President Trump has garnered reams of coverage and criticism for his executive order on refugees, but so far the press has shown little interest in the Administration’s professed desire to create safe zones in the Middle East to protect vulnerable civilians from the conflicts in Syria and Yemen. That’s a shame, for there is some merit to the idea. In Iraq, in particular, the Administration ought to consider the creation of a safe zone in Nineveh Province’s Tal Afar, Sinjar, and Nineveh Plain regions to protect the area’s Turkmen, Yazidi, and Christian populations. These three communities have generally lived together in peace but have endured brutal violence in recent years—first at the hands of Saddam’s oppressive regime and then from ISIS. They have never had an opportunity to build the stable, self-governing local communities that we take for granted in the United States. A safe zone would give them that opportunity. Last year, Chris Seiple, Robert Nicholson, and Andrew Doran wrote that decentralized governance, to include the creation of a province for vulnerable minorities in Iraq, could offer a model for stability in Iraq and possibly Syria. Whether one calls it a province, safe haven, safe zone, or protected area, the concept remains the same: decentralized, local governance based on the principle of equal citizenship that protects the interests and integrity of the distinct communities from which it was formed. A federated model is especially necessary where competing sectarian interests and the principles of centralization and pluralism are in conflict, where the idea of the common good doesn’t exist, and where sectarian violence is the norm. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al Abadi in 2015 put simply what is on the mind of many in the region: “If we don’t decentralize, the country will disintegrate.” Disintegration is indeed often the result where decentralization does not occur, particularly where states are cobbled together without a sense of national identity. It can happen peacefully, as it did in Czechoslovakia, or amid much bloodshed, as it did in the former Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia, where we can find examples of both failure and success. We believe Bosnia, in fact, provides a model for Iraq, and perhaps Syria and Yemen. In the Bosnian case, several years of NATO and UN inaction (1992–95) culminated in the summer of 1995 in a bloody massacre at Srebrenica. Even though Srebrenica had been declared a “safe haven” by international peacekeepers, they had no mandate to use force. The peacekeepers therefore could do nothing as Bosnian Serbs moved on the city, slaughtering thousands of civilians, most of them Muslim men and boys. The term “safe haven” was rightly besmirched in the aftermath of Srebrenica, but the tragedy also became a catalyst for the Dayton Peace Accords (1995), which brought representatives from the warring parties or their proxies to the table (Slobodan Milosevic stood in for Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic). An international implementation force (IFOR) then intervened to create zones of separation along sectarian lines. The “peacekeeping” mandate was replaced with “peace-enforcing.” The operation quickly pacified and stabilized Bosnia. The peace there has held for more than two decades. Iraqi Kurdistan provides another instance in which international intervention in the 1990s succeeded in protecting a distinct group that had suffered genocide and war crimes at the hands of an oppressive regime. Operation Provide Comfort (known as Operation Haven by the British) in Iraqi Kurdistan involved the deployment of only a few thousand British soldiers to northern Iraq. Security was followed by humanitarian assistance. In the quarter century since, Iraqi Kurdistan has developed into a reliable U.S. ally and an autonomous region with independent elections and greater press freedoms than are enjoyed in surrounding areas. Bosnia and Kurdistan constitute perhaps the two most successful international interventions since the end of the Cold War. Both ended conflict, protected local populations, and brought stability. Safe zones in the Middle East can achieve these same objectives. It is likely that several will be needed. Like Bosnia and Kurdistan, some combination of boots on the ground and no-fly zones will likely be necessary. Nowhere is the U.S. (and its allies) better situated to create such a safe zone than in northern Iraq—specifically, the Tal Afar, Sinjar, and Nineveh Plain regions of Nineveh Province. The indigenous inhabitants of this geographically contiguous area—Yazidis, Christians, and Turkmen—have been designated as having suffered genocide at the hands of ISIS by the U.S. government. Not only do these communities yearn for local security, self-governance, and economic self-sufficiency; they are also natural allies. And it’s worth noting that no U.S. troops have ever been attacked by Christians or Yazidis in northern Iraq. Like Bosnia, it is likely that U.S. and allied forces would endure few casualties. Casualties, more than cost, are the greatest deterrent to military intervention, whether that intervention’s aim is to advance national security, humanitarian objectives, or both. U.S. troops have been deployed in Europe and Asia since the end of World War II, yet this has caused little in the way of fatigue. Why? Because the cost in blood has been minimal, so the cost in treasure has been overlooked. This proposal for a safe haven in Nineveh Province would likely result in few casualties. It is even possible that it could be undertaken with a token force and few, if any, U.S. troops. The region’s Christians, Turkmen, and Yazidis—like the Kurds—have been reliable allies for the United States in the region and against ISIS in particular, and they are keen to provide for their own security. An international force, supported by close air support (in the unlikely event of an ISIS counter-attack against the area surrounding Mosul), would secure the region, after which it would need humanitarian aid for economic revitalization. Funds have already been allocated in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for “military and other security forces of or associated with the Government of Iraq, including Kurdish and tribal security forces, with a national mission, to counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to December 31, 2019.” The NDAA also calls for “a detailed blueprint on how humanitarian, reconstruction, and stabilization assistance will be provided to support a follow on governance structure,” and to support “local security forces that are committed to protecting highly vulnerable ethnic and religious communities, such as Yazidi, Christian, Assyrian, and Turkoman communities, against the ISIL threat.” The indigenous inhabitants of the proposed Nineveh Safe Zone must ultimately provide for their own security. The core contingent of these forces is already constituted for the most part. How would these communities, whose homes and infrastructure were largely destroyed during the ISIS occupation, revitalize their economies? There are billions of barrels of oil and natural gas in the proposed area. Foreign security and oil firms are eager to extract these resources, and the revenue derived from them, when placed in a transparent and equitably shared sovereign wealth fund could be used to help returning genocide victims rebuild communities and livelihoods. The Trump Administration has already demonstrated a commitment to private sector growth domestically. The communities of northern Iraq would benefit greatly from this approach. This would require a resurrection of aid models that were abandoned several years ago, such as the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO), which initially met with success in Afghanistan and Iraq. There was much resistance to this private sector approach within the foreign policy bureaucracy (particularly at State and USAID). Aid for the communities in the Nineveh Plain Safe Zone should be structured in the form of economic investment, including microfinance, from firms in North America, Europe, the Gulf States, Lebanon, and elsewhere. The Administration’s executive agencies would facilitate economic revitalization and energy extraction to offset the cost of stabilizing the region, relying where possible on private security firms to protect infrastructure, train local security forces (with the oversight of a token international force and civilian advisors), and generally oversee stability and growth. In addition to traditional U.S. allies such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France, and Germany, the United States could work to expand membership in the Coalition Against ISIS to include other regional partners such as Georgia and Armenia. (Armenia in particular may be looking to redefine its role in the region in order to build alliances with the West and get out from under Russia’s thumb.) The Gulf States, which were apparently receptive to President Trump’s overtures on safe zones for Syria’s predominantly Sunni refugees may also be open to the creation of safe zones in which Muslims enjoy the benefits of equal citizenship, as a means of promoting stability in neighboring Iraq. The ideal time to create the Nineveh Plain Safe Zone is now. In fact, it needs to be incorporated into the larger strategic plan to defeat ISIS and stabilize the Mosul region. Mosul needn’t be completely pacified for a safe zone to be established. Ramadi and Fallujah haven’t been stable for any meaningful stretch of time since the fall of Saddam Hussein, yet stabilization efforts there continue (as they should). As international, national, and regional forces push ISIS out of Nineveh Province, planning the transition from combat to reconstruction must be a priority. The NDAA already contains a mandate to plan for the rebuilding and pacification of Mosul, and planners would be foolish to ignore the minorities displaced from these newly liberated districts, who will comprise the human foundation for any post-conflict order. One question looms large in considerations for any such safe zone: Will Baghdad agree to the plan? Decentralization and stability are ultimately in Baghdad’s best interests, so it seems likely that Baghdad would follow American leadership if the United States government were to make it clear that this is an American priority, and that goodwill between countries depends upon it. Al-Abadi and other leaders, including the Iraqi Cabinet of Ministers, have acknowledged the need for decentralization for Iraq’s minority communities. Any remaining concerns about infringement of Iraqi sovereignty are offset by the fact that there is already an overt military presence to which Baghdad has consented. The U.S. government is already coordinating with the Iraqi government to defeat ISIS, and ongoing U.S. security and economic assistance is not something Iraq can afford to lose. The Nineveh Plain Safe Zone would promote security, foster local (decentralized) governance by the principle of equal citizenship, and revitalize the area’s economy. For the United States, this would, we believe, advance not only humanitarian but also strategic interests in the region. The U.S.-led and supported interventions in Bosnia and Kurdistan in the 1990s ended conflicts targeting minorities, eliminated or reduced conditions favorable to terrorist recruitment, and built security and stability on decentralized, local governance structures in which minorities thrived. This model could work in Nineveh Province. The lessons learned there will provide important insights into the creation of similar (albeit likely more complicated) safe zones in Syria and Yemen. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The American Interest | IDC

