Human rights activists are applauding Secretary of State Tillerson for using the term genocide to describe the Islamic State's mass slaughter of Christians, Yazidis and other religious minorities in Iraq. The activists and attorneys who have lobbied hard on the issue say Tillerson is now using the term after months of equivocation and after State Department lawyers had removed or prevented the use of the word genocide in official speeches and other documents. State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert on Thursday told reporters that Tillerson "firmly believes" that ISIS is responsible for genocide against Christians, Yazidis and other ethnic minorities in Iraq. "When we look at Iraq and when we look at what happened to some of the Yazidis, some of the Christians, the secretary believes, and he firmly believes, that that was genocide." A separate spokesman told the Washington Free Beacon "that it is the Secretary of State's judgment that ISIS is responsible for genocide against groups in areas it controlled, including Yazidis, Christians and Shia Muslims." Both spokesmen also said reports that State Department officials are removing references to genocide are inaccurate but declined to respond when asked whether those attorneys prevented the word from being used in speeches or other documents and reports. An annual Religious Freedom Report that the State Department will release next month will provide a better explanation, the spokesman said. "I can only reiterate that as a general matter we don't comment on internal processes. However, I can let you know that the International Religious Freedom Report will be released next month and will more definitely answer your questions," he said. "We cannot preview that report." Multiple sources said that report is likely to come out next week on the third anniversary of the ISIS massacre of Yezidis on Mount Sinjar. Activists and attorneys deeply involved in the issue dispute the State Department's contention that it isn’t removing the word "genocide," saying the explanation is overly legalistic and demands an explanation of their definition of "removal." A group of six GOP senators, led by Sen. March Rubio, (R., Fla.), sent a letter to Tillerson Thursday seeking answers on reports that the State Department’s Office of Legal Adviser was removing the word "genocide" from speeches and documents. The same activists and attorneys were encouraged by the State Department spokesmen's statements that Tillerson is now willing to use the word genocide to describe the mass slaughter of minority communities in Iraq. "It sounds like to me this is an enormous breakthrough … it is something I applaud, and I think this will make an enormous difference to the victims and survivors and those who are still in refugee camps," said Nina Shea, an international human rights lawyer who directs the Hudson Institute's Center for Religious Freedom. Shea served as a commissioner on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) from 1999 to 2012. USCIRF is an independent, bipartisan U.S. federal government organization created by Congress to make policy recommendations to the president, the secretary of State and Congress on religious freedom violations around the world. Another attorney involved in the issue who requested anonymity to continue working behind the scenes said, "it's great that we won" but questioned whether Tillerson's use of the word genocide will impact any policies or the ability to get U.S. aid to the persecuted communities in Iraq who are on the verge of extinction. "Does [Nauert] mean it's the agency's judgment or Tillerson's personal opinion [that ISIS committed genocide]?" the attorney asked. The attorney said he is concerned because Kerry had used similar language to indicate that his much-heralded genocide designation in March of 2016 was his personal opinion. Kerry's designation was one of the few times in history that the United States designated ongoing mass murders against ethnic or religious minorities as meeting the legal definition of genocide laid out in a 1948 treaty. The agreement requires signatories, including the United States, to take steps to "prevent and punish" genocide. However, Kerry's designation dashed many activists’ hopes by not carrying any real weight in terms of changing the U.S. policy to step in and more effectively direct millions of dollars in relief funds to Christian, Yazidi and other persecuted religious minorities in Iraq. ISIS murders and kidnappings have radically reduced the Christian population in Iraq, which numbered between 800,000 and 1.4 million in 2002 and is below 250,000 now. Without action, activists and charities say, Christians could disappear completely from Iraq in the near future. After meeting with Pope Francis in May, President Trump vowed to do everything in his power to defend and protect the "historic Christian communities of the Middle East." Activists and Catholic leaders are now calling on Trump to turn the rhetoric into action on the ground and help get U.S. aid to these persecuted communities trying to rebuild their homes and their lives in Iraq. The activists are encouraged by Trump's selection of former Kansas Gov. Sam Brownback, who also served in the House and Senate, for the post of the U.S. ambassador at large for international religious freedom. The ambassador heads the State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom, which is charged with promoting religious freedom as a key objective to U.S. foreign policy, according to its website. "I've worked closely with Sen. Brownback when he was a senator on Sudan issues—on Darfur—and he’s a very dedicated, committed, smart and a leader on human rights issues," Shea said. "So I hope that he can be quickly confirmed. We need him—and the minorities that survived ISIS need his voice right now." Rubio said Brownback brings "years of experience and stature at a critical time when religious freedom is under assault" with "ancient religious communities such as Christians and Yazidis on the verge of extinction in Iraq and Syria after the Islamic State's campaign of genocide." Maureen Ferguson, a senior policy adviser with the Catholic Association, said Trump could not have nominated a better person for the