarycky, a member of the Holodomor Remembrance Committee of the Detroit Regional Council of the Ukrainian National Women’s League of America, and other metro-Detroit activists have been pushing for the inclusion and attending meetings of the council, which was created by Gov. Rick Snyder in 2016. They have been somewhat frustrated by the council’s response and noted that all 15 council members are associated with the Holocaust or Armenian genocide. But Kovach said the council wants to first approve the curricula for the Holocaust and Armenian genocide before working on the Holodomor’s lesson plan. She noted the council’s members are volunteers and have limited time to devote. Education about the extermination of 6 million Jews during World War II and Armenian Genocide from 1915 to 1917 was required in Michigan schools beginning in September under a new state law though a formal lesson plan wasn’t approved, Kovach explained. She said the council ultimately wants to develop curriculum for not only the Holodomor but for genocides in Rwanda, Cambodia and Bosnia. The council has a termination date of next August, but Kovach said members plan to continue through another mechanism, perhaps as a nonprofit organization. Vera Andrushkiw, president of the Detroit Regional Council of the Ukrainian National Women’s League of America, said the Holodomor didn’t get a great deal of attention in the years immediate following because Stalin and Russia was a crucial U.S. ally during World War II and Ukraine remained part of the Soviet Union until its dismantling. “There was an in-born fear in people living in the Ukraine,” she said. “They refused to talk about it.” She noted that while the Holocaust has been the subject of many books and films, the Holodomor has not, although a movie called, “Bitter Harvest,” and a book called, “Red Famine Stalin’s War on Ukraine” by Anne Applebaum, were released this year. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Daily Tribune

The U.S government has provided more than $55,000 to Cambodia for the preserving of personal items belonging to prisoners at a Khmer Rouge prison and torture center in the 1970s. The project agreement was signed Monday by U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia William Heidt and Cambodian Secretary of State for Ministry of Culture and Fine Art Chuch Phoeurn. The funding aims to preserve and maintain 3,000 to 5,000 items of clothing, shoes, hats and belts belonging to prisoners who were detained at the Khmer Rouge's main Tuol Sleng prison facility. Under the 1975-79 Khmer Rouge regime, an estimated 17,000 Cambodians were tortured at the center, known as S-21 prison, and then killed. An estimated 1.7 million Cambodians died from execution, starvation and inadequate medical care under the rule of the ultra-communist group. Heidt said the timing of the project is critical since the items are slowly deteriorating. The prisoners' belongings tell the extremely personal and heartbreaking stories of the victims of the Khmer Rouge and include clothing, hats and other items from both adults and children. "If you look closely, you even can see that some items still show blood and sweat stains," Heidt said. "The conservation work will carefully preserve the textiles without removing this historical evidence. Each piece carries its own history and we recognize how important it is to preserve this story for future generations." Chuch Phoeurn welcomed the U.S. funding and said the preservation of the belongings is important because they can help educate young Cambodians. He said some of the items will be displayed at the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 NZHerald

“The violence against the Rohingya in Northern Rakhine in Burma … may also constitute crimes against humanity and even genocide,” the report by parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee said. The report -- Violence in Rakhine State and the U.K.’s response -- was released on Dec.11. It described a lack of effort to recognize the violence by the U.K. government and internationally. “The U.K. government’s equivocation over classifying this violence has ... been frustratingly confusing,” it said. “It has also failed to undertake its own legal analysis. This was not befitting its leading international role, and it should immediately investigate and conduct its own assessment of the situation.” The report said “the U.K. government should take a more hard-headed approach based on the new understanding of the political trajectory in the country and the limits of Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership or ability, or willingness, to speak out.” It also underlined that the “Commander in Chief of the Burmese security forces, General Min Aung Hlaing, bears ultimate responsibility for the violence.” “There appears to be widespread agreement that grave human rights violations have occurred during this crisis, but we heard a variety of views on how this violence should be understood and defined, with some suggesting that the security forces’ abuses against the Rohingya amounted to ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, or even genocide,” it said to describe the level of violence targeting the Muslims. The report by the cross-party group of lawmakers said its members were “surprised that the U.K. government’s response to questions about this violence were not clear and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was reluctant to commit to a definition.” “If atrocity crimes have taken place, these certainly cannot be redressed through repatriation and must be addressed in court to ensure perpetrators are held to account.” Lawmakers were concerned the FCO “has not undertaken its own analysis of the situation” and urged it to “immediately ... send an expert team to gather evidence on sexual violence in conflict and other possible atrocity crimes; conduct a review of the situation and respond to the Committee as to how it will ... guide its policy on the Rakhine crisis, including in assessing whether to pursue a referral to the International Criminal Court.” The Rohingya, described by the UN as the world's most persecuted people, have faced heightened fears of attack since dozens were killed in communal violence in 2012. Since Aug. 25, over 625,000 Rohingya have crossed from Myanmar's western state of Rakhine into Bangladesh, according to the UN. The refugees are fleeing a military operation in which security forces and Buddhist mobs have killed men, women and children, looted homes, and torched Rohingya villages. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Daily News

The UN's Human Rights Council says it is "very likely" Myanmar's Rohingya minority has faced crimes against humanity and possibly genocide at the hands of Myanmar security forces and their helpers. Addressing an urgent meeting held by the 47-member rights body in Geneva, Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, described reports of "acts of appalling barbarity committed against the Rohingya, including deliberately burning people to death inside their homes, murders of children and adults; indiscriminate shooting of fleeing civilians; widespread rapes of women and girls, and the burning and destruction of houses, schools, markets and mosques". Award-winning photojournalist Allison Joyce met Rohingya rape survivors at refugee camps in Bangladesh. IBTimes UK shares their harrowing stories of abuse at the hands of the Myanmar military. Mumtaz Begum, 30, said that one morning the military attacked the village of Tula Toli in Myanmar and burned homes. Everyone ran and hid but the military found them. They shot her husband in front of her and as he lay dying, he asked the military for some water. They responded by shooting him again, and he died. Then the military took her and five other women to a house, with some of their children. They started raping her and the other women and when the children screamed, they hit them in the head with machetes. They hit one of her sons, splitting his skull open, and he died. They also hit her daughter, but she survived and escaped the house. When the military was done raping her and the other women, they set the house on fire. Mumtaz crawled through the flames and her clothes caught fire and the roof caved in, but she was the only woman who managed to escape. The other five women burned to death. She hid in the forest until a group of people found her and carried her to the border and into Bangladesh. Mumtaz says "I want justice and I want to tell the world all the things the military did. They raped and killed us. We want justice." Mumtaz Begum, 30, becomes emotional as she touches the wounds she received when the military set her house on fire after raping her Allison Joyce/Getty Images Mumtaz Begum shows some of the scars she received when her burning clothes stuck to her body Allison Joyce/Getty Images Sunuara, 25, says she had a good life in Myanmar before the attacks on 25 August. She was wealthy, with rice paddy fields, 42 cows and two cars. One day the military attacked the village of Boulibazar and soldiers came to her home. Her husband was staying in another village with relatives and her other children were staying with her parents. Only her 16-year-old son was home with her, and in front of her eyes the military shot him in the stomach and then cut off his head with a machete. Then they tied her wrists and ankles with rope to her bedposts and nine men took turns raping her for six hours. She was eight months pregnant at the time, and the military punched and kicked her stomach. She lost consciousness and when she woke up, her husband and brother found her. For six days they carried her to the border while she drifted in and out of consciousness. They crossed into Bangladesh where she gave birth at a hospital, but the baby died a day later. Sunuara, 25, poses for a photo in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh Allison Joyce/Getty Images Roshida Begum, 22, says that the military threw petrol bombs in the village of Tula Toli, setting houses on fire and randomly shooting people. She fled and hid on a river bank, but the military found her and others. Her husband swam across and escaped. They shot the young boys and stole any jewellery the women were wearing. They took little children and babies and threw them into the river. "Then they took us to a pond and made us kneel up to our necks in the water," she says. "A helicopter was circling overhead again and again. My baby was just 25 days old, but they grabbed him from my arms and smashed him on the ground so hard he died. The military took me and five other women into a house and raped us. After they were done, they slit our necks with machetes. They thought I was dead and they left and set the house on fire. I was the only one who escaped." She hid in a paddy field and in a forest until she came across another woman and her daughter, and together they walked towards Bangladesh. For eight days they walked, surviving by drinking water from the paddy fields. They took a boat into Bangladesh and she went to the MSF clinic, where she spent 18 days recovering. Her husband found her there, and when she was discharged they moved into a camp. In the attack, she lost her mother, father, brother, all together she lost 17 members of her family. "In Bangladesh, sometimes I'm happy, but then I'll see an old man and miss my father, or I'll see a woman with a baby, and I'll miss my son. I can't help but cry. I want justice from the world, why did they kill my mother and father and sisters? I hope the world will give me justice. They killed my parents and relatives for no reason. " Roshida Begum, 22, shows where the Myanmar military