The Family Research Council (FRC) is hosting its annual Values Voter Summit Oct. 13-15, a rogues' gallery of the radical right, this year keynoted by President Trump himself. The FRC is an organization that has relentlessly vilified LGBT people – portraying them as sick, vile, incestuous, violent, perverted, and a danger to children and the nation. Because of its demonizing lies about the LGBT community, it has been named as a hate group by the SPLC. Like its host, the Values Voters Summit claims it stands for “values.” But whose values? 1. What's the Values Voter Summit? 2. What can you do? Here's what speakers at the 2017 Values Voter Summit actually value *Organizations with an asterisk are listed by the SPLC as hate groups. View the full list. Stephen Bannon Executive Chairman, Breitbart News Bannon has legitimized the “alt-right” – a white nationalist movement – by giving it a platform on his news site. Bannon then brought alt-right views to the White House. Breitbart's comments section has become a haven for anti-Semitism. Read SPLC's analysis of Breitbart under Bannon. In his words “We’re the platform for the alt-right." "Are there anti-Semitic people involved in the alt-right? Absolutely. Are there racist people involved in the alt-right? Absolutely.” Tony Perkins President, Family Research Council* Perkins has claimed that gay men are more likely to molest children. This is false. Perkins has written that “only 16 percent of Islam is a religion.” The rest, he claims, is made up of economic, judicial, political and military systems. Perkins claims that gay rights advocates intend to round up Christians in "boxcars." Read the SPLC profile on Tony Perkins. In his words “The videos are titled 'It Gets Better.' They are aimed at persuading kids that although they'll face struggles and perhaps bullying for 'coming out' as homosexual (or transgendered or some other perversion), life will get better. …It's disgusting. And it's part of a concerted effort to persuade kids that homosexuality is okay and actually to recruit them into that lifestyle." "Jerry" Boykin, Jr. Executive Vice President, Family Research Council* Boykin has called Islam “evil” and said it should not be protected by the First Amendment. Boykin threatened physical violence against people who don't use the bathroom of the gender they were assigned at birth. Boykin has said the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy would lead to the destruction of the American military. Read the SPLC profile on Jerry Boykin, Jr. In his words “No mosques in America. Islamis a totalitarian way of life; it’s not just a religion.” Mat Staver Founder and Chairman, Liberty Counsel* Liberty Counsel works to legalize anti-LGBT discrimination under the guise of "religious liberty." Staver has stated that he would personally advocate for disobedience to any U.S. Supreme Court that favored marriage equality. Liberty Counsel claimed that the brutal murder of Matthew Shepherd in Laramie, Wyoming, was not an anti-LGBT hate crime but rather a bungled robbery. Read the SPLC profile on Liberty Counsel. In his words “Now [the Boy Scouts of America will] allow homosexual young boys in the Scouts and allow homosexual leaders in the Scouts, and what are you going to have? You are going to have all kinds of sexual molestation. This is a playground for pedophiles to go and have all these boys as objects of their lust." Brigitte Gabriel Founder and Chairman, ACT for America* Gabriel heads the largest grassroots anti-Muslim group in the country. She a regular guest on the radio shows of anti-LGBT figures such as Sandy Rios, who has a lengthy history of demonizing Muslims. Gabriel promotes wild anti-Muslim conspiracy theories that portray all Muslims as the enemy. Read the SPLC profile on Act for America. In her words “If a Muslim who has—who is—a practicing Muslim who believes the word of the Koran to be the word of Allah, who abides by Islam, who goes to mosque and prays every Friday, who prays five times a day—this practicing Muslim, who believes in the teachings of the Koran, cannot be a loyal citizen to the United States of America.” Frank Gaffney, Jr President, Center for Security Policy* Gaffney has repeatedly opposedallowing LGBT people to serve in the military. The Center for Security Policy has called for congressional hearings, reminiscent of the McCarthy era, to expose the infiltration of the U.S. government by Muslim extremists. Gaffney co-authored the "Team B Report," claiming that Islam itself, rather than a tiny minority of violent extremists, is a threat to American democracy. Read the SPLC profile on Frank Gaffney, Jr. In his words “There is mounting evidence that the president [Obama] not only identifies with Muslims, but actually may still be one himself.” Roy Moore Former Alabama Supreme Court Justice Moore claims Islam is a false religion. Moore has stated same-sex parents are "detrimental to children." Moore has appeared on the radio show of Pastor Kevin Swanson, who said being gay should be punishable by death. Moore wrote that Muslim-Americans should not be allowed to serve in Congress. In his words “Homosexual behavior is crime against nature, an inherent evil, and an act so heinous that it defies one's ability to describe it.” Gary Bauer Founder of American Values and the Campaign for Working Families PAC Bauer led anti-LGBT hate group Family Research Council from 1988 to 1999. Bauer has cited junk science and stated “homosexual conduct is three times more deadly than smoking.” This is false. In 2010, Bauer voiced anti-Muslim sentiments at VVS, saying: “Islamic culture ... keeps hundreds of millions of people on the verge of violence and mayhem 24 hours a day.” In his words “If the United States is going to take in 10,000 Syrian refugees, they should be Christians and we should make no apologiesfor that.” Peter Sprigg Senior Fellow for Family Studies, Family Research Council* Sprigg supports conversion therapyfor LGBT people. Sprigg wrote that “homosexuals are less likely to enter into a committed relationship” and “less likely to be sexually faithful to a partner.” Sprigg has long defended his anti-LGBT claims by citing junk science or cherry-picking from reports. In his words “I think there would be a place for criminal sanctions against homosexual behavior.” What's the Values Voter Summit? The Values Voter Summit is an annual political conference bringing together some of the most extreme groups on the right, including multiple designated hate groups. It was founded in 2006 and is hosted by the Family Research Council. Who's Family Research Council? The Family Research Council (FRC) is an organization that often makes false and intentionally dehumanizing claims about the LGBT community based on discredited research and junk science. The intention is to denigrate LGBT people as the organization battles against same-sex marriage, hate crime laws, anti-bullying programs and the repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. To make the case that the LGBT community is a threat to American society, the FRC employs a number of “policy experts” whose “research” has allowed the FRC to be extremely active politically in shaping public debate. Its research fellows and leaders often testify before Congress and appear in the mainstream media. It also works at the grassroots level, conducting outreach to pastors in an effort to “transform the culture.” Here's their statement on "homosexuality:" Family Research Council believes that homosexual conduct is harmful to the persons who engage in it and to society at large, and can never be affirmed. It is by definition unnatural, and as such is associated with negative physical and psychological health the effects. While the origins of same-sex attractions may be complex, there is no convincing evidence that a homosexual identity is ever something genetic or inborn. We oppose the vigorous efforts of homosexual activists to demand that homosexuality be accepted as equivalent to heterosexuality in law, in the media, and in schools.” Read more about the Family Research Council. What can you do? Bigotry is not an American value. You can stand up for equality and speak out against the bigotry displayed by the Family Research Council. Here's how: Let people know that President Trump is lending the legitimacy of his office to a hate group that relentlessly demonizes LGBT people and works to deny them of their equal rights. Share this message on social media. Expose the Family Research Council's true values. Download this image and share. Educate yourself. Read our profile on the Family Research Council. Take action against hate in your community. Follow our 10 Ways to Fight Hate guide. ____________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 SPLC

Evidence of mass graves in and around Kadugli, South Kordofan is now overwhelming; it includes definitive satellite photography of three large sites and reports by numerous independently interviewed civilians from the region (see | http://www.satsentinel.org/press-release/satellite-sentinel-project-documents-new-eyewitness-reports-and-visual-evidence-mass-graves-sudan/). Evidence also comes from interviews conducted in June by human rights investigators of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS); these findings appear in an internal UN human rights report whose findings have previously been suppressed by UN/New York. They were leaked to me and others, originally by someone who was evidently quite unhappy with UN silence about the deeply disturbing contents of this report. Given the immensity of the atrocity crimes revealed in this extensively documented but still officially unreleased report (“UNMIS Report on the Human Rights Situation During the Violence in Southern Kordofan” | http://www.sudantribune.com/UNMIS-report-on-the-human-rights,39570), it is imperative that the UN make clear who knew what, and when. These terrible incidents and the weak UN response in Kadugli have already been likened, rightly, to the ghastly failure of the UN at Srebrenica, where some 7,000 Bosnian men and boys were rounded up in July 1995 by Serbian army and paramilitary units under the command of (recently captured) Ratko Mladic—and executed while Dutch peacekeepers looked on helplessly. Indeed, two days after Srebrenica was overrun by Mladic’s forces, 4,000 – 5,000 Bosniak Muslims were expelled by the Dutch from their base—as Mladic had demanded (some 15,000 – 20,000 additional Bosniak Muslims had sought safety outside the Dutch base). The events of Srebrenica have occasioned much painful self-reflection by the Dutch over the past decade and a half, and a recent decision (July 5, 2011) by a court in The Netherlands ruled that the Dutch government was responsible for several of the deaths (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14026218/). And notably from the standpoint of international law, Major General Radislav Krstic was convicted of the crime of genocide for his role in the Srebrenica massacre. His conviction by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was upheld by an Appeals Chamber review of “Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic,” Case No. IT-98-33-T. This lengthy and superbly argued Appeals Chamber review is a seminal document in international legal interpretation of the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and has particular relevance for the situations in South Kordofan and Darfur (http://www.icty.org/). Given the extremely strong evidence of genocide in South Kordofan, and the Khartoum regime’s long history of genocidal assaults on marginalized populations in Sudan, the process of assessing awareness of and response to the UNMIS human rights report needs to begin immediately—for the UN, the US and the Europeans, and the African Union. In particular, we need to know about the credibility of the skepticism expressed by U.S. special envoy Princeton Lyman and UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos; we need a clear account of what Ban Ki-moon’s secretariat knew and how it responded to reports that made clear atrocities were being committed in Kadugli and elsewhere in South Kordofan from the very beginning of the conflict that Khartoum instigated on June 5. And we also need to know what was seen by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, particularly its Under-secretary Alain Le Roy. And finally, we need to know what U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton knew when she made her recent remarks about Sudan (http://www.tnr.com/article/world/91861/hillary-clinton-south-sudan-crisis-abyei-kordofan/). We need to know what all these various international actors and parties knew—and when they knew it. The task is challenging. For example, on June 28, in an interview on the PBS NewsHour, Lyman was asked, “Would you say atrocities are occurring by the North Sudanese forces against civilians there?” Lyman’s evasive and disingenuous answer speaks volumes about his character as a diplomat and the larger U.S. response to events in North Sudan: “We certainly have reports of that. Because we don’t have a presence there, we haven’t been able to investigate it fully. There are certainly reports of targeted killings. There are some reports from the other side also. What we’ve asked for is a full investigation.” And to the follow-up question (“By whom [should the investigation be conducted]?”) Lyman responded: “Well, by the UN would be the best. The UN presence has not been sufficient to get out and stop this or to investigate it.” (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/06/sudan-envoy.html/) Lyman certainly knew when he offered this answer that there would be no UN investigation beyond what was being completed by the human rights personnel attached to UNMIS, which had already been confined to its base and ordered out of South Kordofan by Khartoum the day following the independence of South Sudan on July 9. Saying “the UN presence has not been sufficient to get out and stop this or to investigate it” is merely to state the obvious, not to offer any meaningful reply about how the U.S. will actually respond to the now conspicuous human catastrophe in South Kordofan. I’ll return to the question of whether an international investigation of allegations of genocide could be conducted, with or without UN sanction; but we must bear in mind that any Security Council resolution authorizing such a thorough and unfettered UN investigation will be vetoed by China, which would regard such a precedent with horror, as well as deeply threatening to its relationship with Khartoum. But the first question is whether or not Lyman knew what UNMIS human rights personnel knew. Was the special envoy to Sudan, representing the President of the United States, unaware of what was being compiled and then assembled at the very end of June in the 20-page UNMIS report? Was he not concerned enough by these extant “reports” to request U.S. satellite surveillance of the Kadugli area? It was precisely such surveillance by the Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP, at http://www.satsentinel.org/) that revealed three large mass gravesites on July 14, graves dug between June 17, when the earth on this spot was untouched, and July 4, when SSP revealed three conspicuous, capacious, and nearly identical plots of significantly turned earth. Dug in the midst of heavy military activity and following a vast number of summary executions, these mass gravesites have only one plausible explanation. Certainly if the Obama administration is skeptical it may investigate further: the U.S. has much greater satellite capacity than is available to SSP and faces no restrictions on degree of resolution (as SSP does by virtue of U.S. law). Importantly, nearly all the eyewitness accounts in the UNMIS human rights report have been fully corroborated by subsequent accounts: from news organizations (several from the Nuba Mountains), from Nuba sources, from the Satellite Sentinel Project. (I offered an overview and synthesis of this evidence on July 14, at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/atw.php?id=497/). How could Lyman so blithely profess agnosticism about these extremely alarming accounts, especially given Khartoum’s history of genocidal counterinsurgency? SSP reports the presence of irregularly shaped white bags heaped together near the mass gravesites, consistently corresponding to human dimensions. Why hasn’t Lyman requested high-resolution satellite confirmation of what these white bags are? Several eyewitnesses, independently of each other, have confirmed that they are being used for the many corpses that litter Kadugli. What of the more than 7,000 Nuba people who were forcibly removed from UN protective custody at US headquarters in Kadugli on June 20, and who remain unaccounted for? [Note added October 13, 2017: these people were never accounted for and we must assume they were among the many thousands massacred in Kadugli in June 2011]. The UNMIS report confirms what an earlier UNMIS internal situation report (sit rep) had detailed of actions by Khartoum’s Military Intelligence and security services: impersonating Red Crescent personnel, these brutal men compelled the removal of Nuba civilians from the UN protective perimeter (this was reported by Associated Press on June 23, 2011). [Emphases in quoted text and notes from October 13, 2017 are all in blue italics—ER] The UNMIS human rights report declares that its authors had “verifie[d] [the allegation of forcible removal] through multiple interviews of IDPs within the UNMIS Protective Perimeter” (53). We presently have no knowledge whatsoever of the location of these people. The UNMIS human rights report declares that by 5pm on June 20, “approximately 75 percent of the 11,000 IDPs in the vicinity of the Protective Perimeter had vacated the areas… At the time of this report, there are no IDPs in the UNMIS Protective Perimeter…” (54). Why aren’t these UN reports sufficient to compel Lyman to ask for U.S. satellite surveillance? Can there be any reasonable doubt about the accuracy of either UN account? Is Lyman not worried that there are potentially thousands of Nuba in the large mass graves identified by SSP? Perhaps Lyman has a plausible alternative explanation for why, between June 17 and July 4, 2011—during heavy military operations—Khartoum’s forces would be moving earth at three side-by-side and parallel sites, of nearly identical dimensions (five meters by twenty-five meters), and of a size large enough to hold many thousands of bodies, depending on the depth of the excavation. But in the absence of such an explanation, and in light of an apparent unwillingness to request U.S. satellite confirmation of what is occurring at this site, he and other Obama administration officials appear inert before the strongest evidence to date of massive ethnically targeted human destruction. The same questions must be asked of Valerie Amos, head of UN humanitarian operations. On July 15 Amos declared in a prepared statement: “We do not know whether there is any truth to the grave allegations of extra-judicial killings, mass graves and other grave violations in South Kordofan” (http://reliefweb.int/node/426208/). “We do not know whether there is any truth to the grave allegations…”? This is preposterous skepticism, and betrays a highly defensive attitude in the face of evidence that makes all too clear that Amos has not made any serious effort to come to terms with the evidence of mass graves and the various atrocity crimes reported by the UN itself. For the UN human rights report, again focusing on the early days of military action when UNMIS still had some mobility, is a savage indictment—one that Amos certainly would not want to acknowledge having known of while saying nothing. Certainly the introduction to the report is quite unambiguous about what the UN had witnessed in the several weeks prior to the compiling of the report: Monitoring has also revealed that the Sudan Armed Forces, paramilitary forces and Government security apparatus have engaged in violent and unlawful acts against UNMIS, in violation of International Conventions and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) including: verified incidents of shelling in close proximity to UN property, resulting in damage; summary execution of a UN national staff member; assaults on physical integrity of UN staff; arbitrary arrest and detention of UN Staff and associated human rights violations including ill treatment amounting to torture; harassment, intimidation, and obstruction of freedom of movement; and intrusion on UN premises including the UNMIS Protective Perimeter established to protect civilians internally displaced as a result of the conflict. The international community must hold the Government of Sudan accountable for this conduct and insist that those responsible be arrested and brought to justice. The ethnic targeting of Nuba is made explicit in the UNMIS human rights report as well: Interviews with witnesses and victims reveal that the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and security forces have a list of Nubans wanted for being sympathetic to the SPLM/A, which supports the allegation that people in Southern Kordofan were targeted based on ethnicity. Witnesses also mentioned that persons of Nuban descent and “other dark skinned people” were being targeted by SAF and Arab militias. (49) And those contemplating a possible future UN presence in South Kordofan, including a human rights investigating team, should bear in mind just how UNMIS was treated: Throughout the conflict in Southern Kordofan, the SAF, Popular Defence Forces, and the Central Reserve Police Forces have treated UNMIS with gross contempt and a total disregard of its status as a UN body with the privileges and immunities set forth and contained in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Government of Sudan, as well as international conventions on the status of the UN, its staff, and assets, to which Sudan is a signatory. In addition to the killing of one UNMIS independent contractor, the SAF and PDF have intimidated UNMIS staff and subjected them to degrading and inhuman treatment, which has left as many as 45 staff held up in forced imprisonment in the UNMIS Kadugli Team Site, physically debilitated and psychologically traumatized. (44) Examples of this gross mistreatment of a UN-authorized force are many: On 7 June, an UNMIS truck was stopped at a checkpoint near the UNMIS Sector IV compound. Three of the ten IDPs who had been assisting UNMIS personnel with loading supplies for IDPs were pulled out of the truck and beaten up by SAF personnel. An UNMIS staff member who attempted to intervene was threatened at gunpoint by one of the soldiers who asked him ‘do you want to stay or leave.’ The UN personnel drove off with the seven remaining IDPs. The fate of the three IDPs remains unknown. (61) On 16 June, four UNMIS military observers on patrol were detained, interrogated, and subjected to cruel and degrading treatment for two hours. They were intercepted by SAF personnel near the SAF 14th Division Headquarters while en route to Kadugli town to verify reports of mass graves. The military observers were taken to the SAF-JIU 5th Division Headquarters where they were subjected to lengthy interrogation regarding the purpose of their monitoring mission, searched and forced to remove their shirts. A SAF Captain instructed the UNMOs to line up and be killed. He removed the safety of his AK-47, and just as he was about to point the weapon towards the UNMOs, a SAF Major entered the room and ordered him not to shoot [emphasis added]. Immediately following the intervention the officer with the gun shouted “UNMIS leave Southern Kordofan, if not we will kill you if you come back here.” The team was released and told not to return back to Kadugli town. (62) On the evening of 22 June, SAF surrounded the UNMIS Team site compound in Kadugli with three heavy artillery gun-mounted vehicles pointed at the compound from three points, including the front gate. This occurred following the arrest and interrogation of six UNMIS national staff early in the day by SAF military intelligence at the Kadugli airport. These developments have left UN national staff, especially those of Nuban descent, in a state of fear, some psychologically traumatized. (65) There are other powerful observations made by the UN human rights report: With the reinforcement of SAF, Central Reserve Police and militia elements, the security situation deteriorated on 7 June, with indiscriminate shelling of Kadugli town apparently targeting densely civilian-inhabited areas. This led to the secondary displacement of thousands of IDPs who had taken refuge in churches and hospitals to the UNMIS compound where they were sheltered in an area adjacent to the compound that was set up specifically to receive IDPs and provide them security and humanitarian assistance (Protective Perimeter). The SAF took control of the Kadugli airport, including UN assets located at the airport, and closed all civilian air traffic. UNMIS Human Rights received confirmation that SAF, together with militia elements of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), a paramilitary force established in 1989 to assist SAF in ‘defending the nation,’ began going from house to house subjecting residents to identity checks. (9) Eyewitnesses reported to UNMIS Human Rights looting of civilian homes, UN agencies/offices, and humanitarian warehouses, and destruction of property by PDF elements as they fought alongside the SAF. Meanwhile UN Security began the relocation of staff from UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes and INGOs to the UNMIS compound. By the evening Kadugli town, including hospitals, was emptied, as SAF checkpoints were established throughout the town. (10) These “checkpoints” have figured prominently in the accounts of many Nuba over the past six weeks; their clear purpose is to capture or execute all Nuba, claiming that they have “Southern sympathies.” The looting and destruction of humanitarian warehouses has been repeatedly confirmed: these actions have as their goal the ending of humanitarian assistance to the Nuba Mountains, which are the ultimate focus of this growing campaign of genocide. It is important to stress that the international response to the concluding recommendation of this human rights report will define any history of the present moment, particularly given the failure in Darfur to give meaning to the doctrine of a “responsibility to protect,” a “responsibility” that obtains even when there are claims of national sovereignty: The attacks on UNMIS, its staff and assets are so egregious that condemnation is insufficient. The conduct of the SAF, the PDF, the Central Reserve Police Force, and the Government Police, singularly and collectively, has frustrated and weakened the capacity of the UNMIS to implement in Southern Kordofan a mandate given to it by the UN Security Council. The conduct has also resulted in loss of life and injury of UN staff. The international community must hold the Government of Sudan accountable for its conduct and insist that it arrests and bring to justice those responsible.” [emphasis added; [added October 13, 2017: of course there have been no arrests nor any holding of those responsible to account] (74) So, is Amos even remotely credible when she declares, “We do not know whether there is any truth to the grave allegations”? This thoroughly implausible skepticism confronts us again with the question: who within the UN system knew what and when? Is it conceivable that with such serious allegations building over more than three weeks they would not have made their way back to the UN in New York? To the Office of the UN High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR)? To Ban Ki-moon’s Secretariat? Obviously the findings were far too sensitive to be released from within Sudan, even in Khartoum, where the UNMIS human rights team is based. This would have immediately imperiled the presence of remaining, if highly constrained UNMIS personnel in South Kordofan. But there was nothing from the UN in New York—not from UNHCHR, not from anyone in the Secretariat, not from the weak and uninspired Haile Menkerios, the UN Secretary-General’s special representative for Sudanno one said anything. Amos’s silence has been particularly galling, as Julie Flint reports in The Observer today, “causing fury among hard-pressed colleagues on the ground, who have been crying out for much stronger support from the security council, [as Amos] appeared to cast doubt on their reporting” (July 17, 2011) (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/16/sudan-secret-un-reports-nuba ). History is quickly being obscured by those complicit in this cover-up, so let’s recall first what was known earlier in June, and look further at the specific findings of the UNMIS human rights report. On June 17, 2011 (one month ago), I published in the Washington Post a number of very specific accounts that had come to me and many others in the two weeks following the start of military activities (June 5, 2011 | https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/in-sudan-genocide-anew/2011/06/17/AGVhCVZH_story.html/ ). I prefaced these accounts by invoking my February 2004 warning in the Post concerning Darfur, which concluded with a prediction that was borne out with a terrible completeness: A credible peace forum [for Darfur] must be rapidly created. Immediate plans for humanitarian intervention should begin. The alternative is to allow tens of thousands of civilians to die in the weeks and months ahead in what will be continuing genocidal destruction.” (https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2004/02/25/unnoticed-genocide/d9e40128-c203-4614-86fe-b23b1f98edd7/?utm_term=.5b918fb35f8b/) Reports from the ground in South Kordofan were already numerous and in many respects just as compelling as early reports from Darfur: I referred to “disturbing accounts [that] have emerged of the African people of the Nuba being rounded up in house searches and road checkpoints, and subjected to indiscriminate aerial bombardment,” and concluded by arguing that “all signs point to a new genocide.” I noted out that such genocidal ambition by Khartoum was in fact not without precedent in the Nuba Mountains; in January 1992 a fatwa was issued in Khartoum, declaring— jihad against the peoples of the Nuba (who practice a range of religions, including Islam). Because the Nuba Mountains are not geographically contiguous with South Sudan (with which the area is militarily, politically and culturally allied), its people were largely left to fend for themselves. [The] regime imposed a total blockade of humanitarian assistance from the south. Many starving Nuba were forced into ‘peace camps,’ where receiving food was conditional upon conversion to Islam. Some who refused were tortured or mutilated. Khartoum’s decade-long campaign killed and displaced hundreds of thousands. I also reported the extensive use of aerial military aircraft against civilian and humanitarian targets, a tactic that has a very long history under this regime—in Darfur, South Sudan, the Nuba Mountains throughout the 1990s, and currently in South Kordofan (http://www.sudanbombing.org/). It was also clear, I insisted, that humanitarian access was extremely limited by Khartoum’s restrictions, its commandeering of the Kadugli air field, and by its relentless bombing of the Kauda airstrip in the Nuba Mountains. And I also noted that “on June 8 [the UNMIS] base was raided by Khartoum’s military intelligence, and the United Nations was effectively disabled.” This was clear more than four weeks ago. Despite Khartoum’s best efforts we have known what was going on, and so has the UN, though it has chosen not to speak out. This is beyond disgrace; and to the argument that silence about large-scale atrocity crimes was justified in New York as a means of keeping a UN presence in South Kordofan, with extremely limited reporting ability soon after hostilities began, I can only shake my head in disgust at such ghastly expedience. Here it seems appropriate to recall that the initial UN investigation of Khartoum’s military seizure of Abyei (May 20-21) found that these actions were “tantamount to ethnic cleansing” (http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/06/sudans-invasion-of-abyei-is-it-ethnic-cleansing-or-isnt-it/); Ban Ki-moon and his office subsequently ensured that this phrase was excised from the final, public version of the report. This was a morally and intellectually corrupt effort to placate Khartoum, a signature feature of U.S. policy as well, even as it is likely that no decision has done more to produce the present catastrophic situation. I concluded my Washington Post essay by noting that the UN Security Council “demanded” on June 3 that Khartoum immediately withdraw its forces from Abyei: The regime scoffed of course—as it has at previous council “demands,” including those bearing on Darfur. This is bad news for the people of Abyei and for the prospects of a just and peaceful separation of Sudan’s north and south, which is scheduled for July 9. For the Nuba people, such fecklessness spells catastrophe. Too often with Sudan, empty demands and threats signal to the regime that the world is not serious about halting atrocities. Either the international community gets serious about preventing further violence in Abyei and the adjacent region of South Kordofan, or we will again see [as I argued in February 2004 about Darfur] “tens of thousands of civilians . . . die in the weeks and months ahead in what will be continuing genocidal destruction.” A month later, I would change not a word of this. And the UNMIS human rights report bears me out, underscoring as it does that the bombing campaign began in the opening days of the current military and civilian destruction campaign, and has continued throughout: On 6 June, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) commenced aerial bombardments and intensified ground assaults on civilian populated areas in Um Dorein and Talodi localities. Many civilians fled the towns taking up refuge in the Nuba Mountains. Civilians wounded by the bombardments flocked to hospitals in Kadugli. Civilian movement was curtailed further east in Heiban and Kauda localities, as SAF and SPLA roadblocks from the north and south prevented residents from leaving the town. In Kadugli town, residents in the largely SPLM-inhabited Kalimo area were warned by both the SAF and the SPLA to evacuate the area. In the late afternoon, SAF heavily bombarded the west of town in Al Messanie which continued until the early morning of the 7 June. Residents in the Kalimo neighbourhood reported that the SAF was indiscriminately shelling homes where it suspected SPLA elements were hiding. There were also reports that the SAF was conducting house to house searches and systematically burning houses of suspected SPLM/A supporters. (8) In a section devoted to “Aerial bombardments” the UNMIS human rights report makes clear just how constant, destructive, and terrifying this bombing has been: Since the eruption of the conflict, the SAF has carried out daily aerial bombardments into the Nuba Mountains and in several towns and villages populated by Nubans [emphasis added]. The consequences of these bombardments on the Nuban people and in particular civilians, including women and children, are devastating. They have resulted in significant loss of life, destruction of properties, and massive displacement [emphasis added]. UNMIS Human Rights has received photographs of mangled and mutilated bodies of civilians, some cut into halves, including women and children. (39) Starting from 5 June, the SAF has conducted daily aerial bombardments in Kadugli, Kauda, Dilling, Talodi, Um Dorein and other parts of the State populated by Nubans including Heiban, Kauda, Julud, Kudu and Kurchi. These bombardments often start from early evening at about 18:00 and last until daybreak. The bombardments have also targeted civilian facilities such as airstrips. On 14 June UNMIS personnel from the Kauda Team Site reported that the SAF launched air strikes on the airstrip and areas close to the UNMIS compound causing damage to structures inside the Team Site. The bombing rendered the airstrip unusable and impeded humanitarian organizations from re-supplying their stocks from Kadugli town or relocating/rotating staff in these areas. On 25 June, SAF air-strike dropped two bombs on Julud airstrip, just 350 metres from a school, and three kilometres from UNMIS Julud Team Site. As of 27 June, according to UNMO reports from Kadugli and other Team Sites, the SAF was intensifying aerial bombardments in Southern Kordofan. On SPLA positions. Following the SAF aerial bombardment of Shivi village, in Dilling locality on 8 June, UNMIS Julud Team Site reported two civilians were killed, one male and one female. Bombs have also been dropped very close to UNMIS Team Sites. On 19 June, UNMIS Kauda Team Site confirmed that seven bombs dropped in Kauda hitting areas south and northwest of the Team Site. (40) Are Lyman and Amos and other senior UN officials claiming that they did not know of these reports from the ground in Kadugli and Kauda? Are they saying they didn’t credit them? Or are they saying that they did not think them important enough to publicize, given Khartoum’s anger over such truths being told? The UNMIS human rights report provides not only compelling eyewitness accounts of mass graves and continuous aerial bombardment of civilians, but establishes that many other war crimes and atrocities have been committed: On 22 June, an UNMIS independent contractor reported witnessing SAF elements fill a mass grave in Al Gardut Locality in Tillo with dead bodies. She reported that SAF elements transported the bodies to the site, dumped them in the grave and using a bulldozer to cover the grave” [emphasis added; SSP also reports the use of heavy earth-moving equipment] (34) An UNMIS staff member who was detained by SAF at their military facility in Umbattah Locality reported during his detention, that he saw over an estimated 150 dead bodies of persons of Nuban descent scattered on the grounds of the military compound. Some of the bodies appeared to have bullet wounds and he reported a large quantity of blood on the ground. He reported a SAF soldier told them that they had all been shot dead. [emphasis added] (28) On 8 June, an UNMIS independent contractor (IC) was pulled out of a vehicle by SAF in front of the UNMIS Kadugli Sector IV Compound in the presence of several witnesses, while UN peacekeepers could not intervene. He was taken around the corner of the compound and gunshots were heard. Later he was discovered dead by UNMIS personnel and IDPs. Several sources confirmed that the victim was an active SPLM member. (29) Through house to house searches and targeted actions at checkpoints and at the Kadugli Airport, the SAF is believed to have engaged in arbitrary arrests and detentions of persons affiliated with churches or suspected of being supporters and affiliates of the SPLM/A. Thus far most of those arrested are Nubans. On 7 June a Catholic priest reported that SAF and PDF militia were engaged in house-to-house searches mainly in the Banjadid Locality west of Kadugli town causing civilians to panic…. (43) Several passages speak to the existence of earlier mass graves, dug even before the three very large sites discovered by SSP (which were dug sometime between June 17 and July 4): On 10 June, UNMIS Human Rights interviewed residents from Murta village, outside of Kadugli Town, who stated that they saw fresh mass graves located in a valley southeast of the Murta bus station near the Kadugli police training centre. (35) [Two men interviewed by UNMIS] reported that, following their release from SAF custody, they saw fresh mass graves between the SAF 14th Division Headquarters and Kadugli Market. On 16 June, UN military observers, while on their way between the SAF 14th Division Headquarters and Kadugli Market in an attempt to verify the existence of these mass graves, were arrested, stripped of their clothes, and believed that they were about to be executed when a senior SAF officer intervened. (36) Again, these mass graves are in addition to those dug after June 17, as reported by SSP. And there are many other sources for reports of mass slaughter and assaults on humanitarian operations and workers. Flint in The Observer (UK) (July 17, 2011) notes: National staff of international aid organisations have also come under attack. UNMIS cites the case of a young Nuba woman arrested and accused of supporting the SPLM. UNMIS human rights officers saw bruises and scars on her body consistent with her claim to have been beaten with fists, sticks, rubber hoses and electric wires. Underscoring the need for the “independent and comprehensive investigation” UNMIS recommends, the Observer has been told—by a hitherto impeccable source not connected to the SPLM/A—that 410 captured SPLM sympathisers were ordered executed on 10 June by Major-General Ahmad Khamis, one of four senior army officers sent to South Kordofan from Khartoum at the start of the war…. Khamis was one of the main implementers of a government jihad in the early 1990s that brought the Nuba people to the brink of destruction…. [In 1995] Khamis, then head of military intelligence, was repeatedly named as being responsible for torture and executions—including by his own hand. The Independent (UK) reports from the Nuba Mountains (July 8, 2011) “shocking evidence that international peacekeeping mission [in South Kordofan] did nothing to stop ethnic cleansing”: When fighting erupted in the South Kordofan state capital of Kadugli in early June, tens of thousands of terrified civilians flocked to a “safe haven” directly outside the gates of the UN Missions in Sudan (UNMIS) base. Hawa Mando, a school teacher, reached the camp for internally displaced people on 5 June with her family after fighting in the town forced her to flee her home. She witnessed government agents and irregular troops—notorious from atrocities in Darfur—known as the Popular Defence Force entering the camp hunting for people on a list of government critics. “They had lists of people they were looking for,” said the mother of seven. “Local spies would point people out and they would shoot them.” She continued: “In front of my eyes I saw six people shot dead. They just dragged the bodies away by their feet like slaughtered sheep. People were crying and screaming and the UN soldiers just stood and watched in their watchtowers.” (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/un-accused-of-standing-by-while-sudanese-forces-killed-civilians-2308896.html/) Some of the atrocities bespeak complicity on the part of UNMIS in Kadugli, a unit dominated by the Egyptians (the UN human rights investigators were based in Khartoum): Eyewitnesses described to The Independent how they saw peacekeepers standing by while unarmed civilians were shot dead outside the gates of a UN base before being dragged away ‘like slaughtered sheep.’ They also said that local leaders have been handed over to government forces after seeking shelter with UN officials. (For a highly informed and devastating account of the despicable Egyptian performance in South Kordofan, see Julie Flint’s “Probe UN Neglect in South Kordofan,” The Daily Star[Lebanon], July 5, 2011 | http://www.dailystar.com.lb//Opinion/Commentary/2011/Jul-05/142847-probe-un-neglect-in-south-kordofan.ashx#axzz1SKMMn8nj/) Aerial bombardment of civilians, obstruction of humanitarian assistance Khartoum continues its virtually daily bombings attacks in the Nuba Mountains and elsewhere in South Kordofan, relentlessly targeting Nuba civilians (this is especially true of Antonov “bombers,” retrofitted Russian cargo planes that have no militarily useful bombing accuracy). The regime also continues to bomb in northern Unity State (Republic of South Sudan), an extremely provocative military action. Confirmed bombing attacks occurred on June 9, June 10, June 11 (two attacks), June 13, and July 2. Bombing has also occurred in the Southern states of Northern and Western Bahr el-Ghazal and Warrab. And in Darfur such attacks are as relentless as they have been for more than eight years. The consequences of these bombing attacks, especially the shrapnel-loaded barrel bombs dropped by Antonovs, have recently been chronicled—yet again (see my report and data spreadsheet chronicling aerial attacks on civilians from 1999 – May 2011, at http://www.sudanbombing.org/). The Independent reports from the Nuba Mountains: When boys and girls started arriving at his hospital with missing arms and feet, they were the first casualties of war Dr Tom Catena had seen. ‘The injuries are horrifying,’ said the mission doctor who comes from upstate New York, ‘a girl with her feet blown off, another with her abdomen sliced open.’ The victims pouring in from the villages in Sudan’s Nuba mountains were being bombed by their own government, he discovered. Grass thatch villages were being turned to charnel houses as an air force dropped bombs from the back of ageing cargo planes. The government in Khartoum insists it is targeting armed rebels but the Antonovs it is using are non-military aircraft and are randomly destructive. “The worst injuries are from the Antonovs,” said Dr Catena. “This is my first experience of war and you don’t understand the human toll until you see it. These people are being destroyed for nothing.” The only qualified doctor in an area with hundreds of thousands people, the mission hospital has about 400 patients. The doctor who arrived recently from mission work in Kenya said he was nervous at first about speaking out as hospitals were targets. “Why hold back?” he asked. “We should show what’s happening, this is the reality.” Yussef Abdullahi Kuwa reached the hospital in the north of the Kauda Valley on Sunday. The 15-year-old was playing when the bomb hit. He was unable to take cover fast enough and now half his face is missing where hot metal sliced through it. He cannot speak. “My boy has done nothing to this government,” said his father, who took three days to get him to a doctor. “We are powerless.” Children with stumps where their hands or feet should be wander around in the hospital. Sixteen-year-old Jakumo lost his left arm after helping his sister with the washing. The children had been told to lie flat when they heard planes but Jakumo forgot. “I tried to hide behind a tree instead,” he said. “But it hit me.” (“Children With Horrific Wounds Pay Price of Sudan’s Bloody War,” [dateline: Nuba Mountains], July 13 | http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/children-with-horrific-wounds-pay-price-of-sudans-bloody-war-2312664.html/) An equally grim follow-up piece was filed by Howden of The Independent on July 15: Thousands of people are sheltering in the clefts and caves of the granite slopes of the Nuba Mountains, where Sudan’s government claims it is fighting a counter-insurgency campaign against armed rebels. Iqbal al-Nur perches on a wooden cot with a baby pressed to her breast in the shadow of an immense stone. ‘We took what we could carry and came here to escape the planes,’ she says, pointing to the sky where bombers have been launching an aerial assault across the mountains. “As long as the bombing continues, we will stay.” Ms Nur, who has four children, fled with the rest of her village to the safety of the mountains. She gave birth to Ambu, who is now one week old, under a rock soon after arriving. A friend who had a child three days later had to be taken hundreds of kilometres away to the nearest doctor after the infant fell ill. “I am scared Ambu is going to get sick here with the rain and wind,” says Ms Nur, who admits she is also frightened of snakes. “I hate it here but we have no way out.” The towns and villages beneath the mountains are deserted. In Tonguli, a thatched roof is splayed on the cratered floor where it was thrown by the blast. A nearby hut has been reduced to a pile of blackened bricks. Others had their walls shredded by shrapnel. One man here was killed when a bomb ripped through his home as he slept last week. The long civil war’s end, which brought independence last week for South Sudan, has meant little in the Nuba Mountains…. But in the Tonguli mountains, Hussein al-Amin, the chief of a nearby village, reacts with rage at what was said: “We have no roads, no schools, no hospitals; this government gave us nothing. Now they bomb us and they keep bombing us even as we run away from our homes.’ He says that refugees from the bombing campaign have come from all over the northern Nuba Mountains and more are arriving every day. Residents from two towns and at least seven villages are living among the rocks. He is concerned about disease and asks if people outside Sudan can “stop the bombing.” [emphasis added] Like many of the displaced people, Moussa Zeber Ismail comes from the nearest big town, Dalami. The town has witnessed some of the worst fighting since clashes broke out in South Kordofan last month when government forces launched a campaign against Nuban rebels. The town initially fell to the rebels but has since been retaken by forces loyal to Khartoum. “Everything has been destroyed, you can’t find a school, a shop, a house, anything,” Ismail, who is a farmer, says. “They sent Antonovs [bombers] during the day while the fighting was going on. They just threw bombs everywhere, hitting everything, everyone.” The 54-year-old fled into the bush after seeing a friend sliced in half by shrapnel. ‘We hid for 18 days in the bush and then walked here. Up to now, I still don’t know who has been killed and where everyone is,” he says. (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/sudan-air-raids-force-women-and-children-to-run-to-the-hills-2314020.html/) On July 12 Associated Press reported that “the United Nations says staff in Sudan have reported heavy aerial bombardment in South Kordofan State in recent days.” What has gone insufficiently remarked is that these attacks serve as a powerful recruiting tool for the SPLM/A North, which has already more than held its own against SAF forces in ground combat, and this augurs a long war. Agence France-Presse reports from the Nuba Mountains (July 17, 2011): But despite the army’s relentless bombing campaign over the past six weeks, the insurgency shows no sign of weakening, with the SPLA claiming to control much of the ethnically divided state and the new recruits swelling its ranks. Some are young, but many are older, like Abdullah, a middle-aged travel agent from Kadugli who volunteered after fleeing the heavy fighting in the state capital last month, along with 10 friends, four of whom were killed along the way. “I lost so many in Kadugli. First, one of us was gunned down by a Dushka (anti-aircraft machine gun). Then, when we were carrying him, two more were killed by an aerial bomb. Another was killed on the way here,” he says. Others tell similar stories. Aut Maliga was a farmer in the Nuba town of Kurchi, southeast of Kadugli, where five bombs were dropped on a market on 26 June. “I joined the SPLA because I lost so many friends in the bombing, my best friends,” he says. Numerous local sources have confirmed that the air strikes on Kurchi destroyed the market and killed at least 16 civilians, including eight women and children. Another 32 people were hospitalised. The extent and sustained nature of the bombing campaign, like so many of the actions reported here, bespeak significant advance planning: it is simply not possible to conclude that what is occurring is anything but a well-organized campaign that has as its animating ambition the destruction of the Nuba people and all support for the SPLM/A, North and South. The fact of such advance planning has critical implications in assessing the legal character of these atrocity crimes. South Kordofan “De-coupled”? What, then, are we to make of the tepid and wholly ineffective response by the Obama administration to what all evidence suggests is genocide in South Kordofan? Have senior officials silently decided that in continuing negotiations with Khartoum, Abyei and the Nuba Mountains will be “de-coupled,” as Darfur was “de-coupled” last November in the putative interest of securing peace for South Sudan? Of course there is a deeply false premise implicit in such thinking, to say nothing of its moral obscenity. As most informed observers realize, the broader center-periphery conflicts that are so variously ramified throughout Sudan have too often provided Khartoum with diplomatic leverage: narrow international focus on one problem (whether South Sudan, Darfur, or again South Sudan) gives a green light to Khartoum for abusing and assaulting the marginalized areas not the focus of negotiations. This is the diplomatic complement to the regime’s well-tested policies of dividing and weakening politically (and ultimately militarily) opposition to its tyranny. Abyei and South Kordofan are fully intelligible only if this dynamic is borne in mind. But if such “de-coupling” has indeed been decided on, we are not likely to hear it explicitly acknowledged publicly, as a senior administration official did last November in speaking about Darfur. And so far, one must concede this earlier “de-coupling” has been managed deftly, so much so that it has gone unnoticed by even many presumably informed commentators. The New York Times, for example, recently concluded its editorial on the new Republic of South Sudan by declaring: The Obama administration, correctly, is not taking Sudan off its terrorism list and normalizing relations until Khartoum fulfills the peace deal and ends the conflict in Darfur. (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/09/opinion/09sat1.html?_r=2/ ) But this is simply inaccurate. Last November a senior administration official explicitly and publicly “de-coupled” the genocide in Darfur (Obama’s ongoing characterization) and the issue of Khartoum’s longstanding place on the US State Department list of terrorism-sponsoring nations. This official (identified in the State Department transcript only as “Senior Administration Official Two”) declared: One [of two new elements in U.S. Sudan policy] was to indicate that the U.S. was prepared to accelerate the removal of Sudan from the state sponsor of terrorism list if the Government of Sudan did two things. One is to fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and two, to live up to all of the legal conditions required under law for Sudan to be taken off the state sponsors list. By doing this, we would also be decoupling the state sponsor of terrorism from Darfur and from the Darfur issue.” (emphasis added) (http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/11/09/senior-administration-officials-on-developments-in-sudan/ ) The New York Times missed this and ended up by making a key claim that is simply wrong, an error that I pointed out to the Times but which they chose not to acknowledge, either by printing my (or another) letter or offering a correction to its readers. To be sure, the Times has a long tradition of weak editorials on Sudan, with a strong penchant for dodging difficult questions. But this is outright error, and reflects how badly too much of American journalism has followed Sudan’s complexities and the details of U.S. policy. More broadly, the Obama administration seems not to appreciate the scale of ongoing human suffering and ongoing destruction in Darfur, much of it directly consequent upon Khartoum’s construal of just what was meant by the Obama administration decision to “de-couple” Darfur and its people. This occurred even as the agony of Darfuris continues relentlessly. (Those interested in understanding just how terrible conditions are for civilians, especially the more than 2 million displaced civilians in camps, can do no better than to read the daily accounts that come from Radio Dabanga (http://www.radiodabanga.org/). A substantial compendium of recent reports from Radio Dabanga can be found at http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article349.html/). Given the pronounced tendency to expediency that has been evident for more than two years in the Sudan policy of the Obama administration, particularly on the part of former special envoy Scott Gration, it seems more than reasonable to ask whether in celebrating the independence of South Sudan, and engaging only narrowly on outstanding issues between North and South, Obama officials have done and said all they intend to, at least with a seriousness that could change attitudes in Khartoum. Abyei is already lost to the South; even with temporary deployment of an Ethiopian brigade (notably, and unusually, without a human rights mandate), Khartoum retains de facto military control of the region, and there are no prospects for more than 120,000 Dinka Ngok to return to their homeland. Khartoum has already threatened war if South Sudan does anything to reclaim Abyei, or even the self-determination referendum guaranteed by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, now an agreement the Obama administration is prepared to see selectively implemented. South Kordofan stands on the precipice, and there seems little to prevent its tipping over. And looming as the next crisis point in Sudan is Blue Nile [Note added October 13, 2017: On September 1, 2011, the Khartoum regime did in fact initiate hostilities in Blue Nile, with horrific consequences for civilians], also in North Sudan, where war, if it comes, simply won’t be contained. It is not clear that anyone in the Obama administration is thinking seriously about the acute threat posed by recent military developments in this remote region, even as SPLM member and governor of Blue Nile Malik Agar has warned that war becomes increasingly likely as fighting in South Kordofan continues. The UN in South Kordofan The first recommendation of the UNMIS human rights report is the only one that matters: if it is not followed, the others will be meaningless, given Khartoum’s insistence that UNMIS remove all personnel from the North, including South Kordofan (remaining personnel have, UN officials in New York have declared, no continuing mandate—even to protect civilians killed before their very eyes): [The authors of this UN human rights report recommend] that the UN Security Council mandates the establishment of a commission of inquiry or other appropriate investigative authority, including the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the violence in Southern Kordofan and violations of human rights and humanitarian laws and to identify the perpetrators or those who bear the greatest responsibility, with the view to bringing them to justice. (75.1) This recommendation that a “commission of inquiry” be established will receive broad international support, largely because it does not have a chance of being authorized by the Security Council, given the certainty of a Chinese veto. Indeed, we should recall Beijing’s recent comment on North Sudan’s place in the world. Reuters reports (July 13): The world should recognize the efforts made by Sudan in bringing peace to its southern region, now an independent state, and normalize relations with Khartoum, state media on Thursday quoted a senior Chinese diplomat as saying. (dateline: Beijing) This does not sound like a warm-up for authorizing a non-consensual human rights investigation, even if the issue is accelerating genocide, with indisputable evidence of large mass graves capable of holding many thousands of bodies, and a great many thousands of Nuba unaccounted for. But instead of focusing on the enormously challenging task of how to obtain on-the-ground confirmation of what has been so substantially and variously reported by many authoritative sources, UN officials and other international actors indulge in rhetorical posturing with no real entailments: Ban Ki-moon [while in Khartoum] urged the Sudanese Government to put place mechanisms to ensure that humanitarian operations can continue in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, and added that UN personnel need unfettered access. (UN News Center, July 15, 2011) More to the point would have been an urging that Khartoum halt its war on humanitarian operations—in Darfur and South Kordofan. The notion that the regime conducting this terrible war of attrition will “put in place mechanisms to ensure humanitarian operations can continue” is simply a means to avoid speaking about the real nature of the crisis. In fact, the regime has recently threatened to expel all humanitarian workers and operations, from both South Kordofan and Darfur: [A]n official in Khartoum’s ruling party, Gudbi-Al Mahadi, has accused aid agencies of giving logistical support to the rebels, the pro-government Sudanese Media Centre (SMC) reports. He warned the agencies that they risked ‘legal penalties’ and expulsion, SMC said. (BBC News Africa, July 13) North Sudan’s secretary for the political sector threatened Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) operating in Kordofan and Darfur with penalties or expulsion on Monday. Gudbi-Al Mahadi of Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) is reported by the pro-Khartoum Sudanese Media Centre as threatening NGOs with “legal penalties” and “halting of activities” as some were “found providing logistical support to insurgents.” No evidence was provided to support the allegations against the NGOs. But officials from the ruling party said they do not want a repeat in South Kordofan of the large humanitarian presence and the creation of camps for the displaced civilians, as has happened in Darfur.” (“Khartoum threatens NGOs in South Kordofan and Darfur with expulsion,” Sudan Tribune, July 11, 20112) The Observer also reports today on a second confidential UN human rights report, which I have not seen but which seems to comport with the one more widely leaked. It speaks specifically to the issue of Khartoum’s obstruction of relief aid: A second report details how ‘active obstruction by state authorities (in South Kordofan) has completely undermined the ability of the peacekeeping force, UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), to fulfill the most basic requirements of its mandate’ in the Nuba region. The report says the humanitarian assistance and protection provided by UNMIS have become “inconsequential” as it prepares to leave Sudan, at Khartoum’s insistence, by 31 July. (July 16, 2011) Given the terrible precedent of Khartoum’s expulsion of thirteen of the world’s most distinguished humanitarian organizations in March 2009, it would be foolish not to see the strong possibility of linkage between international action on South Kordofan and the fate of the vast humanitarian operation in Darfur on which more than 3 million people depend. Khartoum is in effect threatening relief efforts in Darfur if the regime is pressed too hard on South Kordofan; the regime counts on the international community accepting such a quid pro quo, as it has on so many other occasions. Members of the Security Council are equally facile and irrelevant, “call[ing] on the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s northern sector to agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities” in South Kordofan [emphasis added]. No mention is made in this “call” of the fact that al-Bashir and his security cabal have withdrawn from the “framework agreement” they signed in Addis Ababa on June 28, in which a cessation of hostilities agreement was indeed the primary agenda item: Al-Bashir’s decision yesterday [July 6] to quit negotiations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to end clashes in the north’s only oil producing state, Southern Kordofan, dashed chances of a quick cease-fire. The fighting in Southern Kordofan, which borders Southern Sudan, started when Sudanese troops tried to disarm members of the Nuba ethnic group who fought alongside the southern army during the civil war, according to Southern Sudan’s ruling party. Al-Bashir and his governor in Southern Kordofan, Ahmed Haroun, are wanted by the International Criminal Court over allegations they were involved in war crimes in Darfur. Sudanese President Umar al-Bashir quit talks in Ethiopia to end clashes in the northern oil- producing state of Southern Kordofan, two days before South Sudan becomes independent. “There will be no more negotiations outside Sudan,” Al- Bashir told a rally today in White Nile state in a speech televised live on the state Sudan TV station. (Bloomberg News, July 7) Bashir warned the north would hold no more foreign talks on solving internal conflicts such as violence in the northern border state of South Kordofan where the army is fighting armed groups allied to the