job than Brownback at such a critical time. "As a U.S. Senator, Brownback was a passionate defender of the rights of all people to worship freely, and courageously confronted offenses against human dignity in trouble spots such as North Korea, Iraq, China, Sudan, Vietnam, and Egypt," she said. "At a time when there is an ongoing genocide of Christians and other religious minorities in the Middle East, we hope and pray the Senate will act with urgency in a bipartisan fashion and immediately confirm Gov. Brownback." Jordan Sekulow, of the conservative American Center for Law and Justice, also said he is encouraged by Brownback's selection, saying he would be very effective in that role as a former senator and governor who has demonstrated a deep commitment to human rights issues around the globe. Sekulow is the son of Jay Sekulow, an attorney for Trump. Sekulow's group is preparing new Freedom of Information Act requests aimed at finding out who was responsible for the removal or prevention of the State Department's use of the word "genocide" during the first months of the Trump administration. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Washington Free Beacon

An estimated 850,000 children have been forced to flee fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo's Kasai provinces, the UN's children's agency Unicef says. This makes it one of the world's "largest displacement crises" for children, it adds. Many of the affected children are now in foster care or with relatives. Fighting broke out in Kasai in August 2016 after a traditional leader was killed in clashes with security forces. It has since escalated leaving more than 3,000 people dead. The UN has also discovered dozens of mass graves in the area. In all, 1.4 million people have had to leave their homes "with 60,000 uprooted in June alone," says Unicef's acting head in DR Congo Tajudeen Oyewale. The traditional leader who was killed held the title Kamuina Nsapu. Since his death a number of Kamuina Nsapu militia factions have emerged all fighting for different causes, but with authorities their common target. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 BBC News

Your Excellency, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is facing its deepest crisis since the end of the 1998-2003 war. Prospects for a peaceful transfer of power, on which the country’s stability depends, look increasingly remote, as President Joseph Kabila appears to be moving ever further from elections. Several areas of the country, most notably the Kasai, are descending into violence and the potential remains high for clashes in major cities and towns. The presence of the UN peace operation, MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo), is critical. But it needs to adapt to meet these new challenges. This means moving from joint military operations with the government and stabilisation activities in eastern DRC toward a role more focused on deterring and documenting violence country-wide and stimulating greater consensus among regional and major powers on efforts to end the crisis. The UN’s forthcoming strategic review offers an opportunity to reorient the mission accordingly, all the more important in view of further mandate discussions early next year. Last December, a deal between President Kabila and main political opposition groups provided for an election delay of a year and offered some hope that the DRC might find a way out of its latest political crisis. Since then, however, implementation of the agreement has faltered. Successive rounds of talks before and after the signing of the deal, which saw President Kabila repeatedly attempt to split and co-opt his opponents, also contributed to the fragmentation of the political class and further divided and weakened the opposition. Electoral delays also mean that the president, provincial governors and national and provincial legislatures have outstayed their mandates, further eroding their authority. Numerous political actors and armed groups are now more openly challenging the state, provoking an increasingly violent response from the government. This trend has been documented by the UN’s human rights office, whose data shows over the past months and years a dramatic uptick in violent incidents perpetrated by security forces. The government’s use of the Congolese justice system against rivals has undermined any confidence it enjoyed and its role as a credible umpire. Repeated prison breaks over recent months, massive in scale, further contribute to the image of a state on the verge of collapse. Popular anger at both government and political elites in general is widespread. It has found expression in several riots since January 2015, all repressed by security forces. A deepening social and economic crisis, affecting a population already suffering from endemic poverty, further aggravates unrest. But with civil society crushed by government crackdowns and the opposition in disarray, discontent is disorganised, without clear leadership or representation. Local conflicts and inter-communal bloodshed are also on the rise. These include the violence in the Kasai, where reports have emerged of the Congolese government backing armed groups and a UN Human Rights Council resolution expressed concern over reports of a wave of violence, serious and gross human rights violations and abuses, and violations of international humanitarian law...perpetrated by all, including those involving recruitment and use of child soldiers, sexual and gender-based violence, destruction of houses, schools, places of worship, and State infrastructure by local militias, as well as of mass graves. Armed group activity in the Kivus and Ituri has also flared up. These conflicts affect not only local and national dynamics. Through refugee flows, the presence of foreign militias and trans-border community ties, they also risk renewed regional intervention. The current forum for regional and international engagement in the DRC is the Peace Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF). Established in 2013, it was the result mostly of mobilisation within the South African Development Community (SADC), supported by Western powers, to fight the M23, an armed group plaguing parts of eastern DRC, and halt the associated meddling from the M23’s main sponsor, Rwanda. The new political framework was accompanied by a military component, the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), integrated into MONUSCO’s command but with SADC members providing the troops, and with a more assertive posture against armed groups in the east. The PSCF has since ossified, however, and been overtaken by the now national-level crisis. After fighting the M23, the FIB has shown none of the same determination against other armed groups. Even the limited consensus between Western and SADC powers has collapsed. The DRC’s relations with its main donors have frosted over, with Western powers, in particular the EU and the U.S., attempting to increase pressure on Kinshasa, notably through sanctions on individuals seen as responsible for violent repression of protests and the clashes in the Kasai. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also has been critical, calling for an international investigation of alleged government support for Kasai militias. Kinshasa’s diplomacy on the continent has, however, won it public support from some African leaders. This backing is far from unanimous: some African leaders, including within SADC and the Great Lakes region, recognise that the president’s determination to stay in power lies at the core of the crisis and are more critical behind closed doors. But generally supportive public statements diminish pressure on President Kabila to compromise. The forthcoming UN strategic assessment, with a UN Secretariat team traveling to the DRC this week and reporting back to the Council in September, presents an opportunity for new thinking on the mission’s role. The overarching challenge – given that President Kabila’s government is now, in effect, the principle source of the country’s instability – will be to redefine the mission’s relationship with Kinshasa. After a decade supporting state institutions, striking the right balance between distancing itself from the government while still maintaining sufficiently good relations to operate in the country will be a tough balancing act. Certainly, it is not one the mission can perform without the active support of, and a reasonable degree of coherence among, international and regional diplomats in the DRC. For now, the threat of drastic reductions in MONUSCO appears off the cards. The new U.S. administration, which had suggested that it would seek deep cuts in line with its lobbying for reductions across UN peace operations signed off, in June, on a mission budget only slightly smaller than that proposed by the Secretariat. This is fortunate, given the detrimental impact such a signal of UN disengagement would have on the calculations of communities and leaders across the DRC. But the Secretariat and other Security Council members would be remiss to see this as a vote for the status quo and to back away from serious reform. The U.S. is certain to push again for greater cuts, whether this year or next. It would be better to base reform on a strategic reorientation now rather than on budget pressure later. Plus, more importantly, the mission needs to adapt if it is to remain effective. The priorities should include: Beefing up the mission's deployment across the country of integrated, mobile teams comprising political affairs officers, human rights officials, military observers and members of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), ensuring a regular presence of such teams in all of the country’s 26 provinces. Such teams can deter, as best as possible, and document violence and human rights violations, including cases of sexual and gender-based violence, through engagement and good offices with local officials, civil society and local actors. They could also act as an early warning mechanism. Reversing the mission’s concentration in the Eastern provinces. The situation today requires the UN to effectively cover other parts of the country and adjust its approach to protection based on varying levels of violence in different areas. A lighter but more agile military footprint, that would mean protecting civilians by projection more than presence, would allow the mission to address increased militia violence in areas like the Kasai, while retaining a presence in the east to focus on threats of a more strategic nature and deter regional conflagration. Such an approach would require increased mobility, flexibility and logistics capacity. European troop contributors could offer surge logistics support to assist this move. Integrating the Force Intervention Brigade more fully into MONUSCO. The FIB serves an important function by ensuring some regional involvement occurs under UN auspices. It also deters neighbours’ meddling. But ideally, its operations – namely protection of civilians and a coercive approach toward militias – would fit within MONUSCO, without the need for a separate structure. In this context, the secretariat should consider abolishing the FIB and integrating its forces within the UN mission, ensuring that all force components fulfil their robust mandate. Such a move would provide the mission's leadership with increased flexibility. If this is not feasible, then at a minimum the mission and FIB troop contributors should better allow the FIB to operate outside the east in kinetic operations against armed groups together with other MONUSCO units as required. Reviewing the mission's military cooperation with the government. Large-scale, joint operations with DRC forces against armed groups, long inappropriate, are now not even defensible. Such offensives only make sense as part of a comprehensive stabilisation strategy, and such a strategy cannot be developed in partnership with a government whose objectives now contrast dramatically to those of the UN. Reviewing MONUSCO’s long-term stabilisation and developmental activities, and dropping security sector reform altogether. While much good has been done in these areas, political actors at the provincial and national levels now tend to enjoy insufficient public trust to serve as effective partners. Investing in effective communication between the mission and humanitarian actors, given the critical role they will play as the crisis deepens. This would include better relaying plans for troop presence and posture in conflict-affected areas in which humanitarians operate. Such communication will help further the common goal of civilian protection. Ensuring the mission’s leadership continues to look for opportunities to nudge forward the transition in Kinshasa, while recognising that its influence over President Kabila is limited. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, together with the Great Lakes envoy, should also push regional and major powers toward more convergence on their engagement in the DRC, building on the PSCF. While it may not overcome divergent positions toward President Kabila on the continent and further afield, it might stimulate new opportunities for diplomacy, moving away from a sterile debate on sanctions. The strategic review might also offer an opportunity for a frank conversation with FIB troop contributors on their response to the crisis, as effective UN diplomacy requires greater regional support. The peaceful transfer of power that the DRC needs to escape its current crisis appears ever more remote, given President Kabila’s determination to remain in office, the incoherence of regional and major actors and, therefore, their lack of leverage. But the challenge is not limited to the stalled transition. The whole country faces security threats reminiscent of the 1990s, territorial administration is in chaos, social services are collapsing and state institutions violently contested. The crisis today is national and arguably poses a graver threat to both the country and region than that provoked by the M23 that motivated the PCSF in the first place. Yet regional and international engagement appears to be fading as the danger grows. While MONUSCO alone cannot resolve the DRC’s crisis, it can play a critical role in deterring violence, preventing the worse ravages of the crisis and corralling regional and major powers toward renewed engagement and consensus. The strategic review is an opportunity to shift its mandate in this direction. Sincerely, Jean-Marie Guéhenno President and CEO International Crisis Group _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

The European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) will give an evaluation to incidents of the restriction of evangelism in Russia which were brought about by the "Yarovaya Law" in the summer of last year. The ECHR accepted for review an appeal from an American citizen, the Baptist Donald Jay Ossewaarde, who on the basis of a declaration by a "concerned resident" was fined in Orel. A similar appeal to the ECHR was submitted by a volunteer cleric and citizen of India, Viktor Emanuel Mani, who was arrested in Naberezhnye Chelny and later deported and separated from his family. Experts say that the amendments to the law primarily hit foreigners. The ECHR communicated (accepted for review) the appeal of the American citizen Donald Jay Ossewaarde, who lives with his wife in Orel. As Baptist Christians they assembled believers in their home for reading the Bible. On 14 August 2016, during such a meeting, police officers arrived at Mr. Ossewaarde's home. They explained to the Baptist that a "concerned resident"-the vice-chairman of the provincial government for security matters-had written a statement indicating that "foreign adherents of a religious cult" has pasted excerpts of Scripture to a bulletin board of the building. The American was accused of "missionary activity with violation of the requirements of legislation on freedom of conscience" (point 5 of article 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Violations of Law). For foreigners, the fine on this article is from 30 thousand to 50 thousand rubles "with or without administrative deportation beyond the borders of the RF." The court sentenced the Baptist to a fine of 40 thousand rubles. The ECHR sent questions to Russian authorities asking "was the transfer to the police station and detention there compatible with requirements of legislation of the RF and article 5 of the Convention ("Right to freedom and personal inviolability"). The ECHR also asked "whether there occurred a violation of article 9 and article 11 of the Convention ('Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion' and 'Freedom of assembly and association') in connection with prosecution of the declarer for organization of meetings for reading the Bible." In addition, Strasbourg called attention to the fact that the Code of Administrative Violations of Law has different penalties for Russian and foreign missionaries (the fine is higher for the latter). The Russian side is supposed to respond no later than 30 October, the Ministry of Justice told Kommersant. The staff of the Russian commissioner at the ECHR, Mikhail Galperin, began to work out the "legal position of the Russian side, taking into account the opinion of the competent bodies of state authority and conclusions of national judicial instances." Kommersant has learned that a similar appeal also was submitted by a citizen of India, Viktor Emmanuel Mani. "He is a cleric on a volunteer basis in the 'Love of God' Church of Christians of Evangelical Faith in Naberezhnye Chelny which is a member of the Russian Union of Evangelical Christians-Baptists" an attorney of the international rights advocacy group "Agora," Damir Gainutdinov, told Kommersant. Mr. Mani lived in Russia from 2001. Late last year a new visitor began attending his services. On 4 December 4 he made a donation, approached an employee of the church, and bought literature. Then the visitor send a declaration to the prosecutor's office indicating that the clergyman suggested that he call friends to the church and gave him two brochures and a book; that is, he engaged in missionary activity. "At the trial the defendant explained that he personally did not converse with the visitor and did not give him books," Mr. Gainutdinov says. The Naberezhnye Chelny city court issued a decision for a fine of 30,000 rubles and deportation. The latter was an "extreme penalty," the attorney says, pointing out that Mr. Mani is married to a Russian citizen and they have a daughter who is about a year old. Thereby there was a violation of article 8 of the Convention, the