As Islamic State heads toward defeat in Iraq, Christian and Yazidi survivors of genocide should be returning to their hometowns in Nineveh province. Instead, these fragile minority communities mostly remain stranded at displacement shelters in Kurdistan without the means to rebuild their villages. Many are fleeing Iraq, and the country now risks losing these religious minorities entirely. The Trump administration is making the situation worse by continuing Obama policies that effectively exclude these non-Muslims from U.S. aid in Iraq. Today there are fewer than 250,000 Christians in Iraq, according to the State Department, down from as many as 1.4 million before the 2003 invasion. These Christians speak Aramaic, like Jesus of Nazareth, and trace their faith to Thomas the Apostle, whose relics were spirited from Nineveh by Orthodox monks as ISIS approached. The Iraqi Jewish community, its roots in the Babylonian exile, was forced out over the past 70 years; fewer than 10 Jewish families remain in Baghdad. Yazidis—who have lived near the Sinjar Mountains—number about 400,000. Nadia Murad, the voice for thousands of Yazidis enslaved by ISIS, warned a congressional panel earlier this year that her people could soon disappear because of emigration. This would signal the end of Iraq’s indigenous non-Muslim communities. Since fiscal 2014, the U.S. has provided $1.4 billion in humanitarian aid for Iraq, but very little of it has reached the beleaguered Christian and Yazidi communities. This is because the Obama administration decided to channel most of it through United Nations refugee and development agencies, a practice the new administration has continued. There is no protection for religious minorities in the U.N.’s overwhelmingly Muslim camps, and Christians and Yazidis are terrified of entering them. The U.N. doesn’t operate camps in Iraq for displaced Christians, and the international body has enough resources to shelter only half the Yazidis who congregate around Dohuk, in Iraqi Kurdistan. U.N. programs also exclude the local churches that struggle to care for these minorities, forcing them to raise aid on a piecemeal and insecure basis from other sources. President Trump has spoken about the plight of Christians in the Middle East, but he has done little to effect change. Far lower percentages of Christians and Yazidis are returning from displacement to their homes in the devastated Nineveh Plains and Sinjar, respectively, compared with the larger religious groups in Tikrit, Fallujah and Mosul. The prior administration decided to have U.S. reconstruction assistance, now at $265 million since fiscal 2015, also flow through the U.N. The director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Mark Green, started only last month and has not yet moved to change this policy. USAID lacks direct oversight in Nineveh and relies heavily on U.N. Development Program reports that claim progress in Christian towns. One local church authority told me the U.N. reports “grossly overstate the quality and substance of the actual work” and their projects’ influence is “minimal or nonexistent.” A representative from the Nineveh Reconstruction Committee, a unified church group, told me earlier this month that the only major projects under way are its own. These are supported by Hungary and the Knights of Columbus. Samaritan’s Purse and Aid to the Church in Need are planning projects in Qaraqosh, also without U.S. government assistance. These private charities can rebuild houses, but large infrastructure projects need government aid. The U.N. acknowledges that most of the displaced minorities have not returned home and have shown “a reluctance to return without guarantees of their security and the stability of their towns and villages.” Church leaders close to the displaced are excluded from U.N. and Iraqi government committees that decide stabilization projects, track progress and ensure locals are hired for them. Rex Tillerson’s State Department has not changed this policy. Nor has it answered my request for information. Security remains a problem and threatens America’s regional interests. Iran is moving in on the towns minorities have been unable to reclaim. The U.N. has focused on minor projects in Bartella, a main Christian town. Yet on Sept. 15 the “Imam Khomeini” elementary school and mosque complex opened there at an official ceremony, a “gift from the Islamic Republic of Iran.” In several towns, Iranian-backed militias stand guard. President Trump can take immediate steps to ensure U.S. aid reaches Iraq’s most vulnerable minorities. First, he can direct his administration to address their humanitarian and stabilization needs. This should include dropping the U.N. as a pass-through for U.S. aid. He can also appoint an interagency coordinator to ensure that bureaucratic hurdles don’t interfere with getting aid to all groups. These relatively small tweaks would help preserve the region’s religious minorities. Iraq’s religious minorities are small in number, but assisting them would affirm that the U.S. stands against genocide, protects religious freedom and aids vulnerable minority groups. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) ​Copyright 2017 The Dow Jones Corporation​

In August 2017, Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Dr. Ibrahim al-Jaafari, wrote to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, H.E. Mr. Antonio Guterres, asking for the assistance of the international community to bring Daesh to justice. Dr. Al-Jaafari wrote: ‘we request assistance of the international community to get benefited from international expertise to criminalize Daesh terrorist entity. In this regard, the Republic of Iraq, and the United Kingdom are working on a draft resolution, in line with the Iraq’s national sovereignty and jurisdiction at both the negotiation and implementation stages of the resolution.’ The letter received a very positive reaction from the media, which praised Iraq for its proactive approach in bringing Daesh to justice. However, the praises may have been premature or ill-suited. It was in 2014 when Daesh gained territories in Iraq and established its self-proclaimed caliphate. This was followed by reports of mass atrocities perpetrated by Daesh against religious minorities, most notably, against Yazidis in Sinjar on August 3, 2017, followed by an attack on Christians in Nineveh Plains a few days later. Members of the Yazidi minority search for clues on February 3, 2015, that might lead them to missing relatives in the remains of people killed by Daesh, a day after Kurdish forces discovered a mass grave near the Iraqi village of Sinuni, in the northwestern Sinjar area. (Photo credit: SAFIN HAMED/AFP/Getty Images) Daesh committed acts of ‘murder, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of population, severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, rape, sexual slavery, sexual violence and persecution, committed as part of widespread or systematic attacks directed against civilian populations pursuant to or in furtherance of an organisational policy to commit such attacks.’ The atrocities had a common specific intention to destroy certain religious groups in the region, in whole or in part, and amount to genocide, the ‘crime of crimes’. Nonetheless, no Daesh fighter has ever been prosecuted for genocide. In May 2016, the Iraqi Permanent Mission to the UN in New York urged the UN Security Council to ‘set up a specific international legal mechanism for investigating and bringing to justice the criminals of [Daesh].’ The oral request was not followed up. In September 2016, the UK government, collaborating with the Iraqi and Belgian governments announced the establishment of a ‘Coalition to bring the Daesh to justice’. The coalition was intended to establish the best mechanism to prosecute Daesh fighters for the crimes they have committed in Iraq. Despite its best efforts, the coalition has not achieved a result in the subsequent months. In March 2017, during the follow-up meeting of the Coalition, Amal Clooney of Doughty Street Chambers representing Nadia Murad and other Yazidi victims of Daesh genocide, criticised the Iraqi government for failing to positively consider any of the proposals prepared by the Coalition. Still, there was no progress. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Forbes

