The Burmese army arrested and filed charges against three local journalists this week, sending shock waves through the Burmese press corps. The country is still emerging from decades of military rule, and journalists remain uncertain of what can be safely reported. They are also unsure how much backing they will receive from Burma’s democratically elected leaders. The government, led by the National League for Democracy party of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, has been slow to condemn this and other infringements on media freedom since taking power last year. In her evolution from dissident to politician, Suu Kyi — Burma’s de facto leader — benefited immensely from media coverage, which in an era before widespread Internet access helped keep her cause alive. During military rule, when Suu Kyi was under house arrest in Rangoon, Burmese news organizations operated from exile to bring information about her plight and the fate of Burma’s pro-democracy activists to the world. In 2011, a year after Suu Kyi’s house arrest was lifted, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party launched a series of media reforms. Exiled organizations were allowed back into the country as it ramped up for its historic 2015 general election, the first free nationwide vote in Burma in 25 years. The journalists arrested on Monday — along with four civilians whose identities are not known — were from two of those news outlets, the Irrawaddy and the Democratic Voice of Burma, known locally as DVB. They were stopped after leaving a ceremony held by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army in a remote part of Shan state in the northeast. The TNLA is one of many ethnic armed groups fighting for more autonomy. Though their representatives attended peace talks in May, the rebels continue to clash with the army and have not signed a cease-fire agreement. After being detained, the journalists were transferred to the police and charged under a section of the 1908 Unlawful Associations Act that carries a maximum prison sentence of three years. Rights groups and the U.S. Embassy quickly spoke out, but Suu Kyi’s government appeared to defend the arrests. DVB’s Rangoon bureau chief, Toe Zaw Latt, told The Washington Post that, in his opinion, Suu Kyi may feel she doesn’t need the press anymore. “When it comes to DVB, we always made sure Burma news is regarded in the international arena. Don’t forget Aung San Suu Kyi, we always highlighted that,” he said. “But she does not think that she owes anybody, especially the media. That is very sad.” Advocacy groups have expressed alarm about the state of media freedom under Suu Kyi’s watch. In April, PEN Myanmar, which uses the country’s official name, surveyed 14 groups for a scorecard on freedom of expression. Participants were told to rank different indicators from 0 (regression) to 10 (outstanding progress). The indicator for media independence and freedom received a 1 — no progress. The low ranking stems in part from a lack of unimpeded access to report in conflict areas, an online defamation law that has been used to prosecute journalists and civilians critical of the government, and the ongoing publication of state-sponsored news. Suu Kyi herself has avoided giving interviews in the country. Win Htein, a senior member of the National League for Democracy who was quoted defending the actions of the military in local media, told The Post that he never said he approved of the arrests, — even as he proceeded to offer a justification for them. The longtime NLD stalwart said those involved in peace talks are allowed to meet with armed groups, while others, even others in government, are not. “They went there ignoring this,” he said. He described the case as not serious and said the journalists will “come out sooner or later,” measuring the long years that party activists spent in prison under military rule against the ordeal of the three reporters so far. “A few days is just chickens---,” he said. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Washington Post

Foreign Affairs Minister Aung San Suu Kyi has ordered her ministry to reject visa requests from UN investigators appointed to report on the military’s alleged human rights atrocities in Shan, Kachin, and Rakhine states. “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said we would not coordinate with UN fact-finding mission, as we have disassociated ourselves from the resolution because we do not think that the resolution is in keeping with what is actually happening on the ground,” deputy foreign affairs minister Kyaw Tin told parliament yesterday as reported by RFA. “We will order Myanmar embassies not to grant any visa to UN fact finding mission members,” the deputy minister added. He said UN investigators would have to carry out their mission by visiting neighboring countries. The United Nation Human Rights Council passed a resolution in March calling for an independent, international fact-finding mission to investigate the Myanmar army’s alleged human rights violations in ethnic minority areas, especially against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine State. In May, the council appointed Indian lawyer Indira Jaising, Sri Lanka’s former human rights chief Radhika Coomaraswamy, and Australian human rights advocate Christopher Dominic Sidoti to carry out the investigation. They are expected to produce a draft report by September. An October 2016 raid by Rohingya militants on border guard posts left nine police officers dead. The military crackdown that ensued left over 1,000 dead and 90,000 Rohingyas displaced. The UN found evidence of rape, torture, and murder committed by Myanmar security forces during the four-month crackdown, though the Myanmar government has defended the military from these claims. NLD leader Win Htein responded to the reports in March: “We do not care about this kind of unfair report. Because we do not care, we do not worry.” Aung San Suu Kyi has repeatedly refused to cooperate with the UN fact-finding mission, deferring instead to the Rakhine State Advisory Commission, led by former UN secretary general Kofi Annan and appointed by Suu Kyi’s State Counsellor Office. The commission does not report on human rights abuses. In April, 23 rights groups called on the Myanmar government to cooperate with the UN mission. However, at yesterday’s meeting with the deputy foreign affairs minister, lawmakers appeared to agree with their government’s obstruction of the investigation. One MP said: “This issue can harm our country’s sovereignty. [T]he government must do something effective to protect it.” _________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Coconuts Yangon