1. The Parliamentary Assembly notes that the population of the member States of the Council of Europe is more ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse than ever before. The landscape of religious communities in Europe is complex and evolving, with traditional beliefs spreading beyond their historical territory and new denominations emerging. Such an environment has the potential to render families belonging to religious minorities ostracised for their views and values in contexts where there is a dominant majority that holds conflicting views. 2. In this context, the Assembly recalls its staunch commitment to supporting peaceful coexistence between people of different religious and ethnic affiliations, and striving for a tolerant, respectful and democratic community for all, as outlined in the adoption of several Assembly texts, including: Resolution 1904 (2012) on the right to freedom of choice in education in Europe; Resolution 1928 (2013) on safeguarding human rights in relation to religion and belief and protecting religious communities from violence; Resolution 2036 (2015) on tackling intolerance and discrimination in Europe with a special focus on Christians and Resolution 2076 (2015) on freedom of religion and living together in a democratic society. 3. The Assembly underlines its commitment to protecting the fundamental rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5, “the Convention”), in particular the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion under Article 9, and the right of parents to provide their children with an education in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions under Article 2 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention (ETS No. 9). The Assembly reiterates the fundamental right of children to education in a critical and pluralistic manner in accordance with the Convention, its protocols and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 4. The Assembly considers that particular difficulties can arise with regard to respecting the beliefs and convictions of minority religious communities in the context of the registration of religious organisations, State provided education and social services. The Assembly considers that it is not the role of member States to regulate or validate the beliefs and world views of its population, but to accommodate different perspectives and convictions, and allow individuals to thrive together within the boundaries of public order, health and morals. It considers that the genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and the dynamics of cultural traditions and identities and religious convictions are essential in order to achieve social cohesion. 5. The Assembly therefore calls on all member States of the Council of Europe to protect the rights of parents and children belonging to religious minorities by taking practical steps, legislative or otherwise, to: 5.1. affirm the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion for all individuals, including the right not to adhere to any religion, and protect the right of all not to be compelled to perform actions that go against their deeply held moral or religious beliefs, while ensuring that access to services lawfully provided is maintained and the right of others to be free from discrimination is protected; 5.2. promote reasonable accommodation of the deeply held moral or religious beliefs of all individuals in cases of serious conflict to enable citizens to freely manifest their religion or belief in private or in public, within the limits defined by legislation and provided that this is not detrimental to the rights of others; 5.3. repeal any law or rule which establishes a discriminatory distinction between religious minorities and majority beliefs; 5.4. ensure easy-to-implement options for children or parents to obtain exemptions from compulsory State religious education programmes that are in conflict with their deeply held moral or religious beliefs; such options may include non-confessional teaching of religion, providing information on a plurality of religions, and ethics programmes. This resolution is the result of a motion for a resolution (N° 13333) tabled on 10th October 2013 by Mr Valeriu Ghiletchi (Moldova), appointed as rapporteur by the Committee on Equality and Non Discrimination of the PACE, and other members of the Assembly**. The text of the motion was saying: The Council of Europe is committed to a policy for the protection of rights mentioned in Article 2 of the additional protocol of the European Court of Human Rights to respect the rights of parents to ensure that their children are raised and educated in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions. The Parliamentary Assembly recalls Recommendations No. 1720 (2005) on “Education and religion”, No. 1396 (1999) on “Religion and democracy”, No. 1309 (2002) on “Freedom of religion and religious minorities in France”, No. 1928 (2013) on “Safeguarding human rights in relation to religion and belief and protecting religious communities from violence” (particularly paragraph 9.11), No. 1904 (2012) on “The right to freedom of choice in education in Europe”. The Assembly has expressed concern regarding discrimination that may arise from unnecessary restrictions on the rights of parents to raise and educate their children in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions. The European Court of Human Rights has also ruled on this matter in many decisions, reinforcing the rights of parents to raise their children in conformity with their own convictions. The Assembly finds that new religious movements and religious minorities are especially at risk regarding the infringement of these rights by some member States. Derogatory labeling of religious minorities as ‘sects’, ‘sectarian’, ‘cults’ or any other term generates bias and stigmatization and lead to undue restrictions to a parent’s right to raise and educate their children in conformity with their own beliefs. The Assembly therefore resolves to study and identify cases where member States do not respect the rights of parents to educate children according to their own religious and philosophical convictions, especially with regard to minorities. (*) Assembly debate on 27 April 2017 (17th Sitting) (see Doc. 14260, report of the Committee on Equality and NonDiscrimination, rapporteur: Mr Valeriu Ghiletchi). Text adopted by the Assembly on 27 April 2017 (17th Sitting). See also Recommendation 2101 (2017) at http://bit.ly/2pJGFZ4. (**) The motion was signed by: GHILETCHI Valeriu, Republic of Moldova EPP/CD; AGRAMUNT Pedro, SpainEPP/CD; CHOPE Christopher, United KingdomEDG; CROSIO Jonny, Italy EDG; DESEYN Roel, Belgium EPP/CD; DONALDSON Jeffrey, United KingdomEDG; DUNDEE Alexander, [The Earl of], United Kingdom EDG; GALATI Giuseppe, Italy EPP/CD; HOVHANNISYAN Arpine, Armenia EPP/CD; JAPARIDZE Tedo, Georgia SOC; KALMÁR Ferenc, Hungary EPP/CD; KORODI Attila, Romania EPP/CD; LEIGH Edward, United Kingdom EDG; MAGHRADZE Guguli, Georgia SOC; MENDES BOTA José, PortugalEPP/CD; OROBETS Lesia, UkraineEPP/CD; PALACIOS José Ignacio, Spain EPP/CD; PINTADO Ángel, Spain EPP/CD; QUINTANILLA Carmen, SpainEPP/CD; SOBOLEV Serhiy, Ukraine EPP/CD; WOLDSETH Karin S., Norway, EDG. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Human Rights Without Frontiers International

On April 4, 2017, an attack with chemical weapons struck Khan Sheikhoun, a town in northwestern Syria, killing at least 89 people. While the death toll likely makes this the deadliest chemical attack since an attack killed hundreds in two Damascus suburbs in August 2013, the Khan Sheikhoun attack is just one of the Syrian government’s many recent chemical attacks. Since late 2016, the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons has become more widespread and systematic, and Human Rights Watch research shows that many of the attacks appear to be directed against the civilian population. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Human Rights Watch

Colombo: Sri Lankan coastguards have seized an Indian fishing boat and detained two Indians and 30 Rohingya refugees, including 14 children after the vessel illegally entered the country's territorial waters, authorities said on Sunday. They were detained off the coast of Kankesanturai in the country's northern Jaffna peninsula, the navy said. "Sri Lankan coast guards were observing the International Maritime Boundary Line. They found this Indian fishing boat with unusually large group of people," navy spokesman Chaminda Walakuluge said. The people held include seven men, seven women and 16 children, besides the two Indian crew. A 15-day-old baby and a four-month-old child were also on board, the official said. The boat was carrying Myanmar refugees who had fled to India four years ago due to clashes in Myanmar. The vessel, operated by the two Indians, had entered Sri Lanka's northern waters after crossing the sea border, the officer said. They were handed over to local authorities to decide further action. Investigators suspect that the crew were trying to bring the Rohingya illegally to Sri Lanka. The Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar's Rakhine state are denied citizenship and face brutal discrimination in the Buddhist-majority country. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 First Post

According to the Bishop of Quibdó: In Chocó (one department of Colombia) 20 out of the 30 municipalities have been declared in a state of “Alert” due to combats between the ELN Guerrilla and neo-paramilitary groups (BACRIM). This is exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the department. As the Colombian Government and the largest guerrilla group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), seek to implement the revised Peace Accord, levels of violence and human rights abuses soar to unprecedented levels in the rural areas of Colombia. The second largest left-wing guerrilla group in Colombia Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) started Peace Talks on 7 February 2017 with the Colombian Government, however as yet, no bi-lateral ceasefire has been agreed. In addition to the ELN, right-wing neo-paramilitary groups, referred to by the Colombian Government as ‘Criminal Gangs’ (BACRIM by their Spanish acronym) continue to grow and consolidate. These neo-paramilitaries threaten and perpetuate violence against rural communities and their leaders. They confine the movement of communities, are using anti-personnel mines, generating forced displacement all of which is contributing to the humanitarian Crisis in Colombia, and intensifying the situation of poverty and marginalisation of the population of Chocó. Many communities are being forced to displace due to combats between the ELN and the neo-paramilitary group Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC) [1]. These combats are part of a fight to control strategic locations for coca cultivation, processing and commercialisation, and mechanised small-scale gold mining, in areas abandoned by the FARC guerrilla when they moved into Transitional Local Zones for Normalisation (ZVTN) to disarm. Despite the Early Warning Alerts and the presence of a Joint Task Force TITAN (Navy, Army and Air Force) based in Choco [3], no effective methods were put in place to help protect the local population and to prevent the displacement. TITAN have a force of over 2,500 troops based in Chocó. The Bishop of Quibdó, Monseñor Juan Carlos Barreto Barreto, points out that whilst there is a general effort on the part of the Security Forces, the problem in Chocó is very complex. There are very profitable illegal businesses, such as drug trafficking, extortion and illegal mining, which finance the illegal groups. However, he also raised the issue that at times, in Choco, there appears to be a lack of commitment by the Security Forces to protect local communities. [2] According to the Inter-Ethnic Forum (FISCH), the Indigenous Board and the Dioceses’ of Quibdó, Istmina and Apratadó: “In Chocó, as well as in many regions across the country, we have witnessed widespread and systematic control by illegal armed groups … resulting in the insecurity and vulnerability of numerous communities.” According to Monseñor Barreto it is insufficient to call many of the illegal groups operating in Chocó ‘Criminal Gangs’; as they are in fact neo-paramilitary groups. The Bishop explained in an interview with El Espectador [3], that the Dioceses has information that, in some areas of the country, there are links between the neo-paramilitary groups and the Security Forces. He goes on to say that it is essential that the Security Forces undergo an internal review, and a purification process so that those with links to the neo-paramilitaries are removed from the Security Forces and are no longer able to act in the name of the State. Recommendations to the Government of Colombia • To urgently implement measures in Chocó to address the humanitarian and security crisis, and to consult civil society organisations and the Dioceses’ of Quibdó, Istmina and Apratadó on measures that will most effectively increase security for the citizens of Chocó • To immediately implement the Point 3.4 the Security Guarantees’ Chapter of the Peace Accord and ensure that the financial and political structures supporting paramilitarism in Colombia are dismantled; • To undertake an internal review and purification process of the Security Forces; • Initiate an inter-institutional and intersectoral working group to formulate a specific plan to and allocate sufficient resources to address the issues of unemployment, education, health and public services in the marginalised region of Chocó. References: [1] The Neo-Paramilitary Groups grew out of the mid-ranking Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) that did not demobilise in 2005. The neo-paramilitary groups are referred to by the Colombian Governemnt as Criminal Gangs (BACRIM) [2] “En algunas regiones de Chocó falta más compromiso de la Fuerza Pública”: obispo de la Diócesis de Quibdó Interview in El Espectador; Article from Chocó Territorio de Etnías [3] Ibid (C) 2017 ABColombia

