A Myanmar border guard police officer stands guard in Tin May village, Buthidaung township, northern Rakhine state, Myanmar July 14, 2017. Picture taken July 14, 2017. Myanmar on Sunday rejected allegations of crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing during a crackdown against Rohingya Muslims last year, accusing the United Nations of making exaggerated claims in its report on the issue. Rohingya militants killed nine border guards in October, sparking a response in which the army was accused of raping Rohingya women, shooting villagers on sight and burning down homes, sending an estimated 75,000 people fleeing to Bangladesh. A U.N. report in February said security forces instigated a campaign that "very likely" amounted to crimes against humanity and possibly ethnic cleansing. This led to the establishment of a U.N. probe which is being blocked by Myanmar. The country's own 13-member investigation team - led by former head of military intelligence and now Vice President, Myint Swe - has been dismissed by human rights monitors as lacking independence to produce a credible report. Speaking to reporters gathered in Yangon to conclude its 8-month-long probe, Myint Swe said the U.N. report exaggerated the claims and created misunderstanding for the international community. "There is no possibility of crimes against humanity, no evidence of ethnic cleansing, as per U.N. accusations," said Myint Swe. He added that, "some people from abroad have fabricated news claiming genocide had occurred, but we haven't found any evidence." The panel said that the U.N. report did not take into consideration "violent acts" committed by the insurgents, instead focusing on the activities of the security forces. The U.N. did not immediately respond to a request for comment. The Myanmar commission had received 21 reports from villagers of incidents of murder, rape, arson and torture by the security forces, but, unable to verify their veracity, it referred them to the authorities. "We opened doors for them to complain to the courts if they have evidence that they suffered human rights abuses, but no one came to open a lawsuit until now," Zaw Myint Pe, the secretary of the panel said. The commission blamed the violence on the insurgents, accusing them of links to organizations abroad, "set up to destabilize and harm Myanmar". The treatment of the roughly one million Muslim Rohingya has emerged as majority Buddhist Myanmar's most contentious rights issue as it makes a transition from decades of harsh military rule. The Rohingya are denied citizenship and classified as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, despite claiming roots in the region that go back centuries, with communities marginalized and occasionally subjected to communal violence. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________- (c) 2017 Reuters

Recently unearthed documents in Chinese state archives reveal a national plan to take in large numbers of European Jews, believing it was the right thing to do The scenery in Heshun Township of Tengchong County, southwest China's Yunnan Province. LIN YIGUANG / XINHUA In 1939, China prepared a plan to settle persecuted European Jews in the southwestern Yunnan province, close to the Burmese border, according to documents recently found in Chinese state archives. For unknown reasons, the plan was never implemented. Additional information about Jewish communities in China is slowly emerging as scholars engage with the country and its history. This growing knowledge includes information about the ancient community in Kaifeng in Henan province, and the Sephardi-Baghdadi community that settled in Shanghai in the wake of British imperial expansion in the mid-19th century. Considerable information is also accumulating about the Jews who fled from czarist Russia due to the pogroms and revolutionary waves, and settled in Harbin and other centers like Shanghai and Tianjin, or the uprooted European Jews who came to Shanghai at the end of the 1930s and were concentrated in a “ghetto” in the Hongkou district. However, documents I’ve recently come across from the Chinese state archives reveal an almost unknown government plan to settle refugee Jews in Yunnan, for humanitarian reasons. It’s important to note that when the initiative was drafted, in 1939, the Chinese government itself was in the midst of a humiliating withdrawal inland from the Japanese forces charging west after the fall of the provisional capital of Hankou. A man walks past the Ohel Rachel Synagogue, which was built in 1920, in Shanghai, China. EUGENE HOSHIKO / AP After Germany’s union with Austria, in 1938, and the exit of those countries’ Jews in response to harsh, brutal persecution that ensued, the Chinese government in the hinterland capital of Chongqing, in Sichuan province, decided to adopt a suggestion rasied by Sun Fo (also known as Sun Ke), the son of the Republic of China’s founder and first president Sun Yat-sen. Sun Fo, who served at the time as chairman of the state’s legislative authority, proposed to settle Jewish refugees in a remote area close to the border with Burma. (Myanmar). The documented discussions reflect the Chinese establishment’s sympathy for the Jews and its readiness to help them in their time of need, but also broader, more pragmatic considerations. Color Portrait of Sun Yat-Sen.Library of Congress One document, describing the rationale for the plan, says the world’s Jews then numbered 16 million – four million of them in the United States, three million in the Soviet Union and three million in Poland. The remaining six million Jews, it says, lived in communities scattered around the world. Over the course of 2,600 years of persecution, the document explicitly states, the Jews were oppressed and uprooted. The rise of fascism in Europe led to more brutal, incessant persecution, in particular, in Nazi Germany. The November 1938 assassination in Paris of German diplomat Ernst vom Rath, by a Jew, Herschel Grynszpan, only exacerbated the condition of Germany’s Jews. The document claimed that the U.S. and British governments had not given the Jews sufficient help. In contrast, the Chinese city Shanghai had granted them vital shelter. But now, with that city inundated with refugees, there was a need to reduce the stream of asylum seekers, as well as distribute those taken in around various places in China.Under what was undoubtedly an audacious plan, China would both take in numerous asylum-seeking Jews from Europe, and resettle Jewish communities already living in Shanghai in other places.In addition to the humanitarian consideration, Chinese officials list four major reasons for the initiative. One was assisting small ethnic groups in the spirit of China’s national policy. Another was the hope that assisting the Jews would evoke the British public’s sympathy toward China, mainly because, as is commonly known, many British financiers and bankers who worked in East Asia were Jews. China also expected that helping the Jews would increase the American public’s sympathy to China’s distress. Finally, the absorption of Jews, who had considerable economic means and talents, would be a welcome contribution to China, the planners said. They decided to designate an area close to the southwestern border, appoint an official committee to run the project, enlist Jewish leaders from China and abroad to support the initiative and register Jewish professionals to advance certain fields in China. At the end of April 1939, at the instruction of Chinese prime minister and finance minister Kong Xiang-xi, a round of discussions was held with representatives of the interior, foreign, defense, finance and transportation ministries. The ministries’ comments were sent to the cabinet, which approved the move in principle. The plan stipulated that the policy toward Jews of foreign nationality would depend on their citizenship and the agreements signed with their home states in the past. They were not part of the initiative. However, Jews without nationality would receive special passports from China’s embassies and consulates in Europe. A Jew applying for entry to China will declare that he would respect China’s laws and act accordingly, refrain from any political or ideological activity and not object to the “Three Principles of the People” – nationalism, democracy and livelihood – set by the father of the nation, Sun Yat-sen. Violating these conditions would lead to the settler’s deportation. Those who wish to be naturalized would have to fulfill the official criteria required of any foreigner asking for Chinese citizenship. Naturalized individuals would have rights equal to any citizen, with no racial or religious discrimination. Since building a nation required various experts, scientists, engineers, doctors, technicians, and the like, people with desired skills would be given preference. , the required skills would be registered in China’s embassies and after obtaining the authorities’ approval, andemployment contracts would be signed with them. Those arriving without contracts would be registered in China’s provinces and municipalities, which will advance their employment as much as possible. The assumption was that those with the necessary skills would finance their trip to China themselves.The Interior Ministry suggested Tengyue Town, also known as Tengchong, in the sparsely populated, fertile area adjacent to the Burmese border for their settlement. The assumption was that Jewish refugees in Shanghai would also be able to get there by sea, via Burma, which was under British rule from the end of the 19th century, or via Thailand, from which they would proceed to Yunnan province. Other Jewish refugees from Europe would arrive via Suez, the Indian Ocean and Bengal Bay, proceed to Burma and enter Yunnan. The plans says it would be convenient and even easier for European Jews to reach the allocated destination than travel to distant Shanghai. It was proposed that the government would guarantee and assist building adequate housing for the newcomers.Some of the ministries’ comments and suggestions reflected the prevalent Chinese prejudices about the Jews at the time. The foreign ministry raised the fear that the Jews would in time ask for autonomy or self-determination. Due to the proximity to international trade areas, such a demand could be supported by other states, such as Britain and France. Also, since the Jews are usually mentioned in the same breath as Communism, it was said, China’s enemies could be expected to make the claim that China itself had a Communist orientation.The documents show that the first secretary in Germany’s embassy in China expressed his government’s concern over the initiative and demanded China take into consideration the Jews’ supposed hostility toward Germany. In general, the ministry recommended settling the Jews in small, dispersed places, not close to international trade zones or routes.The defense ministry believed Jews should not be granted residence status, which could lead to a demand for full sovereignty. If a Jewish settlement is necessary, the allocated area must be subject to Chinese law, unlike the situation in Shanghai, and not be near the border, it stipulated.The finance ministry said that Jews with farming or foresting skills should be settled in areas near internal transportation routes or places earmarked for agricultural development. At the same time, it stipulated that the refugees should not be permitted to own land. The transportation ministry suggested consulting the Jews of Shanghai about settling the European Jews, in order to prepare adequate infrastructure.It is not clear from the documents why the plan was scrapped. They do, however, call for further clarifications. Ultimately they say that with all the good will and approval in principle, further clarifications were necessary. That effectively killed the initiative, and an opportunity to save many from their grim fate in Europe was missed.. Apparently Chiang Kai-Shek, with whom Sun Fo had consulted, was apprehensive at that critical time in the battle against the Japanese, about supporting a plan that would harm China’s relations with Germany.Indeed, in those days close relations with Germany appeared vital to China. Japan’s threatening stance against the plan and concern about creating another point of friction with it in west China presumably also played a part in Chiang Kai-Shek’s decision. Ultimately, the plan to settle Jews in China wasn’t carried out, and an opportunity to save many from their grim fate in Europe was missed.The document claimed that the U.S. and British governments had not given the Jews sufficient help. In contrast, the Chinese city Shanghai had granted them vital shelter. But now, with that city inundated with refugees, there was a need to distribute those taken in around various places in China. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Haaretz Daily Newspaper -

Christopher Msando, an official responsible for observing the upcoming Kenyan presidential election, was founddead only ten days before the contentious election is set to take place. Msando was the acting director for Information and Communications Technology at the country’s election commission, the creation of which was celebrated by many local civil society groups and NGOs as a sign that Kenya was achieving a lasting and legitimate democracy. Unfortunately, the expectation of a peaceful political transition was devastated, as officials reported that Msando’s body was found with signs of torture and mutilation. His apparent murder has sparked concern and undermined the already low public morale regarding the immensely critical elections. Some experts are publicly questioning the general legitimacy of the elections, as the results are expected to be very close and thus the outcome could be influenced by violence like the kind used against Msando. As the acting director for his department, Msando had announced plans to use technology that would reduce the possibility of a corrupt election, leading experts to question if he was targeted to enable tampering of the results. Despite the demoralizing setback, the Kenyan public has shown a greater political interest in this year’s elections than in those of the past, according to political experts, and there is still hope for a legitimate election to be borne out on 8 August. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 RtoP Weekly