right to private life. We recall that the article of the Code of Administrative Violations of Law regarding restriction of missionary activity appeared in June 2016, when the State Duma adopted anti-terrorism amendments by Deputy Irina Yarovaya. The amendments, as Kommersant reported, were publicly criticized by religious organizations, including also representatives of traditional confessions. An expert group of the Council on Human Rights under the Russian president also pointed out that the new rules "create unjustified and extreme restrictions for exercising freedom of consciences by believers of all religions and religious movements," and "arbitrarily hold administratively accountable persons who clearly have not committed socially dangerous actions." The director of the Center for Study of Problems of Religion and Society of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Roman Lunkin, commenting on the appeals to the ECHR says that each instance of the application of the "Yarovaya Law" is a debasement of a specific confession since "some are able to preach and others are not." "Foreigners are fined, in the first place, considering that they have the fewest rights to confession of their religion in Russia. At the same time, police and investigators prefer not to distinguish worship services and evangelism, although such a distinction exists in the law," Mr. Lunkin told Kommersant. "The main absurdity of the law is the actual inclusion of the concept of 'missionary activity' within terrorist or extremist activity," the chancellor of the Russian Associated Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals), Konstantin Bendas, told Kommersant. "Foreigners are forced to participate in worship services and talk about religion in fear of deportation and large fines," Mr. Bendas says. "Russian missionaries labor in Myanmar, Laos, India, and another 100 countries. They have their own legislative peculiarities, but there is not such stupidity anywhere." ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 HRWF

The International community is playing games with question of #cholera_in_Sudan. Almost a year into the epidemic, why have wee seen no laboratory tests confirming OR disconfirming the existence of cholera in Sudan? The UN’s World Health Organization in Geneva could quickly provide laboratory analysis of stool/fecal samples from Sudanese victims of what the Khartoum regime insists all must call “acute watery diarrhea.” Why is there only silence from the UN organizations most responsible: WHO, OCHA, and UNICEF? How can we not conclude that these agencies and the UN leadership have been threatened, and in turn intimidated, by the génocidaires who make up the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime? Not to be outdone by the feckless UN agencies, the U.S. Agency for International Development today (July 27, 2017) joins in the chorus that continues to say only “acute watery diarrhea,” thereby contributing to the delay of urgently needed medical supplies to Sudan’s stricken populations. [ Concerning these supplies, see my July 24, 2017 “Open Letter to Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director General of the UN’s World Health Organization” | http://wp.me/p45rOG-25t/] “As of July 7, [2017] health actors recorded more than 23,200 cases of acute watery diarrhea (AWD) since August 2016, accord to the UN World Health Organization (WHO) and the Government of Sudan (GoS) Ministry of Health (MoH).” (USAID, July 27, 2017) More than 23,000 recorded cases—and much of the data has been screened by the Khartoum regime. What about the un-recorded cases, especially in those areas of Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile that continue to be denied humanitarian access? What about the grossly inadequate humanitarian presence in Eastern Sudan? Why should we not assume that a figure for “recorded cases”promulgated by the regime’s “Ministry of Health” is anything but a small fraction of the actual cases? If the regime won’t permit the word “cholera” to be used, why should we expect that figures offered by the same regime will have any integrity at all? I have previously stressed that cholera is easy to diagnosis in a laboratory were stool/fecal samples of victims in Sudan provided. But of course it is also the case that if somehow the disease running rampant in Sudan is not cholera, this fact could just as easily be confirmed by labs in Geneva. Why does the UN’s World Health Organization not provide us with laboratory test results of multiple stool/fecal samples from victims of “acute water diarrhea” in Sudan? At this late date, there is only one answer and it is very unflattering of international resolve to take seriously the vast medical crisis that has been sweeping across Sudan for almost a year. As the rainy season in Sudan reaches its peak, conditions for the spread of cholera are terrifyingly propitious _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) condemns the threatening messages left for four Mexican journalists in the past week that warned them to stop their outspoken reporting. This barbaric behaviour has again confirmed that Mexico’s journalists are in desperate need of protection. The four journalists targeted by the threats are based in Tabasco, Quintana Roo and Michoacán, states with particularly high levels of organized crime and corruption. The first was Luis Rubén López Domínguez, a reporter for the Tabasco Hoy newspaper in Paraíso, in the southeastern state of Tabasco. Gunmen opened fire on López’s car while it was parked outside his home on 19 July and left message on the windscreen warning him to stop reporting if he did not want to get killed. Two placards with death threats were found the same day on the streets of Cancún, in the nearby southeastern state of Quintana Roo. Signed by Los Zetas, one of Mexico’s most dangerous crime cartels, the placards named two journalists: Pedro Canché, the publisher of the Pedro Canché news site, and Amir Ibrahim, the editor of the El QuintanaRoo news site. The fourth target was José Maldonado Sotelo, the head of the Noventa Grados news agency in Morelia, in the southwestern state of Michoacán. A mysterious email received at the news agency on 21 July warned Maldonado to