Sound Clip _________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 maungzarni

What’s the issue? President Joseph Kabila’s apparent determination to remain in power threatens to prolong the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) political stalemate. Having subverted the December 2016 Saint Sylvester agreement that set out a path toward elections, the regime is increasingly confident while the opposition grows weaker and more divided. Why does it matter? The DRC is already among the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Violence has been intensifying across several provinces and the risk of further escalation is high. A rapid implosion would have dire consequences for stability in the DRC and its neighbours. What should be done? Western and regional powers need to redouble efforts to encourage a peaceful transition. The recently-announced electoral calendar provides an opening for reinvigorated international engagement, ideally behind the Saint Sylvester principles. The Congolese opposition and civil society should engage in, not boycott, the political process. Executive Summary The political impasse in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) continues, and violence has been rising in several provinces throughout 2017. Yet the regime of President Joseph Kabila appears determined to stay in power by postponing elections. It has outmanoeuvred the opposition and international actors alike. The blockage carries grave dangers for Congolese and regional stability; the longer the crisis drags on, the harder it will be to pick up the pieces. To minimise these risks, Western and African powers need to overcome their inertia and forge consensus on how to pressure President Kabila. Revising international coordination mechanisms for the DRC could help. A joint Western and African approach should focus on advancing election preparations based on the recently published electoral calendar while actively pushing to open political space and eventually establish the confidence necessary to carry out a credible and peaceful vote and to maintain stability in its aftermath. Since the signing of the 31 December 2016 Saint Sylvester agreement, which stipulated that elections should occur in 2017 and that President Kabila should leave power, the regime has dug in, weakening the opposition through attrition. In contravention of the agreement, it now controls the government and the agreement’s national oversight committee, as well as the electoral commission. It has no grand strategy for staying in power, nor does it need one. The Kabila regime’s control of state finances and key institutions, the opposition’s weakness following the death of its historic leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, and dwindling international attention have allowed it to subvert the agreement’s implementation. Although the opposition coalition platform, the Rassemblement, has remained relatively coherent, it is weak and has been losing traction with a restless population. It is now calling for the establishment of a transitional government without Kabila at the end of 2017, an outcome that has no chance of occurring. The opposition’s weakness along with the regime’s repressive tactics has opened space for armed groups. Insurgencies, massive prison breaks, and vicious or clumsy security force reactions have all grown throughout 2017. There are tentative signs that armed groups are attempting to coordinate their positions, which could become a serious threat to the region’s stability. At least ten provinces now are in the grip of armed conflict, resulting in one of the world’s most complex and challenging humanitarian crises. Neighbours, particularly Angola and the Republic of Congo, are worried by renewed or potential refugee surges into their territory. It is a vicious cycle: as the government’s grip on power loosens, it increasingly uses heavy-handed tactics and disregards the rule of law while invoking the unrest to justify election delays, all of which only further fuels discontent. The electoral commission, after months of delay, finally has produced its electoral calendar, with presidential polls now scheduled for 23 December 2018 – a full year beyond the Saint Sylvester deadline. Left on its own, the government is likely to drag out electoral preparations even longer. International actors have been unwilling to engage more actively, partly out of frustration at the parties’ intransigence, partly due to their own differences over how to pressure the government. Many Western powers have become more critical of the regime, with the European Union (EU) and U.S. sanctioning nearly two dozen officials. In contrast, African heads of state generally have acquiesced as the government violates the spirit and terms of the Saint Sylvester agreement and tend to dismiss Western sanctions as ineffectual. Although neither Western nor African powers hold homogenous views, these broad divides allow the government to forum shop and portray pressure as a form of neo-colonialism. The sheer number of actors involved, including a multitude of regional organisations, adds to the problem. The starting point is for both Western and African powers to recognise that the direction in which President Kabila is driving the country poses the gravest threat to its stability, notwithstanding the uncertainty that a transition would bring. Even if many believe the current regime is highly unlikely to willingly leave power, working toward elections and a more open political environment remains vital. International actors share an interest in holding President Kabila to the Saint Sylvester deal’s main principles – notably the effective organisation of elections, no constitutional amendment to allow President Kabila to remain in office and an opening of political space and respect for human rights – which still offer the best route out of the crisis. Behind closed doors, African leaders recognise the dangers, but the forces of inertia are more complex to overcome. The result: continued public support for Kabila on the continent provides his regime breathing space. Western powers should redouble efforts to overcome differences with their African counterparts, listening to their concerns and, for now, refraining from further sanctions. Even united, it would not be easy for Western and regional powers to nudge Kabila toward a transition and the DRC out of its current predicament; divided, the prospects are close to zero. One option to reinvigorate and sustain regional and international diplomacy around the DRC would be to set up a smaller group of envoys, composed of the institutions that have initiated the group of experts for electoral support – the African Union (AU), UN, la Francophonie, EU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – preferably along with the U.S. Ideally, then, a consensus position would involve active African and Western diplomacy to promote the following: Adherence to the electoral timeline and a transparent elections budget. The recent publication of a feasible timeline – one that gives the opposition time to organise ahead of polls – is an opportunity for active engagement. International actors involved in electoral preparations, including the UN as well as regional groups and the EU, should monitor adherence to the calendar and warn against unjustified slippage. The government and electoral commission (CENI) should make it a priority to clarify and detail the funding of the process. The CENI should also rapidly clarify the financial and operational impact of its proposed semi-digital vote. Any option proposed should include a thorough and open assessment of its impact on the timing of elections. Parliament urgently needs to adopt relevant electoral legislation. Electoral legislation as well as other legal initiatives should avoid restricting political space. Implementation of previously agreed confidence-building measures. The government should establish a credible process to assess the legality and validity of the prosecution of several opposition leaders. It also should allow peaceful political protest, party activity and free media reporting. International actors, including regional ones, should pressure the government to this end. Recent initiatives, such as a restrictive law on civil society, run counter to the spirit of the Saint Sylvester and will hamper the transparency of the electoral process. Opposition parties’ intensified engagement in the process. Rather than boycotting talks or refusing to engage on key issues such as the electoral calendar, opposition figures should intensify their engagement in the process, including by actively challenging the regime’s manipulation of the judiciary. The opposition should transform its narrative and address key social and economic questions, proving their relevance to a restive citizenry. They also should start preparing their party structures and base for upcoming elections. Last, international actors, including the UN, have to be prepared for a potential short-term deterioration of the situation. The UN Security Council should give careful consideration to the recommendations of the September 2017 strategic review of the UN Mission, especially regarding greater flexibility in force deployment and human rights monitoring. The risk of violence escalating over the coming months is high and international actors, including the UN, should be prepared to manage the consequences as best possible. Nairobi/Brussels, 4 December 2017 I.Introduction On 31 December 2016, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) ruling political party coalition known as the Alliance of the Presidential Majority (hereinafter “the Majority”) and the opposition signed the “Comprehensive and Inclusive Political Agreement”, commonly known as the Saint Sylvester agreement. Mediated by the Congolese Catholic Church, it came about under pressure both from the street and international actors. By clearly stating that elections should be held in 2017 and that the constitutional provision on presidential term limits should not be changed, it appeared to answer the question dominating Congolese political life: how to organise a democratic transition of power with an unwilling incumbent. Over the next eleven months, the Majority controlled implementation to suit its agenda of further elections delay (glissement). It has exploited its opponents’ weakness and divisions and profited from a largely passive international community. The 5 November electoral calendar has now officially confirmed additional delay with polls planned for 23 December 2018 and the presidential inauguration scheduled in January 2019.While tension is rising throughout the country, there are few signs that either opposition or international actors have the capacity to shift the status-quo. The talks that led to the Saint Sylvester agreement were the most recent in a series of dialogues following the defeat of the M23 insurgency in 2013. The Majority sought to use these earlier rounds to stay in power beyond the end of President Joseph Kabila’s second and, according to the constitution, final term in office in 2016. However, it was far from plain sailing: talks did not produce an adequate consensus to amend the constitution and in January 2015, surprisingly large popular protests, sparked by government plans to implement an expensive and time-consuming census before it would hold elections, ended any illusion within the Majority that it could quickly engineer an outcome allowing the president to run for a third term. Shortly thereafter, fractures emerged within the Majority: then-Katanga Governor Moïse Katumbi left it in 2015, followed by parties that would form the “Group of Seven” (G7) opposition coalition. The regime’s crack-down on Katumbi and the G7 provided them with some credibility and sympathy among a public desperate for change. Initial attempts to bring together these break-away elements and more established opposition and civil society groups faltered. This changed in June 2016 at a meeting in Genval, Belgium, when newcomers, including Katumbi, and established opponents, including Etienne Tshisekedi and his Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), joined forces, creating the Rassemblement. It demonstrated strength by mobilising massive crowds on 29 July 2016 when Etienne Tshisekedi returned to Kinshasa after a long absence in Belgium. Although it does not include the entire opposition, the Rassemblement became its centre of gravity. International actors strongly supported President Kabila following the 2006 elections, but the chaos of the 2011 polls fed doubts as to the country’s direction. The DRC government regained some sympathy in 2012 and 2013 when it fought the M23 insurgency, which was backed by neighbouring countries. This led to the Peace and Security Cooperation Framework Agreement (PSCF) signed in Addis in February 2013 and based on the following trade-off: DRC’s neighbours promised not to interfere in the country’s affairs, while Kinshasa committed itself to democratic reforms. Backed by international actors, the PSCF remains the most recent high-profile international commitment to peace in the DRC and the region. Since then oversight and support for its implementation has lost momentum as the DRC has become bogged down in a seemingly interminable political and constitutional crisis. Through an analysis of the contentious implementation of the Saint Sylvester agreement this report looks at the intertwined sources of political tension and violence in the DRC throughout 2017. It analyses the international and regional response and argues that, the election delay notwithstanding, there is an urgent need for renewed national and international engagement around some core principles – notably the effective organisation of elections, no constitutional amendment to allow President Kabila to remain in office and an opening of political space and respect for human rights – to prevent the crisis from growing and potentially engulfing the region. It is based on fieldwork throughout 2016 and 2017 in Addis Ababa, Brussels, Goma, Kananga, Kinshasa, Kisangani, Lubumbashi, New York and Pretoria. It builds upon a series of commentaries and op-eds published since December 2016 and is part of a series of publications on the DRC’s broader electoral process. II.Boxing in the Shadow of Saint Sylvester As the political temperature rose in early 2016, the African Union (AU) Commission launched an initiative in support of a national political dialogue led by a member of the AU Panel of the Wise, former Togolese Prime Minister Edem Kodjo. From the start, it was deeply distrusted by the opposition and civil society. Although boycotted by the Rassemblement, the talks took place under Kodjo’s leadership between 1 September and 18 October. The disconnect between these talks and mounting tension on the ground became obvious when security forces violently repressed protests in Kinshasa and the influential Episcopal Conference of the Congolese Catholic Church (CENCO) walked out of the discussions. An agreement eventually was signed on 18 October but it lacked comprehensive opposition and international support. During a 26 October 2016 meeting of the PSCF international follow-up mechanism in Luanda, Kabila came under pressure from several regional leaders, notably Angola’s (now former) President José Eduardo dos Santos, to negotiate a more inclusive agreement. On 29 October, the presidency entrusted the CENCO with a good offices mission. While the bishops brought their moral weight to the table, this eleventh hour attempt was driven mainly by increasing pressure from international actors – including the imposition of sanctions – and from the population, particularly in the form of street protests on 19 and 20 December. All opposition parties participated in the talks, but Etienne Tshisekedi kept a safe distance, as did President Kabila. The Rassemblement insisted on power sharing (in particular allowing the opposition to choose a prime minister), elections in 2017, guarantees that the constitution be respected, more political space (including ending the prosecution of Moïse Katumbi and other political leaders), greater media freedom and reform of the Independent Electoral Commission (CENI). On 31 December 2016, nearly two weeks after the legal end of Kabila’s second and last term, the parties signed the agreement. A.The Agreement The Saint Sylvester “Global and Inclusive” Agreement comprises four main pillars that: Confirm the integrity of the 2006 constitution, which prohibits the incumbent president from seeking a third term, while acknowledging that Kabila would remain in power until his elected successor is installed; Introduce a concrete, albeit adjustable, deadline for elections to be held by the end of 2017; Include the opposition in a power-sharing agreement for the transitional period while remaining vague on how it would be established; and, Introduce an inclusive oversight mechanism and platform for talks among all political actors, dubbed the National Council for Monitoring the Agreement and the Electoral Process (CNSA), to be chaired by the president of the Rassemblement, Etienne Tshisekedi. The agreement also foresees the “revitalisation” of the electoral commission and the lifting of restrictions on political activity, including ending the judicial prosecution of opposition leaders, particularly Moïse Katumbi. Moreover, it calls for a completely new voter roll and for presidential, legislative and provincial elections to be held simultaneously. Finally, the deal envisages further talks to agree on “special arrangements” for its effective implementation, including questions regarding the composition of the government, the procedure for the appointment of the prime minister and a timetable. Although power-sharing is not new in DRC, the creation of a domestic mechanism to monitor election preparation alongside an opposition-led government in principle amounted to a fundamental power rebalancing. Implemented in full, it would have meant shared control over, and oversight of, the electoral process by placing Kabila’s nemesis, Etienne Tshisekedi, in a powerful position as head of the monitoring council (CNSA), and appointing an opposition prime minister who, among other things, would be responsible for budgetary processes. In other words, it would have forced the president and his political allies into an uneasy cohabitation with their rivals. Conversely, however, it would also have made the opposition complicit in any eventual extension of the agreements’ 31 December 2017 deadline. Importantly, a splintered opposition with low levels of domestic support, many of whose leaders were in exile, was far from ready to confront the Majority. At different stages several key opposition parties privately acknowledged that they would need two years to prepare politically for elections. The agreement was widely and rightly welcomed. Still, it contained several inherent deficiencies: it allowed the president to retain full control of the security forces; the Majority, determined to extend its time in power, retained multiple means of generating delays; and the electoral timetable was highly ambitious – to the point of being unrealistic – particularly given the absence of clarity on how to reform the electoral commission, the difficulties in finalising the electoral roll and the question of finance. A generalised institutional inertia – exacerbated by the fact that most potential candidates are complicit in and benefit from the prolonged glissement – compounded these problems. Finally, with the signing of the agreement, domestic and international pressure on the regime noticeably diminished. This allowed it to undermine implementation while the opposition, plagued by internal dissent, lost its focus. B.Non-consensual Implementation On 1 February 2017, Etienne Tshisekedi, the only opposition leader with the charisma to bring massive crowds onto the streets, passed away. His death fundamentally changed power dynamics in favour of the regime and left the Rassemblement in disarray. Several members joined a dissident group (dissident Rassemblement), led by Joseph