Yesterday, June 29, 2017, former Obama administration Special Envoys for Sudan Princeton Lyman and Donald Booth, along with former U.S. Charge d’Affaires in Khartoum Jerry Lanier, wrote a brief letter to the Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, arguing in glib and disingenuous terms for a permanent lifting of U.S. economic sanctions on the genocidal Khartoum regime (it is not surprising that there has been no mention by any of these men, in this letter or elsewhere, of the fact that an arrest warrant has been issued for President Omar al-Bashir, charging him with multiple counts of genocide and massive crimes against humanity in Darfur by the International Criminal Court). The views expressed are not surprising and indeed echo previous and often demonstrably false claims made by these men. The entire letter appears here with my commentary interpolated, in blue italics follow by my initials. I would note by way of preface some of the more remarkable claims and moments during the tenure of these men, particularly Booth and Lyman. I would highlight, as I have on a number of occasions, comments made by Lyman in an interview of December 2011. I do so because it represents so well the preposterous assumptions made by both Lyman and Booth, and how completely misguided their view of the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime has been—a regime today celebrating the military coup that brought them to power exactly 28 years ago (June 30, 1989). In this almost three decades of brutal, tyrannical, and serially genocidal rule, this regime has not changed in any significant way. It has certainly not changed in ways claimed as possible by Lyman in December 2011: “We [the Obama administration] do not want to see the ouster of the [Khartoum] regime, nor regime change. We want to see the regime carrying out reform via constitutional democratic measures.” (Interview with Asharq al-Awsat, December 3, 2011 | http://english.aawsat.com/2011/12/article55244147/asharq-al-awsat-talks-to-us-special-envoy-to-sudan-princeton-lyman ) One hardly knows where to begin in parsing the absurdity of this statement, justifying the Obama administration’s opposition to regime change, overwhelmingly favored by the vast majority of Sudanese and indeed now the linchpin of political and military opposition to the regime throughout Sudan. In the five and a half years since Lyman’s statement, the following have defined the political history of Sudan: [1] Acceleration of militia violence, especially by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—Khartoum’s militia force of choice and now formally incorporated within the regular army (the Sudan Armed Forces, SAF); this violence was dramatically in evidence from 2012 through 2016, culminating in the savage military assault on the Jebel Marra region of Central Darfur, during which chemical weapons were used against civilians nowhere near military actions (Amnesty International, September 2016 | https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/scorched-earth-poisoned-air-sudanese-government-forces-ravage-jebel-marra-darfur/; [2] As part of the rise of the Rapid Support Forces, we have seen a massive increase in the violent expropriation of non-Arab/African farmland | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1P4/; [3] The epidemic of sexual violence against girls and young woman—a central element of Khartoum’s genocidal counter-insurgency efforts—has continued unabated; see my monograph on the subject (2016 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1QG/); [4] Violence directed against civilians in Darfur by Khartoum’s regular forces also continues; most notorious so far this year was the “Nierteti massacre” (January 1, 2017): Nierteti “massacre” sparks outrage across Sudan | Radio Dabanga, January 2, 2017| NIERTETI |At least two people have been killed and 39 others wounded in an attack by Sudanese army soldiers on Nierteti in Central Darfur on Sunday morning. [Figures for casualties varied but suggest that some 60 – 70 civilians were killed or wounded during the vicious SAF rampage; Darfur Union UK lists the names and ages of 11 people killed—five of them under the age of 17—ER] [5] Some 3 million Darfuris remain displaced internally in Darfur or as refugees in eastern Chad—too fearful to return to their homes and lands, living amidst intolerable insecurity and badly attenuated humanitarian operations. 2.7 million IDPs live in some 200 locations (see | http://sudanreeves.org/2017/03/19/internally-displaced-persons-in-darfur-the-invisible-catastrophe/ ) and Khartoum has repeatedly threatened to dismantle these camps, which would make humanitarian relief efforts impossible and leave people utterly bereft and without protection. Moreover, the UN Security Council is today (June 30, 2017) re-authorizing the badly incompetent UN/African Union peacekeeping mission (UNAMID), but only after drastically slashing both military personnel (a 44 percent cut) and police forces (a 33 percent cut). The effect on humanitarian delivery and human security could well be catastrophic; [6] The Khartoum regime continues its severe curtailment of humanitarian access to many hundreds of thousands of Sudanese civilians: the humanitarian embargo imposed in 2011 on areas in South Kordofan and Blue Nile controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-N) continues to this day; Khartoum’s refusal to negotiate access in good faith goes back to its rejection of the African Union/UN/Arab League “Tripartite” proposal of February 2012 (see | http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44516/); In Darfur huge numbers of civilians are denied humanitarian access by the regime use of a wide range of methods: delay/denial of visas and travel permits; physical intimidation of relief workers; freezing of UNAMID assets and mobility; outright denial of access for reasons unrelated to security; and most consequentially, the ongoing expelling of humanitarian organizations (more than two dozen to date) and the vicious intimidation of UN agencies, effectively limited what can be said about mortality, malnutrition, sexual violence, and security conditions generally; [7] Political repression has dramatically increased—the very opposite of the “carrying out [of] reform via constitutional democratic measures” Lyman so fatuously and/or disingenuously spoke of—and in Sudan repression takes many forms: • Steadily increasing what were already draconian restrictions on the national press; • Violent dispersal of demonstrations, most notably in September 2013 when the regime was confronted with country-wide demonstrations that were eventually put down when “shoot to kill” orders were given to police and security services (a fact established by both Amnesty International and the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies); more than 200 people were murdered, perhaps several times that number; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/27/sudanese-protesters-attacked-march-fuel-subsidies/; • The use of torture against journalists, humanitarians, and political opponents; the examples are too numerous to list (many are known to me from direct conversation with victims), but the continuing brutal incarceration of Mudawi Ibrahim, human rights advocate and founder of the Sudan Development Organization (SUDO), is emblematic; he faces the death penalty for his work | https://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/a-human-rights-defender-facing-the-death-penalty//; • Creation of an utterly factitious “National Dialogue,” seized on my opportunistic diplomats like Lyman and Booth, but dismissed by the regime itself as a mere political ploy in confidential meetings, minutes of which have been leaked (see | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1In/; these minutes have been repeatedly confirmed as authentic | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1w5/); the “re-election” of génocidaire al-Bashir in April 2015 had all the electoral authenticity one might infer from his 94 percent victory margin. Lyman’s “reform via constitutional democratic measures” seems the worst sort of grimly bad joke in the wake of this election; • A number of Darfuris meeting with then Special Envoy Booth in August 2016—this in the wake of the savage Jebel Marra campaign of the same year—were promptly arrested once Booth had left. Some remained incarcerated for weeks, despite claimed efforts by Booth to have them set free. Booth’s failure to anticipate these arrests is revealing of just how ignorant of the regime he proved on countless occasions. • Threatening and arresting journalists who use the laboratory-confirmed designation of cholera to describe the epidemic sweeping through Sudan, a product in many