south. Leaders of north and south had agreed on Monday in Ethiopia to continue talks on a series of issues both sides need yet to solve such as ending tensions in South Kordofan. “After the betrayal in South Kordofan [the SPLM/North] come and want to hold talks…. But we will not hold any talks in Addis Ababa or elsewhere with those who take up arms,’ he said. North Sudan would not sign any more international agreements after it wrapped up a peace accord later this month with a small group in the western region of Darfur….” (emphasis added; Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], July 7, 2011) Does anyone at the UN understand the meaning of the word “intransigence”? This seems an important question since it is Khartoum’s signature negotiating posture. No one seems willing to speak the truth about why there is nothing happening in Addis, even as nothing is gained by pretending the regime is anything but what is has repeatedly demonstrated itself to be. A last chance for the “responsibility to protect” UNMIS has been terribly ineffective over the past six and a half years, as has UNAMID in Darfur since it officially took up is mandate on January 1, 2008. At a cost of more than $2 billion per year, the international community has had a right to expect a great deal more from these two operations and from the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The humanitarian side of the UN in Sudan is just as bad in its leadership, especially Valerie Amos and the head of UN humanitarian operations in Sudan, Georg Charpentier (see http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article298.html/). Both have contributed significantly to the invisibility of Darfur’s ongoing agony. But ultimately the real power to act effectively, or not, lies with the UN Security Council, and herein lies the obvious rub. The U.S. and other member states know that any resolution authorizing an intrusive or non-consensual human rights investigation will be vetoed by China. The question, then, is what can be done in the face of such an obviously broken mechanism for responding to international crises, including incipient genocide? First, the U.S. that must decide—with as much help as possible from the Europeans, the Canadians, from Latin American countries, and from any African allies that can be found—that is will bring a resolution authorizing a robust and urgent UN human rights investigation, and thus compel China to veto it (something Beijing much prefers to threaten than actually exercise, for self-serving reasons). And then the resolution should be brought again, modified as necessary to secure a second Security Council debate (Germany is President of the Security Council this month, and we should assume the Germans will strongly support efforts to investigate widespread and compelling evidence of genocide). China will be forced to veto this second resolution, bringing an important clarity to the diplomatic and political situation. The utter futility of Security Council action would then be the backdrop for a nonconsensual investigation of atrocity crimes in South Kordofan, one without UN auspices. If genocide or crimes against humanity are found, as they quickly will be, the entire world will again face the same question that was before it in April 1994, when Romo Dallaire made his well-known plea for 5,000 men to give the UN enough leverage to end the Rwandan genocide. But we are not looking at 100 days of slaughter; rather, the real concern must be for how to stop Khartoum’s grim extermination by starvation and denial of humanitarian access to the Nuba Mountains, coupled with aerial bombing that is destroying the current agricultural cycle. The killing of Nuba in Kadugli is winding down: people are already dead or have fled to the countryside or to the South. What will it take to stop this current genocide? What protection can be provided to those now ethnically targeted on a vast scale? There are no simple military answers, though there are some; but since there is no political will in any event, it would seem simply posing the question takes us as far as we can go. U.S. ambassador to the UN Susan Rice has already explicitly and preemptively taken any U.S. military response off the table. Those nations and organizations that have in the past supported the ideal of a “responsibility to protect” endangered civilians, unprotected or attacked by their own government, must decide whether this much-touted ideal really means something, and if so, what it entails in circumstances like those presently threatening the Nuba people in South Kordofan. Darfur is a recent and defining example of the failure of the “responsibility to protect”: the conflict and genocidal destruction began well before the UN World Summit Outcome Document was issued in September 2005—and continues 6 years after all member states of the UN declared that they were …prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. (UN World Summit “outcome document” on “the responsibility to protect,” Paragraph 139) (http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf/) Darfur would seem to have sounded the death knell for any meaningful commitment to the “responsibility to protect,” but South Kordofan offers one last opportunity. Real hope, however, seems entirely unwarranted. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

In the final week of August 2017 the pristine Ukhia–Teknaf region of the southeast tip of Bangladesh, adjoining the Arakan state of Burma, had a rude awakening. The locals experienced an influx of refugees. Within weeks, parts of the long stretch of the Cox's Bazar–Teknaf road were bursting at the seams with the incoming Rohingya refugees, mostly women and children. They were pouring in “like the gush of a broken dam”, as one resident of Gundhum put it. Most of the uninvited guests were wandering around the area under the scorching summer sun or drenched in the pouring monsoon rain without any cover, not knowing what to do next—where to go, where to find water and food for their thirsty and starving children, a shed for a mother who just gave birth, and medical attention for an elderly who desperately needed it. The residents of Teknaf–Ukhia were faced with this unforeseen development at a time the state authorities based in Dhaka officially declared the Rohingyas as “infiltrators” and ordered the border guards to deport any “illegal Myanmar nationals”. Reportedly, as a senior official of the security force was reiterating the directive to his subordinates, he was interrupted by the blare of helicopter gunships firing on Rohingyas just across the border. Faced with the enormity of the refugee inflow and the burgeoning public opinion in favour of providing them asylum, both at home and abroad, the state authorities in Bangladesh had to come to terms with the futility of non-admission and push-back initiatives. They had little choice but to alter their course in dealing with the crisis. By then, tens of thousands of Rohingyas had fallen victim to unscrupulous fixers and boatmen, who extorted vast sums of money and other assets from the fleeing refugees to facilitate border crossing and find them safe passage. Press reports at the time inform that there was a 6,000 percent hike in river crossing tolls; refugees were paid 1/16th of the official rate of exchange rate while converting money and forced to sell gold at 1/8th of the prevailing market rate; and the fees to smuggle them to other parts of the country varied between USD 1,200 to USD 6,200. By the time the state authorities acknowledged the reality and decided to admit the Rohingyas, the Eid holidays set in, nearly paralysing the civil administration for days. Despite the best of intentions, it took several days, if not weeks, to shore up the official relief effort. In the mean time it was the ordinary folks of Ukhia and Teknaf, of all creeds and classes, who shared their own meals; provided shelter in their homes, yards and land; allowed them to use their kitchens and toilets; helped them in nourishing their starving children and caring for the elderly; and patiently listened to the harrowing tales of losing loved ones that eased the pain of their uninvited guests. In their effort to help the refugees, the locals were joined by hordes of fellow Bangladeshis, young and old, coming from even far-flung districts of Kurigram, Satkhira and Sylhet, and mobilising resources of various types and volumes from their own families, schools, mosques and communities to ameliorate the sufferings of the refugees. Very soon they were joined by specialised agencies such as Ganoshastho Kendra, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Action Against hunger (ACF), Ad-Din, and Zakat Foundations and BRAC. In order to provide space for building shelters to other incoming refugees, many local households endured severe losses as matured trees were felled in the land that were taken as lease from the government. Fields full of crop were damaged by spontaneous human movement. Fishing folks searching for fish fries were suddenly faced with a huge number of new competitors. With the sharp increase of new entrants in the local market desperately looking for work, the wage of local workers, including those in the construction, deep sea fishing, and vehicle plying sectors, registered a drop. People of all walks of life were faced with a steep rise of price of essentials, with BDT 80 being the lowest price of any vegetable, at least double the price in pre-August 25. Fares of all transportation, including rickshaws, registered an increase by 100 to 200 percent. The arrival of consultants, aid workers, and relief activities has shored up the rental cost of vans and heavy vehicles, as well as that of flats and houses, by many times. Thus, while the people of Bangladesh in other regions empathise with the hapless Rohingyas, and among them the compassionate and active try their best to raise funds for Rohingya relief, it is the people of Ukhia and Teknaf who are bearing the brunt of the refugee flow. It was the ordinary folks of Ukhia and Teknaf, of all creeds and classes, who shared their own meals; provided shelter in their homes, yards and land; allowed them to use their kitchens and toilets; helped them in nourishing their starving children and caring for the elderly. Photo: Anisur Rahman Ukhia–Teknaf is one of the most economically depressed regions of the country. Roughly, these two unions cover an area of 651 square kilometres and is home to about 500,000 inhabitants. Post-August 25, this region now hosts an almost equal number of refugees. This is not the first time the area is hosting refugees. In 1978 and 1991–92, it hosted 280,000 and 250,000 Rohingyas respectively. Prior to the recent influx in post-August, it hosted around 300,000 of what the government preferred to term as “undocumented Myanmar nationals” (UMN). News reports inform that a mega-camp fitting 800,000 has been planned around the vicinity in the existing Kutupalong camp. The government plans to bring all Rohingyas including the UMNs in the planned camp and has allocated 2000 acres of land. Construction of 150,000 sheds has been planned; of this, more than 75,000 sheds have so far been constructed to accommodate Rohingya refugees. The entire camp will be divided into 20 blocks with each block having an administrative unit to facilitate all kinds of services. The construction of a nine-kilometre-long electricity line is underway. Sources inform that a road will be built by the army to connect the facility with the main road. There is palpable disgruntlement in the local community about the way the refugee situation is being addressed. Local leaders, elected functionaries, civil society activists, and intelligentsia appear to be in unison that authorities in Dhaka have not provided them with any meaningful space and opportunity to voice their concerns and offer their suggestions to what may turn out to be a protracted refugee situation. The holding of a long session on October 4 of a minister, local MP, secretary, DG NGO Affairs Bureau and district high officials with local leaders and activists is no substitute to a sustained engagement for formulating a well-thought-out strategy for a crisis that has captured the world's attention and will have an immense impact on the lives and livelihood of half a million people of Ukhia and Teknaf. There is a near consensus of the local people on several matters. Firstly, they are at a loss as to why what for decades they understood to be a refugee problem was being labelled as a problem of “infiltrators” initially, and now as “destitute Myanmar nationals”. In this regard, the representative of a local development organisation views that such a shift in labelling will undermine the role of the Rohingya Refugee Repatriation Commissioner, the line agency under the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, with whose office they had developed working modalities on refugees for decades. Some felt putting another agency not guided by the UN normative framework as the lead international counterpart actor instead of UNHCR would be an exercise in re-inventing the wheel. “This may result in immense sufferings to the refugees”, an activist with years of experience on refugee management on the ground observes. Secondly, locals are apprehensive about the feasibility of the proposed a mega-camp. They pondered why the simple logic of rendering services to separate camps of 20,000 residents each would be more inefficient than rendering services to a single camp of 800,000. They felt that the concentration of such a massive number of traumatised people in a confined space would jeopardise their own security, as the mobilisation of a fraction of that number, say of 10,000, for a right or wrong cause based on fact or fiction, may have disastrous law and order implications. Moreover, an epidemic of any sort may also take a huge toll. Inadequate and improper water treatment and sewer facilities will be a breeding ground for such outbreaks. The locals also feel that sinking of thousands shallow tubewells and hundreds of deep tubewells for extracting ground water in a region that is known to be water scarce, in all likelihood will lead to further subsidence of the groundwater table, with adverse impacts not only on drinking water but also on water for irrigation purposes. This is not the first time the area [Ukhia-Teknaf] is hosting refugees. In 1978 and 1991–92, it hosted 280,000 and 250,000 Rohingyas respectively. Prior to the recent influx in post-August, it hosted around 300,000 of what the government preferred to term as “undocumented Myanmar nationals” (UMN). Photo: Anisur Rahman Thirdly, after the initial phase of emergency response, any strategy to deal with the refugee population has to factor in the needs of the local population. For a region that straddles in the red zone of the poverty map, the huge burden of the extra population has to be compensated by developing a mechanism that addresses the insecurity of the locals and covers “health, education, gender development, infrastructure, environment preservation and other support”. They insist that this provision be incorporated into the Rohingya strategy and also in the forms of the NGO Affairs Bureau. Fourthly, the locals feel that aid efforts are being seriously impaired by the endless visits of local and foreign dignitaries. State protocol demands that the Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police greet in person some of the VVIPs and they be escorted with contingents of armed police to ensure safe movements. “Can we afford such luxuries at a time when the nation is in emergency mode”, some ask. Visits, speeches, and photo sessions of ministers, MPs, and sundry in the refugee camps only reflect how insensitive they are of the urgency of the situation. Perhaps time has come to remind the VIPs during their incoming flight to Cox's Bazar the adage that acts of genuine charity demand that the left hand does not get to know what the right hand gives! And finally, local NGOs feel they have been marginalised. The obsession of UN agencies and bilateral donors to assign responsibility of distribution of certain provisions to a mega-NGO, which thus far had very limited engagement and experience in refugee management, is deeply resented. Contesting the “total and single handle approach” in taking care of food supply and education, they demand allowing local Civil Society Organisations (CSO) a role for “ensuring innovation and diversification”. In a note to the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under Secretary General to Office of the Humanitarian Affairs who visited Cox's Bazar in early October they observed such an approach is contrary to the principle of “equitable and dignified partnership for an accountable and sustainable growth of CSOs in Bangladesh”. The local organisations were unequivocal in demanding that they should not be seen as “local implementers/partners” but as “decision making partners”. Their list of demands include hiring local consultants, staff members and vendors for supplying goods and services; non-poaching of local staff members by mega-NGOs and international agencies; and publication of project and aid data along the lines of International Aid Transparency Initiative principles. The above narrative adequately establishes the point that refugee management is a complex and multi-faceted challenge. The best way to meet this challenge is through making decisions with a participatory process. The people of Ukhia and Teknaf have demonstrated their courage and fortitude in facing a challenge of mammoth magnitude. Despite severe resource constraints, they have remained resolute in upholding the dignity of the refugees, sacrificing their own interests. It's time that those at the helm of the state acknowledge their contribution and ensure their voices are heeded in planning and implementing the refugee management strategy. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Daily STar

The decision by Burundi’s National Council for Communication (CNC) to strip four broadcast media outlets of their licences and to suspend a radio station for three months will have disastrous consequences for the country’s already fragile media pluralism and for the safety of its journalists, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) says. Announcing the decision on 28 September, CNC vice-president and spokesperson Aimée-Divine Niyokwizigirwa said Radio Publique Africaine, Radio Bonesha, Radio Renaissance and Télévision Renaissance were having their licences rescinded for spending more than three months without broadcasting and for “failing to sort out their judicial status in time.” The withdrawal of the licences of four broadcast media outlets that were no longer broadcasting is more than an administrative formality because their journalists were continuing to cover the news in Burundi on the websites and YouTube TV channels that these outlets are now running. Niyokwizigirwa told RSF that that the licence revocation applied to all aspects of the activities of these media outlets, meaning that their websites are also now banned. This could have grave consequences for their reporters in Burundi, both for their safety and their ability to keep working. They were already constantly harassed by the authorities, who accused them of working for illegal media. Now the authorities have grounds for claiming that they are illegal. “By rescinding the licences of these media, the CNC is excluding any possibility of their resuming broadcasting in the future, although they have for years acted as the voice of all those who could not obtain any answers to their problems from the authorities,” said RSF’s Africa desk. “The CNC is helping the government to pursue its planned suppression of media pluralism in Burundi. Even if they deny it, the Burundian authorities do not tolerate any comments on the country’s security situation.” The regime’s hostility towards these four media outlets no longer needs to be demonstrated. The grounds given for withdrawing their licences do not lack irony given that all four were the victims of arson or heavy-weapon attacks that forced them to stop broadcasting during the failed military coup against President Nkurunziza in May 2015. Thereafter, they remained closed on the orders of the authorities, on the official grounds that the attacks against them were the subject of a judicial investigation, although its findings were never released. The CNC’s vice-president was also unable to provide any information about the state of the investigation. International warrants were subsequently issued for the directors of these media outlets because they were accused of abetting the coup attempt by broadcasting information about it while it was under way. No criticism tolerated As well as completely neutralizing media outlets that have traditionally been independent, the CNC is also now cracking down on the least sign of criticism from media that have usually been more docile. The CNC announced that it was suspending the radio station of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Burundi, CCIB FM+, for three months for violating “professional ethics and the media law” in a 18 September editorial. The editorial criticized the lack of any government reaction to the massacre of 36 Burundian refugees in Kamanyola, in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo, on 15 September. It also mentioned the lack of adequate investigations into the bodies that regularly appear on the streets of Bujumbura and other parts of the country. The CNC said the editorial also violated the terms of CCIB FM+’s licence, under which it is supposed to “focus above all on covering and promoting the private sector.” This was also the grounds given by the radio station when it announced that it was firing its manager, Eddy-Claude Nininahazwe, in an attempt to ingratiate itself with the CNC, although he had in fact resigned the day before he was fired. Nininahazwe said he stood by what he said in the editorial, citing the station’s right to editorial independence. He also pointed out that the widespread violence was contributing to an unfavourable business climate. He is not the only person to criticize the violence against civilians. A report issued by the UN Commission of Inquiry on Burundi on 4 September urged the International Criminal Court to open an investigation into what it called a “general or systematic attack against the civilian population.” Government spokesman Willy Nyamitwe described the report as part of a western plot to destabilize Burundi, where UN experts have not been welcome since October 2016. Burundi is ranked 160th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index, after falling 15 places in the past two years. _______________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reporters Without Borders