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted Tuesday to advance a bill, passed by the House in June, that attempts to ensure that humanitarian aid is directed at those minorities, including Christians, most affected by the genocide being waged by ISIS. The bill clarifies that it is U.S. policy to” ensure that humanitarian, stabilization, and recovery assistance for nationals and residents of Iraq or Syria, and of communities from those countries, is directed toward ethnic and minority individuals and communities with the greatest need, including those individuals and communities that are at risk of persecution or war crimes.” It instructs the State Department to identify “threats of persecution, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes against members of Iraqi or Syrian religious or ethnic groups that are minorities in Iraq or in Syria.” The State Department is also instructed to identify the “humanitarian, stabilization, and recovery needs” of the persecuted minorities and “entities, including faith-based entities, that are providing such assistance and the extent of U.S. assistance to or through such entities.” “The vote from this morning is an important step toward providing relief for those victims of the genocide committed by ISIS,” said Rep. Chris Smith (R-N.J.) who introduced the bill in the House. “The world’s greatest humanitarian crisis since World War II is unfolding now in the Middle East...many of the region’s indigenous communities now face extinction...But their fate is not inevitable. The United States can avert this unfolding tragedy,” Smith told a House subcommittee when he was pushing for the bill’s passage. The new legislation will help facilitate that government funding be provided to religious organizations on the ground that can directly aid minorities in Iraq and Syria. “It is so essential to work with those who are on the ground that know exactly where the dollars should go,” Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA), a co-sponsor of the original bill, said in June. Knights of Columbus CEO Carl Anderson testified in May of last year on the difficulty that Christians and other minorities persecuted by ISIS face in seeking official aid. “Those who face genocide are a tiny fraction of the population,” Anderson said in a testimony before Congress. “They often must avoid official refugee camps because they are targeted for violence there by extremists. As a result, these minorities often do not get ‘official’ aid. This will continue to be the reality unless specific action is taken to bring the aid to where these minorities are forced to reside by continuing violence.” ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Townhall

Afghanistan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai addresses the 72nd United Nations General Assembly at U.N. Headquarters in New York, U.S., September 19, 2017.© 2017 Reuters On Tuesday at the United Nations General Assembly, Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani promoted his country’s bid to join the UN Human Rights Council. To make his case, Ghani cited the importance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, condemned the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya in Burma, and said that Afghans were “keen to add our voice in support of human rights.” He also called insurgent attacks on civilians in Afghanistan crimes against humanity. Yet, while welcoming the Trump administration’s ramped-up military strategy in Afghanistan, he said nothing about the rising number of civilian casualties from the fighting. Nor did he discuss human rights concerns his own government has failed to address. Ghani didn’t seem to recognize that the purpose of the Human Rights Council is to promote the protection of human rights throughout the world, not to shield its members from criticism. Ghani’s pitch for a Human Rights Council seat was undermined by his government’s poor performance before the UN Committee against Torture in April. Committee members grilled Afghanistan’s delegation about the government’s well-documented failure to curb torture. One committee member pointedly asked Afghanistan’s Attorney General Farid Hamidi, what the government was doing about Gen. Abdul Raziq, whose name has become synonymous with systematic torture, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances. Raziq serves as the police chief of Kandahar, and the committee noted numerous reports of detainees in Kandahar who alleged torture or ill-treatment, including “suffocation, crushing the testicles, water forcibly pumped in the stomach and electric shocks.” Despite Ghani’s 2015 vow to end torture in the country, United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan data indicates it’s on the rise, its statistics demonstrating that 39 percent of detainees of the police and intelligence agency are tortured in custody. Ghani’s impassioned human rights rhetoric falls far short in practice. Afghans won’t take Ghani seriously on protecting rights until he begins to bridge the yawning gap between rhetoric and reality by taking meaningful steps to end systematic torture, and hold police and other security forces accountable. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Human Rights Watch

So much is stuck in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process that it makes sense to question habitual premises and take a new approach. For me, that means deepening my engagement with one of the constituencies traditionally seen by outsiders as one of the most intransigent: Israel’s national religious Jewish community. The more I interact with them, the more I see how detrimental it is that they are excluded from peacemaking. An opportunity to address this exclusion arises when I talk with the British organisation Forward Thinking, which organises study trips to Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland for parties in conflict to meet two diametrically opposed communities in the north of the country and their interlocutors in Belfast, Dublin and London. After decades of violence, Northern Ireland is managing to implement a peace settlement. I discuss with Forward Thinking the findings of our research about the importance of this constituency. They agree to back a study visit for leaders from this community, if we can pull it off. There are many reasons this seems like a highly unlikely proposition for all concerned. One is that most of the leaders of the national religious ideological core have never left the borders of Israel due to its sanctity. Some rarely even leave their yeshivas, or religious colleges, where they focus almost exclusively on the study of sacred texts in Hebrew and Aramaic. Most don’t read other languages, and many have a real reluctance even to engage with mainstream Jewish academic literature. In Israel, this community is perceived by many to be the hawks, the fundamentalists. They are powerful, representing about 15 per cent of society and 20 per cent of the governing coalition. Most of them – though not all – support the settlements that have proliferated in the West Bank, which the Palestinians see as the core of any future Palestinian state, and which Jews view as Judea and Samaria and as the mainstay of their ancestral homeland. The ideological core of this community believes redemption will come when, bluntly put, the People of Israel (Jews) rule the entire Land of Israel according to the Torah of Israel. This notion of organic wholeness leaves no room for Palestinian statehood. It also challenges many liberal notions about separating state and religion and protecting minority rights. Yet after seven years of Crisis Group work, it is obvious to me that there is no hope of a peace deal at all without engaging religious communities. Up until now, they have been excluded by peacemaking that is essentially a secular project couched in the language of diplomacy and international law. These are wonderful things, but they are not part of the world view of the traditional religious populations. This has led religious communities to view the negotiations as an attempt to override not just their own concerns but also their own legal systems, Jewish and Islamic. For Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking to succeed, this will have to be change; indeed, to the extent the three legal systems are incompatible, they will need to evolve, as harmoniously as possible. If a way is not found to make peace that allows religious populations to operate within their worldview and to adjust it, they will fight it and peace efforts will likely continue to fail. A Neglected Constituency I first became aware of the national religious right as a community in 2013, while researching a Crisis Group report on their role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I have come to understand that they are certainly interested in peace, but that they have a different view of what that peace will be. I also know many of them quite well now. They occasionally know of me too, because the national religious media is mentioning Crisis Group as the first international actor to try to bring their community into peacemaking efforts. I join hands with an energetic well-connected national religious rabbi whom I have known for years, Doron Danino, to convene the group because ownership of the process must be in the hands of the community itself. Approaching leading figures one by one, based on Rabbi Doron’s priorities, we bring the group together: two politicians, the deputy defence minister and the deputy speaker of the Knesset, and six prominent rabbis, including one of the community’s most influential spiritual leaders. In their minds, the only reason that can overcome their reluctance to leave Israel is if it will do the Jewish people good. For instance, spending four days in Ireland means four days not teaching the Torah, which in their eyes certainly does good for the Jewish people. Two prominent rabbis decline, saying they are certain in their beliefs and there is nothing to learn from outsiders. But