ways of the regime’s failure to invest in national infrastructure projects, including the provision of clean water to an impoverished population (half the people of Sudan live below the international poverty line); • The violent kleptocracy that is the NIF/NCP regime has created conditions of acute malnutrition in Sudan, malnutrition that is rising even as the agricultural sector is collapsing for lack of regime investment over almost three decades (see | http://sudanreeves.org/2017/04/04/famine-in-south-sudan-should-not-obscure-urgent-food-crisis-in-sudan/); the regime has so intimidated the UN humanitarian agencies that even critical malnutrition data goes unpublished (see | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1pL/). Acute and Severed Acute Malnutrition affects more than 2 million children in Sudan; millions more suffering from chronic malnutrition (“stunting”)—and yet the military and security services commandeer more than half the national budget, ensuring the regime’s stranglehold on Sudanese wealth and political power. In addition to the letter from Booth, Lyman, and Lanier, comments from present U.S. Charge d’Affaires Steven Koutsis seem clearly designed to push for a permanent lifting of U.S. economic sanctions, first imposed by President Clinton in 1997 and strengthened by President George W. Bush in 2006. Koutsis was recently cited by Agence France-Presse (June 24, 2017) as declaring: “None of these other issues were the point of sanctions, and none of these other issues, therefore, should be linked to the lifting of sanctions." The “issues” he was referring to are Khartoum’s abysmal human rights record, its increasing repression and continuing violent suppression of political dissent, its increasingly strident religious intolerance, and its continuing deployment of brutal militia forces in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan. But this statement if profoundly false and is directly belied by the language of the Preface to Clinton’s Executive Order of 1997: We must wonder what part of “the prevalence of human rights violations, including slavery and the denial of religious freedom” escaped Koutsis’ understanding. Rather more to the point, we must ask whether it was an unforgiveable ignorance of this language in the 1997 Executive Order—or a cynical belief that no one would call him on the outrageous inaccuracy of his statement. Many in the Congress are quite aware of what an ignorant and tendentious diplomatic representative Koutsis is; indeed, he is little more than a hack, tasked with getting sanctions lifted using whatever mean are possible (see a fuller account of his handiwork at | http://wp.me/p45rOG-24G/). As a consequence, it is quite likely the Congress will act in the ways it has in the past on critical sanctions issues, including those directed against Russia and Iran. This will include targeted sanctions coupled with other leverage. But the argument for lifting sanctions sent to the House Foreign Affairs Committee deserves close inspection, coming from leading Obama administration diplomats on Sudan—and now that the Khartoum regime has been able to hire the powerful legal and lobbying services of Squire Patton Boggs, one of Washington’s most prominent and powerful law firms (this because of the January decision by President Obama to begin the suspension of sanctions against Khartoum). The hiring of Squire Patton Boggs is particularly notable since, with good reason, Sudan is one of only three countries on the State Department’s list of “state sponsors of terrorism” (along with Iran and Syria). And there can be no doubt of the Khartoum regime’s continuing commitment to supporting radical Islamic militants, as it has done in, for example, Libya (see| http://wp.me/s45rOG-7964/). Ironically, the decision to lift sanctions is motivated not, as Lyman would have us believe, by a hope that somehow this brutal, genocidal regime will somehow come to “carry out reform via constitutional democratic measures.” It is a policy decision by the U.S. intelligence community, which has long dictated the major terms of engagement between Khartoum and Washington (see, for example, my lengthy account from late 2011 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-GT /). The truly enormous new U.S. “embassy” in Khartoum has been filled by the CIA and other intelligence agencies with a full range of surveillance, intercept, satellite monitoring, and other equipment; it is designed to be the primary U.S. listening post for northern Africa, a fact celebrated, if a bit hyperbolically by a regime spokesman: "There is communication between the two bodies and regular meetings. The CIA office in Khartoum is the largest office in the Middle East. Because the United States is aware of the Sudan strategic importance in the region, it has established one of the largest diplomatic missions in the region, even they had to expand their buildings," said Hanafi in an interview with the Khartoum based Al-Sudani newspaper published on Tuesday. (Sudan Tribune, January 31, 2017 | http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article61565/) The Letter from Lyman, Booth, Lanier: Annotated June 29, 2017 Honorable Members
House Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515 RE: U.S. POLICY ON SUDAN Dear Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee: We write to you today regarding U.S. policy on Sudan, and the objectives we all share: ending conflict in Sudan and promoting reforms toward a peaceful and more sustainable system of governance. [This is a terrifying echo of Lyman’s words from December 2011: “We want to see the regime carrying out reform via constitutional democratic measures.”—ER] To this end, we urge you to continue supporting the existing five-track engagement strategy [This isn’t a strategy; it is transparently an effort to put a “smile” on capitulation to the regime in return for the counter-terrorism intelligence Khartoum is believed capable of providing the U.S.—ER] and the opportunity it now affords the United States to advance those objectives. In the same vein, we urge caution in rushing any new legislative action that might undermine this opportunity for progress going forward. [This is a preemptive strike against possible Congressional imposition of a new sanctions regime on Khartoum—ER] Over the last seven years, we have together spent considerable time engaging Sudanese officials inside and outside government; we know how imperfect are the choices when it comes to Sudan, and how critical is a strategy of engagement. [If in this considerable time these men have decided still to cleave to Lyman’s 2011 assessment—“we want to see the regime carrying out reform via constitutional democratic measures”—then it is all to clear that their “engagement” is extraordinarily ignorant of what this regime truly is. Here we might bear in mind the staggering ignorance of Charge d’Affaires Koutsis: “None of these other issues [human rights, religious toleration, ending chattel slavery] were the point of sanctions, and none of these other issues, therefore, should be linked to the lifting of sanctions."—ER] As you know, the State Department is mandated to submit a July 2017 assessment on the five-track engagement plan, which was first initiated in June 2016. That strategy was initiated with a view toward smarter and more results-oriented engagement with Sudan. [I have cataloged above [and seriatim at www.sudanreeves.org/] the “results” of U.S. engagement since the beginning of the Obama administration, and in particular since Lyman’s extraordinarily, incomprehensibly misguided assessment of the regime’s “democratic” instincts—ER] It is designed to use existing tools to leverage changes in behavior by Khartoum’s government in key areas, including a ceasefire and humanitarian access. [Let’s judge the “success” of Lyman’s and Booth’s efforts in light of the facts presented above. In particular, claims about improved “humanitarian access” have been consistently untrue. Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power spoke in January, during her last press conference as Ambassador, of a “sea change” of improvement in humanitarian access. This characterization was rejected by every knowledgeable figure in the humanitarian community—on the ground in Sudan and in the broader humanitarian community internationally; even the State Department could offer no explanation of what led Power to this deeply troubling falsehood. And the basic reality is that a total humanitarian embargo remains in place, as it has since summer 2011, on SPLM/A-N-controlled areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile States. This recalcitrant fact led U.S. Charge d’Affaires Koutsis to the truly bizarre strategy of blaming the SPLM/A-N for the continuation of the embargo—a symptom of how misguided U.S. thinking about the critical issue of humanitarian access has been—ER] The State Department’s first assessment in late 2016 noted the changes the government made in response to the plan, which then resulted a first round of sanctions easing. [Again, let’s judge this glib celebration of what President Obama referred to vaguely as “positive actions” by the realities in Sudan today, and as represented by the facts presented above—ER] The U.S. engagement plan was not intended as a one-off effort, but rather is intended to initiate a framework for sustained bilateral engagement toward the realization of U.S. objectives. The United States retains considerable leverage over Khartoum, which seeks to see additional sanctions removed, its designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism rescinded, its path to debt relief cleared, and full diplomatic and military relations restored. It is important that the Trump Administration and Congress show unity in carrying forward this initiative, and in turning early progress into sustained reform. [In other words, “Believe us: we’re experienced diplomats and former special envoys for Sudan—ignore the realities that are all too conspicuous.”—ER] Progress on the agreed tracks in this first phase of engagement, and lifting the agreed sanctions, moves the U.S and Sudan to the next phase of engagement, [This is hopelessly vague and non-specific, ignoring both military/security and humanitarian realities in Sudan; evidently all three men count on the ignorance of those in the Trump administration making the decision, and are trying to silence the Congress—ER] to include more steps toward respect for human rights, [But the point is that there have been no steps toward respect for human rights”—none! –ER] sustained humanitarian access, [These callous men simply can’t bring themselves to discuss honestly the realities of humanitarian access in Sudan, and the degree to which the Khartoum regime obstructs the work of the world’s finest international relief organizations—this is finally despicable—ER] and a lasting peace. “Peace” for the regime means, and has always meant, military victory—now, after fourteen unspeakably bloody years, essentially achieved in Darfur—and the goal for South Kordofan once U.S. sanctions are lifted permanently. That these men were both content to assert the viability of the “Doha Document for Peace in Darfur,” long after its failure on all counts was conspicuous, should be noted—ER] Stopping the process now would undermine progress to date and prevent forward movement. [Again, there has been no progress—merely an expedient suspension of aerial attacks and military offensives in South Kordofan; these will resume when sanctions have been removed permanently. And judged by every other meaningful criterion—human rights, humanitarian access, economic development, democratization, infrastructure investment—the regime has continued to fail miserably and international rankings in each of these areas bear out this characterization—ER] It would also bind the hands of the new administration and erase the momentum it has inherited. [Again, there is no” momentum”—merely capitulation before Khartoum’s patient determination to get what is wants; it may trim its military behavior as necessary, make noises about improving humanitarian access—but there has been no “progress,” there is no “momentum”—the regime remains fully in power, although it presides over a collapsing economy that is galvanizing Sudan’s political opposition. Lifting sanctions permanently throws and economic lifeline to the regime at precisely the wrong moment—ER] The U.S. plan represents an acknowledgement that sanctions alone had long failed to produce the changes we all hope to see—while also imposing unduly negative consequences on many ordinary Sudanese citizens. [The “unduly negative consequences” suffered by “ordinary Sudanese citizens” are not a function of U.S. sanctions but of the catastrophic mismanagement of Sudan’s economy by the NIF/NCP regime over 28 years, enriching itself and its politically important cabal of cronies in a vast kleptocracy (see | http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/enough-forum-release-kleptocracy-khartoum) • Failure to invest in the agricultural sector and instead selling and leasing vast tracts of arable land to Arab and Asian countries interested in securing their own future food security; the collapse of the once thriving Gezira Scheme is symptomatic—and has nothing to do with U.S. sanctions; • Failure to invest in infrastructure, hence the badly deteriorating water delivery system, which is a primary cause of the wild spread of cholera in the country, including Darfur as the rainy season begins in earnest; • Failure to plan for the consequences of the secession South Sudan (July 2011) and the consequent extremely severe shortage of Foreign Exchange Currency (Forex), now required for the import of more than $1 billion of wheat per year and even refined petroleum products (the regime refused to use the ample oil revenues of 1999 – 2011 to build a significant domestic refining capacity—again, this has nothing to do with U.S. sanctions. Skyrocketing inflation, the precipitous drop in the value of the Sudanese Pound, the inability to import key commodities—including food and basic medicines—these are not a function of U.S. sanctions but gross economic mismanagement and terribly skewed budgetary priorities, devoting resources primarily to the military and security services; History has demonstrated that a punitive sanctions regime cannot alone yield progress in Sudan. [Of course one must ask, then, why is the regime so eager to see them lifted permanently—it is most certainly not out of concern for the “ordinary Sudanese citizens,” who have suffered grievously under this regime’s tyranny for 28 years—ER] Only through the credible and consistent use of both incentives and pressures, and a view toward long-term reform, can we realize our objectives. [“Long-term reform” becomes the illusory fiction to rely on when there is no short-term reform to point to—politically, economically, or in the humanitarian arena; this is the response to the conspicuous absurdity of Lyman’s declaration of five and a half years ago: “We want to see the regime carrying out reform via constitutional democratic measures.” There is no reform in evidence and no evidence that it will occur under this regime—no evidence whatsoever, which is why this perverse letter is so completely without specifics—ER] To this end: It is imperative that the United States follows through on the letter of the engagement plan, and do so on