Reporters Without Borders (RSF), ARTICLE 19 and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) condemn the decision by the US government to end its membership of the UN Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), effective December 31, 2018. It is a serious blow to the work of the international community to strengthen press freedom and the free flow of information globally, and will make the world less safe for journalists and other communicators. We call on the US government to reverse this decision, and strengthen its commitments to multilateral organizations that promote freedom of expression – a core value to international human rights law and the US Constitution. UNESCO, founded in 1945, is responsible for coordinating international cooperation in education, science, culture and communication. One of its main objectives is to promote the respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms. It also has a specific mandate to promote “the free flow of ideas by word and image; it works to foster free, independent and pluralistic media in print, broadcast and online.” The departure of the US from the body, described by UNESCO Director General Irina Bokova as “a loss for multilateralism”, is also a significant blow to international efforts to protect and promote freedom of expression, in particular press freedom. UNESCO has recorded the killings of close to 1000 journalists and media workers since 2007, and is the lead UN agency tasked with ensuring the implementation of the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and Issue of Impunity. Support for UNESCO is therefore intrinsically linked to ensuring that journalists are safe to do their work, including in some of the most dangerous countries. At a time when the world is becoming less safe for journalists, and when restrictions on freedom of expression are multiplying, US withdrawal from UNESCO is deeply troubling, especially when coupled with recent vocal attacks on independent and critical media by US President Donald Trump. “US withdrawal from UNESCO shows that President Trump’s attacks on critical media are more than empty rhetoric, but indicative of a significant shift in the administration away from championing freedom of expression worldwide,” said Thomas Hughes, Executive Director of ARTICLE 19. “Protecting free speech and ensuring journalists’ safety, core US values, requires investing in multilateralism, not running away from it”, he added. “The US decision to exit UNESCO is a concrete example of the current administration’s contempt for journalism and press freedom,“ says Christophe Deloire, RSF’s Secretary General. “US withdrawal is an attempt to weaken the important work of UNESCO, when on the contrary, it is paramount that it be strengthened at a time when journalists are repeatedly targeted for simply doing their job.” “UNESCO plays a critical role in promoting the safety of journalists around the world and U.S. withdrawal will weaken UNESCO's ability to address global press freedom violations, creating a power vacuum that could very well be filled by governments that embrace authoritarian tactics," said Courtney Radsch, advocacy director at the Committee to Protect Journalists. "This decision will have global implications for decades to come.” The US has stated that its decision to withdraw from UNESCO is in part premised on its mounting arrears to the organization, but also on a need for fundamental reforms, including to address an alleged “anti-Israel bias” in the agency. This is the second time the US has left UNESCO, having withdrawn in 1984 to join again in 2003. In 2011, the US withdrew a substantial proportion of its funding to the organization in retaliation for it giving full membership to the State of Palestine. While the US has indicated that it will remain in observer status at UNESCO, it will have substantially less influence to shape reforms within the agency from the outside. RSF, ARTICLE 19, and CPJ call on the US government to reverse its decision to withdraw from UNESCO, and instead commit to invest in the institution to increase its effectiveness and impact, including in protecting and promoting freedom of expression, and securing an end to impunity for attacks on journalists. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reporters Without Boarders

The jail sentence that a Turkish court has passed on Wall Street Journal reporter Ayla Albayrak over her coverage of clashes between Kurdish separatists and Turkish security forces is disproportionate and intended to limit the activities of foreign journalists in Turkey, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) says. The Wall Street Journal announced on Tuesday that Albayrak, who has Turkish and Finnish dual nationality, has been sentenced in absentia to two years and one month in prison on a “terrorist propaganda” charge. She was in New York when the sentence was passed and plans to appeal. She was convicted in connection with an August 2015 article for which she went to Silopi, in southeastern Turkey, to cover fighting between government forces and members of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). “We condemn this arbitrary and disproportionate sentence targeting a journalist whose only crime was to go into the field and report the facts, and thereby do her job,” RSF said. “We think the court’s decision is designed to discourage foreign journalists thinking of going to Turkey, and to restrict their activities there.” Albayrak has been working for the Wall Street Journal’s Istanbul bureau since 2010, covering Turkish politics, the situation of Syrian refugees, and Turkey’s Kurdish minority. Her conviction comes amid steadily mounting diplomatic tension between Turkey and the United States, in which both have just suspended issuing visas to the other country’s citizens. Turkey’s already worrying media situation has become critical under the state of emergency proclaimed after a coup attempt in July 2016. Around 150 media outlets have been closed, mass trials are being held and more than 100 journalists are currently in prison – a world record. Foreign journalists are no longer spared. Several dozen have been expelled in the past two years and some are still being held. They include Deniz Yücel, a journalist with German and Turkish dual nationality. Turkey is ranked 155th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reporters Without Boarders

ou are cordially invited by the Institute for the Study of Genocide and the Cardozo Law Institute in Holocaust and Human Rights to the 2017 Lemkin Book Award Ceremony to honor this year's selected winner, Benjamin Madley's 'An American Genocide: The United States and the California Indian Catastrophe' (Yale, 2016). 2017 Raphael Lemkin Book Award Ceremony Tuesday, October 17, 2017 5 - 7 p.m. Third Floor Lounge Cardozo School of Law 55 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10003 The ceremony will include a public talk with Professor Madley, as well as a discussion led by Professor Karl Jacoby of Columbia University's Department of History and Center for the Study of Ethnicity and Race. The biennial award is for the best nonfiction work that focuses on explanations of genocide, crimes against humanity, state mass killings and gross violations of human rights, and strategies to prevent such crimes and violations. The award committee chose 'An American Genocide' for its meticulous and exhaustive research, theoretical sophistication, and focus on bringing to light an important case of genocide that has received little attention in research and broader public discourse. Attendance is free, but please register here: https://www.eventbrite.com/e/2017-lemkin-book-award-ceremony-tickets-37922352778 _______________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Cardozo Law Institute in Holocaust and Human Rights

Efrain Rios Montt stands during a pause in a hearing at the Supreme Court of Justice in Guatemala City, November 19, 2013. | Photo: Reuters The 91-year-old retired general has senile dementia and will be represented in court by two lawyers. The former Guatemalan dictator Efrain Rios Montt will face a second trial on Friday for genocide, a lawyer for victims said, reviving a case against the man accused of ordering massacres of Maya people during a long civil war. Rios Montt, who ruled Guatemala in 1982 and 1983 after a military coup, was convicted of genocide four years ago along with another military officer but the ruling was overturned. A Supreme Court tribunal will hear the case, Edgar Perez, a lawyer for the relatives of victims who have led a years long campaign against Rios Montt, said on Wednesday. The 91-year-old retired general was diagnosed with senile dementia in 2015. He will be represented in court by two lawyers and will not make a personal appearance. The lawyers were not immediately available for comment. The new trial will revisit the earlier accusations that Rios Montt ordered massacres leading to deaths of at least 1,771 Ixil Mayan people during his 17-month rule. Rios Montt maintains his innocence, saying junior officers acted without his knowledge. Guatemala's 1960-1996 civil war led to the deaths of more than 200,000 people and was the bloodiest among the conflicts seen in Latin America during the era. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Telesur

Executive Summary Long spared by the Sahel’s armed groups, Burkina Faso now faces increasingly frequent and lethal attacks in its north. Although this insecurity in large part is an extension of the Malian conflict, the crisis has strong local dynamics. Ansarul Islam, the group behind much of the violence, which often is portrayed as tied to jihadists elsewhere in the Sahel, is first and foremost a movement challenging the prevailing social order in Soum province, in Burkina’s Sahel region. While military operations reasserted the state’s control in the spring of 2017, the crisis is far from over. Ouagadougou and its foreign partners recognise that their response requires more than military offensives and that a definitive resolution of the crisis hinges in part on the situation in Mali. However, their approach needs to better take account of the local and social roots of the crisis, which are more profound than its religious and security dimensions. In its early stages, Ansarul Islam, founded by Malam Ibrahim Dicko, a preacher from Soum, is a manifestation of widespread discontent at the province’s social order. For years, Malam promoted equality between classes and questioned the dominance of traditional chiefs and the monopolisation of religious authority by marabout families – religious leaders – whom he accuses of enriching themselves at the population’s expense. This rhetoric earned him a wide audience, especially among young people and socially disadvantaged sectors of the population. His turn to violence lost him many followers, but his movement retains enough support to continue a low-intensity insurgency against local and national authorities. Reports of his death during the spring 2017 military operations have not been confirmed and in any case would not end the crisis. A product of local socio-political and cultural conditions, Ansarul Islam is at least as much a social uprising as it is a religious movement. It is less a group critical of modernity than a movement that rejects traditions it believes archaic. It expresses the grievances of a silent majority that holds neither political power nor religious authority. Ansarul Islam uses Islam to frame its opposition to an ossified social order that breeds widespread frustration. Nor is the movement primarily a self-defence group for Fulani, who are in the majority in the Sahel region. Ethnic and identity-based grievances for now assume a marginal role in its discourse. The distant relationship between state and populations in Burkina’s Sahel region also fuels the crisis. The contrast between the north’s economic potential and its lack of infrastructure feeds a sense of abandonment amongst its population. As in central Mali, local communities see state representatives and security forces as foreigners trying to enrich themselves rather than state agents responsible for providing services. As a result, Soum inhabitants are reluctant to cooperate with security forces who are often from other provinces and whose behaviour is sometimes brutal. The northern Burkina crisis is also more than a mere reflection of the situation in central Mali. Ansarul Islam uses Mali as a support base and similarities on both sides of the border exist. But the surge of violence supposedly committed in the name of jihad distracts from conflict’s extremely local and social dimensions and the ability of armed groups to exploit social divides. Insecurity in northern Burkina is due not only to the development deficit, the central state’s failure to understand a territory in its peripheries, or the spillover from its neighbour’s war. It is above all the result of a profound social crisis in the north. Divisions between masters and subjects, rulers and ruled, ancient and modern provide the base upon which Malam Dicko’s popularity grew. A definitive resolution of the crisis depends in part on Mali’s stabilisation as well as the implementation of effective development plans by the government and its partners. More importantly, though, it requires devising a more balanced social order and for local communities to resolve their differences. In this context, the government’s efforts to address the crisis should factor in the following points: Formulate responses that take into account the social and local dimensions of the crisis. While the local order continues to provoke frustration and conflict, ending the crisis will be hard. The scope for government action in this respect is limited: it should not seek to upend a centuries-old social order. The onus should be on local actors to devise solutions adapted to local circumstances. The government and its international partners can at best encourage intercommunal and inter-generational dialogue. Reduce the gulf between security forces and authorities and the local population. Several measures could help: improving intelligence and providing informants better protection; encouraging security forces and the civil service to recruit Fulani (without imposing quotas); boosting joint civil-military activities; prioritising the appointment of Fulani speakers as civil servants and security officials in the Sahel; and severely punishing abuses by officials. Place greater emphasis in the Sahel region emergency program – the development component of the government’s response – on promoting herding, improving justice provision and fighting corruption. Supporting livestock breeding and addressing the dysfunction in the judicial system and the scourge of corruption in the administration would reduce negative perceptions of the state and show it can be useful to the public. Work toward strengthening, in the long term, judicial and police cooperation between Mali and Burkina. This would facilitate investigations that have ramifications in both countries and the management and prosecution of prisoners and suspects. Ouagadougou/Dakar, 12 October 2017 I.Introduction In 2015, Burkina joined the group of Sahel countries under attack from armed and criminal groups that are mainly based in Mali but that also operate from several countries in the region. The area most affected by these attacks is the Sahel region, in the north of the country, on the border with Mali and Niger. However, it was only after the attack on Nassoumbou, in Soum province in December 2016, that the Burkina authorities finally understood that the crisis was caused by local dynamics as well as by the crisis in neighbouring Mali. This report focuses on the province of Soum, epicentre of the conflict and birthplace of the Ansarul Islam group led by Malam Ibrahim Dicko, but also examines the situation in other provinces in the Sahel region (Oudalan, Séno and Yagha) as well as along the country’s other borders, which are also vulnerable. Soum is mainly populated by Fulani, Burkina’s second largest ethnic group. According to the 2006 census, the figures from which need to be treated with caution, the mother tongue of 56 per cent of the Sahel region’s population is Fulfulde, the Fulani language. Several interlocutors estimate that around 70 to 75 per cent of the population in the Sahel region is Fulani. The main subdivisions of this ethnic group are the noble classes and groups descended from slaves, called Rimaibé. The Rimaibé were originally indigenous population groups who were conquered and assimilated by the Fulani. Today, Fulani and Rimaibé are included in the same Fulani ethnic group. They share the same culture, the same language and often have identical family names. Nevertheless, there is still a clear divide. In the words of one Fulani representative: “Everybody knows their place”. In Soum, the indigenous inhabitants, the Kurumba, also called the Fulsé, are in a minority. Some Mossi (Burkina’s majority ethnic group) and members of other groups also live in the province. The Sahel region’s precolonial history explains its current social and political organisation. Between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, Fulani herders from the Inner Niger Delta evicted sedentary farmers and established Fulani domination. The new social hierarchy included nobles and royal families, marabout (Muslim preacher) families, artisans, blacksmiths, weavers, griots (West African story tellers), slave descendants, etc. The Fulani never managed to establish a single political entity, but used Islam as a route to emancipation from animist sedentary peoples. This resembles the current situation in which groups with a Fulani majority are in armed conflict with a central government dominated by the Bambara in Mali and the Mossi in Burkina. The current social revolt in Soum is not therefore trying to restore the Massina Empire, of which they were never part, or the Kingdom of Jelgooji, which never existed as a unified political entity, but rather a continuation of past struggles using other methods and a reflection of the divisions that have troubled the province down through history. This report, which continues Crisis Group’s research into how to address the increase in violent extremism, analyses the root causes of the crisis, which has its origins in an ossified and unequal social order. It emphasises the need to provide a long-term response that is not only military and that takes account of the social dimensions of the crisis. It also evaluates the military response initiated at the beginning of 2017. Although these military operations have reasserted government control, the authorities and their partners have no grounds to adopt a triumphalist attitude. The attacks continue and even if Malam should die, the jihadist groups know how to adapt to the new situation better than the armies that fight them. This report is based on about 50 interviews with members of the security forces, local and national authorities, the government and the opposition, civil society, researchers and the population of Soum. These interviews were mainly conducted between January and May 2017 in Ouagadougou and Djibo. President of the Centre of Quranic Masters of Burkina Faso (right) and a colleague speak to Crisis Group's West Africa Analyst Cynthia Ohayon in Ouagadougou, on 10 October 2017.CRISIS GROUP/Julie David de Lossy II.The Social Roots of the Crisis A.Malam Ibrahim Dicko, from the Radio to Jihad The main protagonist of the crisis in Soum is the founder of Ansarul Islam, Malam Ibrahim Dicko. His real name is Boureima Dicko and he was born into a marabout family in a place called Soboulé, in the province of Soum. He is (or was) about 40 years old. Malam, who is in fragile health, studied at conventional and Koranic schools in Burkina and Mali, and went on to teach in Niger. In 2009, he began preaching in many villages in Soum, where he appointed local representatives, and on two popular radio stations, La Voix du Soum and La radio lutte contre la désertification (LRCD). He preached at a now-closed mosque in Djibo on Fridays. In 2012, the authorities officially recognised his association, al-Irchad. Malam’s skill as an orator and anti-establishment discourse drew a large audience throughout the