CALL FOR APPLICATIONS Research Workshop: Documenting the Holocaust in Nazi-Occupied Poland: Considering New Sources Monday-Thursday, September 11 – 14, 2017 Yad Vashem, Jerusalem The International Institute for Holocaust Research and the Center for Research on the Holocaust in Poland at Yad Vashem, the Jack, Joseph and Morton Mandel Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and the Polish Center for Holocaust Research at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw are pleased to invite applications for a research workshop entitled Documenting the Holocaust in Nazi-Occupied Poland: Considering New Sources. The workshop will take place at Yad Vashem in Jerusalem. The workshop will bring together scholars to present new, original, and unpublished research exploring the theme of new or under-utilized source materials. Participants are encouraged to consider types of primary sources that can provide a new picture of the Holocaust in Nazi-occupied Poland—including archival documents, artifacts, original film footage and photographs, and oral histories. Participants will present their current research projects with special focus on methodological problems or challenges. Daily sessions will be comprised of research, presentations and discussion of the participants’ work. The workshop will be conducted in English. Applications are welcome from scholars affiliated with universities, research institutions, or memorial sites and in any relevant academic discipline, including anthropology, archeology, art history, geography, film studies, history, Jewish studies, law, literature, material culture, philosophy, political science, psychology, religion, comparative genocide studies, and others. Applications will be accepted from scholars at all levels of their careers, from Ph.D. candidates to senior faculty. Applicants should specify in their applications the primary sources they utilize. All application materials must be submitted in either Hebrew or English and received no later than 1 June 2017. Incomplete applications will not be considered after this date. Late applications will not be accepted. An application consists of: 1) A completed application form 2) A one-page abstract (300 words) in English 3) A preliminary list of relevant sources to be presented 4) A short academic biography (15–20 lines) The organizers will cover round trip economy-class air tickets to/from Israel up to a maximum reimbursable amount calculated by home institution location. After the workshop, the organizers will reimburse the participants for their air tickets and the communal (Nesher) shuttle fares between Ben-Gurion International Airport and Jerusalem. Reimbursement will take up to two months. Ground transportation outside of Israel will not be reimbursed and we suggest participants apply to their home institutions for this expense. The organizers will cover hotel accommodation for 5 nights, with arrival scheduled for Sunday, 10 September and departure on Friday, 15 September. All breakfasts and dinners are included in the room reservation. Lunch will be provided at Yad Vashem from Monday through Thursday. Send all application materials to: Eliot Nidam Orvieto The International Institute for Holocaust Research Yad Vashem Email: eliot.nidam@yadvashem.org.il Tel: 972-2-6443-480/ Fax: 972-2-6443-479 This program is made possible by a generous gift from the Tramiel Charitable Trust Fund for the Study of the Holocaust in Poland to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and is supported by Yad Vashem's Center for Research on the Holocaust in Poland, the Aaron Gutwirth Fund, and the Danek Gertner Yad Vashem Scholarship.

Interview with Yaroslav Sivulsky, member of governing body of the Administrative Center of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia Portal-Credo.ru (21.04.2017) Portal-Credo.Ru: What are the very first practical consequences of the decision of the Supreme Court of the RF regarding your liquidation? Yaroslav Sivulsky: One can say with certainty that we will not be able to conduct our big events—district and regional congresses, which we conduct three times a year, because our activity will not only be suspended but it is prohibited according to the court. In essence, this part of the decision is taking effect immediately. And if our houses of worship are confiscated, then regular meetings of congregations, which are conducted weekly, also will be impossible. Most likely, only one option remains—that is to meet in private homes of fellow believers. But this is a serious restriction of freedom. Have any excesses arisen in the wake of yesterday’s decision and the “informational campaign” to arouse hostility toward Jehovah’s Witnesses in the news media that accompanies it? –Today we learned that our Hall of Congresses in St. Petersburg was stoned, glass was broken, and serious physical damage was caused. From the regions we are receiving reports that some of our houses of worship have already been sealed. For example, in Crimea just yesterday police came to the house of worship, interrupted a meeting, and sealed the building. But these are only the starters; all this will come to fruition and around the country a wave of violence against Jehovah’s Witnesses is rising. How is the Administrative Center now functioning? –In essence, it ceased its usual activity: bank accounts are frozen, and work is not being conducted any longer in the offices. We are following the court’s decision and we cannot do anything else for now. Will you continue evangelistic work in Russia, and if so, in what forms? –We call this activity witnessing. Our fellow believers witness about what is written in the Bible, and it seems to me now this should be the personal decision of each of our fellow believers in the country, how they will act in the future. They should take account of certain consequences that participation in religious activity may entail, but practice will show that no decision of courts will be able to restrain a Christian from performing the task which Jesus Christ or God commanded of acquainting other people with God’s standards, with his intentions, and with his personality. Most likely, this activity will continue. Perhaps in a somewhat less explicit form. The status of the Jehovah’s Witnesses was equated in the Russian federation to the Islamic State . . . –Actually, the boundary between real and virtual extremism has been washed away. Many times such statements of our defenders have been voiced in the Supreme Court: Jehovah’s Witnesses are accused of virtual or literal extremism. It is clear that Jehovah’s Witnesses are not any kind of extremists; they are very far from this. On the contrary, they proclaim respect for people and love. Jesus said: “By this they will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one another,” and not hatred. Jehovah’s Witnesses treat people of other faiths and other nations with respect. If you come to an international congress of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, you will see the greatest diversity of skin color and the greatest diversity of nationalities—and they all hug each other and get along amicably. Is it true that on the eve of this court decision you made some attempts to rearrange the property belonging to Jehovah’s Witnesses organizations in order to save it from confiscation? –Some small attempts were made. But it seems that this was blocked. However before the court’s decision takes effect there is still a lot of time, but all operations with our immovable property are suspended so that we have no chances for rewriting or rearranging anything. That means that for you there is already nowhere to return to your workplace? –Essentially, yes. Interview conducted by Vladimir Oivin, Portal-Credo.Ru. (tr. by PDS, posted 23 April 2017) __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 HRWF

