Executive Summary Violent conflicts between nomadic herders from northern Nigeria and sedentary agrarian communities in the central and southern zones have escalated in recent years and are spreading southward, threatening the country’s security and stability. With an estimated death toll of approximately 2,500 people in 2016, these clashes are becoming as potentially dangerous as the Boko Haram insurgency in the north east. Yet to date, response to the crisis at both the federal and state levels has been poor. President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration and affected state governments need to work together, taking immediate steps to shore up security for herders and famers, strengthening conflict-resolution mechanisms and initiating longer-term efforts to reform livestock management practices, address negative environmental trends and curb cross-border movements of both cattle rustlers and armed herders. Familiar problems – relating to land and water use, obstruction of traditional migration routes, livestock theft and crop damage – tend to trigger these disputes. But their roots run deeper. Drought and desertification have degraded pastures, dried up many natural water sources across Nigeria’s far-northern Sahelian belt and forced large numbers of herders to migrate south in search of grassland and water for their herds. Insecurity in many northern states (a consequence of the Boko Haram insurgency in the north east and of less-well-reported rural banditry and cattle rustling in the north-west and north-central zones) also prompts increasing numbers of herdsmen to migrate south. The growth of human settlements, expansion of public infrastructure and acquisition of land by large-scale farmers and other private commercial interests, have deprived herders of grazing reserves designated by the post-independence government of the former Northern region (now split into nineteen states). Herders migrating into the savannah and rain forests of the central and southern states are moving into regions where high population growth over the last four decades has heightened pressure on farmland, increasing the frequency of disputes over crop damage, water pollution and cattle theft. In the absence of mutually accepted mediation mechanisms, these disagreement increasingly turn violent. The spread of conflict into southern states is aggravating already fragile relations among the country’s major regional, ethnic and religious groups. The south’s majority Christian communities resent the influx of predominantly Muslim herders, portrayed in some narratives as an ‘‘Islamisation force’’. Herders are mostly Fulani, lending an ethnic dimension to strife. Insofar as the Fulani spread across many West and Central African countries, any major confrontation between them and other Nigerian groups could have regional repercussions, drawing in fighters from neighbouring countries. As these conflicts increase in frequency, intensity and geographical scope, so does their humanitarian and economic toll. The increasing availability of illicit firearms, both locally-produced and smuggled in from outside, worsens the bloodshed. Over the past five years, thousands have been killed; precise tallies are unavailable, but a survey of open source reports suggests fatalities may have reached an annual average of more than 2,000 from 2011 to 2016, for some years exceeding the toll from the Boko Haram insurgency. Tens of thousands have been forcibly displaced, with properties, crops and livestock worth billions of naira destroyed, at great cost to local and state economies. The reaction from Nigeria’s federal and state authorities, so far, has been wanting. Aside from the recent push against Boko Haram and military operations against cattle rustling, they have done little else to address rural insecurity in the north. Federal security and law enforcement agencies have established neither early-warning nor rapid response mechanisms; they have not arrested and prosecuted perpetrators of violence or offered redress to victims. Until recently, officials have paid little if any attention to improving livestock management practices to minimise friction with agrarian communities. State governments’ responses overall have been short-sighted; most have failed to encourage community-level dialogue. As a result, both herders and farmers are taking matters into their own hands, further aggravating conflicts. President Buhari’s government, which is increasingly viewed with misgivings by many in central and southern states, should make it a priority to take firm and transparent steps to ensure better protection for both herders and farmers. Affected state governments also should better coordinate with federal authorities to reduce risks of violence. The federal government’s failure to define a clear and coherent political approach to resolving the crisis, or even acknowledge its scope, is putting Nigerian citizens at risk. Federal and state authorities should implement five steps. In the short term, these include: Strengthen security arrangements for herders and farming communities especially in the north-central zone: this will require that governments and security agencies sustain campaigns against cattle rustling and rural banditry; improve early-warning systems; maintain operational readiness of rural-based police and other security units; encourage communication and collaboration with local authorities; and tighten control of production, circulation and possession of illicit firearms and ammunition, especially automatic rifles, including by strengthening cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries’ security forces; Establish or strengthen conflict mediation, resolution, reconciliation and peacebuilding mechanisms: this should be done at state and local government levels, and also within rural communities particularly in areas that have been most affected by conflict; Establish grazing reserves in consenting states and improve livestock production and management in order to minimise contacts and friction between herders and farmers: this will entail developing grazing reserves in the ten northern states where governments have already earmarked lands for this purpose; formulating and implementing the ten-year National Ranch Development Plan proposed by a stakeholders forum facilitated by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in April 2017; and encouraging livestock producers’ buy-in through easier access to credit from financial institutions. In the longer term, federal and state governments should consider the following: Address environmental factors that are driving herders’ migration to the south: this will require stepping up implementation of programs under the Great Green Wall Initiative for the Sahara and the Sahel, a trans-African project designed to restore drought-and-desert degraded environments and livelihoods including in Nigeria’s far northern belt; and developing strategies for mitigating climate change impact in the far northern states; Coordinate with neighbours to stem cross-border movement of non-Nigerian armed herders: Nigeria should work with Cameroon, Chad and Niger (the Lake Chad basin countries) to regulate movements across borders, particularly of cattle rustlers, armed herders and others that have been identified as aggravating internal tension and insecurity in Nigeria. Although some of the proposed steps will not yield immediate results, Nigeria’s federal and state authorities, as well as other relevant actors, need to take remedial actions with a greater sense of urgency. Failure to respond, decisively and effectively, would allow Nigeria to continue sliding into increasingly deadly conflict. Abuja/Brussels, 19 September 2017 I.Introduction Although Nigeria chiefly is known for its oil and gas production, agriculture employs about 70 per cent of its labour force. Small-holders in the country’s centre and south harvest most of the country’s tuber and vegetable crops while pastoralists in the north raise most of its grains and livestock. Over 90 per cent of pastoralists reportedly are Fulani, a large ethnic group straddling several West and Central African countries.Pastoralists own approximately 90 per cent of the national herd, estimated at 19.5 million cattle, about 975,000 donkeys, 28,000 camels, 72.5 million goats and 41.3 million sheep. Livestock represents between 20 and 30 per cent of total agricultural production and about 6 to 8 per cent of overall Gross Domestic Production (GDP). About 30 per cent of live animals slaughtered in Nigeria are brought in by pastoralists from other countries. Historically, relations between herders and sedentary farming communities have been harmonious. By and large, they lived in a peaceful, symbiotic relationship: herders’ cattle would fertilise the farmers’ land in exchange for grazing rights. But tensions have grown over the past decade, with increasingly violent flare-ups spreading throughout central and southern states; incidents have occurred in at least 22 of the country’s 36 states. According to one report, in 2016 over 2,000 people were killed and tens of thousands displaced in Benue and Kaduna states alone. According to another, incidents involving herders accounted for 44 per cent of all fatalities in the country in 2016. These conflicts are, by every measure, complex and multidimensional. Formulating appropriate responses requires a clear diagnosis of their root causes, evolution, impacts and implications. This report analyses the factors that help cause or aggravate these conflicts, their evolution and spread, and their human toll. It further assesses responses, especially by the federal government and its security agencies, and outlines possible strategies to reduce or prevent violence. The report is based on interviews conducted in September 2016 and July 2017 with a range of actors and stakeholders, including leaders and representatives of pastoralist and farmer organisations, officials of federal and state governments, security officers, leaders of civil society organisations and local vigilante groups, as well as victims of the violence in Adamawa, Benue, Borno, Ekiti, Enugu, Kaduna and Nasarawa states. II.Drivers of the Violence For centuries, pastoralists drove their cattle east and west across the Sahel, the semi-arid zone south of the Sahara Desert that includes Nigeria’s far northern belt. In the early 20th century, some herders started shifting their migratory routes farther south, pushed by a series of droughts in the far north, but also attracted by heightened security in central and southern Nigeria and by better control of parasitic diseases (such as trypanomiasis or sleeping sickness) in the central and southern zones. Herders also wanted to evade the much-hated cattle tax (jangali) imposed by the British colonial government in the northern region. As cattle herds migrated southward, so did conflicts between pastoralists and farmers. Among the principal causes and aggravating factors behind this escalating conflict are climatic changes (frequent droughts and desertification); population growth (loss of northern grazing lands to the expansion of human settlements); technological and economic changes (new livestock and farming practices); crime (rural banditry and cattle rustling); political and ethnic strife (intensified by the spread of illicit firearms); and cultural changes (the collapse of traditional conflict management mechanisms). A dysfunctional legal regime that allows crime to go unpunished has encouraged both farmers and pastoralists to take matters into their own hands. A.Drought and Desertification Nigeria’s far north is arid and semi-arid, with a long dry season from October to May and low rainfall (600 to 900 mm) from June to September. In 2008, the National Meteorological Agency reported that over the preceding 30 years the annual rainy season dropped from an average of 150 to 120 days. In the last six decades, over 350,000 sq km of the already arid region turned to desert or desert-like conditions, a phenomenon progressing southward at the rate of 0.6km per year. In Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara states, estimates suggest that 50-75 per cent of the land area is becoming desert. These environmental changes have wrecked agriculture and human livelihoods, forcing millions of pastoralists and others to migrate south, in search of productive land. Migration initially was seasonal, with herders spending December to May in the central zone before returning north. Over the last two decades, however, as available pastures shrank in the far north, herders have been staying in the central zone longer – from December to June or July. More recently, some have chosen to graze their herds there permanently. This has triggered increasing disputes over land and water use with central Nigeria’s growing populations of sedentary crop farmers. B.Loss of Grazing Reserves Most of the 415 grazing reserves established by the northern regional government in the 1960s have since been lost. Only 114 were formally documented or demarcated, though the government failed to back these agreements with legislation guaranteeing exclusive usage or take active measures to prevent encroachment. The rest succumbed to pressure from rapid population growth and the associated demand for farmland, were overrun by urban and other infrastructure, or appropriated by private commercial interests. With the Northern region’s division into nineteen states, reserves straddling two or more state jurisdictions lost collective management. The cumulative effect has been to significantly reduce the availability of designated grazing reserves, forcing herders to seek pasture elsewhere. C.Changes in Pastoralism and Farming Practices Changing practices among both farmers and pastoralists have also strained relations. Over the last three decades, some cattle herders have gradually adopted sedentary lifestyles, leaving cattle herding increasingly to young men or boys, aged nine to 25 years, who often lack the civility and maturity to resolve disputes amicably. For their part, crop farmers, with federal government help, have expanded into previously uncultivated land. Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs) in the 1970s encouraged the use of water pumps while National Fadama Development Projects (NFDPs) have helped farmers exploit wetlands (river valleys and flood plains) for dry season irrigated agriculture since 1993. More fertile, well-watered land, coupled with improvements in rural-urban transportation and an expanding urban market, has boosted farmers’ incomes and dry-season employment. But cattle herders lost access to grass-abundant wetlands, which they had previously used with little risk of livestock straying into farms.Furthermore, high-value crops promoted by the National Fadama Development Projects, notably tomatoes and onions, produce little residue for livestock feeding, further diminishing available fodder. In this changed environment, relations became more competitive and confrontational, especially in the absence of negotiations between farmers and herders to ensure access to grazing grounds and livestock routes. D.Rural Banditry and Cattle Rustling Rural banditry also is driving herders south. Over the last decade, cattle rustling has grown in scale and organisation in several northern states where large bandit groups operate with mounting audacity.While this occurs throughout the north, the main theatres have been the Kamuku forest in Kaduna, Falgore forest in Kano, Dansadau forest in Zamfara and Davin Rugu forest stretching through Kaduna, Katsina and Zamfara states. Cattle theft reportedly also has been a major source of funding for Boko Haram in the north east. The loss is hard to estimate: many thefts, especially those occurring in remote villages or forests with limited state security presence, go unreported. One report estimated that in 2013 more than 64,750 cattle were stolen and at least 2,991 herders killed in states across the north-central zone. From 2011 to 2015, bandits, cattle rustlers and other criminals killed 1,135 people in Zamfara state alone, according to the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). Vigilante groups formed to combat bandits (variously known as Yan Banga, Yan Sa Kai and Kato da Gora) have compounded insecurity in some areas where the arrest and summary execution of rustlers sometimes has invited massive retaliatory violence. Elsewhere, vigilantes have turned into predators themselves, extorting cash and cattle from herders as “protection levy”. E.Escalating Conflicts across Northern Nigeria In recent decades, northern Nigeria’s various conflicts also have displaced herders southward. These conflicts – linked to poverty, inequality and religious extremism – have forced large populations to migrate, devastating local economies and livelihoods, including cattle