province (see section II.B). He found it easy to fund the almost daily radio broadcasting of his sermons, apparently with external financial aid. Burkina’s transition government blocked funding for the construction of several mosques, which fuelled the resentment of Malam and his followers toward the sons of marabouts and princes of Soum, whom they accused of using their influence in Ouagadougou to prevent the construction of mosques connected to al-Irchad. The radical nature of Malam’s speeches led the local, traditional and religious authorities to ring alarm bells, but nobody took any genuine preventative action.For a while, Malam was reportedly placed under the surveillance of security services during Blaise Compaoré’s regime, but they probably lost track of him following the destabilisation of the security apparatus caused by the fall of the regime. He was arrested by the French Operation Serval in September 2013 in Tessalit, northern Mali, in possession of a large sum of euros, according to some sources. After a spell in prison in Bamako, he was released in 2015. In Mali, he is reported to have met his mentor Hamadoun Koufa, leader of the Macina Liberation Front, an armed group active in central Mali, during 2015. At the beginning of 2016, the emir of Djibo and the grand imam, whose daughter Malam married, disowned him. He then repudiated his wife and took to the bush, losing most of his followers in the process. Only a close circle of loyal supporters followed him to Mali for training. From there, he tried to eliminate his former comrades.Ansarul Islam has a strong tendency toward settling accounts, which led one locally elected representatives to fear that a “cycle of vengeance” would be established in the long term. The attack on the Nassoumbou military base on 16 December 2016, reportedly led by Ansarul Islam and the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) cost the lives of twelve Burkina soldiers and made Ansarul Islam’s existence official. In June 2017, the unauthenticated publication of a Facebook page claiming to be from Ansarul Islam said that Jafar Dicko, Malam’s younger brother, had succeeded him at the head of the movement. This information corroborated the feeling among Burkina security sources that Malam may have died of wounds sustained during the military offensives in the spring. In the absence of formal proof or the confirmation or otherwise by Ansarul Islam, doubts remain. B.The Challenge to an Ossified and Unequal Social Order Whether Malam is dead or alive, his ideas and dissent have swept the province and become firmly established. First, he denounces marabout families for enriching themselves by using their status of sole legitimate holders of religious authority to extort money from the population. This reflected the division between the traditional marabout families, who have historic legitimacy and within which the imamate is passed down on a hereditary basis, and a new generation of Muslim scholars who believe that religious authority should no longer be the prerogative of a minority. Malam challenges the right of the imams from these families to be the only ones authorised to lead prayers or give opinions on religious matters, especially as they do not always have the required knowledge. Mastery of Arabic lends credibility to this new generation of scholars in the eyes of the population. Malam also denounces the all-powerful nature of traditional chefferies (traditional leaders). This challenge to the social order drives the questioning of traditional practices that, according to Malam, are not prescribed by Islam, such as gifts of money to marabouts at ceremonies, dowries or the organisation of costly parties to celebrate marriages and baptisms. A marriage can cost as much as CFA500,000 (€760), ten times the urban monthly minimum wage. This rhetoric prompts support from the most disadvantaged because it removes a financial burden. Malam also contests the hierarchical relationships between descendants of masters, the Fulani, and the descendants of slaves, the Rimaibé. Although slavery was abolished in the colonial period, there is still a marked division between these two groups. Malam justifies his anti-establishment discourse by affirming it is in line with pure Islam and not perverted by tradition. For example, he says social inequalities are contrary to Islam. He uses Islam to challenge an ossified and unequal social order and practices that are no longer in line with the aspirations of the population. In this region, the Muslim religion is more of a tradition than a religious practice per se. It is not uncommon for princes to drink alcohol and it is forbidden to greet anyone by saying “salam aleikoum” in the courts of the chiefs. Although Malam’s movement is mainly composed of Fulani and Rimaibé, it is not strongly ethnic in character. His discourse certainly calls on the Fulani to defend themselves from the many humiliations to which they are subjected, although he does not openly say this in his sermons. But when he preaches equality between the Fulani and the Rimaibé, he is trying to reduce ethnic divisions. Moreover, there are not only Fulani and Rimaibé in his movement. Most of his followers are Fulani and Rimaibé because his sermons are in Fulfulde and most inhabitants of the Sahel region are from these communities, both of them Fulfulde-speaking. Malam also says “we are the Rimaibé of the whites”, revealing an unsurprising anti-Western dimension. In 2009-2010, Malam’s sermons had a considerable impact throughout Soum. A revealing anecdote illustrates his success: an old elected representative of the province tells how a party activist one day suggested postponing their meeting, because “Malam is on the radio”. Malam lost most of his followers when he resorted to violence, which suggests that although his discourse was successful, not many people believe that the armed struggle can provide a solution. Some of his ideas have taken hold in Soum. For example, it is now rare for a marriage to involve a party with dancing, flutes and drums as per the Fulani tradition. His discourse has proved particularly attractive to young people and the more disadvantaged social sectors because he styles himself as a “defender of the poor” and a “liberator” who wants to lighten the weight of archaic and restrictive traditions.The Rimaibé, the lowest social class in Fulani society in Soum, are naturally very receptive to his calls for equality. His success reflects a generational division between older people, who are inclined to preserve tradition, and young people, who are ready to challenge the status quo as they seek to find a place for themselves in society. The same former elected representative tells how, during the Tabaski festival, a young follower of Malam criticised the practice according to which imams are the first to sacrifice their sheep. Those close to the imam belittled him and said he should not talk about the imam in this way. While Malam was head of the al-Irchad association, it attracted support from government employees, especially teachers. Al-Irchad helped some of them to repay debts as contracting debt is contrary to Islam. Some teachers were implicated in smuggling illegal goods, which would explain Ansarul Islam’s wish to eliminate them and stop them from denouncing their former comrades. This gives credence to the impression that Ansarul Islam is targeting schools. However, although some schools have been threatened (although there have been no claims of responsibility), the attacks on teachers seem to be reprisals against former comrades (and potential informants to the security forces) rather than a wish to attack Western schools. The teacher killed at the beginning of March 2017, Salif Badini, was a former al-Irchad member and he had reportedly become an informer of the security forces. The Ansarul Islam phenomenon is therefore the product of socio-political and cultural realities in Soum. It expresses the grievances of the silent majority that holds neither political power nor religious authority. It is not so much an Islamist challenge to modernity as a rejection of traditions that perpetuate an ossified society that breeds frustration. This phenomenon, which has deep local roots, seems to have attracted support from groups in neighbouring Mali, which gives it regional ramifications. C.A Distant Relationship with the Government Local perception of the government as being distant and incapable of providing services also explains the increasing support for Malam’s movement. People feel that the government has abandoned the Sahel region and has not made the best of its economic potential. However, the Sahel region has the second lowest individual poverty rate in the country. It is more the contrast between the region’s rich agricultural, pastoral and mining resources and its lack of development that causes frustration. Poor infrastructure, especially the roads, a limited number of health centres and schools, lack of water and electricity supply make it seem that “all the indicators are in the red”. The drought and the low water tables hold back the region’s main economic activities, which are agriculture and livestock farming. Djibo, the province’s administrative centre, is home to the country’s biggest cattle market, but the town’s roads have yet to be asphalted. The mining boom showed how foreigners exploit the region’s extensive subsoil resources with no benefits accruing to local people. Reflecting the feeling of abandonment by the government, several interlocutors in Djibo called for the government to tackle Soum’s remoteness by raising its administrative status from province to region. These problems are aggravated by the humanitarian crisis caused by the increasing insecurity. The population of the Sahel region has a negative view of the government. A former elected representative summarised it in this way: “People are really afraid of the authorities”. They think the government is more inclined to look after itself rather than look after them and that is prepared to use force to do so. Historically reluctant to send their children to “French” schools, the Fulani often find it more difficult to find their way around an administrative system that is based on the French model and to understand and demand their rights. Few members of the civil service and the security forces sent to the Sahel region have a good command of Fulfulde. The language barrier increases the gap between the administration and the public. Soum’s inhabitants stress the difficulty of obtaining civil status documents and the authorities’ inability to help herders retrieve their stolen livestock. Although civil servants have long perceived the appointment to posts in the Burkina Sahel as punishment, many of them have become rich on the proceeds of trafficking, corruption and racketeering. In the Sahel region and beyond, there is a sense of victimisation among the Fulani, who are present throughout Burkina. Some complain of under-representation among the political and administrative elite and deplore the fact that, in their eyes, state institutions (justice, administration, security forces) discriminate in favour of other communities whenever there is a dispute. This difficult Fulani relationship with the government complicates the fight against Ansarul Islam. From the start, the security forces found it difficult to secure the cooperation of the public, whether because some of them support the movement, while others refuse to inform on their own people, or because Ansarul Islam has established a climate of terror. The arrival of military reinforcements has gone some way to reassure the population and several interlocutors said that the population was slightly more inclined to help the security forces. For example, the security forces are trying to be more discreet when they contact their informants. Nevertheless, distrust remains, and Ansarul Islam is still said to have supporters in the villages. The security forces still complain of a lack of public support and cooperation. People are worried about the way the security forces will behave and these fears may increase now that military reinforcements have arrived. Our interlocutors deplored the arbitrary arrest and ill-treatment of local people, which may strengthen the feeling of injustice and alienation. The security forces say they sometimes arrest an entire group to avoid the impression that those who are allowed to go free are informants and therefore stop them becoming targets for Ansarul Islam. Whether or not that is true, it is nonetheless the case that the people of Soum feel stigmatised and this represents a real danger. D.An Especially Vulnerable Province on the Border with Mali In some respects, the situation in Soum resembles that in the central region of Mali, a country with which Burkina shares a border of more than 1,000km. The Islamist leader Hamadoun Kouffa and Malam Ibrahim Dicko, who know each other, have had similar careers and have a similar discourse. Both preached in villages and on the radio and criticised the social order, the local elites and the government. However, the situation in Burkina is different to that in Mali. Radical groups in central Mali seem to have drawn their support more from free nomadic pastoralists than from the Rimaibé, and they seek to broaden their following by disseminating sermons in other languages as well as in Fulfulde. The crisis in Soum has so far remained at a low intensity. Although it has created a climate of terror, Ansarul Islam has not managed to plunge the entire province in violence. For the moment, the Soum population is generally not inclined to take up arms. There have been several attempts to establish terrorist cells in Burkina. The Katiba Ansar Dine Sud tried, unsuccessfully, to create a cell in the West, in the area where the attack on Samorogouan (Hauts-Bassins region) took place in October 2015. To the East, members of al-Mourabitoun, a dissident group that split from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, reportedly tried to establish a base in the Tapoa Forest. They failed because they are not so much at home in the forest compared to the desert and because military cooperation between Niger and Burkina works better than between Mali and Burkina (see section III.C.). The failure was also due to the fact that, contrary to in Soum, the populations of eastern and western Burkina are more stable and not ready for war. It would be wrong to interpret the situation in northern Burkina as an extension of the Malian conflict, even though that conflict increases the availability of weapons and provides a safe haven for Ansarul Islam’s men. The crisis in Soum is not simply a mirror image of the situation in central Mali. It is mainly the result of acute local tensions. Several factors make it vulnerable and explain why this province is by far the most affected province in Burkina Faso. The traditional and religious authorities of Soum are not particularly involved in the fight against radicalism. Unlike the neighbouring province of Séno, Soum has fewer Muslim intellectuals and scholars capable of combating the ideas that encourage violence and intolerance. The absence of a central traditional power, strong rivalries between the three chefferies of Djibo, Baraboulé and Tongomayel and their politicisation further complicate their role. The lack of an alternative narrative and the weakening of religious and traditional leaders are allowing Malam’s rhetoric to gain ground. Soum suffers from a lack of development and infrastructure. In contrast, Dori, capital of Séno province, received more investment because it is the region’s administrative centre and because the 11 December national holiday was held there in 2013. Dori houses the regional hospital, while the January 2016 abduction of Ken Elliot, a prominent local Australian-Burkina doctor, reduced health-care provision in Djibo. Finally, Djibo is closer to the Malian border (about 60km) than Dori (about 160km). Soum also lacks political leaders with a national profile, while Séno has long benefitted from the influence of the charismatic former mayor of Dori, the late Hama Arba Diallo. Soum’s vulnerability is also due to historical reasons. The division between the Fulani and the Rimaibé is more marked there than in the neighbouring provinces of Séno and Yagha. It is therefore logical that the challenge to social inequalities should find greater acceptance there. The emirates of Séno and Yagha were more homogeneous than that of Jelgooji (now Soum), which was affected by divisions between families and chefferies. In Séno and Yagha, the longer-standing spread of Islam allowed it to better resist external influences. Geographical factors also play a part, since it is more difficult to find cover on the great plains of Séno and Yagha than in the forest located between Djibo and the Malian border. Finally, animism prevails in eastern and western Burkina, while 95 per cent of the population in the Sahel region follows Islam. All this helps explain why Islamic discourse has had greater traction in the Sahel region. III.A Considerable Military Effort At the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2017, the number of attacks in Soum increased and it looked as though the government might lose control over parts of the North. In the spring of 2017, the security forces began to reassert control, but were unable to eradicate the threat, as shown by the persistence of targeted killings and the increasing number of attacks (see chronology in Appendix C). The slow and problematic reconstruction of the security apparatus following the fall of the Compaoré regime explains the difficulties in providing an adequate response. Strengthening regional cooperation is an essential component of this response. A.The Sahel Region under Threat In the spring of 2017, the government’s decision to send military reinforcements to the North and undertake joint operations with Malian and French forces in Operation Barkhane allowed the Burkina army to gain the upper hand and go some way to reassuring the local population. Visits by several ministers to the region sent a strong signal that the government would not withdraw. Even the opposition recognises the “progress in the fight against terrorism”. However, it is not clear to the security forces how they are going to maintain the pressure and ensure their long-term presence. The rainy season, which makes roads unusable and isolates the population between July and October, has not brought the lull that some observers were expecting. The capacity of jihadist groups to reform, replace an incapacitated leader and formulate new strategies and courses of action should not be underestimated. Even if Ansarul Islam has been weakened, it might still be able to take advantage of this breeding ground for recruitment. The remaining members might be even more determined. The possible death of their founder could galvanise them and make them more violent and less inclined to compromise. In the words of one security source: “We need to pay attention to how we kill this monster”. The fear and the threat remain, as shown by the increase in the number of targeted killings and attacks that have used a weapon not seen before in Burkina: improvised explosive devices, used for the first time in August 2017. In addition, sending reinforcements to Soum reduces the number of soldiers available to protect other regions. Armed groups might therefore launch attacks elsewhere. The abduction of civil servants in May 2017 in Oudalan, the attacks on two gendarmerie posts in the West (Djibasso and Toéni) in September 2017, could indicate that the threat has moved to another area, or that new groups might take advantage of the focus on Soum and attack elsewhere. Ansarul Islam is both a local movement and a group that has contacts, albeit problematic ones, with jihadists active in the Sahel. Although Malam is (or was) close to Hamadoun Kouffa, his links with the new coalition affiliated to al-Qaeda and led by Iyad ag Ghali, the Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin, (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, GSIM), are unclear. Some sources say he has disowned this alliance, while others think the GSIM is not interested in the contact because Malam is not powerful enough. There are reportedly divergences between Kouffa and Malam. The former is reportedly jealous of the increasing power of his “young friend” and did not approve of the killing of Malam’s former comrades because of the prohibition of killing Muslims. The publication on 12 September 2017 of a Facebook page attributed to Ansarul Islam, in which the movement denounced the death of Muslims in the mid-August 2017 terrorist attack in Ouagadougou, suggests there are strong divergences between Ansarul Islam and GSIM. However, this information should be treated with caution, as the Facebook page has not been authenticated. At the beginning of 2017, Malam seemed to be getting closer to the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and they reportedly carried out a joint attack on Nassoumbou. Ansarul Islam uses central Mali as a support base and must therefore have contact with groups that operate there. Ansarul Islam may be plotting a middle course between two tendencies represented by the GSIM and the ISGS. Ansarul Islam rarely claims responsibility for its actions and has no official channel of communication. It is difficult to blame the group for all the security incidents in the Sahel region. It does not have a monopoly of violence. Banditry and other criminal activities affect the