Survivors visit the former Auschwitz-Birkenau camp in Poland on the anniversary of its liberation. Photograph: Kuba Ociepa/Agencja Gazeta/Reuters War crimes files revealing early evidence of Holocaust death camps that was smuggled out of eastern Europe are among tens of thousands of files to be made public for the first time this week. The once-inaccessible archive of the UN war crimes commission, dating back to 1943, is being opened by the Wiener Library in London with a catalogue that can be searched online. The files establish that some of the first demands for justice came from countries that had been invaded, such as Poland and China, rather than Britain, the US and Russia, which eventually coordinated the post-war Nuremberg trials. The archive, along with the UNWCC, was closed in the late 1940s as West Germany was transformed into a pivotal ally at the start of the cold war and use of the records was effectively suppressed. Around the same time, many convicted Nazis were granted early release after the anti-communist US senator Joseph McCarthy lobbied to end war crimes trials. Access to the vast quantity of evidence and indictments is timed to coincide with the publication on Tuesday of Human Rights After Hitler: The Lost History of Prosecuting Axis War Crimes by Dan Plesch, a researcher who has been working on the documents for a decade. The documents record the gathering of evidence shortly after the UN was founded in January 1942. They demonstrate that rape and forced prostitution were being prosecuted as war crimes in tribunals as far apart as Greece, the Philippines and Poland in the late 1940s, despite more recent suggestions that this was a legal innovation following the 1990s Bosnian conflict. The Polish government in exile, the files also record, supplied extraordinarily detailed descriptions to the UNWCC of concentration camps such as Treblinka and Auschwitz, where millions of Jews were gassed. The accounts had been smuggled out of occupied eastern Europe. A charge sheet from April 1944 mention victims being forced to strip off clothing and how “the terracotta floors in the chambers … became very slippery when wet”. The Wiener Library was founded in Amsterdam in 1934 by Dr Alfred Wiener to monitor Nazi antisemitism. He shipped his collection to London on the eve of the second world war, then worked with the British government to inform officials about Hitler’s regime and provide evidence for the Nuremberg trials. Now based in Bloomsbury, central London, the library supports study of the Holocaust and genocide. It also works with the International Tracing Service to provide free help to those searching for relatives who vanished into the concentration camps. “The UN War Crimes Commission catalogue, which can be searched online, will be available through our website this week,” the library’s archivist, Howard Falksohn, said. “People will then be able to come in and look through the archive itself. “We anticipate a lot of interest. Some of the PDF files [on to which the 900GB UN archive has been copied] each contain more than 2,000 pages. This is the first time they will be available to anyone in the UK. It may well be that people will be able to rewrite crucial chapters of history using the new evidence.” Plesch, who is the director of the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at Soas in the University of London, had to get special permission to read the documents, which were closely guarded by the UN in New York. Only researchers who received authority from their government and consent from the UN secretary general were allowed to read them, and they were not allowed to take notes or copies. Plesch helped persuade diplomats, including the then US ambassador at the UN, Samantha Power, to release the secret material. “This is a huge resource for combating Holocaust denial,” Plesch said. “The German national authorities were never given access to the archive by the allies after the war. All of this has never seen the light of day.” Some of the earliest files of evidence were collected to indict Adolf Hitler directly for his role in the coordinating and controlling massacres carried out by Nazi units in Czechoslovakia. Much of the evidence was collected by the Czech government in exile. There are more than 300 pages detailing his orders and responsibilities. The Nazi leader was eventually indicted in secret by a meeting of the UNWCC in late 1944 as Luftwaffe bombs fell on London. One affidavit in the files is from a British soldier, Harry Ogden, who was captured at Narvik in Norway in 1940, escaped from a prisoner of war camp to join Polish partisans and was re-imprisoned in another POW camp alongside Auschwitz. By the late 1940s, the US and British governments were winding down prosecutions of Nazis. President Harry Truman made anti-communism, rather than holding Nazis to account, a priority, Plesch says. “Even action against the perpetrators of the massacre of British RAF officers attempting to escape from prison camp Stalag Luft III, a flight made iconic by films such as The Great Escape, was curtailed.” __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Guardian News and Media Limited

In more than 60 countries, 80 percent of all acts of religious discrimination are directed toward Christians. A new study titled “Under Caesar’s Sword: Christian Response to Persecution” reveals the findings of 17 scholars in Christianity who traveled the world for three years to investigate how Christian communities respond when their religious freedom is severely violated. Referred to as the world’s first systematic global investigation of Christian responses to persecution, the 25 countries in which the scholars conducted qualitative research is where most of the persecution has taken place. [Exceptions are North Korea, which was inaccessible for research, and Eritrea, Somalia and Yemen, which were outside of the project’s logistical capabilities.] The first-hand research attempts to answer three questions: how do Christian communities respond to repression? why do they choose the responses that they do? and what are the results of these responses? In many countries, Christians suffer persecution from both state and non-state actors. Government types include Communist, such as China, Cuba, North Korea, and Viet Nam; Islamist, like Saudi Arabia and Iran; religious nationalism, such as India, Sri Lanka, and Russia; and secular regimes, where examples are found in the post-Soviet republics of central Asia. Even some democracies host and/or enable discrimination and violence toward Christians, as happens in India and Indonesia. In addition to governments, non-state actors that persecute Christians include organized groups and terrorists such as ISIS in the Middle East, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hindu extremists in India, Boko Haram and Fulani militants in Nigeria, and al-Shabab in Somalia and Kenya. Christian responses to persecution, which are not mutually exclusive, fall under three types: SURVIVAL - whereby Christians intend to preserve the life and the most characteristic activities of their communities including worship, education, community life and often evangelization. This includes carrying on in secret, speaking in a language acceptable to a regime, and fleeing. ASSOCIATION - a step beyond survival including building relationships, bridges, and partnerships. This includes engaging in interreligious dialogue, cooperating with other Christian communities and forging coalitions and partnerships inside countries. CONFRONTATON - Christians openly challenge the persecuting government or non-state actors. This can involve protests or court proceedings, and can result in imprisonment, martyrdom, or in rare cases, taking up arms. Major findings from Under Caesar’s Sword, released by the Center for Ethics and Culture at the University of Notre Dame, the Religious Freedom Institute, the Religious Freedom Research Project at Georgetown University with collaboration from Aid to the Church in Need, are: Christian communities most commonly adopt survival strategies, then association, with confrontation being the least common response. Christian responses to persecution are almost always nonviolent, and with very few exceptions, do not involve acts of terrorism. Theology - a Christian community’s theology of suffering, church and culture influences the response of that community. Protestant evangelical and Pentecostal Christians are more likely to be persecuted than mainline Protestants, Catholics, Orthodox Christians or other Christians associated with ancient churches. The intensity of persecution only partly explains Christians’ responses. Success can be difficult to define, but some strategies of response have produced tangible results worthy of emulation. Mainstream media and human rights organization coverage of Christian persecution is minimal. The authors included policy recommendations for persecuted communities, non-indigenous or multinational NGOs, external governments and multilateral institutions, churches and Christian communities, media and journalists, academics, and businesses. The findings are articulated through various media that can be accessed at http://www.ucs.nd.edu. For those who wish to act in solidarity with persecuted Christians, this body of work challenges us to understand their response, to appreciate their courage and conviction, and to imitate their creative and faithful pragmatism. Lou Ann Sabatier Director of Strategy and Communications Take Action: 1. Read Under Caesar’s Sword. 2. Watch the 26-minute documentary about how Christians respond to persecution. 3. Pray that this report will be widely distributed, that the recommendations will be embraced, and most importantly, pray for the persecuted. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Wilberforce Initiative

