Parviz Sabeti crafted a low-profile life for his family – but now he faces a $225m lawsuit over atrocities committed in prisons in Tehran and elsewhere By Richard Luscombe in Orlando Neighbors in the upscale Florida community of Windermere know them as Peter and Nancy, the seemingly friendly retired couple they wave to on morning walks, and who always appear to enjoy visits from their two high-flying grown daughters, one a respected professor of science at Harvard University. Yet behind the high walls of their $3.6m lakefront mansion lies a darker, more closely guarded reality: “Peter” is actually Parviz Sabeti, the alleged head of secret police and chief torturer of the former Shah of Iran’s pre-revolutionary government, now facing a $225m lawsuit in Florida for atrocities committed in prisons in Tehran and elsewhere. A district court judge ruled last month that the 89-year-old Sabeti – after building a successful and low-profile new life for himself and his family since fleeing his homeland in 1978 – must face the accusations in court in the case brought by three plaintiffs who describe themselves as former political prisoners. In court filings, the plaintiffs say they were among thousands of people rounded up as perceived opponents of the shah by Savak, Iran’s notoriously brutal internal security and intelligence agency, and subjected to abuses at Sabeti’s personal direction – including rape, electric shocks, near-drownings and forced nail extraction. One particularly barbaric piece of equipment, they allege, was Apollo, an electric chair named after the early US space program, which featured a metal helmet that amplified victims’ screams into their own ears. Sabeti has not responded publicly to the allegations in the court filings, but has previously denied that Savak tortured detainees and claimed that he “always opposed torture”. While Sabeti’s location was unknown for the best part of 45 years, his position in the Iranian government, and alleged role as an architect of its cruelty as director of Savak’s internal security department, was not. He was identified as a fiercely loyal ally of the shah in a secret analysis by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) written in 1978, which was not released until 2018, and was “widely recognized as one of the most powerful and feared men in the shah’s regime … with the authority to apprehend, interrogate and prosecute opponents throughout the country”, according to the lawsuit. Estimates vary of the number of Savak victims between the agency’s founding in 1957 and its dissolution in 1979, but many thousands were known to have been detained and tortured, with at least several hundred more killed. The three plaintiffs, Iranian men living in California aged 68 to 85, allege they were abducted by Savak in Tehran, beaten into giving false confessions and served prison time. A motion by Sabeti’s lawyers to dismiss the case for breaching the statute of limitations was rejected by district court judge Gregory Presnell of the central district of Florida on 12 August. A trial could take place early next year.According to the lawsuit, Sabeti “has spent the last four decades out of the public eye, concealing his whereabouts and identity”. He and his wife, Nasrin, 75, might even have remained incognito had he not been inadvertently “outed” by one of his daughters in a February 2023 tweet showing him at a rally in Los Angeles denouncing Iran’s Islamic government. While the disclosure may have been inadvertent, and directly led to the plaintiffs’ attorneys being able to locate him and file the lawsuit, some believe it was part of a campaign by the Iranian diaspora in the US to help “sanitize” the history of the former shah’s deposed government and build momentum and support for a new pro-western regime. Reza Pahlavi, sometimes called the “crown prince” of Iran as son of the former shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, told the Guardian in a 2023 interview, at the height of anti-Tehran protests, that he was working with allies to draw up a charter of democratic principles for any new Iranian government to follow. He has since portrayed himself as ready to replace the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and become interim head of state. Sabeti, meanwhile, has worked as Pahlavi’s “security adviser”, according to a 2023 article posted to the website of the National Council of Resistance to Iran, a coalition of Iranian political figures portraying itself as a parliament in exile. Efforts by the Guardian to reach Sabeti were unsuccessful, including emails and calls to his home, and messages seeking comment to all four of his attorneys listed in court documents. Not in question is how well Sabeti and his family have lived in the US since arriving in Florida in 1978, having fled Tehran just weeks ahead of the 1979 Islamic revolution. The Sabetis, who according to leaked state department documents were able to transfer a sizable sum of money from Iran – said by one source to be above $20m – westernized their first names to Peter and Nancy after their arrival.Using those aliases, Sabeti set up what was to become a successful real estate development company in central Florida. Sabeti, his wife and two daughters are listed as directors of several still-active companies on the state of Florida’s business database.Public records seen by the Guardian show that the Sabeti family own at least eight properties in Orange county, including the five-bedroom, six-bathroom Windermere mansion purchased for $3.5m in August 2005. The State Department and the CIA did not respond to questions about the Sabetis’ immigration status in the US, or the grounds on which they were first admitted in 1978. Both Parviz and Nasrim Sabeti, however, hold active voter registrations in Florida, and records show they voted in the 2024 presidential election, meaning both are US citizens. A neighbor said she would often see the couple, particularly Nasrim, out walking, but that the Sabetis mostly appeared to value their privacy. Their house was almost always quiet, apart from occasional visits by their daughters. Neither daughter responded to a request for comment.Florida’s Republican attorney general, James Uthmeier, did not respond to a question about whether he would launch a criminal investigation into Sabeti’s activities, as he previously has for other people in Florida accused of nefarious crimes overseas. Sara Colón, an attorney for the plaintiffs, welcomed Presnell’s orders to deny Sabeti’s request for dismissal, and to preserve the anonymity of her clients, who said they had been subjected to death threats and intimidation since filing the lawsuit. “These decisions are a positive result for survivors of torture who are seeking accountability and justice. This case is not only about ending impunity, it is about affirming that survivors have the right to pursue justice and reclaim their dignity without fear,” she said. The Iranian Collective for Justice & Accountability, an advocacy group for victims of torture and their families, said it hoped the Sabeti case would help end a “cycle of violence” seen in Iran during the shah’s regime and the Islamic fundamentalist government that succeeded it. “The message should be clear and simple: all victims deserve justice, and everyone engaged in torture and repression should be held accountable,” a spokesperson for the group said in a statement.“The roots of the brutal policies being carried out today by the Islamic Republic of Iran are connected to the torture methods enacted by Sabeti and Savak. [The case] should stand as a rejection of a future Iran that re-establishes Savak, or seeks to provide blanket amnesty to current security forces who have been involved in torture and repression.“It is only through justice and accountability that we can overcome the horrific violence and repression that has ruled Iran for decades.”   Copyright 2025 The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/11/parviz-sabeti-shah-iran-lawsuit

I will never forget my visit to Sinjar and Northern Iraq in 2019 or meeting with Yazidi survivors. Their harrowing stories are described in the book on Genocide which I co-authored  with Dr.Ewelina Ochab @EwelinaUO I am enormously proud of the Parliamentary Committee I chair – the JCHR @HumanRightsCtte– on producing such an impressive and unanimous Report – especially recommendations on accountability and Universal Jurisdiction. In my absence in @UKHouseofLords yesterday, following last week’s traffic accident while en route to Westminster, I was immensely grateful to my colleague, Baroness Kennedy of the Shaws KC @HelenaKennedyKC for her outstanding introduction of the debate – and to the contributions of all those who spoke. In 2015 the then Government failed to listen to the pleas which I and others, including @BaronessCoxNewsLord (Michael) Forsyth and Lord (David) Blencathra made in the House, warning of  impending atrocities and genocide against minorities like the Yazidis and Christians. See https://www.davidalton.net/?s=Yazidis I hope that the Government will now act on our Committee’s recommendations to ensure both justice and a more effective way of responding to tell tale signs of emerging genocides.  Our present response makes a mockery of the 1948 Convention on the Crime of Genocide. As Lord Hope of Craighead has observed, it is no longer fit for purpose – and as the abysmal failure to bring to justice a single Briton involved in the genocide of the Yazidis demonstrates we must radically change the way we respond to such terrible atrocities. The Hansard from yesterday’s debate can be read at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2025-09-09/debates/5A3A3CF1-F5C4-4816-921B-103146C43797/DaeshCrimesAccountability(JCHRReport) and see transcript below. The recording is here: https://parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/ebf91b44-80db-451a-a8e4-42230b034c71 Motion to Take Note 5.49pm Moved by Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws  Sharethis specific contribution That the Grand Committee takes note of the Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights  Accountability for Daesh Crimes  (2nd Report, HL Paper 121). Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws  (Lab) Sharethis specific contribution My Lords, it is my honour to introduce the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ report,  Accountability for Daesh Crimes ; it is the JCHR’s second report of the 2024-25 Session, which started last December. In this work, our committee held six oral evidence sessions and heard from expert witnesses and independent officials, including the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation; SO15, the counterterrorism unit of the Met Police; and the Crown Prosecution Service. Before I proceed with introducing the report, I should pay my respects to the exceptional chair of our committee, the noble Lord, Lord Alton. He is unable to be in the Room today as he is recovering from a serious accident that took place at Victoria Station last week—it was a collision involving a bus on which he was travelling—which has caused him some serious damage. He will probably be out of the Chamber for six to eight weeks, so I am standing in his place; I cannot do him justice, but I know that we all want to see him recover from that terrible accident. The case of the Yazidi genocide has been close to the noble Lord’s heart—and, indeed, to mine—from the early days of the Daesh genocidal campaign. Like me, the noble Lord has visited the Yazidi camps and got to know many of the Yazidi community in the years since. He did not give up on the case, despite very poor responses from successive Governments. Let me explain something of the background. Daesh, which is also known as Islamic State, ISIL or ISIS, is a non-state terrorist organisation that emerged from al-Qaeda in Iraq in the early 2000s; if anything told us that the Iraq war was a folly, those repercussions point out very clearly that it was. Daesh has targeted religious minorities, such as the Yazidis, with the intention of destroying diverse ethno-religious identities. Women and girls have been specifically targeted and subjected to abductions, forced conversions, forced marriage, rape and sexual violence. One of the horrors is that, at first, their own community was reluctant to have young women who had been violated over and over again returned to it. Eventually, its religious leadership took a different position and the women could be returned—but not with any of the babies they had conceived. So one of the sadnesses is that I have met girls who were only 14 or 15 when they were impregnated. They left behind babies whom they loved because they also wanted to return to their parents. It was absolutely heart-rending to be confronted with that. It is estimated that 5,000 Yazidis were killed, while more than 200,000 were displaced from their homes. Some 2,500 to 2,700 were abducted and remain missing; we do not know where they are. In 2023, the UK Government acknowledged that acts of genocide were committed against the Yazidi people by Daesh. Earlier today, a number of Yazidi survivors visited this House. They have been closely following this inquiry by the Joint Committee on Human Rights because they want answers as to why British Daesh fighters have not been prosecuted for their involvement in international crimes against the Yazidis, which, as I said, His Majesty’s Government finally recognised as a genocide in August 2023. It is interesting that the German criminal courts have pronounced three judgments on genocide by members of Daesh in dealing with crimes against the Yazidi people. Yazidis are very much like the Jewish community in that, over decades and centuries, they have been discriminated against, subjected to persecution, called infidels and suffered other abuses. As the community tells us, they have endured 74 genocides, and the 2014 genocide by Daesh is in some ways ongoing because of those missing people. We wonder where so many of those women have gone. Are they still in households run by those men and their wives? Many of the women were themselves abusers of their victims. This was also the genocide that some 900 British citizens joined. They left their lives in Britain behind and travelled to Syria and Iraq to join Daesh, and they may well have taken part in genocidal activities against the Yazidis and other religious minorities. Some 425 jihadist volunteers are now back in the United Kingdom. Before this inquiry took place, the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and I met the contingent of the police that deals with war crimes or international atrocity crimes. It became clear that there had never been proper inquiries into the domestic circumstances of those who returned, whether they ever interacted with the Yazidi community and so on. His Majesty’s Government responded to a Parliamentary Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, that: “Over 32 individuals have been convicted of terrorism offences in British courts after previously travelling to the Iraq/Syria theatre of conflict as Daesh fighters”. Just think about it: 32 convictions out of more than 400 who returned to the UK. That was for terror-related offences only, not their involvement in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. This response was the very reason why Yazidi organisations and experts wrote to the Joint Committee on Human Rights and have been writing to people like me and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, seeking our views. They want to know why this has been the case. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, is the chair of the Joint Committee which continued the inquiry and published its findings shortly before recess. His Majesty’s Government have now responded to the findings and recommendations, and I wish to engage with the responses. None of the people who have returned have been convicted for the international crimes committed by Daesh in Syria and Iraq. This means that there have been no successful prosecutions of Daesh fighters in this country for any of those crimes that I have mentioned—genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The focus of the police and the CPS has been on prosecuting terrorism offences. The report calls for a fundamental change in approach to focus on international crimes such as genocide and war crimes. Otherwise, for what purpose do we sign these treaties? Jonathan Hall, King’s Counsel, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, told the Joint Committee on Human Rights: “I detected that the approach of counterterrorism police … was much more about risk management and much less about accountability”. That is the purpose of legislation on war crimes, crimes against humanity and atrocity crimes such as genocide. The police are not really familiar with war crimes. The unit is just not trained to ask the right questions. Its approach is to ask, if this person might return, how to investigate them and potentially get a conviction under terrorism legislation and make sure that the UK is safe. It is important for them to do that, but there are other avenues that should have been explored. The International Criminal Court came into existence only in 2000. We introduced it into domestic legislation through the International Criminal Court Act 2001, but only British nationals or British residents can be prosecuted under that legislation for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. In our courts, it is limited to people who are British. As it turns out, most of those people are British and were born here, but it is very limiting. Other countries do not have such limited legislation. Even the United States, which started in the same way as us by prosecuting only people who are American nationals or who are residing in the United States, realised that that limited it because people often come to countries as visitors or find their way in, and that is the very moment when they should be charged for the crimes that they may have committed. Ms Amal Clooney, a colleague in my chambers, gave evidence to the committee. She said that the current limits of the UK legal framework create “a key barrier to the exercise of universal jurisdiction”. She noted: “The UK’s legal framework deviates from that of both civil law jurisdictions in Europe, such as Germany, and other common law jurisdictions around the world”. We should be thinking about our current position. The report calls on the Government to allow the UK to exercise universal jurisdiction over these crimes. This would mean that anyone who could be prosecuted in UK courts for these international crimes should be. Amendments to the Crime and Policing Bill were proposed in the report to achieve this. Unfortunately, the responses received from His Majesty’s Government’s so far are not very encouraging. Their response in saying that prosecutions require strong evidence was correct—they do. However, they failed to use UNITAD’s evidence. UNITAD is the investigative body that was gathering evidence in Iraq and Syria about the crimes committed by Daesh. We invested millions of taxpayers’ money in contributing towards that UN mechanism, yet we failed to access it to see if there was evidence that could be used against those British returnees who were convicted only of belonging to a terrorist organisation and joining it abroad. His Majesty’s Government also responded that investigations and prosecutions should take place close to where the crimes occurred, meaning that Iraq should be prosecuting people for these crimes. If you were to count on your hands how many rape prosecutions take place in Iraq, you will find that there are very few. A much easier way is that you have somebody in custody who is a member of Daesh. If it can be shown that they were a member, that very membership can bring down the death penalty. So, you do not bother with securing justice for the Yazidi women who were raped over and over again, and sold and resold, and treated as chattels. Iraq and Syria have not been places where judicial systems were likely to deliver justice—certainly not for the women. Concerns raised there in relation to the right to a fair trial and weak processes, among others, continue. To this day, these countries do not have legislation that would enable them to prosecute Daesh fighters for international crimes, such as the ones I have mentioned—genocide, torture and so on. His Majesty’s Government mentioned that the ICC is better equipped to prosecute international crimes. That is in many ways true but not for Daesh crimes, as the ICC does not have territorial jurisdiction over the territories of Syria and Iraq, where most of the crimes were perpetrated. The very premise of the principle of universal jurisdiction is that international crimes cannot be effectively prosecuted in some countries because of ongoing conflict, involvement or complicity of those in power, which is so often the case, lack of laws, a weak judiciary, corruption and so on. His Majesty’s Government did not accept the Joint Committee’s assessment of the lack of co-operation between UK investigative and external prosecuting bodies. Indeed, even our own domestic investigative and prosecuting bodies did not seem to be connected regarding the kind of questioning that could have taken place. It could have been, “What were your domestic arrangements while you were living in Iraq? Where were you living? Who made up your household?” You do not start by saying, “Did you rape women?” You start by finding out how people were conducting their lives when they went home at night having beheaded so many people. His Majesty’s Government identified some developments in co-operation with international mechanisms. However, there was no working relationship with UNITAD for the entire time the mechanism was in existence. UNITAD has now been parcelled up and handed over to UN offices in the United States and it looks as though it is folding. We still do not know the reason why there was no co-operation between the British authorities and UNITAD. The response from the Government is unclear on how they work with the IIIM, which is the mechanism for investigating the crimes that took place during the Daesh interlude in Iraq and Syria. How is evidence collected by the mechanism and could any of it have applied to British citizens who joined this jihad? I was disappointed to see that His Majesty’s Government did not welcome the recommendation on universal jurisdiction, which is the clearest thing. People from Iran, for example, come to this country not wearing elaborate, theocratic outfits that say, “I am part of the revolutionary guard” or whatever, but they arrive here suited and booted to take their children to look at our universities to see whether they should study here. They come in, but we are not able to arrest them, even if they have been identified as members of the revolutionary guard, people who have perpetrated torture and so on. That is true of others who have committed grievous crimes: if they are not residents or do not have a British passport, nothing can be done. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has twice issued the recommendation that we should revisit our universal jurisdiction law. It is there in the Daesh inquiry report, and it is in the Crime and Policing Bill report that we prepared. That recommendation was also supported in the International Development Committee report. The Government’s argument is that, “the question of whether universal jurisdiction should apply to a particular crime is best approached collaboratively between states through treaties”. Treaties are all fine and good, but they have to be translated into law and then into practice. There are existing treaties that impose obligations upon the UK to ensure that international crimes are criminalised and that the perpetrators are punished. This one seems to have slipped through the net; it leaves out anyone who is not a UK citizen or resident, so significantly limits our Government’s ability to deal with international crimes effectively. Further, the report engages with the issue of deprivation of citizenship and Britons in the camps in north-east Syria, which I will also briefly cover. The inquiry found that the UK Government have, in some circumstances, stripped individuals of their citizenship. Katherine Cornett from Reprieve told the committee that “there is a serious lack of transparency when it comes to the use of this power… The UK now uses this power more than almost any other state… Because of the lack of information, there is no demographic data about who has been stripped of their citizenship and about their gender, ethnic background or religion”. The report calls for greater transparency over this power and how it is used. It also calls for periodic independent reviews of the use of the power. I will just deal with the Britons who are in those camps. We saw a film by a very brave war correspondent from Sky News, which showed her interviewing a British person through the gates of a prison. It was obvious that he was British from his speech and so on, and I think he indicated that he was indeed British. So there is somebody in there, and we should be making inquiries about whether he should be brought here and put on trial. The inquiry established that UK nationals are currently detained in camps in Syria. They are essentially open-air prisons with appalling conditions; there is a lack of food and medical assistance, and threats of violence are commonplace. The UN special rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Siobhán Mullally, said: “The particular risks faced by children … must be urgently addressed and without further delay”. They are at risk of serious abuse and of possible trafficking onwards for questionable purposes. She continued: “Repatriation of families currently detained indefinitely in north-east Syria is a necessary first step to meeting the UK’s domestic and international law obligations of protection, effective investigation and provision of effective remedies for the serious human rights violations ongoing”. The report calls for a proactive approach in identifying and locating minors and, where feasible, repatriating them as soon as practically possible. It also calls on the Government to undertake every effort to prosecute British individuals held in camps in Syria where there is evidence that they were involved in grievous crimes. The Daesh inquiry was an important exercise conducted by the Joint Committee to ensure that we deal with the past and the issue of Brits being involved in some of the worst atrocities seen in recent years. The very purpose of this report was to draw this to the Government’s attention, and we hoped for a more positive response from them. I can hope only that the Government will not pass on this important opportunity for a more effective and adequate way of responding to the scale of these crimes. I beg to move. 6.09pm Lord Murray of Blidworth  (Con) Sharethis specific contribution My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Baroness, as we do week after week in the operation of the Select Committee. I have been in touch with our chair, the noble Lord, Lord Alton. He said to me that he was particularly moved by a visit he made in 2019 to Sinjar in northern Iraq, where he had harrowing meetings with Yazidi survivors. I know that his motivation to renew the Select Committee’s investigation into the crimes committed by Daesh in the previous Parliament in this Parliament was motivated by that experience. I also know that the noble Lord is very fed up not to be here; he has invested a great deal in this topic. Indeed, there is some considerable irony that one of the most sanctioned men in Parliament for his campaigning on human rights issues should be laid low by a number 24 bus. However, as the noble Baroness rightly observed, we hope that he will shortly be back to chair the committee. I must also thank the committee’s staff for their help with the inquiry, which was long running—as I said, it started in the previous Parliament—and for preparing the evidence sessions, which were not straightforward, given the difficult nature of the evidence that we heard. I shall make just three points. First, it is shocking that there have been no prosecutions against any Britons for the terrible crimes committed by Daesh in northern Syria and Iraq. It is true that these ghastly crimes need to be investigated and charged appropriately. As the noble Baroness observed, there is a suggestion that of the 400 or so who have returned, 32 have been tried, and they have been tried for terrorism offences rather than for any international offences. One can see why that might be done in that it is easier, and the evidence is available in the UK; we heard evidence about that. However, to do so seems to undermine the gravity of the crimes that they committed. I understand the difficulty and expense of collecting evidence in Iraq, but it is important that these crimes are properly investigated and charged. Our point about co-ordination between the CPS, the DPP and the war crimes unit is a good one. I am afraid that the Government’s response to that was not entirely satisfactory. The Government also responded that these sorts of crimes should be tried locally. I can entirely see the logic of that position, and in a perfect world, that would be right. The terrible crimes committed in northern Syria should be tried in northern Syria, so that the victims can see justice being done. The problem with that position for the Government is that there is an air of unreality. Given the state of government in northern Syria and northern Iraq and the fact that evidence was not collected at the time, there appears to be little will to prosecute these matters effectively. The reality is that we are in a better position to try here those people who are here for their crimes, and they can serve time here for their crimes. We must ensure that those who are here are properly investigated. This must not be swept under the carpet. However, I would not encourage the bringing of people to Britain from northern Syria to be tried. There is a balancing of competing interests between protecting national security and trying those who are already here. I appreciate that the Government’s response echoes that there is a balancing act to be performed. My second point is about deprivation orders. As the report rightly observes, deprivation orders are a useful tool to protect public safety. That is the power of the Home Secretary to remove British citizenship from somebody who is a dual national or entitled to another nationality. Removing their British nationality removes their entitlement to come to the UK and impose any kind of national security threat. Obviously, there are considerable safeguards around the power. There is an entitlement to appeal, as we have seen in the repeated Shamima Begum litigation. The committee’s recommendation that there was insufficient supervision was, in my view, answered in large measure by paragraph 21 of the Government’s response. There is regular reporting of numbers, but that regularity could be increased. I noticed that the last publication of numbers of deprivations went up to the end of 2023; the Government may want to consider whether it is time to publish the numbers again. In paragraph 21, the Government noted: “The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration … has the remit to review the power” by virtue of Sections 48 to 56 of the UK Borders Act 2007, and did so in 2018 and 2024. It is important that that continues. The Government’s response was, therefore, in some measure a satisfactory answer to the points made in the report. The final issue covered in the report was the status of children who may be British in the camps in northern Syria. As is reflected in paragraph 23 of the Government’s response, this has been government policy for some time: “Where British unaccompanied minors and orphans are brought to our attention, it is Government policy to seek to repatriate them where feasible and subject to confirmation of identity and nationality, and any national security concerns”. We are unsure how many there may be. Although I understand the Government’s position that it is hard to say, it is important that efforts are made to ensure that any such children’s needs are addressed as swiftly as possible. I hope that this report has brought to light some considerable issues that the Government will continue to ponder when addressing questions in relation to the crimes committed by Daesh. 6.16pm Lord Thomas of Gresford  (LD) Sharethis specific contribution My Lords, I was devastated to see the injuries that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has suffered—he sent me a photograph. I send him my very best for a swift recovery. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, for stepping in and introducing this debate. If I am a Daesh fighter who engaged in the massacre of the Yazidis between 2014 and 2017, if I am successful in making my way to Europe, I will not go to Germany or Holland, where I might be prosecuted for genocide—I will take a small boat to Dover and seek safety in the United Kingdom, where, under the International Criminal Court Act 2001, only UK nationals and residents can be prosecuted for genocide or a crime against humanity and war crimes outside of this jurisdiction. When the then Bill was before Parliament in 2001, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, argued: “The primary responsibility for the investigation of crimes committed outside the United Kingdom lies with the state where the crime occurred, or whose nationals were responsible. If that state is not able or willing to investigate, the ICC will … step in”. There are 125 signatories to the Rome statute, which set up the International Criminal Court. They do not include Israel, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey or Lebanon. Rather forlornly, from that area, they include just the state of Palestine and neighbouring Jordan. In other words, in almost all areas of the Middle East, the writ of the International Criminal Court simply does not run. At that time, the noble and learned Baroness also said: “The British criminal justice system is based on a territorial link to the United Kingdom … we have to be practical and ensure that we can deliver what we undertake. It is our policy to assume universal jurisdiction only where an international agreement expressly requires it. The Rome statute does not. Rather than taking jurisdiction that will be difficult to enforce, we believe that those countries in which the offences took place should be encouraged to prosecute ”.—[ Official Report , 15/1/01; col. 929.] That is, Syria should be encouraged to prosecute. This Labour Government today pursue precisely the same line. Their response to this excellent report, on which I congratulate the committee, said: “The most serious international crimes not covered by our universal jurisdiction policy are generally already subject to the jurisdiction of international courts or tribunals which are better placed to prosecute such offences where they are not being dealt with by the relevant domestic authorities”. They claimed to be a strong supporter of the ICC. Put aside for a moment these foreign nationals. As the committee heard, more than 900 UK nationals and residents went to support Daesh in the conflicts in the Middle East, and somewhere between 450 and 600 returned. There is no question that, as the United Nations declared, the attack on the Yazidi population, which involved the murder of the men and the rape and enslavement of the women and children, amounted to genocide. Not one of the returnees has been prosecuted for genocide; nor has anyone arriving at our borders, whether legally or in small boats. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, pointed out a moment ago, there is no justice or accountability for the crimes against the Yazidis anywhere in the world. Successive Directors of Public Prosecutions have shied away from bringing proceedings under the 2001 Act. The only case of a person convicted of a war crime on a prosecution brought under the Act was brought by the Director of Service Prosecutions. That person was Corporal Payne, in the Baha Mousa case in Basra, where an Iraqi civilian was beaten and kicked to death in British custody. I was present when he pleaded guilty to a war crime—inhumane treatment of prisoners —which he did only because it was an alternative to murder. He was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment. Payne was in charge of a detention facility, as noble Lords will remember, and invited passing British soldiers in to take a kick at the detainees. I defended in the same case a superior officer who was acquitted of neglect of duty. At Second Reading of the then Bill in 2001, Lord Lester of Herne Hill argued that our courts “should be ready to shoulder that responsibility should a suspected perpetrator of genocide or war crimes come within our territorial jurisdiction in circumstances where the ICC is unable to take over ”.—[ Official Report , 15/1/01; col. 939.] That is precisely the case I am making. In Committee, on 12 February of that year, there were amendments to make genocide and war crimes subject to universal jurisdiction. They were moved by Lord Archer of Sandwell, who served as the Solicitor-General for five years under Wilson and Callaghan; he was supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who was later the Attorney-General for six years under Blair. For the Liberal Democrats, Lord Avebury—the heroic Eric Lubbock—argued strongly in favour of the amendments. My colleague and friend Lord Goodhart, who is much missed, put it succinctly when he said: “Surely it is right that we should not apply a principle of territoriality to this, but if we find on our territory those who are alleged to have committed these terribly serious crimes and if, for one reason or another, there is no possibility of the ICC exercising its own jurisdiction, we should exercise our jurisdiction in this country whatever the location of such crimes and whatever the nationality of the person alleged to have committed them ”.—[ Official Report , 12/2/01; col. 82.] The amendments were withdrawn on a concession that jurisdiction would extend to residents of the UK and not just nationals, as was originally drafted. This report gives the current Attorney-General, in the light of the failure to bring anyone to account for the Yazidi genocide, a chance to reverse the stance taken by some of his predecessors in 2001. I hope that he will support amendments to that effect in the coming Crime and Policing Bill. 6.24pm The Lord Bishop of Oxford  Sharethis specific contribution My Lords, I, too, congratulate the Joint Committee on Human Rights on its detailed and courageous report, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, on bringing this debate. With others, I am sorry that he cannot be with us today. I, too, received the graphic photographs of his serious injuries. The memory of the horrific crimes of Daesh, including genocide, is now fading from public consciousness. There have been so many challenging situations in the world in the past decade. However, the report makes clear that there is substantial unfinished business in respect of Daesh and the perpetrators. It has to be of widespread public concern that so few of the British citizens who perpetrated these atrocities have been brought to justice. I recognise the complexities of seeking to hold them to account before the law, as noble Lords have articulated, but the UK Government’s engagement does not compare well with prosecutions brought by other Governments and jurisdictions. I hope the Government and the new Foreign Secretary will be able to act on the clear recommendations in the report. We collectively need to find more effective ways of being alert to the risks of genocide, and responding to past offenders and bringing them to justice must be a key part of that. Reading the report, I was particularly struck by the plight of the significant numbers of children who are detained with their parents in refugee camps in north-east Syria. The report identifies the serious risks to these children caused by the poor living conditions, as well as the risks of trafficking and radicalisation. We clearly have insufficient information about these forgotten children—their numbers, their whereabouts and the risks to them—but they are UK nationals, and they are surely innocent of any crime their parents have committed. Their plight is ongoing, and they deserve our attention and care. Better information is a key next step here, so will the Government take steps to publish updated data on the number of Britons estimated to be detained in north-east Syria, with information disaggregated by age and gender, if that information is available? I ask the Minister: will the Government now support the call for more urgent fact-finding about the numbers and plight of these children? Will the Government be able to support more proactive attempts to repatriate these children, alongside continuing to seek to bring those who perpetuated the Daesh crimes to justice? What resources and energy are the Government prepared to commit to the task in the coming year? 6.27pm Baroness D’Souza  (CB) Sharethis specific contribution My Lords, I am delighted to follow the right reverend Prelate, with whom I share non-lawyer status—perhaps the only two here. This excellent report has had a somewhat chequered history, interrupted as it was by the election last year, but it has emerged stronger with new and compelling evidence. The purposes of the JCHR inquiry were to assess the UK’s compliance with its obligations to punish genocide, to protect children from trafficking and to support British nationals, including children, in the Syrian camps. My concern is also with the first purpose—the shortcomings in the UK of the legal framework governing international crimes and challenges to accountability. As noble Lords know well, the UK is a signatory to the Geneva conventions and has a legal obligation to prevent genocide, where possible, and to punish perpetrators. The fact of genocide by Daesh against the Yazidi people is indisputable and summarised comprehensively in the report. The UK Government’s response so far rejects the main recommendations in the report, which are focused on strengthening the prevention and punishment of genocide. To summarise the evidence of the UK’s failure to comply fully with treaty obligations: the UK has never prosecuted or convicted anyone for the crime of genocide. In this, the UK law is inconsistent. As we have heard, an individual guilty of genocidal action, and who happens to be in the UK, cannot be arrested unless the individual is a UK citizen or resident. Furthermore, the Government can—and they do—offer temporary immunity to foreign nationals implicated in genocide who visit the UK. Also as we have heard, approximately 425 Daesh fighters have returned to the UK, of which 32 have been convicted under the terrorism-related legal framework, but none has been charged with or convicted of the international crime of genocide, despite the fact that the UK Government have formally accepted that Daesh’s action against the Yazidis constitutes genocide. Currently, UK domestic law provides only limited jurisdiction on genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. It is worth repeating that the courts can prosecute only offences committed by UK nationals or residents or those subject to service personnel jurisdiction. The report proposes the removal of these nationality and residence requirements in favour of universal jurisdiction. Further, it indicates that this can be achieved by amending the International Criminal Court Act 2001 via the Crime and Policing Bill now before the House of Lords. The amendments would provide for the adoption of universal jurisdiction alongside terrorism offences and specified greater collaboration between UK investigative bodies and NGOs, in order to strengthen the collection, preservation and use of evidence. Other recommendations include mechanisms to strengthen the research and documentation of genocide, the establishment of short-term tribunals to prosecute Daesh fighters, and the introduction of measures to enable UK courts to engage with the determination of genocide. The Government’s arguments against the recommendations include the usual defences that a wide number of terrorism-related laws that identify and punish foreign fighters already exist; that the crimes under review are not that different from core international crime prosecutions and thus new measures are redundant; and that the difficulty in getting reliable evidence suggests that the inquiry should take place geographically close to where the crimes are alleged to have taken place, thereby facilitating access to witness evidence. Finally, the Government believe that the best approach lies in collaborating with states by means of treaties. The Government therefore conclude that amending the Criminal Court Act 2001 is not warranted. The reply to the Government’s resistance to universal jurisdiction should be based on the underlying fundamental principles of justice and treaty obligations, not on the lack of political will or, indeed, government timidity. International law is binding on states, not individuals. Universal jurisdiction is not due to the severity of an offence, but, in the words of Geoffrey Robertson, because a crime of unforgiveable brutality ordained by a Government or a clear agent of the state exercising political power is part of the apparatus of the state, as are torturers employed by the state. Such crimes cannot be tied to a territorial jurisdiction, but rest on the truism that we are all human. Universal jurisdiction is further justified because it may make the perpetrator pause and be aware that sometime, somewhere, some prosecutor may feel strongly enough to put him or her on trial. Also according to Robertson, an international criminal order, to which notions of frontiers and extradition rules arising therefrom, are completely foreign. The International Criminal Court Act 2001 needs revision due to the existing loophole that allows alleged perpetrators of crimes against humanity to escape justice merely because of where they are from. Other objections from the UK Government concerning the reliability of evidence can be countered by the emergence of no less than four bodies currently working on gathering and assessing evidence, including French and Swedish government initiatives, together with the results of trials of Daesh fighters already completed in Germany, the Netherlands, the USA, France and Sweden. This failure of political will indicates that, by outsourcing accountability to other jurisdictions that may have inadequate reach and resources, the UK is not fulfilling its obligations under Article 1 of the genocide convention. It remains the fact that not one Daesh fighter has yet been prosecuted in the UK under the terms of the genocide convention. If we are to judge by results, this is a dismal record. 6.34pm Lord Anderson of Ipswich  (CB) Sharethis specific contribution My Lords, as the final Back-Bench speaker, I echo all noble Lords who have wished the noble Lord, Lord Alton, a speedy recovery. He is, for so many of us, the outstanding example of a successful campaigning Cross-Bench Peer. I look forward to his speedy return. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has been doing some important and visionary things in recent years, this report included. I thank it for its work, and will touch on citizenship deprivation, terrorism prosecutions and the prosecution of international crimes. First, on deprivation of citizenship, I was delighted to see the strong recommendations regarding both transparency and oversight. They reflect recommendations made by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, and indeed by me when I occupied that post. In their response, the Government point out quite correctly that the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration published independent reviews of the deprivation power in 2018 and 2024. Successive chief inspectors have done an excellent job and I hold them in high regard. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Murray, will forgive me when I say that, having read the chief inspectors’ reports, I am less easily satisfied than him. The purpose of those inspections, in the words of the 2018 report, was only to examine “the efficiency and effectiveness of the Home Office’s processes”. Even that procedural examination had its limits. The 2024 inspection looked only at the Status Review Unit, which deals with deprivations prompted by fraud or related to serious organised crime. What were described as “‘conducive cases’ where sensitive intelligence is relied upon to make a decision” are handled by the Special Cases Unit and were said to be out of scope. Those cases, of course, are relevant here, so I cannot agree with the Government that existing independent oversight is sufficient. Deprivation of citizenship on grounds conducive to the public good is a power used for national security purposes. As a measure devastating in its effects on the individual and yet exercised on the basis of secret intelligence assessments deferred to by the courts, it requires the same sort of review as is given by the security-cleared independent reviewer, in the service of Parliament and the public, to the other powers exercised by Ministers and the police in relation to terrorism and state threats. Published figures are welcome but afford only the outline of what is needed, and many questions have gone unanswered. To take an example raised in evidence by the independent reviewer, what was the intelligence case for the sudden surge in deprivations in 2017? What was the make-up of those subjected to it? What happened to them and why was deprivation used in preference to all the other tools? This House will soon be asked to look at the Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill, which seeks to reverse the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court earlier this year in N3 and ZA v the Secretary of State for the Home Department. To do our job effectively, we need to know more about how the deprivation power is exercised; the independent reviewer is the person to tell us. One possible reason for the unusual prevalence of citizenship deprivation in the UK, and for the various executive orders that can be placed upon unconvicted persons, is the difficulty in bringing such persons to trial. Reference has already been made to the remarkably low proportion of Daesh returnees who have been prosecuted in the UK for terrorism offences. When I used to look closely at those figures during the heyday of Islamic State, much higher rates were being achieved by our continental neighbours, and I am not aware that this has changed. Thanks to the development of the counterterrorism division of the CPS and the terrorism list in the Crown Court, the prosecution of terrorists in this country has markedly improved since 2006, when Charles Clarke, as Home Secretary, could say to the Home Affairs Select Committee: “I think that an investigating magistrates regime is very superior to the system that we have in this country … I do not think the adversarial system has been a particularly effective means of securing justice”. As is shown in Frank Foley’s informative book,  Countering Terrorism in Britain and France , we continue to place a comparatively high premium on fairness. We do not have an offence as broad as the French “association de malfaiteurs”. We do not have investigative magistrates who can spend months or years building a case while a suspect is in custody, who face less exacting disclosure requirements and who have regard to sensitive intelligence that could never be placed before a jury in coming to their decisions. All this speaks well for our traditions of justice and our unwillingness to compromise them, but it does not make it easy to convict foreign fighters, even for terrorism offences. That brings me, finally, to the shaming fact, which noble Lords have heard already, that no Daesh fighter has been successfully prosecuted in the UK for committing international crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity or even war crimes. I agree with the noble Baronesses, Lady Kennedy and Lady D’Souza, that this amounts to a failure of this country to acknowledge the true nature of the criminality that Daesh presented, particularly in relation to the Yazidi. Without question, it would be hard to prosecute these crimes, but surely that is all the more reason for seeking to remove such obstacles as can be removed. After all, the Government, in their response to the report, indicate agreement with the committee’s conclusion that, where the UK has jurisdiction over international crimes, it should seek to investigate and prosecute them. Desirable, even preferable, as it might be for these crimes to be prosecuted in international or hybrid tribunals, the prospects—from what I have heard—do not look promising. I commend the Government for the support they gave to UNITAD and that they give to the IIIM in Syria and the NCIJC in Iraq. However, like other noble Lords, I would like to know why more cannot be done to ease the path to prosecutions here. Echoing in part the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, I end with three practical questions. Is it right that we have never requested evidence from UNITAD, or joined a joint investigative team for Daesh, and, if so, why? Why have we not signed or ratified the Ljubljana-Hague Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance? Why should we not remove the requirement of citizenship or residency in Sections 51 and 58 of the International Criminal Court Act 2001? 