region. Insecurity is exacerbated by the trafficking of light arms from Algeria, Libya and Mali, where Boulikessi, close to the border, is a staging post. A Kalashnikov costs CFA300,000 or two heifers. Another cause for concern is the presence of Koglweogo, civilian self-defence groups, in many places in the country. They defend their communities from criminals, insecurity and cattle theft. When they are composed of local villagers, their presence does not seem to pose a problem. However, Koglweogo from other regions of Burkina were chased out of Kerboulé (a gold panning site 60km from Djibo) by armed men (possibly connected to Ansarul Islam). Clashes between Koglweogo and other armed groups cannot be ruled out. The presence of Ruga, groups of Fulani herders armed with hunting guns and responsible for recovering lost or stolen herds, could further complicate the security equation, even though there is currently no evidence that they pose any kind of a risk. B.A Security Apparatus under Reconstruction The political unrest in Burkina since Blaise Compaoré’s fall from power in October 2014 disrupted the security apparatus. Compaoré’s diplomacy allowed him to keep many armed groups away from Burkina territory by displaying a benevolent attitude toward some of them. The intelligence service depended more on men and their networks than on institutions. Created in October 2015, the National Intelligence Agency (ANR) is a “big machine [that] has not really got off the ground yet”, even though it had begun to centralise intelligence. The dismantling of the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP), an elite army unit under Compaoré, also disrupted the security apparatus. In the long term, the main challenge facing the Burkina security forces is adapting to new threats. The asymmetric war against non-state armed groups requires resources and strategies that are very different to those required in conventional warfare. The security forces have become accustomed to life in their barracks rather than going out to fight, as Burkina has never gone to war against another country (except for two brief armed conflicts with Mali in 1974 and 1985) and has not suffered a civil war. Promoting a culture of combat and sacrifice, the exact opposite of “a ceremonial army”, is bound to take time. However, Burkina soldiers have had experience of combat during deployments in external operations in sometimes difficult terrain (Darfur, northern Mali). Two elements that are lacking but are indispensable in the fight against armed groups are air power and intelligence. Unarmed Burkina reconnaissance planes are only able to signal a threat: in a remote area, it would need several hours to drive to a given place. Combat helicopters are also necessary. But in addition to equipment, it is training that is really needed. The armed forces deployed in the North also lack the motorbikes they need to move around the bush as easily as their enemies. There is still no intelligence system. As long as the armed forces are not able to work among the local population like the jihadist groups do, the latter will have an advantage. In addition, the security forces suffer from more deep-seated problems. The generation gap undermines cohesion. Ordinary soldiers, young and dissatisfied with their material conditions, believe the hierarchy still supports the old regime, does not have the motivation to leave their air-conditioned offices and is incapable of tackling the new threats. Young non-commissioned officers deplore the weakness of the general staff’s communications and its limited use of new technologies, in a context in which communication is key to defeating terrorism. Human resources management is another weakness: there are not enough administration officers, they do not have the necessary skills and this causes frustration especially with regard to promotion. The army hierarchy is top-heavy with too many high-ranking colonels and not enough junior officers. Finally, the historic rivalry between the police force and the gendarmerie undermines their effectiveness. These two corps are deployed in both urban and rural areas and their duties overlap.All these weaknesses, which should be dealt with as part of security sector reform, partly explain why the security forces are finding it difficult to counter the threat posed by Ansarul Islam. C.Regional and International Cooperation Adapting to cross-border threats involves strengthening regional and international cooperation. While the Burkina military recognise that France’s assistance is indispensable, they want “to sort things out themselves”, because “nobody is going to die in [their] place”. One sector of public opinion does not trust France. Some people accuse it of playing a double game vis-à-vis armed groups, particularly with regard to the Tuareg of northern Mali. The result is a desire to diversify partnerships and get help from the United States, Germany, Russia and Eastern Europe. Burkina has strengthened regional cooperation with Mali and Niger. They have finally formalised the right of hot pursuit but this can pose problems because of sometimes inefficient communications and the risk of clashes between armies. The region’s countries, encouraged by France, are trying to strengthen regional cooperation through a G5 Sahel (Burkina, Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania) joint force project. However, Burkina officers are not very enthusiastic about it. They view it as “an endless round of meetings”, according to one security source. The Burkina leadership believes that Chad and Mauritania are too far away to be worried about the same threats.Besides, funding of the G5 force has not yet been secured. The tripartite dynamic between Burkina, Mali and Niger that is emerging with the plan to deploy one of the three components of the G5 force in the three borders zone, known as Liptako-Gourma, provokes greater optimism. The Burkina believe it is more effective to work in three rather than five. The force will be deployed in Liptako-Gourma but will not include Soum, which remains a Burkina-Mali problem. The Burkina military are also sceptical about the effectiveness of the UN mission in Mali, MINUSMA. They feel its mandate is inadequate. The creation of the G5 joint force raises the question of coordination with MINUSMA, which already has more than 15,000 soldiers and police officers and costs close to $1 billion per year. Moreover, complex overlapping of remits runs the risk of undermining the force’s effectiveness. Besides, the vagueness of the joint force’s mandate, targeting “terrorist groups” and “other organised criminal groups”, further complicates the task. Cooperation is not going as well with Mali as it is with Niger. Some sectors of the Burkina security apparatus are irritated with their Malian neighbour, whom they accuse of not being effective enough in the fight against the armed groups on their territory, leading to the conflict there spilling over into Burkina. One security source deplored the presence of certain armed groups either close to or supported by Bamako along the border with Burkina. The difficult relations between Burkina and Mali date from the Compaoré era, when members of Malian armed groups, starting with the leader of Ansar Dine, the Tuareg Iyad ag Ghali, were allowed to move freely in Ouagadougou. The Burkina military believe their Malian counterparts are “lazy” and joined the army to get an income and not to defend the country. Conversely, they are well disposed toward Niger, because it deploys the resources necessary to prevent armed groups from proliferating on its territory. The Burkina military praise their Nigerien counterparts for their proactive approach and effectiveness. IV.Formulate a Global and Enduring Response At the start of 2017, after months of denial, the Burkina authorities finally understood the need to go beyond military action and formulate a global response to the crisis. They launched an emergency development program for the Sahel region aimed at building infrastructure and reducing poverty. However, these development efforts will not be enough to resolve the crisis, the causes of which are local and deeply rooted in the structure of Fulani society in Soum. An understanding of the importance of the following measures could help to provide a more effective response. Formulate responses that take into account the social and local dimensions of the crisis. Ansarul Islam’s ideology is based on its challenge to a social order that breeds frustration and conflict. The government should not seek to disturb socio-cultural dynamics or to upend a centuries-old social order. It is perhaps better to focus on encouraging local actors to find solutions adapted to a crisis that is deeply rooted in local circumstances. The government and its international partners will not find solutions to questions that pertain to the private life of northern Burkina Faso’s society. They can at best encourage intercommunal and inter-generational dialogue that may help them identify solutions to their own crisis. Reduce the gulf between security forces and authorities and the local population.Strengthening the military presence will not be truly effective for as long as local people refuse to collaborate with the security forces. In the short term, the latter should prioritise the development of an intelligence system and gain access to the community, for example, by distributing mobile phones more generously to enable individuals and units to communicate more easily and by making a special effort to protect them.Deploying Fulfulde-speaking troops and civil servants would also help to reduce the language barrier. In the long term, distrust could be eased if more Fulani were recruited into the security forces and the civil service. It is not necessary to impose quotas or to adopt a policy of positive discrimination, which would give unwanted ethnic overtones to the initiative. However, for example, the government could encourage recruitment by making the entrance examinations more accessible, while remembering that the Fulani have not traditionally had a vocation for joining the security forces or the civil service. Boosting the military’s civic activities would help to show that the security forces can make a useful contribution and go some way to reducing public distrust in them.Finally, arrests should be carried out according to due procedure and should respect human rights. Abusive behaviour by the security forces and civil servants – racketeering, intimidation, arbitrary arrests, physical abuse – must be punished more severely. Regulate religious discourse to combat intolerant and hateful statements, an area where religious and traditional authorities could play a key role. There is a need to improve understanding of the religious landscape in order to fight against intolerant and hateful statements, give more support to Islamic education and invest in the training of imams and Muslim scholars in order to provide them with tools to combat ideas that encourage violence and intolerance. The legitimacy of religious and traditional leaders is sometimes challenged so this is also about ensuring they are sufficiently representative, avoiding any impression that they support the government or are in its pay and ensuring that young people feel they defend their interests. The authorities could prioritise the establishment in Djibo of a section of the Union Fraternelle des Croyants, an association based in Dori that promotes religious tolerance and dialogue. Place greater emphasis in the emergency program for the Sahel region on promoting livestock breeding, improving justice provision and fighting corruption. The perception that the government is doing nothing to support livestock breeding, the region’s main economic activity, increases alienation. As herders are mostly Fulani, this feeling could take on an ethnic connotation. For example, it should increase the size of grazing areas and the number of wells and improve cattle tracks. Infrastructure should also be at the heart of development policies. For example, the construction of a regional hospital in Djibo, on the model of the one in Dori, would improve health care in the provincial capital. The failings of the judiciary and the corruption in the public administration are grievances often expressed by the public. Doing more to address these two issues would send a message that the government can have a useful and positive impact on the daily life of the inhabitants of the Sahel region. Strengthen judicial and police cooperation between Mali and Burkina, so that the authorities of these countries can be informed when one of their nationals is arrested in another country. It is not enough to arrest members of jihadist groups. It is also necessary to open investigations across several countries and then bring perpetrators to justice. This will prevent them exploiting the lack of coordination between countries and slipping through the net. Although police cooperation has improved, a lot remains to be done with regard to the judiciary. Moreover, the security forces deployed in the North urgently need more motorbikes in order to move around the bush more easily and better means of communication to improve the circulation of information. The Burkina armed forces could also do more to improve their reporting to national public opinion about the progress they are making. V.Conclusion It is still too early to assess the long-term effectiveness of the government’s response. But, already, the lull expected in the wake of the rainy season (July to October), which should have impeded movement and reduced attacks by Ansarul Islam, has not materialised. Several lethal attacks took place in northern Burkina in July, August and September. The weakening of this armed group or the death of its founder will not be enough to resolve the security and social crisis in northern Burkina. The crisis will last for as long as the deep roots that permitted its growth remain and could indeed spread to other provinces if nothing is done. ______________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, distinguished Members of the Committee, we appreciate the invitation to appear before you today to testify on the devastating human tragedy that continues to unfold in Burma’s troubled and complicated Rakhine State. Violence and insecurity have exacerbated the longstanding suffering of ethnic Rohingya and other minority populations, created a massive displacement of populations internally and across the border, led to a humanitarian crisis in neighboring Bangladesh, and threatened to undermine Burma’s substantial gains in recent years on its fragile transition from a half century of authoritarian military rule to elected government, including efforts to end multiple armed conflicts and achieve a long elusive national peace. We are grateful for the opportunity to update you on the current humanitarian situation facing those affected by the crisis, describe what the U.S. Government is doing through diplomatic engagement and the targeting of life-saving aid to address this situation, discuss the challenges the international community faces in delivering humanitarian assistance, and discuss next steps to achieve an end to the violence and restoration of security for affected populations. Current State of Play: We’d like to start by highlighting the latest developments since our testimonies to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 5. First, current estimates indicate some 589,000 people, mostly ethnic Rohingya, have fled to Bangladesh since the crisis began. These movements reflect a slowing rate of displacement, but nonetheless the continued flight of vulnerable populations. Refugees continue to cross into Bangladesh, and we continue to receive credible reports of sporadic violence in northern Rakhine State, including vigilante action such as arson and threats of physical harm to ethnic Rohingya. Reputable international NGOs have reported new satellite images that reveal nearly 300 villages were partially or completely destroyed by fire since August 25—more than half of the approximately 470 Muslim villages in northern Rakhine State. We have all seen the heart wrenching coverage of those refugees arriving in Bangladesh, having lost all their property and in some cases family members, and having suffered great insecurity, fear, indignity, and abuses as they fled for their lives. Although some population movements continue and security has not been fully re-established in northern Rakhine State, most reports indicate that our efforts, working with others in the international community, to communicate our concerns directly with Burmese civilian and military authorities and at the United Nations and other fora have helped to decrease the scope of violence in recent weeks. On October 12, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi gave a second public address on the crisis. She laid out three goals for Rakhine State: (1) repatriation of those who have crossed over to Bangladesh and providing humanitarian assistance effectively; (2) resettlement of displaced populations; and (3) economic development and durable peace. Burma has created a funding mechanism to pursue these goals with World Bank support. The Burmese government also implemented a mechanism to coordinate its cooperation with the international community to address challenges in Rakhine State. Aung San Suu Kyi will chair this effort, but at the current time humanitarian and media access to affected areas of northern Rakhine State remains limited. At the same time, Bangladesh and Burma have entered into bilateral discussions on how to facilitate safe and voluntary return of refugees to Burma, a dialogue that we fully support. The sources of renewed crisis this year in Burma’s Rakhine State include coordinated August 25 attacks on security forces and other violent acts carried out by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, a group of Rohingya militants; a disproportionate Burmese military response to those attacks; violence perpetrated by local vigilantes, often acting in concert with security forces; and insecurity for local populations. These developments have taken place against a backdrop of broad discrimination, repression, and violence against ethnic minorities in Rakhine State over many decades. The current crisis, now underway for two non-stop months, has exacerbated longstanding challenges for these vulnerable minorities, including, most acutely, members of the Rohingya community who lack basic rights, including recognition as a nationality and, for many, even citizenship. The violence in Rakhine State has devastated vulnerable populations and caused families and unaccompanied minors to flee. This almost unprecedented population movement has worsened a desperate humanitarian situation in Bangladesh, which already provides safe haven for hundreds of thousands of Rohingya who fled previous crises in Rakhine State. Approximately 87,000 had fled there in 2016 following separate violence last year, joining an estimated 200,000-500,000 undocumented Rohingya and over 33,000 registered Rohingya already living in southeastern Bangladesh for over two decades. With this last round of displacement, the Rohingya population in southeastern Bangladesh is now estimated to be between 800,000 and one million persons. There is a similar population crisis inside Rakhine State, where the precise number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) remains unknown due to ongoing population movements, limited humanitarian access, and a lack of official estimates. In September, the Rakhine State Government estimated the current crisis had created approximately 200,000 new IDPs; however, many of those displaced persons have since crossed into Bangladesh. Prior to the August attacks, 120,000 IDPs from various ethnic populations, including Rohingya as well as ethnic Rakhine, had already been living in camps following inter-communal violence in 2012. Diplomatic Engagement: The suffering of so many calls all of us to action. Secretary of State Tillerson stated last week that “the world can’t stand idly by and be witness to the atrocities that are being reported.” This administration is undertaking all efforts to end the violence and suffering immediately. Our most pressing objectives are achieving protection for all local populations and meaningful, durable solutions for those who have been displaced, including the chance to go home again voluntarily, in safety, and with dignity when conditions permit. We have made it clear to Burmese civilian and military officials at the highest levels, within the central government and in Rakhine State itself, that all stakeholders must end the violence, respect the rule of law, cease displacement, pave a path for Rohingya and others to return voluntarily to their homes, and hold accountable those responsible for violations and abuses. We have expressed alarm about continuing reports of violence perpetrated by security forces, as well as of civilian vigilantes operating outside the rule of law in committing arson attacks on Rohingya homes and blocking humanitarian assistance to many populations. Secretary Tillerson observed last week that “someone will be held responsible” for these acts. We have communicated to relevant authorities that those who have fled to Bangladesh or are otherwise internally displaced in Burma must be able to return home voluntarily – and we welcomed State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s re-affirmed commitment in her October 12 speech that Burma would allow