On 26 April the Society of Social Sister of Budapest (SSS) was declared “House of Life” by the Raoul Wallenberg Foundation. The Sisters of Social Service are a Roman Catholic religious institute of women founded in Hungary in 1923 by Margaret Slachta. The sisters adopted the social mission of the Catholic Church and Benedictine spirituality with a special devotion to the Holy Spirit. “Houses of Life” is an educational program lead by the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation aiming to identify, pay tribute and spread the actions of solidarity of institutions or individuals that extended a hand to the persecuted by the Nazis during the Holocaust. Dr. Gabor Bagdy Ferenc Orosz, head of the Raoul Wallenberg Society of Budapest, spoke on behalf of The Raoul Wallenberg Foundation about the role and mission of the Houses of Life educational program. He mentioned the activity of the Holocaust rescuers, Wallenberg and others. He closed his speech quoting some thoughts from Pope Francis’ prayer on God Friday, and mentioned that the Pope is one of the founding members of the Raoul Wallenberg Foundation. Then, Dr. Agnes Pataki, spoke about the history and activity of the Society of Social Sisters. She spoke in details their work during WWII and the Holocaust. They saved more than 1000 Jewish people. Some persons’ activities were mentioned in details. Margit Schlachta, founder and leader of the society, recognized by Yad Vashem; Sara Salkahazi, killed by the Arrow Cross people (Hungarian Nazis), beatified, recognized by Yad Vashem, and Katlin Roza Peitl, who led the rescuing activity at the very same place where the plaque was placed. Agnes Pataki The plaque was unveiled by Dr. Gabor Bagdy, Vice-Major of Budapest and President of the Christian Democratic Party in Budapest, and blessed by Dr. Janos Szekely, Catholic Bishop. The event was attended by Dr. Jozsef Szecsi, general secretary of the Christian-Jewish Society, by Dr. Endre Bela Huff, executive of the RW Association and by Laszlo Ernyei, councilor of church issues, 2nd District of Budapest. During the ceremony, Ms. Monika Kiss conducted works of chamber music by Liszt, Mozart and Vivaldi. This is the first House of Life plaque in Hungary donated by the Raoul Wallenberg Foundation, an educational NGO chaired by Eduardo Eurnekian and created by Baruch Tenembaum. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation

Ramzan Kadyrov, the President of Chechnya REUTERS The Chechen and Russian governments must investigate claims of persecution of gay men and protect LGBT rights, the US Holocaust Memorial Museum has said, as it condemned an alleged campaign of repression reported in Chechnya in recent months. The museum's director, Sara Bloomfield, said: "The Holocaust teaches us what can happen when state-sponsored, group-targeted violence is allowed to go unchecked. The reports about the targeting of LGBT persons in Chechnya combined with statements from Chechen officials seemingly endorsing violence are cause for great concern." Reports suggest Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov wants to "eliminate" the republic's gay community by the start of Ramadan on 26 May, according to the UK Foreign Office minister Sir Alan Duncan. "Human rights groups report that these anti-gay campaigns and killings are orchestrated by the head of the Chechen republic, Ramzan Kadyrov," Sir Alan told Parliament. More than 100 men have been rounded up and detained in secret prisons by authorities on suspicion of being gay in recent weeks, with many beaten and tortured, the Russian investigative newspaper Novaya Gazeta claimed. At least four are alleged to have been killed. The Holocaust Memorial Museum recalled the purges of gay people in Nazi Germany during the rule of Adolf Hitler. It said: "Gay men were targeted for persecution because they were viewed to be carriers of a 'contagion' that weakened society and did not contribute to the growth of the 'Aryan' population." Some 100,000 were arrested, with half sent to prison and up to 15,000 sent to concentration camps, it said. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Independent

Extant data from a range of sources, as well as reports, analyses and limited surveys, make clear that more than 600,000 people have died, directly or indirectly, from the violence orchestrated by the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime in Khartoum over the past 14 years of genocidal counter-insurgency in Darfur. The victims are overwhelming from the non-Arab/African tribal groups of Darfur, although there has been substantial concomitant violent mortality among some Arab tribal groups, primarily a result of inter-tribal violence. More than a decade ago Khartoum made the reporting of mortality data by the UN a forbidden activity for both the UN and International Nongovernmental Humanitarian Organizations (INGOs): mortality data collection could result in threats of violence or expulsion against those collecting or promulgating data. This fact was conveyed to me directly by the senior UN official overseeing the last collection of data in Darfur, Dr. David Nabarro of the UN’s World Health Organization (2005 – 2006). It is for this reason that former head of UN humanitarian operations, John Holmes, was obliged in a press conference in April 2008 to offer an extrapolation from the data that Nabarro’s team had been able to collect in earlier years: UNITED NATIONS — The U.N.’s humanitarian chief on Tuesday updated the estimated number of conflict-related deaths in Darfur to about 300,000 and lamented that efforts to solve the crisis were stalled on all fronts. In a briefing to the Security Council, John Holmes, the U.N. undersecretary-general for humanitarian affairs, said that continued attacks make it more difficult for aid workers to reach vulnerable people, food aid is about to be halved, the deployment of peacekeepers is beset by obstacles and the peace process has stalled. “I am saddened and angry that after five years of suffering and four years since this council became actively engaged, we have still not been able to find a lasting solution to the suffering of these millions of men, women and children,” he said. (Los Angeles Times, April 23, 2008 | http://articles.latimes.com/2008/apr/23/world/fg-darfur23/). Sudan Tribune did the best job of capturing the nature of this estimate: Holmes predecessor Jan Egeland estimated in 2006 that 200,000 people had lost their lives because of the conflict including deaths from violence, disease and malnutrition. He said this was based on an independent mortality survey released in March 2005 by the U.N. World Health Organization. “That figure must be much higher now, perhaps half as much again,” Holmes said Tuesday. Queried by reporters, Holmes said the estimate of 300,000 dead “is not a very scientifically based figure” because there have been no new mortality studies in Darfur. But “it’s a reasonable extrapolation,” he said. “What I’m saying is if that figure of 200,000 was anything like right in 2006, then that figure must be much higher now,” he said. (Sudan Tribune, April 24, 2017 | http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26883/) Holmes was certainly right that the figure “must be much higher now [2008]” than it was in 2006. But Khartoum’s prevention of mortality data collection meant that all he could offer was a “guestimate,” and not an unreasonable one with no new data and an original focus on mortality in the camps, not mortality outside the camps—something stressed emphatically to me by Dr. Nabarro. But this was nine years ago, and the violence has continued, with a dramatic escalation beginning in 2012. The years 2013 through 2016 were ones of tremendous violent mortality, disproportionately by the Rapid Support Forces, following the urging of Vice President Hassabo Mohammed Abdel Rahman (reported to Human Rights Watch by a defecting militiaman named “Ahmed”): Ahmed, a 35-year-old officer in the Border Guards, spent two weeks at a military base in Guba in December 2014 before being sent to fight rebels around Fanga. Two senior RSF officials, the commanding officer, Alnour Guba, and Col. Badre ab-Creash were present on the Guba base. Ahmed said that a few days prior to leaving for East Jebel Marra, Sudanese Vice President Hassabo Mohammed Abdel Rahman directly addressed several hundred army and RSF soldiers: “Hassabo told us to clear the area east of Jebel Marra. To kill any male. He said we want to clear the area of insects… He said East Jebel Marra is the kingdom of the rebels. We don’t want anyone there to be alive.” “‘Men With No Mercy’: Rapid Support Forces Attacks against Civilians in Darfur, Sudan” (September 9, 2015) My detailed study of the violence in Darfur during the period November 2014 – November 2015 confirms the effectiveness of Hassabo’s urging (“Changing the Demography”: Violent Expropriation and Destruction of Farmlands in Darfur, November 2014 – November 2015″ | December 1, 2015 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1P4/). In August 2010, in the wake of critically important data assembled in eastern Chad by “Darfurian Voices,” I wrote a new analysis of violent mortality and reached the conclusion that mortality at that time exceeded 500,000. I had offered more than a dozen previous such efforts, trying as others had to extrapolate from the equally substantial data collected by the Coalition for International Justice (CIJ) in August – September 2004 at the behest of the U.S. State Department. These CIJ data and the accompanying report seemed to me to justify an estimate of some 400,000 deaths directly or indirectly related to violence; others reached similar conclusions. By April of 2006, a survey of all extant reports and data strongly supported an estimate of 450,000. It should be emphasized again that UN estimates were primarily of mortality among those driven by violence into camps for displaced persons where humanitarian assistance was often woefully inadequate. The data from “Darfurian Voices” formed the primary basis for my conclusion that by August 2010 more than 500,000 Darfuris had died directly or indirectly as a result of violence. These present paragraphs serve the purpose of contextualizing my re-circulation of that analysis and conclusion. Given the continuing irresponsible and uncontextualized citation by news organizations of the UN “guestimate” of 300,000 in April 2008—nine years ago—it seems a warranted effort. The document I re-circulate here has an update from a finding of 2011 by the Small Arms Survey (Geneva) concerning the calculation of violent mortality on the basis of a particular ratio: A reasonable estimate would be an average ratio of four indirect deaths to one direct death in contemporary conflicts. It is on this basis, as well as the analysis of the year November 2014 – November 2015 (and it implications for the preceding and following years) that I now estimate approximately 600,000 Darfuris have died from violence, directly or indirectly. This is a staggering figure—and twice the one reported by virtually every news organization in the world. One notable exception was a dispatch from The Guardian in July 2016, which used my figure at the time of 500,000. The range of estimates for mortality during the Rwanda genocide of 1994 is roughly 500,000 – 1 million, though 800,000 is the most commonly cited figure. Darfur’s mortality now has entered this range of estimates—and violence continues in many areas of what is now a “militia state.” (See on this characterization the important and very recent reports by Small Arms Survey and the Enough Project; there is a terrifying congruence of conclusions.) Some will argue that neither the CIJ study nor the “Darfurian Voices” report is a mortality study per se. And while this is certainly true, the implications of the data presented simply cannot be ignored, even if requiring assumptions—always conservative—at various junctures of statistical analysis. I would note that the news reporting world seems untroubled in using the figure offered nine years ago by John Holmes, self-described as “not a very scientifically based figure” but “a reasonable extrapolation.” My own view, shared by some prominent epidemiologists, is that morally we simply cannot ignore conspicuously large, violent mortality and wait for the violence to end to allow for professional epidemiological analysis—not when the figures are as staggeringly, unforgiveable great as they are in the Darfur genocide. Moreover, the report by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Violence (CRED) (Leuven, Belgium) provides a case study in how badly even professional epidemiologists can misread data and reports when insufficiently familiar with the broader political, military, and ethnic realities of a region such as Darfur; the egregious errors in the CRED report of January 2010 are discussed at length in my August 2010 analysis. Most notably, the authors use a discredited (and withdrawn) U.S. State Department document to reach the utterly preposterous conclusion that there were in Darfur “1,000 – 4,500” deaths—from all causes—in the period February 2003 through August 2003, a period during which massive militia and SAF violence was killing tens of thousands of people directly and through the terrible effects of violent displacement. ************************** Darfur Mortality Update, 6 August 2010—an update, November 2016 [1] [Of note: The Guardian (UK), July 7, 2016 uses my estimate of 500,000 dead from all causes in Darfur and eastern Chad: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/07/princess-tea-darfur-khartoum-royal-family-fall-from-grace/] [2] I have only recently come upon this notable if brief assessment by Small Arms Survey (Geneva), based on a wide range of reports by the organization: SMALL ARMS SURVEY (GENEVA), 2011 Indirect Conflict Deaths • The lethal impact of modern war extends far beyond the number of soldiers and civilians who die violently in armed combat or clashes. Although male and female combatants are the most obvious casualties, armed conflicts also contribute to excess mortality and morbidity in the civilian population—largely through the spread of infectious disease, destruction of assets, the loss of entitlements, and the diversion of scarce resources away from basic services. Indeed: A reasonable estimate would be an average ratio of four indirect deaths to one direct death in contemporary conflicts. To be sure, in Darfur the distinction between “direct” and indirect” deaths can be extremely difficult to draw, and much depends upon specific assumptions about what constitutes “direct” deaths. But if this estimate from Small Arms Survey holds for Darfur, one of the conflict sites most heavily studied by the organization, and if there have been even 100,000 “direct” violent deaths—an extremely conservative figure—then more than 500,000 people have died. Since violent mortality as estimated in this report (as of August 2010) is much higher (although it does not attempt to distinguish “direct” from “indirect” deaths), the figure for total mortality using the Small Arms Survey ratio far exceeds 600,000 from direct and indirect deaths. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ © 2017 · Eric Reeves