6.41pm Lord Callanan  (Con) Sharethis specific contribution My Lords, I too thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, for opening the debate. Like other Members, I wish the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, a very swift recovery. I was delighted to see that he has managed to record and document his injuries in the thorough way that we would expect from him. We all hope that we will see him back at the peak of his powers as soon as possible. We all remember the reports, a couple of years ago, from Iraq and Syria of the appalling crimes when Daesh was at its peak: the beheadings of British humanitarian aid workers David Haines and Alan Henning, the American journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff, and the American aid worker Peter Kassig; the mass murder, which has been referred to, of well over 1,000 Shia Muslim Iraqi cadets at Camp Speicher; the genocide against the Yazidis, which the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, discussed; and women and girls being subjected to abductions, forced conversions, forced marriage, rape and sexual violence. They really were appalling crimes—and made worse by the way they were documented and videoed, so that those who had a particularly strong stomach could watch them all online. There was a kind of unreal, appalling atrocity to them. You read about them, but nothing can quite inure you to watching them online. I watched a couple and had nightmares afterwards, so I could not watch any more after that. In the context of all those crimes, this report is both timely and sobering. I am sure the whole Committee is united on the basic truth that the rule of law must be upheld, and the Government have a responsibility to ensure that justice is done. This is a detailed report, which touches on a wide range of questions relating to domestic law, international law and the fundamental security of our country. We on these Benches, as we did when we were in power, believe that Ministers must put the security of the British people first and foremost. The Joint Committee is right to welcome the Government’s commitment to achieve justice for survivors of Daesh crimes. It is concerning, as a number of noble Lords have said, that, of all those Daesh fighters who have returned to the UK, none has been successfully prosecuted in the UK for these appalling crimes, such as the genocide that the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, referred to. Where a fighter has returned to the UK, we on these Benches are clear that they should be prosecuted for their crimes. While terrorism prosecutions may be more straightforward, as the committee notes in its report, prosecutions of these individuals should include international crimes, in our view. When we were in government, we took strong action to protect the British people from the risks posed by returnees, while ruthlessly pursuing justice for the victims of Daesh. The Home Secretary, as has been noted, has the power to exclude non-British nationals from the UK and, in some circumstances, where that individual would not be made stateless, strip particularly dangerous individuals of their British citizenship. We did not shy away from acting to protect public safety. Of the 900 people who were deemed to be a concern to our national security, and who travelled to Syria and Iraq to join terrorist organisations, I am pleased to say that more than 100 were deprived of their British citizenship by the previous Government. I know, of course—I read in the report—that the joint committee has concerns that the UK uses deprivation of citizenship orders more than almost any country in the world and the committee called for greater scrutiny. I also note, however, that it rightly recognised that it is important for the Government to be able to take steps such as citizenship-stripping in the interests of public safety, and that is a conclusion with which I agree. We took that action in the interests of public safety and I hope that the current Government will continue that work to keep the British people safe. We also introduced tough new powers to prevent British citizens from entering designated terrorist hotspots, without legitimate reason, through the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. Where an individual who has committed these crimes is present in the UK, they should always be prosecuted. Those new powers to prevent entry to terrorist hotspots are, I am pleased to say, already helping to bring more of those fighters to justice. That said, we know that a number of people deemed to be of concern to our national security due to links with terrorist groups, and who have returned to the UK from Iraq and Syria, have sadly not been prosecuted so far. The committee did not report on those numbers but expressed concern about the evidence that it received on the number of Daesh fighters being put to the CPS for charging decisions; that, I am sorry to say, is minimal. I hope that the Minister replying to the debate may provide us with an update on that prosecution work today. Ministers have previously put the number of returnees and the successful prosecution rate on the record, and it would be useful to the committee to have a formal update on those figures. On the question of Daesh fighters who remain in the region, the Government responded by stating that investigations should take place closer to where the crimes were committed to allow for a more robust evidence-gathering process. That principle is broadly right. Whatever the concerns of the committee about the legal systems in Iraq and Syria, and there are many, it has to be right that those Daesh fighters who remain in the region are prosecuted for their crimes there, if at all possible. Indeed, while the committee has raised proposals on the future of domestic legislation in respect of international law, we must always—I am sure the Government are—put the security of the British people first. That means minimising the risk of Daesh fighters who pose a threat to the British people returning to the UK, unless their return is absolutely necessary. In conclusion, we congratulate the committee on, and thank it for, its hard work in preparing this report and we look forward to working with members of the committee in holding the Government to account on future action to bring to justice the perpetrators of those appalling crimes committed by Daesh. 6.49pm Lord in Waiting/Government Whip  (Lord Katz) (Lab) Sharethis specific contribution My Lords, I am grateful to all those who contributed to this short but informative and detailed debate. As every other noble Lord has done, I begin by paying tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, for his incredible work in chairing the committee and producing this report, as well as his wider work with and the representations he has made for many oppressed communities throughout the world, in this case the Yazidi community. He contacted me, as he probably did every noble Lord in this Room, and I have evidence of his injuries too. He wrote very movingly, as the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, said, of his trip to Sinjar and how it fundamentally affected him. He also said to me that he was fed up about not being here today but that, in his encounter with the No. 24, the bus came off worse. I think all noble Lords will be unsurprised at his assessment of whether a mere motor vehicle can stop his commitment to carrying out duties in this House and elsewhere. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lady Kennedy, who has proven a more than able stand-in for the noble Lord in presenting the report to the Committee and making the case. As she said, we have all heard testimony that is heart-rending in different ways. I was struck by the way she focused on the terrible crimes not just against women and children but particularly against young girls, and the way that that has impacted their lives from a very early age. As a parent of two teenage daughters, the impact that has on those girls’ lives is truly terrible to think about. As the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said, this report from the Joint Committee is timely and sobering. I thank it for its continued commitment to this most worthy of causes. Justice must be done and those guilty of carrying out Daesh’s crimes must be held to account. As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford said, there is a real danger of the crimes against the Yazidis diminishing in our collective memory. Having spent a lot of time over a number of years in and around Holocaust education—not to make a direct comparison—I know the importance of continued testimony and awareness of the awful crimes such as those visited against the Yazidis, and it is essential that we do not forget. The importance of getting justice for the Yazidis in the round is not simply about the nuts and bolts of the legal process—it is also about the wider understanding of what happened to that community—though that is not to say that the issues around legal process here and in Iraq and Syria, which the report raises, are not terribly important. I will make some attempt to respond to the points raised. I will begin by setting out the current situation and the Government’s policy. Daesh remains one of the most significant global terrorist threats. We continue to work closely with partners to reduce this threat, including through our work as a member of the global coalition against Daesh. While the UK and its partners in the global coalition have taken effective action against Daesh, it still poses a serious threat. Many of its members continue to enjoy impunity for heinous crimes. We must continue efforts to ensure the enduring defeat of Daesh and to hold it to account. It will not surprise any noble Lords to hear that, as the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said on behalf of the Official Opposition, the safety and security of our people remains the top priority for the UK Government. The Government have been clear that anyone returning from conflict in Syria or Iraq must expect to be met at the UK border by Counter Terrorism Policing, interviewed and, where relevant, investigated to determine whether they have committed criminal offences. I turn to the content of the committee’s report and the issues raised by noble Lords. A number of noble Lords, not least my noble friend Lady Kennedy, raised universal jurisdiction. The UK’s position has not changed: we hold that international crimes are best investigated and prosecuted close to where they are perpetrated. This helps secure reliable evidence and witnesses for a fair and credible judicial process. The UK continues to support partners to deliver this justice. For example, last month marked the 11th anniversary of the Yazidi genocide. The UK strongly supported the passage of Iraq’s Yazidi survivors’ law and has funded its implementation. We have since provided a further £100,000 to boost Iraq’s capacity to hold Daesh to account and to increase survivor access to reparations and rehabilitation. The UK Government exercise universal jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva conventions. However, prosecuting Daesh members in the UK is often difficult due to challenges with gathering evidence and securing access to suspects. I think that, despite criticism, most, if not all, noble Lords who participated in the debate this afternoon recognise those real difficulties. The police work closely with international partners and organisations to improve our access to that evidence. Investigations are a matter for the police, who are operationally independent. If they believe an offence has been committed, the police will refer the case to the Crown Prosecution Service. Decisions on prosecution are taken independently by the CPS. They are based on the availability of evidence and whether prosecution is in the public interest. A range of offences can be used to prosecute foreign fighters returned to the UK with penalties up to life imprisonment. To be clear, the police do not restrict their investigations to terrorist offences. Where there is significant evidence and a legal basis, we will prosecute in the UK. However, building these cases takes time, and we must continue efforts to ensure the enduring defeat of Daesh and to hold it to account. A number of noble Lords raised the issue of using only terrorism charges in the pursuit of justice, not least my noble friend Lady Kennedy, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza. The Government acknowledge the specific nature and scale of international crimes such as genocide. Perpetrators of such crimes must face justice in accordance with the principles that I have outlined. They should be investigated and charged with requisite access to robust evidence and witnesses. There is a wide range of criminal offences that can be used to prosecute returning foreign fighters. CPS charging decisions are led by the evidence, and the most appropriate charge is selected based on the evidence. Crown prosecutors must consider whether evidence is admissible, reliable and credible, and those standards do not differ in a core international crime prosecution. Prosecuting terrorism and core international crimes are not mutually exclusive and can be combined where the evidence presents itself. Many noble Lords, not least the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, drew a comparison between the UK and other European countries, particularly Germany, in terms of success in prosecutions. It is fair to say that Germany has had some fantastic successes that are to be commended. The international community is working together to ensure that justice is done. Sharing evidence and best practice is critical, and we are grateful to our German colleagues. International comparisons in the context of prosecutions must include some caveats. There are fundamental differences between our adversarial system and inquisitorial systems, as raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. Different systems used in other countries can impact on how material is used and exchanged. There are a number of differences, including laws around disclosure and what evidence is admissible at trial, which can be complex. Nevertheless, where there is potential evidence, prosecutors will work with police, intelligence agencies and international partners to build a case to the point where there is admissible, reliable, credible evidence satisfying the Code for Crown Prosecutors. There were some questions from the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and other noble Lords about the collection of evidence of crimes committed by Daesh. In Syria, the UN International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism—the IIIN—assists the investigation and prosecution of individuals complicit in crimes committed during the Syria conflict. We encourage all parties to engage with it and help facilitate evidence-gathering efforts, including unfettered access to sensitive sites used by the former regime’s security apparatus. The UK/IIIM memorandum of understanding signed in March 2022 enables the UK to use IIIM information in investigations and prosecutions and allows the IIIM to request UK information to support prosecutions in other jurisdictions. The MoU signals our ongoing commitment to accountability, and we continue to advocate for the IIIM to ensure that it has the resources required to conduct its operations and address the widespread impunity and suffering of the Syrian people. Through the integrated security fund, the UK funds programmes to document human rights violations and supports the trial and convictions of perpetrators of war crimes, including sexual violence. The UK and the US have co-funded important guidance that sets out relevant, serious, specific advice and best practice to follow when collecting evidence of or investigating sexual and gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence. Through the Global Survivors Fund, the UK has, since 2022, has provided medical, psychosocial, legal and financial support to more than Syrian survivors of sexual violence in Turkey. Turning to what might be termed consular issues, I note the committee’s recommendations on British nationals in north-east Syria and the repatriation of minors. Where unaccompanied British minors and orphans are brought to our attention, we aim to repatriate them where feasible, subject to confirming their identity and nationality and any national security concerns. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford raised specific questions on this issue. We are aware that there are British nationals, including minors, located in north-east Syria, but I am afraid that we are not in a position to comment on exact numbers due to shifting circumstances on the ground, the lack of a consular presence and the range of sources from which information is taken. We do not comment on numbers, as I said. Each request for consular assistance from Syria is considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all relevant circumstances including, but not limited to, national security. It is fair to reflect, as was acknowledged by the committee, that conditions in Syria continue to be difficult, particularly in the north-east where there remains a high threat from terrorism and widespread political instability. This increases the challenges that the UK Government face in facilitating these repatriations. However, I can confirm that we facilitated a repatriation from Syria to the United Kingdom in August. This repatriation was in line with the long-standing policy that all requests from Syria for UK consular assistance are considered on a case-by-case basis. I move on to deprivation and oversight, as raised by the noble Lords, Lord Murray and Lord Anderson of Ipswich. The questions raised were about whether there is sufficient independent oversight and a lack of transparency. As the Foreign Secretary made clear in the Government’s written response to the committee’s report, we believe that there is sufficient oversight of and transparency in the use of the deprivation power. As was observed, the Government publish data on deprivation as part of the  Counter-Terrorism Disruptive Powers Report . Eight such reports have been published to date. We believe that there is also sufficient independent oversight from the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, who has the remit to review the power. The ICIBI conducted independent reviews of the deprivation power in reports published in 2018 and 2024. The power to deprive a person of their British citizenship on grounds that it would be conducive to the public good is used sparingly. Decisions on deprivation are not taken lightly. Lord Anderson of Ipswich  (CB) Sharethis specific contribution I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but he heard what I had to say about the independent chief inspector. As I understand his reports—and I have read both of those just referred to—they are limited to the processes applied by the Home Office, and the more recent one deliberately declared out of scope conducive deprivations based on sensitive intelligence. It dealt only with the much more routine deprivations of citizenship obtained by fraud and a few deprivations in connection with serious organised crime. I am just having a little difficulty understanding how the Minister can say that this oversight is in any way comparable to the sort of oversight that the independent reviewer provides of the remaining parts of the counterterrorism arsenal. Lord Katz  (Lab) Sharethis specific contribution I thank the noble Lord, but I am not sure that I can add a great deal of the detail that he seeks from the Despatch Box. I will be very happy to reflect on his comments in  Hansard  and write to him. The point I want to make, without going into details and reading out a long list, is that deprivation numbers over the past decade have largely been stable. That indicates a proportionate use of the power over a number of years. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Murray—apologies if it was not—who asked about 2024. I can confirm that the figure for 2024 is due to be published but cannot be released at this moment in time. As time is pressing, I shall move on to the role of the CPS. Although the Government are grateful for the committee’s important work on this issue, they do not, I am afraid, accept its assessment of poor co-operation between the Metropolitan Police’s War Crimes Team and the CPS. As is outlined in the Government’s formal response to the inquiry, there are robust structures in place to ensure co-ordination and co-operation on the investigation and prosecution of war crimes. For example, the UK War Crimes Network helps achieve better information sharing and training, as well as improved co-ordination across government and with civil society organisations. We agree with the committee’s call to investigate and prosecute international crimes. The CPS also has strong working relationships with many key countries. Alongside the police, it represents His Majesty’s Government on the Eurojust Genocide Prosecution Network, an organisation that is critical to the co-ordination and sharing of best practice in investigations into genocide. These efforts are most effective when they are conducted near the location of crimes. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Murray, noted, there is a balancing act between competing needs in pursuing this aim, including, as I have already mentioned, in terms of national security. However, I assure the Grand Committee that, where authorities, including the CPS, have jurisdiction, they will act. The CPS has successfully prosecuted individuals who have travelled abroad to fight with Daesh. I wish now to talk a little about the countries that have been the focus of our activities in this area. In Syria, we will support efforts to establish accountability. Justice for victims and survivors is essential, as is clarity for the families of the thousands who remain missing. We are engaging closely with the Syrian Government to ensure that accountability mechanisms are independent, impartial and transparent. Through the UK’s integrated security fund, we support programmes that document human rights violations and help bring war criminals to justice. This has resulted in the conviction of several Daesh members, including, as I have already noted, in Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands. Through the Global Survivors Fund, the UK has also provided support, as I have already outlined, to more than 800 Syrian survivors of sexual violence In Iraq, the UK remains committed to achieving justice for survivors and victims of Daesh crimes. We are working bilaterally through Iraq’s National Center for International Judicial Cooperation, which facilitates international judicial co-operation and evidence sharing on counterterrorism. It is building an archive of evidence that can be accessed by the international community to promote accountability for Daesh’s crimes. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, asked about the role of UNITAD. It is worth saying that the Government are taking steps to ensure that evidence collected by UNITAD can be used by prosecutors globally. Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council established the National Center for International Judicial Cooperation—the NCIJC—in October 2024. The centre is Iraq’s legally designated authority for international judicial co-operation and evidence sharing on counterterrorism. It holds the majority of evidence collected by the UN’s investigative team. All requests for evidence for foreign prosecutions go to the NCIJC, which then arranges for evidence to be obtained and provided. UNITAD’s mandate is to support Iraq rather than supplant the role of its judicial authorities in international judicial co-operation and information sharing. UNITAD holds some historic evidence of Daesh crimes that is not available elsewhere, but the vast majority of the existing evidence sits with the Government of Iraq. It is worth noting that, in July, my noble friend Lord Collins of Highbury met the prince of the Yazidis, Mîr Hazim Tahsin Beg, to discuss the situation in Sinjar and the ongoing challenges faced by Yazidi survivors of conflict-related sexual violence. I end by reaffirming the Government’s commitment to justice. Where we can prosecute in the UK, we will. Where we cannot, we will support others in doing so. We will continue to work with partners, old and new, to ensure that there is no refuge for perpetrators and that those responsible for Daesh’s murderous campaign face justice. I hope that I have addressed most of the questions and points made by members of the committee, but I am very happy to reflect on  Hansard  and engage in correspondence where I have not. Lord Anderson of Ipswich  (CB) Sharethis specific contribution I hate to trouble the Minister again, but I asked a question about the Ljubljana-Hague convention, which is absolutely central to what the committee is talking about. The intention of that convention is to facilitate co-operation between states in investigating and prosecuting the most serious international crimes, specifically genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Admittedly, it was opened for signature only in January 2024, but, as I understand it, since that time 40 states have signed it, including all our closest neighbours: Ireland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and, I believe, all the Nordic countries except Iceland. Even Mongolia has found time to sign it. It sounds very much like this Government’s sort of thing, so I would be perplexed and surprised if there were no intention to sign it. Either now or in writing, I would be very interested to hear from the Minister why we have not signed it yet and what the plans are for signature and ratification. Lord Katz  (Lab) Sharethis specific contribution I apologise for not answering the noble Lord’s question, despite making a note about it. I am not sure how much my answer will satisfy him. At the Ljubljana conference in 2023—the noble Lord noted that it was relatively recent—we were clear that we needed more time to review the convention text following the conclusion of the event. We already have well-established legal frameworks to facilitate international co-operation on the investigation and prosecution of international crimes, and we feel that the convention would offer few advantages over those existing arrangements. The UK remains committed to prioritising and progressing any requests for co-operation from other states in accordance with its existing legal framework. We will continue to work with our international partners to ensure that there is no impunity for international crimes. 7.11pm Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws  (Lab) Sharethis specific contribution The noble Lord has the sympathy of all of us who are barristers, because we have all had the experience of being handed a brief at the last minute and having to struggle with issues that we had not anticipated. I will raise some of the issues that concern me still, despite his brave efforts to deal with this important report. First, the Government are sticking to their old position that things are best investigated close to where they took place. That is a principle that we would all agree with, except in circumstances where there is no indication of that being possible, as in the places about which we are talking. We know that both Syria and Iraq have prosecuted no one. They have certainly arrested people and passed death penalties on people for being members of Daesh or ISIL, but there has been no investigation into, for example, the enslavement, the constant raping and the selling on of women, who are dealt with as commodities. There was an occasion when 19 women were put into a cage and set on fire because they refused to convert. There are all manner of instances about which there is clear evidence, and I believe that we can be satisfied that neither Syria nor Iraq have given any kind of resolution, particularly to the Yazidi people, for the crimes that were committed by the members of this jihadist organisation. Many members in Iraq have been rounded up; there is a very peremptory trial and they are given the death penalty, but there is no investigation into the nature of the crimes that were committed and no sense that the wrongs committed against the Yazidis were given any kind of airing. That is not what justice is about. The Minister mentioned Germany. There have been eight convictions in Germany, three for genocide and five for crimes against humanity. A number of those convictions were against women. Let us be very clear that these women were married to men who were the active service agents beheading people and doing the killing. The women were convicted of complicity in grievous crimes, where they were the orchestrators of the passing on of women to other men for their abuse to take place. Women are therefore involved in this. When the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and I met the police and the unit that deals with anything international, it became clear that for the people who were brought back and the 30 people who were convicted, as I mentioned, there was no question—the officers were frank—of the investigation involving interrogation of the kind that I mentioned in my opening address, asking what their domestic circumstances were, whether they were living with a wife or more than one wife. Often the additional women who were raped were referred to as being second and third temporary wives, and fourth, fifth and sixth wives. I am afraid that the women were complicit, too, in grievous crimes. It is why prosecution of crimes against humanity were successful. The lawyer who helped orchestrate the work in Germany was British, Amal Clooney. She was there showing how Germany’s system of law could be used because there was a willingness there to do it. There is no indication of there being a willingness in Britain to do it. That is what has concerned us in receiving the evidence in preparation for this report. As I say, in Iraq, there have been no prosecutions for international crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, rape or servitude. There have been none, nor in Syria. I am not sure that we can be confident at this moment that that is going to be a priority for the Syrian regime. These people were British citizens. They have returned. The skills were not present within the police to deal with this. It is not easy to recite what the normal processes would be, such as whether the police think that there might be something that they could refer to the Crown Prosecution Service, which would then decide whether there were appropriate crimes and so on. There was no question of the Crown Prosecution Service doing anything other than determining that there was evidence that these people went to Iraq and signed up to be part of ISIL and therefore were guilty of a crime under our law, but there was no investigation of whether more grievous crimes had been committed. The writ still runs. These people could easily be brought in and questioned tomorrow, but there is no indication of that happening. One of the ways in which you could do that is by accessing the evidence gathered. I can tell noble Lords that many organisations—community organisations, women’s organisations, investigative bodies—handed over information that they had received to the IIIM. UNITAD was the receiver and archiver of the evidence. That body has been dismantled, and the archive has been handed over and put into archives at the UN and in the United States of America. What is in that? Are there references to people? Are there incidents that could be investigated that would give testimonies that, within our law, could support prosecutions of these grievous crimes? The questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, are ones that I hope the Government will take away and think about in terms of transparency and proper review, but that is not happening. We were convinced that an inadequate review was taking place. Also, when we asked the police whether they had ever requested evidence from UNITAD? The answer was, “We do not think so”. It would be interesting to find out properly. Was UNITAD ever asked whether it had evidence that might link to British people, English speakers? The other question is why can we not deal with this business whereby we have put such a constriction around those who can be prosecuted under universal jurisdiction, thereby limiting it. Noble Lords heard from a colleague about the fact that when this originally came before this House, when I was a comparatively new Member, we managed to extend the legislation from citizens being the only people who could be prosecuted to people who had residence here. The United States had moved away from that. We should be making it clear that it should be possible to arrest anybody who ends up in this country, even those who are not citizens, although many of these people are, so that justice can be done, and they can stand trial before a court in this country. The Government should sign up to the Ljubljana-The Hague convention so that there is proper mutual assistance. I am disappointed, but I promise my noble friend Lord Katz that I am not holding it against him. I know he got the brief at the last minute, and many of us have been in his circumstances before more difficult tribunals than this one. I hope that the Government take this debate away and think about some of these serious questions. Motion agreed. Committee adjourned at 7.21 pm. © 2025 David Alton – Lord Alton of Liverpool