Olenghankoy.Tshisekedi’s own party, the UDPS, proved particularly ill-prepared for his demise. It split into several factions, some of which rejected the transfer of leadership to Etienne’s son Felix. A formal party conference has yet to be held. Implementation suffered another blow when the Catholic Church – under increasing pressure from the Majority – abruptly stopped its mediation and gave the political initiative back to President Kabila. Exploiting both opposition disarray and international inattention and passivity, the Majority quickly moved to interpret the agreement in its favour. On 7 April, following a few days of consultations boycotted by the Rassemblement, President Kabila appointed Bruno Tshibala as prime minister of a new, extended government. Tshibala had been evicted from the UDPS the previous month after joining the dissident Rassemblement. By choosing Tshibala, Kabila avoided flagrantly appointing a supporter while clearly violating the agreement’s principles, which required that the Rassemblement itself nominate the prime minister. Three weeks later, in talks overseen by the speakers of both houses of parliament, the Majority and several smaller opposition parties (including the Union for the Congolese Nation (UNC) agreed on the special arrangements for the agreement’s implementation.On 22 July, parliament approved the installation of the national monitoring council (CNSA) bureau and the appointment of Joseph Olenghankoy, leader of the dissident Rassemblement, as its chair.By continuing to work with parliament – even though it had reached the end of its legal term on 17 February 2017 – the Majority aimed to give the impression that state institutions continued to function under constitutional authority. The Rassemblement and the church denounced the Majority’s unilateralism. On 9 April, Felix Tshisekedi called for protests, but inexplicably then left for Addis Ababa. Clumsy communication about his absence, contributed to confusion. Security forces were deployed to deter protesters in several cities as a result, the marches failed to mobilise significant crowds. The inclusion of dissident Rassemblement members in government left others out in the cold. Vital Kamerhe, who had risked his credibility as an opposition leader by participating in the AU dialogue, got only a single post in the new government to the dissatisfaction of many in his party.In July, he declined the post of CNSA vice president but, having made excessive overtures to the Majority, subsequently found other major opposition platforms, including the Rassemblement, initially hesitant to accept him back in their midst. The inclusion of newcomers also affected the Majority. The Union for the Development of Congo (UDCO), one of the few remaining parties in the Majority with a strong position in Katanga, lost its sole senior government position. Consequently, the influential Jean-Claude Masangu resigned as party president. None of these expressions of protest had much of an impact. The Saint Sylvester agreement had been hollowed out, with no semblance of power-sharing and no platform for continued talks. The signatories have not implemented provisions to revitalise the electoral commission and undertake confidence building measures. Nor have they adopted legislation to formally establish the monitoring council. The conversation among the government, electoral commission and monitoring council (CNSA) – all of which are dominated by the regime – has come to resemble a monologue. By the end of August 2017, the electoral commission, the government and CNSA launched the evaluation of the electoral process in Kananga. This has allowed the electoral commission to publish its long-awaited electoral calendar, with presidential polls scheduled for 23 December 2018. However, the current trio has little legitimacy. C.The Regime Digs In Over the course of 2017, the Majority has outmanoeuvred both the domestic opposition and international actors. It controls the budget and state institutions, including the electoral commission, and dominates both the narrative and the pace of the political process. Despite a clearly one-sided implementation of the agreement, it has managed to project the appearance of reason and constructive engagement. This resonates with some international actors eager for any semblance of progress and seeking entry points for engagement, notwithstanding widespread scepticism that the regime intends to leave power or organise credible elections.Paradoxically, the opposition, which has the most to gain from the agreement’s full implementation, has seemingly ditched it in favour of pushing for a transitional government without Kabila by the end of 2017, to be followed by elections. Despite the DRC’s violent instability and fractious politics, the regime appears to be well entrenched. It is far stronger than the divided opposition, has suffered no major defection since 2015 and is more focused. Its internal coherence seemingly is based on a mix of fear, money and opportunism. However, occasionally this coherence faces a test. Upheaval in the Peoples’ Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) and the wider Majority alliance on the draft electoral law, introduced by the government in November 2017, and in particular the electoral thresholds it introduces, demonstrates the regime’s unease when confronted with electoral uncertainties. The PPRD leadership sees the thresholds as essential for its electoral strategy – getting rid of the small parties. The presidential family is central but so are others in the political system and the security forces. Some recently installed officials at both national and provincial levels, lacking legitimacy and sensing their tenure in power might be short-lived, have incentives to exploit their positions for personal gain. In Katanga’s mining sector, for example, systematic underreporting of production and opaque management are said to divert millions of dollars in annual revenue from the state treasury. Self-assured, the regime has proved particularly inflexible regarding the fates of Moïse Katumbi and the G7, refusing to halt legal proceedings against them. Katumbi is a particular irritant; his conflict with the regime is both personal and strategic as he potentially could emerge as a serious threat. Accordingly, the Majority is determined to stop their former ally from building momentum and wants to make an example of him to stop others from decamping. So far, despite announcing several times that he would return to the DRC, Katumbi remains in exile in Europe, where the threat he presents to the regime is much reduced. Because the Saint Sylvester is a Congolese agreement, international actors have no formal framework allowing them to push for its implementation and have failed to engage politically in a coherent manner since its signing. This is regrettable as there is evidence – notably the very achievement of the agreement – that the regime can give ground when under concerted pressure. Instead, it shows no sign of compromise. In short, the Majority’s advantage derives less from its inherent strength than from its opponents’ and the international community’s weakness. It has no grand strategy to stay in power, but each additional month in power represents a small gain. When its initial attempt in 2015 to amend the presidential term-limits provision in the constitution was blocked by popular protest and dissent within its ranks, it turned to a glissement. Delaying tactics such as calls in September for a new political dialogue,were immediately dismissed as pointless by the church and the opposition. The issue of the electoral timeline has proved vexing for international actors and the opposition alike. Genuine technical, budgetary and security reasons for delay are compounded by regime manoeuvres to further postpone a vote. The electoral commission, led by Corneille Nangaa, has steadily continued its activities, some constructive, others designed to delay and distract. In 2016 and 2017, it worked on the necessary update to the voter roll but took far longer than in previous elections; by September 2017, it had registered some 42 million voters. On 5 November 2017, after months of dithering, the electoral commission announced that elections would be held on 23 December 2018 and the newly elected president inaugurated on 12 January 2019. The CENI immediately warned that respecting the calendar would require meeting several budgetary and legal conditions and also depends on the external support to the process. Since 2015, the DRC has slipped into a deep economic and budg etary crisis, which is likely to become the next pretext for delays. President Kabila and the government repeatedly and cynically express “concern” about the elections’ cost as compared to other necessary investments. The election budget comes to $1.3 billion, of which the first major step, voter registration, represents $400 million. To organise the three combined polls in 2018, the electoral commission would need approximately $550 million. Despite promising in 2016 that it would fund the entire process, the government has yet to clarify what it has actually disbursed. In the 2018 national budget, adopted on 14 November, 912.5 million Congolese franc, or 8.8 per cent of the total budget of 10.333 billion, is allocated to the polls. It is not yet clear whether it will effectively disburse this in time.Should it fail to do so, this will increase pressure on unenthusiastic donors, none of whom wants to be associated with what could turn out to be an unfair and non-credible process. The longer the delay, the more space the regime will have to exhaust a disorganised opposition. Besides, were a successor to Kabila acceptable to the regime to emerge, he or she inevitably would assume, ahead of the election campaign, a position of considerable financial strength in relation to an opposition with dwindling resources. Delaying the vote also gradually undermines the credibility and relevance of the current institutional and constitutional framework, which could lead regime supporters to declare it void as a pretext for holding a referendum to change it and allow Kabila to extend his tenure in office. For the immediate future such a scenario remains unlikely and could provoke a split between Majority hardliners and a smaller faction that hopes to nominate a successor to Joseph Kabila. But Kabila allies, occasionally float it as an option. D.Opposition Calls for Transition and Popular Mobilisation Faced with regime intransigence, the Rassemblement is trying to regain the initiative. In July, it announced that it would renew efforts at popular mobilisation starting in October. Following its conclave in Kinshasa on 21 and 22 July, it organised a modestly successful two-day national strike on 8 and 9 August as poverty levels make it difficult for people to forgo two days of wages. The conclave included a call for citizens to stop recognising Kabila as president. It also announced sit-ins at the electoral commission’s offices and other acts of civil disobedience. Civil society organisations have taken their own initiatives since mid-2017. The most visible is “les Congolais Debout”, initiated by Sindika Dokolo, son-in-law of former Angolan President dos Santos. Sindika’s family ties to the Angolan political and economic elite contribute to his aura and to the impression that the Angolan leadership at least acquiesces to his increasingly vocal opposition to Kabila. Sindika also has a close personal relationship with Moïse Katumbi. In August, Dokolo and older civil society networks, including Lucha and Filimbi, the two most established social movements, issued a “Manifeste du Citoyen Congolais”, which Rassemblement leaders subsequently signed. Drawing on Article 64 of the constitution, which calls on the people to oppose those who seek to violate it, its declared aim is to force out the regime and establish a transitional government without Kabila for at least six months, with the objective of quickly organising elections. Several civil society activists have proposed Dr Denis Mukwege, a respected campaigner against sexual violence, as a potential president for this period. At this stage, focus has shifted anew to forging greater opposition unity. On 23 October, Vital Kamerhe and the UNC decided to pull out of the Tshibala government (although the minister concerned, Pierre Kangudia Mbayi refused to obey his party and remains as minister for the budget). From his cell in The Hague, Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of another opposition party, the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), also called for opposition unity. The Rassemblement, UNC and MLC all met together with Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, during her October 2017 visit to DRC. Finally, the main opposition parties all reject the new electoral calendar, but failed to adopt a joint communiqué. Civil society and youth movements have been increasingly frustrated by the opposition’s failure to mobilise the population, including for street protests. In October, the opposition’s lone attempt was Felix Tshisekedi’s visit to Lubumbashi, which security forces heavily repressed. In the same month, youth activist platforms, including Lucha, organised protests in a number of cities; several activists were arrested and, during 30 October protests in Goma, five people were killed, including a policeman. Dynamics between the opposition and civil society platforms changed somewhat when on 15 November the Rassemblement joined a call initiated by social movements for countrywide protests against the electoral calendar. As was the case with previous attempts, the initiative failed to gather momentum. Authorities prohibit protests almost systematically, often accompanied by stark warnings by police officials. In response, on 16 November, the EU delegation joined by the U.S., the Swiss and the Canadian embassies published a statement calling for the respect of public freedoms. Although the church has stepped away from direct mediation and is unlikely to reengage soon, it remains important. As mediator, it gave the agreement credibility, but being so closely involved sullied its reputation. In June, it published a strong declaration highly critical of the government, “Congolese rise”. The document, which the opposition often refers to, assesses the political impasse and faults the political class. It warns of, but does not directly call for, massive street protests. CENCO representatives were present on the margins of the Paris meeting that adopted the Manifeste du Citoyen Congolais. In November, the church published partial results of its observation of voter registration, citing several irregularities, in particular during the registration of minors. The Church also denounced the security forces’ repression of protests, stating that at least 56 persons have been killed since April 2017. III.The Smouldering Republic Since 2016, the deepening political impasse in Kinshasa has been accompanied by rising tensions throughout the country. Insurgents in North and South Kivu, Kongo Central and the Kasai region all have exploited the national deadlock to justify their actions. For now, these dynamics appear isolated, but they are increasing in frequency and point to the risks of prolonged unrest. Humanitarian consequences have been considerable, as reflected in the large number of new internally displaced persons and refugees. In October, the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee activated a level 3 (L3) system-wide emergency response – reserved for the most complex and challenging humanitarian emergencies – for the DRC. This situation presents a significant threat to stability in countries to the east, south and west of DRC. The depth and breadth of the political crisis makes the current situation far more perilous than the M23 crisis from 2012 to 2013. The emergence of multiple insurgencies also further strains an already dangerously stretched army (FARDC) and police (PNC). Security forces also are a major source of violence and remain the most frequent perpetrators of human rights violations. Their response often is vastly disproportionate. When combined with the ongoing political crisis, this could precipitate a breakdown – whether gradual or abrupt – presenting a major challenge for the UN mission (the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or MONUSCO). A.Catastrophe in the Kasais The violent conflict in Kasai region, which began early 2016 with an apparent local dispute pitting a traditional chief, Jean-Pierre Pandi – known by his tribal name, the Kamuina Nsapu – against state authorities. Pandi’s reported refusal to pledge support for the regime led the state to deny him official status as a traditional chief. His vocal criticism of the security forces’ predatory practices resonated with the impoverished local population. Tensions escalated and Pandi was killed in an incident with the security forces. As a result, militia groups started to operate under his banner, setting-up roadblocks and attacking state buildings and officials, including the electoral commission. As violence escalated, it became clear that complex and poorly understood local dynamics were becoming intertwined with the national crisis. Indeed, the incident came in the context of regime efforts to pressure traditional chiefs for support and thus broaden its reach. This politicisation of chieftainships proved particularly contentious in opposition-dominated Kasai region, where many resent the state’s attempts to control local chiefs. By mid-2017, there appeared to be over 60 militia groups operating in the Kasai, some related to the Kamuina Nsapu, others allied with the government and still others who have emerged from the chaos.The government responded by reinforcing its military and police presence. Both government forces and militia have used extreme violence, including against civilians.The UN documented 87 mass graves;and in June, a hard-hitting report by the Catholic Church estimated that 3,383 people had been killed.As of April, another militia, the Bana Mura became particularly active south of Tshikapa. Several sources claim the Bana Mura are closely linked to local security officials. Intense violence spread rapidly; at its height (March to July), the conflict covered parts of five provinces and affected wider areas. To date, the crisis has displaced roughly 1.4 million people (out of a total of 4.1 million displaced in the DRC). Approximately 35,000 Congolese fled to Angola as a result of the Kasai violence; in response, Luanda bolstered its military presence at the border. The government has come under considerable regional and international pressure due to this violence and associated human rights abuses. The regime scrambled to regain control, dispatching Foreign Minister Léonard She Okitundu to Angola in May.Kabila personally visited the Kasai region three times between May and September, in the latest instance to launch a government-organised Kasai peace conference.While reports of violence diminished in the second half of 2017, the humanitarian situation in the area remains dire. B.Sparks in Other Provinces Instability has spread to other provinces, severely stretching the security services. Provincial conflicts have been a permanent feature of DRC since the end of the civil war in 2002, as armed groups fight over territory and resources and use local and national grievances to draw support from individuals and communities. The regime has largely adapted to the situation, and several regional states have profited from it. The current conflicts are driven by historical grievances, but also by the current national political impasse, which allows some armed groups to claim legitimacy and weakens the state’s capacity to mediate. In addition, regime figures have fanned the flames of violence, possibly as part of a deliberate strategy, but also to opportunistically reinforce their local base. Today, there are signs (including their own declarations) that some of the currently disparate insurgencies intend to join up. There is no concrete evidence of this occurring at a meaningful scale, but it cannot be ruled out