slit her throat Allison Joyce/Getty Images Roshida Begum shows off her scars Allison Joyce/Getty Images Dildar Begum, 30, says the military stormed into her house in Tula Toli. They took her husband out of the house and to the river bank and shot him. Then they came back into her house and grabbed her two-year-old son from her arms and stabbed him in the head, and then they killed her four-year-old son. Two soldiers held her arms while another raped her, she says. They then beat her and she pretended to be dead. When they left, they set her house on fire. Her 10-year-old daughter, Nurkalima was severely injured when the military beat her over the head with the blades of machetes, but she helped her mother crawl past the bodies of two of her children and out of the burning house. For five days she hid in the hills and when the military left, she went back to Tula Toli on her way to the Bangladesh border. All that was left of her village was smoke and ash where houses used to be. There were bodies everywhere, so many that they were uncountable. She came across some men who carried her for two days to the border, where they were able to cross into Bangladesh by boat. "I don't see any future for me here in Bangladesh. My husband is dead, who will earn money for me and my daughter? I want justice. My kids were killed, I want justice for them." she says. Dildar Begum, 30, becomes emotional while her 10-year-old daughter, Nurkalima, looks on Allison Joyce/Getty Images Dildar Begum's scars from being beaten over the head with a rifle Allison Joyce/Getty Images Myanmar's army began what it called "clearance operations" on 25 August following an attack on police posts by Rohingya insurgents. Refugees arriving in Bangladesh said their homes were set on fire by soldiers and Buddhist mobs, and some reported being shot at by security forces. UN human rights chief Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein said actions by Myanmar's government to "dehumanise" the Rohingya minority were likely to fan more violence and affect more communities across the region. Myanmar's ambassador in Geneva, Htin Lynn, denied any state efforts at "dehumanisation" of the Rohingya, saying it "could be an act of extremist individuals. My government is doing everything possible to deter these extremist acts," he said. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 IB Times

In advance of the United Nations Security Council’s December 12 meeting on the situation in Myanmar, we, a global coalition of 69 human rights, faith-based and humanitarian organizations, urgently call on the Council to take immediate action to address the campaign of ethnic cleansing and mass atrocity crimes, including crimes against humanity, committed against the ethnic Rohingya population by Myanmar’s security forces in northern Rakhine State, as well as the continuing restrictions on humanitarian assistance throughout the state since October 2016. Words of condemnation by the UN, including the Security Council's Presidential Statement on November 6 and the UN General Assembly’s Third Committee’s adoption of a resolution on Myanmar, have not resulted in Myanmar’s government ending its abuses or holding those responsible to account. It is time for prompt, concerted and effective international action. Myanmar authorities are still heavily restricting access to northern Rakhine State for most international humanitarian organizations, human rights monitors, and independent media. Most of Myanmar’s Rohingya population, estimated at more than one million, have been forced to flee to Bangladesh as refugees. Despite a bilateral agreement between Myanmar and Bangladesh, there are insufficient guarantees that return at this time can be informed, safe and voluntary, that requirements for documentation of prior residence will not be used as a pretext to reject legitimate returns, that temporary holding centers will not become semi-permanent internment camps and that returnees will have the same rights of movement, access to livelihoods and health and education services as other residents of Rakhine State. The UN Fact-Finding Mission, which is tasked with preparing a report on abuses nationwide, has thus far been prevented from gaining access to the country. Over 646,000 Rohingya have been made refugees since August 25, when Myanmar security forces launched “clearance operations” in response to armed attacks on security posts by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). Refugee testimonies provide overwhelming evidence of Myanmar military-led atrocities during these operations, and a similar campaign that had begun in October 2016. The crimes against humanity perpetrated against the Rohingya include massacres and other unlawful killings, widespread rape and other sexual violence, looting, deportation and mass arson of hundreds of Rohingya villages. The violence also displaced tens of thousands of people from other ethnic minorities. Rohingya who remain in Myanmar continue to face severe food insecurity and threats in addition to systematic violations of their rights to a nationality, freedom of movement, and access to healthcare, education, and livelihood opportunities. The Myanmar government has the primary responsibility to protect its diverse population without discrimination and regardless of ethnicity, religion or citizenship status. But, the civilian and military leadership of Myanmar, including the military’s Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, refuse to even acknowledge the serious human rights violations against the Rohingya and continue to deny any wrongdoing by state security forces in Rakhine State while ignoring decades of institutionalized discrimination against the Rohingya community. We urge the Security Council to immediately impose an arms embargo against Myanmar’s military that covers the direct and indirect supply, sale or transfer, including transit and trans-shipment of all weapons, munitions, and other military and security equipment, as well as the provision of training and other military and security assistance. The Security Council should also place targeted sanctions on senior officers responsible for crimes against humanity or other serious human rights violations. Financial sanctions should target senior officers who ordered criminal acts or are liable as a matter of command responsibility. The Security Council should explore all avenues for justice and accountability, including through international courts. If the pledge to “never again” allow atrocities means anything, the Security Council cannot delay action any longer. ALTSEAN-Burma Ameinu American Jewish World Service Amnesty International Burma Action Ireland Burma Campaign UK Burma Human Rights Network Burma Task Force Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Carl Wilkens Fellowship Center for Development of International Law Center for Justice & Accountability Darfur Women's Action Group David Rockefeller Fund Emgage Action Entrepreneurs du Monde Equal Rights Trust European Rohingya Council Fortify Rights Franciscan Action Network Foundation for Ethnic Understanding Friends Committee on National Legislation Genocide Watch Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Global Justice Center Global Network of Women Peacebuilders Holocaust, Genocide and Interfaith Education Center at Manhattan College Humanity United Action Human Rights First Human Rights Now Human Rights Watch Info Birmanie International Campaign for the Rohingya International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect ICR2P Investors Against Genocide Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights Jewish Alliance of Concern over Burma (JACOB) Jewish World Watch Médecins du Monde Middle East and North Africa Partnership for Preventing of Armed Conflict (MENAPPAC) Muslim Bar Association of New York Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) Muslin Social Justice Initiative (MSJI) Network of Spiritual Progressives Partners Relief & Development Permanent Peace Movement (PPM) Physicians for Human Rights Rabbinical Assembly Refugee Center Online Refugees International Rohingya Community Ireland Save the Children Society for Threatened Peoples – Germany STAND Canada Stanley Foundation Stop Genocide Now Syrian Network for Human Rights The Center for Media Studies and Peacebuilding (CEMESP-Liberia) The Interfaith Center of New York The Jiyan Foundation for Human Rights The Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies T'ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights United Nations Association - Sweden United Church of Christ, Justice and Witness Ministries Unitarian Universalist Service Committee Viet Tan World Federalist Movement – Canada World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy (WFM-IGP)

On 21 November, the U.S. military began major airstrikes against what it described as Taliban drug labs in the north of Helmand province of Afghanistan. Yet a coercive counter-narcotics campaign will solve neither the country’s poppy boom nor the Taliban’s profiting from it, which has long depended to an extraordinary extent on very local dynamics. It is no secret that the Taliban bankrolls its operations in part by drug money, with estimates of its annual share of the multi-billion-dollar illicit drug economy ranging from tens to a few hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars. The staggering 87 per cent increase in Afghanistan’s opium production in 2017, as reported by the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) this month, also means more profits for the Taliban. But it would be naïve to say the Taliban is fighting because conflict helps it gain control over the profits of the drug trade, or that Afghanistan’s drug production boom is because of the Taliban. The criminal economy thrives on weak state institutions, systemic corruption and poverty, while the insurgency represents, fundamentally, a political challenge. These are separate phenomena with distinct histories and different solutions. The Taliban’s involvement in the opium economy today is in stark contrast to its complete proscription of narcotics as un-Islamic in the past. Ironically, its willingness now to earn from the opium trade is part of its broader evolution that includes increasing pragmatism and the relaxing of some of its religious puritanism and cultural conservatism. In summer 2000, when the Taliban ruled most of Afghanistan, the movement’s late leader Mullah Omar issued a decree banning opium production and trade before the poppy cultivation season began. Even though this was not a formal fatwa, or religious ruling, stunned U.S. and UN officials reported from Afghanistan in the spring of 2001 that the Taliban had almost totally eliminated the cultivation of opium in the areas under its control. That year, Afghanistan’s opium production hit rock bottom, in stark contrast to the preceding two decades, when the country had been one of the world’s largest suppliers of illicit drugs. The UN described the ban as “one of the most remarkable successes ever” in the fight against narcotics. The key to the ban’s successful implementation was its religious justification, I have heard repeatedly during field work among Afghan farmers and Taliban officials who followed the eradication campaign in the east and south of the country, where opium cultivation was most widespread. For years, clerics had debated the religious status of drug production and trading, and half-heartedly attempted a gradual prohibition. Sceptics within the Taliban deemed the absence of a conclusive ruling on the issue as insufficient to deprive impoverished people of their major source of livelihood. But in the end, the