rearing. In Borno state, the north east vice chairman of Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MACBAN), Alhaji Mafindin Danburam, claims association members lost over one million cattle to the Boko Haram insurgency.The economic losses and insecurity have compelled many herders to move south. Easy access to small arms, including assault rifles, makes the situation more dangerous. Weapons come from various sources, some local, others from black markets across West and Central Africa, including from Libya’s looted stockpiles. Herders say they carry weapons to defend themselves and their herds against heavily armed rustlers and other criminal gangs in farming communities. Local vigilantes also say they procure weapons for self-defence. Whatever the motivations and justification, the increasing prevalence of weapons has amplified the human cost. F.Erosion of Traditional Mechanisms In earlier decades, herders and community chiefs agreed on stock routes (burti or butali), sometimes under local government auspices. Disputes over wandering stock or damaged crops typically were resolved by village chiefs and herders’ leaders (Ardos). Those that defied the decisions of these community-level mediators were referred to local authorities. This system started crumbling in the 1970s, undermined by the involvement of the police and courts. Pastoralists hated these new institutions: corrupt police at times extracted fines and bribes while alien and protracted court processes immobilised their herds. Furthermore, local political leaders have tended to favour sedentary farmers, whose votes they crave, over itinerant herders, who may not be around at election time. Consequently, herders feel increasingly marginalised and are largely distrustful of local political leaders as conflict mediators. The absence of effective mediation mechanisms, including sustained community-level dialogues, can encourage violence. In many instances, local governments do not implement recommendations of commissions charged with investigating the conflicts, due to lack of will and widespread governmental lethargy. Over time, both herders and farmers have lost confidence in the ability of authorities to mediate and conciliate. Aggrieved parties have turned to violence to seek redress or revenge. III.The Toll and Impact These conflicts have exacted a heavy humanitarian toll with thousands killed and tens of thousands displaced. Some estimates suggest about 2,500 were killed countrywide in 2016 – a toll higher than that caused by the Boko Haram insurgency over the same period. In Benue, one of the hardest-hit states, Governor Samuel Ortom reports more than 1,878 people were killed between 2014 and 2016. Tens of thousands also have been displaced. From January 2015 to February 2017, at least 62,000 people were displaced in Kaduna, Benue and Plateau states; in the absence of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, most seek shelter in other poor, rural communities, straining their already scarce resources. The fear of conflict alone can drive residents to relatively more secure urban and semi-urban areas. Since both authorities and donors often ignore these conflicts, affected localities receive far less support from the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and international agencies than those impacted by the Boko Haram insurgency. For women and girls, the impact is frequently magnified. The relatives of men killed in the violence often evict widows from their farmland. Moreover, post-conflict economic and social disenfranchisement renders women and girls even more vulnerable to sexual and economic predation. The economic toll has also been huge. According to a 2015 study, the federal government was losing $13.7 billion in revenue annually because of herder-farmer conflicts in Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa and Plateau states. The study found that on average these four states lost 47 per cent of their internally-generated revenues. In March 2017, Benue state Governor Samuel Ortom asserted that attacks by herders coming from more northerly states, and possibly also from Cameroon and Niger, had cost his state N95 billion (about $634 million at that time) between 2012 and 2014. Communities and households also pay a heavy price. The ethnic Nzor-Tiv Global Association estimated its Agatu communities in Benue state lost N65 billion in property ($204 million) during the early 2016 herder attacks. The loss of large cattle herds, crops (due to population displacements and damage to irrigation facilities), as well as increases in transport and labour costs in post-conflict environments all increase poverty and food insecurity in affected communities – and beyond. The conflicts, particularly herder attacks on farming communities, have spawned dangerous political and religious conspiracy theories. One is that the attacks are part of a longer-term Fulani plot to displace indigenous populations and seize their lands. Among Christian communities, herder attacks are widely seen as a subtle form of jihad. In March 2016, the prelate of the Methodist Church of Nigeria, Dr Samuel Uche, said: “We are aware there is a game plan to Islamize Nigeria, and they are using the Fulani herdsmen to initiate it”. In the south east, Biafra separatist groups describe the attacks as part of a northern plot to overwhelm the peoples of the south and forcefully convert them to Islam. Some southerners accuse President Buhari of deliberately failing to stop herder aggression, pointing to his pastoral Fulani background and his position as life patron of the cattle breeders’ association (MACBAN) to buttress their charges. These charges are not supported by any solid evidence, but they are aggravating inter-faith distrust and, undermining the country’s fragile unity. The Sultan of Sokoto, Mohammed Sa’ad Abubakar III, spiritual head of Nigerian Muslims and a prominent Fulani, has repeatedly stressed that Fulani herders who kill should be prosecuted as criminals and even terrorists, but many remain unconvinced in a country with deep inter-faith suspicions. Communities in the middle belt and south have formed self-defence vigilante groups, some of which have threatened organised reprisals. In March 2014, Leonard Karshima Shilgba, an ethnic Tiv academic and thought leader, warned that if the federal government could not stop the attacks, “the Tiv people would also demonstrate that they equally have the right and also the capacity to raise a standing army of thousands from each ward and kindred”. Following an April 2016 attack on Nimbo, in Enugu state in the south east, the separatist Movement for Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) ordered “Fulani herdsmen to leave Biafra land or … face our wrath”. In May 2016, Ekiti state Governor Ayodele Fayose warned of possible attacks on Fulani herders if their alleged predatory behaviour vis-à-vis locals continued. And the president of the Christian Association of Nigeria, Reverend Olasupo Ayokunle, warned: “If the government fails to stop the provocation by the Fulani (herdsmen), they should be prepared for war. No ethnic group has a monopoly of violence and no ethnic group should be a monster to others”. To date, these reprisals against northern herders have not materialised. But signs are ominous. The interplay of herders’ attacks on farming communities and inflammatory rhetoric by ethnic and Christian leaders in the south could spark even more violence. The geographic spread or escalation of the conflicts could put Nigeria’s military and other security forces under greater stress, diverting the resources they need for operations against Boko Haram in the north east, militants in the Niger Delta and other security challenges. There may also be wider regional implications. A major confrontation involving Fulani herders could draw in their brethren from beyond Nigeria. A retired Nigerian military officer told Crisis Group that the Fulani could mobilise support, including fighters, from several West and Central African countries, which would worsen the security situation in two already fragile regions. IV.Deficient Responses A.Federal Government The federal government has, over the years, explored various responses. In April 2014, then President Goodluck Jonathan’s government inaugurated an inter-ministerial technical committee on grazing reserves, tasked with proposing strategies for ending the conflicts. Concurrently, the government set up a political Committee on Grazing Reserves, chaired by then Benue state Governor Gabriel Suswam. The report issued by Suswam’s committee called for the recovery and improvement of all grazing routes encroached upon by farmers and recommended that the Central Bank of Nigeria release a total of N100 billion ($317 million) to the country’s 36 state governments for ranch construction. The National Executive Council (NEC) approved these recommendations but Jonathan’s defeat in the March 2015 elections interrupted their implementation. Although the central bank released N100 billion to state governments, they failed to construct any ranches. On 19 January 2017, the House of Representatives set up a committee to investigate accusations that the funds had been looted and report back within four weeks. The committee’s findings remain unpublished to this day. Soon after assuming office in 2015, President Buhari directed the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD) to formulate a comprehensive livestock development plan including measures to curb farmer-herder clashes. In August 2015, a FMARD committee recommended short-, medium- and long-term strategies, including development of grazing reserves and stock routes. On 25 January 2016, the government announced it was presenting a plan to the Nigerian Governors Forum to map grazing areas in all states as a temporary solution for cattle owners until they could be persuaded to embrace ranching. Most central and southern states, however, opposed the plan, which they viewed as favouring Fulani herders. On 3 March 2016, seeking to mollify this opposition, Agriculture Minister Audu Ogbeh announced the government was sending a bill to the National Assembly to prohibit cattle from roaming in cities and villages. He added that the government had ordered fast-growing grass from Brazil to produce “massive hectares of grasses”, which would be ready for consumption “within the next three months”. More than a year later, there has been no further word about the cattle banning bill and the promised grass. B.Security Agencies and Judicial System The federally-controlled Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) are thinly deployed in rural areas and often lack early-warning mechanisms. Even when community and civil society groups get involved, both herders and farmers say the response to distress calls is often late. Herders say they sometimes have to seek revenge because security forces take no action against attackers who kill them and steal their cattle. Farmers say the agencies’ failure to respond promptly to distress calls and punish aggressors emboldens the herders. The more typical response has been to deploy the police, and sometimes the army, after clashes take place. In a few cases, police have arrested and prosecuted both herders and vigilantes bearing firearms. More often, the country’s dysfunctional law enforcement and criminal justice system fails to arrest or prosecute any perpetrators. Moreover, authorities have generally treated these crimes as political rather than criminal acts, arguing that sanctioning suspects could spark further violence. Even if commissions of inquiry are established, they typically are used as instruments to temper tensions rather than pursue justice. These responses, however well meaning, create a climate of impunity. Under the Buhari administration, the security response has been particularly questionable. In February 2016, following public outcry over attacks by herders that killed scores of people in ten farming villages in the Agatu area of north-central Benue state, Buhari ordered an investigation. Nothing has been heard about it since. On 24 April 2016, Information and Culture Minister Lai Mohammed said the government was working “silently” toward ending the violence, promising: “In few weeks from now, we will begin to see the result of that”. Again, there was no follow up. In April 2016, after widespread condemnation of an attack on Ukpabi Nimbo in Enugu state, the president ordered the police and military to “take all necessary action to stop the carnage”, pledging that stopping herder attacks had become a priority. Since then hundreds have died in more clashes. On 15 July 2016, the chief of defence staff, General Gabriel Olonisakin, announced “Operation Accord” to stop the violence.Nothing more was heard of that campaign. Following clashes in southern Kaduna in late 2016, which killed between 200 to 800 people, the army deployed troops to the area. Still, attacks have continued. C.Federal Legislature The federal parliament also has failed to respond effectively. In 2011, Niger state Senator Zainab Kure sponsored a bill to create a National Grazing Reserves Commission and establish national grazing reserves and livestock routes, but it was not passed and eventually expired when the Seventh Senate lapsed in May 2015. From 2015 to 2016, three new bills were introduced to create grazing reserves, livestock routes and ranches across the country. After much wrangling, all three were dropped in November 2016 on the grounds that land use was exclusively a state government prerogative. Unable to enact new laws, the federal legislature has limited itself to holding public hearings and passing resolutions. On 9 March 2016, the Senate passed a resolution declaring Boko Haram insurgents were behind attacks on farming communities across Benue, Taraba, Plateau and several other states. Unsupported by any public evidence, that resolution was widely seen as a diversion, particularly as spokespeople for the herders’ association had admitted committing some of the attacks in reprisal for previous wrongs. On 10 May 2016, the Senate Committees on Agriculture, Intelligence and National Security held a public hearing on herder-farmer violence. The hearing was not followed by any policy recommendations or action toward ending the violence. D.State Governments In the absence of clear federal guidance, state government responses vary. Several have established state and local peace commissions or committees to promote herder-farmer dialogue and resolve conflicts. Others, like Ekiti state in the south west and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of Abuja in the centre, have passed laws regulating grazing activities. In Benue and Taraba states, governments have introduced laws banning all open grazing. In Edo state, the government said it would create fenced grazing areas with watering facilities, requiring herdsmen to feed their cattle there and pay for the service. Herders, who consider these regulations restrictive, often fail to comply. In the Federal Capital Territory, herders still roam their cattle widely; in Taraba state, the cattle breeders’ association has rejected the grazing ban law, vowing a legal challenge. Some local reactions have been more forceful. In Borno, Niger and Plateau states, authorities occasionally have expelled herder groups from specific areas, following local protests. In May 2016, the governor of Abia state, Okezie Ikpeazu, revived a local vigilante outfit popularly known as the Bakassi Boys. He directed all community chiefs to nominate ten youths for a two-week intensive training with “reformed” Bakassi vigilantes before deployment to rural communities. Two months later, the Cross River state government announced plans to set up a 3,000-member “Homeland Security Service”. Local officials said the members would not carry firearms, but carry out activities such as providing intelligence on herders’ movements and activities. These measures may have reduced clashes in some area, but elsewhere; they have made the situation worse. The expulsion of herder groups has only deepened their resentment. If community-based vigilante groups attack herders in the south, herders might take revenge against southerners residing in the north, thereby further widening the conflict. E.Civil Society Civil society responses have varied. Ethnic and community-based groups defending farmers’ interests typically have organised press conferences and protests, seeking to draw national – and even international – attention to their plight. Some have instituted legal actions; for instance, in May 2016, the Benue-based Movement Against Fulani Occupation (MAFO) filed a suit at the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court based in Abuja, demanding the federal government pay N500 billion (about $1.6 billion) as compensation for failing to protect its citizens. Others, such