in the future. This could seriously escalate the crisis, potentially triggering ever more brutal government crackdowns. In addition to the Kasai region, the provinces affected by these dynamics are mostly concentrated in the east: Ituri, North and South Kivu and Tanganyika provinces, with spillover in Haut-Katanga, Haut-Lomami and Maniema provinces. Some armed groups active in North and South Kivu have links to Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. At the Northern borders, the provinces of Nord-Ubangui, Bas-Uele and Haut-Uele are all affected by conflicts in neighbouring Central African Republic and South Sudan.Lastly, the strategic Kongo Central province, west of Kinshasa, has also seen tensions rise throughout 2017. Kinshasa has also been affected and an incursion in August 2017, linked to the tension in Kongo Central province, caused at least 23 casualties in August. Ethnic identity is an important underlying factor in local and provincial conflict dynamics and is the main way armed group leaders mobilise members. From the part-political party, part-religious sect Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) / Bundu dia Mayala (BDM) in Kongo Central, to the Perci and Elements militia in Tanganyika and Nyatura as well as the Mai Mai Mazembe armed groups in North Kivu, ethnic mobilisation forms the main common thread. A recurring refrain in the discourse of several militia and radical opposition groups is to denounce Rwanda’s alleged influence over the Kabila regime. The most prominent coalition of armed groups, whose discourse refers to the illegitimacy of national institutions, is the National People’s Coalition for the Sovereignty of Congo (CNPSC) a heterogeneous coalition that includes the Mai Mai Yakutumba and the Mai Mai Malaika militia. Its area of operations covers South Kivu, Maniema and Tanganyika, affecting several mining areas, including the gold-mining operations of the Banro corporation in Maniema province. In late September 2017, the alliance advanced on Uvira, the second largest city in South Kivu. Without the intervention of UN Organization Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO) troops, Uvira might well have fallen. This would have been the first time a major town had fallen to rebels since 2012 and would have given the coalition added aura. A special case is Beni territory (North Kivu), which since October 2014, has suffered a string of particularly vicious attacks – generally attributed to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). This recurrent violence – particularly the Beni massacres – illustrates the impunity and general disregard for human suffering that has taken hold of the country’s political class. The humanitarian situation has deteriorated dramatically over the past year. The UN estimates the number of displaced at 4.1 million; the provinces most affected are Tanganyika, South Kivu and the Kasai. Fighting has forced refugees into neighbouring Zambia and Angola. C.Overstretched Security Services The proliferation of security crises has stretched the capacity of the army and police, a challenge compounded by the drop in real salaries. In a whack-a-mole-like dynamic, when the army sent reinforcements to the Kasai region from the Kivus, armed group activity increased in the Kivus. Pressure from various armed groups has compelled the army to focus on protecting major cities, leaving much of the countryside – including lucrative mining areas – to militias. Urban insecurity also increased considerably following several major prison breaks in 2017. The biggest occurred in Kinshasa’s Makala prison from which approximately 4,600 prisoners escaped on 17 May. Then on 11 June, 930 prisoners escaped in Beni, North Kivu. In both cases the prisons were attacked by armed groups presumably attempting to free their comrades. The generalised frustration of the pauperised population could result in further urban violence and even insurgency. Thus far, however, police and army have maintained their internal cohesion. Troops and policemen have been rotated successfully to different theatres and lines of command have held. Although nearly all international training of security forces has been halted, new recruits for both the army and police have been trained and deployed. Another important factor is the further militarisation of the police force, which is now headed by General Amuli Bahigwa, previously in charge of army operations and intelligence. D.Toward a State of Emergency? To a large degree, DRC is already in a de facto state of emergency. Rule of law has been deeply eroded through the political use of the justice system. Legal permission to stage political protests is nearly impossible to obtain. International journalists and researchers find it increasingly difficult to operate in the country and many have been expelled or had their visa requests denied. In the evening, Republican Guard troops man roadblocks in Gombe, the capital’s political and business centre, while the police and military patrol other parts of the city.Officials, including the president, have labelled groups such as the Kamuina Nsapu militia in the Kasai “terrorists”, thereby excluding them from political negotiations and justifying ever harsher crackdowns. If violence continues to spread or if elements of the security forces mutiny or join the opposition, Kabila might decide to declare a formal state of emergency, further postponing the elections. This would be a risky gambit, however. Security forces are already stretched thin. Banking on them to maintain control while excluding a political track could deprive the regime of options to deal with spreading insurgencies. Such a scenario would also make it increasingly difficult for peacekeepers to operate. IV.International Actors: Hesitant and Divided With the stalemate deepening, both opposition and regime have turned to outside actors for support. The former pins its hopes essentially on the UN and traditional Western donors. The government has chiefly reached out to African leaders while maintaining good relations with Russia and China. International apprehension over deepening authoritarianism dates back to the 2011 election and was reflected in the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) and successive UN mandates granting the special representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) a political mandate, though these have yet to prompt concerted action. The government also has successfully limited the UN’s political role. Likewise, African governments and regional organisations have been concerned during periods of violence and engaged in mediation, but the government has been effective at playing the nationalist card to oppose foreign interference. Although neither “the West” nor “Africa” are monolithic blocs, disagreements between the two have been real and opportunities for coordination are almost non-existent. A.Western Frustrations Opposition leaders have devoted considerable time lobbying Western powers. These in turn – including major donors such as the European Union (EU) – generally have adopted a critical stance toward the DRC. In 2016 and 2017, both the EU and the U.S. imposed targeted sanctions on security officials and politicians. The 2016 sanctions arguably helped pressure the Majority to make political concessions during the CENCO-led talks. In 2017, both the EU and the U.S. have been rumoured to be considering additional sanctions focused on regime financial and economic networks; these are strongly supported by the opposition and a number of Western non-governmental organisations. As regime confidence has grown in 2017, Western powers have taken a more reserved approach, leading to much reduced pressure. In May, the EU sanctioned several more individuals, most for their involvement in the violence in the Kasai. The timing of this initiative was not helpful, however, because it coincided with a regional diplomatic mission, and African diplomats felt it detracted from their message. Feeling exposed by a lack of leadership from Washington, the EU and its member states have since become more discreet. This has also provided new space for differences among EU member states, some of whom are inclined to be highly critical of the DRC government, others less so. A June 2017 meeting in Lubumbashi between emissaries of the French President Emmanuel Macron and Joseph Kabila spurred concerns that France was preparing a less critical stance. Belgium, a vocal critic over the last year, toned down its public rhetoric to some extent following regime pressure, but remains critical of the DRC government in the EU and other fora. In any case, the DRC government does not seem overly concerned by Western criticism. For example, it promoted the former Kinshasa police chief, General Kanyama, who had been sanctioned by both the EU and the U.S., appointing him head of the police academies, a position whose holder traditionally meets regularly with international donors. The political transition in the U.S. administration likely gave the regime hope that Washington’s posture had changed. Throughout most of 2017, the Trump administration principally has focused on MONUSCO and on making the force more efficient and cost-effective. While there are clear signs that the new administration is no fan of the Kabila regime, it has neither replaced President Obama’s Special Envoy for the Great Lakes nor appointed an ambassador to Kinshasa, providing the regime with further manoeuvring room. On a late October 2017 visit to Kinshasa, Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, pressed for elections to be held in 2018. While her tone was forthright, this was presented by the Majority as a victory because it provided diplomatic cover for a further twelve months electoral delay. The publication ten days after the visit of a calendar with elections scheduled for December 2018 has been disingenuously presented by the CENI as a concession to domestic and international pressure, because shortly before it had informally suggested pushing the timeframe back to mid-2019. The CENI and the government are already preparing to blame further delays on donors’ unwillingness to support the process. Should the political stalemate persist, Western fatigue could increase to the point where Kabila’s calculations could prove successful. Under those circumstances, despite recognising that the status quo represents a longer-term threat to regional security, Western capitals might well begin to put less energy into coordinating their diplomatic positions and concentrate on advancing more parochial (including commercial) interests. Continued tension between the regime and international actors could push the latter to react quickly to events – including future obstacles affecting implementation of the electoral calendar – with little or no coordinated strategy. More broadly, Western policy could suffer from a lack of knowledge about events on the ground due to restrictions on international researchers and correspondents. This knowledge gap could encourage disconnected “Heart of Darkness” type narratives in the Western media that portray DRC as a place of inchoate and barbaric violence. B.Congolese and Regional Diplomacy African powers have been engaged in managing the DRC crisis for several years, most prominently through the AU dialogue led by Edem Kodjo in 2016. Despite this engagement, they remain hesitant and to some degree divided in their approach. Western powers have usually been more critical of the DRC government, opening a strategic disconnect that has become a key impediment to concerted international action. Both sides have engaged in competing rhetoric on issues such as the adoption of sanctions by the EU and the U.S. An exception occurred at the October 2016 Luanda regional summit, where presidents of both Angola and Republic of Congo exerted strong pressure on Kabila, paving the way for the Saint Sylvester agreement. This represented a rare moment of convergence among international, regional and domestic dynamics that contributed to meaningful progress. During 2016 and 2017, the Francophonie, the African Union (AU), EU and UN also adopted a number of joint statements on DRC. The regime has sought to exploit this division and drive a wedge between Western and African positions. In 2017, the new DRC foreign minister, Leonard She Okitundu, and Kabila’s diplomatic advisor Kikaya Bin Karubi, have been remarkably active on the continent. Even the usually more sedentary president visited several African capitals and attended the July AU Summit and September UN General Assembly. These efforts have symbolic value, demonstrating institutional legitimacy at a time of domestic challenge by showcasing the president and ministers meeting foreign leaders; they also generate diplomatic gains. Opposition leaders sought legitimacy as well by meeting African leaders but were less successful in 2017 than in previous years. They are struggling to engage with African leaders or even participate on the margins of regional summits. The government’s diplomatic achievements have been made manifest as of late. African organisations supported Kabila’s implementation of the Saint Sylvester agreement, as illustrated by the June 2017 communiqué of the DRC-South Africa Bi-National Commission. One month later, Prime Minister Tshibala, whose appointment was highly controversial, attended the SADC summit in Pretoria. The resulting communiqué commended Kabila for progress in implementing the agreement. Not surprisingly, the 23 August meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on the DRC took a similar line, stating that the appointments of Tshibala and Olenghankoy “complete the establishment of the institutional framework for the political transition as provided for in the Agreement of 31 December 2016”. Both the AU and SADC echoed the international stance that the electoral commission should publish a new electoral calendar promptly, but SADC went further by stating that “a number of challenges … have made it unrealistic for the DRC to hold elections in December 2017”. These three statements took similarly strong positions against sanctions adopted by “non-African organisations and countries”, clearly illustrating the gulf separating Western and regional actors. The three above-mentioned communiqués also announced continued engagement in the Congolese electoral process: for South Africa, that means collaboration between each country’s electoral commission; for SADC, nomination of a special envoy (Hifikepunye Pohamba, former president of Namibia) and dispatch of several missions to the DRC in 2017; and for the AU PSC, a reminder of “the need to strengthen the political role of the AU in the search for a solution of the crisis in the DRC”. From 28 September to 1 October, Moussa Faki, chairperson of the AU Commission, visited Kinshasa for consultations with all stakeholders, including the opposition. He was followed on 14 October by South African President and SADC chair Jacob Zuma. On 19 October, regional summits of the guarantors of the PSCF and the ICGLR were held in Brazzaville. The summit conclusions were in line with previous African positions. From 22 to 26 October, the AU PSC visited Kinshasa and on 1 November Moussa Faki received the CENI president in Addis. The AU and sub-region are thus active, but this has not yet been translated into effective political engagement. When on 5 November the electoral commission published its calendar, the AU reacted positively, with a balanced statement that called for Congolese parties to scrupulously adhere to the calendar, for political actors to refrain from statements or acts that could heighten tensions and for the restoration of confidence between the actors “within the spirit of the political agreement of 31 December 2016”. This potentially could form a new basis for the organisation’s sustained engagement, but more than good intentions are required. For instance, it remains unclear how the AU might contribute to the opening of the DRC’s domestic politics – a key condition for a meaningful electoral process. A first and encouraging step is the reinforcement of the AU liaison office to the DRC. So far African powers have consistently supported the electoral process in their statements, and are under no illusion that further electoral delays risk more unrest. However, they remain reluctant to take stronger action or condemn the regime’s delaying tactics for several reasons: they do not wish to encourage a popular uprising that could unseat an incumbent; they share an ideological framework that promotes national sovereignty in the face of real or supposed external interference; and they all fear that a badly managed transition could generate more unrest than would further delays. Angola and the Republic of Congo in particular have reason to fear any unrest: Brazzaville sits across the Congo river from Kinshasa while Angola, facing its own economic difficulties and delicate political transition, shares a porous 2,500km border with Congo. The Kasai conflict already has spilled over into Angolan territory. Furthermore, African leaders do not feel empowered to shift the dynamics of the crisis, partly because their own coordination tools (summits, diplomatic services) are weak and poorly coordinated. None of the regional organisations to which DRC belongs – SADC, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) – possesses established intervention mechanisms or a strong political consensus against incumbents prolonging their tenure in office. This stands in contrast to West Africa’s ECOWAS, for example. Finally, while they fear instability, the country’s nine neighbours and other regional powers such as South Africa have also developed a delicate balance of interests. Many have learned to navigate and even profit from the DRC’s ambient chaos during and since the wars of 1996-2003. A strong DRC could run counter to some of those interests. And competition among these countries over economic opportunities and access can further stymie joint political action. Areas of competition include major projects such as the Grand Inga dam, the exploration of hydrocarbons in eastern DRC and regional logistical corridors toward South Africa, Tanzania, Angola and Kenya. And there are also the well-documented cases of Congolese resources transiting through neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. African powers therefore have reasons, some justifiable some less so, to refrain from stronger and more coordinated action. Along with differences of approach between them and the Europeans, and in the absence of major regional conflagration, this favours the status quo and a passive approach. But as many working level African diplomats, and even ministers, acknowledge in private, there is a great risk of instability in further electoral delays and in the erosion of constitutional rule in the DRC. V.Dealing with the Blockage Through Revitalised Engagement The situation in DRC is fundamentally blocked, with a regime determined to stay in power holding a stronger hand than its opposition and with outside actors appearing both discouraged and divided. The most likely scenario is a prolonged glissement with instability rising although not necessarily threatening the regime elite. Still, government control is weak and weakening. It eventually could face a more coherent challenge, expressed through political mechanisms, street protests, insurgency or a combination of the three. As the UN’s September Strategic Review put it: “the DRC is likely to remain in the current scenario for the foreseeable future, although the possibility of a rapid deterioration of the situation cannot be ruled out”. International frustration and reluctance to engage more fully is comprehensible. No foreign actor wishes to take the lead given the parties’ intransigence. Such international engagement would be vital to signal that help is available to those seeking progress. Support should be directed at the Congolese people – not just at the humanitarian level, but also on behalf of their political aspirations. The 5 November electoral calendar presents a new, concrete opportunity for international