From 2012 to 2014, Myanmar suffered violence between different communities, most of it involving Buddhists attacking Muslims. It ranged from localised, fleeting, inter-group violence, to large scale, apparently well-organised, state-supported killing and destruction of property of a targeted group, running over a number of days. The most serious and protracted violence, which left hundreds, perhaps thousands of people dead and over a hundred thousand displaced, was in Rakhine State, on Myanmar’s western seaboard, bordering Bangladesh. There, its objects were people variously identified as Rohingya, or Bengali Muslims. Large-scale anti-Muslim violence followed in Mandalay Region and Shan State; smaller incidents, some isolated, others sequential, occurred elsewhere. Collective violence is a feature of uncertain times. In Myanmar too—and before it, Burma—it has tended to occur amid rapid political and economic change. As in other religiously, culturally and linguistically heterogeneous countries where a politically oppressive state loosens a highly coercive grip, people there have found themselves wanting for genuinely democratic institutions to express and manage conflict. Mundane and seemingly apolitical events instead have been converted into moments of short-lived but intense violence in which people living in proximity have divided sharply into groups, with one attacking the other. What is it about the violence in this period of 2012 to 2014 specifically that made it ‘communal’? Communal violence consists in overtly performed, episodic, recurrent, sporadic, direct physical hostility between self-defining and mutually identifiable ascriptive communities. It is realised through repeated public expressions that the fundamental common interests of the members of one community are irreconcilable with those of another, giving rise to a shared belief that the other community poses an existential threat. Communal violence excludes the violence accompanying all civil wars and rebellions fought in Myanmar since political independence from Britain in 1948 up to the present, including those in the name of ethnicity, for which the country is well known. The parties to those wars contest state sovereignty. Communal violence is distinguished not only by the absence of any such contestation but also by the firm insistence of a party or parties to the violence on the exercise of sovereignty. In the immediacy of the violence, one or more affected communities demand security, calling for police or military intervention, and tacitly, for the state to intervene on one side or the other. The nomenclature of communal violence does not denote a condition in which evenly matched groups engage in tit-for-tat bloodshed for which each bear equal responsibility. As in India, where communal violence is recurrent, the violence in Myanmar of 2012 to 2014 was overwhelmingly one-sided. Buddhists contrived to commit most of the violence and on every occasion their targets were identified as Muslims, who officially make up approximately just 4.3% of the national population. A feature of communal violence that Myanmar shares with India, then, is the relative lack of capacity of the targeted community to retaliate, and the high degree of certainty that members of the dominant community will enjoy impunity for their actions. How are beliefs about communal violence formed, justified and institutionalised? In short, the answer is contingent on how people interact and communicate; on how some present opinions and interpret events to have others come to share their beliefs about what happened and why. As in other sites of communal violence, politically driven ‘tactical’ media online and in print played an especially significant part in how communal violence was produced and reproduced in Myanmar from 2012 to 2014. One example of an outlet specifically established to interpret and defend an anti-Muslim communalist position is MaBaTha’s Aungzeyadu. This weekly news-style periodical, which takes its title from the pre-regal name of the last empire-building Burmese king, Alaung-hpaya, reproduces sermons of leading anti-Muslim monks, and features articles advocating legal and policy changes to protect Buddhism. It also publishes racist tracts directed against ‘the Bengali’, reports of Islamic terrorism and anti-Muslim protests and movements around the world, commentaries welcoming the flight of Rohingya by boat, and editorials condemning international organisations for bias, and labelling as traitors local writers who oppose the communalist cause. Some of its columnists go on to republish their writings in collected volumes. Blatantly communalist propaganda of this sort does not appear to enjoy wide circulation through newsstands and bookstores, although the fact that it can be distributed openly is alarming. Of greater concern is that its influence has been felt through more mainstream, popular outlets, whose writers have moderated the propagandists’ language, but concurred with many of their premises. After the violence in 2012, news articles in popular periodicals like Weekly Eleven, The Voice, and 7-Day News consistently featured sympathetic portrayals of displaced Rakhine Buddhist populations. Photographs of Buddhist women, children and the elderly escaping to the refuge of monasteries were juxtaposed with a handful of images of marauding Muslim mobs armed with sticks, confronting riot police. Laudatory accounts of local welfare groups’ efforts to bring aid to Buddhists contrasted with the disapproval of international groups for providing the same kinds of support to Muslims. Only when violence spread to other parts of Myanmar in 2013 did some outlets shift their interpretations, expressing scepticism that the violence was spontaneous, speculating about who was responsible, and what they stood to gain. Leaders of civil society groups re-emerging after decades of political struggle against dictatorship have also taken on roles as ‘specialists’ in violence interpretation—as Paul Brass described people playing these roles in India. Few have challenged the idea of communal identity as the basis for political relations. Some have spoken in support of greater border controls to prevent the perceived influx of alleged illegals, and emphasised that citizens’ rights must be put ahead of human rights. But civil society leaders are by no means the only people to offer their specialist interpretations. The former head of military intelligence, Khin Nyunt, has published a book with his reading of recent events and details of the role he played in anti-Muslim operations in the 1970s. That an ex-spymaster is sufficiently confident that his views on these matters are consonant with those of some of the very people whom in earlier years he had imprisoned for political dissidence as to publish them is indicative of the anti-Muslim consensus among non-Muslim interpretation specialists in Myanmar. Despite the disagreements of journalists, civil society activists, former army officers and insurgents on pretty much every other politically salient topic, views on communal violence have tended to converge. At the same time, the views of Burmese have diverged sharply from those of international partners working in Myanmar. So too have they deviated from groups monitoring the country from abroad, not least of all, those making a case for crimes against humanity and genocide. Interpretation specialists communicating to audiences in Myanmar have aggressively rebutted these allegations, blaming the international community for deliberately or ignorantly misinterpreting events. Some have alleged that Muslim organisations, countries and advocacy groups