Taliban built consensus among local community leaders that since the use of any addictive drug was haram, or forbidden in Islamic law, so were activities that brought drugs into use, including the cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotics. Mullah Omar’s effective prohibition in 2000 came amid growing pressure on the Taliban regime from the international community. Yet, those who worked closely with him are adamant that he was not driven by external pressure or the desire to earn international recognition, like some other Taliban leaders. His intense personal conviction tilted the balance on the drugs issue, as it did on other controversial decisions that followed, including the destruction of the Buddha statues of Bamiyan and the Taliban’s refusal to deport Osama Bin Laden. In any event, the Taliban felt its successful ban on drugs was unappreciated by the international community. Opium cultivation resumed as soon as the Taliban regime fell. When the movement returned in the form of insurgency in 2003 in the opium heartland, it was limited in scale and could raise funds to sustain itself by capitalising on the anxiety about a long-term U.S. presence among Afghanistan’s neighbours and anti-Americanism in the Persian Gulf countries. As the insurgency grew larger, it needed more funds. The Taliban had to mobilize revenues domestically, including from poppy production, especially after the drawdown of international troops and the strengthening of the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2014 diverted the attention of its Gulf-based backers. Local commanders who took control of territories where opium production and trade were booming could not resist the lucrative business. The decision to use poppy money to advance jihad is endorsed by some prominent Taliban clerics. Some argue that circumstances, specifically the “American occupation”, make it permissible, since defeating the greater evil requires embracing the lesser evil of drug money. Another rationalisation is that since the Taliban does not officially rule the country, it has neither the responsibility nor the ability to stop drug production or trading, which cuts across government and insurgency-controlled areas. If it cannot be stopped totally, the argument goes, why should the Taliban deny people under its control a profitable livelihood and risk losing support for its jihad. Also at work is a tacit logic that these drugs mainly harm infidels, and as long as infidels occupy Afghanistan or support the occupation, the Taliban need not care about their lives. Despite these justifications, the Taliban’s embrace of the drug trade is limited both horizontally, with a small minority secretly involved in it, and vertically, since the involvement is mainly taxing, rather than running or controlling the trade. A small number of commanders in major opium hubs are involved in all stages of the drug trade. But there is no systemic involvement. The group is not the only player in this business, narcotics are not the Taliban’s institutionalized business, and without drug money, the movement would not fall apart. The bulk of the Taliban – fighters, and commanders in non-poppy growing areas as well as leaders who do not deal with finances – are in the dark about the movement’s relationship to drugs. No one asks how the fighting is funded, and the finance chiefs and those who collect drug-related incomes try to keep the opium returns secret, since involvement with drugs is still ideologically unacceptable for many members. The rank and file dismiss as lies reports about Taliban participation in the drug trade that appear in Afghan and international media and in propaganda by the Islamic State group. Nevertheless, the Taliban profits from the drug trade and in doing so opens itself to the charge of being profit-driven, rather than motivated by a political vision. Some Taliban leaders understand the negative impression this creates in the international arena. In November last year, the Taliban’s political emissaries in Qatar sent a message to the international community through independent Afghan political activists: if the government imposes a ban on drugs in its own areas, they said, the Taliban would return to a complete prohibition. Aerial bombing is a deadly new turn in coercive counter-narcotics operations. U.S. officials have hailed it as an effective element of the new U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, part of a multi-pronged approach in fighting the insurgency. They claim the airstrikes have already had an impact on the Taliban, something that is difficult to measure on ground independently. It is also unlikely to weaken the Taliban financially, not least because its sources of funding are so diverse. The bombing campaign is much more likely to benefit the movement in other ways. This is because most drug labs being targeted are the primary livelihood of ordinary people, and are usually located in populated areas. Destroying them with no provision for alternative sources of income, and the probable killing of civilians in the process, will increase popular support for the Taliban. Accounts from areas affected by the bombing already indicate the airstrikes have mainly hurt civilians and their livelihoods rather than the Taliban. The aerial bombing is also not going to help neutralise Afghanistan’s opium boom. Soaring opium production is largely a symptom of rampant corruption on the state side, and the failure of the Afghan government and its international backers to give farmers viable new ways of earning a living. Corrupt government officials and pro-state elite have long participated in the opium economy on a greater scale than any non-state actor. The transformative reforms needed to tackle these challenges can only come through resolving the insurgency, which in turn can only be resolved through a political settlement. Dismissing the Taliban as a drug-running, criminal enterprise is not the answer. The group stands for a cause that has a popular resonance in non-marginal segments of society, and it is these genuine constituencies and popular roots that account for its continued survival, not the opium boom. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

For Buddhists in Burma, even a quick scroll through Facebook's news feed provides fuel for hatred and nationalistic fervor. An endless stream of provocative photos and cartoons claim that there is no "ethnic cleansing" against Burma's Muslim Rohingya minority. Instead, according to the posts, international news and human rights organizations are falsely accusing the military of carrying out atrocities against the Rohingya to help terrorists infiltrate the country, kill Buddhists and carve out a separatist Islamic province. Burma was long closed off by a military regime, with centuries-old tensions between its Buddhist and Muslim communities leashed by strict control over traditional media.As the country transitions into democracy, those constraints have loosened and access to the Internet has expanded rapidly, most notably through a Facebook program called Free Basics that has catapulted the platform into prominence as a major source of news in Burma. But the sudden proliferation of recently available technologies has accelerated the spread of ethnic hatred in Burma, stoking tensions amid a violent military crackdown that has sent more than 600,000 Rohingya fleeing across the border into Bangladesh. Information-age Burma is defined by Facebook: More people have access to Facebook than have regular electricity in their homes. A recent study found that 38 percent of Facebook users in Burma got most, if not all, of their news on the site. And news feeds in Burma are rife with anti-Rohingya posts, shared not only by ordinary people but also by senior military officers and the spokesman for Burma's de facto leader, Aung Sang Suu Kyi. "Burma is experiencing an ugly renaissance of genocidal propaganda," said Matthew Smith, the co-founder of Fortify Rights, a human rights organization working in Southeast Asia. "And it spreads like wildfire on Facebook." Ruchika Budhraja, a spokeswoman for Facebook, said the company has been ramping up its efforts in Burma to curtail hate speech and has had a Burmese-language team in place to monitor posts "for several years." Facebook relies on users to flag content that might violate the site's complicated "community standards." Misinformation does not qualify for removal on its own but can be removed if it is particularly obscene or contains threats. The most well-known purveyor of anti-Rohingya social media posts is Ashin Wirathu, an enormously influential hard-line monk who turned to Facebook after he was banned from public preaching for a year by the government. Wirathu likened Muslims to mad dogs and posted pictures of dead bodies he claimed were Buddhists killed by Muslims, while never acknowledging brutality faced by the Rohingya. Facebook said in a statement that Wirathu's access to his account had been restricted in the past, and that some content had been removed, but would not say whether the company regularly monitors it for hate speech. Other Buddhist nationalist monks also use Facebook as a recruiting tool. One of those monks is Thu Seikta. In a monastery in central Rangoon, Burma's former capital and largest city, Seikta pulled out a silver tablet and swiped through its applications. Nearby, two junior monks held phones, filming visitors in the hushed, wood-paneled hall. Cats snoozed on sacks of rice. Seikta knows well that Facebook isn't just a place to share ideas but to mobilize followers, too. In April, he advertised a rally he was organizing outside the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon against the State Department's use of the term "Rohingya" and subsequently called for volunteers to intimidate Muslim shopkeepers who work near the golden-domed Shwedagon Pagoda. Facebook said that Seikta's account was being evaluated based on information provided by The Washington Post. Seikta said the Rohingya exodus to Bangladesh since violence broke out in late August made him happy. The Burmese military engaged in what it called "clearance operations" in Rohingya villages and said it targeted only Rohingya militants accused of attacking outposts of the security forces, killing officers and stealing weapons. "Bengali people are the most dangerous people in the world," the monk said. "It is natural for them to go to their home place. If they come back, there will be more violence." In Burma, which is also known as Myanmar, the term "Bengali" takes on pejorative connotations when used to identify the Rohingya. Much of the propaganda that spreads online reinforces the falsehood that the Rohingya are immigrants from Bangladesh, despite the group having historical ties to what is now Burma since before the British colonial era. And the first to perpetuate the use of "Bengali" and other falsehoods on Facebook are often government or military accounts. A recent Facebook post on the page of the office of the Burmese military's commander in chief - which has more than 2 million followers - detailed the results of an internal investigation that exonerated the military of any persecution of the Rohingya and used the term "Bengali terrorist" 41 times. An allegation that some Rohingya burned their own villages and then blamed it on Burmese security forces is also common. Zaw Htay, a spokesman for Suu Kyi, used his Facebook page to share the claim, along with images since proven to have been doctored. They remain on his page. The deployment of Facebook by Suu Kyi's government "smacks of immaturity of governance," said David Mathieson, an independent Burma analyst formerly with