the basis of the Administration’s multi-pronged assessment. [This “imperative” has not been demonstrated, merely asserted by interested parties—interested insofar as they represent policies that have enabled a genocidal regime to continue its tyranny and kleptocratic ways for the entire duration of the Obama administration these men represented—ER] Delaying the process may seem an attractive option, but in reality it would damage U.S. credibility and squander the opportunity now before us. [Again, the “opportunity” is completely unspecified—we are somehow to take it on faith from men who have been shown to be repeatedly and grossly in error in the past—ER] We must continue to work with those who seek long-term reform [And again, the revealing emphasis on “long-term reform”: this is what one stipulates when there is no “short-term reform” to point to—ER] and Sudan’s re-integration into the global community. And we must avoid doing any favors for Sudanese hardliners who represent the worst of the government, and who oppose the very objectives we are seeking to achieve. [This is simply bizarre and reflects an extraordinary ignorance of who really controls power in Khartoum: “Sudanese hardliners who represent the worst of the government.” It is precisely the hardliners who have exerted most control since 2011 and the military decisions that led to the seizure of Abyei and to war in South Kordofan and Blue Nile; it was the hardliners who created the Rapid Support Forces, now the dominant militia force in Darfur and destined to play a similarly large role when Khartoum inevitably moves to seize full military control of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The characterization offered here by Booth, Lyman, and Lanier is but an updated version of an old claim that “if only the ‘moderates’ in the regime can be strengthened…” There are no moderates! Minutes of an August 31, 2014 meeting of the regime’s most powerful military and security officials make fully clear who commands power within the regime—and they are all “hardliners” by any meaningful definition of the phrase (these minutes have been fully authenticated, including by the U.S. State Department)—ER] We believe that now is not the time for legislation that would complicate our sanctions regime and confuse our diplomatic strategy. [If Booth and Lyman revealed anything during their tenure, it was that they had no “diplomatic strategy”—hence, for example, the celebration of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, a peace agreement without any buy-in from either Darfuri civil society or the significant rebel movements. What has distinguished the Obama administration is not a diplomatic strategy but rather fashioning the best tactical means by which to secure Khartoum’s cooperation in providing counter-terrorism intelligence—ER] Introducing new benchmarks—especially those that cannot be effectively measured or achieved—will not help us in realizing our objectives. [This is pure tendentiousness: there is no coherent set of objectives that has any chance of being realized once sanctions are lifted—again, the lack of specifics in this letter, and the refusal to acknowledge errors and failures of judgment of the past, are all too revealing—ER] If Sudan walks back progress to date, [“Progress to date”: how can this phrase possibly be made to comport with the realities I’ve detailed above? This is “argument by bald assertion,” untroubled by realities on the ground in Sudan—ER] or fails on the next phase of engagement, the Administration and Congress can re-assess and take appropriate steps— including punitive measures if necessary—at that juncture. Thank you, as always, for your continued interest and commitment, and we stand ready to discuss these important issues with you further. Sincerely, Ambassador (Ret.) Princeton Lyman Former U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan Ambassador (Ret.) Donald Booth Former U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan Ambassador (Ret.) Jerry Lanier Former U.S. Chargé d'Affaires to Sudan __________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

On Monday, 26 June, the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reportedly captured al-Qadisia, a western district of Raqqa, the de facto capital of the Islamic State (ISIL) in Syria. US-led coalition airstrikes have been assisting SDF throughout the Raqqa campaign against ISIL, but the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said on Saturday that coalition airstrikes in and around Raqqa have also purportedly killed nearly 700 civilians this year. Furthermore, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that US-led coalition airstrikes killed 57 people in a single attack targeting a prison operated by ISIL on Monday. Civilian prisoners are believed to make up the majority of the casualties from the strike. The prison is located in al-Mayadeen, an eastern Syrian town where US intelligence officials believe ISIL has likely moved most of its leaders. Colonel Joe Scrocca, coalition director of public affairs, said that the airstrike mission was “meticulously planned and executed to reduce the risk of collateral damage and potential harm to noncombatants," adding that the allegations will be assessed by the group’s civilian casualty team. Meanwhile, US intelligence officials reported they had observed activities that seemed to indicate preparations for a chemical attack were underway in Syria's Shayrat airfield, the same airfield that Syrian government forces are reported to have used in April to allegedly launch a chemical attack that caused more than 80 deaths in Khan Sheikhoun. White House press Secretary Sean Spicer said late Monday that Syrian forces would “pay a heavy price” if they launched another chemical attack. US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis reported on Wednesdaythat the Syrian government appears to have heeded the warning for now. Despite the controversy on how its airstrikes are affecting civilians, the US-led coalition is moving forward with plans to make Raqqa safe once ISIL is effectively removed. On Wednesday, US-led coalition special envoy Brett McGurk met with the Raqqa Civil Council, which is designed to rule Raqqa after the coalition liberates the city. McGurk and other coalition officials said they would “support first removing mines, lifting rubble, maintenance of schools, then electricity stations and water," according to Omar Alloush, a member of the Raqqa Civil Council. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 RtoP Weekly

Simone Veil, then France’s minister of health, outside the Elysee Palace in Paris, 1974. (Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images) Simone Veil, a well-known French politician and Holocaust survivor, has died. Veil, a former minister of health who in 2012 was awarded France’s highest honor, passed away this week at her home in Paris, her family told the media in France on Friday. The scholar, former judge and feminist activist was 89. A lawyer by education, Veil served as minister of health under the center-right government of Valery Giscard d’Estaing and later as president of the European Parliament, as well as a member of the Constitutional Council of France. In 1975, she led the legislation that legalized abortions in France. President Emmanuel Macron offered his condolences. “May her example inspire our fellow countrymen, who will find in her the best of France,” Macron said in a message to the family. Former French President Francois Hollande presented Veil with the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor at the Elysee Palace in 2012. Fewer than 70 people have received the Grand Cross since Napoleon Bonaparte established