Catholic nuns sing during a jubilee celebration in Pathein, Myanmar. The country's 700,000 Catholics are preparing for a visit by Pope Francis. (Ye Aung Thu / AFP/Getty Images) In August, responding to the first reports of Rohingya Muslims fleeing an army-led crackdown in Myanmar, Pope Francis called on his flock to pray for “our Rohingya brethren.” "Let all of us ask the Lord to save them, and to raise up men and women of goodwill to help them, who shall give them their full rights," Francis told a gathering of pilgrims at Vatican City's St. Peter's Square. As the pope begins an official visit to Myanmar on Monday, the Rohingyas' plight has spiraled into one of the world's gravest humanitarian crises. More than 600,000 people have fled to Bangladesh to escape a systematic campaign of killing, rape and arson that United Nations officials and international human rights groups have described as ethnic cleansing. U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson echoed that assessment Wednesday following an official visit to Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, saying that "no provocation can justify the horrendous atrocities" carried out by security forces and Buddhist vigilantes against the Rohingya. Answer these personality questions, and discover the perfect (and customizable!) website template for your new business. Francis, an Argentine Jesuit, has portrayed himself as a champion of the downtrodden and of interfaith dialogue, and has repeatedly voiced concern for the Rohingya. He faces perhaps the most delicate diplomatic task of his four-year papacy in overwhelmingly Buddhist Myanmar, where the powerful military establishment and a civilian government led by Aung San Suu Kyi refuse to list the Rohingya among the country’s 135 ethnic groups, claiming that they migrated illegally from Bangladesh. While in Myanmar, Cardinal Charles Maung Bo, the archbishop of the largest city, Yangon, has advised the pope not to utter the word "Rohingya," a term that Suu Kyi and the generals do not recognize. But human rights groups are urging Francis — both in his public sermons and private meetings with Suu Kyi and the commander of the military, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing — to use the term to show solidarity with a group that Myanmar has denied citizenship and methodically stripped of basic rights, including the freedom to move, work and marry. In a video message, Francis said, "I wish to visit the nation in a spirit of respect and encouragement for every effort to build harmony and cooperation in the service of the common good." Before the military crackdown, an estimated 1 million Rohingya lived in the western state of Rakhine, many confined to displacement camps patrolled by security forces. “He should use the word Rohingya, and he should use it publicly because the Rohingya have very little left besides their identity,” said Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director for Human Rights Watch. "Part of the dispossession they've faced has solidified their identity because when you have very little else to grab onto, that self-identification is very important." Francis will follow his three-day visit to Myanmar with two days in Bangladesh, where the Vatican said he would meet with a small group of Rohingya refugees in the capital, Dhaka. The Vatican announced the first apostolic visit to Myanmar — where an estimated 700,000 Roman Catholics make up slightly more than 1% of the population — just as the extent of the military campaign against the Rohingya was becoming clear. The trip initially was intended to endorse the country's fitful transition to democracy after a half-century of military rule. Despite the election of the first civilian government in 2015, led by Nobel Peace Prize winner Suu Kyi, the army retains total control over security matters and wields tremendous influence behind the scenes. An advisor to Suu Kyi who sought to curtail the military’s powers was shot dead this year in mysterious circumstances. Suu Kyi, who became an icon for leading the opposition to military rule, has sided with the army against the Rohingya, damaging her image globally. But many Myanmar citizens believe the army crackdown was justified after a Rohingya militant group carried out deadly attacks against security forces. Local Catholic leaders said they hoped the pope would highlight the country's progress and preach reconciliation with an array of ethnic minorities agitating for greater rights in Myanmar, not only the Rohingya. "I think he will not single out any one particular group, but in general, he might say that for all the different races, the government should continue to make peace with them as you are trying to do now," said Archbishop Paul Zinghtung Grawng, the archbishop emeritus in Mandalay, Myanmar's second-largest city. "It's not to point out the defects or what is lacking in the country but rather to encourage and affirm the positive steps that are being taken at the moment." It is not the first time that Francis — who has cultivated a reputation as a straight talker, eschewing much of the ornamentation of his office — has waded directly into difficult domestic politics. In a visit to Colombia in September, he carefully endorsed a controversial peace deal with leftist rebels, urging the country to come together in the name of peace. Experts said Francis would take care not to inflame tensions in Myanmar, which still places severe restrictions on religious freedom, including building new houses of worship for non-Buddhists. Catholicism — brought by Portuguese traders from India more than five centuries ago — long struggled to gain a foothold because of the widespread view that it was a colonial religion. "In terms of perception, it's really only in the first couple of generations of becoming a church of locals and nationals," said Michael Kelly, executive director of the Union of Catholic Asian News, an independent news organization based in Bangkok. Myanmar's Catholic leaders fear that if Francis speaks out too strongly on such an incendiary issue as the Rohingya, it will provoke a backlash that will set back efforts by ethnic and religious groups to claw back broader minority rights. "They're telling Francis: 'Don't go there. It will just bring further complications,' " Kelly said. "The pope comes for a few days, but they're there permanently." __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The LA Times