Human Rights Watch. "The military has embraced this as well. The commander in chief [of the armed forces] is a slave to social media." Facebook's reliance on users to flag questionable content means people like Maung Maung Lwin, 29, a waiter at a trendy coffee shop, are left mostly to their own wits to distinguish fact from fake. Lwin works and lives in Sittwe, the capital of Burma's Rakhine state, home to most Rohingya before these months of upheaval. He flicked the screen of his Redmi Note 3, an inexpensive Indian-made cellphone, to show the news of the Rohingya crisis on his Facebook feed. His friend had posted an anti-Rohingya cartoon that shows the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the United Nations pushing a Trojan horse full of Rohingya militants into Burma. Farther down, dated photos of dead Burmese soldiers are attached to another post. Lwin dismissed the first cartoon as "too political" and the second as obvious fake news. Lwin said he could usually tell the difference between real and fake news. But for most, that kind of discernment comes only with experience, and Burma is just entering the digital era. The Internet's power seems to have disturbed Burma's elected government, too - though not out of any apparent concern for the Rohingya. On Nov. 8, Burma's parliament approved a law that allows the government "to oversee and monitor the misuse of information technology which may harm the character and morality of youths and disrupt tranquility." In a post for Facebook's "Hard Questions" blog, a company vice president wrote of the problem of catching and removing hate speech in Burma. "We've had trouble enforcing this policy correctly recently, mainly due to the challenges of understanding the context; after further examination, we've been able to get it right," he wrote. "But we expect this to be a long-term challenge." _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Washington Post​

Welcoming Remarks Keynote Address: H.E. Fatou Bensouda, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Moderator: Mona Khalil, Legal Adviser, Independent Diplomat Panelists: Niemat Ahmadi, President and Founder of the Darfur Women Action Group Dr. Elisa von Joeden-Forgey, Associate Professor of Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Stockton University & President of Genocide Watch Bibiane Tshefu, Women's Coordinator at the Friends of the Congo DATE: 12 December 2017, UN North Lawn Building (CR 6) TIME: 1:15pm - 3:00pm Please RSVP to: program@darfurwomenaction.org and please indicate whether you have a UN badge or need assistance to access the building We would be grateful if you could join us! _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Darfur Women Action Group

More than 620,000 of the Muslim minority have fled into Bangladesh's Cox's Bazar district since late August Global aid groups on Saturday warned Myanmar they would boycott any new camps for Rohingya returnees to Rakhine state, saying refugees must be allowed to settle in their original homes. The joint statement, signed by more than a dozen humanitarian organisations including Save the Children and Oxfam, said the groups were "concerned" by recent announcements that Myanmar would begin repatriating Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh in two months. More than 620,000 of the Muslim minority have fled into Bangladesh's Cox's Bazar district since late August, when the Myanmar army launched a sweeping crackdown on Rohingya rebels in northern Rakhine state. After inking a repatriation deal with Myanmar in November, Bangladesh said returnees would initially live in temporary shelters in Rakhine state. That announcement raised fears that the refugees would face a repeat of the situation endured by more than 100,000 Rohingya in central Rakhine, who have been trapped in squalid camps ever since they were displaced by a 2012 outbreak of violence. "There should be no form of closed camps or camp-like settlements. INGOs will not operate in such camps if they are created," aid groups said Saturday, adding that all returns must be voluntary. The UN has said the army campaign, which saw hundreds of Rohingya villages razed to the ground, likely amounts to ethnic cleansing and has possible "elements of genocide" -- charges Myanmar vehemently denies. While the worst bouts of violence appear to have subsided in recent months, refugees are still crossing the border, UNHCR said on Friday, insisting that peace must be secured before any repatriation process begins. The Rohingya face intense discrimination in mainly Buddhist Myanmar. Myanmar does not recognise the minority as a genuine ethnicity and has systematically stripped the group of citizenship, while curtailing their movement and access to jobs and basic services. Authorities have also severely curbed aid access to northern Rakhine since the violence erupted in late August, a blockade that has helped drive more refugees across the border. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Daily Mail

Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak called for foreign intervention to stop the “genocide” of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar on Sunday, as he joined thousands of Rohingya protesters in Kuala Lumpur. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak addresses a news conference after talks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the chancellery in Berlin, Germany September 27, 2016. REUTERS/Hannibal Hanschke Muslim-Majority Malaysia has been increasingly critical of Myanmar’s handling of violence and allegations of state abuses in northern Rakhine state, which has driven hundreds of ethnic Rohingya to flee across the borders to Bangladesh. It described the violence as “ethnic cleansing” on Saturday. Najib called on the United Nations, the International Criminal Court and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation to intervene. “The world cannot just sit by and watch genocide taking place,” he told the crowd. Najib’s attendance came despite warnings from Myanmar that Malaysia risked violating the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) principle of non-interference in other members’ internal affairs. In response, Najib said ASEAN, which agreed to declare itself a single community last year, had also pledged in its charter to uphold basic human rights. He also accused Myanmar leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi of inaction, saying that she had declared the Rohingya issue off-limits during bilateral discussions. “How can this be? We should be allowed to discuss everything,” he said. The gathering, organised by Najib’s ruling United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, attracted around 10,000 people, mostly Rohingya. Malaysia summoned Myanmar’s ambassador last week to express concern over the crackdown on Rohingya. It also cancelled the national soccer team’s friendly under-22 matches with Myanmar in protest. Rohingya Society in Malaysia president Faisal Islam Muhammad Kassim said he appreciated Malaysia’s efforts to find a solution to the crisis. “We want the Malaysian government to (send a) message to the Muslim world and the Western countries, to pressure the Myanmar government to solve this Rohingya issue,” he said. The violence in Myanmar is the most serious bloodshed in Rakhine since communal clashes in 2012 that killed hundreds. Persecution and poverty led thousands of Rohingya to flee Myanmar following the violence between Buddhists and Muslims there four years ago. Many of them were smuggled or trafficked to neighbouring countries, mostly to Thailand and Malaysia. Najib, who has been buffeted by graft allegations he denies, vowed on Thursday to fight to the end for Malays and Islam, as he called on UMNO to prepare for elections that are “coming soon”. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reuters

What’s the issue?  The response of Myanmar’s military to militant group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army’s (ARSA) August attacks has led to one of the most catastrophically fast refugee exoduses in modern times. More than 624,000 Rohingya Muslims have fled Myanmar to Bangladesh, creating the world’s largest refugee camp. Why does it matter?  The eviction of the Rohingya community from Myanmar is far from the end of the crisis. The situation is transforming Myanmar’s domestic politics and international relations, and potential future cross-border attacks by ARSA militants could increase tensions between Myanmar and Bangladesh. What should be done?  Imposing targeted sanctions can send an important message and potentially deter others from similar actions against minority communities. But they are unlikely to produce positive change in Myanmar. Even as they impose targeted sanctions, the international community should continue to provide humanitarian support for Rohingya refugees and resist pressure to disengage from the country. Executive Summary Three months after militant attacks triggered a brutal army operation targeting Rohingya Muslim communities in Myanmar’s northern Rakhine State, more than 624,000 have fled to Bangladesh, one of the fastest refugee exoduses in modern times. In addition to unimaginable human suffering, the crisis has transformed Myanmar’s domestic politics and international relations and will have a huge impact on the regional security landscape. Myanmar is rapidly losing what remains of the enormous international good-will that its political transition had generated. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi in particular has been widely criticised for failing to use her moral authority and domestic legitimacy to shift anti-Rohingya sentiment in Myanmar and the government’s current course. Meanwhile, the exodus continues and will likely soon reach its tragic end point: the almost complete depopulation of Rohingya from northern Rakhine State. As the world struggles to define a response, and as the crisis enters a new, fraught and highly uncertain phase, several important elements need to be borne in mind. First, there needs to be continued insistence on the right of refugees to return in a voluntary, safe and dignified manner. At the same time, the grim reality is that the vast majority of the Rohingya in Bangladesh will not be going home any time soon. This presents the enormous humanitarian challenge of sustaining lives and dignity in the largest refugee camp in the world. It also presents grave political and security risks that need to be addressed, including potential cross-border attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) militant group and possible transnational terrorism. Second, it is important to recognise that Myanmar’s political direction has been set and will be extremely difficult to change. The strength of the national consensus is hard to overstate: the government, military and almost the entire population of the country are united on this issue as on no other in its modern history. This will make it extraordinarily difficult to move official policy. Any imposition of sanctions thus requires careful deliberation: they can help send a welcome signal that might deter others around the world contemplating similar actions, but they are unlikely to produce positive change in Myanmar and, depending on what precisely is done, could make the situation worse. This report examines the lead-up to the ARSA attacks on 25 August 2017, revealing new and significant details about the group’s preparations, and the attacks themselves. This is based on research in Myanmar and Bangladesh since October 2016, including interviews with members of ARSA, analysis of WhatsApp messages sent by the group and its