stop covering the work of the Michoacán attorney-general’s office. “Whatever the origin, such attempts to intimidate and censor are intolerable and unacceptable,” said Emmanuel Colombié, the head of RSF’s Latin America bureau. “As well as protecting the targeted journalists, the local and federal authorities must identify and punish those responsible for these death threats. Intimidation of this kind fosters a climate of fear and self-censorship that has a terrible impact on freedom of expression in Mexico.” The uncertainty about the origin of the threats is particularly disturbing and is reinforcing the suspicions of the journalists that local officials may have been responsible. López thinks the Paraíso authorities were the source of threat against him. He says they did not appreciate his latest stories about Paraíso mayor Bernardo Barrada Ruíz’s questionable activities. On the day of the shooting, the city hall’s spokesman accused López of staging it himself. Canché said he thought those responsible for the Cancún placards were “not the narcos but political actors who have teamed up to spread fear and terror among the few critical journalists working in Quintana Roo.” Canché was arrested in 2015 for covering a demonstration and was held unjustly for nine months (see the RSF video). Maldonado, who was already threatened on 3 May, said he thought the threatening email received on 21 July was directly linked to his news agency’s reporting about the questionable past of Rogelio Arredondo Guillén, the head of the Investigation and Analysis unit at the Michoacán attorney-general’s office, who was murdered on 30 June. Michoacán is a particularly dangerous state for the media. Michoacán-based TV journalist Salvador Adame Pardo’s charred body was found in June, a month after his abduction. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reporters without Borders

This evening President Trump announced intent to nominate Sam Brownback as the new Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom. As Ambassador, Brownback will head the State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom, dedicated to monitoring religious freedom abuses throughout the world. The position has been vacant for seven months after Rabbi David Saperstein resigned. Religious freedom organizations have since been advocating for an appointment, particularly as international religious freedom has worsened in the breadth and depth of restrictions and violations. While in Congress, Brownback served as the Senate Co-Chair of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. He led the effort to enact the Trafficking Victims Protection Act which served as the foundation for the movement to stand against human trafficking. Brownback was actively involved during the crisis in Darfur, traveling to that country and pushing for a genocide declaration. He introduced legislation on the deplorable human rights conditions in North Korea and travelled to Sudan where he called on the Sudanese government to end its human rights abuses including civilian bombing and slavery. When Brownback was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, he was on record as calling religious freedom in the Middle East a top concern. He was recognized as one of only three members to receive a perfect score in the International Religious Freedom Scorecard for the 111th Congress. “This nomination comes at a crucial time to improve religious freedom worldwide and to give hope to millions persecuted for their beliefs. The 21st Century Wilberforce Initiative urges the Senate to swiftly confirm Governor Brownback’s appointment” said EVP Elijah Brown. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Wilberforce

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On Friday, July 28, 2017, the Vyborg City Court, 138 kilometers (85 mi.) northwest of St. Petersburg, will resume hearings in the case against the New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures (NWT), a Bible published by Jehovah's Witnesses. Russian authorities are seeking to ban this Bible, as "extremist," despite an amendment to Article 3 of the Federal Law on Extremism signed by President Putin in the fall of 2015. The amendment states: "The Bible, the Quran, the Tanakh, and the Kangyur, and their contents, and quotations from them cannot be recognized as extremist materials." The prosecution's case is largely based on attempting to prove the NWT is not a Bible. The case has been suspended since April 26, 2016, pending a court-appointed analysis of the NWT by the Center for Sociocultural Expert Studies. This week the court received the completed analysis (some 100 pages in length) and has scheduled the hearing to resume on Friday. A copy of the document shows that the 'expert' analysis concluded that the NWT is "not a Bible." The apparent basis for such a conclusion is that the publication refers to itself as the "Holy Scriptures." (Seehttp://bit.ly/2u1kBag for a preliminary English translation of the analysis, along with the original in Russian). This is not the first time the Center for Sociocultural Expert Studies has analyzed the NWT. Their conclusions about the NWT served as the basis for the prosecutor's original claim. This in itself is a violation of a precedent set by Russia's Supreme Court disqualifying an expert from being used twice in the same case to address the same question. According to Roman Lunkin, leading research fellow of the Center for Religion and Society Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Europe, none of the experts at the center has a degree in religious studies and they are unfamiliar with the writings of Jehovah's Witnesses in general. Mr. Lunkin states: "In defiance of all good sense, Russia's law-enforcement system generates completely ridiculous expert studies (and, it appears, they encourage loyal supporters to open expert centers)." Other noted scholars have likewise expressed surprise (see http://bit.ly/2h4GN1W) at the extent to which Russia is willing to go to ban any publications produced or distributed by Jehovah's Witnesses. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 HRWF