have been conspiring to discredit Myanmar in international forums and the media. Like aggressor communities elsewhere, they have positioned themselves as victims rather than perpetrators, as defenders of an embattled religion or culture under attack from others representing an implicitly or explicitly inferior tradition. While interpretation specialists have dominated reportage on the communal violence, the people who actually did the killing and burning have remained obscured. Rarely have specific individuals been praised or condemned for leading an attack on a mosque or murdering its occupants. This awkward lack of specificity and seeming absence of agency after the fact of violence contributes to its sense of menace. Spaces that cannot be occupied by named and known aggressors instead are populated with shadowy, behind-the-scenes types, provocateurs or string-pullers, and unnamed and unidentified policemen who either turn a blind eye or participate in killings. A lack of specificity about perpetrators and their motives is among the reasons that it remains difficult, despite the many advances in social scientific research design of recent years, to develop persuasive causal theories and explanations about communal violence. Nevertheless, whether researchers adopt modes of inquiry that are oriented towards the causes or constitution of violence, we are all forced, in one way or another, to address questions about what did or did not happen, about the factual truth or falsity of reported events—and in so doing, to engage in informed and rigorous critique of rival interpretations. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 New Mandala

A rebel-held neighborhood in Daraa, Syria, after air strikes on Sunday. Members of a United Nations commission investigating war crimes in Syria have not been allowed to visit the country. CreditMohamad Abazeed/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images The chairman of a United Nations commission investigating possible war crimes in Syria has met that country’s ambassador only once, he said. It happened during a chance encounter in a hallway after he had given a briefing to the General Assembly in New York. “Then for 15 minutes, he gave me a lecture,” the commission chairman, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, said of his exchange with the Syrian envoy, Bashar al-Jaafari. “We don’t have any hope that the Syrians will cooperate with us.” Members of the commission, created by the United Nations Human Rights Council in August 2011, have never been permitted to visit Syria by the government of President Bashar al-Assad, which appears to view them as accomplices of Mr. Assad’s enemies. The commission, with a support staff of about 25 people, has collected an enormous volume of material, which could be used in courts, about the atrocities committed in the six-year-old civil war by both Mr. Assad’s side and the groups arrayed against him. The Syrian Mission to the United Nations did not respond to emails requesting comment. The material collected from outside the country includes testimony from more than 1,400 witnesses and victims. The commission also reviews and corroborates photographs, video, satellite imagery, and forensic and medical reports from governments and nongovernmental sources to determine if there are “reasonable grounds to believe” an atrocity has been committed, according to its website. “The fact that we don’t have access to Syria doesn’t mean that we don’t have access to information inside Syria,” Mr. Pinheiro said last week in an interview that included some of his colleagues. And, he said, the commission’s work carries more credibility than evidence of war crimes in Syria compiled by other groups because its work is not financed by one side or the other. “A lot of organizations are documenting the war crimes, they are serious and committed people, but of course they are funded by states that have a vested interest,” Mr. Pinheiro said. “At least we are being funded by the regular budget of the United Nations.” Besides Mr. Pinheiro, a Brazilian political scientist, his fellow commissioners are Karen AbuZayd of the United States, a longtime United Nations diplomat, and Carla Del Ponte of Switzerland, a former war-crimes prosecutor. They are also responsible for compiling a list of suspected perpetrators of war crimes in Syria, which is kept in a sealed envelope in the custody of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein. Even Mr. Hussein has not seen the list, Mr. Pinheiro said. Photo Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, chairman of the United Nations commission investigating possible war crimes in Syria.CreditMartial Trezzini/European Pressphoto Agency Ravi Kumar Reddy, the legal adviser for the Syria commission, said the list was updated annually and would remain secret. Mr. Reddy would not disclose how many people were on the list, saying “it would be unwise.” But Mrs. AbuZayd said, “Not as many as you’d like to think.” Mr. Pinheiro, Mrs. AbuZayd and some of their aides were in New York last week to meet with the United Nations secretary general, António Guterres, and to speak about some of their findings at an informal Security Council session. Mr. Pinheiro and his aides told them that increasing numbers of civilians were now concentrated in northern Syria, where much of the fighting was among militants whose alliances kept shifting. “New conflicts are emerging in which civilians are caught up between all these actors,” said Anis Anani, the commission’s political adviser. While the Islamic State militants are losing territory in northern Syria, he said, “it’s also giving way to unstable dynamics on the ground.” Whether the commission’s evidence will lead to an independent prosecution of suspected war crimes is unclear, even if the documentation is overwhelming. There is no clear path to make that happen. The International Criminal Court, which was created for such a purpose, cannot open a case on Syria without a referral from the Security Council, where Russia — Syria’s ally — would almost certainly block it. “The prospect of an I.C.C. referral is zero,” Mr. Pinheiro said. But Mr. Reddy said the commission had supplied some information to judicial authorities in approximately 10 countries where legal cases related to the Syrian war were underway. He declined to identify the countries or any of the cases. Mr. Pinheiro’s commission also received a new source of support last December, when the United Nations General Assembly voted to create a separate panel to help lay the groundwork for possible prosecutions of Syria war crimes. The panel will “closely cooperate” with Mr. Pinheiro’s commission, the General Assembly’s resolution said. Mr. Pinheiro said that when he agreed to lead the effort in 2011, he believed it would last a year. The commission is already the longest-serving inquiry at the United Nations. “The war is not winding down,” he said. (C) 2017 The New York Times

Jude Sabio from the Philippines poses for a photo with his complaint against Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte outside the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands, on April 24. (Mike Corder / Associated Press) Filipino lawyer filed a complaint Monday with the International Criminal Court accusing Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte of crimes against humanity and mass murder — charges stemming from his war on drugs, which has left thousands dead. The complaint, filed with the court in The Hague, blames Duterte for “a terrifying, gruesome and disastrous commission of extra-judicial killings,” beginning when he was mayor of Davao city in the southern Philippines and continuing during his term as president. Duterte, who ran for president on a tough-on-crime platform, has encouraged the killings of thousands of suspected drug dealers and has boasted of personally killing three people when he was mayor of Davao. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte addresses army troops at Ft. Bonifacio in suburban Taguig city on April 4. (Bullit Marquez / Associated Press) Attorney Jude Sabio, in his filing, charges that Duterte was responsible for more than 1,000 murders at the hands of the “Davao Death Squad” when he was mayor for two decades before being elected president last year, and has broadened the practice since then to include an additional 7,000 deaths nationally. “Immediately after taking his oath as president, he launched a virulent and brutal national campaign against illegal drugs, more popularly called ‘war on drugs,’ that has resulted in a national bloodbath in a scale never seen before in recent history,” the complaint states. A lawyer for Duterte dismissed the complaint as false and politically motivated. The allegations that Durerte oversaw a vigilante death squad as mayor, along with impeachment complaints filed last month and dipping popularity ratings, suggest that he may be paying a political price for his crackdown on illegal drugs. It is not clear, however, whether the International Criminal Court filing will lead to an indictment, and the court has a modest record of actually bringing leaders to justice. Its reach is limited to countries that signed and ratified the Rome statute that created the court in 1998 and have not since rescinded their approval. Among the countries not covered by the court are the United States, Russia, China and Israel. African countries have complained that they are singled out by the court, and have agreed to a plan for a mass withdrawal. Duterte’s opposition is determined to hold the president accountable in some way, and many Filipinos say the prospects for impeachment are dim because Duterte has the support of a majority of Congress. “Duterte is an abomination to the presidency. How can you have a president who is killing his own people?” Sabio said in an interview before filing the case. Sabio is the lawyer of Edgar Matobato, who confessed to being a hitman for the Davao Death Squad last September during a Philippine Senate probe into the extrajudicial killings. Suspected drug dealers as well as users — mostly poor young men in urban slums — have been gunned down with impunity by police and, in some cases, private citizens. In testimony filled with gruesome details, including a description of cutting up victims and throwing them into a river to be eaten by crocodiles, the 57-year-old Matobato named Duterte as the mastermind of the death squad and implicated Davao police officer Arturo Lascañas as one of ringleaders. According to Sabio, his client’s testimony is critical to the ICC case. “We can now establish a pattern to show that when he was mayor of Davao city, President Duterte used the Davao Death Squad as a system to eliminate criminals and control crime,” he said. When first summoned by the Senate committee in October, Lascañas categorically denied the existence of the death squad. He recanted his statement and made a public confession four months later after he had retired from the police force. According to Lascañas, the squad eliminated petty criminals and drug users but later expanded to killing political rivals, including journalists who were critical of Duterte. He also claimed that Duterte issued kill orders, and supplied cash to buy unregistered firearms and issue rewards for each kill. Senior members such as Lascañas enjoyed perks, including a monthly cash allowance of $2,000. “We were run like a Mafia family,” Lascañas said. Matobato and Lascañas have been under protective custody since their public confessions. Lascañas fled to Singapore in April 2016, saying that there were “increased threats” to his security. The potential ICC case follows the impeachment complaints filed by Congressman Gary Alejano, based in part on what the complaint says was Duterte’s failure to defend the country’s territorial rights in the South China Sea. An April 21 aerial view of the Subi reef, one of several islands being claimed by China in the South China Sea, (Francis R. Malasig / European Pressphoto Agency) China’s sweeping territorial claims over the South China Sea have made for hostile relations between the two countries. Last year, the Philippines elevated a territorial dispute with China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which ruled in favor of the Philippines. Duterte, however, set aside the ruling and chose to extend friendly overtures to China, turning his back on the United States, with which the Philippines has a long and complicated history. “Good relations should not be at the expense of national interest,” Alejano said. “As president, he should be the first to defend Philippine sovereignty. Duterte is acting like China’s spokesperson.” Chief presidential counsel Salvador Panelo dismissed the impeachment complaints, corruption charges and ICC complaint. “This is just a rehash of the complaints made during the campaign period. This is nothing but political harassment,” he said. Panelo said he doubted that the ICC complaint would be successful because most of the drug-related killings were routine homicides and not state-initiated. On the president’s pronouncements to kill criminals and reward police for doing so, Panelo said: “Those statements are hyperbole, meant to serve as a dramatic warning to criminals. It is never a crime to say, ‘I will kill you.’” Antonio La Viña, an international lawyer and former dean of the Ateneo School of Government in the Philippines, expressed concerns about the implications of bringing a case before the ICC, saying that before that step is taken, “domestic remedies should be exhausted.” “A finding that no remedy now exists in the country is a finding that rule of law is dead here,” La Viña said. (C) 2017 Los Angeles Times

Seoul, South Korea (CNN)Jang Yeong-jin never loved his wife. Throughout their marriage, he felt guilty and confused, ashamed that he was, in his words, "ruining one woman's life." Jang did not hear the word "homosexual" for the first 37 years of his life, saying he had no concept of what it meant, something not unusual in his native North Korea. "When I was in Pyongyang University, I went to see a neurologist, wondering why I was so different to others," he told CNN. "But as soon as I started talking about my feelings, I had to run out of the office, because the doctor started yelling at me." Jang Yeong-jin says he knows of other people in North Korea who have had the same experience. 'I knew I had to leave' Jang says he could cope with limited food or clothing in North Korea but having nothing to dream for left him miserable. He says the closest he came to a dream was a childhood friend he later realized he had been in love with. Their innocent childhood closeness spread well into adulthood. Holding hands or sharing a bed was not unusual he says, as both of their wives knew they were close. "One day my friend came to see me," he says. "That night I left my wife's bed and got into his, my heart was beating so fast as he slept and I couldn't figure out why I felt so hurt by him." "I got up, went outside and saw a wild goose flying over my head. I knew then I had to leave." Flight to freedom Jang fled across the border into China in 1996, where he struggled for 13 months to find a way to South Korea. China regards North Koreans as economic migrants rather than refugees or defectors, if they are caught they are usually sent back to face punishment. The commute – Riding the Pyongyang Metro. The underground network has two lines and 17 stations. He then made the unheard of, and incredibly dangerous decision to re-enter North Korea, travel south and cross the demilitarized zone, or DMZ, a four kilometer, mine-ridden border than only a handful of people have ever made it through. Jang knew the border well. He woke up next to it every day during his 10 years of compulsory military service, during which he was tasked with decoding South Korea's military communications. "While I was serving on the border, I wondered what life would be like in South Korea and would I live like a real human being there?" he says. 'I always have hope' Jang says he knows of others who have had the same experience as him in North Korea and assumes many are still struggling to understand their feelings. "When I was in the military there was a senior officer who had the same problem as me after he got married," he says. Jang first learned about homosexuality from a magazine in a doctor's surgery in 1998. "There was also a man in my hometown who never got married and lived alone all his life." "North Korea society treats these people as abnormal." Reading a magazine in a doctor's surgery in 1998, not long after he arrived in South Korea, Jang saw an article about homosexuality. It was like a light had been switched on, suddenly he had an identity. "That was the first time I knew what homosexuality was and I was really pleased," he says. "I was 37-years-old by that time and thought I would be living alone for my entire life after leaving North Korea since I could not live with a woman." The only openly gay defector Not that life has always been easy in Seoul. Duped by a swindler in 2004 who started a relationship with him and then stole his savings, his trust in people was greatly shaken. He has no family here, they're all in the North. He has few friends and being the only out gay defector in the South has made settling in twice as hard. "Since I am a defector, I am a stranger in this society," he says. "For all defectors it is hard to settle down, but for me the hardships double." Revelers at a gay pride parade in Seoul, South Korea in June 2016. Jang however, refuses to give into disappointment, pointing out that at least in the South he is allowed to dream. His current dream is that life begins at 60. "I am very optimistic, I always have hope that I would be able to live like everybody else, loving each other, traveling around the world someday," he says. A English translation of Jang's autobiographical novel of his life in the North -- "A Mark of Red Honor" -- is due to be published in 2017. CNN's K.J. Kwon contributed reporting. (c) 2017 CNN