Contrary to the stance of most of the western nations, the Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is supportive of the government’s plan to relocate the undocumented Myanmar nationals, commonly known as Rohingyas, to Thengar Char, an island in Noakhali district. At the same time, the organisation, comprising 57 Muslim majority countries, called upon the government of Myanmar to take their nationals back and provide them full citizenship with all basic human rights. “Rohingya people are our brothers and sisters. We should always take care of them. I congratulate the prime minister and the foreign minister for hosting our brothers and sisters, giving them shelters, social services, medical services and education which is very important for us,” OIC Secretary General Dr Yousef bin Ahmad Al-Othaimeen told reporters after a meeting with Foreign Minister Abul Hassan Mahmood Ali at his office yesterday. “I am pleased to know that the government of Bangladesh is thinking of developing a small island for them. This is very good,” he said. It will be like living in a small normal city as guests with all necessary services, he added, congratulating the government for this move. “I also call upon all the international organisations to help the government of Bangladesh in this regard, said Dr Al-Othaimeen, a Saudi national. “Our people in Myanmar need all the support they need. This is not only a problem of Bangladesh. It is also a problem of our Muslim Ummah,” he said. “We should all help Rohingyas from a humanitarian perspective. This is very important. But, we should also help the political process,” said the secretary general, who is undertaking his maiden visit to Bangladesh since assumption of the office. Describing the Rohingya issue as a human rights one, he said, “Our Rohingya people are denied their basic rights. They need to be recognised by giving their identities. They must return to their country. This is their country. They must have their full citizenship.” “I plead with the Myanmar government, please, these are your people. Give them their basic human rights. We are very much willing to come and sit down with you. Give us a roadmap on how to go forward,” said the OIC chief executive. “All the neighbouring governments including the Bangladesh government, are willing to negotiate to find out how we can move forward on this issue. You cannot deny human rights… Any citizen in the 21st century needs to belong to a country. This is very important for OIC. We will continue pressing on this in a very peaceful manner,” he said. When asked if the OIC will pursue this matter at the United Nations Security Council, Dr Al-Othaimeen replied, “We always said this.” About his meeting with the foreign minister, the OIC secretary general said that apart from the Rohingya issue, they discussed the whole range of issues including terrorism, extremism, socioeconomic and cultural matters. Terming Bangladesh a very important country, he said, “Terrorism has nothing to do with Islam. Islam is a religion of peace, religion of mercy and religion of tolerance. And, Bangladesh is a shining example of all these values of Islam.” “We condemn all the terrorist acts not only in Muslim countries but also in non-Muslim countries. Nothing justifies terrorism and violence,” said Dr Al-Othaimeen, adding that if there is a problem it can be solved through peaceful means. Referring to his meeting with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, he said that he congratulated her for the socioeconomic development and political stability in Bangladesh. The OIC secretary general described Hasina as a ‘shining example’ for all Muslims across the world. He also met with President Abdul Hamid on the day. Dr Al-Othaimeen is scheduled to travel to Cox’s Bazar today to visit a Rohingya refugee camp and surroundings where a large number of Rohingyas reside. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Independent

Iraqis attend the first Palm Sunday procession in the burnt out main church of the Christian city of Qaraqosh since Iraqi forces retook it from Islamic States militants, Iraq April 9, 2017. REUTERS/Suhaib Salem Three years ago this week, disturbing images of women and children fleeing the Islamic State in northern Iraq shocked the world. During the siege of Mt. Sinjar, reports emerged of ISIS militants ruthlessly massacring Yazidi men and kidnapping and enslaving Yazidi women and children. Girls were separated by eye color and sold to ISIS fighters based on their preference. Thousands were trapped on the mountain, desperate for food, water and rescue. Similarly, Iraq’s ancient Christian community was in the crosshairs as ISIS attempted to establish a caliphate. Days after the Sinjar massacre, ISIS seized Qaraqosh, Iraq’s largest Christian city with a population of 50,000. Fleeing on foot, many could not escape being killed, kidnapped, or forced to convert. Churches and other holy sites that had stood for centuries were bombed, defaced or destroyed, or turned into torture chambers and weapons storehouses. The full measure of human suffering exacted against these innocent people remains incalculable. This bloodthirsty campaign targeting ethnic and religious minorities was clearly genocide—a term I do not use lightly. At the time, I and many others urged the Obama Administration to officially recognize the Islamic State’s atrocities for what they were, and then-Secretary of State John Kerry finally did, on March 17, 2016. His declaration that ISIS is “responsible for genocide” against Christians, Yezidis and other religious minorities was only the second time in history that a U.S. secretary of state made a genocide determination—the first being Darfur. Both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives unanimously passed resolutions denouncing this genocide. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the current administration maintains this determination. It is important for Secretary Tillerson to publicly address this issue and clarify the administration’s stance, which my colleagues and I have asked him to do. Even then, words without action will not change the reality on the ground. The Trump Administration must take decisive steps to counter the gravity of the situation: ISIS is seeking to erase thousands of years of history and the people who represent it. The Bible’s Old Testament is full of references to the ancient cities and towns that comprise modern-day Iraq. Abraham hailed from Ur in southern Iraq. Isaac’s wife Rebekah was from northwest Iraq. The twelve sons of Jacob were all born in Iraq, and the spiritual revival depicted in the book of Jonah occurred in the city of Nineveh, now known as Mosul. Many of the Christians there still speak Aramaic, the language of Jesus, and trace their faith back to the Apostle Thomas. Sadly, their population in Iraq has quickly dwindled from 1.4 million a generation ago to less than 200,000 today. If the United States fails to take meaningful steps to support these communities, including ensuring their access to humanitarian assistance and the resources they need to rebuild, even more of them will be forced to abandon their ancient homeland. This would be a tragedy on a multitude of levels, and a deathblow to the vision of a diverse, pluralistic, Iraq that respects religious freedom. The State Department has an obligation to ensure “vulnerable and persecuted religious minorities, including victims of genocide” receive humanitarian aid, as Congress directed in the most recent appropriations legislation. I will continue to press for oversight and accountability in this area, but the Executive Branch must prioritize the issue, rather than allow the inertia of the State Department bureaucracy to dictate the path forward. President Trump should quickly end the exclusion of genocide-targeted minorities from U.S. humanitarian and reconstruction aid. A presidential directive would provide much-needed guidance to State Department and USAID personnel. I have no doubt that once Governor Sam Brownback is confirmed as ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom, he will be a stalwart advocate on behalf of these beleaguered religious communities. Additionally, Secretary Tillerson should move swiftly to appoint a special coordinator based in northern Iraq who can directly oversee U.S. assistance and collaborate closely with local partners and civil society groups. The U.S. should not cede this important work to the United Nations Development Fund. Combining these efforts with diplomatic engagement with Iraq’s central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government, we can help guarantee the political and economic rights of these beleaguered communities, as well their return and protection. President Obama’s misguided foreign policy did real damage to Iraq’s minorities, but these ancient communities could disappear completely on President Trump’s watch if his administration fails to help them. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Daily Caller

Turkish police officers stand guard in front of court house in Diyarbakir, southeastern Turkey, on 30 October 2016 (AFP) Just a few short months ago, visitors approaching Diyarbakir city hall were greeted by a large, black stone statue of a Lammasu – an ancient Assyrian deity with the head of a man, the body of an ox, and the wings of a bird. Now the building is protected by very different guardians: police officers pointing assault rifles out from behind armoured metal outposts. Turkish officials have been systematically removing Kurdish public monuments and memorials across the country's majority-Kurdish south-east. The city hall's Lammasu is just one of the victims of the statue purge. Over the past year the Turkish government has carried out an extensive crackdown on Kurdish political parties after the breakdown of a ceasefire between the banned Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Turkish state in 2015 led to brutal street battles in Diyarbakir and other regional cities. Now that the fighting has largely subsided, the authorities appear to have turned their attention to monuments and expressions of minority culture built by the Kurdish movement. The list of monuments removed or destroyed includes a mural to a dead Kurdish politician, stone reliefs depicting scenes from the historic Kurdish Marwanid kingdom, and plaques bearing the names of Kurdish children who were shot by security forces during the conflict. Workers remove Kurdish language signage from Diyarbakir city hall (Hatice Kamer/MEE) When a statue celebrating the 17th-century Kurdish writer Ahmedi Khani was destroyed in the city of Dogubeyazıt the state administrator claimed the destruction took place during road maintenance works. The state administrators, known as Kayyumlar, who have led the removals, were appointed by the Turkish interior ministry to run city governments in place of locally elected mayors who were arrested in the crackdowns. In the last 18 months, more than 80 co-mayors of local municipalities have been arrested on charges (which rights groups claim are trumped up) of supporting the banned PKK. "The public monuments erected by the Kurdish city councils were an important part of a wider attempt to counter the Turkish state's homogenisation of public spaces and were symbols of the multicultural history of the city," said Serif Derince, a former adviser to the mayor of Diyarbakir and head of the city's cultural programmes. He was fired by the new administrator after the arrest of his former bosses, co-mayors Gultan Kisanak and Firat Anli. Derince points out that in Diyarbakir's central Sheikh Said square there is a statue of Turkey's founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, but no monument to the eponymous Sheikh Said, a Kurdish religious leader who was hanged in the square after leading a rebellion against the central government in 1925. "It was very powerful when people were able to see figures in public spaces which depicted something other than Ataturk," he told Middle East Eye. Walking in central Diyarbakir, it doesn't take long to find evidence of the administrators' new policies. The shattered remains of a stone monument that stood to commemorate the death of Ugur Kaymaz, a 12-year-old Kurdish boy shot dead by Turkish soldiers in the town of Kiziltepe in 2004, his body carrying 13 bullet wounds, can still be seen around the stone base that once supported it. "That monument in particular was important," said Derince. "Kaymaz was killed only because he was a Kurd – there have been hundreds of such cases and the monument marked that history." The site of the Roboski monument in Kayapinar park, Diyarbakir, after its removal (Murat Bayram/MEE) In the city's nearby Kayapınar district, an empty patch of brown land in an otherwise green municipal park tells a similar story. Until recently the patch was the site of a large monument erected by the city to commemorate the killing of 34 Kurdish villagers in a Turkish army air strike in 2011. No trace of the monument remains. The office of the municipality's state administrator did not respond to requests for comment on the removal of the monuments. "Diyarbakir was once known as a multicultural, multinational entrepot, home to Kurds, Turks, Armenians, Assyrians, Yezidis, and Roma," said Adnan Celik, an anthropologist specialising in Kurdish studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris. "When local Kurdish parties got elected they put programmes in place to celebrate that multiculturalism and mark their history," he said. "In knocking those markers down, the state is trying to destroy not only monuments but the memory of that spirit and ultimately the consciousness built by the Kurdish movement." One of the first steps the administrators took was to remove Kurdish-language names on public signs across the south-eastern provinces. In Diyarbakir, the Kurdish and Assyrian name for the city, Amed, was removed from the city hall building and replaced with a large image of the Turkish flag. "It is not only an attack on the Kurdish movement, it's an attack on its political project, including its emphasis on a multicultural and multi-ethnic identity which the Turkish state unfortunately finds threatening," said Celik. "This is a destruction not only of the physical city, as happened during the crackdown, but also public memory: it is a kind of memorycide." _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Middle East Eye

How has the Gulf crisis affected security and stability in the Horn? The Gulf and the Horn are intricately intertwined regions that face common threats and vulnerabilities: armed conflict, transnational jihadism and organised crime, including piracy, human trafficking and money laundering. The current crisis comes at a difficult moment for the historically conflict-prone Horn, much of which is either politically unstable, mired in internal armed conflict or still in a state of fragile post-conflict recovery. Turmoil in the Gulf has sharply escalated the region’s already dangerous militarisation as governments are pressed to side either with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) or with Qatar (and, indirectly, Turkey). This has been profoundly destabilising, sowing new regional divisions and rekindling old hostilities. Perhaps most alarmingly, the Gulf crisis potentially could put Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti on a path toward armed confrontation, inflaming the Horn’s most dangerous three-way territorial dispute. Border tensions rose in June when Qatar removed 400 observers monitoring a ceasefire on the Red Sea island of Doumeira, claimed by both Eritrea and Djibouti, to protest the two countries’ support for its Gulf adversaries. Taking advantage of the pullout, Eritrea swiftly deployed forces to cement its de facto hold on the island. Asmara may have intended to force a resolution of the island’s status, which has remained unsettled since border clashes in 2008. But its actions have increased the danger of serious armed conflict, which would be likely to draw in neighbouring Ethiopia, Eritrea’s bitterest foe and a strategic ally of Djibouti. Despite Djibouti’s protests and calls for intervention by the UN Security Council and African Union (AU), Eritrea so far seems unwilling to withdraw its troops and engage in talks aimed at a peaceful settlement. Reports that Ethiopia is massing forces to dislodge Eritrean troops from Doumeira are unverified, yet plausible. Unless quickly contained, renewed regional tensions over Doumeira conceivably could trigger more serious flare-ups on both the volatile Eritrea-Ethiopia border and on the Djibouti-Eritrea frontier. Attempts by both the AU and UN to promote dialogue have failed so far. Djibouti has called on the AU to insert neutral forces or observers into the disputed areas. Eritrea, which has already blocked a team of AU observers from visiting the island, would probably reject any such intervention, however. China has offered to deploy troops to Doumeira, but though Beijing has good ties with both Eritrea and Djibouti, it is not clear whether this would be acceptable to either country. In July, China deployed its first contingent of combat troops to its new military base in Djibouti – a signal of its intent to play a more prominent role in the region. Why are the reactions of Ethiopia, Egypt and Eritrea important? Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa’s preeminent diplomatic and military power, remains neutral. Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, publicly articulated his country’s anxiety on 7 July, telling parliament in a speech broadcast live that the Gulf crisis “must be resolved expeditiously” or it could “destabilise” the entire region. He expressed particular concern about the Gulf states’ increased military presence, reflecting his country’s fears that an emboldened Eritrea, which plays a pivotal role in Riyadh’s and Abu Dhabi’s regional strategies, could use this as an opportunity to boost its military capacity. The fresh urgency of the “Eritrea Question” in Addis Ababa also is linked to Ethiopia’s rivalry with Egypt, which has close ties to the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Egypt is boosting its military cooperation with Eritrea as well as its presence in the Red Sea, deploying a flotilla of combat vessels that include a frigate capable of firing long-range missiles. While Eritrean and Egyptian officials claim their naval cooperation is for “counter-piracy” purposes only, some Ethiopian commentators dispute this, accusing Cairo of trying to isolate or destabilise Ethiopia through “strategic encirclement”. Behind Ethiopia’s rivalry with Egypt is their long-running dispute over construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam. The Gulf crisis has only magnified Ethiopia’s suspicions regarding Egypt’s ambitions in the Horn, which will almost certainly complicate already delicate negotiations over how to allocate Nile waters. In June, a meeting of the Nile Basin states called by the Ugandan President Museveni broke down, a reflection of growing Egyptian/Ethiopian tensions. Ethiopian relations with Saudi Arabia remain cordial, despite serious disagreements over the planned deportation of thousands of undocumented Ethiopian migrant workers (see below). The kingdom remains an important source of investment, but the Saudis’ growing military profile in the Horn plays into traditional Christian fears of Arab/Muslim powers. What makes Somalia vulnerable? Somalia is a member of the Arab League, and rival Arab powers regard it as part of the Muslim umma. They see Somalia’s strategic location as crucial for protecting the “Arab homeland” and al-amn al qawmi al-Arabi (Arab national security). But Arab powers have competed to maintain influence over Somalia. Until recently, Saudi Arabia and Egypt were the two most prominent rival players in Somalia. Now Qatar and the UAE have emerged on the scene. All these powers actively support rival Somali politicians, further deepening its culture of clientelism. President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo so far has resisted both pressure and financial inducements to back the Saudi-UAE axis and sever links with Qatar. By opting for neutrality, he appears to have enhanced his domestic credibility. Yet the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) risks losing Saudi and UAE military and financial aid. Talks held in early July between Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir and Somali Prime Minister Kheyre were reportedly acrimonious. Jubeir is said to have launched a blistering attack on Mogadishu, warning of dire consequences unless it cut ties to Doha. The UAE allegedly is considering ending its program to pay, train and equip a special forces unit for the Somali National Army. It is not clear whether the UAE-trained Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), Puntland’s coast guard, will be affected, but that would be highly unlikely, not least because of the UAE’s close links with Somali subnational governments. Some domestic critics allege the government’s “neutrality” is both detrimental to the national interest and ideologically motivated. Farmajo, they claim, is beholden to certain individuals in key positions of authority with close links to Qatar and ideologically linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. But the government has also received support from Qatar and, more importantly, from its ally, Turkey. In mid-June, the prime minister sent out discreet distress calls to Western donors, indicating that Saudi Arabia and the UAE had decided to withhold direct general budgetary support. Loss of Saudi financial support would cause significant harm, disrupting the government’s ability to function. But Somalia’s appeal comes at an inauspicious time for the European Union (EU) and other key donors, which are straining to mobilise funds to avert famine and support the country’s expensive peacekeeping operation. What has Somaliland gained? The Yemen conflict and the Gulf’s internal crisis have catapulted Somaliland, which broke away from Somalia in 1991, into a position of geopolitical prominence. Both developments enhanced its strategic importance to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which means that even as Mogadishu faces the prospect of a potentially crippling cash crunch, Somaliland stands to reap a hefty financial windfall. The self-declared republic has secured a raft of lucrative military, commercial and infrastructure deals with the UAE. Under a deal to upgrade the port of Berbera, Somaliland will get $442 million from the UAE’s port logistics conglomerate, DP World. Under a separate agreement, Somaliland has granted the UAE a 25-year lease to build a military base and use the Berbera airport. This is expected to spawn some $1 billion in investments to develop and modernise infrastructure. In late June, President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud Silanyo visited the UAE to highlight its “strong strategic partnership” with Abu Dhabi and the Saudi-led coalition. The government also cancelled an aviation agreement that allowed Qatar Airways to use Somaliland airspace. The president and ruling party, which face a difficult election later this year, are marketing the UAE deal as a “development bonanza”. But it still faces hurdles. Somalia, which claims sovereignty over Somaliland, is challenging the agreement’s international legality, and Ethiopia is concerned about its military component. To assuage the Ethiopian government, Somaliland and DP World are giving it a 19 per cent commercial stake in the Berbera Port. Still, the Ethiopian prime minister’s warnings about the growing Arab military presence (see above) suggests Addis Ababa is far from reassured. How significant is the Gulf’s military footprint in the Horn? Saudi Arabia and the UAE have signed military cooperation agreements that significantly scale up and diversify their military presence in Eritrea, Djibouti, Somaliland and Somalia. Their primary motive is the war in Yemen, especially efforts to take control of the Yemeni coastline, cut off rebel supply routes, and increase naval and aerial attacks against the Huthi and Saleh forces via a southern flank. The two Gulf states initially set up a logistics hub in Djibouti’s Haramous facility near Camp Lemonier, stationing specialised troops there to help prosecute the war in Yemen. A dispute – whose cause remains unclear – led Djibouti to evict the Emiratis and Saudis, which moved to Eritrea in 2015. The UAE temporarily broke ties with Djibouti, which were quietly restored in 2016. Saudi Arabia reached a separate agreement to establish a base there. Eritrea has obvious appeal to Gulf military strategists: it has well-developed military facilities, experienced armed forces and is close to Yemen’s important southern flank. The two Arab states signed an accord with Eritrea in 2015 that granted them a 30-year lease to use the port of Assab, a military airfield close to the port and other facilities on Eritrean-owned islands in the Red Sea. The UAE can use these sites to launch naval and aerial strikes deep inside Yemen. Hundreds of Eritrean troops and special forces back the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, in addition to other troops from Sudan and Somalia. The Emiratis also have trained hundreds of Somali commandos in Mogadishu. Increased military support to the Somali government has three primary goals: to bolster counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia, counter the growing military influence of Turkey (which has a base in Mogadishu) and secure regional military allies for its Yemen campaign. Finally, the UAE signed an agreement with Somaliland to build a naval base in Berbera. The proposed naval base is adjacent to the port of Berbera, which, as noted, is partly managed by an Emirati company. The Somali government protested the deal, but has softened its stance, following President Farmajo’s trips to Riyadh and the Emirates. It is worth noting that three Horn states are now actively engaged in the Yemen conflict: Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia. Why is the Horn so important to the Gulf? Centuries of shared faith and commerce have placed the Gulf and the Horn among the world’s most interdependent regions. Gulf powers view the region bordering Africa’s Red Sea and Gulf of Aden as their natural sphere of influence. For the Saudis, in particular, the pursuit of strategic influence has traditionally combined aid, humanitarianism and proselytisation of their Wahhabi faith. The latter assumed greater priority following Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution and the growing assertiveness of Shia Islam. Until recently, trade was not very high on the agenda. Today’s scramble for influence is driven by both geo-economic and geo-security imperatives: securing a post-oil future and prepositioning for a potential future conflict with Iran. Gulf states, with the UAE taking the lead, have significantly increased investments in infrastructure, real estate, hospitality, transportation and telecommunications in the Horn. In addition to its deal with Somaliland (see above), DP World has won concessions to manage a string of ports in the hands of national and subnational governments – Djibouti, Bosaso (Puntland), Kismayo (Jubaland Interim Authority), and most recently Barawe (southern Somalia, South-Western state). In the words of a senior EU diplomat, the UAE is “pursuing a one-belt-one-port strategy in the Horn, mimicking China’s One belt and One Road. Abu Dhabi Fund for Development also provides loans and grants to fund infrastructure projects in Somalia and Kenya. Kenya is now buying the bulk of its oil from the UAE and in return exporting coffee, tea and textile products. As food security becomes a key component of the Gulf’s regional strategy, their sovereign wealth funds are acquiring agricultural land in the Horn. Saudi Arabia long has been interested in Ethiopia, a country with abundant water and fertile land. Mohammed al-Amoudi, a Saudi-Ethiopian billionaire, owns a massive rice plantation in Gambela, in south-western Ethiopian, irrigated with water diverted from River Alwero. Finally, Qatar, the most food-import dependent of the Gulf states, has also been seeking agricultural investments. It negotiated with Kenya in 2009 to obtain 40,000 hectares of land in the fertile Tana Delta, though negative domestic publicity (land issues are extremely sensitive in Kenya) have put the talks on hold. But the Qatari Investment Fund recently signed a contract worth $1 billion to support plans by a Doha-based food conglomerate, Hassad Foods, to develop 20,000 hectares in northern Sudan. The Horn also supplies the Gulf with cheap, often unskilled workers, who send home significant remittances. Though economically beneficial, this migration causes political friction. Horn states accuse their Gulf counterparts of poor labour standards that encourage maltreatment; Arab states say governments in the Horn are not doing enough to stem illegal migration, which has risen significantly in the last two decades. Periodic crackdowns and expulsions of migrant workers have strained relations between the Gulf and countries such as Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia. Ethiopia, with an estimated 500,000 workers in Saudi Arabia alone, has suffered the gravest consequences. Some 23,000 Ethiopians in the country face imminent deportation. The situation has political overtones: both Saudi Arabia and the UAE seem intent on using the threat of mass expulsion to pressure Horn states into cutting ties with Qatar. This is putting Ethiopia’s official stance of neutrality under considerable strain. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls for the immediate release of French freelance reporter Loup Bureau, who is the latest journalist to be jailed on a terrorism charge in Turkey. He has been held for the past eight days in the southeast of the country. Bureau was arrested on 26 July near the Iraqi border, in an unstable region where he was preparing a report on the Kurdish issue and what life is like for the local population. After five days in police custody, he was charged and taken to a prison in the town of Şırnak on 1 August. He is accused of terrorism-related activities, a charge often brought against journalists nowadays in Turkey. Last week, RSF attended the start of the trial of 17 employees of the independent newspaper Cumhuriyet who are facing up to 43 years in prison on terrorism charges. “We call for Loup Bureau’s immediate release,” said Johann Bihr, the head of RSF’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia desk. “We are extremely concerned about his imprisonment and the serious charges brought against him. He is just a journalist. We hope that the Turkish investigators will soon recognize this.” Aged 27, Bureau is on the point of completing his journalism studies and is due to defend his thesis next month. He has already covered many of the world’s hotspots including Egypt, where he spend a year after the 2011 revolution, and Ukraine, where he was one of the authors of an award-winning report on the Maidan protests. He has also covered Pakistan’s Tribal Areas and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. It seems that a report he did for TV5Monde in 2013 on Syrian Kurdish militias fighting Islamic State is being treated by Turkish judicial investigators as evidence against him. Turkey is ranked 155th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index. The situation of its media was already worrying but has become critical under the state of emergency proclaimed after the July 2016 coup attempt. Around 150 media outlets have been closed, mass trials are being held and more than 100 journalists are currently in prison – a world record. Foreign journalists are no longer spared. Several dozen have been expelled in the past two years and some are being detained. They include Deniz Yücel , a journalist with German and Turkish dual nationality. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reporters Without Borders