supporters, publicly-posted videos and interviews with villagers in Rakhine State and recently-arrived refugees in Bangladesh. Much of the research has been done by experienced personnel fluent in the Rohingya language. The report also assesses the impact the crisis will have on Myanmar. Finally, it discusses some possible international policy responses. Brussels, 7 December 2017 I.Background to the Crisis While the current crisis is rooted in longstanding discrimination and denial of human rights, the immediate trigger was the emergence of a militant group within the Rohingya population in the north of Rakhine State. This hardened national sentiment toward the Rohingya and shifted the calculus of the security forces. Harakah al-Yaqin, subsequently rebranded in English as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), first began organising itself after deadly communal violence in 2012. It launched its initial attacks – coordinated assaults on the Border Guard Police (BGP) headquarters and two other bases – on 9 October 2016. Previous armed militant groups had been based in the hills (the Arakan mujahidin in the 1950s), or launched hit-and-run attacks from across the border in Bangladesh (for example the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation in the 1990s). In contrast, ARSA operates from within Rohingya villages, using cells of villagers who have been given some basic training but most of whom do not have access to firearms, only bladed weapons and some improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In response to the October 2016 attacks, the military deployed overwhelming retaliatory force against nearby villages, followed by extensive “clearance operations” – brutal counter-insurgency operations that the military has used for decades in other parts of the country – with the stated purpose of recapturing the dozens of small arms and thousands of rounds of ammunition looted by ARSA.When troops came under attack from militants and villagers and a senior officer was killed, the military further escalated, including the use of helicopter gunships in civilian areas. Over the following weeks, tens of thousands of Rohingya fled to Bangladesh and security forces burned down several thousand homes. A United Nations (UN) human rights office report found the “very likely commission of crimes against humanity”. A retired senior army officer noted that it would have been more effective to use the police to achieve the operation’s stated purpose of recovering the looted weapons and ammunition (most were not found). In the months following the October 2016 attacks, ARSA set about consolidating its authority in Rohingya villages in northern Rakhine and preparing for the next round of attacks. It did this through the targeted killings of dozens of Rohingya men with links to the authorities (such as village heads, other local administrators and suspected informers), ramped up training in the hills as well as IED production in safe houses. The authorities were aware of these developments, with the state media reporting many of the killings as well as the discovery of IED factories. For them, the next ARSA attacks were seen as a matter of when, not if. II.Build-up to the Crisis In the months before the August 2017 ARSA attacks, a series of incidents suggested an uptick in ARSA training and preparation, putting Rakhine Buddhist villagers and the security forces on edge: On 4 May, the accidental detonation of an IED during an ARSA explosives training course in Kyaung Taung village tract (north Buthidaung) killed seven men including the instructor, and injured at least five others. According to a reliable source close to the events, the instructor was Pakistani, not Rohingya. He was badly injured and died in Padakar Ywar Thit village tract (Maungdaw) while being carried to Bangladesh for treatment. The people carrying him asked a village head to arrange his burial in a local cemetery but after being informed of the situation, security officials arrested the village head and took the body to Buthidaung hospital. These officials were the source of domestic Myanmar media reports some days later about the death of a foreign militant.On 7 May, security forces investigating the IED detonation discovered the training camp and bomb-making materials. Six days later, the government announced it had found the bodies of five victims buried nearby, which they said included two foreigners. This prompted security forces to undertake violent evictions and clearance operations in the area (particularly around adjacent Tin May village tract), killing several people and prompting some families to flee to Bangladesh in May and June.On June 20-21, the government reported that security forces had killed three men while clearing a likely ARSA training camp in the mountains near Sein Hnyin Pyar village tract (south Buthidaung).On 24 June, four Rakhine Buddhist villagers came across bomb-making material while foraging in Kyun Pauk Pyu Su village tract (north Maungdaw). ARSA members shot two of them dead; the two others, one of whom was injured, fled and alerted authorities. However, ARSA members apparently removed the incriminating material before the security forces reached the spot. This was the first known case of ARSA killing non-Rohingya civilians, and significantly increased anxiety among Rakhine Buddhist villagers; some 200 fled to Maungdaw town, fearing ARSA attacks. On 27 June, security forces in the area were placed on high alert; on 30 June, senior government officials in Naypyitaw discussed the situation at a “special meeting on Rakhine State”.On 1 August, authorities reported that an IED accidentally exploded at an ARSA safe house in Pan Taw Pyin village tract (Maungdaw) and that they found explosives and other bomb-making material at the house. Two days later, eight members of the Mro ethnic group, both men and women, were killed in the hills of Maungdaw township. The government immediately blamed ARSA, although some local villagers say the killings were related to the illicit methamphetamine trade.On 4 August, BGP clashed with a group of villagers in Auk Nan Yar village tract, Rathedaung township, firing a dozen or more shots while trying to disperse a 300-strong crowd angry over the arrest of villagers suspected of being associated with ARSA, including a prominent local imam. During the clash, one of the suspected militants escaped; local villagers reported several injuries from gunshots, including four people taken to Bangladesh for treatment. There were already significant tensions in the area. On 27 July 2017, a Rakhine villager had gone missing while foraging in nearby Chut Pyin village tract. Three days later, while searching in the surrounding hills, security forces and villagers discovered a stash of tarpaulins and food, including World Food Programme (WPF)-branded energy biscuits (see section V.A below), which they took to be an ARSA camp. Believing militants killed the missing person, Rakhine villagers declared a boycott of Muslims in the area. In the nearby village of Zay Di Pyin, Buddhist villagers blocked all access roads with barbed wire and prevented residents from going to work or accessing the mosque, food markets and water sources. According to various sources, on 27 August, security forces and local vigilantes perpetrated a mass killing of “at least scores” of Rohingya villagers in Chut Pyin. These events provoked heightened nervousness. On 9 August 2017, the commander-in-chief and other senior military officers met with leaders of the Arakan National Party, the largest party in Rakhine State – a rare meeting between the top brass and a political party. The party expressed concerns about the security situation in northern Rakhine and requested the arming of local Rakhine Buddhist militias. That same day, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi convened a ministerial meeting on the security situation in Rakhine to discuss the recent killings and rising tensions. The following day, the government highlighted its deployment of some 500 troops to northern Rakhine to reassure local non-Muslim villagers and conduct patrols in the mountains between Maungdaw and Buthidaung where militants were suspected of having established training camps. The escalatory dynamic was well under way. On 16 August, ARSA uploaded a video of its commander, Ata Ullah, flanked by armed fighters and warning the Myanmar military to demilitarise northern Rakhine State and end abuses of Rohingya; he specifically cited the blockade of Rohingya villagers in Zay Di Pyin. He reiterated that the group had no relation with international jihadist groups and said that, contrary to government assertions, it did not target Rakhine civilians. III.ARSA Attacks and Military Response A.ARSA Attacks In the early hours of 25 August 2017, from 1am until dawn, ARSA launched attacks on some 30 BGP posts and an army base. Their human wave attacks in some cases involved hundreds of people, mostly untrained local villagers armed with farm tools as well as some hand-held and remote-detonated IEDs. A small number of further clashes occurred over the next several days. The official death toll was fourteen members of the security forces, one government official and 371 people the government characterised as militants. ARSA initiated the attacks via a WhatsApp audio message delivered shortly after 8pm on 24 August. It instructed cell leaders to mobilise all male villagers over the age of fifteen, assemble in pre-planned locations with whatever sharp objects were available and attack designated targets. Many ordinary villagers apparently responded to the call, which was often conveyed by respected local Islamic clerics (known as “Mullahs” or “Maulvis”) or scholars (“Hafiz”) who seemingly made up most cell leaders and who enjoy considerable religious and community authority. Many untrained villagers were provided with IEDs for use in the attacks. The targets were mostly small police posts and checkpoints, except for the army base in Chin Tha Mar village (near Nga Yant Chaung or Taung Bazar), Buthidaung township, though not many villagers appear to have joined this attack, which was quickly overpowered. ARSA members claim they planned to attack additional targets but that some police posts were deserted when militants reached them. Other targets were more heavily defended than expected and the attackers suffered heavy casualties. The security forces assert that they had several hours advance warning; whether accurate or not, they clearly were expecting attacks at some point. On 25 August, ARSA issued a series of messages apparently intended both to instil confidence and resolve among its members and followers and to promote and glorify martyrdom, the goal being to encourage lightly armed male villagers to participate in highly risky attacks. Some messages falsely claimed that ARSA was taking control of the areas it attacked. Members were also reassured that armed reinforcements had been dispatched; they never arrived. On 28 August, Ata Ullah issued WhatsApp audio messages instructing his followers to burn down Rakhine Buddhist villages with Molotov cocktails. This was in direct contradiction to the group’s repeatedly stated policy and prior approach, which was to refrain from attacking non-security targets. The reason for this change is not clear, though it may have been because non-Rohingya vigilantes from nearby villages were helping the military burn Rohingya villages during clearance operations. ARSA might have concluded that Rakhine and other non-Rohingya villagers therefore were a fair target. In the event, the order does not appear to have been widely acted upon as only three non-Rohingya villages are known