as the pan-Yoruba socio-cultural organisation Afenifere, have set up arrangements to monitor both herders and cattle thieves. In turn, livestock producers’ groups and pastoralists’ organisations, strenuously defend herders’ interests and insist media reports of incidents are often politically motivated. Fulani umbrella groups, such as Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore, also tend to downplay herders’ involvement in the violence. The back and forth between highly partisan positions further complicates the search for common ground. Non-governmental organisations generally have been more conciliatory and constructive in response to the violence. They have focused on post-conflict reconciliation and peacebuilding, improving early warning and strengthening relations between communities and security agencies. International partners are encouraging herder-farmer dialogues through various local initiatives. For instance, in June 2016, the British Council-sponsored Nigeria Reconciliation and Stability Project (NRSP) supported the Bayelsa state Peace and Conflict Management Alliance in organising a dialogue between farmers and herders. Likewise, on 27 April 2017, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) sponsored and hosted a conference on herder-farmer dialogue, involving the All Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN), MACBAN, the Interfaith Mediation Centre (IMC) and others. There are some encouraging results. Representatives of herding and farming communities pledged to continue working for peace at a November 2016 mediation forum in Shendam, Plateau state, organised by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) with support from the German embassy. And, in April 2017, a herder-farmer dialogue in the Udege and Agwada Development Areas of Nasarawa state, facilitated by some local politicians and community leaders, produced a peace agreement. But results remain limited and fragile. V.Five Steps to Help Address the Conflict Like the Boko Haram and Niger Delta insurgencies, the herder-farmer crisis is a threat to Nigeria’s national security. President Buhari’s government and state government should acknowledge this and work together in five areas to prevent further conflict. A.Improve Security for Herders and Farmers An immediate step is to improve security for both herders and farming communities. At a minimum, the federal government and its security agencies should intensify operations against cattle rustlers, improving systems to track livestock movement and trade, arresting individuals who carry illegal firearms and prosecuting suspected assailants. 1.Strengthen police capacity to curb rustling and banditry In recent years, the federal government and governments of some northern states have initiated several joint efforts against cattle rustlers and bandits. In July 2015, the governors of Niger, Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, Kebbi, Katsina and Zamfara states jointly funded an anti-rustling operation in the Kamuku/Kuyanbana forests that straddle all six states. The operation involved four organisations: the army, Nigeria Police Force, Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps and Directorate of State Security (DSS). In 2016, the army launched two other operations against cattle rustlers and bandits in the north west, parts of the north-east and north-central zones. Some state governments, such as Katsina, Zamfara and Sokoto, also have negotiated peace agreements with the bandits, inviting them to lay down their arms and return stolen cattle in exchange for building roads, hospitals and schools in their communities and grants of cash and land to individuals. These efforts have yielded some results, recovering large numbers of stolen cattle. However, cattle rustling and banditry still persist on a significant scale. Armed groups have returned to some parts of Zamfara state where bandits seemingly had agreed to arms-for-development proposals. That said, gains produced by amnesty programs and cash rewards could prove short-lived; such programs risk entrenching a culture of violent crime and banditry among constituents who seek to leverage such activities to extract state concessions. In the near term, and together with continued attempts to reach peace deals, governments should sustain ongoing military and other security operations. Further down the road, they should consider shifting their strategy for curbing cattle rustling and other banditry from episodic military operations to steadily deploying more and better-equipped police units in rural and forested areas where bandit groups are based. This would allow police to respond rapidly to incidents and discourage further attacks. 2.Improve livestock tracking Smarter animal tracking and identification systems can also curb cattle rustling. State ministries of agriculture should oversee cattle branding, certify cattle traders, monitor cattle markets and regulate abattoirs and slaughterhouses. The federal agriculture and transport ministries should renew efforts to establish safer and more efficient arrangements for transporting livestock across the country. Although a long-distance transportation arrangement, utilising the government-run rail system, was inaugurated in 2016, the effort was suspended shortly thereafter amid mutual accusations of bad faith and incompetence. Adoption of so-called smart devices could also help. Herders acquiring solar-powered Livestock Tracking Devices and herders’ associations subscribing to and regularly updating the Cattle Rustling Information System (CATRIS), could help generate some of the information security agencies need to track rustlers and recover stolen cattle. 3.Prevent attacks on farming communities The federal government should follow through on promises to stop armed attacks on farming communities, especially in badly affected southern Kaduna and Benue states. To that end, federal security agencies – notably the police and Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps – will need to focus on preventive measures, including community liaison mechanisms to upgrade intelligence gathering, early warning and rapid response. A key priority is to curb the influx and possession of illegal firearms, especially automatic rifles. The new federal whistle-blower program on illegal firearms is a promising start; it should be supported by speedily following up on informants’ leads and protecting their identities.Likewise, the steps taken by several state governments to curb illicit weapons should also be sustained. Better coordination between federal and state law enforcement would be another important step. The former could set up an inter-agency task force, overseen by the federal justice ministry, to help states investigate major cases of herder-farmer violence and bring culpable parties to justice. At a minimum, the Buhari administration could investigate major high-fatality incidents that have occurred under its watch. Finally, state governments also could provide greater assistance to victims of herder-farmer violence, especially those not directly involved in the violence. Working with local and international organisations, they could, for example, expand humanitarian aid for displaced persons, especially women and children. B.Support Community-based Conflict Resolution Local and community-based dispute resolution mechanisms have proved effective in both averting violence and helping communities recover from conflict. Forums that allow various constituencies – farmers, pastoralists, community vigilantes and state security agencies – to monitor, identify, discuss and manage potential threats can be particularly helpful. These also can be used to help farmers and pastoralists explore mutually beneficial ways to coexist. Wherever possible, state and local governments should support or establish such mechanisms, especially across the worst-affected north-central region. For their part, local politicians, ethnic, religious and community leaders, as well as representatives of pastoralist and farmer associations need to speak out against violence. The media should try to provide more balanced coverage that avoids inflaming tensions through stereotyping, unfair generalisations and sensational reporting. C.Establish Grazing Reserves and Encourage Ranching There is urgent need to reform and improve grazing arrangements. In March 2016, the federal government announced its intent to establish grazing areas across the country, but vehement opposition from farming communities forced it to relent. It needs a more nuanced approach, which takes into account local sensitivities regarding cattle roaming and open grazing, not only in the south but also in predominantly farming areas of the north-central zone. As a first step, the federal government, working with state governments, should jointly survey, demarcate and officially document existing grazing reserves that have not been over-run by human settlements and infrastructure. The federal government also should follow through on its plan to establish new grazing reserves in the ten northern states that have already provided 55,000 hectares to that end. It should help state governments develop these areas following the model provided by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), which is funding three reserves in Sokoto state. Separately, the federal government should take steps to encourage ranching. The Buhari’s administration’s Agriculture Promotion Policy (APP) 2016-2020 acknowledges “the cattle value chain has become a security problem … as roaming cattle increasingly is a source of friction between land owners and herdsmen”. Accordingly, “a key shift is necessary: retaining cattle in ranches”. Likewise, an April 2017 northern leaders’ summit recommended “a concerted development of ranches” as a key step toward ending clashes. Some initial steps have been taken. In April 2017, a policy dialogue initiated by the federal agriculture ministry and facilitated by UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) recommended that the government formulate and implement a ten-year National Ranch Development Plan. It also called for securing support from traditional livestock producers by helping them establish cooperatives and linking them up with financial institutions such as Bank of Agriculture (BOA) and Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing system for Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL). Significantly, the foremost livestock producers’ group, Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), though initially reticent about the ranching option, has endorsed these recommendations. Federal and state governments also need to work out alternative plans for the large numbers of herders who may lose their livelihoods in the transition from open grazing to ranching. The federal government’s policy direction and stakeholders’ concurrence signal a growing consensus on the imperative of shifting from open grazing to ranching. Already, some retired military officers, former civil servants and multinational corporations have established a few large ranches. The federal government could advance this process by formulating and implementing the proposed National Ranch Development Plan. The federal ministry of agriculture and rural development, along with various other relevant local and international agencies, should apply the ideas and resolutions generated at the National Conference on Transforming the Nigerian Livestock Industry, held in Abuja in September 2017, in driving the formulation and implementation of the proposed plan. That said, governments of some states, like Benue and Taraba, that recently introduced new laws prohibiting open grazing, should exercise restraint in enforcing such laws, and encourage a phased transition to ranching. They and other state governments should promote ranches, including by clarifying processes for acquiring land and obtaining credit, devising modalities for ranch management training, and encouraging private-public partnerships. Federal and state governments also need to work out alternative plans for the large numbers of herders who may lose their livelihoods in the transition from open grazing to ranching. D.Combat Desertification Some estimates suggest that during the twenty-first century, two thirds of Nigeria’s eleven far northern states could become desert or semi-desert regions. Besides provoking considerable economic and livelihood losses, this would force many more pastoralists to migrate southward, risking more conflicts with the growing farming communities. Over the longer term, therefore, federal and state governments should intensify implementation of the Great Green Wall Initiative for the Sahara and the Sahel. The project initially called for planting a 15km wide belt of trees, running 7,775km across nine African countries from Senegal to Djibouti. It was later broadened to include building water-retention ponds and other basic infrastructure, establishing agricultural production systems, and promoting other income-generating activities. Nigeria’s National Agency for the Great Green Wall aims to rehabilitate 22,500 sq km of degraded land by 2020. Thus far, the agency’s impact is scarcely felt: there is no evidence of increased tree cover, significant new infrastructure or environmental restoration across the eleven impacted states. The agency needs to be reorganised, better resourced and more goal-oriented to deliver results within the 2020 timeline. In the same spirit, the federal government should develop strategies for mitigating the impact of climate change, managing environmentally-induced migration, preventing conflicts over use of land and other natural resources – and implement them. In November 2011, the government drafted a National Adaptation Strategy and Plan of Action on Climate Change (NASPA); in November 2012, it adopted a National Policy on Climate Change. The country’s official development policy, called Vision 20:2020, also contains climate considerations. These policies and plans, until now largely only on paper, should be implemented. E.Strengthen Regional Cooperation Some dimensions of the herder-farmer conflict can only be fully addressed within a regional framework. This will require Abuja to work in close coordination with neighbouring countries both to manage human and cattle movements across borders and to fight illicit arms trafficking. Following revelations that foreign herders were involved in attacks on farming communities, Agriculture Minister Ogbeh said the government would present proposals at the African Union “to compel member countries to take steps to prevent their herdsmen from grazing into neighbouring countries”, warning there could be “a major international crisis if we do not stop it now”. To that end, the government should engage the governments of Cameroon, Chad and Niger, as well as the ECOWAS commission, to reach agreement on how to collectively monitor and regulate international transhumance pastoralism, in accordance with relevant international instruments including ECOWAS Protocols. It should also strengthen regional cooperation in combating desertification and mitigating the impact of climate change. VI.Conclusion Escalating conflicts between herders and farmers are among Nigeria’s most pressing security challenges. This could potentially generate bloodshed on an even wider scale unless President Buhari’s government makes ending this violence a national priority. State governments also need to formulate and implement steps to address the needs and grievances of all sides transparently and equitably. Strengthening law enforcement, supporting local conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, establishing and protecting grazing reserves would all make a significant and immediate difference. In the longer term, the greater challenge will be curbing the arms influx and, crucially, addressing the environmental trends that are forcing herders south. Failure would spell greater danger for a country already battling other severe security challenges and, potentially, for the wider West and Central African region. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