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has received confirmation that Bassel Khartabil Safadi, a Syrian software developer and free speech activist, was executed by President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in October 2015. Bassel Khartabil’s wife, human rights lawyer Noura Ghazi Safadi,confirmed on Monday 1 August that he was executed a few days after his removal from a Damascus prison to an unknown location on 3 October 2015. Until now, there had been no news of him since that date. He was 34. An open source culture advocate who tried to promote unrestricted online access to news and information in Syria, Khartabil had been held ever since military intelligence arrested him in Damascus on 15 March 2012 ­– almost certainly in connection with his activities. “We offer our condolences to the family of Bassel Khartabil, whose release we had repeatedly demanded,” RSF said. "After this news of yet another shocking crime, we reiterate our call to the UN Security council to refer crimes against journalists in Syria to the International Criminal Court.” Khartabil’s wife told the media in November 2015 that she had learned from Syrian intelligence sources that a military field court might have sentenced him to death. Human Rights Watch noted at the time that “military field courts in Syria are exceptional courts with secret closed-door proceedings that do not meet international fair trial standards.” Khartabil founded the Aiki Lab in Damascus in 2010 with the aim of developing digital art practices and teaching collaborative technologies. He also participated in international projects such as Mozilla Firefox, the Arabic version of Wikipedia and the Syrian branch of Creative Commons. He was responsible for the “New Palmyra” project, a website with a downloadable 3D version of the ancient city of Palmyra as it was before its destruction by Islamic State fighters. He was on Foreign Policy magazine’s list of the Top 100 Global Thinkers in 2012, and won the Index on Censorship Digital Freedom Award in 2013. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reporters Without Boarders

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls for the immediate release of two journalists with the opposition newspaper Le Quotidien, whose arrests yesterday in Abidjan on a charge of “divulging false news” violated Côte d’Ivoire’s press law. Dan Opeli and Yves Kuyo were arrested over a report in the newspaper’s 28 July issue claiming that National Assembly speaker Guillaume Soro was the target of a judicial investigation and that his bank accounts had been frozen. They are being held at the National Gendarmerie’s department of investigations at the behest of Abidjan-Plateau district prosecutor Richard Adou, who denied the report. Soro himself has not brought any legal action or demanded the right to reply in the newspaper. The arrests of the two journalists and their continuing detention is very disturbing inasmuch as press offences were decriminalized by the 2004 press law, which is still in effect. “We call on the judicial authorities to free Dan Opeli and Yves Kuyo because the press law in effect in Côte d’Ivoire does not allow journalists to be detained, said Cléa Kahn-Sriber, the head of RSF’s Africa desk. Journalists cannot be jailed for what they report. If it is defamatory or mendacious, legal recourse is available.” Prosecutor Adou often takes advantage of one of the flaws in the press law’s wording in order to bring charges against journalists that are linked to the criminal code. The authorities also try to defend their actions by arguing that police custody and preventive detention do not constitute imprisonment. Under the press law, only the National Press Council, the body that regulates and manages the media, is authorized to punish journalists for any breach of the law. Prosecutor Adou has nonetheless increasingly allowed himself to take liberties with press freedom since Alassane Ouattara became president in December 2010. This is not the first time that journalists have been detained improperly for press offences. Six newspaper owners and journalists were detained for several days in February on charges of “publishing false news” and “inciting army personnel to insubordination and rebellion.” The case is still pending before the Abidjan-Plateau district court. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reporters Without Borders

Executive Summary The Anglophones of Cameroon, 20 per cent of the population, feel marginalised. Their frustrations surfaced dramatically at the end of 2016 when a series of sectoral grievances morphed into political demands, leading to strikes and riots. The movement grew to the point where the government’s repressive approach was no longer sufficient to calm the situation, forcing it to negotiate with Anglophone trade unions and make some concessions. Popular mobilisation is now weakening, but the majority of Anglophones are far from happy. Having lived through three months with no internet, six months of general strikes and one school year lost, many are now demanding federalism or secession. Ahead of presidential elections next year, the resurgence of the Anglophone problem could bring instability. The government, with the support of the international community, should quickly take measures to calm the situation, with the aim of rebuilding trust and getting back to dialogue. Generally little understood by Francophones, the Anglophone problem dates back to the independence period. A poorly conducted re-unification, based on centralisation and assimilation, has led the Anglophone minority to feel politically and economically marginalised, and that their cultural difference are ignored. The current crisis is a particularly worrying resurgence of an old problem. Never before has tension around the Anglophone issue been so acute. The mobilisation of lawyers, teachers and students starting in October 2016, ignored then put down by the government, has revived identity-based movements which date back to the 1970s. These movements are demanding a return to the federal model that existed from 1961 to 1972. Trust between Anglophone activists and the government has been undermined by the arrest of the movement’s leading figures and the cutting of the internet, both in January. Since then, the two Anglophone regions have lived through general strikes, school boycotts and sporadic violence. Small secessionist groups have emerged since January. They are taking advantage of the situation to radicalise the population with support from part of the Anglophone diaspora. While the risk of partition of the country is low, the risk of a resurgence of the problem in the form of armed violence is high, as some groups are now advocating that approach. The government has taken several measures since March – creating a National Commission for Bilingualism and Multiculturalism; creating new benches for Common Law at the Supreme Court and new departments at the National School of Administration and Magistracy; recruiting Anglophone magistrates and 1,000 bilingual teachers; and turning the internet back on after a 92-day cut. But the leaders of the Anglophone movement have seen these measures as too little too late. International reaction has been muted, but has nevertheless pushed the government to adopt the measures described above. The regime in Yaoundé seems more sensitive to international than to national pressure. Without firm, persistent and coordinated pressure from its international partners, it is unlikely that the government will seek lasting solutions. The Anglophone crisis is in part a classic problem of a minority, which has swung between a desire for integration and a desire for autonomy, and in part a more structural governance problem. It shows the limits of centralised national power and the ineffectiveness of the decentralisation program started in 1996. The weak legitimacy of most of the Anglophone elites in their region, under-development, tensions between generations, and patrimonialism are ills common to the whole country. But the combination of bad governance and an identity issue could be particularly tough to resolve. Dealing with the Anglophone problem requires a firmer international reaction and to rebuild trust through coherent measures that respond to the sectoral demands of striking teachers and lawyers. There is some urgency: the crisis risks undermining the approaching elections. In that context, several steps should be taken without delay: The president of the republic should publicly recognise the problem and speak out to calm tensions. The leaders of the Anglophone movement should be provisionally released. Members of the security forces who have committed abuses should be sanctioned. The government should quickly put in place the measures announced in March 2017, and the 21 points agreed on with unions in January. The government and senior administration should be re-organised to better reflect the demographic, political and historical importance of the Anglophones, and to include younger and more legitimate members of the Anglophones community. The National Commission on Bilingualism and multiculturalism should be restructured to include an equal number of Anglophones as Francophones, to guarantee the independence of its members and to give it powers to impose sanctions. The government should desist from criminalising the political debate on Anglophone Cameroon, including on federalism, in particular by ceasing to use the anti-terrorism law for political ends and by considering recourse to a third party (the church or international partner) as a mediator between the government and Anglophone organisations. In the longer term, Cameroon must undertake institutional reforms to remedy the deeper problems of which the Anglophone issue is the symptom. In particular, decentralisation laws should be rigorously applied, and improved, to reduce the powers of officials nominated by Yaoundé, create regional councils, and better distribute financial resources and powers. Finally, it is important to take legal measures specific to Anglophone regions in the areas of education, justice and culture. Cameroon, facing Boko Haram in the Far North and militia from the Central African Republic in the East, needs to avoid another potentially destabilising front opening up. If the Anglophone problem got worse it would disrupt the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2018. Above all, it could spark off further demands throughout the country and lead to a wider political crisis. Nairobi/Brussels, 2 August 2017 I.Introduction Since October 2016, protests around sectoral demands have degenerated into a political crisis in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions. This crisis has led to the re-emergence of the Anglophone question and highlighted the limits of the Cameroonian governance model, based on centralisation and co-optation of elites. The Anglophone area consists of two of the country’s ten regions, the Northwest and the Southwest. It covers 16,364 sq km of the country’s total area of 475,442 sq km and has about 5 million of Cameroon’s 24 million inhabitants. It is the stronghold of the main opposition party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF) and plays an important role in the economy, especially its dynamic agricultural and commercial sectors. Most of Cameroon’s oil, which accounts for one twelfth of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), is located off the coast of the Anglophone region. The politicisation of the crisis and the radicalisation of its protagonists is mainly due to the government’s response (denial, disregard, intimidation and repression), the diminishing trust between the Anglophone population and the government and the exploitation of the identity question by political actors who have aggravated the population’s resentment to the point that probably most Anglophones now see a return to federalism or even secession as the only feasible ways out of the crisis. What is the Anglophone crisis about? Who are the protagonists? How is it perceived by Francophones? What is the government’s response? How has the international community reacted? What role are the Anglophone diaspora and religious actors playing? In order to reply to these questions, Crisis Group has relied on documentary research and conducted around a hundred interviews during several visits to the Anglophone regions, Yaoundé and Douala, between December 2016 and May 2017. The report analyses the structural factors that caused the crisis in the Anglophone regions, the strategies and motivations of the actors, and the political and economic consequences. It formulates recommendations aimed at breaking the deadlock and rebuilding trust, with a view to facilitating a genuine dialogue and identifying sustainable solutions. II.The Roots of the Anglophone Problem: Colonial Legacy and Failure of the Centralised Model A.The Colonial Legacy The German government and the traditional Douala chiefs signed a treaty in July 1884, establishing a protectorate called Kamerun. Its territories were shared out after the German defeat at the end of the First World War. The League of Nations appointed France and the UK as joint trustees of Kamerun. The Anglophone problem and a number of other weaknesses in present-day Cameroon have their roots in the colonial period. During the period of the mandate and the trusteeship, each colonial power shaped their territories in their own image. This resulted in major differences in political culture. English was the official language in the territory under British administration. The justice system (Common Law), the education system, the currency and social norms followed the British model. The system of indirect rule allowed traditional chiefdoms to remain in place and promoted the emergence of a form of self-government to the extent that freedom of the press, political pluralism and democratic change in power existed in Anglophone Cameroon prior to independence. The territory was administered as though it were part of Nigeria and several members of British Cameroon’s Anglophone elite were ministers in the Nigerian government in the 1950s. In contrast, the Francophone territory was directly administered by France following the assimilationist model, although colonisers and the traditional elites also practised a form of indirect government, especially in the north of the country. French was spoken and France’s social, legal and political norms shaped the centralist political system of successive regimes. Bogged down in a total war against the nationalist movement (Union des populations du Cameroun – UPC), which challenged French presence, the Francophone territory was less democratic. B.Independences and Reunification: Different Dreams in the Same Bed The process leading to the reunification of the two Cameroons is at the heart of the Anglophone problem. The Francophone territory gained independence on 1 January 1960, becoming the Republic of Cameroon. The British territory comprised Southern Cameroons and Northern Cameroon. In the referendum held on 11 February 1961, Northern Cameroon chose to join Nigeria and Southern Cameroons chose to join the Republic of Cameroon. Southern Cameroons became independent on 1 October 1961 when it joined the Republic of Cameroon. At the time of the 1961 referendum, the political landscape in Southern Cameroons was already dynamic. According to reputed historians, the majority of the population aspired to independence. But the UK and some developing countries were against it on the grounds that Southern Cameroons would not be economically viable and that it was best to avoid the creation of micro-states. They advocated a vote in favour of joining Nigeria. The UN therefore excluded the independence option and limited the referendum to a choice between joining Nigeria and reunification with the Republic of Cameroon. The main figures among the Anglophone political elites, Emmanuel