The DRC has extraordinary potential for socioeconomic advancement. EPA/Dai Kurokawa Once again, the cycle of instability and political uncertainty has the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on high alert and agreements between prominent political actors have done little to stem the tide of violence. The situation has become so dire that Congolese nationals at home and abroad have raised concerns about the safety of civilians. These were echoed by the United Nations during a recent Security Council meeting. Until the end of 2016, the insecurity was limited to the country’s eastern Ituri region but violence is now being reported in Kasai in the central region of the country. Lives are lost daily and there have been reports of increasing human rights abuses. As a result, the International Criminal Court is following the situation closely. The renewed instability is partially a consequence of the failure by the Congolese government to organise the general elections in 2016, as per the country’s constitution. This is considered by some as a deliberate political move orchestrated by the “Majorite Presidentielle” ruling coalition. In response, frustrated local communities have used violent protests to send a strong, clear message of dissent to the government. Of course, these protests are also politically motivated and maintained. In the face of this persistent insecurity, violence and political instability, scholars and policymakers have not been able to map out a viable peace plan. Peace talks alone are proving to be ineffective because the problems are structural. Institutional crisis, poverty, inequality, individualistic leadership – and lack of political will to resolve these – are all key factors in the ongoing conflict. These need to be addressed if the DRC is ever to break the cycle of insecurity it’s caught up in. Struggle for legitimacy Ever since the 2016 elections were postponed, parliament, the senate and other executive institutions have been operating “off mandate”. Officials within the executive and legislative branches of government will continue to perform their functions until fresh elections are held. This is in line with the constitutional court’s interpretation of the constitution. But this doesn’t address the issue of legitimacy. Legitimacy must be socially as well as legally recognised. Recent protests suggest that the current government isn’t perceived as legitimate by the people of the DRC. And they are likely to continue until a legitimate government is installed. Institutional legitimacy is key to the stability and security of the DRC. This legitimacy can only be rebuilt through fair and inclusive elections. Failure to follow this route will result in a cycle of violence and instability. Addressing social and economic inequality While institutional illegitimacy is a major hurdle to peace and stability in the DRC, the violence is also anchored in poverty and economic inequality. The UN’s latest Multidimensional Poverty Index reports that 77.1% of the Congolese population live below the poverty line. Therefore, any peace plan that doesn’t take a proper look at the social and economic factors that feed conflict will be meaningless. The more people are deprived of basic human needs, the greater the chance of violent protest. Conversely, poverty alleviation and access to economic opportunities would reduce violence in the DRC. To raise the majority of the country out of poverty the government must invest in initiatives that promote economic and financial inclusion from the ground up. Change in the DRC will only occur if it’s nurtured from the grassroots. Good governance and leadership The stability of any country also depends on its ability to transition peacefully from one leader to another. If the DRC had invested in a mechanism for the peaceful transition of power the country wouldn’t be in turmoil today. With more than half of its population being under the age of 24, the country has extraordinary potential for socioeconomic advancement. But this can only be achieved if the political class includes the youth in decision-making processes with a view to entrenching a culture of transferable leadership. This would require fundamental changes in the leadership approach and a shift towards ethical, humanistic and inclusive practices. Political actors must put aside their own individualistic interests and ambitions for the benefit of the national interest. For institutional reform, economic restructuring and the peaceful transfer of power to happen, politicians and policymakers must act in good faith. The history of the DRC suggests that there’s no political will for change. But the new wave of young leaders who are hungry for change may be able to put enough pressure on government to effect it. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Conversation

Waitresses transform into musicians to perform at a North Korean restaurant in Phnom Penh. PHNOM PENH: On a quiet midweek evening on the streets of the Cambodian capital, the Pyongyang Restaurant is at near capacity. Inside the square room, adorned with dramatic landscape murals, music starts to blast. Waitresses in bright traditional Korean garb drop their trays and pick up their instruments. With great skill they twirl in formation and belt out odes to the homeland. It is patriotic, unapologetic North Korea thousands of miles from the secretive state. This is one of the Pyongyang regime’s money-spinners: Restaurants dotted throughout the world with profits used to raise foreign exchange. The shadowy proceeds of the evening seem to matter little to the bustling tables of mostly South Korean, Chinese and local customers. This is a curious glance into a nation that dominates world headlines but remains nothing but an odd cliche to most people. In Cambodia, it is just one small aspect of an unusual relationship with North Korea that has morphed over decades. From what was once a warm mutual friendship, current ties are far more uncertain, underpinned by global tensions and leveraged by the region’s main power player, China. Now, as Pyongyang finds itself again in the crosshairs of international ire, scrutiny has extended to Phnom Penh to see how it contends with an old ally. The roots run deep, back to the Cold War era. Late King Norodom Sihanouk had a firmly knitted friendship with the founder of North Korea (DPRK) and long-time supreme leader Kim Il Sung. In 1974, a winter palace was built outside Pyongyang for the monarch and he sought refuge there for many years, bringing back to Cambodia a personal troupe of North Korean bodyguards, whom he trusted more implicitly than their local counterparts. “For the DPRK to obtain recognition from one of the most ancient monarchies in Asia was a diplomatic gain, never to be forgotten and for which to be grateful for a long time,” said Julio Jeldres, counsellor to the Cabinet of His Majesty the King of Cambodia. Those royalist ties still hold, though somewhat tenuously. Sihanouk’s son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, now a peripheral figure in national politics, just this month renewed royalist ties with a high-ranking DPRK diplomat. Norodom Sihanouk (L) is welcomed in 1975 to Pyongyang by North Korean President and "Great Leader" Kim Il-Sung (Photo: Xinhua/AFP) Reaching out to a diminished power in Cambodian politics for “moral support” is an act of desperation from Pyongyang, according to Jeldres. “North Korea feels isolated now and is seeking to gain support from any sources that can give such support,” he said. “Today, the same personal relationship that existed between the leaders of Cambodia and the DPRK does not exist.” It is true that the Hun Sen-led government is hardly as embracing as the former king. Yet, still Pyongyang keeps popping its head up in the country. THE IRRITANT Just a few miles away from Cambodia’s national treasure, the Angkor Wat temple complex, lies another imprint of the Korean regime’s soft power projections. The Angkor Panorama museum is a US$24 million project bankrolled by the Mansudae Overseas Project Group, North Korea's propaganda construction group, in grand cooperation with the Cambodian government. Opened in December last year, it is a celebration of the ancient Angkor empire with one especially striking and epic 120m mosaic. This is no site for explicit propaganda. But the profits are set to flow back to Pyongyang for the first decade of the museum’s operation, no matter how measly they are from the as-yet rarely visited site. This type of small commercial enterprise is one many countries do not allow North Korea to set up. Yet Cambodia “permits” it to “retain a quiet, vestigial friendship with North Korea”, according to Sebastian Strangio, author of Hun Sen’s Cambodia. “But if the relationship became a burden, it would show no hesitation in cutting off what few ties remain,” he said. The Angkor Panorama Museum is one of North Korea's soft power projections in Cambodia. (Photo: AFP/Tang Chhin Sothy) North Korea though has been an irritant in recent years on several occasions, testing Cambodia’s resolve to walk a delicate path of equilibrium with a nation considered a “pariah” by the United States. In July 2016 it was revealed the kingdom was one of the nations to which Pyongyang had dispatched supposed assassins to launch terror attacks against defectors and South Koreans. That same month, a proposed visit by DPRK foreign minister Ri Yong Ho was rejected by the Cambodian government. In August, North Korean vessel Jie Shun, sailing under a Cambodian flag, was seized carrying a large shipment of munitions. That action coincided with an end to the kingdom’s flag convenience scheme, known to have assisted North Korea smuggle drugs and weapons throughout the world for years. Cambodia has also found itself oddly embroiled in the killing of Kim Jong Un’s estranged half brother, Kim Jong Nam, in February at Kuala Lumpur’s international airport. At least one of the two women who eventually carried out the assassination using a deadly nerve agent was known to be in Phnom Penh shortly before the attack. Asked about ongoing investigations in Phnom Penh, police spokesman Kirth Chantharith said he had no knowledge of the case. “I haven’t heard about this,” he said. The extent to which the plot has formed or rehearsed in Cambodia remains unclear. So too do the reasons why those masterminding the killing chose Cambodia to induct her. “Cambodia has traditionally been an off-the-radar meeting ground for Islamist terrorists and North Korean elements,” said Geoffrey Caine, a journalist who specialises in Korean affairs. “Foreign intelligence and diplomats have geared many of their problems to sewing up its porous borders and enforcing the rule of law. But the fact is that Cambodia is one of the most corrupt countries in the world, according to Transparency International.” Still, these dubious incidents, in clear view of the world, could wear down the Cambodian government’s patience with a partner that no longer serves them much purpose or musters much rapport. The government could cast North Korea adrift at any point. ‘JUST A FRIEND’ The Kim Jong Nam killing has further frayed DPRK ties with Southeast Asia, especially Malaysia. With Cambodia toying precariously with ASEAN solidarity by taking Beijing’s side in the South China Sea contest, the government might be better served holding tight with its neighbours, said Chheang Vannarith from the Cambodian Institute of Strategic Studies. “North Korea-ASEAN relations are worsening. It is not in Cambodia's interest to align itself with North Korea,” he said. Already, it has developed strong economic ties to South Korea and publicly denounced the North’s nuclear program – in a soft tone nevertheless. “We asked North Korea, a friendly country, to reason with us,” said foreign ministry spokesman Chum Sounry after a bilateral meeting in January. “(North Korea) is just a friend, but when a friend does a wrongdoing, Cambodia doesn’t support it and condemns it,” Cambodia government spokesman Phay Siphan told reporters last year. That attitude means the likelihood of Cambodia stepping into a mediation void to help settle an inter-Korean dispute, as some observers have suggested as a solution, has likely drifted out of the realm of possibility. “I doubt very much that the North Koreans would listen to the Cambodians. The only actor with considerable weight to influence North Korea is China,” Jeldres said. Vietnamese suspect Doan Thi Huong (left) was charged with the murder of Kim Jong-nam. (Photo: AFP/Mohd Rasfan) Prime Minister Hun Sen has appeared more willing to wade into the global debate but has stayed true to his non-interventionist mantra, which comes thick with criticism of perceived US aggression. His lead now largely comes from Beijing, increasingly propping up Cambodia with no-strings attached investment and loans. Analysts say the motives for Cambodia’s posturing are purely economic rather than being based on values or moral order. “Cambodian foreign policy comes down to getting the patronage of the highest bidder. It's mostly absent of principles and actual policies,” Caine said. “It's all about who gives Cambodia the most money. North Korea has little to offer these days.” What is left, in plain view at least, are the outposts – the museum and handful of restaurants dribbling dollars back to the fatherland, poor fragments of the type of status North Korea once enjoyed here. As the customers trickle out of Pyongyang Restaurant, the waitresses that had just dazzled with their performances return to their more mundane duties. Patriotic tunes again seep from the inner sanctum of the building, this time recorded and played through speakers, and for the benefit of the staff members rather than the patrons. They are all believed to live in a nearby compound, still isolated from the outside world and not allowed to roam freely in Phnom Penh or mingle with local population. They are here but not really, far from the turbulence of global politics yet still firmly in the constrained orbit of their rulers. Cambodia, indeed, is a strange place to call home. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Channel News Asia

When it comes to religious persecution, Christians are the most widely targeted community, said a new report released this week. But despite oppression and threat of violence, the faithful “should not be afraid,” said a Pakistani archbishop. Pakistan’s Christians have made vital contributions to the country’s history and must not refrain from professing their faith in the midst of the current persecution, Archbishop Sebastian Shaw, OFM of Lahore, Pakistan. “Even under discrimination or some violent actions,” Christians should take courage, he said, citing the words of Jesus that “people will hate you on account of My name.” “You are not guilty, but because you are Christians and because you are following the Gospel values…being honest, being more responsible, being more dutiful, more charitable,” he said of Pakistan’s Christians, violence and harassment will follow. Archbishop Shaw spoke with CNA at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. at the April 20 release of the new report “Under Caesar’s Sword.” The archbishop leads the largest Catholic diocese in Pakistan, with around 500,000 members. “Under Caesar’s Sword” documents not only the persecution of Christians around the world, but how they choose to respond to persecution. “Christians are the most widely targeted religious community,” the report explained, “suffering terrible persecution globally.” There are three common responses of Christian communities to violence or harassment, the report noted: “survival,” “strategies of association,” and “confrontation,” which is “the