The Special Advisers to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect express concern at continued allegations of grave violations and abuses of human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law in the context of the on-going conflict in Yemen and voiced their support for the call made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to establish an impartial, international mechanism to investigate the facts and the circumstances. Civilians continue to bear the brunt of the conflict in Yemen. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has reported that since March 2015, there have been 13,920 verified civilian casualties, with 5,159 civilians killed and 8,761 injured - an average of more than 110 civilians killed or injured per week. Coalition airstrikes continued to be the leading cause of civilian casualties, and child casualties, in the conflict. These include only the casualties recorded by reporting mechanisms; the true extent of casualties is almost certainly much higher. The conflict has been characterised by a disturbing pattern of apparent attacks by all parties to the conflict targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, markets and residential areas, without consideration for the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. The impact of the conflict has been exacerbated by disregard for international humanitarian law. According to United Nations estimates, 17 million people are food insecure, including seven million people on the brink of famine. The unprecedented rise in the cholera epidemic has reached over 690,000 suspected cases with 2,090 associated deaths – the largest ever outbreak in a single year. “We call on the international community – and particularly the Security Council and Human Rights Council – to take action to end the carnage and remedy this man-made crisis”. “The international community has a moral and legal responsibility to support accountability in Yemen by immediately establishing an impartial international mechanism to comprehensively investigate allegations of serious abuses and violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law committed by all parties to the conflict, and their allied forces with a view to ending impunity. The perpetrators must be brought to account. Justice must be served to the victims. It is incumbent on the international community to halt the suffering that is being inflicted on the Yemeni population”. * *** * UNITED NATIONS PRESS RELEASE For media queries please contact: Peter Mutua, Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/ Phone: +1 212 963-1284; Email: mutuap@un.org ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 United Nations

As almost 400,000 refugees flee ethnic cleansing in Myanmar, world leaders meeting at the UN General Assembly should hang their heads in shame that they have not only failed to make good on their promises to take in more refugees, but have actively dismantled refugee rights in many parts of the world. A year on from the Leaders’ Summit on Refugees in New York, where leaders pledged to take in more refugees and help vulnerable people forced to flee their countries, global refugee numbers are increasing year on year as conflicts spiral out of control. “The horrific situation in Myanmar is exactly why we need more than just a sticking-plaster approach to helping those fleeing war and persecution. After being subjected to horrific violence, including killings and having their villages burned to the ground, these Rohingya refugees are now facing a humanitarian crisis as Bangladesh struggles to support them,” said Salil Shetty, Amnesty International’s Secretary General. The latest evidence published by Amnesty International points to a mass-scale scorched-earth campaign across northern Rakhine State, where Myanmar security forces and vigilante mobs are burning down entire Rohingya villages and shooting people at random as they try to flee. In legal terms, these are crimes against humanity – systematic attacks and forcible deportation of civilians. As a consequence, in the space of less than three weeks, almost 400,000 Rohingya refugees have fled Myanmar to Bangladesh. This is more than the total number of refugees who came to Europe by sea in 2016. “Poor and low-income countries such as Bangladesh, Uganda and Lebanon are left struggling to deal with huge numbers of refugees, when rich countries who host far fewer should be stepping up to provide aid and resettlement places. Leaders of rich countries prefer to pretend the problem does not exist. What will it take for governments to wake up to the reality that their response to the global refugee crisis is totally broken?” said Salil Shetty. At last year’s Summit on Refugees, convened by former US President Barack Obama, governments pledged to take in more than 360,000 refugees – doubling the number of places offered in 2015. While these pledges represented an increase, they were based on the whim of governments rather than on the needs of the people they were purporting to help. Since the Leaders’ Summit, many governments have not only failed to meaningfully address the growing refugee crisis, but have outdone each other in trying to dismantle refugee rights and have failed to respond to new crises around the world. One prominent example is the USA, which under President Trump is now reversing Obama’s pledge to take in 110,000 people in 2017 and instead capping the numbers at 50,000, and potentially taking in even fewer refugees in 2018. “The USA’s policy towards refugees has to be viewed in a global context. In the shadow of Trump’s cruel policies, other countries around the world have continued to dehumanize refugees and turn their backs on them,” said Salil Shetty. “Whether it’s the EU condemning refugees to abuse and exploitation at the hands of criminal gangs in Libya, or Australia subjecting refugees to severe physical and psychological damage in its offshore detention centers, rich countries have contributed substantially to the alarming deterioration of refugee rights. “It is against this backdrop of governments’ callous treatment of people fleeing conflict and violence that the world’s fastest growing refugee crisis is unfolding before our eyes in Bangladesh.” World leaders gathering in New York for this year’s UN General Assembly are expected to discuss the spiraling situation in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, from where the long-persecuted Rohingya population have been forced to flee because of an unlawful and totally disproportionate military response to attacks by a Rohingya armed group. “Instead of attending summits to shake hands with each other and make promises they don’t intend to keep, heads of state should show some leadership,” said Salil Shetty. “That means delivering a comprehensive plan to protect civilians in conflict, ending crimes against humanity and implementing proper solutions for refugees such as the Rohingya who are in a desperate situation. “In case they have forgotten, this is what the United Nations is for.” ________________________________________________________________________________________________ (C) 2017 Amnesty International

According to the latest figures, there are nearly 400,000 Muslim-majority Rohingyathat have been forced from their homes in Myanmar. The UN says it looks like a "textbook example" of ethnic cleansing. The country's leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has been widely condemned for lack of moral leadership and compassion in the face of the crisis, denting the Nobel Peace Prize laureate's reputation. The civilian government and the military seem to be speaking from the same scripts ... The government ... has been using terminology like 'extremist', 'terrorist', 'separatist'. What that does is it appears to create this kind of hysteria which many in Myanmar have appeared to be listening to and which is fuelling support for the military. Oliver Slow, chief of staff, Frontier Myanmar However, the story is not just about Aung San Suu Kyi. It is primarily about the Myanmar military, the flames and bullets it has used to dispossess the Rohingya and chase them from the country. And it's about a government information campaign that reeks of propaganda. "A huge amount of the media focus has been on Aung San Suu Kyi and almost all of it has been condemnatory ... but she's not the one carrying out the ethnic cleansing," says Mark Farmaner, executive director of Burma Campaign UK. "It's Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the military. He's not even being referred to in any of this media coverage." The Myanmar constitution limits the powers of its civilian government. Aung San Suu Kyi and her ministers do not have authority over the military, which surrendered absolute power less than three years ago, after more than a half-century of military rule. But Aung San Suu Kyi does have the power to criticise. And she has not criticised the forced eviction of hundreds of thousands of Muslim Rohingya, nor the military's burning of Rohingya villages to the ground, nor questioned the role of the military. Instead, Aung San Suu Kyi and her government have criticised the international news media and the UN workers documenting the Rohingya refugee story - dismissing their reports as fake news. "Dismissal and denial of well-documented accusations, allegations and evidence is part of genocide. Dismissing the reports of hundreds of women who have been wronged and violated and Suu Kyi dismissing them as fake news, fake rape. That was what you read on Aung San Suu Kyi's official Facebook page: fake rape," says Maung Zarni, a Burmese human rightsactivists. The state is feeding the domestic news media the same narrative and it's being reinforced online. And while the relatively recent opening of Myanmar's media and internet space has empowered new voices, it's also provided Buddhist nationalists with new platforms to dispense fear and hatred of the Rohingya. Back in the days of military rule, journalists from Myanmar fought hard for their freedoms. Some set up news outlets in exile. A news magazine called Irrawaddy based itself just across the border in Thailand, pushing a pro-democracy agenda. The magazine now operates out of Yangon and - like most of the domestic news media - has adopted the government's position on the Rohingya story. Its English-language site refuses to call Rohingya citizens of Myanmar. It calls them Bengalis instead. The magazine's editor, Aung Zaw, was interviewed on CNN earlier this month. His line on the Rohingya is in perfect harmony with the state's, that they do not belong to Burma. In 2014, Zaw and his magazine were lauded by the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists for coverage of Myanmar that the CPJ called "authoritative and independent". "The media organisations that were based in exile were much more professional, were much more balanced in their reporting. But now, even some of them are toeing the government line. It's very worrying for the whole future of press freedom, and where people in Burma get their information," says Farmaner. Contributors: Maung Zarni - adviser, European Centre for the Study of Extremism and Burmese human rights activist Oliver Slow - chief of staff, Frontier Myanmar Mark Farmaner - executive director, Burma Campaign UK __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ © 2017 Al Jazeera

Persecution of the Rohingya, Kachin, Shan, Karen and other minorities in Myanmar has been continuous since a military coup installed the Ne Win junta in 1962. The ethnic Burmese monopoly of political, economic, and military power has resulted in systematic oppression of non-Burman minority groups. Genocide Watch has issued Genocide Emergency Alerts for Myanmar annually since 2006, with major updates in 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2017. We declare Genocide Emergencies when there are ongoing genocidal massacres. In this statement I will summarize the evidence of persecution, forced displacement, and genocide by the army and police of Myanmar against two groups: the Rohingya and, briefly, the Kachin. Similar evidence exists of the government’s crimes against the Shan and Karen. The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic minority of one million people that has lived in Rakhine state for centuries, but which increased during British colonialism to provide labor for agriculture. They face systematic religious and ethnic discrimination because under Myanmar’s constitution, they are not classified as one of 135 legally recognized ethnic minority groups with Myanmar citizenship. Ethnic Burmese consider the Rohingya as “illegal immigrants” from Bangladesh. Bangladesh does not recognize the Rohingya as its citizens. Without citizenship, the Rohingya have no civil rights in Myanmar. They are stateless. · The regime refuses to issue identification cards to Rohingya, which are necessary to be able to travel, as well as to obtain passports and enroll in higher education. · They are denied land and property rights and ownership. The land on which they live can be taken away at any time. · The Rohingya people are barred from government employment. · Marriage restrictions are imposed on them. They are limited to two children per couple. · They are subject to forced labor, extortion and other coercive measures. · Public services such as health and education are neglected. Illiteracy is 80%. · More than 40,000 Rohingya children in western Myanmar are deprived of rights to travel, to attend school, or to marry in the future, because their parents had an unauthorized marriage or exceeded the two-child limit the Myanmar government has imposed on the Rohingya. These blacklisted children are refused birth registration, and so are not included in family lists and must be hidden during the authorities’ population checks. · The Rohingya are subject to curfews and other restrictions on basic freedoms. The Rohingya are a dehumanized and persecuted minority in Myanmar. Many attempt to flee to Bangladesh or Malaysia in rickety boats, but are not accorded the rights of refugees in those countries. Every year hundreds of these boat people drown. Others are maimed or killed by land mines sown at the border by the Myanmar army, who also shoot people who are running away. Genocide Watch uses a ten stage model of the processes that lead to genocide. They are not linear. Many of them occur simultaneously. But they provide a logical model for seeing the early warning signs and understanding how to prevent genocide by countering each stage. 1. Classification divides the society into “us” versus “them.” The Rohingya and Kachin are classified as non-Burmese ethnic groups, with religions other than Buddhism. Most Rohingya are denied citizenship. The 1982 Citizenship Law holds that only members of the 135 groups named in the law that were deemed to be in Burma prior to 1824 can be citizens. 2. Symbolization provides ways to identify the groups. Rohingya and Kachin speak their own languages, have their own clothing, and have their own places of worship. The identity cards that Rohingya once held were taken away in 1989, and new ID’s have only been issued to around 4000 Rohingyas on the condition that they say they are “Bengali,” validating the government’s false narrative that they are immigrants from Bangladesh. 3. Discrimination against Rohingya includes denial of government jobs, health care, education, and confiscation of land and property. 4. Dehumanization includes propaganda that Rohingya are jihadists, terrorists, murderers, and thieves. The leader of the 969 Movement, Monk Ashin Wirathu, has said that he wants to lead a campaign to purge Burma of all Muslims -“starve them to death, make them homeless.” He was jailed for his involvement in burning alive an entire Muslim family -a well-to-do grocer and a Haj returnee- in his birthplace. 5. Organization includes the 969 movement, extremist orders of monks, and the Tatmadaw government army and police. They carry out the murders and disappearances, torture, rapes, and arson of Rohingya villages. 6. Polarization has resulted in creation of concentration camps for Rohingyas and separation of them from the Rakhine Buddhist population. 7. Preparation has included planning for aggression and arson against Rohingya villages, and recently the buildup and invasion by large numbers of Tatmadaw troops in Rakhine state, with trucks and heavy weapons. 8. Persecution [itself a crime against humanity] has included forcing the Rohingya into concentration camps, denying them medical care, food, and water, torture, and mass rape. Many Rohingya have fled in rickety boats and large numbers have drowned while fleeing. 9. Genocidal massacres have resulted in thousands of deaths. Starvation and death from disease in concentration camps, especially of children and the elderly, have cost thousands of lives. Births are restricted through limits on family size to two children. Others cannot get birth certificates, a violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Myanmar is a state-party. 