it in 1802. Veil, a native of Nice, was imprisoned at Auschwitz and later Bergen-Belsen before she was liberated in April 1945. She published the best-selling autobiography “A Life” in 2007. The following year she was admitted to the Academie Francaise, a highly prestigious institution comprising individuals, often philosophers and writers, recognized for scholarly excellence. The institution, which has 35 members, of whom only six are women, was “revolutionized” by the admittance of Veil, a longtime campaigner for women’s rights, according to an obituary written about Veil by the RTL broadcaster. The president of CRIF, the umbrella organization representing French Jewish communities, wrote in a statement that he was “immensely saddened by the passing of Veil. “With her high standards and loyalty, this activist for women’s rights has left an indelible mark on French politics and its intellectual life,” Francis Kalifat wrote, adding that Veil had done so “with courage and dignity.” In 2012, CRIF described Veil as “one of France’s most cherished personalities and someone who plays an important role in keeping her camp from succumbing to the temptation of allying with the Front National” nationalist party. “Her name is associated with women’s equality, the memory of the Shoah and the European community,” CRIF added. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ © 2017 Jewish Telegraphic Agency

Thirteen years ago, the international community declared that genocide was taking place in Darfur. However, the UN dismissed the concerns of the US Congress and the European Parliament, while grudgingly recognising merely that atrocities were taking place in the western region of Sudan. Consequently, peacekeepers were dispatched to protect civilians. Today, the UN is again misleading the international community by defending its plan to cut by nearly half the existing peacekeeping force, which will undoubtedly put millions of civilian lives at risk. This decision is based on the very UN lies, deceit and cover-ups that I witnessed when I served as the spokesperson for the UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID) between August 2012 and April 2013. During the eight months I served in Darfur, I saw how UNAMID‘s leadership perpetuated the Big Lie: its first chief, the Congolese politician Rodolphe Adada, declared in 2009 that Darfur’s war was over. Supported by the department of peacekeeping operations (DPKO) based in New York, UNAMID chiefs and senior managers covered up Khartoum’s horrendous crimes by reducing the war in Darfur to a “counter-insurgency conflict” opposing the Sudanese government and Darfur rebels. This deception allowed them to hide the other and most devastating war, the one the Arab-supremacist regime of Omar al-Bashir has been waging against Darfur civilians, mostly of non-Arab origins, for over a decade now. For years, UNAMID and DPKO used every trick to conceal the truth about the deliberate government bombing, mass killings and forced displacement of unarmed civilians from the ethnic Zaghawa, Fur and Massalit populations. UNAMID and DPKO kept silent too about the systematic mass rape of women and girls, and many other atrocities that they were carefully documenting, including the government-orchestrated massacre of Arab nomads in Khartoum’s gold war in Jebel Amer. Throughout my time in Darfur, I also witnessed how UNAMID chiefs and their counterparts in New York concealed the fact that the Sudanese government, instead of disarming the infamous Janjaweed militias as demanded by the UN Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), had brazenly transformed, super-armed, and re-branded them as the Rapid Support Forces, an even more lethal force under the command of the country’s notoriously vicious intelligence services. Refusing to be part of the UN’s conspiracy against innocent civilians, I resigned my post, putting an end to my 10 year UN career to expose the UN cover-up. My testimony, supported by a Foreign Policy investigation, prompted the International Criminal Court to call on the then UN chief, Ban Ki-moon to conduct a “thorough, independent and public inquiry.” Instead, Ban set up an in-house review that found that UNAMID routinely concealed from the UN headquarters evidence revealing the responsibility of Sudanese government forces for deadly attacks against civilians and peacekeepers. Yet, despite a plethora of incriminating facts, Ban’s review insisted that there was no evidence of an intentional cover-up. Thirteen years ago, the international community declared that genocide was taking place in Darfur. However, the UN dismissed the concerns of the US Congress and the European Parliament, while grudgingly recognising merely that atrocities were taking place in the western region of Sudan. Consequently, peacekeepers were dispatched to protect civilians. Today, the UN is again misleading the international community by defending its plan to cut by nearly half the existing peacekeeping force, which will undoubtedly put millions of civilian lives at risk. This decision is based on the very UN lies, deceit and cover-ups that I witnessed when I served as the spokesperson for the UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID) between August 2012 and April 2013. During the eight months I served in Darfur, I saw how UNAMID‘s leadership perpetuated the Big Lie: its first chief, the Congolese politician Rodolphe Adada, declared in 2009 that Darfur’s war was over. Supported by the department of peacekeeping operations (DPKO) based in New York, UNAMID chiefs and senior managers covered up Khartoum’s horrendous crimes by reducing the war in Darfur to a “counter-insurgency conflict” opposing the Sudanese government and Darfur rebels. This deception allowed them to hide the other and most devastating war, the one the Arab-supremacist regime of Omar al-Bashir has been waging against Darfur civilians, mostly of non-Arab origins, for over a decade now. For years, UNAMID and DPKO used every trick to conceal the truth about the deliberate government bombing, mass killings and forced displacement of unarmed civilians from the ethnic Zaghawa, Fur and Massalit populations. UNAMID and DPKO kept silent too about the systematic mass rape of women and girls, and many other atrocities that they were carefully documenting, including the government-orchestrated massacre of Arab nomads in Khartoum’s gold war in Jebel Amer. Throughout my time in Darfur, I also witnessed how UNAMID chiefs and their counterparts in New York concealed the fact that the Sudanese government, instead of disarming the infamous Janjaweed militias as demanded by the UN Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), had brazenly transformed, super-armed, and re-branded them as the Rapid Support Forces, an even more lethal force under the command of the country’s notoriously vicious intelligence services. Refusing to be part of the UN’s conspiracy against innocent civilians, I resigned my post, putting an end to my 10 year UN career to expose the UN cover-up. My testimony, supported by a Foreign Policy investigation, prompted the International Criminal Court to call on the then UN chief, Ban Ki-moon to conduct a “thorough, independent and public inquiry.” Instead, Ban set up an in-house review that found that UNAMID routinely concealed from the UN headquarters evidence revealing the responsibility of Sudanese government forces for deadly attacks against civilians and peacekeepers. Yet, despite a plethora of incriminating facts, Ban’s review insisted that there was no evidence of an intentional cover-up. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 HuffPost - HPMG News