Mbella Lifafa Endeley, John Ngu Foncha, Solomon Tandeng Muna and Agustine Ngom Jua, pleaded at the UN for an independent state of Southern Cameroons, or alternatively for temporary independence during which time it would negotiate the terms of unification from a better position. The UN’s rejection of the independence option left two opposing camps during the referendum. Endeley, the leader of the Kamerun National Congress (KNC), campaigned in favour of joining Nigeria. Foncha, the leader of the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), who left the KNC in 1955, Muna and Jua campaigned in favour of reunification with the Republic of Cameroon. Influenced by these prominent political leaders and by a certain fear of being absorbed by the Nigerian giant, the vote went in favour of reunification. Representatives of Southern Cameroons and the president of the Republic of Cameroon, Amadou Ahidjo, met at Foumban in the west of Francophone territory from 17 until 21 July 1961 to negotiate the terms of reunification. Even today, the failure to keep the promises made at the Foumban conference, which did not produce a written agreement, is among the grievances of Anglophone militants. The Anglophone representatives thought they were participating in a constituent assembly that would draft a constitution guaranteeing an egalitarian federalism and a large degree of autonomy to federated states, but Ahidjo imposed a ready-made constitution that gave broad powers to the executive of the federal state to the detriment of the two federated states (West Cameroon and East Cameroon). The Anglophones, who were in a weak position, accepted Ahidjo’s constitution and only obtained a blocking minority by way of concession. The National Assembly of the Republic of Cameroon approved the federal constitution in August 1961 and Ahidjo promulgated it on 1 September, while Southern Cameroons was still under British trusteeship. The constitutional process for reunification and abandonment by the British left Anglophones with the impression of having been deceived by the Francophones, and also explains the bitterness of Anglophone militants toward the UK. C.The Centralist Model and the Emergence of Anglophone Grievances Since 1961, unification and centralisation have been the political dogmas of the Ahidjo (1960-1982) and Paul Biya (1982-) regimes. After reunification on 1 October 1961, Cameroon became a federal republic, but in practice inherited a shaky federalism with an unequal distribution of power between the two federated states in the federal assembly and in the government. Amadou Ahidjo was the federal president and John Ngu Foncha was both vice president of the country and prime minister of West Cameroon, in line with the constitutional provision according to which the vice president must be from West Cameroon if the federal president comes from East Cameroon, and vice versa. At the time of reunification, Ahidjo already had a near political monopoly in East Cameroon. Only West Cameroon represented a serious obstacle to his hegemonic ambitions. In 1961, he set about bringing West Cameroon under control through a mixture of repression and exploitation of divisions among Anglophones. At the federal level, despite the constitutional guarantee that English and French would both be official languages, French was the administration’s language of preference. On 20 October 1961, Ahidjo signed a decree reorganising federal territory into six administrative regions, including West Cameroon, and appointed a federal inspector for each region, who was to report to the federal president. That provoked discontent among Anglophones, because West Cameroon could not at the same time be a federated state according to the constitution and an administrative region by decree. The federal inspector had more power than the elected prime minister of West Cameroon and showed it on a daily basis by humiliating members of the federated government and parliament. In 1962, Ahidjo signed several orders limiting public freedoms. With the war against the UPC still at its height in East Cameroon, the arbitrary arrest and detention of opponents and trade unionists accused of subversion became common. Although these arrests took place mainly in the Francophone part of the country, Anglophone leaders became concerned about the repressive direction that the federal executive was taking.Other measures, such as the introduction of driving on the right-hand side of the road, the imposition of the metric system and the FCFA as currency took place during the 1960s. The change in currency entailed a reduction in the purchasing power of the Anglophone population by at least 10 per cent. Ahidjo also demanded that West Cameroon cut all links with the UK with the result that it lost several export duty advantages afforded to Commonwealth countries. The federated states did not have financial autonomy and depended on grants from the federal state. Understanding where the real power was located, the Anglophone elites competed with each other for positions in the federal government, spending more time trying to please Ahidjo than defending the Anglophone population. Ahidjo took advantage and manipulated the rivalries among the elites and the ethnic and cultural divisions between Grassfields in the north, which had cultural and linguistic links with the Bamilékés of the west Francophone region, and the Sawa in the south, who had cultural and linguistic links with the Francophone coast. The result was political chaos in West Cameroon, including a split between Foncha and Muna, who left the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) in 1965 to form the Cameroon United Congress (CUC). In 1965, in order to further weaken Foncha, who he believed to be less accommodating on the Anglophone question, Ahidjo tried to use his constitutional powers to appoint Muna as prime minister rather than Ngom Jua, Foncha’s heir apparent in the KNDP, the majority party in the West Cameroon parliament. He was unsuccessful in this because of strong opposition from the federated parliament. But one year later, taking advantage of divisions among the Anglophones, Ahidjo called for the creation of a single party in the two Cameroons, in the name of national unity. Strengthened by the support of some Anglophone leaders, such as Endeley and Muna, who saw an opportunity to dethrone Foncha, he succeeded in his objective. The Cameroon National Union (CNU) was formed in 1966 and the other parties were dissolved. Foncha, Jua and Bernard Fonlon (assistant general secretary at the presidency) were initially opposed but changed their views for fear of losing their positions in the federal government. The single party resulted in the Anglophones losing all their institutional leverage to plead their cause. In 1968, Ahidjo was able to appoint his new ally, Muna, as prime minister, replacing Jua. Once the single party was formed, Ahidjo intensified centralisation, going so far as to suppress federalism on 20 May 1972, when Cameroon became the United Republic of Cameroon, following a referendum. Anglophones continued to challenge the legality of this change on the grounds that the 1961 constitution did not provide for any alteration in the form of state and stipulated that only parliament could amend the constitution. Anglophone militants also consider that the referendum should not have taken place throughout the country and should have been limited to West Cameroon, which had the most to lose. Finally, they claim that it was not possible to hold a free and transparent referendum in the context of the time and that the ballot was marred by serious irregularities. It was also in 1972 that Anglophones really began to challenge their marginalisation. At the CNU National Congress in 1972, Bernard Fonlon publicly criticised the creation of the unitary republic. Other prominent Anglophones, such as Albert Mukong and Gorji Dinka were also fiercely opposed. Foncha and Jua wrote privately to Ahidjo and expressed their opposition in the official media. When Paul Biya succeeded Ahidjo in November 1982, he further centralised power. On 22 August 1983, he divided the Anglophone region into two provinces: Northwest and Southwest. In 1984, he changed the country’s official name to the Republic of Cameroon (the name of the former Francophone territory) and removed the second star from the flag, which represented the Anglophone part of the country. Anglophones formed movements and associations to resist their assimilation. In 1994, they protested in vain when the government, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), announced the privatisation of the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC), which played a major economic and social role in the Anglophone part of the country. In that same year, the government’s move to standardise the Anglophone and Francophone education systems provoked strong resistance from teachers’ unions and the parents of pupils and it finally had to create an independent General Certificate of Education (GCE) Board by presidential decree. Unification left Anglophones with a sense that their territory was in economic decline, because it entailed the centralisation and/or dismantling of West Cameroon’s economic structures, such as the West Cameroon Marketing Board, the Cameroon Bank and Powercam, as well as the abandonment of several projects, including the port of Limbé, and airports at Bamenda and Tiko, with investments in the Francophone part of the country winning out. In particular, unification left the impression of a democratic setback, cultural assimilation and a downgrading of political status. Many Anglophones are convinced that the Francophone part of the country followed a strategy to marginalise Southern Cameroons and are still not sufficiently aware of the disastrous impact the economic crisis of the 1980s also had on several Francophone regions. When the multiparty system was restored in the 1990s, the Anglophones seized the opportunity to make their grievances heard. On 26 May 1990, the Social Democratic Front, a new pro-federalism opposition party, with a national vocation but with a strong contingent of Anglophones, was formed in Bamenda. It gained ground in the Anglophone part of the country before extending its influence into Francophone provinces. It then participated in the October 1992 presidential elections and came close to winning it. With the prospect of a review of the constitution to adapt it to the multiparty system, the Anglophones organised the All Anglophone Conference (AAC) in 1993 and called for a return to federalism. The Consultative Committee for Review of the Constitution rejected this option in favour of decentralisation. Meanwhile, after resigning in 1990 from the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), the name adopted by the single party in 1985, Foncha and Muna, yesterday’s rivals, resigned from the consultative committee in 1994 and openly criticised the assimilation of Anglophones. In that same year, a second All Anglophone Conference (AAC2) was organised in Bamenda and some of the participants called for a two-state federal system or secession. During this period, Muna and Foncha launched diplomatic offensives at the UN to demand independence for Southern Cameroons. The position of the Social Democratic Front, which rejected secession and proposed, in the context of Francophone opposition to a two-state federal system, a four-state federal system, was judged to be ambiguous by some Anglophone militants, who in 1995, formed movements calling for two-state federalism or secession: the most well-known was the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), the youth wing of which, Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL), resorted to low-intensity violence. Since 1996, the SCNC has taken further diplomatic initiatives at the UN, the African Court of Banjul, the Commonwealth and national embassies. After the golden age of the 1990s, dissent weakened and the focus switched to the Anglophone diaspora’s advocacy in the international community and the creation of an Anglophone consciousness through the education system, writings of Anglophone intellectuals, the churches, associations and the local media. However, SCNC militants continued to organise protests in the Anglophone regions every 1 October and spectacular actions such as the proclamation of independence by the Ambazonia Republic on radio Buea in 1999 and in 2009. Despite the emergence of Anglophone movements, centralisation continued and Anglophones lost even more political strength at the national level. In 2017, there was only one Anglophone among 36 ministers with portfolio. The roots of the Anglophone problem lie in a badly-organised reunification that was based on centralisation and assimilation, and in economic and administrative marginalisation. Personal and ethnic ambitions and rivalries among the elites did not help matters. They have not always been able to present a common front to defend an increasingly heterogeneous Anglophone cause. Since the 2000s, the Anglophone question has deeply divided society. It finds expression in the mutually negative perceptions of the Anglophone and Francophone populations and the occasional reciprocal stigmatisation. The current crisis represents an especially worrying resurgence of this old problem. Never before has the Anglophone question manifested itself with such intensity. III.From Sectoral Mobilisations to the Resurgence of the Anglophone Problem A.From the Strike to the Crisis The current crisis began on 11 October 2016 in Bamenda when lawyers from the Northwest and the Southwest went on strike. Their demands, ignored until then by the justice ministry, were related to the justice system’s failure to use the Common Law in the two regions. The lawyers demanded the translation into English of the Code of the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) and other legal texts. They criticised the “francophonisation” of Common Law jurisdictions, with the appointment to the Anglophone zone of Francophone magistrates who did not understand English or the Common Law, and the appointment of notaries, to do work done by lawyers under the Common Law system. A lack of trust in the government and the brutality of the security forces aggravated the problem and radicalised the public. On 8 November 2016, the lawyers mobilised hundreds of people for a march in Bamenda and reiterated their demand for the full restoration of the Common Law system as it was at the time of the federal system. They added a demand for federalism. While the march was taking place peacefully, gendarmes violently dispersed the crowd, manhandled some lawyers and arrested some motorbike taxi drivers (“Okada boys”). In response, some youth and Okada boys set up barricades at several crossroads and clashes between demonstrators and gendarmes left several wounded. On 21 November, teachers went on strike as well. They organised a rally against the lack of Anglophone teachers, the appointment of teachers who did not have a good command of English and the failure to respect the “Anglo-Saxon” character of schools and universities in the Anglophone zone. At the rally, several thousand people joined teachers to express grievances ranging from the lack of roads in the Northwest to the marginalisation of Anglophones. The police and the army violently dispersed the demonstrators. Several people were severely beaten, dozens of others were arrested and at least two people were shot dead, according to a report by the National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms the (Commission nationale