among others is a sense that their new political power means they have greater responsibilities. Ultimately, a prominent rabbi says he will go “because we are really trying to save lives, the lives of Jews. We should do anything in our power to avoid bloodshed”. Myself, I don’t want to go. When the preparation work is completed my work is done, I tell the participants and Rabbi Danino. But they insist that I join the group, as someone with experience bridging Irish and Middle Eastern conflicts, and who speaks Hebrew and English. The clinching argument is that they are only nine people, and in traditional Judaism, we need ten men (a minyan) to hold a public prayer. I have to say yes. For the next week, I pray with the group three times a day. As the days go by, unexpectedly I feel more a participant than organiser. Soon I too begin to look at the conflict in Ireland through a new lens. I see things I have not seen when I visited over a decade ago as a peace activist, taking part in facilitating disarmament workshops. My impression strengthens that religion is being re-interpreted all the time – whatever the religious fundamentalists claim – and that I should do my part as an agnostic person to become more post-secular, in the sense of not thinking that my secular beliefs should be imposed on others. Mapping New Worlds I’m not the only one to make new discoveries. A few of the members of our group have never flown in an airplane before. They are excited to discover Israel’s place in the world on the little airplane TV map and to experience the minor modern miracle of airport baggage retrieval belts. We begin with a guided tour along Belfast’s lines of conflict. My group has a really big surprise. They ask: we are being told there is no violence, so why are these walls still here? On the other hand, they are almost happy to discover that you can end violence and still keep communities apart. That peace doesn’t lead into full, harmonious integration. That you can address a conflict in a way that does not bring the kind of full resolution that leads to assimilation. And for them, this is actually reassuring. Culturally, they are afraid that peace will lead to Jews marrying outside the community, immersing themselves in non-Jewish culture and then stopping being Jews. In Belfast, we meet religious leaders, political leaders, activists, former negotiators and former militia fighters. It’s a very complex conflict and it’s hard to follow all of the nuances. Broadly, we all gradually get it, and not just on one level. I quickly realise that every question my group asks has two layers: about the conflict in Ireland, of course, but also another about our own conflict and what it means for the reality back home. We naturally contrast the way the Irish employ the term “sanctity of land” and the way national religious Jews do it. When we ask about the way the Irish believe in divine promise we think about what we Israeli Jews believe about divine promise. Our rabbis have their beards, kippahs, curled hair, and long-held views. It is very challenging for them to listen to pastors and priests, because for most of them Christians are heretics engaging in idolatry and abandoning pure monotheism with their doctrine of the trinity of God, Jesus and the Holy Spirit. And the history of Christian persecutions of Jews, since the early days of the Catholic Church, is ever present in their minds. Still, the atmosphere in the meetings with the Irish soon becomes relaxed. The actors in the Northern Ireland peace drama meet a lot of visitors, but these are still people with a mission, who really feel that they managed to do something good that they want to share with others. Forward Thinking has us meet the top people: the heads of churches, a former prime minister, people who actually signed the Good Friday Agreement and the St Andrews Agreement. After you go through such a peace process you understand how very complex your conflict is and how easy it is from the outside to misjudge others who are entrapped in conflict. The Israeli participants prove to be superb listeners, which is more than I expected. Forward Thinking as well said at the end of the trip that the group was exceptionally inquisitive and sharp. Perhaps it’s because there is no need to talk about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and defend their own positions. But there’s something else. They are really struck by a priest who discreetly hides his cross in his pocket. They find his attitude toward them is very respectful and it helps develop a deep empathy. They discover that Catholicism has changed dramatically from a few decades ago. Specifically, it no longer argues that Christianity replaces Judaism or that God no longer views Jews as the chosen people. One pastor does offend the rabbis, saying: “Jesus is the messiah and we believe in it and that is the true faith”. But the Forward Thinking organiser apologises profusely without being asked to. Such kindness from non-Jews impresses the rabbis. They came to study Catholics and Protestants killing each other, and they end up thinking about Christian-Jewish relations. One of the rabbis turns to me and says: “I have to revisit everything in terms of our attitude to Christianity. We need to issue new rulings about the kind of interaction that is permissible with Christians. They systematically treated us very decently”. The Israelis also begin to project their own national religious mapping of their Middle Eastern conflict onto the Irish one. For some of them, our next destination, Dublin in the Republic of Ireland, is Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. They see the Catholic Irish as the indigenous population of Ireland, just as they view the Jews as the indigenous population of Israel. They consider the Jewish homeland extends from parts of modern day Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea – the land God promised to the Jews in Abraham’s time. The Jews of Israel have just come back home, they are not colonial settlers. For them, Northern Ireland is the West Bank. It is the Protestants who are perhaps there without a good reason, as settlers. And Britain is the Arab hinterland, the Arab states. This is ironic, given that in Northern Ireland, it is the Protestants who tend to be pro-Israeli and the Catholics who tend to be pro-Palestinian. A Subtle Shift Along the way, my companions tease out other lessons. We’re just on a study tour of Ireland, so of course we’re very far from doing something that is going to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in any immediate way. We’re not expecting new answers with a capital A for those seemingly intractable issues like Jerusalem, refugees or security. But as we go from meeting to meeting, I see a group that has little experience either internationally or with other conflicts begin to broaden its thinking and question some fundamental assumptions. People see that it’s not just in Israel that talking to three people can produce ten opinions. For instance, the urge of Israeli and Palestinian negotiators for the last 25 years has been to get an agreement that formally ends the conflict and resolves competing claims once and for all. For Israel’s religious right, this is very problematic and part of a secular package. They want an end to the killing. But the kind of peace they pray for is about getting much more. For them for example true peace is linked to Isaiah’s prophecy in which swords are turned into ploughshares when a Temple is erected at the center of what today Muslims consider to be the al-Aqsa Mosque. So when they find out that the Northern Ireland conflict seems resolved both without transferring people out of their homes and also without formally conceding any fundamentals of the positions of either party, these features seem very good from their point of view. In short, my companions experience what it means for Irish people to reach an agreement on something that, after centuries of violence, had seemed entirely impossible to them. That “final status” is something that can be left for the future. And that compromises and in-between positions can be agreed if the mere possibility of the peace they pray for is not negated. The national religious right, at least in terms of the voices that were in the group, is in any event divided on what the end goal should be. One side says: look, we have to find some modus vivendi with the Palestinians, not based on defeating them, but also not based on accepting to give up our claims to the land indefinitely. But the other side still thinks: the Palestinians must be defeated, and the only problem is that Israel is not trying to do so; that any talk about two states, even if nothing is being done about it, still leaves room for Palestinians to hope that there will be a Palestinian state; and that any separate treatment of “settlements” by the Israeli state is disastrously wrong. They say the Palestinians must be made to understand that there will be no Palestinian state and must acquiesce to live under Jewish authority with “equal rights except the right to vote”. Of course these are not equal rights, but this is how they describe it. So if there is a shift I observe