Nepal’s social media ban reflects a broader struggle over free expression and state control by Charlie Campbell Editor at Large Protesters capture Singha Durbar, which housed the office of the former Prime Minister and other ministries, amid raging Gen Z protests against corruption and a social-media crackdown, in Kathmandu, Nepal, on Sept. 9, 2025. Skanda Gautam—SOPA Images/LightRocket/Getty Images An eerie calm returned to Nepal on Wednesday after an army-enforced curfew paused two days of anti-government protests that had convulsed the capital Kathmandu and other cities, with predominantly young demonstrators burning tires, ransacking ministries, and invading politicians’ homes so that the occupants had to be airlifted to safety. At least 22 people lost their lives and hundreds more were injured by security forces in the carnage, which was ostensibly sparked by state attempts to block access to social media but in truth reflect an explosion of long bottled-up rage against political corruption and widespread inequality in the Himalayan nation of 30 million. The banning of 26 social-media platforms including Facebook, YouTube, and X was officially due to the companies’ failure to register and submit to government oversight, though protesters attributed the move as an attempt to block the crescendo of online complaints from young people furious at the luxurious lifestyles enjoyed by children of the political elite, so-called “nepo kids.” The disparity between what ordinary Nepalis experience and what they saw flaunted online prompted calls last week for mass protests—calls which only mushroomed following the hamfisted social-media ban. Even after that prohibition was lifted on Tuesday, and the resignations of Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli and Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak, the unrest escalated. “The government in Nepal was trying to use those new social-media regulations to prevent the very thing that happened,” says Michael Kugelman, a D.C.-based South Asia analyst. “So it completely backfired.” The power of social media to foment popular protest is no stranger to Asia, where the internet has been a key driver of popular uprisings that toppled governments in Sri Lanka in 2022 and Bangladesh in 2024 , and continue to roil Indonesia today. But it’s a phenomenon that first came to light in the 2010 Arab Spring , when a series of anti-government protests swept the Middle East and North Africa that were predominately organized online. Most notably, and in a clear augury of Nepal today, efforts during the Arab Spring to block social-media access simply cut a head of the hydra: highlighting the state’s blatant disregard for freedom of speech and assembly, vindicating the protesters’ complaints, and widening sympathy for their demands. Little wonder authoritarian states were spurred by the Arab Spring into enacting draconian internet controls. Across Nepal’s northern frontier, China’s Great Firewall became the poster child for tightly regulated online space. Not only does the Great Firewall block undesirable external information but also weeds out and proscribes politically sensitive domestic content. But the Great Firewall is just one aspect of a complex web of overlapping controls in China, where buying broadband or a smartphone SIM card requires a government ID. Even using public WiFi requires phone number verification—also linked to your ID—while users of China’s ubiquitous WeChat messaging service must register their bank details to join groups with more than 100 members. These myriad verifications mean that even supposedly anonymous posts on online forums can bring legal consequences, promoting a culture of self-censorship. When trouble does flare, responses are swift and resolute, such as the Chinese Communist Party’s censoring of online discussion about activist and journalist Sun Lin, who died in November 2023 following a beating by police in apparent punishment for negative social-media posts regarding strongman Xi Jinping. Increasingly, AI tools are being employed to swiftly target and remove compromising material. “Beijing officials must be looking on their Kathmandu counterparts with pity and glee, counting their lucky stars that mainland Chinese netizens can’t even miss what Nepalese have fought so hard to get back,” says Sean King, senior vice president focusing on Asia for consulting firm Park Strategies. But it’s not only autocracies that are waging a war against free speech online. Last year, global internet freedom declined for the 14th consecutive year, according to the 2024 Freedom on the Net report by Freedom House, with only 17% of the assessed global population gauged to enjoy free and open internet. On the other side of Nepal from autocratic China, India is a test case for how democracies are employing increasingly sophisticated tactics to control online narratives. For one, since 2023 India has ramped up efforts to regulate its internet by empowering many more officials to issue takedown orders directly to tech firms—rather than just its IT and Information and Broadcasting ministries as previously permitted. Leading up to last year’s general election, the Indian government also sought to install a “factchecking” unit to rectify purportedly false reporting—prompting objections from journalists and tech companies. Everything from news about a deadly stampede to cartoons that lampoon Prime Minister Narendra Modi have been the subject of removal orders. Of course, a completely unregulated internet also has issues, as spotlighted by how online hate and misinformation contributed to the genocide of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. “Regulating social media has always been a double-edged sword,” says Meenakshi Ganguly, Asia deputy director for Human Rights Watch. “Because sometimes social media can promote violence and the targeting of minority groups and vulnerable communities.” What’s next for Nepal is unclear. Nepalis struggle with per capita annual income of less than $1,400, while youth unemployment stands at around 20%, spurring more than 2,000 young people to leave the country every day to seek work overseas, mainly in the Middle East. Demonstrators are demanding the dissolution of parliament, mass resignation of lawmakers, immediate suspension of officials who ordered firing on protesters, and fresh elections. Whether these demands alone will solve Nepal’s problems is doubtful. At the least, the hope is that the nation’s political class learns to heed criticism rather than just silence it. Unfortunately, the reverse lesson for authoritarian states—and those aspirationally so—is the existential risk of relinquishing control, because not only can you never put the genie back in the bottle, but trying to often just fuels the fire. “Resentment and anger shouldn’t come as a surprise to Nepal’s political leadership—if they just choose to listen,” adds Ganguly. “But as often happens with governments, they tend to want to shut down critics, as opposed to addressing the complaints themselves.” Copyright 2025 Time

A satellite image shows long-range 'suicide' drones and launching gear north of the airport in Nyala, Sudan, May 6, 2025. Maxar Technologies/Handout via REUTERS Sept 12 (Reuters) - More than a dozen long-range kamikaze drones seen near an airport controlled by Sudan's Rapid Support Forces during a major air assault on army territory in May indicate the paramilitaries have new weapons that could alter the course of the war. The conflict between the RSF and Sudan's army has created the world's worst humanitarian crisis over the past two-and-a-half years, drawing in myriad foreign interests, and threatening to fragment the strategic Red Sea country, a major gold producer. Images and analyses shared by the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab and verified by Reuters showed 13 "delta-wing" drones alongside launching gear near Nyala airport in Sudan's western Darfur region on May 6 this year. Such drones, which are designed to crash into their targets, typically have a range of about 2,000 km (1,200 miles), a range that would reach anywhere in Sudan and far further than any other models the RSF was previously known to possess. Yale assessed it was one of two possible Chinese models. Two experts contacted by Reuters said they could not confirm the manufacturer but agreed on the likely range. Similar models are also produced by companies in Russia and Iran. China's foreign ministry denied having any knowledge of the drones. "China has always adopted a prudent and responsible attitude in military exports, and has consistently and conscientiously implemented relevant Security Council resolutions and fulfilled (our) own international obligations," a spokesperson said. China's defence ministry did not immediately reply to Reuters requests for comment. The appearance of the drones and 16 launch platforms near the Nyala airport overlapped with a barrage of drone attacks on Port Sudan , which took place between May 3 and May 9. The researchers said the drones were gone by May 9 while the platforms remained visible until early September. At the time, some analysts speculated that the attack on the army's wartime capital around 1,600 km from Nyala may have been launched from areas to the east of Sudan as the RSF was not known to have such capabilities. Sudan accused the United Arab Emirates of carrying out the attacks using warplanes and kamikaze drones launched from an Emirati base on the Red Sea. The UAE denied the allegations and has repeatedly denied accusations it supports the RSF. After initially relying on ground incursions, the RSF has ramped up its air capabilities and increasingly relied on drone attacks since losing territory in Sudan's center and east earlier this year. The paramilitary group launched drone attacks on the capital Khartoum this week in what it said was a response to attacks by the military on civilians elsewhere in Sudan, though it was not clear what models were used in the strikes. Analyses by the defence intelligence company Janes and Wim Zwijnenburg of Dutch peace organisation Pax confirmed the May images showed long-range delta-wing suicide drones, similar to models produced in several countries that have ranges of approximately 2,000 km. The RSF did not immediately reply to Reuters requests for comment sent to a spokesman. On Thursday it reiterated allegations that the army had targeted civilians in drone attacks. The army has denied the allegations. Earlier in the year, Reuters identified three Chinese-manufactured CH-95 drones with a strike distance of up to 200 km at Nyala airport. At the time, the RSF was frequently launching drone attacks on closer-range targets including fuel depots, dams, and military bases across areas controlled by the Sudanese army. The Sudanese army has repeatedly targeted Nyala airport and its surroundings, including with strikes earlier this week. The Yale researchers did not determine how the drones may have reached Darfur. Since the early 2000s, the Darfur region has been under an arms embargo that has been frequently violated. © 2025 Reuters. All rights reserved

The Trump administration has ramped up pressure on Venezuela through an unprecedented military deployment and use of force in international waters off its coast. Concerns of further escalation have mounted as U.S. officials signal more strikes are likely to come. Expert Brief by Roxanna Vigil September 9, 2025 The USS Sampson, a U.S. Navy missile destroyer, docks at the Amador International Cruise Terminal in Panama City, Panama, September 2, 2025. Daniel Gonzalez/Anadolu/Getty Images Since late August, the Donald Trump administration has deployed a significant military presence to the Caribbean Sea off the coast of Venezuela. This includes at least eight warships, a submarine, and other assets, along with approximately four thousand Marines and sailors. The mission is part of a new effort to use military force to combat drug cartels that have been designated as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), following a secret directive that Trump reportedly signed in July authorizing such action.  The second Trump administration’s policy towards Venezuela began on a conciliatory note with U.S. Special Envoy Richard Grenell’s trip to Caracas on January 31, but since then, it has become increasingly adversarial. The escalation raises questions about broader geopolitical implications, including the potential for further U.S. military actions in the region. Why did the United States strike an alleged drug vessel off the coast of Venezuela, and will there be more strikes? On September 2, Trump announced that “U.S. Military Forces conducted a kinetic strike against positively identified Tren de Aragua Narcoterrorists in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility.” Trump indicated that the strike—which killed eleven people—took place in international waters and was targeting individuals who were transporting drugs to the United States. In 2024, the U.S. government sanctioned the Venezuela-based Tren de Aragua gang as a transnational criminal organization, citing its involvement in a range of criminal activities, including illegal mining, kidnapping, human trafficking, extortion, and drug trafficking—particularly cocaine. Tren de Aragua was one of eight organizations that the Trump administration designated as FTOs ; the others are from Colombia, El Salvador, and Mexico. The deployment and strike represent a major escalation in the U.S. government’s fight against drug trafficking, which has traditionally relied on the interdiction of vessels suspected of transporting drugs. It also represents a sharp increase in tensions with Venezuela. A day after the attack, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States plans to carry out more strikes against drug traffickers designated as terrorists. The Trump administration has also reportedly ordered ten F-35 fighter jets to Puerto Rico as part of its counter-drug and counterterrorism mission in the Caribbean. The jets are expected to arrive this week. When asked whether regime change is the objective in Venezuela, Trump avoided a direct answer, instead saying that , “we’re not talking about that, but we are talking about the fact that you had an election, which was a very strange election, to put it mildly.” Trump’s comments contrast with the explicit regime change policy of his first term. In 2019, after Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro claimed victory in disputed elections, the United States backed Juan Guaidó, then president of Venezuela’s legislature, as interim president. Soon after, the Trump administration launched a “maximum pressure” campaign that included broad economic sanctions on Venezuela. At the time, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton said , “President Trump has been very clear, he wants a peaceful transfer of power to Juan Guaidó.” Maduro was also indicted on narco-terrorism charges during the first Trump administration. To increase pressure, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced a reward increase of up to $50 million for information that could lead to Maduro’s arrest. How has Maduro reacted to the escalation?  The Venezuelan leader called the deployment of U.S. military assets to the region “the greatest threat that has been seen on our continent in the last one hundred years.” Days later, he remarked that “none of our differences justify a high-impact military conflict in South America.”   On September 4, the Pentagon issued a statement indicating that two Venezuelan military aircraft flew by a U.S. Navy ship and warning Maduro not to interfere with the U.S. military’s counter-narcotics and counterterrorism operations. Pentagon officials later confirmed a second incident of a Venezuelan aircraft flying by a U.S. Navy vessel. At a press conference the next day, Trump said “if they do put us in a dangerous position, they’ll be shot down.” In what appears to be an attempt by Maduro to ease tensions, Venezuela’s defense minister announced on September 7 that twenty-five thousand troops have been deployed to Venezuela’s border and coastal regions to combat drug trafficking. What are the ramifications of further escalation with Venezuela? Venezuelan emigration. Further escalation, including the U.S. military directly attacking Venezuela, could lead to an increase in migration out of Venezuela. Almost eight million Venezuelans have fled the country since 2014 due to worsening economic, humanitarian, and political crises under Maduro’s rule. Venezuela’s neighbors are hosting most Venezuelan migrants and refugees and would likely bear the brunt of a new wave of migrants caused by further escalation.   U.S. deportations . In March, Washington and Caracas resumed cooperation  on the deportation of Venezuelan nationals in the United States. The escalation calls into question whether this cooperation will continue. In addition, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced on September 3 its decision to revoke Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for approximately 250,000 Venezuelans who had been living in the United States prior to 2021. (DHS had already announced the revocation of TPS protections for approximately 350,000 Venezuelans in the United States under a 2023 designation). DHS justified the revocation  by stating that conditions in Venezuela have improved “in several areas such as the economy, public health, and crime that allow for these nationals to be safely returned to their home country.” An escalation could worsen conditions in Venezuela, contradicting the justification DHS has used to revoke TPS for Venezuelans. Economic harm. Further escalation could also impact U.S. business interests in Venezuela, particularly for oil and gas company Chevron, which resumed  producing oil in Venezuela and shipping it to the United States in August, according to Reuters. Depending on the scope and frequency of future strikes, a further escalation also carries the potential risk of disrupting legal boat traffic in the Caribbean Sea, to include commercial shipping and ships transiting the Panama Canal or misidentifying a legal boat as a drug boat. How have other countries reacted? Reactions from leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean have been mixed . Mexico’s foreign affairs secretary stressed the country’s preference for a “peaceful solution of conflicts” during a press conference with visiting Secretary of State Rubio. When Rubio visited Ecuador, President Daniel Noboa thanked him for the Trump administration’s efforts to “actually eliminate any terrorist threat.”    While Trinidad and Tobago’s Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar praised the U.S. strike, other members of CARICOM—a trade bloc representing fifteen Caribbean countries—have expressed a desire for an open line of communication with the U.S. government to avoid future surprises. Meanwhile, Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro was more critical of the strike, saying that it “violates the universal principle of proportionality of force and results in murder.” Human rights groups have condemned the strike as an  extrajudicial killing and called for the White House to provide legal justification. Beyond the region, Russia, a staunch ally of Venezuela, criticized what it said was the United States putting “blatant pressure” on Venezuela. China, too, publicly condemned the U.S. naval deployment as an “interference of external forces in Venezuela’s internal affairs under any pretext.” This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. Copyright 2025 Council on Foreign Relations