des droits de l’Homme et des libertés, CNDHL). Several other incidents took place in Bamenda at the end of November, leading to riots On 28 November, the crisis, which had until then been limited to the Northwest, spread to the Southwest. Students at Buea University organised a peaceful march on the campus to call for the payment to students of the president’s achievement bonus, denounce the banning of the University of Buea Student Union (UBSU) in 2012 and protest at the introduction of a penalty for late payment of education fees and the additional fee charged for accessing examination results. The university rector’s response was to call the police onto the campus. They brutally repressed the students and arrested some of them in their homes. Female students were beaten, undressed, rolled in the mud and one was allegedly raped. The most violent confrontation took place on 8 December in Bamenda when the CPDM tried to organise a pro-government rally in the Anglophone regions. The angry crowd prevented the rally from taking place. In violent clashes, four died, several were wounded and around 50 arrested. Demonstrators set fire to a police station, government buildings and vehicles. The prime minister, the CPDM secretary general, the governor of the Northwest region and the national security adviser, who were due to attend the rally, had to hide all day in the governor’s residence to escape the violence. The government responded to these demonstrations by militarising the region, causing the social climate to deteriorate even further. The violence in Buea on 28 November and in Bamenda on 8 December aggravated the crisis and led to extensive media coverage. Images of abuses by the security forces quickly spread on the internet and on to international television channels. They had a decisive impact on public opinion and opened the Pandora’s box of the Anglophone problem. Further incidents took place in January and February 2017 in Bamenda and other towns such as Ndop. They led to riots that left at least three dead, while government buildings and vehicles were set on fire. From October 2016 to February 2017, at least nine people were killed and more sustained gunshot wounds. There were 82 arrests, including of journalists and lawyers, according to the communications minister and about 150 according to the SDF. They appeared before a military court under the terrorism law. The security forces also arrested and intimidated prominent Anglophones. For example, Paul Abine Ayah, a judge at the Supreme Court, was arrested without a warrant in March on charges of funding the Anglophone campaign. He has since remained behind bars. B.The Government and Anglophone Actors: Strategies and Motivations Faced with the Anglophone crisis, the government tried to maintain the status quo. However, realising there were limits to what it could achieve with repression, it began talks with the striking unions. At the end of November, the prime minister formed an ad hoc inter-ministerial committee charged with leading negotiations. It comprised four Francophone ministers and was placed under the supervision of the prime ministry’s cabinet director. At the start of December, the lawyers and teachers formed the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC, “the Consortium”). It was initially formed by four lawyers’ associations and several teachers trade unions, with Félix Khongo Agbor Balla as president, Fontem Neba as secretary general and Wilfred Tassang as treasurer. On 25-26 November, the prime minister unsuccessfully conducted a first mission to Bamenda to open negotiations. He arrived without concrete proposals, perhaps expecting that the promise of dialogue and his presence would be enough to end the strike. This visit was an early sign of the divisions within the Anglophone elites working within government institutions in Yaoundé. While the prime minister recognised the existence of the Anglophone problem and invited the trade unions for talks in Bamenda, other prominent Anglophones, such as the minister and permanent secretary at the National Security Council told the media in Yaoundé that there was no Anglophone problem. This inflamed opinion in the region, making the prime minister’s mission impossible and, especially, confirming the Anglophone belief that the prime minister, a post occupied since 1996 by an Anglophone, had no real power. From December 2016 to January 2017, the ad hoc committee conducted several missions to Bamenda. The list of union demands increased from eleven to 25 between November and January but negotiations nearly reached an agreement, with the government saying it was ready to meet 21 of the 25 demands. However, on 13 January, police abuses, against a backdrop of rumours, provoked riots in Bamenda and the negotiations collapsed. On 14 January, the Consortium cancelled a meeting with the committee, condemned the violence perpetrated by the security forces and declared a two-day Operation Ghost Town in the Northwest and the Southwest. The government responded by shutting down the internet in the two regions on 17 January, banning the Consortium and the SCNC and arresting Consortium leaders and several activists such as Mancho Bibixy, claiming that the Consortium had conditioned agreement on the introduction of federalism. Crisis Group has gathered many witness statements, some contradictory, of the 13 January 2017 events, which marked a decisive break in attempts at dialogue. Some said that the security forces opened fire at point-blank range on motorbike taxis. Others said that Anglophone movement radicals tried to introduce the issue of secession into the debate, with the result that both sides hardened their positions. Although these incidents contributed to the failure of negotiations, they were not the only reason. In fact, the tension in the two regions, the repression by the security forces and the radicalisation of public opinion had put Consortium leaders in a difficult position. They were forced to go beyond their own sectoral demands – especially as the 21 points accepted by the government only included the teachers’ demands, not the lawyers’ demands – and to deal more broadly with the Anglophone problem. According to a Consortium leader, “repression by the regime has opened a Pandora’s box and the public has forced us to put the Southern Cameroons issue on the table”. Negotiations were difficult because of the deep distrust between the government and representatives of the Anglophone community. The ad hoc committee did not inspire much confidence, because most of its members were Francophones. Consortium members did not believe that the government would keep its promise to meet 21 of its 25 demands. So they proposed federalism in order to guarantee implementation of reforms and achieve a more general solution. Meanwhile, the government believed that the trade unions had a hidden agenda involving secession and that this was why they continually added to their list of demands. Probably to avoid the crisis spreading to the Francophone part, the government brandished the spectre of secession by conflating Anglophone grievances and the division of the country. Some Francophone intellectuals said that federalism was only a step on the road to secession. There were some indications, such as the positions taken during the negotiations and confirmed in several interviews, that some members of the regime in Yaoundé tried to strengthen the position of the more radical Anglophones with the aim of presenting the Anglophone contestation as a dangerous attempt to divide the country. The government also claimed there was a plot, presenting the Anglophone strike as an initiative funded by the diaspora and supported by groups who were trying to destabilise Cameroon. After the arrest of Consortium leaders on 17 January, continued school closures and an intensification of Operation Ghost Town, the government took measures in the justice and education sectors to try to calm the situation. In December 2016, it had already announced the recruitment of 1,000 bilingual teachers, a FCFA2 billion (€3 million) grant to private schools and the redeployment of Francophone teachers away from Anglophone regions. On 23 January 2017, the president of the Republic created a National Commission for Bilingualism and Multiculturalism. But Anglophone militants criticised this as too little too late and regretted that nine of the commission’s fifteen members were Francophones, that most of them belonged to the older generation and that several were members of the CPDM. The commission is handicapped by its remit, which gives it no power to impose punitive measures, and restricts it to preparing reports and advocating for bilingualism and multiculturalism. Some of its members have recognised this weakness. The government announced other measures on 30 March, including the creation of new benches for Common Law at the Supreme Court and new departments at the National School of Administration and Magistracy (Ecole nationale d’administration et de magistrature, ENAM), an increase in the number of English language teachers at ENAM, the recruitment of Anglophone magistrates, the creation of a Common Law department at Francophone universities and provisional authorisation for Anglophone lawyers to act as notaries in the Northwest and the Southwest regions. On 20 April, the government turned the internet back on after a 92-day cut. Although these measures were a significant first step, they did not meet the concerns of the trade unions or resolve the political component of the Anglophone question. They were made rather late in the day, when the public were already calling for the release of detainees and negotiations on constitutional reform with the aim of introducing federalism. Anglophones continued to take action. When the internet was cut, protesters used text messages and phone calls to organise protests. When it was restored they reverted to mainly using WhatsApp. More recently, the campaign has nevertheless weakened, especially in the Southwest, partly because the economic consequences have become hard to bear for the public and also because of government pressure. New radical groups are using intimidation, threats and violence to maintain support for the movement. The public, elected representatives, parliamentarians and religious leaders regularly receive text messages and calls from Cameroon and abroad, informing them of Ghost Town days, now called Country Sundays. For example, a Francophone teacher at the University of Buea received eleven text messages and six telephone calls in a single day after ignoring a call to take part in Operation Ghost Town. Country Sundays take place every Monday and every national holiday or commemoration day. Anyone not adhering to the movement faces harassment and threats. Threats are sometimes carried out. Between January and June 2017, dozens of shops in markets at Bamenda, Buea and Limbé, about fifteen government buildings and vehicles and a dozen schools were set on fire for not observing Country Sundays. These violent incidents have fuelled the government’s strategy of demonising the Anglophone campaign, all the more so as exiled Consortium representatives distanced themselves late and rather timidly. The authorities and the security forces also used tough methods to break the movement, intimidating the public and printing companies that produced pamphlets, and threatening heads of schools and business owners with revoking their licences if they took part in the strikes. The security forces worked with telephone companies and money transfer agencies to identify and arrest the local contacts of secessionists in exile and block the transfer of funds from abroad to the Anglophone regions. The two sides have made abundant use of propaganda. The government as well as Anglophone militants have circulated false information on the internet and in text messages and pamphlets. In particular, the government has exploited the idea of false news to sow doubt and avoid responsibility for human rights violations by casting doubt on their veracity, even in confirmed cases. The Anglophone diaspora did not initiate this crisis, contrary to previous challenges to the government. It only took a dominant role after the 17 January arrest of Consortium leaders. Internet-based campaigns contributed to mounting public anger and increased the popularity of secessionist ideas. The diaspora helped to give the crisis a higher profile at the international level by organising demonstrations outside the parliaments of Western countries and through diplomatic initiatives, such as commissioning the American law firm Foley Hoag to call for the independence of Southern Cameroons. This crisis also marked a generational renewal within the Anglophone movement and the diaspora. The historic standard-bearers of the Anglophone question who were members of the SCNC, the Cameroon Anglophone Movement or the AAC were not centre stage. Militants of the 1990s from Cameroon University, who emigrated in the period after 1995, were succeeded by young people from Buea University and the University of Buea Student Union, who left Cameroon more recently. Although the great majority of the Anglophone diaspora probably supports the current protest movement, a minority has reacted in a hostile manner to calls for secession and to the movement as a whole, to the extent of sometimes writing to the authorities of the countries where the leading exponents of the secessionist current are living to call for their expulsion. The movement is also weakening because of internal divisions over ideology, strategy and actions. Some Consortium leaders, such as Wilfred Tassangand Harmony Bobga, respectively in exile in Nigeria and the U.S., broke with the official federalist line and formed the Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF), which advocates secession. Even the Consortium’s interim leaders in the diaspora, such as Mark Bareta and Tapang Ivo, now support secession. Within the secessionist movement, divergences persist about strategy and operational methods. Some want to prioritise diplomatic offensives, while others put the emphasis on supporting Operation Ghost Town. There are also differences about whether to use violence, which are intensified by rivalries and the struggle for power. Since March, several small violent groups have been formed. On social networks, they circulate contact details of people and organisations failing to observe Ghost Town operations, as well as those of local authorities and senior Anglophone officials hostile to the strike. They call on the public to burn down their properties. These groups also call on citizens not to pay tax and encourage attacks on Francophones. Christian denominations supervise most schools and universities in the Anglophone regions. At the beginning of 2016, the Catholic bishops of the two regions wrote to President Biya and travelled to Yaoundé to meet him, but he did not receive them. On 22 December, they published their letter in the form of a memorandum listing most of the Anglophone grievances. The government accused them of fuelling the crisis and began to intimidate members of the clergy and the heads of schools, calling on them to open their schools, which had been closed since the beginning of the crisis. In April, a fictitious association of parents lodged a complaint against the bishops and ministers, making the government more unpopular in this zone where religious leaders are respected. However, though the latter back the Anglophone cause, the fear of reprisals from the instigators of Operation Ghost Town rather than support for the strike