The trouble in the Balkans today is not Russian meddling, though there is some of that, but a special case of the malaise afflicting Eastern Europe: unchecked executive power, erosion of the rule of law, xenophobia directed at neighbours and migrants and pervasive economic insecurity. The pattern varies from country to country but is palpable from Szczecin on the Baltic to Istanbul on the Bosporus. The countries of the Western Balkans – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia – have long tended to follow patterns set by their larger, more powerful neighbours. They are doing it again. The ability of the European Union (EU) to fix problems in the Balkans is hamstrung when the same troubles persist within its own borders, sometimes in more acute form. Take erosion of democratic norms: Hungary over the past decade has slid from 2.14 to 3.54 on Freedom House’s “Nations in Transit” democracy score (lower is better). Poland’s decline is more recent but equally steep. Croatia is also backsliding. Almost all the Western Balkan states are declining, too, but more slowly. The familiar image of the Balkans is of a region with lots of minority problems: small groups that are oppressed or want to break away. Today, though, the most bitter and dangerous conflicts in most of the states there are between parties that appeal mostly or exclusively to the majority ethnic community. Minorities are bystanders, pulled in against their wishes. What of the risks of secession? At least three territories have the capacity to break relations with their parent states and establish local control, at least temporarily: Bosnia’s Republika Srpska; Macedonia’s Albanian-majority north west; and Kosovo’s Serb-majority north. All three would prefer to live under a government of their kin, yet none has acted, because they believe secession is doomed to fail. No important country is willing to recognise another breakaway republic in the Balkans. This can change in at least two ways. If a state fails to perform essential tasks like holding elections, adopting a budget and disbursing funds, a region could claim independence was necessary and try to break off on these ground. Alternatively, separatism could lose its stigma if one or more territories in the EU context were to break off peacefully – though in practice there is no appetite to accommodate this at the EU level and sensitivities abound among member states. But if either of these happen, it will be time to worry about the Balkans. Faltering Macedonia A crisis is gathering momentum in Macedonia, highlighted as some 200 protesters stormed its parliament on 27 April after an ethnic Albanian politician was voted in as speaker. Clashes that followed inside and outside the parliament injured over 70 people. The country’s substantial Albanian minority fought a small, short war against the central government in 2001. Veterans of that conflict battled police with much loss of life as recently as May 2015. Yet as Macedonia teeters on the brink of state failure, its domestic conflict has little to do with inter-ethnic tensions: it is between two predominantly Macedonian parties, the ruling, right to far-right VMRO-DPMNE and the opposition Social Democrats (SDSM). The country has been a candidate for EU membership since 2005, when it was at the head of the Western Balkans pack. How did it fall behind? VMRO-DPMNE has governed Macedonia since 2006. At some point after taking power – 2010 at the latest but the exact date remains unclear – the government began perpetrating what an EU investigation called a “massive invasion of fundamental rights”. This came to light in part in a series of leaks in spring 2015, summarised by the EU report as: “electoral fraud, corruption, abuse of power and authority, conflict of interest, blackmail, extortion … criminal damage, … nepotism and cronyism”, and many other offences including interference in the judiciary and independent institutions at all levels. The government was also shown to be illegally wiretapping thousands of people, including nearly all prominent political figures, along with media and many diplomats. VMRO had in effect converted most of the state into machinery to serve its partisan interests. Under intense EU pressure, early elections were held in December 2016 that would normally have resulted in an opposition coalition government. Macedonia had also agreed to a mechanism to investigate and prosecute the previous government’s abuses. None of these things happened. The largely ceremonial president, though constitutionally requiredto appoint the head of the majority coalition as prime minister, refused: he is a loyal VMRO man. The president claimed that the Social Democrats’ concessions to their Albanian coalition partners endanger the state. In fact these concessions are mild and reasonable. The result is a standoff. Naim Rashiti, executive director of the Balkans Group, a think-tank, warns that “VMRO simply does not want to transfer power, so it threatens to provoke ethnic conflict instead”. Though neither party can form a government, VMRO continues to run the state in caretaker mode. Meanwhile, what began as a battle between two predominantly Macedonian parties has spilled over into ethnic tension. VMRO has pinned its hopes on mobilising Macedonian fears of the Albanian minority and its alleged separatism. There are signs this is working: support for the SDSM has fallen, and “patriotic” demonstrations in favour of VMRO take place in Skopje daily. Macedonia’s Albanians have remained loyal despite reservations about how the government treats them. They reasoned that Macedonia offered them the fastest route to membership in NATO and the EU. Since VMRO’s abuse of power has frozen Macedonia’s candidacy, this is no longer true. Albania overtook Macedonia in Freedom House’s democracy rankings in 2016, and even Kosovo – with the worst rating in the region – is not far behind. Meanwhile, amid precarious inter-ethnic cohabitation, VMRO’s exploitation of fears of Albanians’ so far marginal separatism is creating the conditions – a xenophobic failed state – that may provoke the minority to seek secession. Macedonian civil society has called for targeted sanctions against officials, and the European Parliament’s rapporteur raised the possibility of “other instruments, starting from the financial kind”. The basic requirement is that the majority coalition must be allowed to take office and govern. To do otherwise is to risk ethnic conflict in one of the most dangerous parts of the Balkans. Macedonia was spared bloodshed during Yugoslavia’s disintegration, and its populations are still mixed, with Albanian-majority regions starting in the suburbs of Skopje, the national capital. European messaging has been disastrously confused. While Brussels urges responsibility, some member states give aid and comfort to VMRO, which is an associate member of the European People’s Party (EPP). That link is presumably the reason for Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz’s otherwise inexplicable decision to campaign for VMRO in the December 2016 elections. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, also an EPP colleague, said “Macedonia cannot be stable without [VMRO]”, endorsed that party’s call for a new election and urged the EU to speed up accession talks with Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro. Europe needs to speak with one voice and show zero tolerance of any party that systematically abuses power, or any state that systematically ignores the rule of law. Kosovo’s Copycats Kosovo’s leaders need to hear the same warning, because they are making the same mistakes. A struggle for power between Albanian-majority parties is paralysing the state and creating a dangerous ethnic backlash. A coalition of opposition parties won national elections in June 2014, but the incumbents refused to give up power. The details arecomplicated, but the consequences of the ruling Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)’s clinging to power – if somewhat mitigated by a power-sharing-arrangement with the centrist Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) – are clear: Kosovars’ public trust in key institutions has plummeted; in the most recent poll, confidence in the prime minister fell from 48.5 per cent before the crisis to 19.7 per cent; faith in the Assembly and the president fell by similar amounts. The opposition chose to fight the PDK’s iron grip on power with the most powerful weapon in its arsenal: nationalist resentment of Serbia and Kosovo’s Serb minority. A minor rock-throwing incident in Gjakovë in January 2015 degenerated within weeks to riots in the capital, Pristina, as opposition activists focused popular rage on the government’s weak spot, its alleged coddling of the Serb minority and subservience to Belgrade. The parliamentary opposition resorted to months of disruption, setting off tear gas canisters in the Assembly, pelting the prime minister with eggs and blocking the lectern. The government responded with waves of arguably illegal arrests of opposition deputies. At one point in 2016, nearly half the opposition’s representatives were in prison. An entirely technical exercise in border demarcation with Montenegro, a key EU requirement for visa-free travel for Kosovars, became hostage to the crisis amid spurious opposition accusations the government was giving away land. Relations between the government and opposition parties have started a fragile recovery. A dialogue mediated by Balkans Group since March 2016 has party leaders talking and persuaded the opposition to stop disrupting the Assembly. Persistent work by civil society and local actors has in this case shown more durable results than high-level visits by international actors. Traditionally, Kosovo leaders have relied on internationals to resolve their conflicts. This home-grown initiative is a welcome departure. Lurching toward Paralysis in Bosnia In its last Balkans report, in 2014, Bosnia’s Future, Crisis Group noted “little risk of deadly conflict” but warned the country was “slowly spiralling toward disintegration”. Recent events confirm that assessment. Bosnia’s foundational problem is that none of its peoples, or their leaders, like its constitutional order – but ideas for fixing it run in opposite directions. When times are calm, Bosnians can muddle through. Even minor stresses bring the fault lines to the surface. The latest of these might prove fatal. The details are again complicated, but the gist is straightforward. The Constitutional Court has struck down part of the election law, and unless it is amended, Bosnia will be unable to replace the current legislature and executive when their terms expire in October 2018. A caretaker government could function for some months but not pass a budget; by spring 2019, therefore, Bosnia might be in paralysis and disintegration. The good news is that the laws are not especially hard to repair. The bad news is that amendment requires the main Bosniak, Serb, and Croat parties to agree. Any major party can hold things up indefinitely, perhaps to wring unrelated concessions out of reluctant partners. Something like this happened before: in January 2012, the court struck down a small part of the election law pertaining to the city of Mostar. The town has now missed two rounds of local elections and is still run, after a fashion, by a mayor in his fifth year as caretaker. There is no city council. What is barely tolerable in a medium-sized town cannot work nationwide. Srećko Latal, director of the Social Overview Service think-tank and regional editor for the Balkans Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), warns that “state paralysis is exactly the kind of crisis that separatists in Republika Srpska are waiting for, as it would provide an ideal justification to break away”. Republika Srpska’s leaders have made no secret of their desire for independence; its president, Milorad Dodik, once boasted that “one day [independence] will fall into our hands like ripe fruit from a tree. We are waiting to have examples of how to do this in Europe so that no one can blame us for anything”. Preventing a catastrophe in Bosnia requires placing the state on a more stable foundation, rather than merely repairing the cracks revealed by this most recent crisis. Conventional wisdom holds that revisiting Bosnia’s constitutional structure is a fool’s errand, and that instead, the country needs the balm of European integration. That is now a very remote possibility: too remote for safety. Crisis Group repeats its recommendation to the leaders of Bosnia and its two entities: initiate a debate on fundamental reform along the lines sketched out in our last report. Our Man in Belgrade Macedonia’s crisis is the worst, and most dangerous, in the region, but its leaders are not alone in treating the instruments of state as their personal property. In Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić came to power in 2012 on a pro-European, clean government platform. He won EU support by promising cooperation on the main European priority, resolving the Kosovo-Serbia dispute. Since then he has leveraged that support – especially a claimed close relationship with Germany’s Angela Merkel – to gain what an international official described as “unparalleled control of all aspects of the Serbian state, media and society”. The official noted that Vučić’s “compliance with external partners has been rewarded with a blind eye being turned on [his] increasingly authoritarian” rule at home. His party’s influence over the media is reflected in his overwhelmingly positive coverage, compared to negative or neutral stories about his rivals. What did Vučić do to get carte blanche from Europe? His main achievement was giving up Serbia’s ambition to govern Serb-majority territory in Kosovo, and agreeing to partially lift the veto on Kosovo’s membership in international organisations. These were big steps, hard for a former nationalist to take. As a result, Kosovo could sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU and get its own international telephone code. Yet, Kosovo is still barred from the UN, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, and the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue has stalled. Serbia lacks a formal veto over Kosovo’s membership in these bodies but other states, notably Russia, back up and enforce Belgrade’s wishes. Vučić forced the Kosovo Serbs to join Kosovo government institutions at local and national levels, but he retains full control over their elected representatives, who make regular pilgrimages to receive instructions. In a reckless provocation that nearly led to armed clashes at the border, Serbia painted the first train scheduled to service both countries in its national colours and with the slogan “Kosovo is Serbia”. The Kosovo-Serbia dialogue was built on the assumption that the hard questions of recognition and status were unresolvable, so a long period of incremental rapprochement was the way forward. That was probably right, but the approach is now exhausted. Within Kosovo, debate on the role of the Serb minority has been hijacked for partisan mobilisation, and as long as Pristina treats its Serbs as a punching-bag, true normalisation with Belgrade will remain impossible. The time for a frank dialogue about status may not quite have arrived but it is not far off. The necessary outcome is already clear enough: an independent Kosovo, recognised by Serbia, with an integrated but autonomous and self-governing Serb minority. The Russians: More Opportunistic than Strategic Until very recently, Montenegro was the sole bright spot in the Western Balkans. It is due to join NATO in May 2017 and is the most plausible candidate for early membership once expansion returns to the EU agenda. Its economy shows robust growth, and its politics are relatively placid. Or they were, until a recent election was marred by a bizarre plotimplicating Serbian and Montenegrin gangsters and Russian spies in what some claim was an attempt to topple the government and assassinate the prime minister. The New York Times reported in February on a series of Russian moves “to exploit political fissures in [the Balkans,] an area that was once viewed as a triumph of muscular American diplomacy”. Others such as the Atlantic Council’s Dimitar Bechev are more cautious, but note the “lacklustre political landscape of the present-day Balkans does provide Russia with endless opportunities to rock the boat”. Apart from this odd episode, Montenegro’s impressive track record is mysterious: it is the only country in Europe to be governed by the same party – in effect, the same person – since the late 1980s. It is enormously corrupt – so much so that an international watchdog named Montenegrin leader Milo Djukanović its Person of the Year “for his work in promoting crime, corruption and uncivil society”. Djukanović became an important Western ally during the late 1990s, when he broke with Serbian dictator Slobodan Milošević. Since then, he has fostered his country’s alignment with the EU and NATO, joining in the former’s sanctions against Russia in 2014. His country’s success suggests it is possible to thrive against all Western advice about democratisation and accountable government. Russia’s role in what really happened in Montenegro remains obscure. There is evidence of planning for violent action by a motley group of Serbs and Montenegrins, drawn from veterans of the wars of the 1990s and the criminal underground. The plotters were apparently connected to Eduard Shishmakov, said to be a member of Russia’s military intelligence service. Dejan Anastasijević, a journalist who has covered the paramilitary underground, has written that Shishmakov served with official cover in Poland but was expelled as persona non grata; his presence in Serbia was under a pseudonym and without cover, perhaps a demotion. For an intelligence officer seeking to rebuild a tattered career, Anastasijević added, recruiting dodgy former fighters and gangsters would be normal behaviour, but it is unlikely Moscow would sanction an assassination. Moscow’s interests in the Balkans are clear: prevent or delay NATO expansion but also push against EU’s dominance in the region, and promote friendly parties and leaders while compromising and embarrassing opponents. Russia has few illusions about Slavic brotherhood. Few in the Western Balkans bother to learn Russian. Balkan leaders do play Russia off against the West, especially when they feel exposed to uncomfortable EU pressure – or when they hope for cash handouts from Moscow. But Europe is a far larger financial presence. While Russia is not above stirring up trouble when it can do so at low cost, BIRN’s Latal argues that it does not want to see deadly conflict in the region, because this would likely draw in NATO forces. The Balkans are increasingly discussed as a region hit by the chill of a new Cold War. But the most important thing Europe can do to keep peace and foster reform in the region is to focus on local sensitivities, which are much stronger drivers of risks in the region than geopolitics, and to remain healthy itself. This is a small part of the world, some eighteen million people with a collective GDP of about half of 1 per cent of the EU’s. They will follow the European lead, whether that is recession and xenophobia or booming open societies. Beyond this, Europe should affirm its basic standards of democracy. Leaders in Serbia, Macedonia, Kosovo and some EU member states systematically violate these norms with impunity. Whatever expediency justified this has passed; hollowing out the rule of law is now the main threat. Finally, Europe should signal that the time for avoiding hard questions in Bosnia and Kosovo is ending. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

Overview In Raqqa the U.S.-led coalition to defeat the Islamic State (ISIS) faces its toughest test to date in Syria. The primary challenge in capturing the majority-Arab city on the Euphrates river lies not in the fight itself, though that may well prove costly. Rather, it arises parallel to the offensive and will increase the day after: first, how to handle the explosive geopolitical dynamics surrounding the battle; these already have spurred the 25 April Turkish airstrikes against U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in north-eastern Syria and their comrades in nearby north-western Iraq, and the risk of further escalation is high. Secondly, how to secure and govern Raqqa once it is wrested from ISIS. And finally, how to address a potentially more pivotal battleground with ISIS in oil-rich Deir al-Zour province downstream. A major headache lies in the U.S. choice of partner in its push for Raqqa. Since September 2014, Kurdish forces of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) have coordinated with the expanding, though still modest, U.S. military role in northern Syria, both supported by airstrikes carried out by a U.S.-led military coalition. This cooperation has yielded significant military successes against ISIS but also dramatically extended the area the YPG controls. The YPG may be an essential partner for Washington, but it also is a highly problematic one, because it is the armed Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey, which the U.S. lists as a terrorist organisation, and which is locked in a round of violence with Turkey, a NATO member that is indispensable to U.S. counter-terror efforts and to any attempt to de-escalate and ultimately end the Syrian civil war. The YPG now operates under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella grouping designed to facilitate recruitment among Arabs and provide an additional nominal degree of separation between U.S. support and the PKK. While the SDF has grown in recent months to include a notable number of Arab recruits, in practice it remains squarely under YPG command and wholly reliant upon the PKK-trained Kurdish fighters who form its backbone. That is obvious to anyone dealing with the SDF, and indeed to Turkish officials, whose frustration over their NATO ally’s empowerment of a PKK affiliate has soared in proportion with that affiliate’s military progress. Within this alphabet soup of acronyms lie difficult, potentially crucial decisions for the Trump administration. Turkey is pressing the U.S. not to use the SDF to take Raqqa, suggesting it should partner with Ankara and its Syrian rebel allies instead. But U.S. officials see the YPG-led SDF as more capable and much better positioned, and coordination between U.S. and SDF forces on the ground is already deep. Few in Washington view the Turkish counter-offer as a viable alternative if the U.S. wishes to take the city within the next several months. By most accounts, the U.S. administration appears to have concluded that the benefits of driving ISIS from Raqqa as soon as possible justify the potential costs of further damaging Washington’s strategic alliance with Ankara and the risks associated with attempting to seize an overwhelmingly Arab city of some 200,000 with a Kurdish-dominated force. Two critical questions remain: what options are available to mitigate those costs and risks? And how to prepare for even steeper challenges awaiting further east in Deir al-Zour? This briefing outlines four key points to consider and four recommendations to help address them. It draws on four Crisis Group research trips to northern Syria, two to Sinjar in northern Iraq, another to PKK headquarters in Iraq’s Qandil mountains, extensive discussions with senior YPG, PKK, Turkish and U.S. officials, and Crisis Group’s ongoing conversations with a broad range of the conflict’s other actors and influencers. I.Many Acronyms, Same Chain of Command The YPG and its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), are the PKK’s Syrian affiliates, and there is little prospect for their organic link with the mother party to change in the foreseeable future. Qandil-trained and battle-hardened PKK cadres with years – in some cases decades – of experience in the organisation’s struggle against Turkey hold the most influential positions within the YPG and, by extension, within the SDF’s chain of command; within the PYD-run civil governing bodies that administer YPG-held areas; and within the security forces, such as the Asayesh (security police), which are the backbone of that governance. While most of these cadres are Syrian Kurds (though notable roles are also played by Kurds from Turkey and Iran), loyalty to the PKK’s internal hierarchy appears to override relations to local society. Many also operate largely behind the scenes, or with titles that understate their actual authority, while nominally responsible officials lacking direct ties to the organisation are reduced to placeholders. Though this gives the PKK presence in northern Syria a local face, the reality of who wields power is evident to those living there and should be to external observers as well. For the U.S., this presents a singular dilemma. While the YPG is indispensable to defeat ISIS, there is no avoiding the fact that the U.S. is backing a military force led by PKK-trained cadres in Syria, while the PKK itself continues an insurgency against a NATO ally. True, Turkey also bears considerable responsibility for the escalation with the PKK that has occurred since 2015. But Turkish officials point out what they consider U.S. double standards: the U.S. continues to treat the Syrian jihadist group Hey’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, formerly known successively as Jabhat al-Nusra and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) as an al-Qaeda affiliate, arguing that their shared ideology, joint objectives and loyalty to a common leader (Ayman al-Zawahiri) render HTS’s disavowal of organisational ties to al-Qaeda meaningless. Turkey is applying similar logic toward the PKK’s relationship with the YPG and PYD. PKK-trained cadres’ experience, discipline and effective command-and-control structures have enabled the YPG to punch above its military weight, smoothly expand its ranks and secure areas under its control – which now include a broad swath of territory encompassing most of north-eastern Syria and, separately, the Afrin canton north of Aleppo. Since September 2014, these factors have also rendered it an especially appealing partner to the U.S. military effort, particularly in comparison to less organised, more divided and less militarily