during the trip, it is in some of the group’s approach to the problem of eradicating Palestinians’ sense of national identity. We left Israel with a wide range of national religious right ideas. And when we return, that spectrum narrows somewhat. Even participants who still talk of defeating Palestinians now think that for these Palestinians to accept the new reality, maybe it is better for Israel to recognise some kind of Palestinian identity. Interestingly enough, we in Crisis Group are witnessing much the same trend of accepting gray areas in final status issues in our contacts with a Palestinian Islamist organisation, Hamas. Britain’s Different Kind of Muslim On the way back, we stop in London. This is the result of one of our conversations to secure the participation of the rabbis. As the rabbi put it: “With all due respect, we want to hear what the Protestants, the Catholics have to say. But our conflict is not with the Protestants and not with the Catholics. The conflict is not even an Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is a Jewish-Muslim conflict, it is a theological conflict. So, can we meet Muslims?” It’s true that between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea there are very few mainstream Muslims who would agree to meet this group. And there aren’t many Muslim leaders in Belfast. So on the way back, we stop off in England. We arrange to meet Muslim scholars, an imam and Muslim experts. Some of the Muslim experts are serving members of the British Army, who thus provide a different perspective on Muslim participation in state and society. The dialogue is significant because the answers to my group’s questions are much more nuanced and self-critical regarding Islam than what they hear back home. It helps them see that Palestinian motivations that they see as religious may actually stem from Palestinian national aspirations. For instance, when it comes to Jerusalem’s contested Holy Esplanade, which Jews call the Temple Mount and Palestinians call the Noble Sanctuary, my group is shocked to hear the London Muslims say that they see no problem with Jews praying in the sanctuary’s al-Aqsa mosque. Another insight is that much of the talk about Europe being secular and marked by full separation of state and religion is false. They learn that England has a queen who is the head of the Anglican Church and that this is not necessarily problematic for non-Christians. All the members of our group see Israel as a Jewish state, but some of the rabbis in our group end up strengthened in their view that the problem in Israel might lie in the organisation of state and religion, and that new approaches might help address the religious layers of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They feel that Israelis should look more at European countries to learn what such models mean for the rights of the dominant nation, freedom of religion, status of minorities, and public education. The Plane Back Home On the plane ride back home, my group animatedly debates all the ideas they have encountered. Some see similarities with the conflict in the British Isles and others say “Northern Ireland is totally different. The people have given up on their faith, they are largely secular, they have compromised on things they shouldn’t have”. But I hear a new counter-argument too: “Look, they are not killing each other, they are not rearming. And at the same time, they aren’t giving up on their major aspirations. What does it mean politically for us when we go home?” All of the group enjoy the chance to consider and analyse a conflict in a way they can’t at home, where they can’t meet many Palestinians or Muslims on the other side. Talking to all the stakeholders from another conflict, hearing the dialectics between enemies and peacemakers, seeing escalation and de-escalation, experiencing the way saying something affects the other makes a difference. It helps them see a much more complex picture, for instance what the important roles played by Dublin and London might say about outsiders’ roles in the Middle East, the need for the elite to stay in touch with the people, or that concord between purported extremists is possible. They are able to compare the points of view of negotiators who deal with law and draft treaties, and those of religious leaders who have drafted complementary sermons for the churches. The group gains confidence too. Going, they want total discretion. Coming back, they share their impressions with the main national religious newspaper in an article entitled “Northern Ireland as a Parable”. Suddenly the rabbis with the big beards are all over social media standing next to Ireland’s peace walls, talking heads want to know what’s going on, one of the rabbis gets on the biggest radio program in Israel to share trip insights, it’s a big thing. To outsiders it may appear as if the hawks at one end of the Israeli political spectrum are all the same, but within this community there is a very serious conversation about the theological possibility of compromise, about whether we have the mechanisms that allow for peace, about connecting the political and religious layers of the conflict. Pushing back against critics, they are creating a new space to discuss ways out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One rabbi gives a talk on the Northern Ireland trip to 300 yeshiva students, which trickles back to all their families. The all-male character of the group comes under attack, so later this year a group of prominent women from the national religious community will go to Ireland too. One critic in the WhatsApp group of a right-wing political party challenges the group: “You are going to the Europeans to learn from them. Christians! What are they trying to do? To convert us?” And one of the group members retorts with what all peace activists of Israel have been saying for the last century: “You have to do whatever you can for peace.” ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

On 20 September, the German Government endorsed the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance working definition of antisemitism during its cabinet meeting. The endorsement of the working definition was in line with the recommendations made by an independent group of experts on the topic of antisemitism. The endorsement of the working definition was intended to send a strong signal in the fight against antisemitism. "We Germans are particularly vigilant when our country is threatened by an increase in antisemitism," said Minister of the Interior, Thomas de Maizière, following the meeting on Wednesday morning. "History made clear to us, in the most terrible way, the horrors to which antisemitism can lead." "I very much welcome the endorsement of the working definition of antisemitism by the German Government," said Ambassador Felix Klein, Head of the German Delegation to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance and Special Envoy for Relations with Jewish Organizations. "In order to address the problem of antisemitism, it is very important to define it first and this working definition can provide guidance on how antisemitism can manifest itself. Following the adoption of the working definition by 31 Member Countries at the IHRA plenary in May 2016, I am pleased to see a number of countries are also introducing it on a national level. We are proud to join Austria, Israel, Romania, Scotland and the United Kingdom in affirming that there is no place for antisemitism in any society and we call on other states to follow." Mark Weitzman, former Chair of IHRA's Committee on Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial who helped spearhead IHRA's adoption of the working definition said "We commend Germany for taking this important step. Endorsement of the Working Definition of Antisemitism shows that Germany is committed to confronting antisemitism in all its forms and is an example of moral and political leadership." Dr. Robert Williams, the current Chair of the Committee, said "Germany's endorsement demonstrates a clear understanding that this working definition helps identify the many forms that antisemitism can take today. In a time of rising antisemitism it provides clarity to those dealing with the problem and can be an extremely useful tool in educating and combating antisemitism on all levels." For more information, please consult the fact sheet on the working definition of antisemitism and the press release on the adoption of the working definition of antisemitism in May 2016. In October 2013 the IHRA's 31 Member Countries also adopted a working definition of Holocaust denial and distortion. The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance unites governments and experts to strengthen, advance and promote Holocaust education, remembrance and research worldwide and to uphold the commitments of the 2000 Stockholm Declaration. The working definition of antisemitism: Bucharest, 26 May 2016 In the spirit of the Stockholm Declaration that states: “With humanity still scarred by …antisemitism and xenophobia the international community shares a solemn responsibility to fight those evils” the committee on Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial called the IHRA Plenary in Budapest 2015 to adopt the following working definition of antisemitism. On 26 May 2016, the Plenary in Bucharest decided to: Adopt the following non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” To guide IHRA in its work, the following examples may serve as illustrations: Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic. Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for “why things go wrong.” It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits. Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to:  Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.  Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective — such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.  Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.  Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust). Adopt the following non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” 2  Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.  Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.  Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.  Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.  Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.  Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.  Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel. Antisemitic acts are criminal when they are so defined by law (for example, denial of the Holocaust or distribution of antisemitic materials in some countries). Criminal acts are antisemitic when the targets of attacks, whether they are people or property – such as buildings, schools, places of worship and cemeteries – are selected because they are, or are perceived to be, Jewish or linked to Jews. Antisemitic discrimination is the denial to Jews of opportunities or services available to others and is illegal in many countries. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance

Per a government cabinet decision, Germany now has an official standard description for anti-Semitic statements and acts. The definition should make it easier to identify and combat instances of anti-Semitism. The official definition of anti-Semitism was drawn up by the government's conservative Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere and Social Democratic Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel. It is almost identical to the one proposed by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) used by countries around the world, including, for instance, Britain and Austria. The IHRA definition reads: "Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of anti-Semitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities." The definition was adopted after the government's regular Wednesday morning cabinet meeting. De Maiziere stressed the importance of consensus on the term in Germany, which is still plagued by various manifestations of anti-Semitism. "We Germans are particularly vigilant when our country is threatened by an increase in anti-Semitism," said the interior minister. "History made clear to us, in the most terrible way, the horrors to which anti-Semitism can lead." Neo-Nazism is only one form of present day anti-Semitism Defining anti-Semitism may seem to be self-evident, but it took considerable time and effort for Germany to agree to a specific wording. Other countries were quicker take up this definition. "I very much welcome the adoption of the working definition of anti-Semitism by the German government," said Felix Klein, head of the German delegation to the IHRA and the Foreign Ministry's special representative for relations with Jewish organizations. "In order to address the problem of anti-Semitism, it is very important to define it first, and this working definition can provide guidance on how antisemitism can manifest itself. We are proud to join Austria, Israel, Romania, Scotland and the United Kingdom in affirming that there is no place for anti-Semitism in any society and we call on other states to follow." The cabinet has recommended that law-enforcement and other public officials use the official definition. A first step and framework The adoption of the IHRA definition fulfills one of the recommendations of an independent expert commission on anti-Semitism issued in April. Commission member and Green parliamentarian Volker Beck called it "a first step." "The adoption of the definition sets out a framework," Beck said in a statement. "Government action on various levels – from legal prosecution to educational measures to the sensitization of the judicial system – is now more binding. We can create a common understanding in government of the problems and challenges and a evaluation framework for preventing and combating [anti-Semitism]." Critics of the IHRA definition say it fails to distinguish between anti-Semitism and legitimate criticism of Israel Beck had previously criticized the government for failing to act on the commission's recommendations. A definition, the commission argued, was essential for classifying and prosecuting anti-Semitic crimes and for distributing money to prevention programs. In the past, the task of cataloging anti-Semitic crimes as such has fallen to private organizations like the Antonio Amadeu Foundation. As the commission detailed in its report, today's anti-Semitism takes forms as different as extreme-right xenophobic fears of a global Jewish conspiracy and Israel-focused hostility toward Jews among Arabs and other Muslims. Other government cabinet members stressed that anti-Semitism in Germany could not be reduced to any single group. "Unfortunately, anti-Semitism is pervasive throughout this society," said Minister for Family Affairs Katarina Barley in Berlin. That sentiment was seconded by the director of the Anne Frank Education Center in Hessen, Meron Mendel, who warned against reducing modern-day anti-Semitism to Muslim migrants and refugees. Arson against a synagogue as 'non-anti-Semitic' Critics of the IHRA definition say it fails to distinguish adequately between anti-Semitism and legitimate criticism of Israel. But Jewish groups in Germany welcomed the cabinet's decision precisely because its description of anti-Semitism also applies to excessive criticism of Israel as a "Jewish collective" and not a nation like many others. Jewish Council President Schuster hailed the government's decision "It's as important to combat anti-Semitism dressed up as putative criticism of Israel as to fight against the old stereotypes about Jews," said the president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Joseph Schuster. Schuster added that Wednesday's decision would be of help to police – a sentiment seconded by Deidre Berger, the director of the Berlin Ramer Institute for German-Jewish Relations of the American Jewish Committee. "The lack of a unified definition has led to anti-Semitic incidents being all too often ignored in recent years," Berger said. "The fact, for example, that the courts considered an arson attack on a synagogue in Wuppertal as non-anti-Semitic illustrates the necessity of a definition." Berger called for police training on the subject and for the next government to appoint a permanent anti-Semitism commissioner to ensure that the commission's recommendations were implemented. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ © 2017 Deutsche Welle

On 25 September, barring a last-minute postponement, the Iraqi Kurdistan region will hold an independence referendum. Voters will be asked whether they want “the Kurdistan region and the Kurdish areas outside the region’ s administration to become an independent state”. The referendum cannot turn Kurdistan into an independent state, regardless of turnout and outcome, because the vote is merely consultative and legally non-binding. Still, the situation presents serious risks, both if the referendum is held and if the price paid to delay it is too high. On the ground, the day after the referendum likely will look very much like the day before. Iraqi Kurdistan’s legal status will not change, and Kurdish officials probably will retain their posts in the central government in Baghdad, including Iraqi President Fuad Masoum. Motivations for holding the referendum have more to do with internal Kurdish politics and longer-term relations with Baghdad than with immediate national Kurdish aspirations. For those driving the referendum, namely the president of the Kurdistan region Masoud Barzani and his party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the most immediate objective is not so much to move quickly toward a declaration of independence, but rather to shore up their own political fortunes within Iraqi Kurdistan and its chief city of Erbil. By adopting an assertive nationalist stance, they hope to silence dissent and force opponents to fall in line. Moreover, by extending the referendum to so-called “disputed territories”, a term that defines areas outside the Kurdistan region over which Baghdad and Erbil advance competing claims, the Kurdish leadership aims to strengthen its case for annexing these areas, provided they achieve a resounding yes-vote there. But political consequences of the vote, intended and unintended, nonetheless could be profound. Once the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) is defeated, key aspects of Iraq’s power structure once more will be up for re-negotiation. This includes the question of de-centralisation of authority, the organisation and deployment of security forces, the internal balance of power within the Shiite majority and the state of U.S.