The European Union has pledged hundreds of millions of euros for the ’Khartoum Process’, a multinational effort to manage migration from the Horn of Africa to Europe. In Sudan, it supports a mix of development and humanitarian assistance - but also the country’s controversial border control and counter-trafficking and counter-smuggling operations. The upcoming AU-EU Summit next week in Ivory Coast is an opportunity for the EU to renew its commitment to put human rights at the heart of its work, including its migration response. The EU’s programs in Sudan have been widely criticised on human rights grounds, in large part because its border control support the notoriously abusive Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which were responsible for atrocities in Darfur. The EU has flatly denied funding the RSF, but the perception that it does shows the cost of doing business with Sudan’s abusive government. That perception is reinforced every time the RSF commander, Mohammed Hamdan, known as ’Hemeti’, brazenly boasts of capturing migrants on Sudan’s border with Libya at the behest of the EU. This blind-eye approach feeds into a wider shift in Sudan policy, not just by the EU but also the United States, which in October formally revoked broad economic sanctions on Sudan. Sudanese forces, including the RSF, collude with human traffickers and smugglers rather than responsibly investigate them, Human Rights Watch and the United States government have found. Moreover, the violence Hemeti boasts about triggers other abuses. Sudan’s law enforcement and judicial officials conflate trafficking and smuggling, resulting in criminal prosecution of trafficking victims. In 2017, this was one of the problems that kept Sudan on ’tier three’ - the lowest designation in the US government’s annual counter-trafficking evaluations. In Sudan, migrants are vulnerable to a litany of abuses. Rape, arrest, and jail Many live in legal limbo; can be rounded up and arrested at any time and summarily tried for immigration violations; and can be jailed, fined, and deported without due process or transparency. They face extortion and other forms of exploitation. When I was in Khartoum in October, an Eritrean tea-seller told me that two policemen raped her in June and threatened her with deportation if she reported the case. She finally told a trusted friend about it in September. Sexual violence against domestic workers, many of them trafficked, appears alarmingly common. Obtaining refugee status – which under Sudan’s encampment policy means going to a refugee camp to register and staying there – does little to guard against abuses by Sudan’s national security service. An Ethiopian man in his sixties who has a refugee card told me of his harrowing experience one night in August, when three national security agents took him from his home in Khartoum, forced him into a pickup, and detained him for nine days in an unmarked building, where they interrogated him about his links to an Oromo opposition group in Ethiopia. He feels certain the Ethiopian government asked Sudan to pick him up, although he has been living in Khartoum for more than 30 years. Sudan regularly deports refugees in violation of international and African regional prohibitions on refoulement – that is, sending refugees back to countries where they face persecution. In August and September, Sudan deported hundreds of Eritreans, including 30 children, on alleged immigration law violations, a move the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, said flouted Sudan’s international obligations. In 2016, Sudan deported over 300 migrants, most Eritrean, including six registered refugees, back to Eritrea, where they faced abuse. Such deportations are likely more frequent than media reporting suggests. If the EU wishes to support the Khartoum Process’ goals, it needs to engage in the difficult task of pressing Sudan to improve respect for human rights – not just of refugees, but more broadly. It is not enough to disavow support for the RSF; it should improve information and legal services, adopt a clear set of human rights benchmarks for Sudan, and call Sudan out on specific violations and patterns of abuse that affect everyone in the country. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Sudan Tribune

Responding to the announcement that the Governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh have signed an agreement to send Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar, Sanna Johnson, Regional Director for Asia at the International Rescue Committee said: "This announcement is deeply worrying. Refugees are still arriving in camps in Cox’s Bazar on a daily basis, indicating that the Rohingya population continues to face significant threat, so talk of repatriation is, at best, premature. It is absolutely vital that the principle of non-refoulement is upheld; no one should be returned to a country in which they face persecution. With reports of the mining of the border by the Myanmar military, the violent clearance of up to 200 villages, it is clear that the conditions for safe, voluntary and informed returns are not being met.” A recent IRC survey in Cox’s Bazar found just 11% of refugees wished to return to Myanmar, with the remaining 89% wanting to either stay where they were or move to other sites in Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s decision not to recognise newly displaced Rohingya as refugees limits their rights under International Refugee Law. Without refugee status nor citizenship in Myanmar, displaced Rohingya are faced with only two options: to stay trapped in camps in Bangladesh in dire conditions, or return to Myanmar with limited protection. The right to return must always be an option, but with limited access in Rakhine, the IRC has been unable to assess the conditions that displaced people would be returning to. What we do know is that the conditions in which the Rohingya live, stripped of their basic rights and freedoms, unrecognized as an ethic group and denied citizen status, must urgently change in order for this crisis to be resolved. Johnson added: “This agreement raises more questions than it answers; it is imperative that if any returns do take place, they are monitored and assured to be voluntary not forced, safe and informed, that full UN oversight of the process is in place. We must not see mass returns of people to camps in Rakhine. The IRC is calling for aid agencies to be granted full access to refugee populations in order to meet immediate humanitarian needs, until a long-term humanitarian response is put in place. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Rescue Committee

The US decision to label the Myanmar Army’s counter-insurgency operation in northern Rakhine as “ethnic cleansing” is “unhelpful” for Myanmar’s efforts to bring about durable peace in the state, President’s Office spokesperson U Zaw Htay said. After avoiding the term during his visit to Myanmar last week, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on Wednesday described the Myanmar Army’s actions against Rohingya Muslims as “ethnic cleansing”. The crisis developed after an Aug. 25 attack by Muslim militants against government security forces sparked a military clearance operation, which prompted over 600,000 Rohingya Muslims to flee into Bangladesh amid allegations of human rights abuses. “The situation in northern Rakhine State constitutes ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya,” Tillerson said in a statement. “That statement is unhelpful for Myanmar [which is] trying to find long-term solutions. We found that the statement failed to mention the killings of Hindus and innocent civilians by ARSA, and its conclusions were reached without any proven facts,” U Zaw Htay told The Irrawaddy. Washington will also pursue accountability through U.S. law, including possible targeted sanctions against those responsible for the alleged abuses, which have driven hundreds of thousands of Rohingya into Bangladesh, according to the statement. Journalist U Thiha Thway suggested that Tillerson released the statement after deciding during his visit that the National League for Democracy (NLD)-led government and the Myanmar Army had different positions on the Rakhine issue. “The United States may have confidence that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s government will take action against wrongdoing in Rakhine and take responsibility. But