actors to engage on this basis. Efforts should be based on the key principles of the Saint Sylvester agreement. All relevant international and regional actors, as well as the DRC government, have signed up to it; it remains the governing roadmap; and all conceivable alternatives, including the opposition’s idea of a transitional government without Kabila, are either unfeasible or could play into the regime’s hands. Moreover, its core principle – respect for the integrity of the constitution and thus also the need to organise elections for an orderly transfer of power – represents a sound outcome and an answer to regime attempts to pursue its own dilatory tactics and interests. What has been lacking since the signing of the agreement is international political engagement and an effective strategy, leaving the initiative totally with the regime. Reversing this dynamic requires focusing on several building blocks: Active international engagement and overcoming divisions. This is the starting point; effective international pressure on President Kabila to genuinely move toward elections and relinquish power will necessitate both sustained high-level engagement and greater unity among outside actors; otherwise, Kinshasa will continue to engage in forum shopping to find the most sympathetic interlocutor. To achieve this goal, Western powers and African leaders, should attempt to iron out differences in their assessment of the situation and their political strategy to achieve change and avoid further disintegration of the country. Disagreement essentially has revolved around how best to push Kinshasa toward elections in a reasonably expeditious timeframe. The question of sanctions is among the most divisive. In 2016, they likely helped forge the December agreement. But their value has diminished over time as the regime exploited them to portray foreign pressure as a form of Western imperialism; meanwhile, targeted individuals learned how to circumvent punitive measures. New sanctions should not be imposed while efforts are made to align international views and forge a more united front. However, they remain a potential tool to be used to either discourage human rights abuses or as part of a strategy to help shift political calculations at critical moments. Ideally, they should not be imposed unless coordinated with African partners. If it becomes obvious that the regime is not acting in line with its commitments, the AU and regional organisations should consider bringing more pressure to bear. This could include preparing an honourable exit for President Kabila. The AU, including its Peace and Security Council, and the SADC are already seized and both organisations have the influence and legitimacy to press the Kabila-regime. Setting up an international envoy group to help forge consensus and advance the DRC’s political process. This group should bring together Western and African nations in the form of a small group of key international envoys. Without the need for unwieldy new structures, this would aim to revitalise coordinated international engagement. The current International Contact Group, which includes Western powers and donors, paradoxically is both overly crowded and unrepresentative. It benefits from only occasional participation from low level African representatives and as such does not serve to bridge international divides, nor does it have the agility to respond to events. The Contact Group, which also covers Burundi and wider regional issues, can be revitalised, expanded with African representatives, and act in support of the envoy group – providing regular buy-in from committed donors and partner countries. The envoy group should strike the right balance, including a variety of views, especially Western and African. It could comprise representatives of institutions (or countries) that initiated the team of experts in support of the electoral commission that was created at September’s high-level meeting in New York – namely the UN, AU, EU, Francophonie and SADC, ideally with the addition of the U.S. This envoy group should meet regularly and work closely with the SRSG and the UN special envoy to the Great Lakes, whose office could serve as its permanent secretariat. Among its goals would be to prepare and follow-up benchmarks for the electoral process, connect initiatives at the national, regional and international levels, exchange analysis and channel support for elections. Sticking to the electoral timetable. The electoral commission has now published its long-awaited calendar. Its main merit is to provide a new opportunity for national and international convergence and engagement, while its main flaw is that it has not been agreed to by the major opposition and civil society platforms. The new timetable is technically feasible and provides a realistic political timeframe for the opposition to organise itself and fully participate in the polls. The main risk is that the regime will see this calendar as just one more opportunity to start the process of delays all over again. The budget, security, legal or technical impediments all potentially offer an opportunity for the CENI, CNSA and government to block further progress. The new electoral law, that was to be adopted by parliament by 30 November, is a potentially time-consuming issue that could also seriously affect the political dynamics.Both the opposition and international actors should focus on closely supervising the processes within the CENI and other developments to avoid such a dynamic taking hold. As a matter of urgency, international actors involved in the electoral process should supervise adherence to the calendar actively, warning against unjustified slippage. They also should guard against any government call for snap elections which would catch the opposition unprepared and unable to compete – an unlikely albeit not implausible scenario. The recently proposed team of electoral experts – comprising representatives from the UN, AU, EU, SADC and Francophonie – should quickly be operationalised. There is a possibility that the U.S. and UK will join the experts to support the preparation of the elections. Its working relationship with and independence from the electoral commission has to be clear in its terms of reference. It should work in concert with a dedicated senior UN advisor (as suggested in paragraph 49 of the UN strategic review). This technical group should continuously assess and review the process and develop benchmarks for the provision of international support. Essential areas are: the voter list and its planned audit, adequate national funding, clarity on CENI intentions regarding the voting system (traditional ballots or a semi-electronic vote) and the logistics support provided by MONUSCO. As to the latter, any such support should be targeted at strategic choking points that, if left unaddressed, are liable to cause further delays. Parliament should promptly adopt the electoral law and the legislation on seat distribution. Outside parties should press the government to clarify its plans for funding the electoral process; in turn, the level of ambition (notably, for example, the extent to which the voting process will be digitalised) should reflect available funds. The government should refrain from initiatives that distract from this priority, such as new policy proposals that ought not to be in its purview insofar as it lacks legitimacy. The entire process ought to be as transparent as possible. Pressing for confidence-building measures enshrined in the agreement. Opposition and civil society actors have no confidence in either the government or current actors responsible for the election’s management and oversight (CNSA, CENI). The regime has effectively hijacked implementation of the Saint Sylvester agreement. To effectively operationalise the electoral calendar, and consistent with the principles of the Saint Sylvester agreement, international actors, including those in the region, ought to press the regime to rapidly enact the legislation required for the CNSA to operate and allow it to be opened up to civil society observation. They should press for the opening up of political space to allow the opposition to operate freely. Steps should include setting up a credible process to assess the legality and validity of the current prosecution of several opposition politicians.The CENCO report on the cases of Moïse Katumbi and Jean-Claude Muyambo, presented to the government in March 2017, should be taken into account. Creating a more level electoral playing field also will require the government to allow peaceful political protest, political party activity and free media reporting. MONUSCO police and human rights observers should play a part in this, by continuing to actively monitor police operations, in particular during protests. Recent legislation on civil society activities goes counter to this and should be reversed. An engaged opposition. International action also has been hampered by the tactics of the DRC opposition, which too often has boycotted talks, out of understandable distrust of either the regime or of one another. The better course would be for opposition figures to intensify their engagement in the process, including by seeking an active role in the electoral process, pressuring the government to open political space, beginning work on their electoral platforms and proving their relevance to a restive citizenry. Foreign governments with sway over the opposition should encourage such a course. Preparing for the future. With the balance of forces currently pointing at best toward stagnation, both regional and international actors should take steps to prepare for what might come next. This means being ready to respond to a further deterioration, including the spread and intensification of insurgencies. If the impasse continues, armed groups that are as yet poorly coordinated could conceivably merge efforts or at least synchronise them. This would fundamentally alter the situation. MONUSCO will be at the front line and needs to shift rapidly toward a more flexible and mobile posture, notably by being able to deploy resources more quickly around the country as signalled in its September strategic review. VI.Conclusion At its December 2016 signing, the Saint Sylvester agreement seemed to offer a credible way out of the DRC’s spiralling crisis. A considerable weakening of the opposition, lack of international political engagement, a focus on the conflict and humanitarian crisis in the Kasai and an effective diplomatic offensive by the Congolese government all contributed to stalling its implementation. Yet this setback aside, the fundamental principles of the agreement remain a solid foundation for international reengagement aimed at avoiding any further degeneration. The likelihood that the DRC will witness a rise in violent conflict remains high; the Kasai experience suggest how quickly and intensely it can spread. Should that occur, a regime that lacks both popular legitimacy and resources will find it highly challenging to manage. In the short term, this likely would reinforce the regime’s belief in its strategy of glissement, but at a huge human cost. A sudden, major deterioration of security, with large scale displacement and major implications for the region, cannot be ruled out. The immediate priority is for Western and regional powers to forge consensus, as best they can, on a coherent approach. This requires that both revisit existing policies: for now, the West should pause any further sanctions and African powers should step up pressure, even if behind closed doors, on President Kabila. A new electoral calendar for the DRC is on the table. It is far from ideal, as it allows Kabila to extend his stay in power, with all the attendant consequences for the country. But now is not the moment to sit on the sidelines and reinforce those in the regime who are eagerly awaiting the opportunity to blame further delays on foreign powers or the opposition. This latest development provides a new opening for the region and donor community to step up their efforts and work in concert toward this common goal. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

Pope Francis arrived in Bangladesh from Myanmar on Thursday as part of a visit that has been overshadowed by the plight of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees. PHOTO: AFP The dusts of Suhrawardy Udyan have settled down by now. The much-talked-about papal visit to Burma and Bangladesh has come to an end. The visit created quite a bit of furore both at home and abroad. The Vatican staunchly defended its decision of not allowing the Pope to utter the word “Rohingya” during his Burma visit. Its spokesperson claimed that “the Pope is not going to lose any moral authority” and insisted that “still stands (intact).” Detractors, however, felt the Pope fell short of what was expected of him, given his strong track record of advocating for refugees and migrants. They held that “there should be nothing controversial about the Pope identifying people by the name they want” (Fortify Rights) and felt betrayed that he missed out “an unparalleled opportunity” to bring light to the indiscriminate violence against the Rohingya. Terming or not terming a group by its preferred self-identification tag is not an issue of simple semantics. Intrinsically tied to this is the question of recognition of a group's right to self-identification. An important component of Burma's ruling elite's genocidal agenda against the Rohingya is the denial of the latter's self-identity. Since the military takeover in 1962, the State in Burma launched a systematic campaign to destroy the Rohingya identity. Despite the existence of valid historical records and official documentation of the existence of the Rohingya community in Arakan for centuries, the Burmese authorities deviously present them as “illegal migrants” from the region that is currently Bangladesh. Rejecting the Burmese claim that Rohingya are recent arrivals and the Rakhines are original settlers, eminent SOAS historian Michael Charney persuasively establishes “the shared immigrant nature of the entire population of the littoral” known as Arakan. He strongly argues that “No group in Arakan would pass the test as 'indigenous.'” The Pope's acquiescence to the pressure of the Burmese authorities for denying the use of the term Rohingya was a missed opportunity to condemn the genocidal acts of the Burmese government. His act became a party to the denial of the group identity of a people who are facing an existential threat from a state-sponsored genocidal act. Had the Pope stood his ground, it would have probably encouraged many others to support the rights of the Rohingya. It was a missed opportunity for the Pope “to publicly refute the unconscionable pressure by Aung San Suu Kyi and the Myanmar military to deny the Rohingya their identity.” (Human Rights Watch) At a recent RMMRU conference on Ending the Slow Burning Genocide of Rohingya by Myanmar, Rohingya activist Nay San Win reminded, “The term Rohingya is not a racial slur. It is a dignified term for more than two million people who are living across the world.” The then UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, in 2014 in Naypyidaw, expressed concerns about the welfare of the country's Rohingya Muslims. Ban did so in deference to the international human rights principle of self-identification of groups, and to the obvious dismay of his hosts. It will be unfair to hold Pope as an individual responsible for this blunder. At a press conference in Yangon held at the end of Pope's visit to the country, Myanmar's Catholic Church's Bishop John Hsane Hgyi suggested that reports of atrocities being committed are not “reliable” or “authoritative” and that those who are criticising Myanmar's response to a complex situation should “go into the field to study the reality and history” to obtain “true news.” Such statements do not help but remind the observers to recall the complicity of the Vatican and other German Churches with the Nazi regime, and to wonder that the corpus of international human rights instruments that have been framed over the last 70 years have had little impact on the institution. The Rohingya episode has again demonstrated that despite their avowed declaration to stand up for the wretched of the earth, when push comes to shove, the institution does not condemn the perpetrators at appropriate moments when it should and such condemnation would wake up the rest of the world to the realities of what is going on. The papal trip to Burma was conceived in June this year, much before the current wave of atrocities began. As the situation in Arakan deteriorated since August 26, the Vatican secured ample warning about the wanton genocidal acts of the Burmese security forces with active connivance of the Buddhist vigilante groups. One wonders what prompted the minders of the Pope to execute the visit even when the refugees were fleeing violence in Arakan. This visit, as one observer put it, was essentially “wading into a diplomatic and political minefield.” One may recall that Pope Francis in the recent past has publicly denounced “the persecution of Rohingya brothers and sisters” who he said were “tortured and killed, simply because they uphold their Muslim faith.” In the decades ahead, if and when the Vatican releases the documents pertaining to this papal visit, one would get to know whether the Burma visit was the result of internecine conflict within the Vatican establishment to malign an otherwise progressive Pope or was it a collective decision to promote Catholicism in a country where Christianity is the fastest growing faith, according to 2014 Population and Housing Census conducted by the UN Population Fund (UNFPA). During the first two days of his visit to Bangladesh marked by formal meetings, the Pope did not utter the term Rohingya. It is only during his meeting with the members of the affected community that he made a reference to Rohingya. The Pope had little to offer to his baffled Rohingya guests. He was visibly moved by the horrific recounting of experiences of the Rohingya families. But it appears even those were not enough for the leader of the planet's 1.6 billion Catholics to unequivocally condemn the genocidal acts of the barbarous Burmese regime. Instead, he begged forgiveness for the rest of the world for turning a blind eye, for dragging its feet and not acting, for not extending its support, for not being tough on Burma and for appearing to give parity to the Rohingya militants' attack on police posts in August with the three-month-long brutal campaign of the Burmese military that had resulted in the exodus of hundreds of thousands of refugees. Without extending his support to the demands of the victims for trial of the perpetrators, one wonders what prompted the pontiff to ask for forgiveness on behalf of the architects and executioners of this slow burning genocide when they themselves are celebrating their murderous acts? Surely there is no reason to believe that Gen. Ming Aung Hlaing, the head of the Burmese army and the Butcher of Arakan, broached the idea to the Holy Father when they met in Yangon! The Rohingya episode drives home the point that despite his efforts in promoting the cause of the underprivileged, his own herd, the Catholics, remain the Pope's priority. In this context, a question raised by the Chicago-based Rohingya Nasir Zakaria – “Is one minority more valuable than another?” – becomes pertinent. The Vatican should learn from the fact that the appeasement policy of Hitler during the World War II did not work. If the genocidal regime in Burma is not effectively resisted, one would not be surprised that in its project to make Burma only for Buddhists the regime will target the Christians and other minorities soon after it accomplishes the current task of annihilating Rohingya. The episode further lays bare the irony that the debate surrounding the Rohingya has reduced to utterances while the entire population in Arakan is facing genocidal extermination. Shame on the international community for failing to acknowledge and decisively act on this slow burning genocide.