experienced Syrian rebel factions that have benefitted from U.S. support elsewhere in the country. The PKK’s ideology – the product of imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan’s evolving philosophy and the personality cult constructed around him – also provides certain advantages. Indoctrinated YPG members fight with a zeal rivalling that of the war’s most hardline jihadists, and Öcalan’s emphasis on broadening the PKK’s agenda beyond Kurdish nationalism provides an intellectual framework for incorporating new recruits – within the SDF and even the YPG itself – from other components of Syrian society. (Whether those recruits connect with the PKK’s ideology, however, is another story – SDF officials acknowledge that many do not.) Yet for all this success, the PKK’s approach to governance and continued prioritisation of insurgency within Turkey leave its Syrian affiliates with key vulnerabilities that will become more acute as they attempt to seize and control Raqqa. II.The YPG is Risking Overstretch The role of PKK-trained cadres is similarly central to governance. They hold the most influential positions in the Asayesh security forces that control these areas and the “Democratic Self-Administration” that administers them. Rhetoric aside, their governance essentially entails single-party rule built on a social contract of three pillars: military success, security and provision of a bare minimum of services necessary to sustain daily life. The Self-Administration has created a multi-layered array of local bodies designed, in theory, to foster broad participation in governance; in practice, these do not hold meaningful authority or political influence. They are best understood as mechanisms that co-opt locals through access to services. In majority-Kurdish areas, this model appears sustainable for the time being. Complaints are common, especially concerning mandatory conscription, the Self-Administration’s chaotic handling of the school system, infrequent electricity and arbitrary arrests of the PYD’s Kurdish political opponents. Another huge problem is the economy, which is deeply constricted by Turkey’s closure of its border with YPG-held areas. On the Iraqi border, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG, controlled by the rival Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP, a close ally of Turkey), limits trade to a small and unreliable trickle. That said, judging by the dismal standards of wartime Syria, the net governance result nevertheless appears positive: YPG-held areas are far safer and better administered than those controlled by opposition factions, and the security services are much less brutal than those of the regime and ISIS. Moreover, there is palpable Kurdish pride, even among some critics, in the YPG’s military accomplishments and in the extent to which those have transformed Kurdish language and culture from suppressed to locally dominant. Outside majority-Kurdish areas, however, this governance model appears fragile. Thousands of Arabs now participate in YPG-led military efforts – whether due to conscription, need of salaries or desire to liberate home areas from ISIS. But they are doing so on behalf of an organisation whose militantly secular culture clashes with local norms, whose Kurdish identity many view as a threat and which has shown no inclination to share power meaningfully. Efforts by the YPG (and its Self-Administration) to achieve Arab buy-in to its project have been partial and haphazard and do not amount to a meaningful share in governance. Official rhetoric signals inclusiveness and pluralism, but YPG flags and posters of Öcalan adorn streets and town squares (including in majority-Arab areas) in a manner typical of autocratic, single-party rule elsewhere in the region. Arab figures willing to participate in the Self-Administration are handed impressive titles but no real authority. Local governance bodies function as channels to convey complaints and petitions rather than as platforms for effective participation, while ultimate power of decision rests with the Qandil-trained PKK cadres. Beyond that, these institutions are limited to the distribution of meagre services that are unlikely to purchase the loyalty of otherwise sceptical citizens. That leaves the Self-Administration’s security provision as the primary pillar for its claim to legitimacy. Yet, even this asset can turn into a liability: residents appear relieved at the degree of safety and order provided, but wary of the PKK cadres-led, Kurdish-dominated Asayesh security forces that uphold it. During a March 2017 Crisis Group visit to the majority-Arab town of Tel Abyad and nearby areas, the Asayesh’s efforts to staff checkpoints with local Arab personnel, while notable, were deemed insignificant by Arab residents. As an Arab professional participating in the Self-Administration put it, “most of the problems the Self-Administration is asked to solve have been created by the security forces in the first place”. Another added: “The Arab recruits have no authority; people’s [problems] come from the Asayesh cadres”. Arbitrary detentionsare a particularly common complaint and a reminder that the success of the YPG and Asayesh in limiting ISIS attacks must be measured against the heavy-handed tactics they employ, which themselves can drive new recruits toward ISIS. As a result, it is easy to imagine how the expansion of YPG control to additional Arab population centres could strain its governing capacity to breaking point. If the YPG and its allies do indeed capture Raqqa, stabilising and controlling it with the organisation’s current model could backfire, enabling the post-ISIS re-emergence of a jihadist insurgency (and accompanying racketeering networks) in asymmetric form – the very method that allowed the organisation’s predecessor (al-Qaeda in Iraq) to survive and rebound from apparent defeat ten years ago. III.Northern Syria Remains Tied to the PKK-Turkey Conflict Serious though the governance challenge may prove, it is the PKK-Turkey conflict that poses the biggest threat to the YPG and thus to U.S. counter-terror objectives in Syria. This fact was underscored by the 25 April Turkish airstrikes on YPG and PKK targets in north-eastern Syria and Sinjar (in north-western Iraq), which reportedly killed twenty YPG fighters and, in an apparent mistake, five members of the KDP’s peshmerga force, which split control of Sinjar with rival PKK-backed forces in a tense cohabitation. More extensive Turkish military action could seriously hamper a U.S.-backed SDF offensive on Raqqa city by forcing the YPG to divert resources toward its own defence. And even if the Raqqa campaign proceeds smoothly, the threat Turkey poses will remain. In contrast to the mountainous areas where the PKK mainly operates in Turkey and northern Iraq (where the organisation has its headquarters), the Syrian territory the YPG controls is largely flat and does not lend itself to the guerrilla warfare in which its fighters excel. If Ankara were to launch a major military intervention against the YPG-PYD in northern Syria, there is little the PKK and its affiliates themselves could do to stop a rapid advance by the capable, well-equipped Turkish army. Their hope has been that the presence of U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Russian personnel in YPG-held areas would deter such an attack. That always was a gamble, and – as the Turkish strikes demonstrate – one that will only grow riskier over time. While the Turkish leadership’s public rhetoric has fluctuated dramatically (particularly in the build-up to the 16 April referendum on presidential powers), the message conveyed by Turkish officials in private has remained relatively consistent: The YPG-PYD are part and parcel of the PKK; the PKK has deployed the YPG’s Syrian manpower, resources, tactics and newly acquired battle skills in military operations within Turkey (an allegation difficult to verify); and so long as the PKK’s armed insurgency continues, the YPG-PYD will remain in the Turkish military’s crosshairs. Turkish officials depicted the 25 April strikes as aimed at disrupting alleged PKK efforts to move fighters and weapons across the Syrian and Iraqi borders in support of operations in Turkey. But Ankara is also concerned that a lead role for the YPG in Raqqa will deepen its alliance with Washington, add to its international legitimacy and thus strengthen the PKK’s strategic hand; given the timing of the strikes, disrupting preparations for a YPG-led Raqqa offensive may have been another central motivation. Prior to the strikes, the YPG’s on-the-ground cooperation with the U.S. and Russia appeared to be the main factor limiting direct violence between it and Turkey. The most notable example occurred in February-March 2017, as Turkey began pressing against YPG-backed local forces outside Manbij, a city west of the Euphrates taken by the YPG-led SDF from ISIS in August 2016. YPG fighters subsequently withdrew to the town’s perimeter, leaving locals as the face of security and governance. Yet, this is a particularly sensitive area for Turkey, which understands Manbij to be an essential chain in the YPG’s efforts to connect its north-eastern holdings to Afrin, and views the YPG’s thinly-disguised continued control as a breach of earlier U.S. assurances that the group would withdraw to the river’s east bank. In this case, both Washington and Moscow manoeuvred, apparently without coordination, to successfully deter Turkish attack: the U.S. dispatched clearly marked armoured vehicles to patrol sensitive areas along the front, while Russia brokered a deal between the YPG and Syrian regime to deploy a small contingent of regime and Russian personnel as a buffer between YPG and Turkish-backed forces. While such manoeuvres have succeeded in averting further escalation in some cases, the PKK has been running a huge risk in continuing insurgency inside Turkey while expecting Washington and Moscow to protect its Syrian affiliates from Turkish retribution. Though the U.S. has strong incentive to safeguard the YPG while offensives against ISIS continue, ultimately it will likely view relations with Turkey – a NATO member and critical ally – as more important to its broader strategic interests. In turn, Russia’s calculus is informed primarily by its desire to preserve its ally, the Syrian regime, which itself seeks to reassert authority within YPG-held areas once it has regained the capability to do so. The fact that U.S. objections failed to deter Turkey’s 25 April strikes should serve as a warning for what could lie in store. If and when ISIS’s remaining eastern strongholds are captured and the urgency of the jihadist challenge begins to recede, the YPG may find itself dangerously exposed. Even in the short term, risk of additional escalation is real and could spiral higher if PKK attacks in Turkey re-escalate following a winter lull. More extensive Turkish action against the YPG in Syria is possible, especially if tensions soar further. Perhaps more likely, however, is additional Turkish intervention on the Iraqi side of the border, where the PKK has maintained a significant presence in Sinjar since it helped take the Yazidi town from ISIS in November 2015. Extending its control there to link with Iran-backed Shiite militias nearby could open a road connecting YPG-held areas of Syria with Baghdad – a trade route enabling the YPG to escape economic strangulation and potentially establishing a corridor between Iran and the Mediterranean under control of Tehran’s allies (“Popular Mobilisation” militias and the Syrian regime), the PKK and the YPG. Turkey views the deepening of Iranian-PKK ties so close to its border as a threat, fears that Sinjar mountain could become a new PKK logistics base and may doubt the capacity of its own Kurdish ally, the KDP, to contain the PKK on its own. Notably, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan already has said that Turkish military operations will continue in order to prevent Sinjar from becoming a PKK base. Further Turkish action there could reverberate violently in northern Syria and Turkey; it may also exacerbate domestic pressures on Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, whose rivals could exploit any violation of Iraqi sovereignty to which he does not respond in order to undermine him. IV.A Tougher, More Important Battle Lies Further East While Raqqa has garnered Western attention as ISIS’s de facto capital and supposed nexus of international planning, the future of Deir al-Zour will likely prove more important to the group’s fate and more consequential for the further course of the war. Located on the Euphrates river between Raqqa and the Iraqi border, Deir al-Zour city is eastern Syria’s largest urban centre (with a pre-war population of around 240,000), and the surrounding province – most of which remains under ISIS control – contains the country’s most significant oil fields. The Syrian regime still controls its airport and a chunk of the city on the river’s western bank, but its forces (and an estimated 72,000 civilians living in these areas) are completely besieged by ISIS and thus reliant on supplies ferried by regime and Russian aircraft. Deir al-Zour city and the riverbank towns to its south east – including al-Mayadin and al-Bukamal – are the geographic nexus of ISIS territory spanning eastern Syria and western Iraq, and their importance will only grow as it loses Mosul, Raqqa and other territory on its periphery. Already there are reports of ISIS moving families, personnel and resources from Raqqa to these areas as SDF forces approach the former. By the time a U.S.