perhaps it has decided to [release the statement] in order to find out what’s really happening on the ground,” he said. The Myanmar government has repeatedly asked the international community to provide facts to back up allegations of human rights violations in Rakhine, but has received no meaningful facts to help with verification, he said. “So only the United States knows what the intention of that statement was,” he said. “The Myanmar government will try to find a durable solution in northern Rakhine State based on Dr. Kofi Annan’s recommendations,” he added. In another international development related to the Rakhine issue, UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said Tuesday that he had received “very troubling” evidence that will be used to assess whether genocide has been committed against Rohingya Muslims. Amid pressure from the international community, the Myanmar government entered into a repatriation agreement with Bangladesh on Thursday, Labor, Immigration and Population Minister U Thein Swe told The Irrawaddy. The two countries will form joint committees within two weeks, and start the repatriation process in two months, he added. However, Myanmar will only accept those who return voluntarily, and will take action against those who have violated laws in Myanmar, the minister said. The Myanmar government also plans to issue national verification cards (MVCs) on the spot to Rohingya Muslims at repatriation centers, he said. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Irrawaddy

Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Myanmar’s top military general in Beijing on Friday and discussed China’s support amid international criticism over its treatment of the Rohingya minority, according a statement from the general. Chinese President Xi Jinping (R) attends a meeting with Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang (not pictured) at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam November 13, 2017. REUTERS/Luong Thai Linh/Pool Chinese President Xi Jinping (R) attends a meeting with Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang (not pictured) at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam November 13, 2017. REUTERS/Luong Thai Linh/Pool China has offered diplomatic backing to its southern neighbour throughout the crisis, despite growing pressure from Western countries for the Myanmar military to be accountable for alleged atrocities. More than 600,000 members of the Rohingya Muslim group have fled from Buddhist-majority Myanmar’s Rakhine State to Bangladesh in three months since insurgent attacks on security posts sparked a brutal counter-insurgency campaign. China helped to block a resolution on the crisis at the U.N. Security Council, while the United States this week called the response by the military and local vigilantes “ethnic cleansing”, echoing earlier statements by senior United Nations officials. According to a statement on the Facebook page of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, he and the Chinese leader on Friday discussed the “promotion of cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries, the situation of China standing on Myanmar’s side at the forefront of the international community regarding the Rakhine issue,” and other issues. Min Aung Hlaing arrived in China on Tuesday and has largely met Chinese military officers during his visit. The statement also said they discussed ongoing talks between Myanmar’s government and myriad ethnic insurgent groups, some of whom are based along Myanmar’s shared border with China. According to Chinese state news agency Xinhua, Xi said China was closely watching the peace process and was “willing to play a constructive role... for security and stability in their border areas.” The Xinhua account did not mention Rakhine, but cited Xi saying that China “always respects Myanmar’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”. _________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reuters

Hamida, 22, (center) and her son Mohammed, aged one, wait to receive food aid along with hundreds of other Rohingya refugees, at Kutupalong Refugee Camp, in Bangladesh. © UNHCR/Andrew McConnell UNHCR takes note of reports that the governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar have reached agreement on the return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar. Some 622,000 people have fled Myanmar’s northern Rakhine State since 25 August, triggered by a wave of violence underpinned by denial of citizenship and decades of deep discrimination. UNHCR has not yet seen the details of the agreement. Refugees have the right to return. And a framework that enables them to exercise this right in line with international standards, will be welcome. First and foremost, this means that return must be voluntary, and take place in safe and dignified conditions that pave the way for lasting solutions. At present, conditions in Myanmar’s Rakhine State are not in place to enable safe and sustainable returns. Refugees are still fleeing, and many have suffered violence, rape, and deep psychological harm. Some have witnessed the deaths of family members and friends. Most have little or nothing to go back to, their homes and villages destroyed. Deep divisions between communities remain unaddressed. And humanitarian access in northern Rakhine State remains negligible. It is critical that returns do not take place precipitously or prematurely, without the informed consent of refugees or the basic elements of lasting solutions in place. People must have the option of returning home, and not be confined to specific areas. Progress towards addressing the root causes of flight, including their lack of citizenship, as recommended by the Rakhine Advisory Commission, will also be crucial. UNHCR looks forward to seeing details of the agreement between the two countries, and stands ready to help both governments work towards a solution for the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh that meets international refugee and human rights standards. For more information on this topic, please contact: In Cox’s Bazar, Mohammed Abu Asaker, abuasake@unhcr.org, +880 18 7269 9849 In Cox’s Bazar, Mitra Salima Suryono, suryono@unhcr.org, +880 19 0620 0363 In Bangkok, Vivian Tan, tanv@unhcr.org, +66 81 827 0280 In Geneva, Duniya Aslam Khan, khand@unhcr.org, +41 79 453 25 08 In Geneva, Andrej Mahecic, mahecic@unhcr.org, +41 79 642 97 09 _____________________________________________________________________________________________ © 2017 UNHCR

Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir Thursday Castigated the U.S. policy in the Middle East region and praised Russia for its support for his country on the international arena. Al-Bashir who is visiting Russia for the first time held talks on Thursday with President Vladimir Putin on economic and military cooperation between the two countries at the Black Sea resort of Sochi. According to a translated transcription of al-Bashir’s speech during his meeting with Putin released by the Kremlin, the visiting president thanked Moscow for its support to his government during the past years. "We are grateful to Russia for its position at international venues. We appreciate its efforts to protect the Sudan," said al-Bashir during the meeting which was attended by ministers from both sides. "Our positions coincide on the majority of issues. We are primarily opposed to U.S. interference in the domestic affairs of Arab countries, in particular, U.S. interference in Iran," he further added in his remarks to Putin who was sitting beside him. The Sudanese president is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes for the actions of his government forces during the counterinsurgency in Darfur region. Also, the UN Security Council and the U.S. administration imposed a number of sanctions against the Sudan. In a shift of American policy towards the east African country, President Donald Trump last October decided to repeal the economic sanctions on Sudan. Also, American and Sudanese officials agreed to resume talks on the remaining sanctions. Nonetheless, al-Bashir went in his speech to Putin to accuse Washington of being the source of the problems that the Middle East is facing now. "We think the situation that developed in our country (the same applies to Darfur and South Sudan) has the same roots – U.S. policy. As a result, our country split into two parts, which made a bad situation worse. We need protection from aggressive U.S. actions," he stressed. "We believe that what is happening in Syria today is also due to U.S. interference, which resulted in such a disaster there," he added. "We think peace cannot be achieved without President Bashar al-Assad. We believe that Syria would have been lost without Russia’s assistance," said the Sudanese president in what may cause him troubles with his Saudi allies. It is not clear if al-Bashir was aware that his speech was recorded and would be broadcasted by the Russian government. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION During his meeting with Putin which took place after two days of bilateral meetings between different delegations, al-Bashir also expressed his government desire to enhance economic and military relations. On the military cooperation, he underlined that Sudanese land troops and aviation are equipped with Russian weapons. "Now we are launching a large programme to reequip our armed forces and we agreed with the Defence Minister [Sergei Shoigu] that Russia will help us in this. We would like to increase our presence in Russia by sending more military attaches here," he said. He offered to open Russian military bases in the Red Sea region. "We are also concerned about the situation in the Red Sea. We believe U.S. interference there is also a problem. We would like to discuss the use of military bases in the Red Sea," he said. He said there is a need to have Russian experts in Sudan to ensure the follow-up of the Sudanese army re-equipment process, as it was agreed with the Russian defence minister. The Sudanese government allocated a significant amount of money to build a strong army and developed in parallel a muscular militia to fight the rebel groups in western and southern parts of the country. On the economic file, al-Bashir said they want to develop the mining sector, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and construction of nuclear power plants in Sudan. Also, he said they want to develop business with Russia in oil production, agriculture and railways. In return, al-Bashir proposed to help Russia develop relations with African countries saying "Sudan may become Russian’s key to Africa". "We are also interested in developing relations with BRICS," he concluded. BRICS is an economic block including Brazil, Russia, India and China, and South Africa, analysts say it will become among the four most dominant economies by the year 2050. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Sudan Tribune

What happened?  On 14 November, credit ratings agencies declared Venezuela in partial default on its foreign debt, after the country failed to meet a $200 million payment to bondholders. Why did it happen?  Economic mismanagement and corruption have reduced Venezuela’s foreign currency reserves to under $10 billion. Its dollar earnings have fallen dramatically due to a sharp decline in the oil price. Heavily dependent on imports, it must also pay billions every year to service huge liabilities, acquired at very high interest rates, during the oil boom. Why does it matter?  The Venezuelan economy is in free-fall amid a protracted political crisis, which saw dozens killed on the streets earlier this year. It faces a likely presidential election in 2018. A full-blown default could add an escalating humanitarian emergency to this economic and political crisis. What should be done?  The government should restore powers to the opposition-led parliament and seek its approval for a restructuring package. But this must form part of a full-scale political negotiation, with international supervision, including agreement on the appointment of an autonomous Supreme Court and Electoral Council and guarantees of a free and fair presidential election. I.Overview The financial markets have long regarded Venezuela’s default as probable, and have charged the country accordingly. Already by mid-2017, the implied risk of default within twelve months was over 50 per cent, while the risk over the subsequent five years was above 90 per cent. As of today, Venezuela is technically in default on part of its debt, raising the possibility that creditors at any moment could move to recover the full amount owed. That would total some $60 billion in bonds issued by the government and by the state oil corporation, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., or PDVSA, although the total foreign debt is generally thought to be around $150 billion, of which two thirds could be subject to immediate demand. The last major default in Latin America was that of Argentina, which ceased payment on most of its $132 billion foreign debt in 2001 amid a severe economic and political crisis. It took Argentina fifteen years to reach a final settlement with “hold-out” creditors and restore its access to financial markets. A Venezuelan debt crisis is likely to be even more complex and cause more political and social damage. First, an orderly restructuring of the debt is all but impossible: the government not only lacks a credible economic and financial recovery plan, it also faces sanctions, which could expose those providing the country with fresh loans to criminal prosecution. Furthermore, the government is likely to maintain its rigid and economically harmful controls over currency exchange and access to U.S. dollars. Moreover, while Argentina is one of a handful of countries that are self-sufficient in food, Venezuela has a declining food and agriculture sector and malnutrition is rampant. Some 96 per cent of its foreign earnings come from the oil industry, whose overseas assets may be vulnerable to seizure by creditors. The disruption of oil exports could trigger a humanitarian emergency in a country that is already suffering severe shortages of food, medicines and other vital goods. Politically, Venezuela is increasingly isolated: all major countries in the hemisphere, as well as the EU, have joined in demanding a restoration of democracy. Adding to the instability is a presidential election due to take place next year. The issue of who will be the official candidate has yet to be resolved. II.Default On 2 November, President Maduro announced his decision to “decree a refinancing and restructuring” of Venezuela’s foreign debt. Although the government insists it has no intention of defaulting, it subsequently failed to make several debt payments within contractual time-limits, leading ratings agencies to downgrade its debt to the “selective default” category. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) – a market association that decides whether to trigger insurance payments on bad debt – declared a technical default. On 13 November, the government hosted a meeting in Caracas with bondholders, ostensibly to launch the restructuring/refinancing process. Maduro put Vice President Tareck el Aissami in charge, causing many bondholders to stay away because Aissami and another commission member (Finance Minister Simón Zerpa) face U.S. Treasury Department sanctions. Although the department ruled that merely attending the meeting was not a violation of U.S. law, negotiating with these individuals clearly would be. Moreover, U.S. sanctions prohibit issuing any new debt to Venezuela, unless it is approved by parliament, rendering the process futile without a political agreement. In the event, the meeting lasted a mere half-hour. Aissami read a communiqué devoted mainly to blaming U.S. sanctions for payment delays and offered few clues as to what the government would do. Some bondholders who attended said they were asked to pressure the Trump administration to lift sanctions. As long as the government continues to pay, albeit belatedly, creditors are likely to hold off taking action that would trigger a full-scale default. However, that may change, especially if it becomes clear the government is taking steps to safeguard assets that would be potential targets for seizure in the event of default. III.Economic Freefall The Maduro government boasts that it has disbursed more than $71 billion in debt repayments over the past four years. During the same period, imports have fallen from over $45 billion in 2012 to under $20 billion this year. The country’s health service is close to collapse and most vital medicines have vanished from pharmacies. In October, for the first time, the monthly consumer price rise exceeded 50 per cent, often regarded as the threshold for hyperinflation. Food prices are rising even faster, yet wages are not indexed to prices. Millions of households rely at least partially on a government program to distribute cheap food to the poor, but the food has to be imported with oil dollars. The Catholic charity Caritas declared an emergency earlier this year when moderate to severe malnutrition among under-five year olds surpassed 10 per cent. In 2018, debt servicing is likely to consume around a third of oil revenues, even if the present price recovery continues. Some economists have argued that it is immoral to pay bondholders while Venezuelans die from malnutrition and preventable diseases. Default – especially a simple cessation of payment, with no restructuring or refinancing deal in place – could leave the country even less able to pay its bills, however. This is not merely because it would further reduce Venezuela’s access to credit, but also because bondholders could attempt to seize its significant oil industry-related overseas assets, potentially paralysing an industry on which the entire economy depends. These include not only physical assets, such as refineries, but also pending oil payments. Any attempt to confiscate these holdings is likely to result in drawn-out legal battles over the distinction between sovereign debt (which enjoys immunity from asset seizure) and that of PDVSA, whose sole shareholder is the Venezuelan state. The surrounding region is already suffering the consequences of Venezuela’s crisis, from declining trade to spreading epidemics and an expansion of organised crime. Middle-class professionals are no longer the only ones leaving. Colombia alone has received at least 470,000 Venezuelans, many of them poor, placing welfare services under severe strain, especially in border areas. IV.Democratic Meltdown Venezuela has been sliding toward dictatorship for years. The trend accelerated after the opposition Democratic Unity (MUD) alliance won control of the National Assembly (parliament) two years ago. The government used its control of the Supreme Court to block all parliamentary initiatives and strip the assembly of its powers, including control of the budget and the issuance of foreign debt. It has used the National Electoral Council (CNE) to block a recall referendum against President Maduro, schedule elections at the ruling party’s convenience and tilt the electoral playing field against the opposition. From April to July this year, the opposition demanded a return to democracy in almost daily mass demonstrations that were met with violence by security forces. More than 120 people died. On 30 July, the government held an election to a National Constituent Assembly (ANC), ostensibly tasked with reforming the 1999 constitution. The opposition alliance boycotted the poll, arguing that the election was unconstitutional and violated the principle of one-person-one-vote. There is evidence the government falsified turnout figures. The 545-member assembly, composed exclusively of government supporters, was installed on 4 August. Two weeks later, after parliament refused to recognise the Constituent Assembly, the latter assumed legislative powers by decree. However, this new legislature is regarded as spurious by many foreign governments, including the twelve-member Lima Group of countries, mainly from Latin America, the U.S. and the European Union (EU), which continue to recognise the National Assembly’s authority. With the Constituent Assembly in place, the government called elections for state governors, which should have been held in December 2016. Polls showed the Democratic Unity alliance was likely to win more than half the 23 states, but the electoral council resorted to measures clearly aimed at depressing the opposition vote, such as relocating voting centres at the last minute. In the event, the government claimed eighteen governorships. Evidence of fraudulent vote counting emerged in one state – Bolívar – but overall the government appears to have out-manoeuvred the opposition. It continues to enjoy the support of up to a quarter of the electorate and has also refined a system which makes access to food and other services conditional on political loyalty. This political setback left the opposition severely weakened and more divided than ever over strategy. Pro-government factions are also vulnerable to divisions, which could be further exacerbated in the event of default and likely pressures to dismantle the system of currency controls. A significant portion of the sovereign and PDVSA bonds are reportedly held by government leaders and supporters. V.International Sanctions On 26 August, President Trump issued a ban to prevent any individual or corporation in the U.S. or subject to U.S. jurisdiction (which includes most of Venezuela’s major creditors) from financing the state oil company for more than 90 days or the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for more than 30. This allows trading to take place but rules out long-term finance. Moreover, since the debt is in U.S. dollars, any renegotiation would inevitably involve the U.S. financial system. Thus, there is little prospect of a viable refinancing plan unless sanctions are lifted. In addition, President Maduro and many other senior government figures are subject to individual U.S. sanctions, which make it a crime for anyone subject to U.S. jurisdiction to have dealings with them. Vice President Tareck el Aissami is also