10. Denial permeates government statements, including the statements of Aung San Suu Kyi. The UN Commission of Inquiry, UN Special Rapporteur and other neutral observers have been barred from the country. In 1978, Burma’s Tatmadaw army launched systematic persecution against the Rohingya that resulted in destruction of their mosques, mass murder and rape. 277,000 Rohingya fled from Burma. The persecution accelerated in 1991 and 1992 when a renewed wave of oppression and pogroms drove an estimated 250,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh and makeshift camps around Burma’s coastal borders. Apart from denial of citizenship, the Rohingya are subject to such state-sponsored human rights abuses as forced displacement, forced labor, rape and other sexual violence, extrajudicial killings, extortion, police harassment, restrictions on freedom of movement, land confiscation, arbitrary taxation, inequitable marriage regulations, a two-child-limit family planning policy, exclusion from access to jobs, education and healthcare, and eviction and destruction of their homes. These dire conditions resulted in a refugee exodus of over 140,000 Rohingya to neighboring countries such as Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Boarding rickety boats, thousands of Rohingya fleeing Myanmar face a perilous journey across the Adaman Sea and Bay of Bengal. These journeys can take up to 40 days, with starvation, dehydration, physical and sexual abuse and murder on board. Arrival in these countries has been no guarantee of security. Thailand, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Malaysia have disregarded international refugee law. They have repatriated Rohingya and have denied them refugee or asylum status. Many are taken by human traffickers upon arrival and sold into servitude or sex slavery. Even where they are admitted to refugee camps, the Rohingya live in squalor beset by diseases and starvation, with no access to employment, education, healthcare and humanitarian aid. Ceasefire negotiations in 2011 resulted in some improvement in relations between the government and some recognized ethnic groups. However, since the Rohingya are not officially considered a recognized ethnic group, they are excluded from this national dialogue and remain vulnerable to state-sponsored ethnic violence and persecution. During 2012, violence increased against Rohingya and other Muslims in the Rakhine State. According to the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, the Rohingyas have become one of the most oppressed ethnic groups in the world. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report on discrimination against the Rohingya. Miss Thidar Htwe, a Buddhist woman from Rakhine, was murdered on 28 May 2012. Government officials arrested and charged three Muslim men with the attack. The Economist reported that six days later a mob of Buddhist vigilantes stopped a bus carrying Muslim pilgrims, killing ten and raping one. Violence by Buddhists against Muslims grew. Scores of Rohingya were slaughtered. Attacks against Muslims spread to other areas of Myanmar. Attacks by government forces followed shortly thereafter. Mass media have incited discrimination against the Rohingya and Muslims, using derogatory terms and twisted stories when reporting on incidences. Violence against Muslims is not just targeted against the Rohingya; Muslims living in other states have also been targets of ethnic, racial, and religiously motivated violence. The Burmese government has committed atrocities against Muslims, including mass killings and rapes, burning of Muslim villages, arrests, forced labor, and torture. Many Muslims attempt to escape to Bangladesh for sanctuary. However, in Bangladesh the Myanmar refugees face discrimination, exploitation, and deportation. In Myanmar, the Rohingya are a stateless people. In 2012, Buddhist violence against the Rohingya reached new heights. Human Rights Watch called the attacks on Rohingya “ethnic cleansing,” carried out by Rakhine militias and incited by extremist Buddhist monks with support by state police. Bureaucratic obstructions, corruption, extensive restrictions, and expulsion of humanitarian groups from access to vulnerable populations in the Rakhine State compound these atrocities. Marginal improvement in freedom of expression has become an avenue for Buddhist chauvinists to broadcast anti-Rohingya, anti-Muslim rhetoric. Militant Buddhist nationalists are attempting to forge a sense of national identity based on Burmese chauvinism. Such anti-Rohingya. Anti-Muslim invective is spreading paranoia of Muslim expansionism. Anti-Muslim violence has also occurred beyond the Rakhine state. In 2013, Buddhist chauvinists launched “Movement 969,” an anti-Muslim campaign in which Muslim businesses are marked and boycotted. Such Symbolization is reminiscent of Nazi marking of Jewish businesses. Government propaganda has stressed the importance of protecting the “true Burmese” religion of Buddhism from “outside contamination.” On 28 March 2013, The New York Times reported that President Thein Sein publicly declared that he would begin using force to stop religious conflict and rioting in Myanmar. This was the president’s first public comment on the issue since 40 Muslims were killed during rioting in central Myanmar the week before. About 12,000 were forced out of their homes and into refugee shelters as a direct result of that rioting, which included burning of Muslim houses and mosques. This was the worst instance of violence against Muslims in the past year. On 29 March 2013, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, issued a statement from Geneva in which he not only expressed the UN’s concerns about the violence between Muslims and Buddhists in Myanmar, but urged the government to take “bold steps” to rectify the ongoing violence. Speaking at the UN General Assembly in September 2014, Myanmar’s Foreign Minister, Wunna Maung revealed the “Rakhine State Action Plan” drafted for the “reconstruction and development of the Arakan/Rakhine state,” which included the relocation of all Rohingyas to unspecified detention camps. This calculated plan of forced displacement of the Rohingya population constitutes a crime against humanity. When Aung San Suu Kyi was released, the western press was deluded into writing about a “democratic Myanmar.” In fact, the model Myanmar is following is China’s, with firm control by the military unshaken. His Holiness The Dalai Lama, Archbishop Tutu, and at least seven other Nobel laureates have urged fellow Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi to champion the cause of the Rohingya. Their calls have been met with silence, much to the indignation of human rights advocates in the international community, who have accused her of political opportunism. Some have even asked that she surrender her Nobel Prize. The UN General Assembly, UN Human Rights Council, the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR), and the Kofi Annan Commission have urged Myanmar to extend citizenship to the Rohingya, and to arrest human rights violators. They have called upon ASEAN to develop regional solutions to the worsening emigration crisis. The United States, Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia have expressed concern about the Rohingya crisis yet delivery of aid to the Rohingya has remained minimal. Several countries have even lifted sanctions and cancelled bilateral debt in favor of economic investment in the new, “open” Myanmar, with its prime location between India and China. Myanmar continues to perpetrate deliberate persecution of the Rohingya. Impunity for human rights abusers against the Rohingya remains official policy. Combined with Myanmar’s intransigent denial of citizenship to Rohingya, withholding of healthcare, confinement in detention camps, and forced displacement, Genocide Watch, Human Rights Watch, Fortify Rights, Amnesty International have concluded these systematic, intentional tactics constitute crimes against humanity. In 2017, the misguided Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked Myanmar police posts and killed as many as 30 police officers. The Myanmar army and police, with Rakhine militias, have launched vicious genocidal massacres against the Rohingya. They justify their crimes as counter-insurgency against “terrorists.” ARSA’s violent attacks have turned what was seen by most observers as one-sided aggression against a peaceful people into the misperception that this is a two sided civil war. It plays directly into the Myanmar government’s narrative of counter-terrorism. Such attribution of evil intent to the victims is called “mirroring” by genocide scholars. The victims are said to intend to commit exactly the same crimes that the perpetrators plan to commit against the victims. Mirroring is a powerful justification for and incitement to genocide. It was used when the Nazis accused Jews of intending to slaughter Germans; by Hutu Power militias in Rwanda when they accused Tutsis of intending to murder all Hutus; and by Bosnian Serb militias when they accused Bosnian Muslims of intending to kill Serbs. It is the equivalent of the self-defense claim in justification for killing. The press and spokespersons for governments have called the Myanmar government’s aggression “ethnic cleansing.” This is a term invented by Slobodan Milosevic as a euphemism for forced displacement and genocide. It is an insidious term because there is no international treaty law against it, whereas there are international laws against forced displacement and genocide. Genocidal massacres are acts of genocide. Genocide consists of acts of genocide intended to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Genocide is precisely what the Myanmar government and supporting militias are committing against the Rohingya. Myanmar is committing both “ethnic cleansing” [forced displacement] and genocide. The crimes often go together. Genocidal massacres are used to terrorize a victim group into fleeing. The so-called "international community" (which exists only in mythology) will avoid calling the crimes "genocide." There are several reasons: · Lawyers have gutted the word “genocide” of its preventive effect by insisting on judicial standards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt rather than a prosecutor's preponderance of the evidence standard. British Foreign Office, US State Department, and Dutch Foreign Ministry lawyers have even claimed that only a court can invoke the word "genocide," a view that ignores the very name of the International Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Courts always come after a genocide is over, too late to prevent it. · China will block forceful action by the UN Security Council. ASEAN, the relevant regional organization, could Act under UN Charter Chapter Eight, as it did in East Timor. But it won't because normally ASEAN governments leave each alone. · "Genocide" is a more powerful word than "ethnic cleansing" but governments in the UN prefer to do nothing, rather than take more forceful action to stop genocide. Why does it make a difference whether these crimes not be named “crimes against humanity” or “war crimes,” and instead be called “genocide?” Ethnic Cleansing is a euphemism for forcible displacement. “Ethnic cleansing” is not a term used in the Rome Treaty of the International Criminal Court. It has no legal meaning in international law. In 2007, three epidemiologists and I conducted a study1 of the effect of using the words “ethnic cleansing” rather than genocide in four of the most recent genocides: Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Darfur. Our team counted the number of uses of the terms “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide” in The New York Times, UN press releases, law journals, and statements by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. We came to four important conclusions: 1. Use of the terms has no relationship to the number of people who have been killed. 8000 killed at Srebrenica was ruled “genocide” by the ICTY. Yet a U.N. Commission of Inquiry ruled that over 100,000 killed in Darfur (now over 300,000) was not sufficient evidence of intent to commit genocide by the government of Sudan. 2. Choice of the term to be used is determined by willingness to take action to stop the killing. When the terms “ethnic cleansing” or “crimes against humanity” were used, it indicated unwillingness to take forceful action to stop the crimes. These weak words have never motivated the use of force. Indeed they were probably chosen because the decision whether or not to use force had already been made. 3. It was not until the term “genocide” was applied to the crimes, that force was used to stop them. · This occurred three months into the genocide in Rwanda when the State Department finally acknowledged on June 10, 1994 that “acts of genocide” in Rwanda were the same as “genocide”, which is defined in the Genocide Convention as “acts.” This declaration came after the US had voted in the UN Security Council to pull UNAMIR troops out of Rwanda on April 21, 1994 and voted against sending in UN forces in May, when the killing was still underway. By June 10, the Rwandan Patriotic Front had won the civil war and stopped the genocide. 800,000 Rwandans were slaughtered. The US and other world powers were not willing to risk the life of a single soldier to protect them. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has convicted over fifty leaders of genocide and courts in Rwanda have convicted hundreds more. · The same denial emerged in Bosnia, as the world press and the US government called the massacres “ethnic cleansing” from 1991 until the Srebrenica massacre on July 11 - 13,1995, which provoked a NATO conference on July 21, and resulted in NATO bombing of Serb forces on August 30. The bombing brought Serbia to Dayton to agree to a ceasefire, division of Bosnia, and a NATO peacekeeping operation. The Bosnian civil war came to an end. The ICTY and International Court of Justice have ruled that the massacre at Srebrenica was genocide. · Kosovo was called “ethnic cleansing” until US War Crimes Ambassador David Scheffer noted “indicators of genocide” on April 7, 1999, followed immediately by bombing of Belgrade, which brought Serb surrender and NATO occupation of Kosovo. Six Serb leaders were convicted of crimes against humanity by the ICTY and the Kosovo Tribunal has convicted other perpetrators. · Regarding Darfur, following a careful empirical survey of evidence of genocide among Darfuri refugees, on September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that “genocide has occurred and may still be occurring in Darfur. We believe the evidence corroborates the specific intent of the perpetrators to destroy "a group in whole or in part." He also said, “However, no new action is dictated by this determination.” A decision had evidently been made by the President not to involve US or NATO military forces in stopping the genocide, so all that followed were ineffective increases in the African Union monitoring force, but no direct military intervention by NATO or the US. Although the International Criminal Court has charged Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and two others with genocide in Darfur, they have never been arrested and brought to trial. Sudan has three active genocides today. It is an example of the failure of the UN to stop genocide, and of the African Union and states-parties to the ICC Treaty to enforce international criminal law. 4. When the term “genocide” is used to describe crimes against humanity, use of force is possible. When the crimes are only called “ethnic cleansing” or “crimes against humanity,” it is a sure indicator of lack of political will to take forceful action to stop them. Since 2000, the term “atrocities” has replaced “crimes against humanity” as an indicator of absence of will to take forceful action to stop them. Crimes against the Kachin: Fighting in Myanmar’s Kachin state pits the Kachin Independence Army and its majority Christian population against the Burmese Buddhist government. Ethnic Shan in Kachin State have also been displaced. In 1994, the Burmese government reached a peace agreement with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) ending large-scale conflict between the two parties in the jade-rich territory. KIO maintained effective control, and political tension remained high for the next 17 years. In June 2011, that ceasefire agreement was shattered and fighting once again broke out between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and Burmese government when the government attacked KIA forces near a hydropower plant. Fighting since has been non-stop. The government says it only attacks in self-defense. However, government attacks on Kachin villages have intensified since December 2012. Human Rights Watch estimates that since the attacks have begun, over 75,000 Kachins have been forced to flee their homes looking for refuge. Attacks include raids and burnings of villages and rapes and murders. Many Kachin have fled to China, only to be deported. On January 19, 2013, President Thein Sein declared a ceasefire, which was immediately broken by his own army. The two groups – KIA and the government – met for peace talks in February 2013, but tensions remain and there has been no stop to the violence. Tens of thousands of Shan Buddhists have also been displaced from Kachin state since June 2011. About 300,000 of Kachin State’s 1.2 million residents are Shan. Kachin Christians also face discrimination. It is estimated that over 100,000 Kachins have been displaced as a direct result of the fighting. In February 2015, Myanmar’s army said more than 130 people had died in a battle with rebels in the northeast, declaring it would not rest until stability was restored to the border area which tens of thousands have fled. Fighting raged in the remote Kokang region of Shan state where conflict erupted on February 9 with insurgent attacks on soldiers that triggered a military onslaught, prompting at least 30,000 civilians to escape into bordering China. Conclusion: The Permanent People’s Tribunal should find the Myanmar Army and police, 969 and other Buddhist militias and the Myanmar civil government guilty of: 1. Crimes against humanity against the Rohingya, Kachin, Myanmar Muslims and other minority ethnic groups, including: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation and forcible transfers of populations; imprisonment; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, and other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity; persecution against identifiable groups on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender grounds; enforced disappearance of persons; and other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious bodily or mental injury. 