-Iran competition for influence in the country. By calling the referendum, Barzani is tossing a stone into an already troubled pond. Old Actors, New Realities The impact already is visible. Iraqi Prime Minister Hayder Abadi, who thus far had urged accommodation with Erbil, has felt compelled to move toward a more hard-line position. His government has declared the referendum non-constitutional and, despite lacking the legal authority to do so, the Iraqi parliament voted to depose the governor of Kirkuk, a staunch referendum proponent from an area that is especially contested and volatile. Kurdish lawmakers walked out of the session, giving a taste of how the referendum issue may quickly lead to a breakdown of the political process. Abadi is under pressure from Shiite factions close to Iran who could well use the vote to undermine his leadership, posing as the real defenders of Iraqi unity against Kurdish claims. That may help them win over Sunnis living in the disputed areas, but it also could provoke clashes between the armed factions they control and the KDP peshmerga during or after the vote. There are regional consequences too. Turkey and Iran, both neighbours of Iraqi Kurdistan, have voiced strong opposition to the referendum and warned of dire consequences. For now however, their actions do not seem to be truly aimed at preventing the vote. Ankara and Tehran appear confident that they possess sufficient leverage over leading figures in the KDP and its rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), to prevent Iraqi Kurdistan from becoming a fully independent state, irrespective of the vote’s outcome. These Kurdish politicians rely on Turkey and Iran for support, and their dependency will only increase if the referendum provokes an escalation with Baghdad. Turkey and Iran appear to be waiting to see the effects of the referendum on Iraqi and regional politics to become clearer before making more decisive moves. If, by pushing through the referendum despite strong international opposition, the KDP ends up increasingly isolated, Turkey may seek to exploit the vulnerability of its Kurdish partner to consolidate its foothold in Dohuk and the Ninewa plain, in north-western Iraq. This area is of strategic importance to Ankara because it borders eastern Syria, now dominated by a movement it regards as a dangerous foe, the Democratic Union Party (PYD). This is the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has fought a three-decade long insurgency against Ankara. For its part, Iran may see the referendum as an opportunity to strengthen its position in Baghdad and north-eastern Iraq. Deteriorating relations between Erbil and Baghdad almost certainly would strengthen the Iran-affiliated Shiite factions at Abadi’s and his government’s expense. Tehran also could seek to bolster its Iraqi allies’ influence and leverage over Sunni Arabs who live in the disputed territories and fear Kurdish encroachment, as well as over those PUK members who oppose KDP policies. Postponement Scenarios In this context, voices urging Barzani to at least postpone the vote have been loud, clear and eclectic. The assortment of countries includes the U.S., its Western allies, Turkey and Iran, as well as the UN. Barzani has responded by saying he could only delay the referendum if the Kurds were to receive international guarantees that independence negotiations with Baghdad will begin. This almost certainly is a bridge too far even for his closest Western partners. At present, talks are ongoing regarding whether Barzani might accept some lesser, vaguer version allowing him to walk back without losing face while avoiding the provocation of Baghdad. A postponement of the referendum would be the best case scenario, but not at any price. In their desperation to halt the referendum, international actors – the U.S. prime among them – should tread carefully and avoid paying a price they may come to regret later. Some commitments make sense, such as support for immediate resumption of Erbil-Baghdad negotiations on the full range of issues that divide them. Others would be more fraught, such as any commitment affecting the status of Kirkuk or the disputed territories, or blind support for a referendum to be held by a certain date if talks with Baghdad fail, regardless of whether that referendum is to be conducted in Kirkuk or the disputed territories. In other words, kicking the can down the road makes sense, but not in any direction. Otherwise, the cost of postponement could well turn out to be heftier in the long run than the cost of the referendum itself. Some guidelines should be followed under both scenarios of postponement or non- postponement. If the vote is delayed, the time gained should be used for active mediation by Iraq’s and the Kurds’ partners to de-escalate the situation and press Baghdad and Erbil to negotiate in good faith modifications to the legal framework governing their relations. If the referendum proceeds as planned, tensions are likely to rise along with the temptation to penalise Erbil. But the smarter course for Baghdad, as well as regional and international actors, would be to downplay the event and virtually ignore it. Unless Barzani takes the next, far more perilous step of seeking to move unilaterally toward independence, the referendum’s value will diminish over time as nothing on the ground will change and nor will the status of the Kurdistan region. Handled properly as essentially a non-event, the referendum might not have overly damaging consequences. Effective Self-reliance For Kurds, this could well come as a bitter disappointment. Many read their history as a struggle following a linear path toward statehood. In reality, the national Kurdish struggle in Iraq has been less linear than uneven, a function of the status of the central state. Whenever the regime in Baghdad has been threatened, it has either brutally repressed its Kurdish peripheries or largely withdrawn from these areas, allowing Kurdish parties to perform basic governance and local security functions while resisting their attempts to gain full autonomy. This occurred after the defeat of Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War and after his ouster in 2003. Today’s developments reflect the weakening of the central state in the face of ISIS. In this sense, the referendum is less a reflection of steady, historical progress toward a Kurdish state than of the crises surrounding Iraq. It is less a demonstration that a Kurdish state can stand on its own than a by-product of the Iraqi state’s current weakness and of a region in turmoil. Regardless of their future status, the priority for Iraqi Kurds should be to put their own house in order rather than seeking to exploit surrounding regional disorder, to which they would then inevitably be vulnerable. In short, the Kurdish political parties that led the national struggle over the last century now face the challenge of transferring their power and authority to Kurdish institutions. The key lies in renewing the leadership of the two historical Kurdish parties, the KDP and PUK, to empower a new generation of Kurdish leaders who, their party affiliation aside, can prioritise nurturing a professional bureaucracy and security forces. By doing so, they could turn the Kurdish region into a more effective, self-reliant entity, which would serve them well regardless of any future dispensation on legal status. In the same spirit, they also should avoid triggering conflict with Baghdad and Iraq’s non-Kurdish communities. This applies especially to the question of the boundary separating the Kurdish region from the rest of Iraq. The status of the “disputed territories” must be negotiated as it cannot be imposed by either side. Equally important, Kurdish leaders should propose a vision for Iraqi Kurdistan which all political movements and non-Kurdish minorities alike can share. _________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