accused by U.S. authorities of links to drug trafficking. Canada has also imposed individual sanctions, while the EU has approved a legal framework for travel bans and asset seizure. Venezuela’s exclusion from the dollar-based financial system is driving it to seek closer ties with Russia and China, both of which have rejected what they consider Western interventionism and shown far greater flexibility in renegotiating their own bilateral debt. These two countries are believed to hold some $30 billion in Venezuelan debt. VI.Talks Offer Slim Hope On 1 December, the government will once again sit down for talks with some leading opposition members in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. However, the two sides have very different agendas. The government wants the opposition to recognise the Constituent Assembly, call for an end to sanctions and promise to secure parliament’s approval to issue more debt. The opposition’s principal demand is free and fair elections, which it believes would remove the present government from power. Previous rounds of talks have led nowhere. The main difference on this occasion appears to be the presence of Latin American foreign ministers acting as “guarantors” for the negotiations. Past talks foundered partly because the government used them to buy time and to divide and disparage the opposition. This task was made easier by opposition politicians who failed to agree on a unified strategy and by international facilitators who did not insist on a solid framework for negotiation and guarantees of compliance. The opposition remains fractured, with only seven of its two dozen parties agreeing to attend the talks, though this round will be preceded by a wider consultation process, including talks with civil society organisations. Venezuela’s dire economic, financial, social and political crisis cannot be resolved piecemeal. The government will only be able to manage the debt crisis by de-coupling sovereign debt from PDVSA debt to avoid asset seizure and by working out a refinancing agreement with bondholders. But it cannot do this without also making significant concessions in return for the National Assembly’s approval of fresh debt and an agreement to call for the gradual lifting of sanctions. Government concessions would have to include giving up monopoly control over the Supreme Court and Electoral Council and agreeing to hold free elections under international supervision. It would also have to produce an economic reform package, including dismantling distortionary exchange and price controls and agreeing to a unified exchange rate. Such a package likely would be credible to investors only if announced by a completely fresh economic team incorporating independent experts. Any agreement should also include an emergency social program, financed in part by money freed up by debt relief, and incorporating aid from foreign governments and NGOs. The prospects for agreement are slender, however. Therefore, the international community needs to prepare for a significant deterioration in the humanitarian crisis by increasing assistance to neighbouring countries to meet the needs of destitute migrants, and continuing to press the Venezuelan government to allow humanitarian aid deliveries inside the country. It should also address the reasons for the repeated failure of talks to produce a solution. This means devising a credible and workable procedure for negotiations, and applying sufficient pressure through allies of Venezuela’s government and opposition to induce both parties to accept it. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

Sooronbai Jeenbekov will be inaugurated as Kyrgyzstan’s fifth president on 24 November, the victor of a tight, unpredictable, contested but ultimately legitimate election. The new leader, a loyal member of the ruling Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK), won 54 per cent of the vote and gained a majority in every province but Chui and Talas – the home territory of the defeated main opposition candidate Omurbek Babanov. As president, Jeenbekov will face a number of challenges and opportunities, both at home and in Central Asia. The state Committee for National Security (GKNB) on 4 November opened an investigation against Babanov for inciting ethnic hatred based on a speech he made on 28 September in an ethnic-Uzbek area of Osh, a city in southern Kyrgyzstan’s Ferghana Valley. Babanov called on Uzbeks to defend their rights and for any Kyrgyz police officers who harassed Uzbeks to be dismissed. Some observers see the GKNB case as politically motivated. While tensions remain high in Osh, the epicentre of violent ethnic clashes that left 400 mostly Uzbeks dead in June 2010, unrest could also occur elsewhere. Babanov travelled abroad after the campaign, but if he returns he could be arrested at the airport, raising the possibility of protests in his stronghold of Talas, a city 300km west of Bishkek. His arrest and trial would undermine Kyrgyzstan’s international credibility, lay bare the politicisation of the security services and the judiciary, and show unwillingness to tackle deep-seated inter-ethnic issues in the south. Former President Almazbek Atambayev, also from the SDPK, was sometimes unpredictable but managed to balance competing regional and business interests inside Kyrgyzstan, key factors in the ousting of Presidents Kurmanbek Bakiev in 2010 and Askar Akayev in 2005. Jeenbekov will have to replicate this balancing act and make a strategic decision whether or not to reestablish central government control in Osh, which operates like a fiefdom. The latter risks upsetting heavy-weight figures in the south with vested interests, but in the long term, a failure to do so will perpetuate internal political tensions. The new president will also have the opportunity to shape the debate about the role of religion in society. For too long – and much like other Central Asian states – Kyrgyzstan has overly securitised its response to those practicing non-traditional forms of Islam, creating tensions and resentments, while politicians leading a secular state make public displays of piety integral to their political personas. Kyrgyzstan is widely perceived as an easy target for terrorist activity, as the August 2016 attack on the Chinese embassy demonstrated. It will be essential to find a balance between assessing what are real risks and what are questions of religious freedoms and civil rights. As soon as he takes office, Jeenbekov should make every effort to repair Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with Kazakhstan, which deteriorated spectacularly after President Atambayev accused Astana of meddling in the Kyrgyz presidential election to bolster Babanov. Astana responded by introducing strict customs controls on the Kyrgyz-Kazakh border citing concerns about Chinese goods being smuggled through Kyrgyzstan. The disruption on the border is negatively affecting Kyrgyzstan’s economy and Kyrgyzstan has complained to the World Trade Organization and to the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, a trade bloc of which Kazakhstan is a founding member. Russia has so far failed to make any meaningful comment on the standoff. The degree to which Kazakhstan is motivated by anger at Atambayev or genuine concerns about cross-border smuggling is unclear. Still, it will fall to Jeenbekov to spearhead a reconciliation. How open-minded Kazakhstan will be to