Im Chaem at home near Anlong Veng: faced charges of crimes against humanity, including mass murder, enslavement and extermination. Photograph: Nevenka Lukin We find her, a bird-like figure in a stained orange wrap skirt and pink blouse, nursing a swollen hand at her stilted house in a village near the Thai border. Her tired, glaucous eyes, dark-brown rimmed with blue, watch us with suspicion. Two of her grandchildren stop their work of shelling black beans to observe us approach. A daughter spies us idly from a hammock. A lot of people came here asking questions, the old woman tells us, but prime minister Hun Sen told them to stop. What do we want? This is Im Chaem, a grandmother who until recently faced charges of crimes against humanity, including mass murder, enslavement and extermination. A United Nations-backed tribunal accused her of running a prison in northwest Cambodia where some 40,000 people died in the late 1970s. As a Khmer Rouge official, it was alleged, she also oversaw the construction of dams, part of the regime’s irrigation plan to increase rice production. Early this year the judges dropped the charges, a move critics said undermined the tribunal’s credibility and raised questions about interference by the government, which opposed the prosecution. Im Chaem sits alongside her grandchildren and listens to our questions. “No, I don’t remember anything from back then. I’m old – 76,” she says gently but firmly, swinging her sandalled feet like a schoolgirl and running a hand along a worn handbag at her side. “You should ask the people in the ministries, in the government, about all that.” Im Chaem with some of her grandchildren at home near Anlong Veng in northern Cambodia. Photograph: Nevenka Lukin You might not remember, I tell her, but many others remember you from those times. “I’m just living my life, a quiet life now,” she retorts, turning away and frowning into the distance. She lives a charmed life among her daughters and grandchildren, tending to her jackfruit and papaya trees and to three plump cows that far outsize the scrawny cattle seen elsewhere in the village. Her husband “comes and goes”, she says, then nods at her 14-year-old granddaughter. “This one doesn’t want to go to school. She’s worse than the cows out there.” She throws back her head and laughs, revealing a full set of healthy teeth, rarely seen in Cambodians her age. They’re stained blood-red from chewing betel nut. The tribunal was established in 2006 as a joint project between the UN and Cambodian government, but there were constant disputes over whom to prosecute as the government blocked efforts to try anyone besides the regime’s senior leaders. More than a decade later, at a cost of more than €250 million, it has convicted three people. Some two million died at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Irish Times

The failed UN/African Union “hybrid” Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)—the greatest failure in the history of UN peacekeeping and one of the very most expensive—continues (per its most recent reauthorization by the UN Security Council | June 2017) to draw down its forces on a scale ensuring that what exceedingly limited protection the Mission has offered will be greatly reduced. 44 percent of military personnel are now deploying out of Darfur and 30 percent of the policing personnel. The knock-on effects of withdrawing this hopelessly misconceived, demoralized, ill-equipped, and badly led Mission are many. Some of the greatest consequences will be a reduction in humanitarian access; for example, since the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) flies only to areas militarily protected, locations abandoned by UNAMID troops will no longer be accessible. This is especially perverse since a condition for the permanent lifting of U.S. economic sanctions by the Trump administration was the improvement of humanitarian access in Darfur. The UN’s current estimate of the number of people in Darfur in need of humanitarian assistance is 3 million. Tragically, the greatest consequence of UNAMID’s deployment out of Darfur are the continuation, and in some places acceleration, of daily ethnically-targeted attacks on civilians throughout Darfur, primarily by Arab militias controlled or sanctioned by Khartoum. Non-Arab (African) civilians continue to be—as they have been for more than fourteen years—subject to murder, rape, displacement, and loss of property and goods. There is good reason to believe that we will see in the reports from Darfur (conveyed primarily by Radio Dabanga) continuation, even expansion, of these attacks. Only the fact of previous vast destruction of African villages and the violent expropriation of farmlands, and the massive concentration of displaced persons (some 2.7 million in Darfur itself,another 320,000 in eastern Chad refugee camps) limits the scale of attacks. Moreover, we should remember that some 600,000 people have been killed as a direct or indirect result of violence over the past fourteen years: this approaches ten percent of the pre-war population in Darfur (see | http://sudanreeves.org/2017/01/05/quantifying-genocide-darfur-mortality-update-august-6-2010/). As a crude barometer of the scale of violence, I have been assembling a brief bi-weekly compendium of foreshortened dispatches from Radio Dabanga and Sudan Tribune (all with sources on the ground). For surveys covering more extensive periods the violent expropriation of African farmlands (November 2014 – November 2016) and the rape of girls and young women (for the years 2014 and 2015), see: http://sudanreeves.org/2016/02/17/changing-the-demography-violent-expropriation-and-destruction-of-farmlands-in-darfur-november-2014-november-2015/ http://sudanreeves.org/2017/03/07/continuing-mass-rape-of-girls-in-darfur-the-most-heinous-crime-generates-no-international-outrage-january-2016/ For the period November 18, 2917 – December 4, 2017(also including several alarming medical dispatches concerning cholera, as well as haemorrhagic fever in Kassala): • No return of IDPs to their areas despite violence reduction in Darfur: UN official | Sudan Tribune | 19 November 2017 An international official deplored that the decline of clashes with the rebels groups and inter-communal violence did not help to create a conducive environment for the return of displaced people to their area of origin. [This comes perilously close to blaming the victims for their plight–for the insecurity that UNAMID has been unable to end despite its ten-year deployment (beginning January 1, 2008). The reality is that people don’t leave the displaced persons camps, or the refugee camps in eastern Chad, because they feel—on the basis of excellent intelligence—that security is simply not adequate. Khartoum’s Arab militia forces are still engaged in murder, rape, extortion, robbery, and a range of other violent actions, often specifically directed at returnees; see below—ER] “The armed groups in Darfur today had largely been defeated, the ferocity of inter-communal violence had declined, and there had been no new large-scale displacements, Bintou Keita,” Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, told the Security Council on Thursday during a presentation of the UN Secretary General’s latest report on the African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) “However, those positive developments had not led to the voluntary and sustainable return of internally displaced persons,“ Keita further said, noting that nearly one-third of Darfur’s population remained displaced. [These “positive developments” most conspicuously do not include a return of land and farms violently expropriated by Khartoum’s militia forces—this is the single greatest obstacle to any sort of meaningful peace agreement. Moreover, those who do attempt to return, having been guaranteed security, are typically assaulted and forced to flee again; this is the reason the camps populations and refugee population in eastern Chad have been so grimly stable for so long: see below—ER] She pointed that the slow return of IDPs reflects anxiety about security and lack of confidence about present and future prospects due to slow progress in addressing such issues as land, poor resource management, accountability, and security sector reform. According to the UN agencies, nearly one-third of Darfur’s population remained displaced. However, the number of displaced people has remained stable. [The total population of displaced persons—internally displaced in camps, displaced outside of camps, and refugees in eastern Chad—is approximately 3 million civilians, overwhelmingly from the non-Arab/African populations of Darfur, which were a demographic majority before the war, when the population was estimated to be 6 million to 6.5 million(there has been no reliable census in the region for decades). In other words—and especially if we consider the massive mortality of the past fifteen years—we are talking about HALF the pre-war population, not a “third”—ER] • AU, UN team visits Darfur to assess UNAMID reconfiguration process | Sudan Tribune | November 17, 2017 (KHARTOUM) A joint team from the African Union and United Nations has visited Sudan to assess the first phase of the hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID) reconfiguration[euphemistic crap for “withdrawal“—ER] and make recommendations for the second phase. [The “second phase” of a perversely self-celebratory failure is certain to be nothing more than further self-celebration, even as the mandate of the Mission continues to be betrayed in the most fundamental ways. Such language is the cruelest of jokes on the people of Darfur—ER] • Sudan women centres run campaign against gender-based violence | Radio Dabanga | November 24, 2017 | KHARTOUM Sudanese women rights centres launched the Women’s Initiative and Building Trust campaign to combat violence against women on Thursday, against the backdrop of activities against tea sellers in Khartoum. The campaign will run for 16 days straight until 10 December and shed more light on the issue of gender-based violence while raising efforts to combat the problem in Sudan. The Sima Centre for Training and Protection of Women and Children’s Rights, the Gender centre, Sobat, Asimat, and Alaq participate in the campaign. They will host a number of activities and events. Nahid Jabrallah, the head of the Sima centre in Khartoum, told Radio Dabanga that she is surprised that female genital circumcision and domestic violence have still not been criminalised in Sudan. “This should be included in the personal status laws.” Jabrallah also pointed to the prevalence of sexual violence against women. “The campaign is aimed at ending sexual, social and economic violence against women.” [Sexual violence against girls and women has been something UNAMID has never taken seriously, and it has failed massively in its reporting responsibilities in this arena. The quarterly reports of former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon typically reflected UNAMID’s reporting failures—ER] • Mother killed, daughter raped on farm in North Darfur | Radio Dabanga | November 21, 2017 | TAWILA A woman was stabbed to death and her daughter raped in Tawila locality in North Darfur on Monday. Two armed men attacked Maryam Yagoub Suleiman and her 16-year-old daughter when they were willing their farm in Daba Naira, north of Tawila. “They attempted to rape the daughter,” said a relative of the two. “Maryam fought back, but the attackers stabbed her with a knife and killed her on the spot.” The attackers, two armed herders, subsequently raped the daughter at gunpoint. “She has been taken to El Fasher for treatment. We have filed a complaint to the police,” the relative reported to Radio Dabanga. [The need for adequate reporting by UNAMID and other international actors on the continuing epidemic of sexual violence in Darfur could hardly be more obvious. The continuation of such attacks is but one more measure of UNAMID’s ghastly failure—ER] • Sudanese forces storm IDPs camp in West Darfur in search of weapons | Sudan Tribune | November 20, 2017 (KHARTOUM) A joint government force on Monday has raided Abu Zar camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in West Darfur state as part of the forcible phase of the disarmament campaign. [We should expect to see many more such reports as the “disarmament campaign” continues, and Khartoum pursues its plans for dismantling the camps for displaced persons—ER] • Sudan plans to attack IDPs camps in Darfur: SRF | Sudan Tribune | November 24, 2017 (KHARTOUM) The Sudanese Revolutionary Forces (SRF) led by Minni Minnawi has warned against government plot to attack the IDPs camps in Darfur under the pretext of the disarmament campaign. [There is already far too much evidence of such plans on the part of the Khartoum regime; whatever one thinks of the SRF as a source of intelligence, there is a cogency to the claim here that is not only supported by the evidence to date but by the announced ambitions of the Khartoum regime. See especially report by Suliman Baldo for the Enough Project: Ominous Threats Descending On Darfur: Overview: Weapons Collection Campaign With “Shoot to Kill” Orders | Suliman Baldo, The Enough Project | November 9, 2017 https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/OminousThreatsDarfur_Nov2017_Enough1.pdf العربية https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Ominous-Threats-Descending-On-Darfur_Nov-2017_AR.pdf • UNAMID, OHCHR urges Sudan to focus on Darfur displaced civilians | Sudan Tribune | November 21, 2017 (KHARTOUM) Sudanese government has to improve security, humanitarian and human rights situation of displaced people in Darfur as the end of armed clashes creates conducive conditions to engage in effective, and durable policies said a joint UN report released on Tuesday. [These are meaningless, vacuous demands, made of a regime that it is fully capable of ignoring ALL UN and international demands—ER] From January 2014 to December 2016 the hybrid peacekeeping operation (UNAMID) documented 1,286 allegations of human rights abuses and violations against 3,358 victims, including 2,108 women and 299 children. [Such recordkeeping by UNAMID is grotesquely inadequate to the realities it is supposed to reflect. UNAMID’s gross failure to keep adequate records of murder, rape, violent expropriation of farmland, and much else reflects the poor morale of the Mission, its refusal to investigate much of what is reported to it by Darfuris, and a profound incompetence. The Mission continues to stand as the greatest peacekeeping failure in UN history, even as it has been one of the very most expensive—ER] • UNAMID probing Mission worker on sexual assault allegation | Sudan Tribune | November 28, 2017 (EL-FASHER) The hybrid peacekeeping in Darfur (UNAMID) said the Mission and the Sudanese authorities are investigating an allegation of sexual offences by a Mission worker. [A grim indication of the attitude toward sexual violence by the Mission as a whole, and an indication as well about morale within the Mission—ER] • Children injured in North Darfur gunfire | Radio Dabanga | November 29, 2017 | TAWILA Two children were seriously injured when armed militants opened fire on a groupreturnees in the Katur area of Tawila locality on Monday. Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that armed elements in three Land Cruisers with machine guns and others on camelsopened fire indiscriminately at a group of people who have returned to Katur area in the framework of voluntary repatriation. They said that 12-year-old Saadia Hamid Eisa and seven-year-old Abdelhameed Abdelmajeed Adam were seriously injured. The attackers also stole 21 cows and five donkeys. [To date, this has been a theme for a great many, if not the majority of those who have sought to return to their villages, having been assured of adequate security. This does much to explain what Bintou Keita,” Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, complains of (see first dispatch above—ER] • Man killed, hijacks in North and South Darfur | Radio Dabanga | November 24, 2017 | KUTUM / KATOR Militiamen killed a man in a gold mine area near Kutum, North Darfur, on Wednesday. Two government vehicles were hijacked in separate incidents in Darfur. Three unknown gunmen shot and killed Adam Abdallah Musa at Hashaba, east of Kutum, a witness told Radio Dabanga. At 10 pm the gunmen, riding two motorcycles, opened fire in the Hashaba gold mine area and killed Musa on the spot. On Thursday, eight gunmen hijacked a Land Cruiser belonging to collectors of the locality of East Jebel Marra in South Darfur. A source said that the gunmen opened fire from their vehicle on the road between Deribat to Kator. They shot Abu El Gasim Haroun and seized their vehicle. [As part of its genocidal “counter-insurgency on the cheap,” Khartoum has created a monster that neither UNAMID nor the RSF can control, and the victims of this militia lawlessness are the civilians of Darfur—ER] • Three dead in Darfur gun violence | Radio Dabanga | November 20, 2017 | KUTUM / TULLUS / EL SALAM Three people have died in separate incidents of gun violence in Darfur over the weekend. A farmer was gunned-down in North Darfur, while government forces collecting arms in South Darfur. Witnesses from Farok area north of Kutum in North Darfur told Radio Dabanga that gunmen opened fire on Abdallah Adam while he was tilling his farm at Farok area north of Kutum and killed him instantly. The motive for the shooting was unclear. In separate incidents, government forces engaged in the campaign to collect arms in Darfur fired on a group which killed two people and injured six others after severely beating them in Tullus and El Salam localities in South Darfur. • Traditional gold prospector killed by gunmen in North Darfur | Sudan Tribune | November 25, (El-Fasher) A traditional gold prospector on Thursday was killed by three gunmen in North Darfur state. [The Jebel Amir gold mining area of North Darfur will remain the epicenter of very considerable violence in North Darfur for the foreseeable future—ER] • North Darfur tribe leader’s house damaged | Radio Dabanga | November 28, 2017 | MELLIT The house of King Yasser Hussein Ahmadi, the leader of the Berti