explains the decision of Catholic and Protestant institutions to not resume their courses. The Anglophone protest movement also caused division among Francophones and Anglophones within the National Episcopal Conference of Cameroon (NECC). In January 2017, at a meeting in Mamfé, Francophone bishops criticised their counterparts for not opening their schools, while the latter regretted the Francophone clergy’s ignorance of the Anglophone problem and the threats to which they had been subjected. In April, the archbishop of Douala and NECC president published a statement deploring the legal proceedings against the bishops but calling on them to open their schools. This statement, criticised by Anglophone militants, undermined the legitimacy of the archbishop, who had been mentioned in January as a possible mediator. One year from the next presidential elections, the governing elites in Yaoundé fear that the crisis will spread to Francophone regions, which share some of the socioeconomic difficulties experienced by Anglophones and where frustration took a violent turn in 2008. As the government perceives the crisis as a threat to its survival, it considers intimidation, violent repression and the internet shutdown as a risk worth taking, despite possible pressure from the international community. It feels the economic consequences and the possible electoral slump of the CPDM in the Anglophone regions at the next elections are a reasonable price to pay, because they are limited from a national point of view. C.The International Community’s Response The international response has been led by the U.S., multilateral organisations and international civil society. On 28 November 2016, the U.S. State Department published a communiqué calling for dialogue in the Anglophone regions and calling on the government of Cameroon to respect fundamental freedoms. In December, the UN Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa condemned the violence and asked Cameroon to respect minorities. On 18 January 2017, the president of the African Union Commission expressed concerns about acts of violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions and called on the government to seek dialogue. The UN Special Representative for Central Africa visited Yaoundé in February and April. He met Consortium leaders in prison and signed a communiqué calling for the release of prisoners, the restoration of internet and dialogue. On 23 March, during President Biya’s visit to the Vatican, the Pope invited him to pursue dialogue and respect minorities. These statements helped to secure an end to internet shutdown in March, but did not result in any moves toward the structural and constitutional reforms requested by Anglophones. Bilateral responses and the European Union (EU)’s response has been the weakest. Except for the U.S., Cameroon’s Western partners, such as France, the UK, Germany, Canada and the EU have not made any public statement, saying they are exercising discreet diplomatic pressure on Yaoundé. The strongest reactions have come from international civil society, especially from the UK Bar and organisations like Amnesty International. The lack of coordination of the international response has undermined new initiatives. Several European countries planned to publish statements but, in the end, remained silent, clearly for fear of finding themselves isolated. Other partners with economic interests in Cameroon probably preferred to tacitly support the regime, which protects them against Chinese competition. In February, some European countries wanted the European Union to issue a joint statement on the Anglophone question, but the initiative was blocked by other member states anxious to avoid criticising Cameroon too openly because of its role in the fight against Boko Haram. This relatively timid reaction can be partly explained by diplomats’ hesitation to intervene in a crisis whose consequences are limited to the country in question, without repercussions in the sub-region, and which remains less acute than other crises in Africa. Although limited, the gains made by discreet pressure confirm them in their opinion that private diplomacy is the best strategy. More generally, Western countries have tended to deal with Cameroon in the context of its relative stability compared to other Central African countries and the low risk that the Anglophone crisis will lead to partition of the country. Cameroon’s role in the fight against Boko Haram reinforces this attitude. The government of neighbouring Nigeria has not got involved in the current crisis. Moreover, it is wary of the Anglophone protest movement, because it fears that an independent Anglophone Cameroon could act as a base for separatist Nigerian movements. Nevertheless, some inhabitants of south-eastern Nigeria sympathise with Cameroonian Anglophone activists, although this probably does not amount to any substantial support. IV.A Political, Economic and Social Crisis A.The Political Consequences The current crisis has increased support to federalism among the Anglophones population – which most probably was already high – and reinforced support for secessionism. This new configuration shows the depth of the Anglophone problem. Ghost Town operations and school closures could not have continued for nine months without the adherence of a large proportion of the population. As the population becomes more frustrated and disappointed, its desire for fair integration and willingness to coexist with Francophones is eclipsed by aspirations for autonomy. Although most Anglophones want federalism, there is no consensus about the number of states in a future federation. A two-state federation, as before unification, or a four or six-state federation to better reflect the sociological composition of the country and make the idea of federalism acceptable to Francophones, or ten states to copy the current pattern of Cameroon’s ten regions? Some people insist that however many federated states are created, the federal capital Yaoundé should not be included in any of them. For some Anglophone activists, federalism seems to be a maximalist negotiating strategy. They raise the bar high in order to obtain at least an effective decentralisation, with genuine autonomy for the country’s ten regions, starting with improvements to and the full application of current laws on decentralisation. The debate on the shape of the federation also reveals divisions that often undermine the Anglophone movement – between the Northwest where the “Grassfields” ethnic groups, close to the Bamiléké, are in the majority, and the Southwest, dominated by Sawa ethnic groups. Most Anglophones in the Northwest favour a two-state federation, as in 1961. The southern elites and indigenous groups have always denounced the demographic, political and economic domination and monopolisation of their lands by Northern migrants, and therefore tend to prefer a ten-state federation in order to preserve their autonomy. Some of them, notably the Bakweri minority, would even form a federated state with the coastal Sawas (the Douala) rather than with the Grafis of the Northwest. Other southerners propose a federation with several states or a two-state federation with genuine decentralisation within the two regions of the Anglophone federated state. The Anglophone protest movement has tried, with some success, to go beyond these old divisions, partly because several members of the Consortium are southerners.However, when, at the end of January, the traditional chiefs of the Northwest wrote to the president of the republic to ask him to release prisoners as a goodwill gesture, the traditional chiefs of the Southwest responded by sending a motion of support to the government and calling on the youth of the Southwest to break with the disorder caused by northerners. However, the public has not shown itself to be very divided. Although Ghost Town operations are reducing in intensity, they are also observed in the Southwest and are sometimes stronger in towns like Kumba, where young people have denounced the ethnic rhetoric of their elites. The crisis has revealed the gap between the concerns of the Anglophone population and the Anglophone elite, which has for a very long time tried to mediate between them and Yaoundé and sometimes even supported a firmer repressive position. In fact, the prime minister and the Anglophone elite, which tried to mediate at the start of the crisis, have been jeered by crowds. The lack of legitimacy of Anglophone leaders is also true, to a lesser degree, of opposition leaders. In November 2016, the president of the Social Democratic Front was booed in Bamenda when he tried to calm an angry crowd. The crisis caused tension in the SDF between a more radical group that, like the deputy Wirba, calls for a two-state federation or for secession, and a more traditional group that wants a four-state federation or, for the most moderates, effective decentralisation. To better reflect opinion in its electoral base, the SDF strengthened its commitment to a four-state federation in 2017, while also taking symbolic steps such as not attending the 20 May march in solidarity with Anglophone detainees. Even in the governing party, the CPDM, Anglophone deputies have expressed their concerns to the government. In March 2017, they begged the head of state to at least restore internet access and release Anglophone political detainees. The Anglophone crisis is a classic case of a dissatisfied minority while at the same time the result of structural problems. First, it reveals major governance failures, with a lack of decision-making capacity accentuated by the all-powerful president’s prolonged absences from the country, a false decentralisation, the lack of legitimacy of local elites, tension between generations, a political system that relies on co-opting traditional chiefs and local elites, and a policy of regional balance that has been hijacked to their own advantage by families close to the regime. Second, the crisis is prolonging restrictions on civil liberties which have become more pronounced since 2013: a ban on demonstrations, the arrest and beating up of political party militants, journalists and researchers. It has even served as a pretext for greater repression, with the use of anti-terrorist legislation for political ends, greater control over social media and threats against journalists. Finally, the regime’s refusal to negotiate on fundamental questions and its sometimes brutal response highlight its authoritarian nature. The crisis could have an impact on the 2018 elections and even on the African Cup of Nations football competition in 2019. If the present situation persists, it will be difficult to organise peaceful elections in the two Anglophone regions. But when elections take place, the stance of Anglophone militants who have gained in popularity during this crisis will be crucial. Anything seems possible at the moment: a boycott, support for the SDF or the emergence of new movements. In 2016, the SDF appointed a Francophone secretary general for the first time in an attempt to start rebuilding a national base, but then immediately radicalised and moved closer to the Anglophone position because of the crisis. Will it again moderate its positions and try to gain support among Francophones, which it has not managed to do since 1997, or will it prioritise the Anglophone zone, in the hope of improving on its performance in the last elections? Whatever happens to the SDF, the CPDM and the Francophone parties are henceforth in a weak position in the Anglophone regions. B.The Economic Consequences Economic marginalisation has played a major role in provoking discontent among Anglophones. Even though the two Anglophone regions are suffering no more than some Francophone regions from the prolonged economic crisis, Anglophones feel their potential is not being realised (or is being deliberately wasted) and feel abandoned. No serious economic study has been published on the economic impact of the crisis, but there is no doubt that the isolation for several months of these two regions, which contribute around 20 per cent of Cameroon’s GDP, has had an impact on them as well as on the national economy. In 2016, the Anglophone regions were among the most digitally connected in Cameroon, just behind Douala and Yaoundé. Shutting down the internet paralysed several sectors of the local economy, notably banking and microfinance. The local economy is based on the oil sector (9 per cent of GDP), timber (4.5 per cent), intensive agriculture, including large plantations owned by the Cameroon Development Corporation and other smaller plantations that supply Douala and the countries of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, as well as cocoa, rubber, etc. Anglophones and Southerners in particular often complain about the low proportion of Anglophones in the workforce and in decision-making posts in state oil companies, such as the National Refining Company (Société nationale de raffinage, Sonara), based in the Southwest, and the National Hydrocarbons Corporation (Société nationale des hydrocarbures, SNH). The crisis has hit all sectors of the local economy, except for hydrocarbons and forestry, which has had an impact on some commercial sectors and industries in the Francophone regions. Several estimates put the direct cost of cutting access to internet alone at CFA2 billion (€3 million). C.The Social Consequences The crisis has revealed the divisions between Francophones and Anglophones in Cameroon. Francophones are generally unaware of the reasons for the Anglophone problem and view Anglophones who are calling for federalism or secession with a mixture of curiosity and suspicion and even make fun of them. Anglophones are critical of Francophones for their lack of solidarity. While many Francophones say they support the Anglophones’ demands, the latter believe that this support is in word only and that Francophones do not really understand the problems that stem from being a minority. In fact, very few representatives of Francophone civil society organisations and political parties have visited the Northwest and the Southwest since October 2016. Francophone teachers did not come out in support for their ill-treated Anglophone colleagues. When Anglophone lawyers were beaten up and illegally arrested, support from the Bar was tardy and limited, leading some Anglophone lawyers to call for the creation of their own Bar. Another stumbling block is that most Francophones are opposed to federalism and prefer effective decentralisation. Some Francophones also criticise Anglophones for “tribalising” issues and making it sound like they are the only ones affected by problems that are, in fact, national. They point out that some Francophone regions are less well off than Anglophone regions. Francophone teachers in the Anglophone zone complain about discrimination in the universities, while Francophone citizens complain about their stigmatisation and the calls for violence against them issued since January 2017. Some Francophones make fun of Anglophones and support government repression. There are of course exceptions, such as Abouem Atchoyi, former higher education minister and former governor of the Southwest and the Northwest, who published a long article in January 2017 asserting the legitimacy of Anglophone demands. However, the crisis has also raised awareness. Some Anglophones said that public services in Yaoundé treat them better and that official communications pay greater attention to bilingualism. The crisis has highlighted the economic resilience of the Anglophones, which is essentially