Borno state Governor Babagana Zulum, center back, speaks to people affected by a Boko Haram attack, as he visits the area in Darul Jamal, Nigeria, Saturday, Sept. 6, 2025. (AP Photo) by Haruna Umar, Dyepkazah Shibayan and Mark Banchereau | Associated Press MAIDUGURI, Nigeria (AP) — Boko Haram militants killed dozens of people in a nighttime assault on a village in northeastern Nigeria that is home to residents who had recently returned from a camp for internally displaced persons, authorities said. The attack on Darul Jamal in the Bama local government area took place late Friday and killed at least 60 people, a resident of the village, Mohammed Babagana, told The Associated Press. Borno state Gov. Babagana Zulum, who visited the attacked community late Saturday evening, confirmed to reporters that over 60 died in the attack. “We sympathize with the people and have pleaded with them not to abandon their homes as we have made arrangements to improve the security and provide food and other lifesaving items that they have lost,” Zulum said. The chairman of Bama’s local government, Modu Gujja, said over a dozen houses were burnt and more than 100 people were forced to flee. Taiwo Adebayo, a researcher specializing in Boko Haram at the Institute for Security Studies, spoke to residents of Darual Jamal and said the killings on Friday night were carried out by a faction of Boko Haram known as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad . Boko Haram, Nigeria’s homegrown jihadis, took up arms in 2009 to fight Western education and impose their radical version of Islamic law. The conflict has spilled into Nigeria’s northern neighbors, including Niger , and resulted in the death of around 35,000 civilians and the displacement of more than 2 million others, according to the United Nations. Boko Haram split into two factions after the death of the group’s longtime leader, Abubakar Shekau, in 2021. One faction is backed by the Islamic State group and is known as the Islamic State West Africa Province, or ISWAP. It has become notorious for targeting military positions. The other faction, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad , or JAS, has increasingly resorted to attacking civilians and perceived collaborators and thrives on robberies and abductions for ransom. “When JAS attacks and kills a lot of people like they did last night in Bama, it’s usually that they suspect the victims of spying for the rival ISWAP or the military,” Adebayo told the AP. The Bama local government area was the target of several Boko Haram attacks a decade ago, forcing many residents to flee. Following military operations in the area in recent years, authorities had resettled displaced people in several communities, most recently the village of Darul Jamal in July. Kaana Ali, a Darul Jamal resident, said he decided to leave the community for good after he confirmed the deaths of close family friends in the attack on Friday. “But the governor is still begging us to stay back as more protection would be provided to secure our community,” he said. Copyright 2025 The Associated Press

A new report has cast a harsh light on the Wagner Group's three years in Mali, showing how the Russian mercenary group was a source of instability rather than a solution to the country’s security woes. Wagner mercenaries pictured in Mali, 2024. © Thomas Coex/AFP by Radio France Internationale The Russian paramilitary group Wagner has left behind a troubled record in Mali, according to a report published by the United States-based war crimes watchdog   The Sentry . The organisation assessed Wagner’s impact in the Sahel country between January 2022 and June 2025 – when its mercenaries were replaced by the Africa Corps, a new force directly under Moscow’s command. When the Wagner Group announced its departure earlier this year, it claimed its "mission was accomplished". However, the report's findings detail three and a half years of insecurity and strategic failure. 'A triple failure' The report outlines what it calls Wagner’s “ triple failure ” . The first is a military one: the Russian fighters proved unable to secure northern and central Mali, despite high expectations from Bamako’s transitional authorities. Secondly, their arrival coincided with a “significant increase” in attacks against civilians. And third, far from strengthening ties between the army and local populations, their actions “gravely undermined” confidence, creating fertile ground for jihadist groups to boost recruitment. Wagner’s presence, the Sentry argues, also destabilised the Malian security apparatus. “The fighters of Wagner sowed chaos and fear within the military hierarchy,” the report notes, describing a chain of command now plagued by mistrust and poor communication. Fragile partnership Speaking to RFI, Justyna Gudzowska, executive director of the Sentry, said Malian authorities turned to Wagner believing the Russian mercenaries would “take greater risks and truly commit to fighting terrorists". Instead, she explained, “Wagner fighters refused to act without payment, refused to help without financial compensation, and in some cases flatly refused to take risks ". What was intended to be a partnership with the Malian armed forces quickly soured, she said. “Wagner treated Malian soldiers as subordinates, perpetrated grave abuses, and instilled such fear that even Malian troops were afraid to speak out.” These issues culminated in a decisive defeat in July 2024, when rebels from the Azawad region of northern Mali and jihadists from the al Qaeda-linked JNIM group ambushed Malian and Wagner forces at Tinzaouatène, killing more than 80 Russian mercenaries and around 50 Malian soldiers. This blow, according to Gudzowska, tarnished Wagner’s reputation well beyond Mali’s borders: “More than a year later, it has still not recovered.” While Wagner has departed and Russia's Africa Corps has stepped into its shoes, Mali’s security crisis shows little sign of abating. Jihadist groups remain active across wide swathes of the country. Earlier this week, they reportedly seized the strategic town of Farabougou in central Mali , days after forcing the army to abandon one of its largest camps in the region. JNIM fighters now control the town, imposing their rule on returning residents, including bans on secular music, alcohol and cigarettes. © 2025 Copyright RFI

CDS Christopher Musa poses beside a truck branded in the new name and Logo of the special task force in Plateau State. Credit Golok Namwa . By Masara Kim ‘Reality Is, We Are at War:’ Plateau State Legislator (Jos) On the eve of a U.S. Congressional hearing on Nigeria’s complex civil war TruthNigeria surveyed thought leaders in the key contested battleground state of Plateau and found consensus that ascending violence is likely on the state’s horizon. The controversial Fulani ethnic militias linked to dozens of village burnings and atrocities against Christians during the last decade continue to dominate seized lands, according to local leaders and national politicians. “The [border] is so porous,” said a former member of the Nigerian Parliament, Simon Mwadkwon to TruthNigeria. “We are aware that they came from almost every part of this country,” said Mwadkwon, a former Senate Minority leader. “Even from Nasarawa State, a lot of them have moved into Plateau State,” Mwadkwon said. “They are still here, within the mountains here. They are there right now,” said Mwadkwon, who represented Plateau’s northern Senatorial district in the Nigerian Senate until 2024. As of September 2nd, there are rumors of impending terror attacks in areas south of Jos the state capital. The kinetic areas hug the state’s southwestern border with Nasarawa State, where terrorists identifying as Fulani have established camps and displaced thousands according to locals. On September 1, Fulani terrorists killed one person and burned several shops and houses near the state’s southern border with Nasarawa State, TruthNigeria learned. It was the latest in a series of attacks claiming more than five residents in the Qua’anpan County in recent weeks according to Danladi Fwankat Dimas, a local community leader. The early morning attack targeted Christian residents in a village hub located close to a large swath of forest stretching across the southern edge of Plateau State bordering Nasarawa, Dimas told TruthNigeria. “At 2:20 am, the Fulani [terrorists] attacked the town of “Nteng,” burned houses, shops and killed one person, Danladi Audu Zoelangmut of Koelakan Nteng,” said Dimas. “This is not the first time the community is being attacked,” Dimas told TruthNigeria. “Even last Friday August 29, there were multiple attacks in and around the community,” Dimas said. “On Friday at about 5:30 am the Fulani attacked Jepmorop community, a village under Nteng which shares boundary with Lafia local Government Area of Nasarawa state through Mangwat and Jibial,” said Dimas. “They burned several houses, destroyed farmlands and displaced many. Later that same day at about 3:40 pm another village near Nteng was attacked by the Fulani, who also burned houses and destroyed farm crops,” Dimas went on to say. “An hour later at about 4:20 pm they attacked Mafi, a village close to a major town of Nteng under Koelakan and killed one person,” Dimas added. A map of Plateau State showing some major terror hotspots in red. Credit Masara Kim. While residents were still ducking for cover from the terrorists fire in Quaanpan, Nigeria’s Chief of Defence Staff General Christopher Musa was in Jos, unveiling a new name for the joint military task force Operation Safe Haven. General Musa announced the task force will henceforth be known as “Operation Enduring Peace.” The task force is rebranding, featuring new logos, flags, and badges since its establishment in 2010. Musa acknowledged public concerns regarding effectiveness and efficiency by troops as part of reasons for the change and declared a new mandate and focus for the task force. “In practical terms, we are deploying additional personnel, enhancing logistics, and providing critical operational assets to improve effectiveness,” said General Musa at a ceremony on Friday August 29. The new name of the hybrid security outfit was cold comfort to the Plateau residents who for years have waited in vain for military units to come to their rescue during midnight attacks by swarms of Fulani ethnic militia shouting Alahu Akbar! Scores of villages and towns have been taken over in Plateau State since the infamous serious of attacks mounted over a 10-day period from Dec. 23, 2023, and dubbed “Black Christmas. From July to September 1, 2025, terrorists continued their reign, displacing civilians and seizing territories around the state’s borders. In the weeks leading up to the so-called rebranding, more than 300 residents were killed in the border areas of Bassa, Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Bokkos, Mangu, Quaanpan and Wase all of which are lined up along the borders with Kaduna and Nasarawa from the northwest to the southeast of Plateau state. TruthNigeria investigations have revealed a terrorist-led land grabbing campaign that sprang from the north, west and central parts of Plateau during the black Christmas massacre of over 280 Christians in 2023 has recently been followed by a new invasion from to the southwest, south-south and southeast of the state. “The reality is that we are at war,” says the Speaker of the Plateau State House of Assembly, Naanlong Daniel. “And the situation requires strategic efforts to see that this issue is addressed,” said Daniel recently. “As representatives [of the people], what has happened [in recent times] has exposed us to a lot of things. And I think it is only right to make sure that all the loopholes are closed, using all the information we have available,” Daniel said during a visit to the scene of a brutal murder of 27 Christians including babies near Jos. “Even though security issues are classified, I can assure you that we will escalate this [matter] to the security agencies to see how this issue can be addressed,” Daniel said, responding to concerns of residents regarding terrorist threats from surrounding states. But Senator Simon Mwadkon feels differently about the ability of federal troops to curb the situation. “You can see that if they claim they have been doing well, their effort is not good enough. Because day in day out, people are being killed,” said Mwadkwon, who pointed to Fulani militants for the attacks. “The whole issue is all about land grabbing. These people want to occupy our land. And each time we hear the military say they have repelled them. What are you repelling? People have come to kill for goodness’ sake they should also die,” he said. Despite widespread attacks and displacements, military civilian-affairs officers in several local government areas have staged so-called “peace meetings” based on the premise that 800 Plateau Christians gunned down since January first were victims of “farmer herder clashes.” Yet, eyewitness testimonies of terrorist invasions published in Epoch Times since 2021 and TruthNigeria since 2023 have found no evidence of reciprocal clashes. Governor Caleb Mutfwang has repeatedly opposed the claims, insisting the attacks in Plateau State are genocidal, aimed at ethnic displacements and territorial control. © Newspaper WordPress Theme by TagDiv

Women protest the loss of innocent lives of Hazara Muslims. Source: Yahoo Images A newly released investigative legal and archival analysis from the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy , presents compelling evidence of genocide against Afghanistan’s Hazara community. The report, “The Hazara Genocide: An Examination of Breaches of the Genocide Convention in Afghanistan” , concludes that systematic killings, targeted bombings, sexual violence, and mass displacement carried out against Hazaras since the Taliban’s return to power meet the legal definition of genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention. Key findings include: At least 473 Hazaras killed  and 681 wounded  in 61 documented attacks over the past five years. Evidence of coordinated bombings, shootings, executions, and other atrocities aimed specifically at Hazara communities. Survivor testimony and historical documentation highlighting both ongoing and long-term persecution. The analysis—prepared  with contributions from more than a dozen leading legal experts—has already drawn significant attention from policymakers and global leaders. Former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice Beth Van Schaack  emphasized that the report “offers a critical opportunity to lay the groundwork for justice, accountability, and a stable peace in Afghanistan,” while Lord David Alton , Chair of the UK Joint House of Lords and House of Commons Committee on Human Rights, described it as “a clarion call for justice that the international community cannot ignore.” This report builds on New Lines’ track record of rigorous genocide investigations—including those on the Uyghurs, Tigrayans, and Ukrainians—that have informed genocide determinations and accountability measures by governments and parliaments worldwide. This work is spearheaded by Susanna Kelley, Head of the Mass Atrocities and International Law portfolio at New Lines Institute. Please reach out to this email ( skelley@newlinesinstitute.org ) for quotes or comments. We hope your organization reviews the report and that its findings might inform your work on accountability, advocacy, and survivor support. The full report is available here:   The Hazara Genocide: An Examination of Breaches of the Genocide Convention in Afghanistan   Please do not hesitate to reach out if you would like to discuss the findings further or explore opportunities for collaboration in ensuring recognition and justice for the Hazara people.   Tristan E. Miller Mass Atrocities and International Law Portfolio New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy

By Edward Wong and Adam Rasgon Aug. 29, 2025 The United States generally allows foreign officials to attend the United Nations General Assembly. The administration’s move comes amid a new push for Palestinian statehood. The move by Secretary of State Marco Rubio could be aimed at weakening discussion of Palestinian statehood at the United Nations meeting. David Dee Delgado/Reuters Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on Friday that he would not issue visas to Palestinian officials to prevent them from attending the annual United Nations General Assembly in New York next month. The visa ban applies to officials from the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization who are not based in the Palestinian mission at the U.N., the announcement said. The State Department said Mr. Rubio was making the move to hold the two bodies “accountable for not complying with their commitments, and for undermining the prospects for peace.” The agency is demanding that they both “consistently repudiate terrorism,” including the Hamas-led attack in Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, and “end incitement to terrorism in education.” The department also said the Palestinian Authority, which governs the Israeli-occupied West Bank, must end appeals to legal institutions, including the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, and stop pushing countries to recognize a “conjectural Palestinian state.” The action by Mr. Rubio raises doubts about whether Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the Palestinian Authority and the P.L.O., will be able to attend the General Assembly in September, an annual conclave where world leaders discuss the most pressing global issues, from wars to famines to environmental crises. Mr. Abbas has called for the establishment of a Palestinian state and denounced Israel’s decades-old military occupation in past speeches at the U.N. He said last year that Israel was carrying out a “full-scale war of genocide” in Gaza. “Palestine will remain ours,” he told the leaders gathered at the U.N. “And if anyone were to leave, it will be the occupying usurpers.” Mr. Abbas has consistently affirmed support for a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, and in the 1990s the P.L.O. officially recognized Israel’s right “to exist in peace and security.” Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization, at the U.N. General Assembly last year. His office expressed “deep regret and astonishment” at Mr. Rubio’s decision. Dave Sanders for The New York Times The move by Mr. Rubio could be aimed at weakening discussion of Palestinian statehood at the U.N. meeting. France and Canada recently announced that they planned to recognize a Palestinian state at the meeting next month, and Britain said it would, too, if certain conditions were met. Those would be the first countries from the Group of 7 allied nations to do so; 147 nations already recognize such a state . Britain said it would reconsider doing so if Israel demonstrated “sufficient progress” toward addressing the humanitarian disaster in Gaza and toward reaching a hostage and cease-fire deal with Hamas. Britain has also said Israel must commit to “a long-term sustainable peace,” reviving the prospect of and a two-state solution for the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Britain has said Hamas, which it considers a terrorist group, should release all the remaining hostages and give up governing Gaza. The United States generally issues visas to allow foreign leaders to come to U.N. headquarters. For officials from countries under severe U.S. government sanctions, American officials restrict their movements in New York. In 2019, as the first Trump administration was carrying out an economic pressure campaign against Iran, U.S. officials announced they were barring senior Iranian officials and their family members from entering the United States. The State Department made the announcement while President Hassan Rouhani of Iran and more than 80 of his top diplomats and aides were in New York to attend the General Assembly. Mr. Rouhani and the other Iranian officials were allowed to remain in the country for the meeting. The United Nations has said the United States has no right to prevent foreign officials from visiting U.N. headquarters. The relevant law is a headquarters agreement between the United States and the United Nations that limits U.S. government efforts to restrict certain visitors to the headquarters, said Julian Ku, a professor of international law at Hofstra University. In 1988, the United States denied Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian leader, a visa on national security grounds after the United Nations invited him to speak. Mr. Abbas’s office expressed “deep regret and astonishment” at Mr. Rubio’s decision and called on the Trump administration to “reconsider and reverse” the move, according to Wafa, the government-run news agency based in the West Bank. One Palestinian official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information, said the U.S. government had been taking a long time to issue visas for officials planning to travel to New York for the meeting this year. At the end of July, Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa of the Palestinian Authority traveled to U.N. headquarters, where he attended a conference in support of the two-state solution. Mr. Rubio has been an outspoken critic of supporters of Palestinian rights and has vocally defended Israel’s military actions. Kenny Holston/The New York Times Mr. Abbas, 89, has long expressed opposition to violence against Israelis and ordered the Palestinian Authority’s security forces to cooperate with the Israeli military and the Shin Bet domestic intelligence agency — a policy that has garnered praise from Israeli officials. In a letter to President Emmanuel Macron of France in June, Mr. Abbas said that the 2023 attack in Israel was “unacceptable and condemnable” and that Hamas should immediately release all hostages. The Biden administration had said Israel must ultimately allow the Palestinian Authority to govern the West Bank and Gaza even as U.S. officials pushed for more transparency and less corruption in the authority. But the Trump administration has taken a much more hostile stance. Mr. Rubio and Steve Witkoff, the special envoy for peace missions, did not visit Palestinian officials in Ramallah on recent trips to the Middle East, in which they met Israeli officials a short car ride away. Mr. Abbas repeatedly clashed with the first Trump administration, ultimately barring senior Palestinian officials from having contact with people in that administration. During Mr. Trump’s second term, however, he has tried to rehabilitate his relationship with his American counterpart. Gideon Saar, the Israeli foreign minister, thanked Mr. Rubio on social media for “this bold step and for standing by Israel once again.” Mr. Rubio has been an outspoken critic of supporters of Palestinian rights and has vocally defended Israel’s military actions, which have come under widespread condemnation around the world. He has moved to revoke the permanent residency status and visas of foreign citizens legally in the United States who have publicly supported Palestinian rights. Federal judges have rebuked Mr. Rubio for the actions, saying they most likely violate First Amendment protections. They have ordered the U.S. government to release people detained for deportation as a result of Mr. Rubio’s moves. © 2025 The New York Times Company

By Nicholas Kristof Aug. 30, 2025 Ivor Prickett for The New York Times As debate boils over allegations of genocide in Gaza, there’s another place where all sides in the United States seem to agree a genocide is underway — yet largely ignore it. That’s Sudan, probably the site of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis today. Famine was officially declared there last year; the United Nations reports that some 25 million Sudanese face extreme hunger and at least 12 million have had to flee their homes because of civil war. Tom Perriello, who was the U.S. special envoy for Sudan until this year, tells me that he believes that the death toll by now has exceeded 400,000. In January, the Biden administration officially declared the killing in Sudan to be a genocide. In April, the Trump administration also characterized the slaughter as a genocide, and the State Department confirmed to me that it views the situation in Sudan as a genocide. So there is bipartisan agreement in the United States that Sudan is suffering both genocide and famine — and also, apparently, a bipartisan consensus to do little about it. The Biden administration was too passive, and now so too is the Trump administration. President Trump is actually slashing assistance this year to Sudan, increasing the number of children who will starve. Whatever you think of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza — and I’ve been unsparing in my criticism of Israel’s actions and America’s complicity in the bombing and starvation there — we should recognize our collective failure to address this other crisis with an even higher death toll. Neither should be seen as a distraction from the other; we have the moral bandwidth to be appalled by the enormous suffering in Sudan and in Gaza alike. This failure is global. Arab and African countries have done more to aggravate the suffering in Sudan than to ease it. The U.N. in 2005 declared a “responsibility to protect” civilians suffering atrocities, but that lofty language seems a substitute for action rather than a spur to it. Survivors describe ethnic cleansing of almost unimaginable savagery. On the Sudan-Chad border last year, a woman named Maryam Suleiman told me that in her village an Arab militia lined up all the men and boys over the age of 10 and massacred them, and then raped the women and girls. The lighter-skinned gunmen targeted her Black African ethnic group, she said, quoting a militia leader as saying, “We don’t want to see any Black people.” The racist massacres are an echo of the Darfur genocide of two decades ago in western Sudan. One difference is that this time there is far less interest, and a complete failure of political will to respond. It is “a Gaza — which is horrible enough — writ still larger,” said Anthony Lake, who was national security adviser to President Bill Clinton and later led UNICEF. “And largely off camera.” Two decades ago, the U.N. secretary general at the time, Kofi Annan, visited Darfur (and helped smuggle me in) and pushed to ease the crisis with negotiations and peacekeepers. The current U.N. secretary general, António Guterres, said in February that the world must not turn its back on Sudan, but I sometimes think that’s what he himself has done. The killing and starvation in Sudan are results of a two-year struggle between two warring generals. One faction is the Sudanese Armed Forces and the other is a militia called the Rapid Support Forces. Both have behaved brutally, starving civilians and impeding humanitarian efforts to aid the hungry. “We’re being blocked from reaching the hungry — and attacked for trying,” said Cindy McCain, the executive director of the U.N. World Food Program, which had three of its trucks carrying food aid destroyed this month by drone strikes. Aid workers say that while both sides have committed war crimes, the Rapid Support Forces are responsible for the worst atrocities, such as the burning of entire villages and the slaughter and rape of civilians. Outsiders perpetuate the war by arming both sides. The United Arab Emirates in particular, despite denials, appears to be the main supporter of the Rapid Support Forces, underwriting its campaign of atrocities. While the Biden administration refused to hold the Emirates accountable, and now the Trump administration is doing the same, Congress has provided more leadership. Some members are pushing for a ban on arms transfers to the Emirates while it continues to enable mass murder and rape. That’s a useful pressure point: The Emirates is a remarkable nation that cares about its reputation, and public pressure previously led it to pull out of the disastrous war in Yemen. What could Trump do? It would help if he called on the Emirates to cut off the Rapid Support Forces or at least end the atrocities. He could appoint a special envoy for Sudan. And he could ramp up American support for grass-roots Sudanese assistance programs, such as the emergency response rooms that run communal kitchens. World leaders will gather at the U.N. in September to repeat platitudes about making the world a better place. One test of their sincerity is what they will do for the major Sudanese city of El Fasher, besieged by the Rapid Support Forces and facing starvation. Sudan watchers fear that if El Fasher falls, the Rapid Support Forces will engage in mass killings and rapes, as they have elsewhere. “Here in El Fasher, we are starving,” Avaaz Sudan Dispatch, a newsletter that follows Sudan, quoted a civilian in the city as saying. “The responsibility is not just on those holding the guns. It’s on the world. The Arab countries. The African Union. Europe. The so-called international community. All of them.” “We know they can help,” the civilian continued. “We know they have the power to airdrop food. They have planes. They have supplies. But they are choosing not to.” © 2025 The New York Times Company

Recognising that, since the horrific Hamas-led attack of 7 October 2023, which itself constitutes international crimes, the government of Israel has engaged in systematic and widespread crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, including indiscriminate and deliberate attacks against the civilians and civilian infrastructure (hospitals, homes, commercial buildings, etc.) of Gaza, which, according to official UN estimates, at the date of this resolution, has killed more than 59,000 adults and children in Gaza ; Recognising that these crimes are estimated to have left many thousands of people buried under the rubble or otherwise inaccessible, and most probably dead; Recognising that this bombing and other violence is estimated to have injured more than 143,000 people, with many maimed; Recognising that the actions of the Israeli government against Palestinians have included torture , arbitrary detention , and sexual and reproductive violence ; deliberate attacks on medical professionals , humanitarian aid workers and journalists; and the deliberate deprivation of food, water , medicine , and electricity essential to the survival of the population; Recognising that Israel has forcibly displaced nearly all of the 2.3 million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip multiple times, and demolished more than 90 percent of the housing infrastructure in the territory ; Recognising that the consequences of these crimes have included destroying entire families and multiple generations of Palestinians ; Recognising that Israel has destroyed schools, universities , libraries, museums, and archives , all of them essential to the continued existence of Palestinian collective well-being and identity; Recognising that Israel has killed or injured more than 50,000 children and that this destruction of a substantial part of a group constitutes genocide, as emphasized in a joint declaration of intervention in the International Court of Justice case of The Gambia v Myanmar by six countries—Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom— which states “that children form a substantial part of the groups protected by the Genocide Convention, and that the targeting of children provides an indication of the intention to destroy a group as such, at least in part. Children are essential to the survival of any group as such, since the physical destruction of the group is assured where it is unable to regenerate itself.”; Recognising that Israeli governmental leaders, war cabinet ministers , and senior army officers have made explicit statements of “intent to destroy”, characterizing Palestinians in Gaza as a whole as enemies and “human animals” and stating the intention of inflicting “maximum damage” on Gaza, “flattening Gaza,” and turning Gaza into “hell”; Recognising that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has endorsed the current US President's plan to forcibly expel all Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, with no right of return, in what Navi Pillay, head of the UN Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, has said amounts to ethnic cleansing ; Recognising that the deliberate destruction of agricultural fields, food warehouses, and bakeries and other violence that prevents food production, in conjunction with denial and restriction of humanitarian aid, indicate the intentional infliction of unlivable conditions resulting in starvation of Palestinians in Gaza; Acknowledging that, on 21 November 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant of Israel, in the court's ongoing investigation opened on 3 March 2021, of crimes committed on Palestinian territory since 13 June 2014, charging them with crimes identified in the Rome Statute, in the Gaza Strip from at least 8 October 2023, including the starvation of civilians, intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population, murder, and persecution; Whereas Israel's actions in response to the October 7 attack and subsequent holding of hostages have not only been directed against the Hamas group responsible for these, but have also targeted the entire Gazan population; Acknowledging that the International Court of Justice found in three provisional measures order in the case of South Africa v. Israel — January, March, and May 2024 — that it is plausible that Israel is committing genocide in its attack in Gaza and ordered Israel to take all measures within its power to prevent and punish the direct and public incitement of genocide and to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance to civilians in Gaza; Acknowledging that leading global international law organizations and UN bodies, including Amnesty International , Human Rights Watch , Forensic Architecture , DAWN, B’Tselem and Physicians for Human Rights , and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories , have conducted extensive investigations and issued reports concluding that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza; Acknowledging that a number of Israeli , Palestinian, Jewish , and other scholarly experts working in Holocaust and Genocide Studies and in International Law have concluded that Israeli governmental and military actions constitute genocide; Acknowledging that international civil society has a responsibility to prevent genocide by encouraging and assisting states to fulfil their obligations under the Genocide Convention to prevent, suppress, and punish genocide; Acknowledging that putative security measures against members of a group are often pretext for mass killing and genocide as it has become in this case; Therefore, the International Association of Genocide Scholars: Declares that Israel’s policies and actions in Gaza meet the legal definition of genocide in Article II of the United Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948); Declares that Israel’s policies and actions in Gaza constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in international humanitarian law and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; Calls upon the government of Israel to immediately cease all acts that constitute genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity against Palestinians in Gaza, including deliberate attacks against and killing of civilians including children; starvation; deprivation of humanitarian aid, water, fuel, and other items essential to the survival of the population; sexual and reproductive violence; and forced displacement of the population; Calls upon the government of Israel to comply with the Provisional Measures orders of the International Court of Justice; Calls upon the state parties of the International Criminal Court to comply with their obligations, cooperate with the Court, and surrender any individual subject to an arrest warrant; Calls upon all states to actively pursue policies to ensure respect for their obligations under international law, including under the Genocide Convention, the Arms Trade Treaty and international humanitarian law, with regards to Israel and Palestine; and Calls upon the government of Israel and all other United Nations members to support a process of repair and transitional justice that will afford democracy, freedom, dignity, and security for all people of Gaza. Current as of 28 July 2025 Resolution passed 31 August 2025