resolving the spat will also depend on whether or not they see Jeenbekov as a strong, independent leader or merely Atambayev’s puppet. There is now scope to improve relations with Uzbekistan in a way that was unimaginable before President Shavkat Mirziyoyev took office in December 2016. Much of the initiative is coming from the Uzbek side but the amount of progress made between the two states is remarkable. Regional cooperation, in the long term, will foster stability in Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan can play a leading role in both practicing and promoting the type of cooperation that defuses tensions in border areas and over shared resources such as water and energy. By doing so Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan can provide a model of collaboration and peacebuilding in the region. Kyrgyzstan is still a young parliamentary democracy in a difficult neighbourhood. If Jeenbekov is to continue Atambayev’s program of fighting corruption, efforts need to extend beyond targeting the SDPK’s political opponents. Kyrgyzstan and its partners should begin to address how corruption in politics can be tackled. Beyond the technical success of casting votes electronically, there are many opportunities for illegal practices. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) election observers said the presidential elections were legitimate, but local concerns focus on arrests of opposition figures, vote buying and the misuse of administrative resources. Having been the first country in Central Asia to see a president voluntarily leave his post at the end of his constitutionally mandated term, Kyrgyzstan is in many respects light years ahead of its neighbours. Tajikistan could be facing a potentially destabilising transition in 2020, and Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev, 77, cannot hold power forever. Any regional stress will be quickly felt in Bishkek, another reason that Jeenbekov should focus on bolstering Kyrgyzstan’s long-term stability while the situation is calm. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

Rohingya refugees wait to cross into Bangladesh. Photograph: Fred Dufour/AFP/Getty Images The United States has called the Myanmar military operation against the Rohingya population “ethnic cleansing” and threatened targeted sanctions against those responsible for what it called “horrendous atrocities”. “The situation in northern Rakhine state constitutes ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya,” secretary of state Rex Tillerson said in a statement, using a term he avoided when visiting Myanmar last week. “The United States will also pursue accountability through US law, including possible targeted sanctions” against those responsible for the alleged abuses, which have driven hundreds of thousands of Rohingya into neighbouring Bangladesh, he said. On Thursday morning, the US embassy in Myanmar said it had temporarily suspended travel for American officials to parts of Rakhine state, citing concerns over potential protests after Tillerson’s comments. In a further ratcheting up of pressure on Myanmar’s military and civilian leaders, the UN envoy on sexual violence in conflict said on Wednesday that alleged atrocities against Rohingya women and girls by the military may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Pramila Patten, who met many Rohingya victims of sexual violence in Bangladesh camps during a visit this month, said she fully endorses the assessment by UN human rights chief Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein that Rohingya have been victims of “ethnic cleansing”. Speaking at a news conference in New York, Patten said at a news conference that the widespread use of sexual violence “was clearly a driver and push factor” for more than 620,000 Rohingya to flee Myanmar. It was “also a calculated tool of terror aimed at the extermination and removal of the Rohingya as a group,” she added. Rights monitors have accused Myanmar’s military of atrocities, including killings, mass rape and arson, against the stateless Rohingya during so-called clearance operations after attacks by Rohingya militants on 30 police posts and an army base in August. More than 600,000 Rohingya Muslims have fled Rakhine state in Buddhist-majority Myanmar since the crackdown which followed the insurgent attacks. Most have gone to Bangladesh. “These abuses by some among the ... military, security forces, and local vigilantes have caused tremendous suffering and forced hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children to flee their homes,” Tillerson said. While repeating US condemnation of the insurgent attacks, he added: “No provocation can justify the horrendous atrocities that have ensued.” Myanmar’s two-year-old government, led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, has faced heavy international criticism for its response to the crisis, though it has no control over the generals with whom it shares power. “It’s not a situation that is completely under her authority, but certainly we are counting on her to show leadership and also to work through the civilian government with the military to address the crisis,” a senior US official told reporters in a conference call. The term “ethnic cleansing” is not defined in international or US law and does not inherently carry specific consequences, a second senior US official said on the call. Murray Hiebert, a south-east Asia analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies thinktank in Washington, said the state department’s use of the term and threat of sanctions “will likely have limited to no impact on the ground.“ “It is likely to create more distrust between the United States and Myanmar’s military and government and push them closer to China, Russia, and its more authoritarian neighbors in southeast Asia,” he added. A UN official in September described the military actions as a textbook case of “ethnic cleansing,” but until now the US has avoided the term. Washington has sought to balance its wish to nurture the civilian government in Myanmar, where it competes for influence with China, with its desire to hold the military accountable for the abuses. US officials also worry that the mistreatment of the Rohingya Muslim minority may fuel radicalism. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Guardian