them to return. Much depends on how quickly it will be possible to establish conditions that make repatriation possible and safe and the precise way in which people are repatriated. We cannot ignore that vulnerable people fled to Bangladesh because they felt it was unsafe for them to stay in Burma. Unless Burmese security forces create a secure environment for all populations, it would be unreasonable and unwise to expect or facilitate their return. We are encouraging closer communication between Burma and Bangladesh. A senior Burmese delegation traveled to Dhaka on October 2 and the two sides agreed to form a joint working committee on repatriation. Principals in our government have been strongly engaged on this issue. President Trump has discussed the situation with multiple leaders from Southeast Asia. Secretary of State Tillerson called Aung San Suu Kyi to urgent action. Vice President Pence denounced the Burmese military’s disproportionate response in his remarks at the United Nations. USUN Ambassador Haley spoke at an open Security Council meeting and called for an international role in ending the violence. National Security Advisor McMaster and other officials spoke with the Burmese National Security Advisor. Our Ambassador in Burma has actively engaged top Burmese government and military leaders throughout this crisis. In September, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Murphy visited Burma, including Rakhine State, and met with Aung San Suu Kyi as well with other national and state government and military figures. All U.S. officials have urged authorities and stakeholders in Burma to protect civilians, pursue accountability, and cooperate with the international community, and made clear that this crisis has implications far beyond Rakhine State. We are also engaging and consulting with ASEAN member states, the European Union, international organizations, and many others on the crisis. Rakhine State Crisis Humanitarian Challenges: The humanitarian challenges before us are many. Our focus is on: (1) gaining access for assistance in Rakhine State; (2) working with host governments in the region to ensure refugees are offered safe haven and treated with respect, and that host countries have what they need to help the refugees; (3) specific contributions made by the State Department in coordination with USAID; and (4) ensuring that UN and other humanitarian agencies have the support they need to respond. Humanitarian Access: The number one humanitarian priority is gaining access to those in need in Rakhine State. Relief agency access to many of the affected areas remains severely limited. As of October 10, the Government of Burma (GoB) had granted travel authorizations in northern Rakhine State only to Red Cross agencies. Although the GoB has granted some international NGOs travel authorizations to work in central Rakhine State, other government regulations and procedures are hindering INGOs from accessing all IDP camps and affected communities. In addition, safety concerns, a local climate of intimidation, and restrictions on movements prevent many local Burmese staff of these organizations from accessing those in need. We take every opportunity to emphasize to Burmese officials at all levels of government the need to allow humanitarian assistance to those in need. The White House, State Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations have issued statements calling for immediate unhindered humanitarian access to all affected populations, including northern Rakhine State. The government’s commitment to do so is encouraging, but we seek further implementation on the ground. We are working with international partners and stakeholders inside Burma to overcome challenges that have precluded humanitarian agencies and NGOs from reaching affected areas of northern Rakhine State. We have succeeded in securing Burmese government cooperation for the Red Cross Movement (RCM) to deliver assistance, but they alone cannot assess or meet all of the humanitarian needs in Rakhine State. Specifically, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) are working with the Myanmar Red Cross Society to implement a response plan as the situation continues to evolve. ICRC has stressed to the Burmese government that the RCM will not be able to address all needs and the UN agencies and international non-governmental organizations will also need operational space. We are also pressing for unfettered access for the UN Fact Finding Mission and other UN officials, media, and human rights organizations to this isolated part of Burma. Working with Host Governments: We recognize the huge strain that the influx of refugees is currently placing on Bangladesh, as well as the concerns of other countries in the region such as India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand where displaced Rohingya and other Burmese minorities have fled in the past. It is essential that neighboring countries keep their borders open for those fleeing violence in Burma, and we will continue to emphasize this to those in the region, along with seeking ways to support governments hosting refugees. Bangladesh has kept its border open, though it is concerned about its capacity to absorb so many refugees, in addition to security concerns related to the influx of so many vulnerable people in such a short period of time. We appreciate the generosity of the Government of Bangladesh to those fleeing the violence, many of whom arrived after walking for days and are in need of food, water, and medical care. They found official and makeshift camps already overstretched by previous influxes of refugees. International aid agencies are working to scale up operations and provide basic life-saving assistance to the new arrivals. The majority of those in need have little access to food, water, health care, and proper shelter. The ongoing monsoon season has exacerbated the situation, as flooding and poor infrastructure make aid delivery even more challenging. The UN issued a revised appeal with an estimated $434 million required for emergency response in Bangladesh to meet needs through February 2018. The Government of Bangladesh is working with UN agencies and the international community to provide temporary shelter and protection. Bangladesh has now donated 3,000 acres of land and is working with UN agencies to establish needed infrastructure to support the refugee population. The government has also initiated a registration process to document the Rohingya population in southeastern Bangladesh and provide individuals with identification documents that we hope will facilitate access to services and protection. Since September 11, the Ministry of Home Affairs has conducted biometric registration of over 100,000 refugees with UNHCR’s assistance. In every meeting with Bangladesh officials, we thank them for allowing refugees to cross and we discuss ways to support Bangladesh as the government upholds humanitarian principles while balancing its own security concerns. We also urge Bangladesh to provide the necessary access to humanitarian organizations to that they can provide life-saving aid. Humanitarian Assistance: In addition to our diplomatic engagement, the United States is providing humanitarian assistance through our UN and international organization partners to help vulnerable populations affected by the Rakhine State violence. The United States continues to be the global leader in providing assistance to people in need in Burma and throughout the region. Thanks to support from Congress, in FY 2017, the United States contributed nearly $104 million in assistance to displaced populations in Burma and for refugees from Burma in the region. Of this funding, the State Department’s contributions totaled nearly $76 million, including nearly $34 million in emergency assistance to respond to this latest crisis. This funding provides life-saving assistance to meet critical humanitarian needs, such as food, non-food items, shelter, water, sanitation, and health both inside Burma and in host countries through trusted humanitarian partners including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and international non-governmental organizations, among others. These agencies are a key part of the international humanitarian system that is governed by humanitarian principles and brings technical expertise and operational capacity to respond quickly and effectively to large-scale crises such as this. Humanitarian Coordination: In addition to funding levels, the region’s capacity to handle the humanitarian crisis is dependent on the capacity of the UN-led humanitarian response, including deployment of emergency response experts and adequate staffing levels. In Bangladesh, we continue to advocate with UN coordinating agencies to increase expert technical staff on the ground and strengthen the coordination structure supporting implementation of the response plan. In a refugee crisis such as this, UNHCR holds the global protection mandate; however, in Cox’s Bazar, UNHCR’s role to date has been limited by the government. The government has recently increased cooperation with UNHCR and approved its role in leading protection services. This will help improve conditions in Cox’s Bazar, including through increased information on the number and needs of refugees and coordination in responding to the most vulnerable individuals. Government constraints on funding to experienced international NGOs and delays in approving their permit applications have limited the INGOs’ ability to access emergency funds and assist all those in need. In some displacement sites, strained water collection points, lack of adequate sanitation facilities, and high population density have raised concerns regarding the increased risks of disease outbreaks. Humanitarian partners are engaging in disease prevention activities and diligently treating cholera patients in coordination with government authorities. We will keep up pressure to ensure seamless coordination and strategic vision for the response in Bangladesh. Long-Term Challenges: In addition to pressing for immediate action to end violence and meet humanitarian needs, we are also supporting the Burmese elected government’s efforts to address inherited challenges in Rakhine State. The government established the Rakhine Advisory Commission, led by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, which in August produced a set of recommendations for addressing the complex issues in Rakhine State that have ignited many crises over past decades. Kofi Annan urged the UN Security Council on October 13 to push for the return to Burma of Rohingya refugees, reiterating that world powers must work with the country’s military and civilian leaders to end the refugee crisis. The Commission’s recommendations provide valuable ways forward in addressing underdevelopment, shortcomings in government services, access to justice, and ensuring a credible, transparent citizenship process for all people in Rakhine State. The government of Burma has committed to implementing the recommendations, and established mechanisms to do so. We must support and encourage these efforts, and in particular press the Burmese armed forces to support its civilian elected governments in implementing all of the recommendations. The U.S. government’s overarching policy response also includes efforts to discourage the serious human rights abuses we have seen, identify potential means to hold accountable those responsible for such abuses, increase appreciation inside Burma for tolerance and human dignity, encourage the fragile democratization and processes in Burma, and further support economic development in Rakhine State and throughout the country. We will not do this alone. We are consulting with regional partners, members of the international community in international bodies like the United Nations, and courageous voices inside Burma who want human dignity for all who reside in that country and a peaceful and stable future. Conclusion: For decades, Congress and the U.S. Government have worked closely together on Burma as partners. In particular, we thank this Committee for its leadership and bipartisan collaboration. Together, we supported Burma’s democracy movement through the dark days of repressive military rule, and together we supported a military reform government’s transition toward democracy. It is in our interests, and those of the diverse populations of Burma, including Rohingya, to see the new, elected government succeed. The current crisis in Rakhine State has exposed the fragility of that democratic transition. Greater civilian control over, and professionalization of, the armed forces is needed, as are reforms that will bring an end to the military’s heavy-handed tactics that have fueled violence across Burma since independence. The democratically-elected government, security forces, local community leaders, and populations across the country all must calm tensions, end the violence, and secure the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of all those displaced. Only then will there be a chance for lasting peace and change in Rakhine State and across the country as a whole. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, we are strongly engaged to bring an end to this major crisis and to find lasting solutions to the long-standing challenges in Burma’s Rakhine State and beyond. U.S. government humanitarian assistance provides an important lifeline until this possibility becomes reality. We are grateful for the generosity of Congress and the American people who make our assistance possible. We will look to Congress, as we always have, as an essential partner in these efforts. Thank you. We are ready to answer any questions you have. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 US Department of State

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls on the Cambodian authorities to withdraw spurious charges against two former journalists with the Cambodia Daily, a recently closed independent newspaper, and to quickly return to the path of democracy and respect for media freedom. The two journalists, working for the Cambodia Daily, Aun Pheap and Zsombor Peter, have only just learned that they are facing possible two-year jail sentences on the absurd charge of “incitement to commit a felony” under articles 494 and 495 of Cambodia's criminal code. Their “crime” was to have interviewed future voters in the northeastern province of Ratanakiri as part of their coverage of the campaign for municipal elections held on 4 June. Unbeknown to them, a Ratanakiri prosecutor filed formal changes against them on 28 August. “Asking questions during an election campaign has absolutely nothing to do with inciting crime. This is what we call journalism,” said Daniel Bastard, the head of RSF’s Asia-Pacific desk. “Bringing such grave charges against two reporters for just doing their job – and furthermore for a newspaper subsequently forced to close as a result of harassment by the authorities – is an alarming sign that Prime Minister Hun Sen’s government is bent on crushing dissent ahead of next year’s general elections.” The original complaint against Aun and Peter was made by the municipality of Pate’s former mayor Romam Yout, who accused them of “inciting [voters] to support the opposition party.” Their lawyer says they just asked questions, which violates neither election laws nor a set of media guidelines issued by the National Election Committee. In the wake of the original complaint, information minister Khieu Kanharith posted a photo of Peter’s Canadian passport on Facebookand threatened him with reprisals if he failed to respect the electoral law. The post, which was later removed, is indicative of the government’s hostility towards independent journalists. Aun and Peter “are under a lot of pressure,” said Cambodia Dailyeditor Jodie DeJonge, describing the situation in Cambodia as going from “bad to worse.” The newspaper’s general manager and deputy publisher are banned from leaving the country and are facing possible six-year jail sentences. The Cambodia Daily published its last issue on 4 September, ending a 24-year history as one of the pillars of Cambodia’s fragile democracy. It was forced to close by a sudden tax department demand for payment of 6.3 million dollars in alleged back taxes. Radio Free Asia was forced to close its Phnom Penh bureau ten days later, also as a result of government intimidation. RSF sources say the information ministry is now refusing to issue press cards to the journalists who used to work for the Cambodia Daily and Radio Free Asia, thereby preventing them from freelancing. Australian documentary filmmaker James Ricketson has meanwhile been detained since June, when he was arrested for filming an opposition party demonstration. Charged with espionage, he is facing a possible ten-year jail term. Cambodia is ranked 132nd out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reporters Without Boarders

In this file photo, an Iraqi Christian spruces up his shelter with a cross and other Christian symbols at the Ashti camp for internally displaced Iraqis in Ainkawa, a Christian enclave of the Kurdish capital, Erbil. (Credit: Dale Gavlak/CNS.) Two millennia of Christianity in Iraq could be wiped out completely if war breaks out between Iraqi forces and Kurdish nationalists, warned a U.S. adviser to the Chaldean Catholic Church. Stephen Rasche said the international community must act quickly to prevent a new conflict in Iraq following the Sept. 25 referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan, where 93 percent of 3.3 million voters chose independence. The poll triggered a hostile reaction from the Iraqi government, which immediately halted flights over Kurdish air space and stopped recognizing visas issued by the Kurdistan Regional Government. Rasche said unless tensions between Baghdad and Erbil are defused, Christian refugees returning to towns on the Ninevah Plains could find themselves in the midst of a “greater war” than that fought against ISIS. If the refugees were unable to resettle because of a new conflict, then “Christianity in Ninevah is gone,” he said. “It will disappear after 2,000 years if we do not rebuild now,” said Rasche, 57, a Catholic lawyer from Boston who acts as director of resettlement programs for the Chaldean Catholic Archdiocese of Erbil in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. “Archbishop Bashar Warda of Erbil has said repeatedly over the last year that what comes after ISIS could be even more dangerous to the Christians than what came during ISIS,” he said. “There is real concern that real war could break out between those aligned on the Iraqi side and those aligned on the Kurdish side,” he told Catholic News Service in an Oct. 10 interview in Liverpool. “The biggest and most important thing the international community could do right now is prevent a war,” Rasche continued, adding that “intense diplomatic pressure” needed to be exerted on the two sides now to prevent a conflict. Western nations, he said, have “the ability to do that if they use all the tools at their disposal - they have the ability to prevent war.” Christians have lived in Iraq since the time of the apostles, but their number has plunged from 1.5 million to just 250,000 in the past 14 years. Most of them were living in the towns and cities of the Kurdish-controlled Ninevah Plains until it was overrun by Islamic State in 2014. This year they began to return from refugee camps to rebuild their settlements after liberation by Iraqi and Kurdish forces. The Ninevah Plains, however, is now “ground zero for the disputed territories between the Kurdish regional government and Baghdad,” said Rasche. “Right now, there is a de facto dividing line between the Iraqi sector and the Kurdish sector that goes right down the middle of Christian Ninevah,” he added. “It is a specific request of the Christian churches in this north Iraq region that, in any dialogue or any settlement, that the resulting area of Christian Ninevah remains unified and not split.” His comments came days after five Catholic and Orthodox bishops issued a joint statement appealing to the international community to protect the Christians of Ninevah. “We cannot hide our concern that the situation for the Christians has become very difficult and leads to uncertainty,” said the statement. “It is a clear fact that this situation has created in Christians a state of fear and concern about the possibility that the struggle may develop into a crisis that will have far-reaching repercussions for all. “Care should be made not to involve the last remaining Christian land in political bargaining, as our vulnerable community cannot withstand further schism and division in addition to the ongoing political and sectarian fights,” they added. Father Salar Kajo, 35, a Chaldean Catholic priest helping to resettle refugees in villages in Kurdish territory, told CNS the region’s Christians had entered a critical period. “It is the last chance for us,” said Kajo, vicar general of the Diocese of Alqosh. He added that none of the Western aid money channeled through the United Nations to help resettle religious minorities dislocated by Islamic State had reached the Christians in the region. “There have been reports in the media that they have given us millions of dollars, but we have received nothing,” he said. Resettlement projects were being funded only by private donations and a grant of $2 million paid directly to the church by the Hungarian government, he said. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Crux Now