United Nations agencies have convened over 100 government and civil society partners from 12 countries for a landmark three-day (June 28 to 30) meeting in Bangkok to respond to gender-based violence. A press release issued by World Health Organisation South-East Asia Regional Office, the Bangkok meeting drew participants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Indonesia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Timor-Leste. The meeting was convened by the Asia-Pacific regional offices of the United Nations Population Fund, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the WHO. “A collaborative and coordinated response is needed in every country, which brings together several key sectors, including the police, the legal and justice system, social services and health,” said the release. To that end, a joint UN programme was established last year on Essential Services for Women and Girls Subject to Violence, with the participation of UNFPA, UN Women, UNODC, and WHO. The Essential Services Package for Women and Girls Subject to Violence sets out concrete guidance for services that should be available to every survivor, no matter where she lives or who she is. The Essential Services Package facilitates the implementation of several commitments made by member states to address violence against women and girls, including the Sustainable Development Goals, the 2016 WHO global plan of action on health systems’ response to violence against women and girls, and the 2013 Agreed Conclusions of the Commission on the Status of Women. “This package of services emphasises more than ever the importance of coordinated approaches that place the survivor at the center of response, prioritising her safety and well-being,” said Miwa Kato, UN Women regional director for Asia and the Pacific. WHO estimates one in three women have experienced physical and/or sexual violence globally. According to UNFPA’s 2016 Regional Snapshot on prevalence of violence against women in the Asia-Pacific region between 15 per cent and 68 per cent women have reported experiencing physical or sexual violence, or both. “Countries in our region are committed to addressing gender-based violence. As mandated by the World Health Assembly resolution on the global plan of action on violence against women and girls, the health sector, in coordination with other sectors, is stepping up its efforts to provide survivor-centred care by training health care providers and improving access to services,” said Dr Poonam Khetrapal Singh, WHO regional director for South-East Asia Region. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Himalayan Times

France’s largest bank is facing serious accusations after three NGOs on Thursday said they filed legal action against BNP Paribas alleging “complicity in genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity” during Rwanda’s 1994 genocide. The suit alleges Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP), as the bank was known before its merger with Paribas in 2000 to become BNP Paribas, “participated in financing the purchase of 80 tonnes of arms that served to perpetrate the genocide” despite the fact, it claims, “that the bank could not have doubted the genocidal intentions of the authorities of the country for which it authorized the transfer” of funds. The groups note that a United Nations arms embargo was in effect at the time. The genocide in the tiny central African country claimed 800,000 lives, mostly from Rwanda’s ethnic Tutsi minority, between April and July 1994. The three NGOs leading the charge are Sherpa, an anti-corruption group that defends victims of economic crimes, Ibuka France, an association that defends survivors of the genocide, and the Collective of Civil Parties for Rwanda (CPCR), a group based in France that pursues claims against genocide suspects. Sherpa earned headlines recently when it filed a lawsuit against the Swiss-French cement giant LafargeHolcim alleging the company financed Islamic State group in Syria. In their complaint against BNP, the NGOs claim the bank “authorised two transfers of funds [totalling more than $1.3 million] on June 14 and 16, 1994, from the account that the National Bank of Rwanda held with BNP towards an account at the Swiss bank UBP” held under the name of Willem Tertius Ehlers. The group’s complaint says Ehlers, a South African national and former secretary to South African leader P.W. Botha, owned an arms brokerage firm called Delta Aero at the time. The suit claims Ehlers and Rwandan Hutu colonel Théoneste Bagosora concluded an arms sale in the Seychelles on the day after the second transfer of funds. It says the weapons were officially purchased by Zaire, as the Democratic Republic of Congo was then known, but with two Rwandans in the delegation that travelled to the Seychelles. The groups cite testimony given by Bagosora himself before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda describing the transfer of weapons from the Seychelles to Goma, on Zaire’s border with Rwanda, and then into Rwanda. Bagosora, now 70, is serving a 35-year sentence for crimes against humanity in connection with the genocide. For its part, BNP Paribas has yet to respond to the substance of the allegations. “We have learned through the media about a lawsuit being filed,” a BNP Paribas spokesperson told news agencies on Thursday. “At this time, we do not have sufficient information about it to enable us to comment on it.” A separate complaint was filed on Wednesday against "X", or persons unknown in the French legal parlance, for “complicity in genocide and complicity in crimes against humanity” during the Rwandan genocide by Survie, a French group that “denounces all forms of French neo-colonial intervention in Africa”. Survie wants an inquiry to be opened. “There are strong suspicions about the involvement of French politicians and military personnel in the cooperation with the Rwandan government before, during and after the genocide,” said Safya Akorri, Survie’s lawyer, according to Le Parisien, which alongside Radio France broke the news about the complaint.” It is up to the judiciary, and not civil society, to help in understanding their role and establishing possible penal responsibility.” Survie had filed a prior complaint that was dismissed last fall. In the latest issue of the French quarterly XXI, editor-in-chief Patrick de Saint-Exupéry looks at similar allegations as relayed by an unnamed civil servant who had access to still-classified French archives from the time. Saint-Exupéry’s piece accuses the Elysée Palace of ordering the re-armament of Hutu authorities in the wake of the genocide. His source claims a memo to that effect was signed by Hubert Védrine, the palace’s secretary general at the time under late Socialist president François Mitterrand. “For more than 20 years, associations, historians, the French judiciary have been asking for access to these archives. For 20 years, these archives have rested, ferociously protected,” Saint-Exupéry told FRANCE 24’s French language Journal de l’Afrique. “So it obviously begs the question today of the opening of these archives and I believe that today is the issue.” _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 FRANCE 24 with AFP and REUTERS