tribe in North Darfur, was stormed by members of the Rapid Support Forces on Friday morning. His house has been searched several times. The house search in Mellit locality resulted in the damage to some furniture and was conducted “in a humiliating manner”, the head of the Berti youth group, Mohamed El Haj Yousif, told Radio Dabanga. He reported that a number of RSF members, driving 14 Land Cruisers, raided the King Ahmadi’s house. “They beat one of the guards, broke the outside door and searched the house.” Inside, they broke chairs and parts of the tribal brass artefacts. “This is the fifth time his house has been searched in this shameful and unfortunate manner,” El Haj said. He was unable to report the reasons for the house searches. [This assault on the king (or Malik) of the Berti is fully revealing of the contempt of the RSF for non-Arab/African people. This should be seen as a portent of the future for African tribal culture in Darfur, and for those non-Arab/African Darfuris in Khartoum, now an immense number—ER] • Dead, injured in Darfur road accident, shooting | Radio Dabanga | November 22, 2017 | NYALA / GIREIDA • Al Bashir asks Russia to ‘protect Sudan against US aggression’ |Radio Dabanga | November 26, 2017 | SOCHI [A powerfully revealing example of the hypocrisy, mendacity and expediency of the Khartoum regime leadership; coming after the lifting of U.S. sanctions, such absurd charges as al-Bashir made in seeking protection against “U.S. aggression” ignores (among other things) the reality of the immense value the U.S. intelligence community places on its new Khartoum embassy, filled with state-of-the-art surveillance, monitoring and other intelligence equipment: it is now the prime U.S. listening post in northern Africa—ER] • Sudan’s RSF accuses Darfur tribal leader of involvement in foreign conspiracy | Sudan Tribune | November 27, 2017 (KHARTOUM) – Commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, (aka Hametti) Monday confirmed the arrest of Darfur tribal leader Musa Hilal accusing him of involving in a foreign conspiracy against Sudan. Heavy clashes erupted on Sunday between the SRF and Hilal’s Border Guards Forces (BGF) at his headquarters in Mistiriyha, North Darfur state. Hametti told the official news agency SUNA that Hilal and three of his sons, as well as a number of his aides, were captured, stressing the RSF director of general supplies Brigadier Abdel-Rahim Gumma and a number of RSF elements have been killed during the clashes. [This attack could spur further violence in this part of North Darfur, violence in which civilians will inevitably be caught in the cross-fire—ER] • Man shot dead | Radio Dabanga | December 1, 2017 | NIERTETI A man was shot and killed in his house in Central Darfur. The 30 year-old Eisa Adam Eisa Abdelrahman was shot and killed in his house in El Wehda district, Nierteti town, by unknown gunmen. A listener reported to Radio Dabanga that three gunmen arrived at his house and called him to come outside. “They shot him dead on the spot and fled the scene.” Abdelrahman was married and had two children. • Man murdered, mother found dead in Central Darfur | Radio Dabanga | December 4, 2017 | NIERTETI / ZALINGEI Gunmen shot and killed a displaced man from Nierteti North camp in Central Darfur on Friday night. In a separate incident, the lifeless body of a displaced woman was found near a market on Saturday. Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that on Friday night gunmen wearing military uniforms opened fire on Jarelnabi Adam Ishag at Block 4 of the Nierteti North camp and instantly killed him. [Perhaps the most appalling failure of UNAMID is its almost complete inability to protect the camps for displaced persons; indeed, if those attacking the camps are regular troops, the RSF, or sanctioned militias, UNAMID forces simply watch—ER] • 23 people killed in North Darfur clashes with Musa Hilal fighters: army | Sudan Tribune | November 29, 2017 (KHARTOUM) North Darfur clashes between the government’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and fighters of the Border Guards Forces (BGF) of Musa Hilal resulted in the death of 23 people from the two sides… • North Darfur Defence Minister denies civilian casualties in Misteriya raid | Radio Dabanga | November 30, 2017 | MISTERIYA [Despite the denial by someone who is nothing more than a spokesman for the Khartoum regime, Radio Dabanga reports: Member of Parliament Eisa Mustafa claims that at least 12 civilians died during the raid on Sunday. Witnesses who fled from and around Misteriya told Radio Dabanga that there was a campaign of arrests of youths and men conducted by the RSF. In an interview with Radio Dabanga, they said that they fled to live rough in the mountains and valleys as the Misteriya area has been besieged and all the roads leading to it were closed since the events broke out Sunday. Appeals via social media demand the siege to be lifted as it is apparently preventing people from burying the dead as bodies are left to decompose in the open. On Wednesday the UNICEF Resident Representative, Abdallah Fadil, said that a UN delegation would be sent to Misteriya to find out the situation resulting from the clashes in the area. Fadil told a news conference in Khartoum that a UNAMID team would arrive in the area within the next few hours to conduct a field investigation. He added that “we would investigate the violations against the civilians and children there, certainly there are children.” [Indeed, so where was UNAMID at the time of the obviously impending violence?—ER] • Detained Central Darfur tribal clan leader dies in Khartoum | Sudan Tribune | November 29, 2017 (EL-FASHER) A tribal leader and one of the prisoners arrested in Mistiriyha, North Darfur, died on Monday night in a hospital belonging to the Sudanese security service in Khartoum, as his family has accused the has accused the government of executing him. • Central Darfur prince ‘dies of torture’ in Khartoum | Radio Dabanga | November 29, 2017 | KHARTOUM The family of Adam Khater, the Prince of Olad Eid in Central Darfur, have accused Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) of torturing the prince to death. [Such action would be entirely in keeping with the character of NISS. They are masters of torture, and have a free hand from the regime to use this savagery however they wish—ER] Prince Adam Khater was one of those arrested in Darfur and transferred to Khartoum on Monday along with Musa Hilal, former janjaweed leader and chairman of the Revolutionary Awakening Council. The son of Prince Adam Khater’s brother accused the security apparatus of torturing his uncle to death. He said his uncle was arrested with Musa Hilal at Misteriya and transferred with him to Khartoum. They family was notified of his death after arriving in Khartoum. The Sudanese Communist Party has warned of the transformation of Darfur into an arena of regional and international conflict and massive wars, as well as bearing the danger of tearing apart the rest of the country in the wake of events in Misteriya, where Hilal, his sons, brothers, and many followers were detained in a raid by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). • West Kordofan students ‘waterboarded’ by Sudan security | Radio Dabanga | November 30, 2017 | BABANUSA • Sudan Liberation Movement accuses Khartoum government of ‘eliminating Darfur Prisoners of War’ | Radio Dabanga | November 27, 2017 | OMDURMAN The Sudan Liberation Movement faction led by Minni Arko Minawi (SLM-MM) and the SLM-Transitional Council have accused the government of physically eliminating some of their affiliates, and torturing and amputating parts of others who were captured in fighting in Darfur in May. The head of the SLM Transitional Council, El Hadi Idris Yahya, explained in an interview with Radio Dabanga broadcast on Monday that 245 members of the two movements were captured. Two of them died in the prison, while some prisoners had legs and hands amputated. He conceded that he was not sure whether the amputations were the result of combat wounds or physical torture. [We may be sure that whatever the truth of these allegations, they will never be investigated by UNAMID, the UN, or the International Committee of the Red Cross—the Khartoum regime would never permit any such investigation—ER] • Court orders 83 students shaved in public in northern Sudan | Radio Dabanga | November 26, 2017 | DONGOLA The community security police of Dongola in Sudan’s Northern state arrested 83 youths last week, most of them students, for ‘odd shaving and wearing inappropriate uniforms’. The arrests are part of an apparent police crackdown on ‘inappropriate dress and hair styling’ for which strict rules apply under Islamic law. [How shari’a works in Sudan—ER] • Sudanese returnees face harsh restrictions in Blue Nile state | Radio Dabanga | December 3, 2017 | AL TADAMON Sudanese pastoralists who have returned to Al Tadamon locality in Blue Nile state complain of restrictions and deterioration of the security situation, especially from militia activity on the border with South Sudan. The pastoralists, many of whom have returned to the town of Bout after being refugees in South Sudan, complained to Radio Dabanga of restrictions imposed by security services and military intelligence on goods coming out of the town and the deterioration of the security situation in the border areas with South Sudan. Callers said that the security services do not allow the pastoralists to take more than 10 kilogrammes of sugar and one kilogramme of flour from the markets. Goods are also allegedly confiscated on the pretext that “they exceed the quantities authorised without a permit from the security services.” The residents of Bout have confirmed the deterioration of the security situation, especially in the areas bordering South Sudan, because of the presence of South Sudanese militias in the areas of Goz El Mafaza, 80 kilometres southwest of Bout. The pastoralists also complain of the confiscation of more 13 tractors during this year, as well as “the imposition of indiscriminate taxes on the pastoralists while crossing to South Sudan.” [Blue Nile returnees will have much in common with those attempting to return to their lands in Darfur—ER] MEDICAL NEWS: • New cholera cases emerge in Port Sudan | Radio Dabanga | November 29, 2017 | PORT SUDAN Despite reports of the cholera epidemic abating in Sudan, medical sources continue to note the emergence of new cases of cholera in Port Sudan. Journalist Osman Hashim told Radio Dabanga that according to medical sources “on Friday the Ministry of Health opened two isolation wards at both Port Sudan Hospital and the Children’s Hospital.” He said that on Friday the wards received 12 cholera patients; seven at Port Sudan Hospital and five at the Children’s Hospital. [The failure of the UN—particularly the World Health Organization and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs—has ensured that cholera has not and likely will not been eradicated in Sudan: there are now simply too many reservoirs of the highly contagious Vibrio cholerae bacterium—ER] • ‘New cholera cases in Sudan’s Sennar but epidemic abating’: Doctor | Radio Dabanga | November 20, 2017 | SINGA [This was in Sennar State: nine days later, twelve new cases of cholera were reported in Red Sea State—ER] • More haemorrhagic fever cases in eastern Sudan | Radio Dabanga | November 19, 2017 | KASSALA Medical sources report an increasing incidence of haemorrhagic fever in Kassala in eastern Sudan. Three deaths were reported at Kassala hospital in early November. In an interview with Radio Dabanga a healthcare worker who asked not be named strongly criticised “the authorities’ neglect and lack of seriousness in dealing and coping with the disease.” The doctor expressed surprise and dismay that the Ministry of Health has consistently denied an outbreak of the disease in Kassala. He said that most patients must receive treatment at home after being seen by doctors in outpatient clinics because of lack of adequate health care in the hospital. [An increasing number of haemorrhagic fever cases in Sudan is an extremely alarming development—but yet again, officials of the Khartoum regime refuse to acknowledge the crisis. And again, no comment from the UN’s World Health Organization—ER] ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Honduras has entered a political crisis that is turning increasingly violent following the disputed results of the 26 November general elections. In a climate of deep mistrust between the two contenders – President Juan Orlando Hernández, from the conservative National Party, and Salvador Nasralla, left-wing opposition contender and TV personality – the final count concluded a week after the poll, with President Hernández emerging victorious. However, initial results in the early hours of Monday 27 November, when over half the votes had been counted, showed the opposition on course for victory with Nasralla claiming a 5 per cent lead. After three further days of vote counting, interrupted by a five-hour outage of the computerised voting system, the Supreme Electoral Court announced that President Hernández had taken the lead. The sudden switch in the presidential race has elicited disbelief and fury in opposition circles. Nasralla’s Alliance party, which insists the entire electoral process has been compromised, refused to participate as an observer in the count of the last remaining votes. The opposition is demanding a more extensive recount, and has until Wednesday to lodge formal complaints against the election. Opposition anger has ignited across the country, leading to blocking of roads, running clashes in major cities between protesters and security forces throughout last week, as well as more peaceful displays of outrage, such as the large marches last Sunday and a cacerolazo (pot-banging protest). Incidents of looting and attacks on businesses during the protests suggest the political crisis has been affected by Honduras’ exceptionally high levels of criminal violence. Its homicide rate, at 59 murders per 100,000 habitants each year, makes it one of the world’s most lethal countries. On Friday 30 November the government declared a state of emergency and a curfew in an effort to contain the unrest, which has claimed at least three lives according to local media. The army has been granted special permission to detain anyone suspected of insurrection. Why have electoral authorities taken so long to process the results? The president of the Supreme Electoral Court is a member of the ruling National Party and a close ally of President Hernández, inviting public speculation as to the latter’s influence over the drawn-out count. “Are we going to give them the power? In exchange for what?”, said one of Hernández’s allies in a WhatsApp audio message sent to his supporters the day after the elections. The opposition’s accusations are based on a series of circumstances that they consider to be evidence of fraud: the electoral institution took nine hours to provide the first official results; the swing in favour of President Hernández started on Wednesday 29 after the electronic counting system stopped working; and there was a 20 per cent lower voter turnout in the country’s northern regions as compared to various southern regions, President Hernández’s heartland. Although the Supreme Electoral Court will itself need to prove that its handling of the poll has been clean, doubts over the probity of the electoral process reflect broader concerns as to the increasing power of the executive branch. Described by Tegucigalpa diplomats as “a political fox”, President Hernández’s strategy over the last four years has been to accumulate power across state institutions, including electoral and judicial. His greatest feat in this respect was to quash the constitutional ban on re-election. Paradoxically, former President Manuel Zelaya was ousted in 2009 after trying to hold a referendum on the very same issue. What has sparked this level of public outrage? The fraud allegations have rekindled old political hostilities from the June 2009 coup d’état, when the army seized former President Zelaya while still in his pyjamas and sped him into exile. Since then, Honduras “has been on standby for eight years”, explains a veteran journalist. One side of the political divide is represented by President Juan Orlando Hernández, who is close to the Honduran military and the economic elites; the other is former President Zelaya, the brain of the opposition Alliance, who aspires to become a special presidential adviser to the political novice Nasralla. Hernández has crafted an impressive public image over his term in office, promoting the country’s economic growth and reduced murder rate. Opposition supporters, on the other hand, refer to Honduras as “Juan Orlando’s dictatorship”, and denounce militarised public security, rampant corruption and systematic human rights abuses. Court cases pointing to high-level corruption and crime have undermined the already scant public trust in national government and institutions. In testimony in March 2017, an extradited drug lord in the U.S. claimed there were connections between President Hernández, former President Porfirio Lobo – both from the National Party – and drug trafficking groups. Both politicians have strenuously denied the accusations and neither has been charged. A multimillion-dollar embezzlement scandal in the social security system exposed ties to the 2013 presidential campaign of President Hernández, who admitted it unwittingly took money from companies linked to the racket, but said that neither he nor the party was aware of the source of the funding. The scandal sparked huge protests, coinciding with the 2015 anti-corruption rallies in Guatemala. Over 66 per cent of Hondurans fall beneath the poverty line. The breach between the economic hardship of most Hondurans and scandals of illicit enrichment allegedly involving the political establishment have intensified public disaffection. According to recent surveys from Latinobarómetro and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), only 34 per cent of Hondurans support democracy and trust elections. In the case of support for democracy, Latinobarómetro finds that