Restoring the devastated regions of Iraq and Syria will require a new, bottom-up approach to post-conflict reconstruction, focusing on local security and entrepreneurship rather than the traditional approach of central planning. (AP Photo/Felipe Dana) History will not look kindly on the failure of the United States and its allies to intervene early against the Islamic State and Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Hundreds of thousands have been killed in Iraq and Syria since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, and the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament have officially declared the Islamic State's slaughter of Yazidis, Christians, and other minorities in the region a genocide. America's allies in Europe are faced with an unprecedented refugee crisis that has shaken the continent's political foundations to the core. The terror threat in both Europe and the U.S. is higher than ever. It is now up to the Trump administration to get things right in Iraq and Syria. President Trump's missile strike against the Assad regime in April was a welcome sign that the U.S. has found its moral resolve after years of passivity. The recent liberation of Mosul is another step in the right direction. However, to succeed in the long term, the U.S. and its allies will have to bring more to the table than the will to act militarily. The refugee crisis makes it paramount to restore the ability of Iraqis and Syrians to build a safe and prosperous future for themselves. Without security and economic opportunity, refugees will be unable to return home, and their host countries will have to carry an enormous economic and social burden until refugees are fully integrated. Restoring the devastated regions of Iraq and Syria will require a new, bottom-up approach to post-conflict reconstruction, focusing on local security and entrepreneurship rather than the traditional approach of central planning by national governments and international organizations. Economist Carl Schramm made the case for this new kind of "expeditionary economics" in a Foreign Affairs article in 2010. It is high time to implement Schramm's vision. What would expeditionary economics look like in Iraq and Syria? First, security should be locally driven and encompass all segments of society, including minority groups. This is a time-honored principle of policing in the Western world. Many of America's European allies have built great expertise in training police forces and could add tremendous value by taking on the task of enabling local Iraqi and Syrian communities, including Yazidis, Christians, and other minorities, to police themselves. The Christian communities on the Nineveh Plain in northern Iraq, who are currently excluded from policing their own areas by the majority groups in power, would be an excellent place to start such a local policing effort. Second, the rule of law should be locally driven and focused on defining and securing property rights. International aid and development organizations rarely pay much attention to property rights, perhaps because we in the West have come to take such institutions as the local county clerk for granted. But ill-defined and insecure property rights are a constant source of conflict that often undermine social stability and economic growth in developing countries. This has been documented in the groundbreaking work of economist Hernando de Soto. Third, economic redevelopment in the region should focus on local entrepreneurs, local workers, and the development of indigenous growth businesses. Returning refugees can play a key role in this process, serving as a link between investors and customers in the West and local businesses in Iraq and Syria. The U.S. and the European Union can help by removing barriers to trade and facilitating a mapping of microeconomic assets in the region and in the refugee communities. Right now, asylum centers and refugee camps should be busy collecting information on the skills of the refugees they are housing, matching these enormous human resources up with entrepreneurial leaders who can put them to work. The U.S. has a long track record of welcoming the world's "huddled masses, yearning to breathe free" and turning them into successful citizens and entrepreneurs. It is perhaps this history as a better, future-oriented place that sometimes tempts America to turn its back on the Old World, even when it is on fire. The challenge now is to harness America's exceptional entrepreneurial expertise to deny genocidal tyrants and terrorists the social chaos and economic misery they thrive on. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Washington Examiner | IDC

As at 13 July 2017, 89 people have died, since 13 March 2014, in politically-motivated killings. No one so far, has been convicted of any of these killings. This has led to the appointment of the R15 million Moerane Commission of Inquiry into political killings in KwaZulu-Natal. Last week, the Raymond Mhlaba Municipality in the Eastern Cape’s Council Speaker, Thozama Njobe, was shot and killed after she reported that she had received threats to her life. Outspoken African National Congress (ANC) Member of Parliament, Dr Makhosi Khoza, is currently in the news for publicising death threats to herself and her family over her political utterances. The recently released Public Protector’s report into the political killings at Glebelands Hostel, which partly forms the basis for the Moerane Commission, revealed a toxic mix of squalor, poverty, murder and State indifference. In particular, eThekwini Municipality (the Municipality), which bears administrative responsibility for the hostels, was found to have failed to promote a safe and healthy environment. The Municipality too failed to give the residents of the Hostel equitable access to the municipal services to which they would have been ordinarily entitled. The local South African Police Service (SAPS) were found wanting, as was the Department of Social Development (DSD). The SAPS failed to uphold the rights of the Glebelands residents to be free from all forms of violence and failed its constitutional mandate of preventing crime. The DSD was found to have failed its constitutional responsibility to the victims of hostel violence. The remedial action recommended includes the Provincial Head of