2. War crimes against the Rohingya, Kachin, and other ethnic minority groups, including: murder; mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; taking of hostages; intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population; intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historical monuments or hospitals; pillaging; rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy and other forms of sexual violence; conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities. 3. Genocide against the Rohingya, including: the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d ) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide. In addition to this legal judgment, the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal should adopt the following set of recommendations: Recommendations by the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal on Myanmar · Myanmar must extend full citizenship to the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities including property, education, health care and travel rights and all other rights guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. · Myanmar must stop its official discrimination and persecution of the Rohingya, Kachin, Myanmar Muslims, Karen, and other minorities. · Myanmar should arrest and hold perpetrators of human rights abuses, hate crimes, genocidal massacres, rape, torture, arson and ethnic and religious violence against the Rohingya, Kachin, Myanmar Muslims, Karen and other minorities accountable in its courts. There must be no impunity for military personnel or ethnic militias. · Myanmar and neighboring nations should allow humanitarian, human rights, and religious organizations, and journalists unobstructed access to Rakhine state and Rohingya refugees, and to areas with Kachin, Karen, and other ethnic minorities. · Myanmar must grant visas and full access to Commissions of Inquiry of the UN Human Rights Council and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights in order to investigate and document human rights abuses against the Rohingya, Kachin, Myanmar Muslims, and other minority groups; · ASEAN nations should be encouraged to bear responsibility for the emigration crisis and open their borders to Rohingya asylum seekers in accordance with the ASEAN Charter, and permit them to settle in refugee camps until Rohingya are granted full citizenship rights in Myanmar. · The US, EU, Arab League, Japan, and other prosperous nations should provide the financial and material resources necessary to support the burden borne by Bangladesh, Malaysia, and other nations that welcome Rohingya refugees. · The 1982 Citizenship Law should be repealed and the Myanmar Constitution should be amended to grant full citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in Myanmar. · The Myanmar Constitution should be amended to make Myanmar a genuinely Federal republic, with autonomy and self-government for the states of Myanmar and their diverse ethnic groups. · Military representation in Parliament should be abolished and all members of Parliament should be directly elected. Minority groups must be fairly represented in Parliament. · The Myanmar Constitution should be amended in order to place the Armed Forces and Police under full civilian control. · The “citizenship verification process” proposed by Aung San Suu Kyi and others should be rejected. Instead all persons born or naturalized in Myanmar should be considered citizens of Myanmar and they should all be issued national identity cards and all the rights of full Myanmar citizenship. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Dr. Gregory Stanton

Efforts to reunify Libya after six years of internal strife have drifted. Global and regional powers should seize the opportunity of a high-level UN meeting on Libya and a new UN special envoy to speak with one voice and act to build an effective and inclusive peace process. On 20 September, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, António Guterres, will chair a high-level meeting on Libya on the side-lines of the General Assembly. After a long period of drift in international diplomacy, this marks an opportunity to bring greater clarity of purpose to the UN’s mission in Libya. In the meeting’s aftermath, UN member states should speak in a united voice about the urgency of healing the country’s institutional divides, addressing pressing economic and security challenges and empowering the Secretary-General’s new Special Representative, Ghassan Salamé, to find the best way to relaunch an effective and inclusive political process. Initial indications are that Salamé, who is expected to present his plan for negotiations, will seek to work within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) signed in Skhirat, Morocco, in December 2015 even as he seeks to quickly renegotiate some if its elements. There is widespread international consensus that the LPA, despite its flaws, is the only viable framework at the moment; its collapse would leave an institutional and legal vacuum. The UN is expected to initiate its renegotiation by seeking to get two key institutions whose role is endorsed by the agreement, the House of Representatives (the parliament elected in June 2014 and operating from the eastern city of Tobruk), and the State Council (an advisory body created by the LPA and whose members largely are drawn from a previous parliament) to fulfil their intended functions under the agreement – something neither has done since they were created. The goal also is to get them to agree to new arrangements for the composition and mission of both the Presidency Council, the body created by the LPA and supposed to act in a head-of-state capacity for a transition period, and the Government of National Accord, the executive body supposed to run state affairs. This would be a welcome development. As Crisis Group has previously argued, the formation of a new government and the separation of its duties from that of the Presidency Council offer a plausible way out of the current deadlock in the implementation of the LPA. Such an outcome also requires the backing of a wider array of actors who make up Libya’s fragmented political and military landscape. To make progress on any new roadmap, however, UN envoy Salamé will need to receive the full-throated support of the states that have been most involved in Libyan diplomacy: France, Russia, the UK and the U.S. among permanent members of the Security Council; Libya’s neighbours, including Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Italy; regional powers further afield such as Qatar and Turkey; and regional institutions such as the European Union (EU), the League of Arab States and the African Union. The diplomatic vacuum of the last year resulted in too many competing initiatives that have created confusion among Libyan factions, or were exploited by them. Greater international convergence is needed to restore the primacy of the UN as the show-runner of the Libyan peace process. Consultation with Salamé also is essential to avoid undermining him. This includes consulting him on interventions aimed at countering people-smugglers in the Mediterranean or jihadist groups that, if unilaterally implemented, could damage his agenda. A political settlement is ultimately the best way to address the myriad of consequences stemming from the Libya’s current instability. Avoiding Arbitrary Deadlines At a minimum, external actors should set common expectations for the coming period of renewed negotiations. The idea of 17 December 2017 (the two-year anniversary of the signing of the Skhirat Agreement) serving as an arbitrary deadline for the expiration of the institutional framework created by the LPA should firmly be put to rest. It would place undue pressure on efforts to restart meaningful peace negotiations, which will take time to get off the ground. The LPA, as Crisis Group argued in 2015, was rushed. The international community should not repeat that mistake. The question of whether, and when, to hold elections is more complicated. Several Libyan and outside actors have called for new elections as soon as possible. So too did a 28 July communiqué issued after France hosted a meeting of the head of the Presidency Council, Faiez Serraj, and the head of the Libyan National Army, Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar. In theory, calls for new elections are sound. The institutional arrangements created by the LPA always were meant to be transitional, and Libyans should enjoy a chance to democratically appoint their leaders and the current status quo is nearing collapse. In practice, however, legal and political obstacles are likely to obstruct holding them soon. Without some sort of preliminary agreement that has relatively broad buy-in, elections are likely to set back efforts to reach a settlement. The areas of disagreement among the various camps are fundamental and include the basic contours of a new regime: should Libya be a monarchy or republic; should it be a federation or centralised; should elections be parliamentary, presidential, or both; what electoral law should apply; as well as who, and particularly whether Qadhafi-era officials, can run. If today’s belligerents cannot agree on whether elections should be held and what they should be for, what hope is there that they can produce a viable solution? The better course is to agree on a transitional arrangement before elections. Those who advocate holding them quickly hope they can create a new legitimacy through the ballot box. Yet, the current Libyan conflict in part is due to the adoption of this logic to push for the June 2014 elections, which immediately were contested (through legal and military means) by the losing camp and interpreted as a carte blanche by the winning camp. To avoid reproducing the same dynamics, the peace process should focus not on elections as an end-goal, but rather on ensuring their outcome is not seen as a zero-sum game. Economics and Security The UN is rightly focused on resetting the political process, retaking leadership over negotiations to modify the LPA to allow for its implementation. This is its prime mission. But, given the reality that achieving progress likely will take time, there is also a need to advance on two issues of immediate importance: addressing Libya’s economic situation and launching a security track. Given the UN’s limited resources, it cannot do so without the support of key regional and international actors. In his 28 August address to the Security Council, Salamé rightly put the spotlight on Libya’s economic situation, arguing that unless “economic challenges are addressed, and soon, the humanitarian crisis in Libya will deepen”. Such challenges include: healing the rift between rival branches of key economic institutions such as the Central Bank of Libya and National Oil Corporation and ensuring they operate effectively; improving the quality of governance, including relations between the Central Bank and the government; resolving the liquidity crisis faced by Libyan banks; and confronting rampant economic predation. Some of this will necessitate outside economic expertise and guidance, whether from states or international financial institutions, and greater collaboration by concerned actors. In the case of fuel-smuggling, for instance, Libya’s neighbours need to coordinate with those who have the capacity to confront land and sea-based smugglers. Since the beginning of the UN’s efforts in 2015, the peace negotiations’ security track has never taken off. The UN’s current security-related mission is focused on making Tripoli safe for both the Presidency Council and the impending return of UN staff. At a minimum, this should be broadened to include establishing a dialogue among security actors in various parts of the country, starting at the local level (for instance, in southern Libya) and ultimately widening this nationwide. This is a necessary complement to a political dialogue, particularly as security issues – including leadership of security institutions – lie at the heart of disagreements over the LPA. Importantly, this also will make possible broadening negotiations beyond the international community’s four main interlocutors: Serraj (a political actor with no military base), Haftar (an important military actor with political ambitions), President of the House of Representatives Agheela Saleh (a political actor with local military backing in the east) and President of the State Council Abdelrahman Swehli (a political actor with some influence among military groups in the west). Broader talks can also bring in a range of political-military actors with national and local-level influence, but no institutional perch. A related matter is that of the political and military support many international actors have given to various sides of the conflict. In the case of military backing, this happens in flagrant violation of the UN-imposed arms embargo, as revealed by the June 2017 report of the UN Panel of Experts on Libya. While violations exist on all sides, the report highlighted particularly egregious ones in support of Haftar’s faction. Such actions have a track record of making him reluctant to compromise. Egypt, France, Russia and the United Arab Emirates, which have the greatest influence over Haftar and are most active in engaging him, should ensure that he is fully incentivised to collaborate with Mr Salamé’s efforts. Altogether, this amounts to a tall order for the new special envoy who will need to find the right sequencing for a political process and balance the sometimes-contradictory interests of Libyans and external actors alike. His task is hard enough – and will be made infinitely harder if he does not enjoy the political backing and resources of a more united and effective international community. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