to have been attacked or burned down by Rohingya. One particularly high-profile case is the alleged massacre by ARSA of dozens of Hindu men and women in Kha Maung Seik (also known as Fakira Bazar) in Maungdaw township. Conflicting accounts of the incident and of who was responsible have surfaced. Survivors who fled to Bangladesh initially told Bangladeshi journalists in late-August that the killers were Rakhine militants; others said later that they wore masks, preventing identification. The first report of the incident by Myanmar media on 5 September 2017 attributed the killings to ARSA, based on interviews with survivors in Myanmar. A more detailed account reaching the same conclusion was posted on Facebook on 13 September by a Rakhine nationalist parliament member who investigated the incident. The security forces reported finding and exhuming a mass grave containing the victims’ bodies on 24 September; these subsequently were cremated. It is not clear what forensic evidence remains. B.Catastrophic Military Response A brutal military response that failed to discriminate between militants and the general population, followed by continued insecurity and restrictions that have imperilled livelihoods, has driven more than 624,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh. This is one of the fastest refugee exoduses in modern times and has created the largest refugee camp in the world. A large proportion of Rohingya villages in the area have been systematically reduced to ashes by both troops and local Rakhine vigilante groups that were equipped and supported by the military following the 25 August ARSA attacks. Grim details of the military and local vigilante campaign of violence, described by the UN as “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (a characterisation that has now been echoed by the United States) and by human rights groups as crimes against humanity, have been set out in a series of detailed reports by these organisations. They document widespread, unlawful killings by the security forces and vigilantes, including several massacres; rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and children; the widespread, systematic, pre-planned burning of tens of thousands of Rohingya homes and other structures by the military, BGP and vigilantes across northern Rakhine State from 25 August until at least October 2017; and severe, ongoing restrictions on humanitarian assistance for remaining Rohingya villagers. Crisis Group’s analysis of population data for northern Rakhine State from various sources suggests that around 85 per cent of the Rohingya population in these three townships has fled to Bangladesh over the last twelve months, leaving behind only 100,000-150,000. There are also some 320,000 Muslims in central Rakhine State, many but not all of whom identify as Rohingya; 120,000 of these have been confined to displacement camps since communal violence in 2012. The three northern townships were impacted in somewhat different ways: Maungdaw township was the focus of ARSA attacks on 25 August 2017 and in October 2016. It had the largest Rohingya population and shares the longest border with Bangladesh (river and land, as well as adjacent seaboard). It bore the brunt of the military response and it appears that almost the entire township has been depopulated of Rohingya, apart from some parts of Maungdaw town and a small number of villages. Buthidaung township has historically been less affected by violence and displacement than Maungdaw. It also shares a land border with Bangladesh, along the hilly and hard to access northern part of the township; most of the population lives in the south. There were no ARSA attacks here in October 2016, only a small number in August 2017, to which the initial military response appears to have been more localised and limited. Far fewer Rohingya villages were initially burned here compared to Maungdaw. While the military response and burnings triggered some immediate departures to Bangladesh, the vast majority left later to escape untenable living conditions: continued burning of villages and attacks or threats by Rakhine vigilantes plus new, severe movement restrictions that deprived people of their normal means of survival from farming, fishing, foraging and trading. With humanitarian assistance also heavily restricted, communities came to the decision in late September 2017 that they had no choice but to make the long and dangerous journey in large groups, over the mountains to Maungdaw and on to Bangladesh. Rathedaung township, unlike Maungdaw and Buthidaung, is a Rakhine Buddhist-majority area that does not share a border with Bangladesh. One of the three October 2016 ARSA attacks was here, in Koe Tan Kauk (close to the boundary with Maungdaw); the government claimed an ARSA attack in this area on 25 August 2017. Subsequent anti-Rohingya violence and threats had a much greater communal component. Nearly all Rohingya in the township have now fled to Bangladesh, apart from five villages with no viable escape route and only very limited access to food or humanitarian support. In addition to the massive Rohingya exodus, the crisis also led to the displacement of some 27,000 non-Rohingya villagers and government employees in northern Rakhine, most of whom fled the initial ARSA attacks and subsequent clashes. Nearly all moved or were evacuated inland, to the main towns of Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Sittwe. The government is now strongly encouraging them to return and begin rebuilding their damaged or destroyed houses. Since 25 August 2017, the government has blocked access to northern Rakhine State by the UN and most other humanitarian actors. The Red Cross movement (the International Committee, International Federation, and Myanmar Red Cross Society) have been permitted to work, although they face delays and restrictions as well as enormous logistical challenges in reaching populations in need; they have called for other humanitarian actors to be granted access. On 6 November, the World Food Programme was able to resume food aid to Rohingya and non-Rohingya communities through the government but with no staff access to monitor distribution directly. IV.Dangers Ahead A.Repatriation Remains a Distant Hope More than 624,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh in the last three months. Myanmar’s neighbours and other members of the international community must insist on their right of return and press the Myanmar authorities to create conditions conducive to a voluntary and safe repatriation. At the same time, prospects are extremely dim for the return of any significant number of Rohingya refugees to their home areas in Myanmar in the short or medium term. Myanmar and Bangladesh signed a repatriation agreement on 23 November 2017 in Naypyitaw. While it was politically expedient for both sides – Bangladesh to signal that it will not host the refugees indefinitely, and Myanmar to respond to charges of ethnic cleansing and ease pressure for action – it should be seen as a statement of intent rather than a sign that return is imminent. On paper, the criteria for returnees to be accepted by Myanmar are not too onerous: they need to have left Myanmar after 9 October 2016 (ruling out historical caseloads) and to provide evidence of bona fide residence in Myanmar, with no need for any particular documentation (an address should be sufficient). But the main obstacle to repatriation is that most are very unlikely to want to do so (according to the agreement, returns must be voluntary). The conditions on the ground in northern Rakhine are far from conducive, and the exodus of deeply traumatised refugees continues. There is lack of clarity from Myanmar on whether they would be allowed to return to their villages of origin and reclaim their farmland. The agreement also provides for the issuance of National Verification Cards at the point of return – a document most Rohingya reject out of fear that it will codify second-class citizenship status. The government and security forces have expressed concern about the presence of “terrorists” (that is, ARSA) or their supporters among the refugees, warning they would arrest such individuals upon return, which suggests returnees will be subject to extreme scrutiny or vetting. Another major obstacle is that Rakhine Buddhist leaders and communities are strongly opposed to the return of any Rohingya refugees. Even if these obstacles could be overcome, a repatriation effort on this scale would overwhelm Myanmar’s capacity and resources; a senior official asserted that only 300 could be processed per day. Myanmar has consistently declined any role for the UN Refugee Agency, which could mobilise the necessary support as well as credibility in the eyes of the Rohingya and internationally; the bilateral agreement does not require it. Fundamentally, neither the government nor security forces possess the political will to create conditions for voluntary return and implement a credible and effective process to that end. This raises the prospect of a long-term concentration of hundreds of thousands of traumatised Rohingya confined to squalid camps in Bangladesh, with no obvious way out or hope for the future. That would not only be a human tragedy, but also a grave security threat. Such a context would be ripe for mobilising further violent responses and potential transnational jihadist recruitment. B.Security Risks ARSA may still be reeling from the enormity of the crisis that its attacks triggered; tellingly, no videos of Ata Ullah have been released since 28 August 2017. Still, it appears determined to regroup and remain relevant. A Twitter account that likely represents the group remains active. It issued a statement on 7 October 2017 announcing the end of its unilateral ceasefire two days later, putting pressure on the group to demonstrate its continued capabilities. ARSA has not launched any new attack since then, but will undoubtedly strive to do so. Given how ARSA is organised, this will require a significant departure from its previous way of operating. Rather than basing uniformed, armed militants in camps, ARSA has, to date, organised cells within hundreds of villages, led by a network of respected local leaders, including young Mullahs. It attempted to incite a general uprising among the population, overrunning police posts using overwhelming numbers of ordinary villagers with farm tools, rather than military might. Yet operating under cover of the civilian population is no longer possible given that few Rohingya villages remain. Most of the group’s organisers and fighters are now in the Bangladesh camps, having fled along with the rest of the population. The group may thus shift to cross-border attacks, which would require different training, access to weapons as well as operating space in Bangladesh. Acquiring that space might now be more realistic given Bangladesh’s anger and frustration toward Myanmar. If ARSA launches cross-border attacks, it could aim at opportunistic security targets in northern Rakhine or turn to attacking any non-Muslim villagers resettled on Rohingya lands, an easier target. Inevitably, such attacks would have profoundly negative consequences. They would escalate tensions between Bangladesh and Myanmar and could potentially lead to clashes between the two countries’ militaries. New ARSA attacks would reinforce anti-Rohingya sentiment within Myanmar and prompt heightened security measures that would further diminish prospects for an eventual refugee return. Moreover, attacks against Rakhine Buddhist villagers would inflame anti-Muslim sentiment in general and could tip central Rakhine State, so far untouched by the recent violence, into crisis. Intercommunal relations are now on a knife-edge, which further constrains the ability of Muslims in the area to move freely and access services and livelihoods. Communal attacks there are a very real threat, and unlike their coreligionists in northern Rakhine, these communities have no viable escape routes. Finally, while new ARSA attacks could provoke further violence, international jihadist groups represent a far bigger security threat to Myanmar. The country has justified what it calls clearance operations by arguing the nation faces a terrorist threat. This could be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The plight of the Rohingya has captured the attention of the Muslim world, becoming a cause célèbre like perhaps no other since Kosovo. Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and other jihadist groups, which have long issued statements of solidarity with the Rohingya for propaganda purposes, are now calling directly for attacks on Myanmar and its leaders. Most recently, on 27 October 2017, the media arm of al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent released a video message from the group’s leader, Abu Syed al-Ansari, repeating calls for a jihad against Myanmar in support of the Rohingya. Myanmar is not prepared to prevent or deal with such an attack, which could be directed or merely inspired by these jihadist groups. Any attack, particularly on a religious target in a major city, would shred the fraught relations between Buddhists and Muslims across Myanmar, potentially sparking widespread communal violence; there are Muslim communities in most cities and many rural areas in Myanmar. C.Impact within Myanmar Extreme Buddhist nationalist sentiment, a growing concern in Myanmar in recent years, has contributed to – and been reinforced by – the current crisis. This has included anti-Rohingya hate speech in state media under the civilian government’s editorial control and in sermons by prominent Buddhist monks. A sermon by Sitagu Sayadaw, one of Myanmar’s most revered monks and a leading doctrinal authority, is particularly alarming. Preaching to military officers at a garrison and training college in Kayin State on 30 October 2017, he urged unity between the military and monkhood, then appeared to provide a religious justification for the mass killing of non-Buddhists. He recounted a well-known fifth century legend from Sri Lanka commonly used in Myanmar to justify violence in defence of the faith, telling the soldiers that no matter how much they had to fight, they should remember that non-Buddhists killed were “not fully human”. The sermon and local media reporting of it have been widely shared on social media, with many Myanmar people expressing support, though some have voiced unease or opposition. The government and military’s repeated, blanket denials of wrongdoing, widely disseminated in English and Burmese via state media, further reinforce a climate of impunity. This is particularly dangerous given that negative sentiments toward the Rohingya population are widespread at all levels of the military and in society as a whole. A recent editorial in the state paper dismissed “baseless accusations against the Myanmar Armed Forces” and stated that “it certainly does not take a legal expert to come to the conclusion that all those village[r]s who took part in the raids are also punishable under the anti-terrorism law. This fact may perhaps explain why nearly half-a-million people decided to cross over to … Bangladesh”. A detailed internal investigation by the military concluded that troops fired “not a single shot” on civilians and that “all security members … strictly abided by the orders”, a further signal of impunity. In a 21 September speech to northern Rakhine State troops, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing honoured “brilliant efforts to restore regional peace, security” and warned that a “race cannot be swallowed by the ground but only by another race” (a well-known Burmese saying that is also the motto of the immigration department). In a 15 November meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson, he stated that those who had fled to Bangladesh were ARSA terrorists and their families. Beyond the risk of further abuses against the Rohingya, the authorities have reinforced an ugly strand of nationalism that will outlast the current crisis and could be channelled to target other minorities. At a minimum, it will be more difficult for national leaders to make the necessary concessions in the peace process of greater minority rights and political and economic devolution. This could undermine prospects for a stable, peaceful and more prosperous future, and thus imperil the country’s political transition or significantly shift its landing spot. The crisis also will define the country in the eyes of much of the world for years to come. This will have a negative impact on trade, investment, tourism and global good-will, at a time when Myanmar is emerging from decades of isolation from the West. This is in turn likely to feed anti-Western sentiment, leading to greater estrangement and potentially cementing the country’s status as a pariah. The government’s priority long-term aims – balancing China’s geostrategic influence, integrating into the global economy and rehabilitating the military’s international image – may now be all but impossible to achieve. V.Government and International Response A.Government Position On the day of the attacks, the government declared ARSA a terrorist group under domestic law. It issued a warning to the media to refer to ARSA as “extremist terrorists” rather than use terms such as “insurgents”. It claimed that international NGOs may have been collaborating with ARSA and that World Food Programme (WFP) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) food aid had been diverted to the group. The government also stated that ammonia and tubes provided by development agencies for construction had been turned into IEDs. These statements set the tone for Myanmar’s escalatory response to the attacks and uncompromising attitude toward the UN and humanitarian agencies. Allegations of aid agency collusion were condemned by the U.S. ambassador to Myanmar as “absurd” and by the UN Human Rights chief as “irresponsible”, as they placed humanitarian staff “in danger and may make it impossible for them to deliver essential aid”. The accusations resulted in a boycott of aid agencies by their local contractors in Rakhine State and shipments came under mob attack. The government blocked access to northern Rakhine for all organisations (except the Red Cross) and most media. On 19 September and 12 October 2017, Aung San Suu Kyi addressed the Rakhine crisis in speeches that were criticised internationally, but gained strong local support. She questioned why Rohingya were fleeing, saying there were “allegations and counter-allegations” and claiming many Muslim villages were untouched and peaceful. She also announced the creation of a national fund for Rakhine State under her direction – the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development – and lobbied for Myanmar conglomerates and the general population to contribute cash; it has so far received some $20 million. Nine taskforces were established, all related to development. The risk is that if, as seems likely, repatriation does not proceed quickly or at scale, and there is no dramatic progress on desegregation or citizenship for Muslim communities across Rakhine State, this fund will end up supporting development initiatives that increase inequality and exacerbate conflict. As we have noted in prior reports and briefings, development interventions must be properly sequenced with political steps to address discrimination, segregation and citizenship status. B.International Response The crisis has prompted significant international scrutiny and criticism. UN Secretary-General Guterres sent an official letter to the Security Council on 2 September 2017 – the first time a Secretary-General has done so on any issue since 1989 – saying that “the international community has a responsibility to undertake concerted efforts to prevent further escalation of the crisis”. The Council met five times in August-October on the issue – including a briefing by Guterres on 28 September and a 13 October closed-door “Arria Formula” briefing with Kofi Annan, who was appointed by Suu Kyi in 2016 as chair of an advisory commission on Rakhine State, which completed its work in August. Guterres called on Myanmar to end the violence, allow unfettered humanitarian access, ensure the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of the refugees to their areas of origin, and prioritise implementation of the Annan commission recommendations – points echoed by several Council members. On 6 November, given Chinese and Russian opposition to a resolution, the Council instead unanimously agreed on a presidential statement that “strongly condemns the widespread violence that has taken place in Rakhine State since 25 August, which has led to the mass displacement” of Rohingya communities; “expresses alarm at the significantly and rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation”; and “demands the Government of Myanmar grant immediate, safe and unhindered access to United Nations agencies and their partners”. Myanmar expressed “deep concern” at the adoption of the statement and its use of the term “Rohingya”. The UN General Assembly approved a human rights resolution on Myanmar on 16 November, reviving annual resolutions dropped in 2016 in recognition of the country’s progress. Some countries also raised concerns bilaterally in a series of phone calls and meetings with Suu Kyi and the Commander-in-Chief. On 19 September, the UK announced it was suspending training programs for the Myanmar military and Prime Minister Theresa May signalled her willingness to support further action. The European Union Council of Foreign Ministers decided on 16 October to suspend visits of Myanmar military officers to Europe and review all defence cooperation, while also flagging the possibility of more formal sanctions. On 23 October, the U.S. issued a statement outlining its own steps, including restrictions on travel of current and former senior military leaders to the U.S., cancelling military-to-military engagements and exploring options for visa bans and asset freezes under the Global Magnitsky Act. On 22 November, Secretary Tillerson declared that the situation in northern Rakhine constituted ethnic cleansing and that accountability would be pursued through U.S. law, including possible targeted sanctions. Congress is currently vetting draft legislation that would re-impose some of the sanctions lifted in 2016. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau appointed a Special Envoy to spearhead diplomatic efforts to address the crisis, but the envoy, Bob Rae, was unable to secure any meetings with government officials during his visit to Myanmar in early November 2017. Myanmar set its political direction early in the crisis, and, so far, international scrutiny, pressure and diplomatic engagement has brought about no meaningful change – not even seemingly minor concessions such as allowing UN humanitarian access to the area or signalling openness to international support or advice. Extremely strong domestic political consensus on this issue has united the government, military and vast majority of the population as never before in Myanmar’s modern history. The international community thus faces a major challenge. In the face of ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, the political and moral imperative to take action has become overwhelming. The huge reservoir of international good-will for Myanmar and for Suu Kyi personally that existed prior to the crisis is rapidly drying up. Many countries wish to support Myanmar’s transition away from military rule, and have no desire to undermine its first democratically elected government in more than 50 years. But given the strong perception that the diplomatic channel is not producing results, and with public views hardening in many countries in the West and the Muslim world, the imposition of sanctions by Europe and the U.S. seems inevitable. Over time, the drumbeat for holding those most responsible criminally accountable will also likely increase. Yet policymakers should be under no illusions: sanctions are very unlikely to prompt positive change in Myanmar. Indeed, – depending on specifics – they could make matters worse. Unlike in the past, there is no domestic debate on different policy approaches that sanctions might be thought to influence. Their most likely effect will thus be to push the government, military and population even closer together and to reinforce current narratives in Myanmar that the West is a fickle friend and unreliable partner. Government leaders have explicitly warned that criticism and punitive actions from the West will only push them closer to China. History also is a guide. Until 2012, Myanmar was under some of the most stringent bilateral sanctions of any country; contemporaneous Crisis Group research indicates that these did almost nothing to influence the military regime and had very little tangible impact on it. Although termed “targeted”, they had little impact on the regime and its leaders, but caused significant damage to the general economy and the fortunes of ordinary people – something acknowledged for example by then-Secretary-of-State Hillary Clinton when she initiated a review of U.S. policy in 2009.There are few new options on the table, and any return to sanctions will inevitably involve some of the same basic elements. For Myanmar, these do not represent ominous new threats but rather the prospect of return to a very familiar status quo ante. Policymakers nevertheless feel they should act, not only in response to political pressure from their constituents but also to send an important broader signal to would-be perpetrators that such abuses will not go unpunished. There are ways policymakers can limit potential negative impact on the Myanmar people, who should not pay the price for the actions of a military that is constitutionally outside of democratic control. First, resist the urge to disengage. Policymakers should not lose sight of the distinction between government and people. Myanmar is home to millions of the poorest people in the region, and their aspirations for a better economic future must not be forgotten. The urge to disengage from the country, therefore, should be resisted. People-to-people exchanges with the West through academic, cultural and commercial interactions and tourism are crucial for a country that was isolated for so many decades. Second, maintain development assistance and non-military engagement. This will be easy for Western countries to commit to in theory, but hard to deliver in practice now that Myanmar is no longer a global good news story and its government is showing little flexibility on aid modalities. Trade preferences recently reinstated by the EU and U.S. are critical in supporting manufacturing jobs in Myanmar and should not be revoked. Third, work carefully to minimise the collateral impact of any targeted sanctions. Targeted sanctions on specific individuals and entities against whom there is evidence of wrongdoing, can help to promote accountability. Recent experience in Myanmar shows, however, that ostensibly targeted sanctions can have broader systemic impact on the economy that should be avoided. Fourth, engage with the military and government prior to imposing any sanctions. The goal should be to maximise any leverage that is available (even if minimal) at the critical moment of opportunity, by raising the prospect of any new sanctions and pushing for progress on the key objectives before these measures are imposed. Given the limited utility of sanctions, the international community should do all it can to mitigate the humanitarian disaster and influence the situation in other ways. This could include: Provide substantial ongoing humanitarian support to the Rohingya refugees, to reduce the risks of a further humanitarian catastrophe and alleviate the enormous burden on Bangladesh and local communities. This can help also mitigate the risk of refoulement. Assist Myanmar to define a pathway out of the current crisis, on the understanding that at least part of the challenge relates to management and implementation ability, in addition to political will. In particular, since the development-first approach being pursued by the government will be neither credible nor effective, pushing for political decisions to implement key recommendations of the Annan commission, including as regards discrimination, segregation and citizenship. Meaningful progress on these issues is vital to creating an environment conducive to voluntary repatriation, and giving international credibility to the Myanmar’s efforts. Begin contingency planning for the humanitarian, security and political consequences of a scenario where the Myanmar-Bangladesh bilateral process does not lead to significant numbers of refugees returning home. This will be discussed in detail in forthcoming Crisis Group reporting. China is particularly well-placed to promote positive outcomes should it decide to prioritise these. While in recent decades it has always supported Myanmar governments politically, and continues to be sceptical of international pressure, its blanket support cannot be taken for granted by Myanmar. China does not want this to come at the cost of its important relations with Bangladesh and the wider Muslim world, which is part of the reason why it allowed the recent UN Security Council presidential statement to be issued. China also has significant economic and strategic interests in Rakhine State that could be impacted by the crisis. So far, however, it has focused on allowing Myanmar and Bangladesh to work out the issue bilaterally. VI.Conclusion The actions of the Myanmar military in northern Rakhine State have created a major humanitarian catastrophe, a crisis for the country and a security threat to the region. It has strengthened an ugly strand of nationalism that will be long-lasting and could lead to the targeting of other minorities in the future. The crisis will define Myanmar in the eyes of much of the world for years to come, with hugely negative consequences across the board on trade, investment, tourism. The country has squandered its considerable reserves of global good-will just when it needed them most, as it was emerging from decades of isolation from the West. Myanmar has also put itself at much greater risk of attack by transnational jihadist groups. Priority long-term aims of balancing China’s geostrategic influence and economic dominance in the country and rehabilitating the military’s international image have been significantly set back. The abuses against the Rohingya minority have captured global public opinion, and the uncompromising posture of the government has exacerbated the situation. Western countries almost certainly will re-impose some of the sanctions that had been lifted in recent years. As they do so, they should acknowledge their inherent limitations and approach them in a manner that can maximise leverage while minimising collateral damage on Myanmar’s long-suffering population. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

In a new record for the persecution of the media in Turkey, a total of 68 journalists are due to appear in court in four different trials during the week of 4 to 11 December. A third of these journalists are already detained. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) condemns the baseless terrorism charges on which they are being tried and reiterates its call for their immediate release. All 68 are accused of supporting or belonging to a terrorist organization and most of them are also accused of “trying to overthrow the government and constitutional order.” Forty-four of them have already spent around 18 months in provisional detention. RSF’s Turkey representative, Erol Önderoğlu, is attending all the hearings, which are taking place in Istanbul and its suburbs. “With the same extremely grave charges, the same abuse of provisional detention and the same contempt for due process, these four trials illustrate the scale of the criminalization of journalism in Turkey,” said Johann Bihr, the head of RSF’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia desk. “The judicial system is now just serving as a veneer to disguise the deliberate elimination of all dissent. We reiterate our call to the authorities to free imprisoned journalists at once and to abandon these political trials.” The week-long judicial marathon began on 4 December with the resumption of the trial of 29 journalists charged with acting as the “media wing” of the Gülen Movement, which is accused by the government of being behind the July 2016 coup attempt. Two of these journalists, Murat Aksoy and Atilla Taş, were released at the previous hearing but 20 of them, including Abdullah Kılıç, Habip Güler and Yakup Çetin, are still detained and the 4 December hearing ending with the decision to keep them in detention until the next one, scheduled for 6 February. They are facing a possible sentence of between ten years in prison and life without any parole. The trial of six journalists in connection with revelations about President Erdoğan’s son-in-law, energy minister Berat Albayrak, resumed yesterday. Two of them, investigative reporter Tunca Öğreten and Mahir Kanaat of the left-wing daily BirGün, were finally freed under judicial control after nearly a year of provisional detention. None of the six is now detained but they are still facing possible 15-year jail sentences on charges of cooperating with a group of hackers and divulging state secrets in order to assist various terrorist organizations by “creating a negative perception of the authorities.” The next hearing has been set for 3 April. The trial of 30 former journalists and employees of the daily newspaper Zaman will resume tomorrow. Twenty-one of them, including Şahin Alpay, Ahmet Turan Alkan and Ali Bulaç, are in provisional detention. The case against them is largely based on the mere fact that they worked for Zaman, which was regarded as sympathetic to the Gülen Movement and was dissolved by decree in July 2016. Each of them is facing the possibility of three life sentences. The well-known journalists Ahmet Altan, Mehmet Altan and Nazlı Ilıcak, whose trial on similar charges will resume on 11 December, are all in provisional detention. Their criticism of the government is alleged to have “prepared the way” for the coup attempt, which Ahmet Altan is also accused of supporting by means of “subliminal messages.” The four lawyers who defend the Altan brothers were expelled from the courtroom during the last hearing. The prosecutor is due to present his summing-up at the hearing on 11 December. The already worrying media situation in Turkey has become critical under the state of emergency proclaimed after the July 2016 coup attempt. Around 150 media outlets have been closed, mass trials are being held and the country now holds the world record for the number of journalists detained. Turkey is ranked 155th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reporters without Borders