Honduras has the lowest rate of all Latin American countries surveyed. Could the risk of political instability affect criminal violence in Honduras? The spike of criminal violence following the 2009 coup, after which Honduras became the primary landing zone for drug flights from South America and underwent a rapid growth in the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, is a bad omen. Honduras’ criminal economy has recently been undergoing a change in power and personnel. New drug trafficking forces are allegedly taking over from the most prominent groups – the Atlantic Cartel and The Cachiros – after these were weakened by extradition of several leaders. Gang presence, recruitment and violence in urban areas are matters of huge concern: “we are on the way to ending up like El Salvador”, says one Honduran academic. The toll of death and fear turned the country’s second city, San Pedro Sula into "murder capital of the world", with 169 murders for every 100,000 inhabitants in 2012. According to UNHCR data, there were 174,000 victims of forced displacement between 2004 and 2014, and 8,100 asylum seekers in 2016 alone. Regardless of who wins, what are the most pressing challenges for the incoming Honduran administration? If President Hernández gets re-elected, as now seems likely, his opponents would find it hard to forgive him victory in a poll they regard as irrevocably rigged. In the face of street protests and threats to his legitimacy, he may well enhance the coercive approach to security matters that he has already displayed in creating a hybrid police-army force, toughening judicial sentences, and promoting military-oriented education programs. Should opposition candidate Nasralla eventually triumph, his administration would suffer a very different flaw. The political divide between him – a self-proclaimed centre-right candidate – and former President Zelaya, a left-wing, anti-U.S. figurehead who is close ally of the Venezuelan government, would probably spill over into government. According to one academic in Tegucigalpa: “the only thing this opposition alliance has in common is the motto ‘fuera JOH’ [in Spanish “go away JOH”, the acronym for President Hernández]”. Whatever the outcome, this crisis has magnified the importance of three issues on the in-tray of the new Honduran government. An urgent political reform will be needed to address the causes of this particular crisis, including legalisation of re-election and guarantees of independence for electoral institutions. Worsening public mistrust in the country’s institutions will require more robust anti-corruption efforts, with support from a strengthened Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH), an advisory mission assisting Honduran prosecutors run by the Organization of American States (OAS). In terms of security, police reform should seek to build a system of law enforcement that reduces impunity, works to prevent rather than solely combat criminal violence, and leads to the eventual de-militarisation of public security. How can the international community mitigate the effects of the current crisis? The U.S. already provides major political and security support to Honduras, and President Hernández has prioritised good bilateral relations during his term in office. “[Honduras] is the spoiled child of the U.S. in Central America”, states a Tegucigalpa-based diplomat. This good relationship was on show in the recent postponement on 6 November of the termination of Temporary Protected Status for 57,000 Hondurans living in the U.S., the same day the Department of Homeland Security announced the status would not be renewed for Nicaraguans. A close ally of President Hernández and a big donor, the U.S. would be inclined to overlook claims of wrongdoing in the electoral process, but would be loath to see an escalating political crisis causing disruptions to the Honduran economy and security conditions, with the risk these entail of larger migrant flows to the U.S. Electoral observers from the European Union and OAS should extend their in-country presence as much as possible, first in order to make sure the remaining 5 per cent of votes are processed to the satisfaction of electoral authorities, the opposition and the wider public; and second, to provide assurances that the same flaws in electoral management do not affect a repeat poll if that is deemed to be the best solution to the crisis. These missions remain the only credible mediators in the country given the questionable independence of the Supreme Electoral Court. The holiday season may well bring a fragile respite to Honduras. But by January 2018, the country will be far from the international spotlight, and at risk of sustained and violent political disputes. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

Mon Mao (64), a survivor of the Khmer Rouge regime who attended reconciliation meetings with Khmer Rouge foot soldiers in Andong Bey, near Anlong Veng. Photograph: Nevenka Lukin In Anlong Veng in northern Cambodia, the conversation turns to food. “But what did you get to eat?” 14-year-old schoolgirl Thy Daly asks Huoy Teng(62) and Mon Mao (64), who survived the murderous Khmer Rouge regime in the 1970s. Very little, is the answer. “Back then I was so hungry I’d go to the rice paddy and pick a few grains and roast them, unhusked. I would have eaten anything,” Teng explains to the group comprising schoolchildren and student teachers. “I had a makeshift torch and went around at night with my siblings to catch toads.” “I was so skinny,” says Mao, “that you could see my knee bones sticking out.” The two quiet-spoken men, who were civil parties to the UN-backed tribunal to prosecute Khmer Rouge leaders, have travelled from their village in Chong Kal district to Anlong Veng to share their experiences with young people born long after the atrocities of the regime. Former Khmer Rouge cadre Tron Kron (72). Photograph: Nevenka Lukin “Some people don’t believe our story, especially young people,” Teng tells the group. “Some dismiss it as a fairy tale. But you must believe that it happened. It is true.” From 1975 to 1979, under the leadership of Pol Pot, the communist Khmer Rouge regime oversaw the killing by torture, hard labour and starvation of some two million people in Cambodia. Teng and Mao were forced to work constructing dams and building the irrigation system that the Khmer Rouge viewed as vital to expand rice production. “The senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge are to blame,” says Mao. “If there was a death sentence, we would like them to receive it.” Huoy Teng (62), a survivor of the Khmer Rouge regime. Photograph: Nevenka Lukin Teng adds: “But the smaller cadres, the soldiers were not at fault. Please don’t discriminate against them. They are not to blame for their leaders’ acts.” This visit to Anlong Veng, the final stronghold of the remnants of the Khmer Rouge before it integrated into the Cambodian state in 1998, has a dual purpose: the two men will also meet some of those ex-cadre members who now live quiet lives of retirement in the district. Regime survivor The initiative is part of the work of the Documentation Centre of Cambodia (DC-Cam), whose founder Youk Chhang, himself a survivor of the regime, gathered some one million documents, films and photographs from the period, many of which have served as evidence in the tribunal. The centre helped introduce the study of the Khmer Rouge period into secondary schools in 2009, and runs a peace centre and museum in Anlong Veng. It has elaborate plans for the area, including the opening of an educational tourist trail that includes, among other stops, the grave of Pol Pot, the home of Ta Mok, known as his “butcher”, and the peace centre. Schoolgirls from the former Khmer Rouge stronghold of Anlong Veng visit the grave of Khmer Rouge official Ta Mok, known as Pol Pot’s “butcher”. Photograph: Nevenka Lukin “Some nine million people had already left school by 2009, so in a country of 16 million there’s still a lot of people who don’t know their own history of past abuse,” Chhang explains in his Phnom Penh office. “There is a risk of it being repeated. People can know what happened by looking at social media, for example. But to understand you need to really educate people. Not just for memory but for healing, for reconciliation – to reconnect the broken pieces within us.” It is in that spirit that Huoy Teng and Mon Mao travel with the students some 30km to Andong Bey, a struggling, dusty town with many boarded-up houses. “So many people have left to work in Thailand due to problems with micro-financing,” explains Phat Bora (22) of DC-Cam. “They borrowed money and now the prices of the crops went down, so they went across the border to work as labourers to try to pay the debt.” Mark of respect Tron Kron (73) and her husband Nov Chuoo (72) have had no such problems. We find them at home with their daughter and grandchildren, Kron lounging in an army-design hammock, one hand attached to a drip suspended overhead. Teng approaches them and places his hands in prayer position as a mark of respect. The couple, both of whom were Khmer Rouge foot soldiers in Kampong Thom province, greet us, and Teng, who has not met them before, sits as though joining friends. Ly-Sok Kheang of the Documentation Centre of Cambodia, and director of the Anlong Veng Peace Centre, at the grave of Pol Pot in Anlong Veng, northern Cambodia. Photograph: Nevenka Lukin “You were separated into ‘new’ and ‘old’ people,” Chuoo explains to the students, glancing at Teng every so often as though for confirmation that what he is saying is true. It was clearly preferable to be in the “old” category; “new” people weren’t trusted and were often executed ahead of others. “There was this killing site called the ‘well farm’. They would kill people beside a well – usually by beating them – and then throw them into the well,” Chuoo tells the students. “Yes, I witnessed people being taken to the well and bludgeoned with farming tools,” says Teng, nodding. “And when the bodies began to rot, they added more.” “Yes, people were taken by the truckload to be killed that way,” says Kron. “There were only a few executioners, but there were quite a lot of people.” Didn’t it poison the water supply? “Water was never a problem due to the irrigation system,” says Bora. Children at the Cambodia Asean International School in Anlong Veng, northern Cambodia. Photograph: Nevenka Lukin It is a surreal experience to witness a conversation filled with such horrific detail, held in such calm terms, and by someone who suffered the atrocities being spoken about at the hands of people including his interlocutor. There are no dramatic gestures, no clearing the air, no apologies. Karmic acts “In our culture, it’s considered too easy to say sorry,” says DC-Cam’s Ly Sok Kheang, director of the Anlong Peace Centre. “Cambodian people prefer to say let bygones be bygones. Let him or her face their karmic acts. Saying sorry is not workable.” Anlong Veng was the final stronghold of the Khmer Rouge, and is now a kind of retirement district for former cadre members. The ideology, however, has not gone away. Many people here still revere Ta Mok, known as Pol Pot’s “butcher”. There is a Khmer Rouge “mindset”, says Kheang, “that makes it difficult to align ideologies. They tend to stick to their own group, so it’s difficult to integrate the communities.” Emma Leslie, director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies in Siem Reap, Cambodia. Photograph: Nevenka Lukin Emma Leslie, director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, which held its annual Peace Practitioners’ Research Conference in Siem Reap last month, says the big challenge lies in educating Cambodia’s young people and equipping them with the information and skills to lead the country in the future. The centre, which runs a master’s programme, will open a peace museum in Battambang next year. “Seventy per cent of the population is under 30. You have all these young people and not an education system that has critical thinking, also that doesn’t really deal with history.” Reconciliation shouldn’t be only about the Khmer Rouge, says Leslie. She is unconvinced of the merits of the UN tribunal. “As a model it was useful for collecting information, but not for reconciliation, and certainly not for justice.” ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Irish Times

India’s reticence on the Rohingya crisis undermines its democracy and global standing The Pope has been in South Asia this week, with the focus of his stops in Bangladesh and Myanmar on the reconciliation and rehabilitation of more than 836,000 Rohingya (including 623,000 since August, according to the UN’s International Organisation for Migration) who have fled gruesome violence in Myanmar. Flurry of diplomatic activity The Pope is by no means alone. In the past month, the U.S. sent Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to Myanmar, while a senior State Department team as well as the British and Canadian international development ministers travelled to Rohingya camps in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar. Singapore’s Foreign Minister has made trips to Naypyidaw and Dhaka, exploring a role for ASEAN countries to help in the crisis. And earlier this month, Bangladesh Foreign Minister Abul Hassan Mahmood Ali took the European Union’s Foreign Affairs High Representative along with the German, Swedish and Japanese Foreign Ministers for a survey of the refugee camps. No Indian leader has, however, visited them. In a rare shift of position from not involving itself in the internal politics of another country, China decided to play a mediatory role in the issue, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi went to Dhaka to meet Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on November 18, and then to Naypyidaw to meet President Htin Kyaw. Within days, Bangladesh and Myanmar announced an agreement to begin the repatriation of Rohingya refugees back to Rakhine province in about two months, as part of what Mr. Wang called a three-phase solution. It is significant that within the same week, Myanmar Army Chief Min Aung Hlaing visited China for more talks on the Rohingya crisis, while the country’s other power centre, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, is now headed to Beijing for three days. Biggest nation, smallest voice In this flurry of diplomatic activity, it would be natural to ask why India has been so soft-footed and silent in comparison. As the subcontinent’s biggest nation, neighbour to both Bangladesh and Myanmar, as well as the country most likely to be affected if the numbers of Rohingya refugees continue to grow, India in fact should be showing the most initiative in this crisis. Instead, through a series of blunders that began with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s own visit to Myanmar, India has allowed its voice to be muffled. Even as hundreds of thousands were fleeing violence at home, Mr. Modi refused to refer to the Rohingya in his press statements in Naypyidaw in early September. Nor did India refer to anything other than the terror strike by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army while discussing the violence in Rakhine. It wasn’t until two days later, and after some prodding from Ms. Hasina, that the Indian foreign office even issued a statement of concern over the refugee crisis that had reached alarming proportions, something the U.S. has now called a clear case of “ethnic cleansing”. Moreover, in Bali, India refused to endorse a 50-nation parliamentarian conference’s declaration because it referenced the Rohingya. Every other South Asian country, including Buddhist-majority Bhutan and Sri Lanka, endorsed the Bali declaration. Later in September, the government began to dispatch humanitarian aid in an operation rather grandly named “Operation Insaniyat (Humanity)”, but was only one of several countries including the U.S., Turkey, Azerbaijan, Malaysia and others to do so. The government’s consignment to Myanmar of a mere 3,000 “family bags” last week also slipped notice given the large numbers of those displaced inside Rakhine and in desperate need of assistance. The Indian effort, coupled with Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj’s visit to Bangladesh, where she didn’t even spare time for a trip to the camps, stands out not just in stark contrast to other nations, but to India’s own record. In every way, the Rohingya crisis is mammoth, with around a million men, women and children in Bangladesh and Myanmar living perilously. India, which has a tradition of rushing humanitarian aid and medical assistance, doctors and volunteers to other nations — for example, after the 2004 tsunami, the 2008 Cyclone Nargis that hit Myanmar, and the 2015 Nepal earthquake — has been seen to visibly hold back during the Rohingya crisis. Position at the UN Meanwhile, at the UN too, India’s voice has been consistently muted, ceding space to other countries to take the lead on the issue. The U.K., for example, hosted a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly with Myanmar’s National Security Adviser and Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister, attended by senior officials from Indonesia, Turkey, Australia, Canada, Sweden, Denmark and the U.S. At the UNGA’s Third Committee vote, India abstained on a resolution calling for an end to military action, one of 26 abstentions on the proposal to send a UN fact-finding mission to Myanmar — 135 countries voted in favour of the resolution. While India’s vote is consistent with its position on interventionist resolutions, it doesn’t mark itself out for principled leadership of any kind. If anything, the votes have had a bearing on India’s standing in Bangladesh, one of its closest allies in the region, whose leadership is struggling to cope with the flow of refugees as Ms. Hasina braces for a tough election next year. In short, all of India’s actions since the outbreak of this round of violence in Myanmar have negated its position as a regional, subcontinental and Asian leader. Regaining that stature will require a more proactive stance in being part of the solution to the crisis. To begin with, the impression that the government’s decision to push out nearly 40,000 Rohingya living in India since 2012 is guided by its domestic political compulsions is not conducive to India’s international ambitions. Therefore, it may be necessary for India to put its own concerns about repatriation on hold until it is able to work with both Bangladesh and Myanmar on the issue, preferably in a trilateral format. This should have been easier for India than for China, given it already works with them on regional issues as a part of BIMSTEC. Spell out the refugee policy The government must also iron out internal contradictions on India’s refugee policy. Even though it is not a signatory to any UN refugee convention, India has a proud tradition of giving a home to neighbours in distress: from Tibetans in 1960s to East Pakistanis in the 1970s, from Sri Lankans in the 1980s to the Afghans in the 1990s. More recently, the Modi government even changed its long-term visa rules to help minorities fleeing violence from neighbouring Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. If India now says it cannot help Rohingya, who are a minority in Myanmar, it is either saying that Rohingya are not Myanmarese or that Myanmar is not a neighbour, both of which contradict previous positions. The government’s argument in court that Rohingya refugees pose a terrorist threat wasn’t used for Sri Lankans or Afghans. India also has a unique position as a country that is home to every religion practised in the region and must play to this strength. For all these reasons, India, which has high stakes in global and regional governance, must ensure its voice is heard on the Rohingya crisis. Mumbling as part of a chorus while one of the biggest human tragedies is unfolding across two of India’s borders does not behove a nation with global leadership aspirations. Those questioning India’s push for a Security Council seat have often cited its record as a fence sitter at the UN. All those critics must be silenced now by clarity in India’s position on an issue where abstentions cannot suffice. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ © 2017 The Hindu