People dont generally associate Buddhists with violence, especially not the type of violence that sees houses set on fire and gunfire sprayed around villages. But one expert says people around the world need to shed their romanticised view of Buddhism and Buddhists as a peaceful religion and confront the reality of one of the worst human rights abuses in the world. For three weeks now villages have been burning in Myanmar as military take revenge for an insurgent attack on police and paramilitary posts on August 25, reports News.com.au. Its the second outbreak of violence since October last year and nearly 400,000 Rohingya have fled Rakhine state. People have been arriving at the Bangladeshi border town of Teknaf, crossing the Naf River in small boats. At least 88 people have drowned after their boats capsized while making the crossing. As the tragedy unfolded on the beaches near Shah Porir Dwip fishing village, across the water, smoke could be seen billowing from burning villages in Myanmar. Villages fleeing the violence tell of mobs of soldiers and Buddhist monks setting houses on fire and spraying the areas with automatic gunfire. ;I think we should stop romanticising Buddhism and Buddhists as more peaceful than any other people," Myanmar expert Dr Maung Zarni told ABC. ;There is a romanticised, rosy, orientalised of Buddhism among the English speaking population around the world and other non-English speakers as well ... but thats just so false.; Dr Zarni said Buddhism had been used as a political ideology dating back thousands of years and was as susceptible to political manipulation in the same way as Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Judaism. As thousands flee the retribution, the defacto leader of the country, Aung San Suu Kyi, has been virtually silent. Once acclaimed as an important symbol of the struggle against oppression, some are now calling for Suu Kyi to be stripped of her Nobel Peace Prize, awarded for her non- violent struggle for democracy and human rights. This is what;s going on. A Rohingya family reaches the Bangladesh border after crossing a creek of the Naf river on the border with Myanmmar, in Coxs Bazars Teknaf area. Photo / AP What started the violence? It began on August 25 when Rohingya insurgents attacked Myanmar police and paramilitary posts. The insurgents say they are protecting their ethnic minority from persecution by security forces in the Buddhist-dominated country. In response, the military unleashed what it called "clearance operations" to root out the insurgents. Many Rohingya villagers who have fled into Bangladesh say Myanmar soldiers shot indiscriminately, burned their homes and warned them to leave or die. Others have said they were attacked by Buddhist mobs. Why do they hate Rohingya? Rohingya Muslims have faced decades of persecution in Buddhist-majority Myanmar, and are denied citizenship despite centuries-old roots in the Rakhine region. Many people in Myanmar dont call them Rohingya, instead using the term ; and say they are people who migrated illegally from Bangladesh. Dr Zarni said the military consider Rohingya "borderlands people, who have cultural and historical ties with both Burma (now known as Myanmar) and East Bengal (a Muslim majority area formerly known as East Pakistan and now Bangladesh). He said the military initially had concerns about the growth of a Muslim population next to Bangladesh, one of the biggest Muslim-majority countries in the world. But this morphed into a national security concern when Burmas General Ne Win changed the militarys official policies from multicultural, multiethnic to anti-Chinese and anti-Muslim. A Rohingya Muslim man Abdul Kareem walks towards a refugee camp carrying his mother Alima Khatoon after crossing over from Myanmar into Bangladesh. Photo / AP Killing continues Those who arrived Wednesday in wooden boats on beaches near Shah Porir Dwip fishing village described ongoing violence in Myanmar. One Rohingya man said his village of Rashidong had been attacked six days earlier by Myanmar soldiers and police. When military and police surrounded our village and attacked us with rocket launchers to set fire, we got away from our village and fled away to any direction we could manage, Abdul Goffar said. Myanmar presidential office spokesman Zaw Htay said that out of 471 "Bengali" villages in three Rakhine townships, 176 were now completely empty while at least 34 more were partially abandoned. Myanmar has accused the Rohingya of burning their own homes and villages - a claim the UN human rights chief criticised as a "complete denial of reality.; UN spokesman Stephane Dujarric told reporters on Thursday that 10,000 people reportedly crossed the border in the last 24 hours. Combined with the Rohingyas who fled during the last round of violence in Rakhine state last October, Dujarric saids estimated that some 40 per cent of the total Rohingya population have now fled into Bangladesh;. An estimated 60 per cent of the Rohingyas arriving in Bangladesh are children, Dujarric said. Bangladesh was already housing some 500,000 Rohingya who fled earlier flashes of violence including anti-Muslim riots in 2012. Rakhine state had up to 1 million Rohingya before the latest violence. Rohingya Muslims, who crossed over from Myanmar into Bangladesh, prepare a meal in the open at Taiy Khali refugee camp, in Bangladesh. Photo / AP The thousands of Rohingya flooding into Bangladesh every day have arrived hungry and traumatised. Many need urgent medical care for violence-related injuries, severe infections or childbirth. Two existing refugee camps were packed beyond capacity, and Bangladesh has said it would free land to build a third. Panic erupted Thursday along roadsides where local volunteers were distributing food, water and other supplies haphazardly from parked vehicles. "There are acute shortages of everything, most critically shelter, food and clean water," UNICEF country representative Edouard Beigbeder said. The UN childrens agency said it needed $7.3 million to help just the hundreds of thousands of Rohingya children now at high risk of contracting waterborne diseases. On Thursday afternoon, a scuffle broke out at a makeshift relief centre at Kutupalong, where some refugees tried to break into the centre and were beaten back by at least four security guards wielding sticks. Those who managed to receive some aid after waiting hours in line were dismayed by the meagre hand-out. "I have just got a tarpaulin sheet but no food," said 55-year- old Osman, who gave only one name. I need rice to eat, I need to feed my family. They said they can't give us anything else. What will I eat now? Myanmars State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi is under pressure over the treatment of Rohingya Muslims. Photo / AP Pressure to act Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate who lived for years under house arrest when Myanmar was ruled by a military junta, has faced a torrent of criticism since the crisis erupted. Facing growing condemnation globally, Suu Kyi decided not to attend UN General Assembly meetings between September 19-25 to instead deal with what the government said were domestic security issues. On Thursday Security Council members called for "immediate steps to end the violence," de- escalate the situation and ensure civilian protections. The statement was the first made by the UNs most powerful body in nine years addressing the precarious situation Rohingya face, Britains UN Ambassador Matthew Rycroft said, calling it "an important first step." But Dr Zarni said countries like Australia should stop providing aid to Myanmar and work together with other nations to exert serious economic and diplomatic pressure. The western world as well as others, stood together when (a) 5 per cent white minority ran an apartheid regime in South Africa,; he said. ;We are not simply talking about apartheid where people were at least allowed to live as second class citizens, we are talking about fully fledged genocide; Dr Zarni said the Rohingya was being subjected to "nothing less than a slow genocide of nearly 40 years" and the world was failing to stop these types of crises. The UN is completely paralysed when it comes to issues of the worlds most downtrodden, oppressed people, not just Rohingya,; he said. failing in Rwanda, we failed in Cambodia, we failed in Srebenica, now were failing in this. Dar Yasin of the Associated Press reported from Shah Porir Dwip, Bangladesh. David Keyton in Stockholm, Sweden, and Edith M. Lederer at the United Nations contributed. Copyright 2017 The New Zealand Herald __________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 New Zealand Herald

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls on the Bangladeshi authorities to act judiciously in the case of two Burmese journalists held on spying charges in the southeastern city of Cox’s Bazar. They were arrested a week ago while on assignment for the German magazine GEO to cover the Rohingya refugee crisis. Photo-journalist Minzayar Oo and his assistant Hkun Lat are facing the possibility for being jailed for five years for trying to cover the crisis resulting from the exodus of around 400,000 Muslim Rohingyas from neighbouring Myanmar since late August. They were arrested on 7 September although the police did not report their detention until Friday. After their arrest, they were taken to the capital, Dhaka, for secret interrogation and were then returned to Cox’s Bazar. The police said the charges against them include spreading “false information” and “false impersonation” because they entered Bangladesh on tourist visas rather than as journalists – charges described as relatively minor by their lawyer, Jyotirmoy Barua. But they are also charged with spying because, according to the Cox’s Bazar police chief, they were “collecting information on the Rohingya for Myanmar.” This carries a possible five-year jail sentence. “We are very disturbed by the spying charge, which is not based on any evidence and is probably due to factors that have nothing to do with these two journalists,” said Daniel Bastard, the head of RSF’s Asia-Pacific desk. “Their professionalism is unanimously recognized and they were just trying to do their job by documenting the region’s acute crisis.” A request for their release on bail was rejected yesterday. Meanwhile, they have not been able to see their lawyer. RSF calls on the Bangladeshi authorities to respect the rule of law in their handling of the case. Bangladesh is ranked 146th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reporters Without Boarders

Obede Lutana, an orphan who found himself alone in a war zone after his father was killed. He says he is 15 years old, but looks younger. (Sara Hylton / For The Times) Obede Lutana lost both his parents in South Sudan’s increasingly vicious civil war—his father shot to death by soldiers last year on the family’s farm near Yei, his mother killed in an outbreak of disease. Lutana was left to live with his cousin, a young woman who cared for him as the chaos escalated around them on all sides. She stayed for nearly seven months. Then one day when Lutana briefly left the house, she placed a pot of food on the stove and slipped out the door. “She cooked food and left without saying goodbye,” said Lutana, who gives his age as 15 but looks younger. “I’d just gone a little way from home,” he said. “I thought she’d take me with her.” His mother died of illness, his father was shot by soldiers as he tried to forage food, and his cousin abandoned him. Obede Lutana fled South Sudan as a refugee in the company of a neighbor. (Sara Hylton / For The Times) Many children like Lutana have been arriving here in recent weeks, navigating a rickety bridge that marks the border between South Sudan and Uganda. Most often, they are dusty and painfully thin. Many seem numb and withdrawn, unwilling or unable to describe what occurred on their lonely journeys. South Sudan fought a 22-year civil war for independence from Sudan, leaving much of the country shattered. The Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement took power at independence in 2011, but its army fractured along ethnic lines 18 months later when President Salva Kiir, a Dinka, faced a leadership rival in his deputy, Riek Machar, a Nuer. Last year the war spread, drawing in other ethnic groups in west and southern South Sudan. Both sides have been guilty of war crimes, according to rights groups, though the majority appear to have been carried out by Kiir’s forces, which have attacked farmers, shopkeepers, market traders and fleeing women. Entire villages have emptied. The fighting has forced nearly a third of the country’s 12 million people to flee their homes, resulting in Africa’s biggest refugee crisis since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Life was hardly good for South Sudan’s children even before the war. The government plows more than half its finances into the army, weapons, security and administration, leaving little for anything else. Even before the fighting, children on average received less than five years of schooling, and more than half the population lived below the poverty line. Now things have gotten worse. Since the war re-started, oil production has declined sharply, the economy has collapsed and inflation is running at more than 900%. Of the more than than a million people who have fled to refugee camps in Uganda, 61% are children. The numbers of children traveling alone, or with no one but other children, are staggering: up to 36,000, officials estimate. Few had much food along the way. Some were raped. Some tagged along with adults, only to see soldiers kill the people who were leading them to safety. Some children witnessed parents or siblings killed in attacks or saw their parents die in the bush. In Lutana’s case, soldiers attacked the village in August 2016, forcing Lutana and his father to flee into the bush. But there was no food. Desperate, his father crept back to the family’s small plot of farmland to pick some corn. “He ran into some government soldiers and he was shot,” Lutana said. “Later, I saw his body in the middle of the farm.” Helena Sitima, 11, was working in a field with her mother when soldiers came. She ran but they killed her mother. (Sara Hylton / For The Times) Helena Sitima’s father died of illness when she was a baby. In November, the girl was digging with her mother in the family’s small farm plot some distance from their house near the village of Payawa when government soldiers arrived. Helena’s mother, who had a knee problem, moved slowly. “When I saw them, I started running. My mother could not run and the soldiers opened fire and they shot my mother there. I heard bullets behind me.” Helena, 11, ran back to the house where her teenage sisters were watching two small brothers. All of them fled to the bush carrying a few cooking utensils, water cans and clothes. At sunset that night, the three sisters left their brothers in the bush, told them to be quiet and not to move, and crept back to the small hut where they took cassava flour and water. “The next day, a neighbor went and got my mother’s body and brought it into the bush. We buried her there. People started crying. I cried too. I cried all day.” The sisters stayed in the bush for a week trying to look after their brothers, but besides the flour there was no food. Eventually, they made their way with a neighbor to Uganda, where Helena’s uncle and siblings were routed to a different camp. Helena shares a tent with her former neighbor, Jennifer Sadiya, 25, and Sadiya’s baby. On the flat dirt outside, children play with a small ball made of string and plastic bags. Another group sits playing cards. In the mornings and evenings, girls take their yellow plastic jerry cans to the well. When it rains, as it often does in this rainy season, families huddle inside for much of the day as smoke from cooking fires drifts and fills their tents. Nelson Moi, 60, a farmer who fled attacks in South Sudan, is caring for two orphaned grandchildren in a refugee camp in Uganda. (Sara Hylton / For The Times) Nelson Moi, a farmer, is caring for two orphaned grandchildren in the Uganda refugee camps. His son, a shopkeeper, was shot by soldiers in Yei in October 2016. When soldiers attacked his village of Moga in December, Moi fled with his blind wife and his widowed daughter-in-law, Mary Jokuda, 23, and her 8-year-old son, Benson Yakani. He also brought another orphaned granddaughter, Margaret Poni, 11, whose mother had died nine years ago. Moi and the family lived in the bush for two months with no food except bitter wild roots. But Mary Jokuda fell ill with a fever. The family tried to save her, picking wild roots to make medicine, but she worsened. After two weeks she died. “Now I have a problem. I don’t have anything to support my grandchildren,” Moi said. “I have tuberculosis and I am asthmatic. Just moving is hard. My wife, she’s blind, so it’s very difficult to look after small children.” Benson Yakani, 8, left orphaned by South Sudan's war. His father was killed by government soldiers. His mother died in the bush. (Sara Hylton / For The Times) How children ended up traveling alone through some of the most violent war corridors in Africa is a question with no single answer. Some children were in school when attacks happened, fled into the bush and had to make their own way to Uganda, sometimes taking groups of younger children with them. “By the time they reach the border point, most of them tell us this is the first meal they have had for days or weeks on their journey to Uganda,” said James Kamira, World Vision child protection officer in Uganda. “They say, we have walked 10 or 15 days or close to a month, but this is the first meal we are getting.” One 15-year-old girl gave birth in the bush on the way to Uganda and nearly died of hunger, he said. Another 15-year-old girl, walking with her 6-year-old sister, was raped by an armed group in front of the child, according to Kamira. Later she was accosted by more armed men and raped again. “When they get to the border, they’re numb. Most of them have witnessed their parents or other people or children being killed on the way,” he said. “They have a sense of fear of the unknown and they have high levels of stress. They have no trust.” Benson Yakani, 8, a South Sudanese refugee, was orphaned when his father was shot by soldiers in South Sudan and his mother died in the bush after the family fled attacks. His cousin Margaret Poni's mother died of illness. (Sara Hylton / For The Times) Sixty-four percent of children in the camps are not in school, according to the United Nations. Helena Sitima does go to school and tries to please her foster mother. But she misses her family and especially her mother. “When I go to bed at night, I remember them and I feel lonely and sometimes I cry. I remember my mom and I think about her, because she loved us,” she said. When unaccompanied children from South Sudan arrive in Uganda, they are interviewed by government officials, given a number and two packets of high protein biscuits, which they usually tear open and eat immediately. Aid workers provide cash, emergency food and clean water. But food rations for refugees had to be cut by 50% from last month because of a shortfall in donations – although those with malnutrition still get a full ration. In the camps, malaria and diarrhea are the biggest killers of children. In the Bidibidi refugee camp, one family buried their 2-week-old baby next to the wall of their hut. A child's grave with a cross made of sticks and strings, and the child's shoes, in Bidibidi refugee camp, Uganda, for South Sudanese refugees fleeing attacks (Robyn Dixon / Los Angeles Times) Others are buried in the graveyard at the edge of the camp, where the plots bear no names or tombstones. The graves of children are marked with small piles of rocks, or a makeshift cross, or in one case, a pair of small black sandals. Some are little more than dirt mounds melting away in the rains, increasingly difficult to see. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Los Angeles Times