-backed campaign seizes Raqqa, the functional aspects of its role as ISIS’s de facto capital may have largely shifted. In other words, the fight for these areas could prove decisive in eliminating the group’s space and capacity to govern territory. However, the stakes in Deir al-Zour extend far beyond ejecting ISIS. They include the future of governance for roughly one million Syrians living under (or besieged by) ISIS – an Arab Sunni population among which the 2011 anti-regime uprising took root and which experienced some of the fiercest and most traumatic violence among local rebel factions and ISIS as the latter seized control of the province in 2014. There is also oil, which provides an immediate source of income for whoever controls it and potential leverage in any eventual negotiations over Syria’s future. And there is Deir al-Zour’s strategic location, a point that warrants particular emphasis: whoever captures Deir al-Zour and the riverbank towns to its east controls a key crossroads between Syria and central Iraq (where ISIS still holds territory adjacent to the Syrian border). For U.S. policymakers, Deir al-Zour presents dilemmas commensurate with its importance. Even if asserting control over Raqqa proves easier than expected, attempting to capture Deir al-Zour by relying primarily on the YPG-led SDF would be extremely dangerous: the aforementioned overstretch risks and demographic challenges are much greater there. ISIS certainly will attempt to exploit the SDF’s reputation as a Kurd-dominated force, and may succeed to rally otherwise critical locals to its side against the shared threat of a perceived invader. A successful defence could allow the group to rebound, boosting its efforts to appear as a defender of Sunni Arabs who see themselves at the losing end in both Syria and Iraq. And even if the offensive succeeded, governing the area would require managing complex tribal and local dynamics in a society far removed from the Kurdish communities in which the YPG-PYD’s administration has proven most successful, while addressing the potential challenges of asymmetrical insurgency and persisting regime presence. The situation contains all the ingredients of a treacherous morass. A U.S. decision to sit back in the expectation that the regime and its allies will regain control appears equally problematic. First, the regime’s capacity to defend its foothold in the city is already under strain and will be tested further if additional ISIS fighters move to Deir al-Zour from Raqqa. Secondly, the regime’s chronic manpower shortage suggests that any serious attempt to take Deir al-Zour would rely to a significant extent on Iran-backed Shiite foreign fighters – forces even more likely to drive locals into ISIS’s arms than is the SDF, and boost the group’s “Sunni” credentials regardless of the outcome. If the regime and its partners were to prevail and establish control over Deir al-Zour, gains by Iran-backed Shiite militias against ISIS on the Iraqi side of the border potentially could establish a contiguous land corridor from Iran to the Mediterranean preferable to the Sinjar route described above, as it essentially would be controlled by Tehran’s close allies (rather than passing through PKK and YPG areas). Washington’s regional partners undoubtedly would view this as a serious strategic setback, as would a U.S administration determined to contain Iran’s influence. Equally likely, however, is that relying on the regime to deliver the final blow to ISIS could simply turn into a drawn-out wait: so far Damascus has evinced little desire to go on the offensive in the east, and, from its perspective, it may appear more cost-effective to simply maintain its presence in the city, particularly since shifting forces toward Deir al-Zour could leave openings for rebel advances elsewhere. A third potential force consists of anti-ISIS rebel factions based in the south-eastern desert and the adjacent Eastern Qalamoun mountains. These include a key contingent of fighters originally from Deir al-Zour province who were driven out by ISIS some three years ago and hence may have a better chance to win local support. These factions gained ground against ISIS in March 2017 and already receive material support from the U.S. and other states backing the opposition – most via the covert operations room managed in cooperation with Jordan and other opposition sponsors, while a smaller group participates in an overt program run by the Pentagon. Their numbers currently are far from sufficient to take the lead in Deir al-Zour; nor would they possess the military capacity or cohesion to do so in the foreseeable future. Arguably, however, expanded U.S. support could enable them to play an important role there as part of a broader U.S.-backed coalition of forces that also would include SDF elements (see recommendations below). In considering whether to invest in such an effort, U.S. officials face familiar obstacles. True, some of the problems that have bedevilled support for rebels elsewhere are less of a factor in the south east: coordination among state backers via Jordan is better than that which occurs via Turkey to northern rebels; a smaller number of relevant factions makes for easier management; and HTS jihadists are not a significant player in the area. Still, the absence of established hierarchy and dominant leadership renders the risk of fragmentation higher than within the SDF and complicates the prospect of providing tactical battlefield support. There is also the additional challenge of how to address the regime’s control of much of Deir al-Zour city (assuming it is able to defend its besieged foothold as additional ISIS fighters likely shift to the area), and the possibility that regime and allied forces might race from regime-held Palmyra to pre-empt or disrupt U.S.-backed opposition efforts in Deir al-Zour. Recommendations for U.S. Policy Gaining some degree of Turkish consent for the Raqqa operation against ISIS is critical. This is true not only because of Ankara’s spoiler potential (as highlighted by the 25 April ai strikes), but also because Turkey’s control of Syria’s northern border and leverage with non-jihadist rebel factions render it an essential partner in any effort to weaken HTS, the other leading jihadist group in Syria. Further erosion of Washington-Ankara relations would also present opportunities for Moscow to fish in the muddied waters. But if the Trump administration is unable to secure adequate Turkish buy-in, the following recommendations could mitigate fallout with Ankara and improve prospects for U.S.-backed efforts against ISIS throughout the Euphrates River Valley. 1.Aim for a halt in major PKK attacks in Turkey by pressing PKK-trained cadres in Syria to see the crossroads ahead Ultimately, the PKK will have to decide between prioritising its insurgency inside Turkey despite the risk, or scaling back its military activities in Turkey to protect its Syria project. U.S. support on the ground and in the air in Syria may be delaying that decision point by temporarily (and only partially) deterring Turkish attack. Yet, when asked how they plan to address their Turkish problem once the U.S. turns its attention away from northern Syria, leading figures of the PKK and its affiliates tend to respond with misplaced optimism. Over time, one narrative suggests, the current Turkish leadership will alienate its Western partners enough to make them choose an alliance with the YPG over Ankara. Another common response posits that “Turkey today resembles Syria in 2011”, and that the country is headed for a multi-actor civil war that will create new opportunities for the Kurds. U.S. officials meet regularly with YPG and PYD counterparts. They should continue to rebut these illusions and help the YPG understand the geopolitical constraints within which it is operating: the U.S. views Turkey as essential to its efforts to contain Iran, balance Russia and counter jihadist groups, and it thus will remain a key ally. A full halt to PKK attacks is highly unlikely in the absence of mutual agreement by both the Kurdish organisation and Ankara – a prospect that, at this stage, appears distant. Still, the U.S. should ensure that the YPG is aware that it understands the depth of YPG/ PKK ties, and warn it that continued major PKK bombings in Turkey – such as those that have targeted security forces in crowded areas of Ankara, Istanbul and Diyarbakır – inevitably will carry direct, negative consequences for U.S. relations with its Syrian affiliates. 2.Attempt to mediate a deal in Sinjar The KDP-controlled Kurdistan Regional Government’s limiting of trade between northern Iraq and YPG-held areas of Syria carries an unintended consequence: it increases the strategic importance of the PKK’s presence in Sinjar, which the YPG views as a means to open a road to Baghdad that would limit its dependence on trade routes controlled by Damascus. In principle, a potential deal could address all sides’ concerns: a PKK withdrawal from Sinjar (as desired by the KDP and Turkey) in exchange for the KDP fully opening the border to trade (which would alleviate economic pressure on YPG-held areas). This will not be easy to attain, but close U.S. relations with both the YPG and KDP render it worth pursuing. If achieved, it at least would remove one fuse in this explosive multi-party, cross-border conflict. The U.S. already has shown its ability and willingness to use its leverage in northern Iraq when it temporarily shut down all military assistance to the KRG after the KRG halted U.S. arms supplies to the YPG in March 2017; the KRG promptly reopened the arms channel. 3.Push the YPG to establish a new governance model in Raqqa, and provide planning and resources to make it possible If the YPG-led Raqqa campaign proceeds, a significant increase in U.S. engagement on governance will be necessary to mitigate the risks of overstretch outlined above. Using a conditional offer of increased “stabilisation” support to areas under their control as leverage, the U.S. should press the YPG/PYD to: Rebrand its local governance, beginning in Raqqa and potentially extending to other majority-Arab areas under its control. Symbolically, it should put an end to the Öcalan posters and YPG flags. More substantively, it should restructure, rename and streamline local governance bodies, taking care to ensure that nominally senior local officials are capable, credible and better able to demonstrate added value than their counterparts in other YPG-held areas. In Raqqa, governance should avoid the impression, prevalent elsewhere, that behind each Arab figurehead sit PKK-trained cadres monopolising real authority via trusted local Kurdish liaisons. Entrust security in Raqqa to local forces trained by members of the U.S.-led international coalition. The U.S. should play a lead role in this training, in recognition of the essential role credible, effective, locally-rooted security will play in preventing the re-emergence of jihadist cells. The U.S. should make clear that this effort intends to establish a security force that reflects Raqqa’s social composition to the greatest extent possible, and is capable of operating autonomously of the cadre-led Asayesh. Progress toward that end will help earn local buy-in for post-ISIS governance and could signal to Turkey and sceptical Syrians alike that the SDF’s capture of territory no longer entails the arrival of single-party YPG-PYD rule. Besides a careful crafting of command structures, a viable concept to secure future funding for the force appears key. If security forces – or any non-YPG components of the SDF – are left to fund themselves locally, conflict over sources of income could damage credibility and invite violence, resulting in opportunities for radicals to exploit. 4.Develop a new coalition of forces for Deir al-Zour Given the costs and risks of attempting to capture Deir al-Zour province with an exclusively YPG-led force, the U.S. should move now to prepare an alternative. One idea floated in Washington is to work with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries to incorporate some of their forces with, and thus bolster the capacity of, rebel groups. That would be problematic. Aside from questions related to the effectiveness of such Arab forces (some of which already are bogged down in Yemen) and to that of opposition groups, any such intervention in Syria likely would raise the risk of regime, Iranian and possibly Russian measures to undermine what they would view as a hostile offensive. A better option would be for the U.S. to seek to combine and divide responsibility among rebel forces currently in the south east and Arab elements of the SDF. This combined force would operate under a new banner (ie, not the SDF) and be led and organised by the U.S. YPG forces potentially could play an important supporting role, much as Kurdish peshmerga have in the battle for Mosul in Iraq; but they should neither lead the offensive nor take charge of post-capture governance, which should develop separately from the YPG-PYD’s Self-Administration. This option would entail increased investment from Washington and a deeper role than the U.S. has played – or signalled willingness to play – thus far. Assuming regime forces maintain a foothold in Deir al-Zour, it also would require U.S. engagement with Moscow to avoid a mutually-damaging fight between regime and rebel forces that inevitably would redound to ISIS’s advantage. None of this will be easy. But amid an array of bad choices, such a scenario arguably is the best, least hazardous and most sustainable option to expel ISIS from the area between Deir al-Zour city and the Iraqi border. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