Yanghee Lee (L), the UN's Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, visits a camp in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, where tens of thousands of Rohingya Muslims took refuge from an army campaign, Feb. 21, 2017. Myanmar doubled down Thursday on its refusal to cooperate with United Nations' efforts to investigate reported army atrocities in the strife-ridden western state of Rakhine, with the foreign ministry saying it has ordered the country's embassies not to issue visas to UN investigators. The United Nation Human Rights Council issued a resolution in March calling for the dispatch of an independent, international fact-finding mission to investigate the alleged recent human rights violations by security forces in Rohingya Muslim communities in the northern part of the state. In May, the council appointed three legal experts and rights advocates as members of a fact-finding mission to investigate the human rights situation in Myanmar, especially in Rakhine state. The mission was tasked with producing a draft report by September. On Thursday, however, Kyaw Tin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affair, told parliament Myanmar's embassies were ordered not to grant visas to UN fact finding mission members. "Daw [honorific] Aung San Suu Kyi said we would not coordinate with UN fact-finding mission as we have disassociated ourselves from the resolution because we do not think that the resolution is in keeping with what is actually happening on the ground," he said during questioning in parliament. "We will order Myanmar embassies not to grant any visa to UN fact finding mission members. But this mission will travel to Myanmar’s neighboring countries and will ask in these countries what they want to know and submit its report to UN," Kyaw Tin added. Myanmar soldiers carried out a four-month crackdown in parts of Rakhine state following a deadly raid on border guard posts in October 2016, which officials blamed on Rohingya militants in the country’s impoverished and religiously and ethnically divided westernmost area. The U.N. previously said that reports of atrocities committed during the crackdown that killed an estimated 1,000 people and displaced about 90,000 Rohingya, most of whom fled to neighboring Bangladesh where they are living in refugee camps, may amount to genocide or ethnic cleansing. On April 11, a top-level Myanmar government official briefing foreign diplomats, U.N. agency personnel, and reporters called the U.N. resolution "less than helpful," saying that Myanmar has made progress in dealing with the situation in Rakhine. He noted that the government is complying with most of the 30 recommendations made by a Rakhine advisory committee headed by former U.N. chief Kofi Annan by opening restricted areas to news media, allowing increased humanitarian access, and agreeing to close down three internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in three Rakhine towns. Two weeks later, an open letter sent by 23 rights groups and other international organizations is calling on world governments to urge Myanmar’s cooperation with the U.N. fact-finding mission saying the country would be better off allowing reports of sexual violence, extrajudicial killings, torture, and the destruction of homes by security forces in Rakhine state to be openly and honestly addressed. The foreign ministry's stance was supported by members of parliament at the hearing. "This issue can harm our country’s sovereignty. I was thinking that the government must do something effective to protect it," said lawmaker Hla Htay Win. Another member of parliament, Oo Hla Saw, weighed in, urging a tough line. "Sending a fact-finding mission to our country is cavalier. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi should declare our attitude toward this," he said. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Radio Free Asia

WEBLINK : http://info.icrc.org/humanizing-the-laws-of-war?ecid=ACsprvt5AfunEA7WGTWmtBYbK0Cl1CTpuWxTVAFyaU3ySHeuDhiP_dJpYQYrvSCs3pBmVhF_hA2o&utm_campaign=Forum%20-%20eNewsletter%20-%202017&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=53718394&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-81_5DleV1m0kkG6u3gZm3_iNq_aTiaB1anNPeUEyZL4d7fCb6OQ-A8Kakr88k7GXXg8iPny16lMJtDEKwE39tHu1sfI2Wd1WA_lCKfItiuQ7YxiMs&_hsmi=53718394 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________(c) 2017 ICRI

The Equality Court sitting in the South Gauteng High Court in Johannesburg has ordered the Congress of South African Trade Unions' (Cosatu) Bongani Masuku to make "unconditional apology" to the South African Jewish Board of Deputies (SAJBD) for comments he made in 2009. Masuku was found guilty of hate speech on Thursday morning. The SA Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and SAJBD were squaring off with Masuku and Cosatu. Judge Seun Moshidi said Masuku should apologise within 30 days of the order or within a period that the parties may agree. "The impugned statements are declared hurtful, harmful, incite harm, and propagate hatred, and amount to hate speech... " Moshidi said. Masuku and other members of Cosatu and affiliated unions were present in court for the judgment. In 2009, the SAHRC found Masuku guilty of hate speech. He was called to apologise to the SAJBD, which he refused to do. According to reports, the SAJBD accused Masuku of hate speech for comments he made during a lecture at the University of the Witwatersrand, hosted by the Palestine Solidarity Committee and the Young Communist League. The complaint lodged in 2009 was based on threatening, inflammatory and derogatory statements made by Masuku against the mainstream South African Jewish community, City Press reported. The SAJBD's complaint detailed how Masuku, in a public address at Wits University, as well as in various written communications, threatened that Jewish South Africans would be targeted because of their support for Israel. The weekly Sunday paper also added that Masuku made statements that Jewish lives would be made "hell", and that vigilante action would be taken against Jewish families suspected of having members serving in the Israeli military, and that Jews who continued to stand up for Israel should "not just be encouraged, but forced to leave South Africa". Masuku and Cosatu were ordered to pay legal costs. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 News24

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls for the release of three journalists who were arrested after covering an event organized by an illegal armed group, and urges the authorities to drop the charges brought against them under the draconian Unlawful Associations Act. The three journalists – Aye Naing and Pyae Phone Naing of Democratic Voice of Burma and Thein Zaw of The Irrawaddy – were charged and imprisoned in the northeastern city of Hsipaw on June 28, two days after their arrest. Their trial is due to start on July 10. They were arrested after covering a drug-burning ceremony organized by the outlawed Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) to mark International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking. Under the Unlawful Associations Act, any form of contact with an outlawed group is punishable by up to three years in prison. It was widely used by the former military government to silence dissent for nearly half a century. “Aung San Suu Kyi’s statements about free speech need to be more than just empty promises,” RSF said. “It is appalling to see the ruling National League for Democracy use the same laws as the previous military regime to censor the media. If the NLD wants to break with the military era’s archaic practices, it must send a clear message of support for democratic values, starting with media freedom.” In Burma, the authorities continue to harass the media using laws that were specifically designed to silence criticism. Two Voice Daily journalists were detained last month as a result of a complaint brought by the military under the Telecommunications Act. In April, Myo Yan Naung, a human rights activist and NLD member, was jailed for criticizing the head of the armed forces on Facebook. Burma is ranked 131st out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Reporters Without Boarders