A general view shows Syrian refugee camps dotted in and around the Lebanese town of Arsal, near the border with Syria, Lebanon, September 21, 2016.© 2016 Reuters Many refugees in Arsal, a border town in northeast Lebanon recently cleared of armed groups, face pressure to return to Syria, Human Rights Watch said today. Some have already returned to Syria because of the harsh conditions in Arsal. A recent Human Rights Watch visit to Arsal found widespread lack of legal residency, restrictions on freedom of movement, and fear of seemingly random arrests during army raids. Lebanese authorities should prioritize restoring services and protecting civilians there, following the military campaigns and negotiated agreements that pushed the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra militants out of the area. “Conditions in Arsal have gotten so bad that many refugees have decided to go back into a war zone,” said Nadim Houry, terrorism and counterterrorism director at Human Rights Watch. “Lebanese authorities have a difficult job maintaining security in Arsal, but now that ISIS and al-Nusra have been pushed out, it is essential to improve services and protect civilians.” Syrians who left Arsal for Idlib told Human Rights Watch by phone that they went back to Syria because of the situation in Arsal, including army raids on refugee settlements, a widespread lack of legal status, fear of arrest and detention, restrictions on their movement, and limited access to education and health care. Human Rights Watch did not find evidence of direct forced returns, but all of those interviewed said they left under pressure, not voluntarily. Lebanon should ensure that refugees can regularize their legal status and have freedom of movement and access to humanitarian aid, Human Rights Watch said. Security measures should respect the rights of civilians in Arsal. Arsal currently hosts an estimated 60,000 Syrians alongside a population of 38,000 Lebanese, according to the municipality. The Lebanese army has maintained tight control over Arsal since the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra attacked the town in 2014, and has restricted access to the town since then. While the army quickly regained control of the town, fighters from the Islamic State and al-Nusra remained in areas around Arsal until recent campaigns by the Lebanese army and Hezbollah ended in negotiated deals, under which armed men and their families as well as unaffiliated civilians returned to Syria. Almost 10,000 Syrians have returned from Arsal since June, according to the municipality, largely under agreements negotiated by Hezbollah. Human Rights Watch entered Arsal in September, with permission from the Lebanese authorities, to interview Syrians and assess conditions first-hand. Human Rights Watch spoke with 19 refugees inside Arsal and by phone with five Syrians who returned to Syria. “When we left [Arsal], we were forced to go,” said a doctor who returned to Idlib. “It wasn’t our place. We would always be persecuted there. Our fate was either arrest, or death, or permanently living in anxiety. This is why most people left, because of the persecution.” Syrians said that the widespread lack of legal residency was a factor in the decision of many to return to Syria. Nine of the 19 said they did not have legal status, and that men in particular feared arrest by the General Security Organization when trying to renew their residency. Without residency, Syrians face restrictions on movement for fear of arrest, affecting their access to work, health care, and birth and marriage registration. Aid groups estimate that between 70 to 80 percent of the estimated 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon lack legal status. Eight Syrians in Arsal said that either they or an immediate family member had been arrested when trying to renew their residency, and that authorities had detained children as young as 9. One camp representative showed Human Rights Watch a list of 222 people who attempted to renew residency but whose identification cards had been held by General Security for at least a year – and as long as three years in some cases. Syrians said that they feared arrest by the army during frequent security raids on refugee settlements in Arsal. Many said they perceived the arrests as “random,” and feared they could be arrested at any time. Several said that the mass raids in June resulting in the arrests of more than 350 Syrians, and the deaths of four Syrians in military custody amid evidence of torture, created a sense of fear and contributed to families’ decisions to return. Human Rights Watch has called on the army to release its investigation of this incident, but the army has not done so. Camp leaders said they were still unaware of the whereabouts of some of those detained. “I’m not against the army,” one camp leader in Arsal said. “We will enter with them if they want to enter camps, we want to cooperate with the Lebanese army.” Syrians in Idlib said they did not have clear information about conditions there before they returned. UNHCR, the United Nations refugee agency, does not have a permanent presence in Arsal, was not involved in facilitating the returns to Syria, and for the most part did not interview Syrians before they left to assess whether their departure was voluntary. UNHCR has not issued a public assessment as to whether these returns were voluntary. “Our stay in Arsal was in fear, living in the unknown, our departure was in fear and to the unknown, and the trip was in fear and through the unknown,” said one man who returned to Idlib. “We were asking about guarantees but no one told us what it was. … We were in psychological torment. It’s the most difficult decision to make: whether to stay in the unknown or go toward the unknown.” Almost all of the Syrians interviewed said they would have preferred to stay in Lebanon if they had felt safe. Syrians still in Arsal also said that they felt under pressure to leave. “The army is putting pressure, General Security is putting pressure, people are putting pressure on us, the situation here is unacceptable,” one man said. But while some said they would consider going back under an international agreement, all said they would prefer to remain in Lebanon if conditions improved, until it was safe to return to Syria. “I want to go back home with my honor, go back to my house, not under pressure [to Idlib],” one woman said. Lebanon is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, but is bound by the universally binding customary law principle of nonrefoulement not to return anyone to a place where they would face a real risk of being persecuted, exposed to torture or other ill treatment, or to threats to their lives or freedom. Lebanon is also bound by the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment not to return anyone to a country where they would be in danger of torture or ill-treatment. Refoulement occurs not only when a refugee is directly rejected or expelled, but also when indirect pressure on them is so intense that it leads them to believe that they have no practical option but to return to a country where they face serious risk of persecution or threats to their lives and safety. The returns to Syria follow heightened calls by Lebanese politicians for the return of refugees to Syria. In July, President Michel Aoun called for safe, not voluntary, returns. Idlib province is considered a “de-escalation zone,” based on an agreement among some of the warring parties in Kazakhstan in May, but cannot be considered safe for returns. International experience has shown that “safe zones” rarely remain safe, Human Rights Watch said. “With ISIS and al-Nusra gone from Arsal, Lebanon should recognize that it’s not in its interest for refugees to fear interaction with security services and reassess its security policy,” Houry said. “Lebanon should ensure that Syrians are able to obtain legal residency and that security operations respect the safety and security of refugees living in Arsal.” ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Human Rights Watch

Seorang pakar pembunuhan jenayah kaum, profesor Dr Gregory Stanton melihat sekatan jadi alat paling berkesan untuk menekan Aung San Suu Kyi dan rejim tentera myanmar dalam menangani krisis Rohingya. Beliau menarik perhatian, sekatan memberi kesan kepada iran dan iraq semasa dua negara teluk itu dikecam masing-masing kerana isu nuklear dan kepimpinan dictator. Translation: A racial crime killer expert, Professor Dr Gregory Stanton sees sanctions as the most effective tool for suppressing Aung San Suu Kyi and myanmar military regime in addressing the Rohingya crisis. He drew attention, restrictions affecting iran and iraq while the two countries were censured by nuclear and dictatorial leadership respectively. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ © 2017 Astro Awani