based on the solidarity of Anglophones living in the Francophone zone and abroad. However, it has also caused social problems that were not anticipated by the strikers: for example, the boycott of schools has entailed extra childcare demands, which falls mainly on women, and increases in juvenile delinquency, teenage pregnancies and school dropout. V.Ending the Crisis: Resume Dialogue and Deal with the Real Problems Even though the violence, which raged from November 2016 to January 2017, has come to a halt, aspects of the crisis remain: radicalisation of the diaspora and a segment of the population, a loss of confidence in the government and targeted social violence. The trial of Anglophone militants is flawed in ways that illustrate persistent problems: it has been repeatedly postponed and conducted in French, with only rough translations provided if at all, and this for offences committed by Anglophones in Anglophone regions. If a lasting solution is not found, the next resurgence of the Anglophone problem could be violent. The haughty attitude and cynicism of senior government officials, notably when they say that “as long as the Anglophones do not take up arms, the current strike does not worry [us] unduly”, could promote instability. “What can the Anglophones do? If they don’t want to go to school, so much the worse for them”, added a senior official. They are mistakenly relying on the strike losing impetus and the emergence of divisions among strikers, because although the campaign has weakened since May and even if it fizzles out, the fundamental problem will remain and people will continue to feel dissatisfied. Within the secessionist movement, although the official objective remains independence through non-violence, there are growing calls for violence. Messages calling for the armed struggle circulate among WhatsApp groups and instances of targeted social violence have been recorded (intimidations, arson, beatings). On Facebook and YouTube, the Southern Cameroons Defense Forces regularly announce their imminent arrival to liberate Ambazonia. In July 2017, an Ambazonia Governing Council made its appearance online and Sisiku Ayuk Tabe was elected prime minister in an online vote. All this needs to be taken seriously, all the more so as some secessionist groups have circulated videos encouraging violence, for example, explaining how to make Molotov cocktails. Partisans of armed violence have not yet put their ideas into practice because they do not have either the resources or enough support from abroad. They are still a small minority, even among those in favour of secession. But questioning of the central principle of non-violence, inherited from the SCNC, gives cause for concern. The reason why the crisis has not descended into armed violence is also that the main actors have not wanted it to. Neither did they expect a crisis of such scale and duration. A lasting solution to the Anglophone problem requires measures to calm the situation and rebuild trust between the government and Anglophone actors, coherent measures to respond to sectoral demands and institutional reforms to address the national governance problem of which the Anglophone issue is symptomatic. It is unlikely that any of these measures will be taken without international pressure. A.Take Conciliatory Measures, Rebuild Trust and Launch a Genuine Dialogue before the Elections It is difficult to envisage a credible dialogue unless the government takes conciliatory measures and until trust is rebuilt between the parties. A discourse of tolerance, openness to dialogue and recognition of the Anglophone problem by the head of state would constitute a first important gesture. This should be immediately followed by several measures to calm the situation: release members of the Consortium; invite exiles to return to the country; halt legal proceedings against Anglophone clergy; open legal proceedings against security forces responsible for abuses; reshuffle the government and senior officials to increase the political representation of Anglophones and replace the senior officials whose actions have exacerbated tensions; and restructure and reconstitute the Commission for Bilingualism and Multiculturalism.Finally, the President of the Republic should visit the Anglophone regions. The government could then go on to reconstitute the ad hoc interministerial committee, this time with parity for senior Anglophone officials, and broaden its remit beyond dealing with sectoral demands. This would require decriminalising the political debate, including on federalism, and considering recourse to a third party (Catholic Church or an international partner) to mediate. B.Respond to Anglophone Concerns Once negotiations have begun, the government should make concessions with a view to improving the political and administrative representation of Anglophones. The government should also increase public and economic investment in the Anglophone zone and ensure that the majority of the security forces and administrative and legal authorities deployed there are Anglophones. Finally, it should apply the measures it has announced or that were decided with the Consortium and take additional measures to strengthen the semi-autonomous character of Anglophone educational and legal systems. C.Reform Governance in the Medium Term The Anglophone crisis has showed the limits presidential centralism and a governance system that depends on co-optation. Implementation of effective decentralisation could mitigate this problem at the national level. It appears to be the only alternative to federalism and has the advantage of being able to satisfy Francophones, the vast majority of whom reject a two-state federal system and, at the same time, moderate Anglophones, who are open to the idea of a ten-state federation or decentralisation. The executive and the senior levels of the administration are the only real opponents of decentralisation. That is understandable: it would take away the presidency’s complete control over the regions and could – by opening the way for local democratic experiences with possible national impact – threaten the regime’s absolute power.But there is a serious risk that the crisis could deteriorate and, in time, destabilise the country. A government-backed decentralisation could provide a more consensual and peaceable future. A genuine decentralisation could even encourage a healthy process of renewal within the CPDM. Several Francophone leaders and some senior government officials are favourable to such a development. Decentralisation could take place on the basis of the ten current regions. It would require full application and the improvement of existing laws. At the moment, decentralisation is deficient: government-appointed representatives run the big cities, play the role of super mayor and only report to the President of the Republic, rendering town councils inoperative. The latter have to wait for their budgets to be allocated by the government representatives, which provokes discontent among both opposition mayors and those belonging to the ruling party. The transfer of financial resources (the percentage of which is not detailed in legal texts) has only increased from 4 to 7 per cent in 13 years, while it is 20 per cent in other decentralised unitary states like Kenya and Ghana. Other powers are not always transferred and remain in the hands of authorities appointed by Yaoundé. If a new attempt at decentralisation is going to be acceptable and effective, it must reduce the powers of administrators appointed by Yaoundé by creating regional councils, introducing elected regional presidents, transferring significant financial resources and powers, and implementing measures that are already provided for in law. It should also take legal measures specific to Anglophone regions in the areas of education, justice and culture (not currently covered by legislation). D.A Firmer International Response A firmer response from the international community could help to avoid the conflict from deteriorating and threatening the stability of this pivotal Central African country. It could begin by emphasising the right of Anglophones to discuss their future and that of their country, to better political representation and to expect greater official willingness to take into account cultural and linguistic differences. Public condemnation of the use of anti-terrorism laws for political ends would also be an important first step. The UN, the UK, the U.S., France and the African Union should speak up on behalf of the international community. The UK and the UN are historic actors in this process. France is a strategic partner for Cameroon, and the biggest aid donor in Anglophone Cameroon. But Anglophones believe that it acts as a brake on the international community’s response, even though it has sought to promote multilingualism and multiculturalism within Francophonie. The Cameroon government does listen to the U.S., Cameroon’s most important security partner and home of the largest part of the Anglophone Cameroon diaspora. The first major international actor to react to this crisis, it should keep up the pressure. These countries and organisations should encourage the Cameroonian government to take measures to calm the situation, engage in a genuine dialogue and reform the governance model, including the implementation of decentralisation. It should also make itself available to mediate if necessary during negotiations, if the parties so desire. VI.Conclusion The violence that was rife between November 2016 to January 2017 in Cameroon’s two Anglophone regions and the support for the Operation Ghost Town that followed, showed that the Anglophone problem is deep-rooted. It will not be resolved by denying it exists or by repression, but by dialogue and institutional reform. In the context of pressure from the government and the financial difficulties of continuing the strike, some people have disassociated themselves from the movement and more would do so if it were not for the threats of secessionists. However, they are still dissatisfied. After sacrificing an academic year and resisting pressure from the government and secessionist militants, the risk is that they will become increasingly bitter if no reasonable progress is made, especially on educational reform and governance. The government is wrong to bet on the crisis running out of steam. The threat of a second year of school closures hangs over the beginning of the next academic year. With a year to go before the next presidential and general elections, it would not be politically sensible to ignore the dissatisfaction and anger of a fifth of its population, especially as Francophones share some Anglophone grievances. Above and beyond the electoral question, the sporadic violence of the last few months and the use of social networks have shown that some secessionists are ready for the armed struggle. The opening of a front in the West could prove to be dramatic for Cameroon, which already faces Boko Haram in the Far North and militias from the Central African Republic to the East. Nairobi/Brussels, 2 August 2017 Appendix A: Map of Cameroon Appendix B: Timeline A timeline of Cameroon's history is available in the PDF version. Appendix C: Glossary AAC: All Anglophone Conference CACSC: Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium CAM: Cameroon Anglophone Movement CATUC: Catholic University of Cameroon CDC: Cameroon Development Corporation Cemac: Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale (Central African Economic and Monetary Community) Cenajes: Centre national de la jeunesse et des sports (National Centre for Youth and Sports) NECC: National Episcopal Conference of Cameroon CNC: Conseil national de la communication (National Communication Council) NCHRF: National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms CUC: Cameroon United Congress ENAM: Ecole nationale d’administration et de magistrature (National School of Administration and Magistracy) IMF: International Monetary Fund FWM: Free West Cameroon Movement GCE: General Certificate of Education INS: Institut national de la statistique (National Institute of Statistics) KNC: Kamerun National Congress KNDP: Kamerun National Democratic Party NOWELA: Northwest Lawyer's Association OHADA: Organisation pour l’harmonisation en Afrique du droit des affaires (Organisation for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa) NGO: Non-governmental Organisation CPDM: Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement SCACUF: Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front SCDF: Southern Cameroons Defense Forces SCNC: Southern Cameroons National Council SCRM: Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement SCYL: Southern Cameroons Youth League SDF: Social Democratic Front SNH: Société nationale des hydrocarbures (National Hydrocarbons Corporation) Sonara: Société nationale de raffinage (National Refining Company) SYNES: Syndicat national des enseignants du supérieur (National Union of Teachers of Higher Education) UBSU: University of Buea Student Union CDU: Cameroon Democratic Union UNC: Union nationale camerounaise (Cameroon National Union) UNDP: Union nationale pour la démocratie et le progress (National Union for Democracy and Progress) UPC: Union des populations du Cameroun (Union of the Peoples of Cameroon) ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________(c) 2017 International Crisis Group

Women calling for the repeal of a law in Jordan allowing rapists to escape punishment if they marry their victims stood outside Parliament in Amman on Tuesday. CreditReem Saad/Associated Press The Parliament in Jordan voted Tuesday to revoke a law allowing rapists to evade criminal prosecution if they marry their victims, becoming the latest country in the Middle East to move to scrap such laws. A handful of countries, including several in the Arab world as well as in the Philippines, a majority Catholic country, have maintained legal provisions for men accused or convicted of rape to avoid punishment. Women’s groups have agitated for years for the laws to be repealed, saying they further victimize rape survivors. And one by one, the laws are falling. A government committee in Jordan had recommended that the law, known as Article 308 of the country’s penal code, be revoked and the lower house of the Jordanian Parliament voted to do so on Tuesday. The repeal is expected to be endorsed by the appointed Senate and approved by King Abdullah II. Cheers went up from the spectators gallery in Parliament when the measure passed, according to an Associated Press report from Amman, the Jordanian capital. Suad Abu-Dayyeh, a Middle East expert at Equality Now, a women’s rights group, called it “a historical moment.” “Jordan is now setting a very good example for other countries in the region that still have these discriminatory legal provisions,” she said in a statement. Continue reading the main story Morocco repealed its marry-your-rapist law in 2014, after a widely publicized case of a teenager who killed herself after she was forced to wed the man she accused of raping her. A parliamentary committee in Lebanon has recommended that its law be repealed; a vote by the full legislature is expected later this year. And Tunisia got rid of its law last week. Proponents of the laws contend that they shield the survivor and her family from the shame of rape. In patriarchal societies, including in the Arab world, a family’s honor is often deeply linked to a woman’s chastity. Opponents say that laws promote impunity for rape. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The New York Times