On Friday, Pope Francis travels to Egypt, the largest Arab country and home to the Copts, the Middle East’s largest Christian community. His principal purpose is to take part in an interfaith dialogue with Grand Sheikh Ahmed el-Tayeb, who heads el-Azhar, the ancient center of Sunni Muslim learning. Begun 20 years ago, this dialogue effort is best known for Tayeb’s breaking it off in 2011, after he faulted Pope Benedict XVI for an “unacceptable interference” in Egypt’s internal affairs. Media now herald its resumption as a breakthrough, a sign of thawed relations between the two venerable institutions. For Christians, it comes at a desperate time and place: Ancient Christian communities are being relentlessly targeted by ISIS, as was underscored on Palm Sunday when two Coptic Orthodox churches were bombed, killing 45 members of the congregations. Christian–Muslim meetings have typically been exercises in futility. They have borne little fruit, often resulting in Christian concessions and apologies that go unreciprocated. A classic example is the Vatican’s intervention with Roman city officials to facilitate the construction a Saudi-backed mega-mosque during the 1970s; Saudi Arabia has responded by continuing to ban churches within the kingdom, despite its million Christian foreign workers. It does not augur well that in late February, in preliminary meetings for this dialogue, Vatican diplomats reportedly avoided sensitive issues, called generally for more tolerance and less religious extremism, and obsequiously remarked that, given its Abrahamic roots, Islam is considered “the closest religion” to Christianity, a perplexing statement that glosses over both the Old Testament, which Christianity shares with Judaism, and the absence of any sacred texts that Christianity shares with Islam. Whether the Cairo meeting will have real significance or turn out to be more dialogue for dialogue’s sake will depend partly on what Pope Francis says. What the Pope Can’t Say The pope will have to take into consideration the grand sheikh’s red line: no criticism of Islam. Tayeb holds the view that to ask el-Azhar to address attacks on churches is to insinuate that they are caused by Islamic extremism. He rejects that assumption as “Islamophobia,” a form of blasphemy or “defamation against Islam.” What angered Tayeb five years ago and prompted him to freeze the Vatican dialogue was precisely a papal denunciation of a church bombing in Alexandria at a Mass on New Year’s Eve, 2010. Pope Benedict called for the Copts’ protection. Two months ago, in a talk at the time of this round’s preliminary meetings, Tayeb indicated that his views on this score haven’t changed. While condemning the recent attacks, he stated that they have “nothing to do with religion” but “just exploit the name of Islam.” Were Francis to take Benedict’s approach, it would guarantee the dialogue’s quick, unceremonial end. What the Pope Is Likely to Say The pope can’t entirely ignore the elephant in the room. Since 2011, when this dialogue was suspended, ISIS and other terrorists operating under the banner of Islam have all but destroyed two of the region’s four largest remaining Christian communities, in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt — churches that trace their roots to the Apostles. Severely persecuted and forced into a mass exodus, Iraq’s Christians now number about 200,000, down from their pre-2003 population of 1.4 million. Syria is reported to have lost up to half of its 2 million Christians. In 2015, Pope Francis was the first to call this “genocide.” Moreover, when this meeting was announced last October, no one anticipated that “Islamic State of Egypt” was about to announce its formation. It did so by proclaiming in a video that the country’s Copts were its “favorite prey” and the targeting of them its “priority.” Last December, the Coptic Orthodox Cathedral compound in Cairo was bombed, and 25 of the faithful were killed. In North Sinai in February, seven Copts were murdered, and terrorists drove a thousand others from their homes. April 9 saw the twin church bombings. On April 18, the ancient monastery of St. Catherine was attacked in South Sinai. These developments can’t be ignored. In recent weeks, in gestures and short statements, the pope has given clues as to what he might say in Egypt. The Vatican is showing a united Christian front. Francis has issued condolences to the Coptic Church following the Palm Sunday attacks and recently broadcast that he would like his visit to “be a witness of my affection, comfort, and encouragement for all the Christians of the Middle East.” His refusal of the protection of an armored car for the trip is a brave gesture of solidarity with them. Bartholomew, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople and head of Greek Orthodox Christians, will accompany him, along with Pope Tawadros II, representing the Coptic Orthodox Church. In Egypt, taking the grand sheikh’s own words, the pope should ask him to define and clarify key terms that ISIS and other jihadi groups use to recruit Muslims. In another symbolic gesture of solidarity, Pope Francis last weekend at St. Bartholomew’s Basilica in Rome participated in a memorial service for contemporary martyrs. One of the speakers was Rose, the sister of Father Jacques Hamel, a priest whose throat was slit by Muslim extremists during Mass in a French church last summer. The pope departed from his prepared remarks to offer an anecdote about the persecution besieging Christians in the Muslim world today. He said that a Muslim man he met at a migrant center in Greece told him that he saw terrorists slit his wife’s throat when she refused to discard her crucifix. Perhaps anxious not to be seen as anti-Muslim, Francis, emphasizing that the Muslim husband was aggrieved, concluded the story by calling the migrant center a “concentration camp,” a hyperbolic remark that drew press attention and offended Jewish groups. Pope Francis took a step back from the persecution issue a few days later, in a brief, friendly video message to all the people of Egypt, not just the Copts. Referring to the recent violence, which he imprecisely described as “blind,” he said, “Our world needs peace, love, and mercy. It needs peacemakers, people who are free and who set others free, men and women of courage who can learn from the past in order to build the future, free of every form of prejudice.” What the Pope Should Say In Egypt, the pope is likely to continue bearing witness, invoking platitudes and keeping his focus on the Christian martyrs rather than the sensitive issue of their persecutors. He will also likely stress the philosophy of “healthy secularity,” which would ensure full citizenship for Christians, an important theme pressed in Christian–Muslim dialogue since Benedict’s time but without noticeable progress on the ground. The pope needs to do more. He should challenge the grand sheikh to promote specific, measurable educational reforms in the Muslim world. In 2015, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi went to el Azhar and pressed the imams for a “religious revolution” to end terrorism to little avail. The grand sheikh has given him an opening. At the preliminary meetings, Tayeb called the terrorists “deviants” from the right path of Islam and argued that they “misunderstand” Islam. “Exonerating religion from terrorism is no longer sufficient,” he said. Taking the grand sheikh’s own words, the pope should ask him to define and clarify key terms that ISIS and other jihadi groups use to attract and recruit Muslims. Tayeb has already made progress with the doctrine of takfir, a form of excommunication which the terrorists use to justify the killing of Sunni Muslims who reject extremism. Tayeb must do the same with all the terms that are used to justify on Islamic grounds the killing and harming of Christians and others. Clarification is needed on such loaded terms as infidel, polytheist, idolator, apostate, and blasphemer and on the doctrines of dhimmitude and jihad. ISIS uses these and other terms regularly in its videos and online publications, which resonate with enough Muslims to make Islamic terrorism an existential threat to Christian minorities in the Middle East and a growing threat worldwide. As commonly taught, such language is a source of “continual incitement” of youth, as Henri Boulad, an Egyptian Jesuit, told the Vatican newspaper, L’Osservatore Romano. For a helpful example, Pope Francis could point to Morocco. Earlier this year, its High Religious Committee removed the death penalty for apostasy, rescinding its 2012 ruling that apostates were condemned to death. It clarified: “The most accurate understanding, and the most consistent with the Islamic legislation and the practical way of the Prophet, peace be upon him, is that the killing of the apostate is meant for the traitor of the group, the one disclosing secrets, . . . the equivalent of treason in international law.” The head of the Roman Catholic Church has much to impart from Christianity’s own historical struggle with such issues in coming to terms with modernity. As a leading Sunni authority with particular influence in Egypt, where al-Azhar trains 1,000 preachers each year, the grand sheikh should be pressed to publicly and unequivocally delink from violence all the Islamic terms used to justify terror and persecution. Pope Francis should not shy away from making that demand. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 National Review

Families evacuated from East Ghouta, Syria, congregate in the courtyard of the Dahit Qudsayya collective shelter for basic aid. Photo: OCHA/Josephine Guerrero 27 April 2017 – With fighting intensifying on numerous fronts in Syria over the past months, the top United Nations humanitarian official today urged consolidation of the nationwide ceasefire, most importantly a pause in fighting on the outskirts of Damascus, to enable the delivery of aid. “The Secretary-General has said time and again that there will be no military end to this conflict. Yet, military might continues to be used against civilians in a way that defies all reason, let alone morality or the law,” Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen O’Brien told the Security Council. He said that the use of “abhorrent chemical weapons” on 4 April in Khan Shaykhun was yet another horrific account of such brutality. “I wish I could say mindless brutality – but no, it was deliberate, planned, predetermined, by other humans against their own fellow human beings, sheer unbridled cruelty by leaders and commanders. And we await the investigation to confirm which ones.” “The humanitarian situation is deteriorating, if that were possible, and the need for active engagement by members of the [Security] Council is urgently needed,” he said. The core needs of the Syrian people from the international community remain largely unchanged, noting that they include the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure by all parties to the conflict; immediate, unimpeded and sustained access to all in need throughout Syria; an immediate lifting of all sieges; and a political solution to the conflict. In besieged eastern Ghouta, outside Damascus, civilians remain trapped amid reports of relentless shelling, airstrikes, and ground fighting, he said, noting that the last informal access routes have reportedly been closed further restricting movement for the some 400,000 people who live in the area, and who the UN has been unable to access since October last year. Stephen O'Brien (shown on screen), Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefs the Security Council via video teleconference on the situation in Syria. UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe As the noose has tightened around eastern Ghouta, some 30,000 people in the adjacent areas of Barza and Qaboun have also come under siege by the Government of Syria, he added. “As it is already too late for the more than a quarter million Syrians who have died already in this atrocious war, so members of the Security Council it is action today that counts,” O’Brien stressed, via video link from Geneva, Switzerland. He also urged the lifting of arbitrary and bureaucratic impediments by all parties throughout Syria. “I will not repeat again the bureaucratic delaying tactics used by the Government of Syria to thwart humanitarian assistance at every turn, beyond saying that it continues to bring untold human suffering,” Mr. O’Brien said. Only four convoys have deployed so far under the new two-monthly April-May plan, reaching 157,500 people. None of these convoys reached besieged areas, due to a lack of necessary authorizations, he said. Although the overall number of those besieged has been reduced to just over 620,000 people due to evacuations, this process is not in line with humanitarian principles, and not conducted in consultation with the people affected. “Let us not pretend that those who evacuate move to a location of safety. Many of those who displace to Idlib or northern Aleppo continue to live in areas where civilian structures, including hospitals, come under regular aerial bombardment, and their access to basic goods such as food and shelter is limited,” he said. (c) 2017 United Nations