The event will be held at the National Press Club from 9:30-10:45am on Tuesday, December 12. To register, please click HERE. Under the auspices of the War Crimes Committee, three internationally renowned judges - Navanethem 'Navi' Pillay (Chair), Thomas Buergenthal and Mark Harmon - led the Inquiry and authored the Report. Judge Navi Pillay will deliver keynote remarks at the December 12 event. Among other things, Judge Pillay has served as a judge on the International Criminal Court, as President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights from 2008-2014. Greg Kehoe of the IBA's War Crimes Committee also will deliver remarks. Among other things, Mr. Kehoe, a former federal prosecutor, led the team of lawyers and investigators that advised the Iraqi Special Tribunal, an ad hoc court formed to prosecute Saddam Hussein and other regime officials. The Report contains nine (9) Calls for Action, including a call for the UN to provide the International Criminal Court or a special international tribunal with jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute those responsible for committing crimes against humanity in North Korea's political prisons, known as kwanliso . The Report also calls on North Korea to dismantle its gulag system and release an estimated 80,000-130,000 political prisoners. (Note: this figure includes scores of children, spouses, parents, etc., who have been imprisoned pursuant to North Korea's longstanding policy of eliminating the "seed" of three generations of "class enemies.") Further, it calls for targeted sanctions against persons responsible for past or ongoing crimes against humanity in North Korea's political prisons, as well as a ban on the importation of products made with materials or labor from North Korea's penal system. Relying on satellite imagery and the testimony of numerous defectors - including North Korea's highest ranking defector in recent years, Thae Yong-ho - the Report debunks North Korea's ongoing denial of the very existence of its political prisons, which Amnesty International describes as "very possibly home to some of the most appalling torture in the world." Evidence of crimes presented to the Inquiry included: prisoners tortured and killed on account of their religious affiliation, with officials instructed "to wipe out the seed of [Christian] reactionaries" a prisoner's newborn baby being fed to guard dogs and killed an abortion induced by three men standing on a wooden plank placed on a pregnant prisoner's stomach a female prisoner losing consciousness after enduring a beating designed to trigger premature labor, with prison officials killing her baby before she could regain consciousness the deaths of countless prisoners as a result of deliberate starvation, malnutrition and overwork, including 16-hour shifts in coal mines for minors and adults alike routine public executions carried out in front of prisoners of all ages, including young children Finally, Hogan Lovells, an international law firm that previously has worked to raise awareness of human rights abuses in North Korea, provided very significant pro bono assistance to the Inquiry. Thank you for giving this your consideration. We hope to see you at the National Press Club on December 12th. Best regards, Michael Maya Director International Bar Association, North America Office 1667 K St. NW, Suite 1230, Washington, D.C. 20006 Michael.Maya@int-bar.org | (202) 827-3385 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korea's Political Prisons

There have been many clear indications in recent years that the central issue in negotiating a successful peace agreement for Darfur is the safe return of displaced African (non-Arab) farmers to lands that have been violently expropriated from them by Arab militias or groups of armed Arab men who have participated in these violent land seizures. I have provided on a continuing basis extensive detail about the character of these land seizures; and for the period November 2014 – November 2015 I accumulated and mapped particulalry extensive, detailed data indicating the scope of this violence: “Changing the Demography”: Violent Expropriation and Destruction of Farmlands in Darfur, November 2014 – November 2015,” December 1, 2015 | Eric Reeves, author; Maya Baca, research and editing | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1P4 There are over 500 data entries for a period of one year, mapped over the three main administrative areas of Darfur: North Darfur, South Darfur, West Darfur (“East Darfur” is essentially a “carve-out” from South Darfur; “Central Darfur” is essentially a “carve-out” from West Darfur). The report itself makes clear just how violent the expropriation of land in Darfur has been, and how difficult it will be to remove those armed Arab forces who seized the lands, many of them not from Sudan, but Arab migrants from Chad, Niger, and Mali—assisted in their resettlement by the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime in Khartoum. Rape and sexual violence have been a defining feature of these seizures of farmlands and the means by which girls and women have been prevented from returning to their lands to work them (men returning are more likely to be murdered). Here again, I have provided extensive detail about the character and extent of sexual violence for the period January 2014 – December 2015: “Continuing Mass Rape of Girls in Darfur: The most heinous crime generates no international outrage,” January 2016 | Eric Reeves, author; Maya Baca, research and editing | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1QG And again, there are hundreds of data entries in a spreadsheet that has been mapped onto the three main administrative units of Darfur; there is also an extensive bibliography of the reporting on rape and sexual violence as a weapon in the genocidal counter-insurgency war waged by the Khartoum regime since 2003. The first significant report on rape came from Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (Holland) in 2005—over twelve years ago. The aggregated data, along with the many reports of the past twelve years, together clearly indicate that many tens of thousands of Darfuri girls and women have been raped; some girls have been as young as eight years old. A tremendous number of the victims have suffered significant physical injury (rapes are often brutal gang rapes), and the psychological trauma is simply unfathomable and incalculable. The destruction of the social fabric of families and villages is similarly incalculable and will stand as one of the very grimmest legacies of the Darfur genocide, in which the racial/ethnic animus of sexual violence has always been all too clear. A Future Without Peace The implications of massive violent expropriation of African farmland and the consequences of the ongoing epidemic of sexual violence are impossible to overstate. And yet no peace process to date, no proposed peace process, and indeed no commentary on a Darfur peace process takes account of the challenges posed by these terrible realities. In other words, there is no realistic plan or process for peace in Darfur. As a consequence, the future looks as grim as the past. And if Khartoum pursues its repeatedly declared plans to dismantle the camps for displaced persons, there will me an immediate and massive crisis: these displaced persons—overwhelmingly from the African (non-Arab) populations of Darfur—will have no lands to return to. Several thousand African villages have been destroyed in their entirety by violence earlier in the genocide; thousands more have been at least partially destroyed. And the violence continues, if on a lesser scale because of previous extremely high levels of destruction. Security remains extremely poor throughout Darfur, and violence can re-emerge rapidly even in areas that may have enjoyed a temporary respite. Moreover, the already severely attenuated humanitarian relief efforts in Darfur will collapse with widespread dismantling of the camps: people will be forced to flee to areas too insecure for humanitarian organizations to reach, and these people will not longer be concentrated—as they are in the camps—in ways that make possible organized delivery of food, medical care, and resources for clean water and adequate hygiene. There are approximately 2.7 million Internally Displaced Persons in Darfur, according to the UNand some 320,000 Darfuri refugees in eastern Chad—together almost half the pre-war population of Darfur, and again, overwhelming from the African tribal groups of Darfur. Mortality in Darfur—which already stands at approximately 600,000 dead from violence(direct and indirect) over the past fifteen years (see | me/p45rOG-AB/)—will skyrocket. Instead of peace for the region, the Darfur genocide may be entering its most destructive phase. Yet none of this informs the policy decisions of major international actors: the UN, the African Union, the U.S., the European Union, or rich and significant countries such as Canada, Japan, Canada, Israel, and Australia. Other important international actors from the Arab world, Latin America, and Asia stand silent and acquiescent. Moreover, for their part, China and Russia continue to stand allied with the Khartoum regime in the UN Security Council and on the broader world stage. Khartoum stands intransigent, having recently been rewarded by the Obama and Trump administrations with the lifting of longstanding U.S. economic sanctions. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Maung Zarni

On November 22, after some reluctance, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson joined the United Nations and United Kingdom in calling the current Rohingya crisis an “ethnic cleansing.” Holding Myanmar’s military, security forces, and local vigilantes responsible for the crisis, Tillerson stated that the United States could pursue accountability via targeted sanctions. While some hailed Tillerson’s label of ethnic cleansing as a start, it’s worth taking a closer look at the politics behind it. First, ethnic cleansing does not elicit a legal response, whereas the labels of “crimes against humanity” or “genocide” do. Second, targeted sanctions are known to be ineffective, so threatening Myanmar with them seems unproductive. The current humanitarian crisis began on August 25, when the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army coordinated an attack on Myanmar’s police and security forces. Myanmar’s military crackdown on the Rohingya population was severe, resulting in a mass exodus that is now called the fastest growing refugee emergency in the world. Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries in the world, is now host to at least one million Rohingya refugees, and relief agencies like the United Nations Children’s Fundare struggling to establish a health system to try to limit malnutrition and the spread of disease. Stories of burning villages, massacres, sexual violence and rape are emerging daily. So, then, why is there a global unwillingness to label the Rohingya persecution by the Myanmar government and military as genocide? There are three main reasons why “ethnic cleansing” is preferred as a label over “genocide.” First, labeling a crisis “ethnic cleansing” has no legal implications—and hence is easier for states to deal with. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide has declared genocide to be a crime under international law, and defines it as “the intent to destroy an ethnic, national, racial or religious group.” Ethnic cleansing, on the other hand, refers to the expulsion of a group from a certain area, but there is no treaty that determines its parameters. Even though the lines between ethnic cleansing and genocide are blurry, the former requires no domestic and international legal action. The label of ethnic cleansing, therefore, seems like a call for action but in reality is less politically charged, and is more like a “feel good” option for the international community. Second, labeling an atrocity as ethnic cleansing is less time consuming. Historically, applying the label “genocide” takes decades. For example, the systematic killing of the Armenian people by the Ottoman Empire in 1915–1917 was first recognized as genocide by the United States in 1975 (though Alabama and Mississippi still do not recognize it). While 28 countries recognize the Armenian genocide, Turkey continues to reject the label. Similarly, the UN recognized the organized targeting and killing of the Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 as genocide in 2014—20 years after the atrocities. Just last week, Ratko Mladic, the “butcher of Bosnia,” was found guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity twenty years after committing the acts, and after a trial that took five years to conclude. And third, ethnic cleansing opens the door for the United States to impose specific economic and military sanctions on Myanmar. The State Department is especially interested in pursuing sanctions against Myanmar’s government and military officials who are directly responsible for the atrocities. The problem is that sanctions are typically unsuccessful in changing state behavior, so even if the United States imposed specialized sanctions on Myanmar, it would do little to ease the plight of the Rohingyas. Targeted sanctions could also derail Myanmar’s already slow economic development, which is largely due to decades of oppressive military rule. Myanmar’s government, military, and Buddhist hardliners not only continue to deny allegations of genocide but have become emboldened in their persecution of the Rohingyas. For example, Myanmar’s authorities constantly link Rohingyas, who are Muslim, to terrorism, taking advantage of the rhetoric of the Global War on Terrorthat has mostly targeted Muslims worldwide. Though there are some concerns about jihadist recruitment in the Rakhine province, there is little evidence to suggest the Rohingya as a group are a unique threat. Myanmar’s leader, the now defamed Aung San Suu Kyi, even went as far as to blame “fake news” for distorting information regarding the latest military crackdown in the province, calling it a “huge iceberg of misinformation.” Amidst pressure from Bangladesh, Myanmar signed a repatriation program, but has agreed only to take in those refugees who can present identity documents, such as government-issued “white cards.” This of course is an impossible feat for thousands who fled with almost nothing—and will most certainly be unable to produce any evidence of citizenship and/or residency. The label of genocide, however, is important—and necessary in the Rohingya case. The most significant advantage that genocide has over any other label is that Myanmar’s authorities would come under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), a special court that investigates and prosecutes war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Even though proving genocide takes time, there is a great deal of empirical evidence in the Rohingya case. For example, Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocideoutlines five acts that constitute a genocide: Killing members of the group, Causing serious bodily or mental harm, Deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction in whole or in part, Imposing measures intended to prevent births, and Forcibly transferring children. There is ample evidence of the Rohingyas being subjected to each of these heinous acts, and human rights groups are rigorously documenting the physical destruction and psychological torment being inflicted on the Rohingyas by Myanmar’s military now. Not all labels are created equal. This is precisely why it is imperative to use the correct one. In the case of the Rohingya crisis, genocide is perhaps the only label that could give Myanmar’s government and military pause in their persecution, for fear of being tried at the ICC. As for inviting outside military intervention, the label of genocide shares the same risk as the label of ethnic cleansing. What ethnic cleansing does not provide is a legal implication, which is vital. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Cato Institute