Dear Dr. Ghebreyesus, We wish to kindly draw your attention to the cholera epidemic currently ravaging many parts of the Republic of Sudan and caused the death of thousands of victims, especially in Sudan’s peripheral areas. Since the outbreak of the disease in August 2016, all of Sudan’s 18 States, including the national capital Khartoum and its twin cities Omdurman and Khartoum North (Bahri) were severely affected. The epicentre of the cholera pandemic is now reported in war- ravaged Darfur region. All indicators suggest the widespread nature of the disease and the need for urgent intervention of the World Health Organisation. Evidence of the existence of the disease is that on 1 st June 2017, Sudan’s Federal Minster of Health informed the National Assembly “Parliament” about the spread of the disease in many parts of Sudan and he provided precise figures of the number of cases registered and the mortalities reported during the period August 2016 – June 2017. Other independent sources, including the US Embassy in Khartoum and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) confirmed, in two separate occasions, the spread of cholera in Sudan. Although we believe that the figures indicated by the Government of Sudan are conservative and do not reflect the reality on the ground, however, the case fatality rate deduced in June 2017 is over 1.8% of confirmed cholera cases, which is a mortality rate above the threshold to declare cholera epidemic in a country. According to independent medical practitioners in Khartoum and elsewhere in Sudan the numbers of confirmed cases of cholera are much higher and that the mortality rate in some affected areas has reached over 10% of the declared cases. We are very concerned that the Government of Sudan refused to declare the existence of cholera in the country for several months and instead it refers to the epidemic as “acute watery diarrhoea” in the words of Sudan’s Minister of Health when he informed journalists in Khartoum about the existence of the disease on 4 June 2017. The apparent unwillingness of the Government of Sudan to declare the cholera epidemic in the country severely affected mobilization efforts to rescue the victims. In addition, there were reports that GoS – at Federal and State levels – obstructed the work of local volunteers. Dr. Hussein Gasim Abu-Aker, head of medical emergency service at Omdurman Hospital had been dismissed from his post because he refused to conceal the existence of the cholera epidemic. On 7 June 2017, the security forces arrested and detained three activists (Mr. Ahmed Abu Zaid, Adil Hadatha and Eyman Ali Ismail) while they were taking part in an awareness raising campaign against cholera in Haj Yusuf residential area in Khartoum Bahri. Dear Dr. Ghebreyesus, We call on you to take leadership in addressing the cholera crisis in Sudan, especially in the Darfur region and save the lives of thousands of likely victims that are languishing in miserably camps for internally displaced persons. We persuade particularly appeal to you to call upon the Government of Sudan to declare, in no ambiguous terms, the existence of cholera pandemic in the country. We further call on the WHO to develop emergency plans for intervention to curb the ongoing cholera epidemic in Sudan taking into consideration the special needs of regions of the country that witness concentration of vulnerable groups in densely populated makeshift settlements with extremely poor health service and sanitation such as Darfur, where environmental and health infrastructures are extremely poor. Signed: 1. Abdelbagi Jibril, Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre _____________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Abdelbagi Jibril,

Arakan is burning. The Burmese rulers appear to be on the brink of achieving their much- longed-for a “final solution” of the Rohingya question. A reign of terror has been let loose in northern Arakan. Rohingyas are being shot, butchered, disembowelled, torched and drowned. Women are being raped and gang-raped, and children are being mutilated often in front of their helpless parents and siblings. To stave off foul smell from the rotting corpses, they are either being charred or dumped in shallow mass graves, often dug under duress by the ones who are to meet the same fate. Village after village are being torched, resulting in “midnight in summer noon.” In short, genocide of unimaginable barbarity is in progress against the Rohingyas. Those who managed to flee had harrowing tales to share. A mother who was away from home when attackers came later found her baby daughter cut into halves; a paralysed elderly woman unable to run was torched to death; people trying to flee atrocity were indiscriminately fired upon from helicopter gunships. Many survivors suffer from the heart-wrenching burden of not being able to provide the last rites to their loved ones, not even sheets to cover the bodies; a fleeing mother has to live with the agonising memory of watching vultures zeroing in on the mutilated body of her dead son whom she was unable to bury. Their flight was no less distressing. Most walked for days on difficult terrains through hills, jungles and knee-deep water, often drenched in monsoon rain, constantly in fear of being attacked by the military or their cohorts, and by armed goons who pounced on them for whatever meagre valuables they were carrying. Many narrated that their fellow travellers' journey was harshly cut short as they could no longer endure hunger and hardship, some falling victim to snakebites. Losing family members as they ran in different directions during the mayhem and at night-time treks in deep jungles was also reported. When they were about to cross the border with Bangladesh and were beginning to feel relieved, they were faced with the stark reality of denial of entry. Left with no option, they had to pick up both energy and hope to undertake the next part of the trip, not to mention through more perilous and vulnerable routes. Others capable of dispensing fair sums of money secured the services of fixers, thriving on facilitating border crossing. The story of exploitation of the escaping people by unscrupulous locals has been aptly covered by this daily in several reports. For instance, a fleeing family was paid only Tk 8,000 (less than USD 100) in exchange for ten cows that they managed to bring with them. This is the gruesome reality of the hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas escaping the genocide being committed by the Burmese authorities. The world is witnessing the Arakan version of Rwanda and Srebrenica massacres. Commentators, campaigners, politicians, Nobel laureates, faith leaders and general masses in many parts of the world have been stunned by the stance taken by the unofficial head of the Burmese government, Aung San Suu Kyi, the icon of liberty and freedom. Strong criticism and caricatures of the fallen idol have flooded the social and print media. Some view it as her inability to stop the genocide crafted and executed by the Burmese military against her wishes; the less charitable ones accuse her of being an active accomplice. As Mark Farmaner of Burma Campaign UK, in his incisive piece published on HuffPost on September 13, 2017, reminded us that while Suu Kyi continues to receive the flak for failing to live up to her image, it is the military that completes the unfinished agenda of ridding Arakan of Rohingyas. Quite cogently, he puts forward the case that the powerful states, including those who present themselves as champions of human rights and rule of law and style themselves as moral guardians of countries like Bangladesh, are pampering and promoting the head of the Burmese army, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Included among are the US, Germany, Italy, Austria, the European Union, Japan and India. Hlaing is reputed for his hard-line stand in dealing with Kachin, Shan and Rohingya communities. The General “is guilty of ethnic cleansing, he is under investigation for war crimes and crimes against humanity and he is the biggest obstacle to democratic reform,” effectively running a parallel government in the country. The Obama administration lifted most of the US sanctions targeting the country's military in October 2016; the British government continues to provide training to the army; Germany and Austria accorded “red carpet treatment” to the General when he visited those countries; Italy hosted him last year; and the EU “even had him address their prestigious annual meeting of military heads of EU countries.” The Prime Ministers of Japan and India were perhaps honoured to grant him audience. The latter provides the Burmese army a range of military hardware from artillery guns and rocket launchers to war gaming software. Quite understandably, the Israel and Burma relationship is premised on transferring knowledge of Israeli oppression and dispossession of the Palestinians. As Israeli rights activist Ofer Neiman observes, “Weapons used against the Palestinians are being sold as ; to some of the worst regimes on the planet,” including Burma. This policy of placating the Burmese military commander in his vicious genocidal campaign against Rohingyas and crimes against humanity harks back to the policy of appeasement of the western alliance on Nazi Germany. The above reality explains the palpable reticence of western liberal states in holding the Burmese generals accountable for genocide and crimes against humanity. Their duplicity becomes brazen when they leave no stone unturned to prosecute the likes of Robert Mugabe and Omar Al Bashir for similar charges. Thus, it is not only the Burmese generals who are to be made accountable for genocide of the Rohingyas and crimes against humanity perpetrated against other nationalities in Burma, their liberal external patrons also have a case to answer. After all, it is the latter's relentless pursuit of resources, strategic and commercial interests, including that of arms trade, bereft of human rights considerations, that has shored up this brutal regime. With impunity it unleashed the demon of destruction in this 21st-century Burma. Sadly, the much-celebrated corpus of human rights declarations, covenants and conventions lies in tatters as do the books of nursery rhymes of Rohingya children in burnt-out villages of Arakan. _____________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Daily Star,