Saiful Rahman, 30, left, walks toward the mainland with his family after crossing the Naf River from Burma. (Ismail Ferdous for The Washington Post) The soldiers arrived in the village in western Burma just after 8 a.m., the villagers said, ready to fight a war. They fired shots in the air, and then, the villagers say, turned their guns on fleeing residents, who fell dead or wounded in the monsoon-green rice paddies. The military’s retribution for a Rohingya militant attack on police posts earlier that day had begun. Mohammed Roshid, a rice farmer, heard the gunfire and fled with his wife and children, but his 80-year-old father, who walks with a stick, wasn’t as nimble. Roshid said he saw a soldier grab Yusuf Ali and slit his throat with such ferocity that the old man was nearly decapitated. “I wanted to go back and save him, but some relatives stopped me because there was so many military,” Roshid, 55, said. “It’s the saddest thing in my life that I could not do anything for my father.” The Burmese military’s “clearance operation” in the hamlet of Maung Nu and dozens of other villages populated by Burma’s ethnic Rohingya minority has triggered an exodus of an estimated 400,000 refugees into Bangladesh, an episode the United Nations human rights chief has called “ethnic cleansing.” The tide of refugees is expected to grow in the coming days. The new arrivals — dazed, clutching their belongings, some barefoot in ankle-deep mud — have overflowed an existing camp and put up makeshift shelters. Others simply sit on the roadways, fighting crowds as volunteers on large relief trucks fling down bags of rice or bottles of water. Rights groups say it will take months or years to fully chronicle the devastation the refugees are fleeing. Satellite photos show widespread burning, witnesses recount soldiers killing civilians, and the Burmese government has said that 176 Rohingya villages stand empty. No total death toll is yet available because the area remains sealed by the military. Najma Begum and her 1-year-old daughter left their home in Burma after her husband told her to escape. He stayed behind. (Ismail Ferdous for The Washington Post ) Nearly a dozen villagers from the Maung Nu hamlet who escaped recounted their last hours in their homes and the long journey that followed. They were interviewed for two days in Kutupalong refugee camp near the Bangladesh border, where they arrived last week. Fortify Rights, a Southeast Asia-focused human rights organization, estimates the death toll in Maung Nu and three nearby villages to be 150. “I can’t count how many,” said Soe Win, a 10th-grade teacher. “We were all watching what the military did. They slaughtered them one by one. And the blood flowed in the streets.” The latest wave of violence began Aug. 25, when an emerging group of Rohingya militants, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, attacked 30 police posts and an army base in Rakhine state, killing 12. The subsequent military crackdown has prompted hundreds of thousands of refugees to leave Buddhist-majority Burma, a Southeast Asian nation until recently ruled by a military junta and where Rohingya have long been denied citizenship and other rights. The International Rescue Committee estimates that eventually 500,000 will flee to Bangladesh, half of Burma’s known Rohingya population , most of whom live in troubled Rakhine state. The area has long been riven by tensions between Buddhist villagers and the stateless Rohingya, who have been there for centuries but are considered by the government to be illegal immigrants, “Bengalis” from neighboring Bangladesh. After crossing the Naf River, Rohingya refugees try to get on a boat leaving Shahporir Island for the Teknaf region of Bangladesh’s mainland. (Ismail Ferdous for The Washington Post) The crisis has sparked widespread outcry and condemnation of Burma and its de facto leader, Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. She and her government have said little about the plight of the Rohingya, except to reframe the situation as a national security matter as the new militancy has coalesced. On Monday, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, called the exodus “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” In Maung Nu, a hamlet of about 750 houses that sits along a narrow stretch of the slow-moving Mayu River, the Rohingya had long lived in relative calm, sipping tea with their Buddhist neighbors, villagers say. But their peaceful coexistence ended when Rohingya insurgents launched their attack on police posts. The military crackdown has continued unabated since then, black smoke scudding across the skyline, visible in southern Bangladesh even this past week. Mohammed Showife, 23, an auto mechanic, said that on the first day of the assault, he and his family had just finished their morning prayers and were preparing rice when three soldiers appeared in the yard, announcing their arrival with a strafe of machine-gun fire and telling the family that they had to leave immediately. “They said, ‘You Bengalis come out from the house. You can go anywhere you want, but you can’t live here,’ ” Showife recalled. He and his family members scattered, and he stopped to help his neighbor Mohammed Rafique, 17, whose right hip had been run clean through by a bullet, back to front. They ran through a mob looting homes and soldiers setting fire to other dwellings with shoulder-fired rocket launchers. Many villagers took refuge in the jungle, where the dense foliage, thick after the monsoon season, provided cover. Once there, some of the women sat weeping silently. Other villagers just looked at each other: What would they do now? They tried to attend to Rafique’s wound with boiled water and torn strips of clothing. The first night, an uneasy darkness settled in, the sky flickering with fire and shadows. They and the villagers still in the hamlet did not know then that there would be five nights more. A makeshift Rohingya refugee camp on the way to Teknaf from Cox’s Bazar. (Ismail Ferdous for The Washington Post) On the second day, a businessman hiding in his house got a call from a tall, skinny, army sergeant the villagers all knew and called Bajo, who had often dined in the businessman’s home. Bajo told Mohammed Zubair that the military was going to be requisitioning one of his passenger boats. Given the circumstances, Zubair, 40, felt he had no choice but to give it to them. He sent the boat and its captain to the jetty at the nearby army camp. The officers accepted the keys with a warning for the captain: “You will also be killed.” The captain eventually escaped unharmed and fled with the others. Zubair said he had followed to see what was to become of his vessel. He says he watched in horror as the military began stacking the boat with dead bodies, one after another like lumber, including those of two 13-year-old boys he had known well. “I fainted from seeing this,” Zubair said. He believes the corpses were dumped in the river. On the third day, Rafique’s mother, Khalida Begum, 35, had grown tired of moving from house to house with her four other children, desperate for news of her son. She had raised them on her own on a tailor’s salary after her husband died years ago, so she and the children are unusually close. They managed to make it to the jungle, where she saw Rafique lying motionless beneath a tree. She ran to him and joyfully covered his face with kisses, as he emerged from a fevered haze. At first he was so disoriented that he didn’t recognize her. But soon both were crying. On the sixth day, the residents of Maung Nu, fearing that the danger was growing, decided as a group to start walking north to the border with Bangladesh. They walked for eight days with few provisions, eating banana leaves and drinking water from streams. The children whimpered. Showife carried Rafique on his back, the teen drifting in and out of consciousness. After a while, their legs began to swell. Finally, they reached a crossing high on a hill marked by a simple pillar that they understood meant they had arrived in Bangladesh. It was 4:30 in the afternoon. It was raining. Before them was a new city of refugees, thousands of temporary tents made from bamboo poles covered in black plastic sheeting. The villagers knew tough times lay ahead as they descended the hill, slipping in the mud. For days afterward, when some of them closed their eyes, they could see the lifeless bodies of their neighbors and hear the ring of gunfire. But at the pillar, a little cheer went up. “I was very happy,” Khalida Begum said. “I was crazy, I was excited. I thought: Now we are safe.” Days later, her eyes filled with tears when she recounted that moment. It was the first time she had allowed herself to believe what the others who helped Rafique out of the village had hoped: that her son would live. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Washington Post

Rohingya refugees wait for food and clothing in Tankhali, Bangladesh, on Friday. (Paula Bronstein/Getty Images) IN JUST three weeks, the long-simmering conflict between the Burmese government and the persecuted Rohingya minority has exploded into the most massive and brutal episode of ethnic cleansing the world has seen in years. Since a militant attack on Aug. 25 provided a pretext, Burmese troops have driven hundreds of thousands of Rohingya across the border to Bangladesh by systematically burning scores of villages and terrorizing their residents. Last week, more than 380,000 people were reported to have crossed the frontier; on Friday, U.N. officials said many thousands were still waiting to pass. An estimated 240,000 of the refugees are children, according to UNICEF. What U.N. Secretary General António Guterres rightly called “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” is the culmination of years of discrimination by Burma’s government and Buddhist majority against the Rohingya, Muslims who have been denied citizenship even though many have lived in the country for generations. On Aug. 25, a small militant group claiming to represent the Rohingya attacked a handful of police posts and army camps, killing about a dozen people. The government’s scorched-earth response has, by its own account, left 176 out of 471 Rohingya villages in the northern region of Rakhine state completely abandoned. Evidence collected by human rights groups, including satellite photos, shows scores of villages burned to the ground. In a report released Friday, Human Rights Watch said it counted 62 villages targeted by arson attacks and 35 with extensive destruction. Journalists on the Bangladesh border Friday reported smoke still billowing up from Burmese territory. More detailed reporting, as well as relief efforts, has been impossible because of the authorities’ refusal to allow in most journalists, aid workers and diplomats — including the senior State Department official who arrived in the country Friday. The international response to this crime, which rivals the cleansing campaigns in Darfur, Sudan, in the early 2000s and Kosovo in the 1990s, has been shockingly weak. After meeting behind closed doors on Wednesday, the U.N. Security Council used its lowest-order form of statement to express concern about “excessive violence during security operations.” The State Department has been equally cautious. Too much attention has been focused on Burma’s de facto civilian leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been woefully silent about the atrocities but also lacks the ability to control the military. What’s needed instead is more direct pressure on the Burmese army. The Obama administration lifted U.S. sanctions on the generals and the businesses they control in an attempt to promote a democratic transition; these now ought to be reimposed by the Treasury and State departments. Some officials express concern that tough measures might cause the army to turn on Aung San Suu Kyi and her civilian government. In fact, international censure could provide the Nobel laureate leverage — if she is willing to use it. At the United Nations, Burma is shielded by China, which is untroubled by its atrocities and may even welcome them for their potential to ruin the country’s relations with the West. The United States should nevertheless seek to force a public Security Council debate on the cleansing. The more the crimes against the Rohingya are exposed to the world — and their authors made to pay a price — the more likely they are to stop. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Washington Post

Crowds look on at three children 'washed up' on Naf River ABC News (Australia) Bodies of Rohingya Muslim children have washed up on a river after reportedly being shot dead by police in Burma, according to a video that has emerged of the scene. Crowds stand around the apparently lifeless bodies of what looks like a young boy and an infant both laid out on the sand on the shore of the Naf River, which forms a natural border with neighbouring Bangladesh. A young boy in shorts then appears in the frame carrying the small body of a baby and gently places it next to the boy. None of the three children are seen moving and appear to be dead. Relatives of Rohingya Muslims who live overseas and saw the video told how their relatives are being “slaughtered” by the military and the police when they try to flee Burma. Almost 400,000 Rohingya have fled over the Naf crossing over the past three weeks amid claims they are being burnt out of their villages in what was called a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” by Prince Zeid bin Ra’ad Zeid al-Hussein, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Some 100 members of the minority have reportedly drowned while trying to make the treacherous journey to escape deadly persecution in Burma while packed into boats and clutching their few possessions. Rohingya Muslims who have already sought refuge overseas in the past spoke out after seeing the video. Community leader Anwar Sha, who lives in Australia, said he was aware that tens of thousands are still trying to flee. He told the ABC news channel, which broadcast the video, that there were about 30,000 people trapped in the hills – far from the relative safety of Bangladesh. "They have no food, they have no shelter. They are just dying there," he said. "As soon as they try to go out of there, group by group, the military and the police are attacking them and slaughtering them." He added: "I hear one of [my] sisters has already crossed to Bangladesh, but two other sisters — I have not heard about them. "There is no contact with them and I don't know where they are." Some 1,000 Rohingya have been reportedly killed by the military and police in Burma over the past three weeks. Burma’s leader Aung San Suu Kyi has come under fire for failing to speak out against the outbreak of violence against the Rohingya which has been condemned by the United Nations. Its human rights official Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein hit out at the “brutal security operation” against the persecuted people and called it “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing”. _______________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Independent