the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) monitoring SAPS investigation of allegations of police torture and killings, with a copy of the final report being given to the Public Protector. Arguably, while the remedial action recommendation rightly shines a spotlight on the State’s failures, they however are not far-reaching enough in bringing to book the culprits behind the killings. While perhaps politically-motivated killings - since 1994 - have ceased to occupy public discourse, the reality is that political killings continue and are mostly linked to local political rivalries and connections to criminal networks, notably in the taxi industry. This, according to research conducted by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). South Africa lacks an established system to collect information on political killings and such research often only focuses on the killings targeting specific individuals affiliated to political parties. The killing must further be motivated by contestation over access to political power. This suggests that there may be many more political assassinations which are not classified as such, where the motive behind the killing is unknown. The ISS makes the point that “Political office may come to be seen as the primary vehicle for acquiring financial assets and security. In a context of generalised poverty and financial insecurity, political office is also a source of broader leverage. One may be able to use one’s influence to help members of one’s family to secure jobs or houses”. The Constitution envisages a democratic State founded on human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, among other values. The Constitution places a duty on the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights so enshrined. Political rights are also enshrined and importantly, citizens are free to make political choices. The targeted killings serve to intimidate citizens and curtail the freedom to make political choices as intended by the Constitution. In turn, this affects the health of South Africa’s democracy. Ultimately, human rights are interdependent, interconnected and indivisible. Perhaps the Glebelands Hostel situation best encapsulates this mantra. Glebelands Hostel, on the city’s peripheries, meant to house men from rural areas, working in low income and menial jobs, stands as a relic of apartheid South Africa and should not be in existence 23 years into democracy. That such dehumanising, single-sex dwellings continue to exist, is an indication of the State’s failure to not only protect and respect the dweller’s rights to dignity but also their rights to access adequate housing. The dehumanising conditions in turn have festered conditions, which made it possible for the unabating political killings with seeming impunity. In the run-up to the 2019 elections, where the contest for power will become more concerted - the stakes are sure to be higher - so will possibly, the political killings, with the hostels as places of mobilisation. The Moerane Commission will do well to ensure that independent, high-ranking SAPS personnel investigate the political killings - as should the Minister of Police - for other political killings outside of KwaZulu-Natal. For as long as the political killings happen with seeming impunity - South Africa’s democracy will continue to be eroded. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Centre for Constitutional Rights

U.S. President Donald Trump arrives to delivers remarks at the 2017 National Scout Jamboree in Summit Bechtel National Scout Reserve, West Virginia, U.S., July 24, 2017. © 2017 Reuters In a series of tweets from his personal account, US President Donald Trump announced this morning that transgender people would no longer be permitted to serve in the US military. This discriminatory decision not only jeopardizes the careers of thousands of transgender personnel now serving, it also sends a dangerous message that some personnel are unfit to serve solely because of who they are. The tweets mark a sharp reversal of recent Department of Defense (DoD) policy. In 2011, Congress repealed the infamous “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy and allowed lesbian, gay, and bisexual personnel openly to serve in the military. In 2016, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter announced that DoD was lifting the ban on transgender service and would cover transition-related healthcare costs for service members. In his tweets, Trump justified reinstating a blanket ban on transgender service by citing the “tremendous medical costs and disruption” that inclusion would entail. Yet, a study commissioned by the DoD concluded last year that allowing transgender service members to serve openly would have “minimal impact on readiness and health care costs,” around US$2.4 million to $8.4 million in a military healthcare budget of $6.2 billion. To put this in perspective, the military spends $41.6 million on Viagra each year. Because Trump made the announcement on Twitter, the scope and details of the ban are unclear. A tweet from the president does not invalidate federal regulations, and the DoD’s Directive-Type Memorandum 16-005 and Instruction 1300.28, which provide guidance on transgender service, formally remain in place. The executive branch has not issued any written policy beyond the tweets, and multiple lawmakers – including GOP Senators Orrin Hatch, Richard Shelby, and John McCain – expressed concern about the decision shortly after it was announced. Lawmakers are right to condemn today’s discriminatory announcement, but transgender personnel need more than their sympathy. Trump’s dubious arguments about cost and disruption are no justification for a policy that bans all transgender people from serving in the US military. A year after transgender people began to openly serve, those concerns are so far-fetched that it’s hard to see them as anything other than half-hearted excuses for a deliberate act of discrimination. As the details of Trump’s new policy emerge, Congress should act swiftly to ensure that prejudice has no place in the armed forces and transgender people are able to serve their country openly and freely. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Human Rights Watch