Former Bosnian Serb wartime army leader Ratko Mladic has been sentenced to life in prison Wednesday after being found guilty of genocide over atrocities committed during the Bosnian war from 1992 to 1995. Verdict proceedings had been interrupted earlier when his legal team claimed that the 74-year-old's blood pressure was too high. After outbursts from Mladic, Judge Alphons Orie -- who was delivering a summation of the case -- ordered the removal of the ex-general, telling him he could monitor proceedings by audio and video. Mladic's legal team had asked for proceedings to be halted or for the summation of the case to be skipped, which the Judge refused. Mladic had been charged with two counts of genocide, and nine crimes against humanity and war crimes for his role in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1995, during which 100,000 people were killed and another 2.2 million displaced. He was found not guilty on one charge of genocide. The trial, which opened in 2012, is taking place at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, Netherlands. The ad-hoc court was established to prosecute crimes committed during the Balkans conflict. Mladic was accused of orchestrating a campaign of ethnic cleansing, including the slaughter of thousands of Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in July 1995. It is the worst massacre to have taken place in Europe since the Second World War. Arrested in 2011, Mladic's trial has lasted 530 days, included more than 500 witnesses and nearly 10,000 exhibits. Before the case was adjourned last December, prosecutors recommended a life sentence. Mladic had referred to the court as "satanic" and labeled the charges against him as "obnoxious." Who is Ratko Mladic? The ex-general -- accused of being "the Butcher of Bosnia" -- was in command of the Bosnian Serb army which entered the town of Srebrenica in July 1995. In the days which followed, 8,000 Muslim men and boys were systematically slaughtered by troops under his leadership. The late Bosnia peace negotiator Richard Holbrooke once described Mladic as "one of those lethal combinations that history thrusts up occasionally -- a charismatic murderer." Mladic faced charges over his actions during the siege of Sarajevo where his heavily armed forces cut the city off from the outside world. Serb forces pounded the city from higher ground positions each day, trapping Sarajevo's residents in the valley below. More than 10,000 people, mostly civilians, perished. As the war ended in 1995, Mladic went on the run before being found 16 years later when police burst into the garden of a small house in northern Serbia. Though he was carrying two handguns, he surrendered without a fight. He was extradited for trial in the Netherlands. In 2011, a tribunal judge entered not guilty pleas for Mladic after he refused to cooperate and was forcibly removed from the courtroom at the judge's order. Mladic's judgment day comes more than a year after Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan Karadzic was sentenced to 40 years in prison in March 2016, for his role in the 1990s conflict. Former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was arrested in 2001 but died before his trial could be completed. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson speaks at a press conference in Myanmar on Nov. 15, 2017. (Aung Htet/AFP/Getty Images) Secretary of State Rex Tillerson shifted his position on the widening crackdown on Myanmar’s Rohingya minority, calling it for the first time Wednesday “ethnic cleansing,” and threatening sanctions against officials responsible.Tillerson slammed Myanmar’s military and local vigilantes for carrying out “horrendous atrocities” and causing “tremendous suffering” in its campaign in Myanmar’s northern Rakhine state where the Rohingya population is concentrated. “After a careful and thorough analysis of available facts, it is clear that the situation in northern Rakhine state constitutes ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya,” Tillerson said in a statement released Wednesday. “Those responsible for these atrocities must be held accountable,” he said, and called for an independent investigation into the violence. It is a belated departure for the United States, which has used careful, restrained language since the latest crackdown began in August. Nearly 1 million Rohingya have been forced to leave their homes, many fleeing to neighboring Bangladesh. Tillerson’s declaration, which comes months after similar denunciations from the United Nations, puts fresh attention on the growing humanitarian crisis in Myanmar and Bangladesh. But while Washington has shifted gears rhetorically, it hasn’t taken any steps to punish Myanmar’s government just yet. Unlike terms such as “crimes against humanity” and “genocide,” the “ethnic cleansing” label does not automatically trigger domestic or international legal actions. “It is a descriptive term and it carries with it, again, the sense of urgency,” a senior State Department official told reporters on Wednesday. “It does not require any new obligations, but it does emphasize our concern about the situation.” During a visit to Myanmar earlier this month, Tillerson said the violence have “characteristics of crimes against humanity” but stopped short of adding further labels. Human rights groups have for months documented horrendous atrocities Myanmar forces carried out against the ethnic minority Rohingya Muslim groups, including gang rape, torture, and murder. They criticized the United States for dragging its feet on declaring the campaign ethnic cleansing, despite the top U.N. human rights official branding it as such over two months ago. “Secretary Tillerson’s acknowledgement of ethnic cleansing and call for an investigation sets an example for how the world can respond to this crisis,” said said Joanne Lin, national director of advocacy and government relations for Amnesty International USA. “The time for outrage and condemnation has passed.” While human rights groups are urging Washington to impose broader sanctions and push for an international arms embargo on Myanmar, the State Department said at this point it is only eyeing targeted sanctions against the military and government officials responsible for the atrocities. “The idea of again levying broad-based sanctions is not something that we think is going to be very productive,” a senior State Department official told reporters on Wednesday. Sweeping economic sanctions wouldn’t focus on punishing the officials responsible, and could derail Myanmar’s slow economic emergence to the rest of the world just as it slowly opens up from decades of military rule, the official said. Myanmar had been under broad Western sanctions for nearly thirty years until 2016, when then-President Barack Obama rolled back U.S. economic sanctions after the country formed its first democratically elected civilian government — though the military still retains significant residual power after decades of rule. Rohingya Muslims have been persecuted in Myanmar, a majority-Buddhist country, for decades, but the conflict and subsequent refugee flow has intensified in the last year. The latest crisis kicked off in August, when Rohingya militants attacked Myanmar police outposts, prompting Myanmar to launch a massive so-called “clearance operation” in the region in retaliation. Since last year, nearly 700,000 Rohingya Muslims have fled Myanmar — more than half the population of Rakhine state. Despite widespread international condemnation, the violence has not abated. “The Rohingya have suffered attacks and systematic violations for decades, and the international community must not fail them now when their very existence in Myanmar is threatened,” said Cameron Hudson, director of the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. “Without urgent action, there’s a high risk of more mass atrocities.” The Myanmar government has prevented international human rights investigators from Rakhine, and insists that its armed forces have not committed atrocities while dealing with the Rohingya. On Tuesday, Myanmar’s national security advisor, in an opinion piece in Wall Street Journal, went so far as to suggest that the testimony of victims of the violent crackdown could be part of a plot to discredit the government. “A number of sources indicate that we are seeing a sophisticated campaign designed to discredit and destabilize the Myanmar government,” wrote U Thaung Tun. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Foreign Policy