least common response.” Survival would entail communities choosing to remain where they are in the face of persecution, as minorities have in Iraq and Syria, and either gathering covertly for worship as underground churches do in China, or maintaining a tenuous relationship with regimes in power. Communities utilizing “association” would develop relationships with other non-governmental organizations or international bodies like the United Nations, or would strengthen their social ties in their country through social services or practicing forgiveness. Examples of this course of action would be Coptic Christians and Muslims in Egypt, who acted to protect each other’s churches and mosques from vandalism and violence in 2011. Another example was in 1996 when, “anticipating martyrdom, Christian de Chergé, leader of the ‘Tibhirine Monks’ of Algeria who were martyred in 1996 during the uprising, wrote a letter to his would-be killers, forgiving them and inviting them to a future of living together in freedom.” “Christian responses to persecution are almost always nonviolent and, with very few exceptions, do not involve acts of terrorism,” the report stated. Christians in Pakistan, Archbishop Shaw explained, helped build and unify the country when it was founded in 1947, especially through the health and social sectors and the educational institutions which formed some of the country’s present-day leaders, including the prime minister and the speaker of the National Assembly. However, following the nationalization of the country’s schools in 1972, Pakistan became “more Islamized” and Christians were marginalized more and more, the archbishop said. They currently only make up around two percent of the country’s population. Their marginalization includes infringements upon their rights and mob violence. Acts of terror against Christians have also increased, with a suicide bomber killing 72 and injuring 340 last year in an attack on a Christian celebration of Easter Sunday at a park in Lahore. Additionally, anti-blasphemy laws have resulted in 40 persons on death row or serving life in prison, according to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. The laws, which do not require evidence for an accusation and which carry the harshest of penalties, have been used to harass Christians. Mob violence is utilized to pressure the government and the courts to issue or uphold harsh sentences for Christians for alleged crimes. Asia Bibi, a Christian mother of five, was convicted in 2010 for alleged blasphemy but the country’s Supreme Court suspended her death sentence and her case is still in question, Archbishop Shaw said. Today, Christians don’t count as a full person according to the country’s witnessing law, which requires the testimony of two Christian men to equal that of one Muslim man when witnessing to a crime. Women are also considered below men, as four Christian women would have to testify to count as a full witness. New textbooks in schools have also circulated which contain “hate material,” the archbishop said, which prevents a “harmonious society” from growing. Archbishop Shaw said he tells Christians “you were born in Pakistan, so God has a special purpose for you to be born in Pakistan,” saying their presence there is no accident. Christians should not back away from the public square, he insisted, but should be “assertive enough to profess your faith in a very dignified way.” He exhorted them “not to fight,” in response to violence, “but that does not mean that you let people kill you. You have to be courageous to approach people in a very assertive way to share your values in being human and being a Christian.” Christians should seek to grow in knowledge of their faith and their “religious traditions,” he said, and should share their faith with others through interreligious dialogue. This last part is key, he said, because if Christians and Muslims can have a “roundtable” to learn each other’s religious values, then they can find common ground. Some of the worst persecution of Christians occurs in countries where they are isolated and which are largely closed off to outside research, the report said, countries like North Korea, Eritrea, Somalia, and Yemen. Christians worldwide should seek to implement these practices of dialogue, bridge-building with other members of society, and non-violence, the report said. “The benefits of these strategies may seem short-term and modest, but from the standpoint of those persecuted, the strategies reflect a kind of divine logic, one rooted not only in hope for reward and fulfillment in the life to come but also in the conviction that should these communities remain true to their faith, there will come a day when the persecuting regime or militant group may pass away and the church spring up and branch out with vigor, as it has done so often in history before,” the report stated, citing the early Christians’ faith amidst the persecutions by the Roman Empire. “Those who wish to act in solidarity with persecuted Christians can imitate their creative and faithful pragmatism,” the report concluded. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 IRAQI CHRISTIANS ADVOCACY AND EMPOWERMENT INSTITUTE

Some 2,000 Rohingya refugee families live in the Balukhali camp in southern Bangladesh, according to the camp's leader. Michael Sullivan/for NPR Can all hope be lost? I used to think not. I used to think that no matter how tough life gets for people, they always have hope to cling to – to get them through it. Then I met some Rohingya refugees on a trip to Bangladesh last month. Reporter Michael Sullivan and I were there to report on the latest wave of the Muslim minority group to flee over the border from Buddhist-majority Myanmar. We spoke with Rohingya living both inside and outside of the refugee camps that have taken root in southern Bangladesh. Working through interpreters, they told us the stories of how they'd fled from their homeland late last year during the latest Myanmar military crackdown against them. How their villages had been sacked and their homes burnt to the ground. How they'd faced a brutal military campaign of torture and mass rape. Tens of thousands of them had been displaced. After hearing these distressing accounts, I wanted to know: Given all that they had been through, what were their hopes for the future? A Puzzling Question We asked about a dozen refugees. And I was shaken by their answers. I asked one woman, Shajada — a name she chose for herself to protect her identity and her family back in Myanmar — what she hoped for her future. She responded via the interpreter: "Do you mean in terms of food?" I tried to clarify and re-clarify the question through the interpreter. Shajada, who had suffered an injury to her legs and hips while fleeing the Myanmar army that's left her almost immobile, finally did answer: "I don't hope anything for me. I don't hope for me because I cannot even move from one place to another because if I move, I fall down." Another young woman, Roshida — also not her real name — flat-out didn't comprehend the question at first. "We do not understand," Roshida responded, speaking for herself and her cousins. After we asked the question a couple of different ways, Roshida did finally say that if she could eat and Myanmar was peaceful, she would go home and try to get married. That's an extraordinary hope for the future given what she'd been through. When the Myanmar military came to her village, Roshida was raped by four soldiers. In that part of the world having been raped can ruin a woman's prospects of finding a husband. We thought perhaps the question of hope was getting lost in translation, so Michael tried asking: "How do you still go on?" A woman who called herself Zubaida — again to protect her identity — answered by listing the things she needs to do to survive in the camp: sell rice, find a job, learn to speak Bangla (the Bangladeshi language). What Is Hope? These conversations made me wonder: What exactly is hope? "Hope is what we want to happen," says neuroscientist Dr. Tali Sharot, who directs the Affective Brain Lab at University College London and does research on optimism, emotion and decision making. Hope — and optimism — does not come from any particular part of the brain, she says. Instead, a person's ability to hope and be optimistic is part genetics and part experience. "So you can be born with a certain way of processing information that makes you more likely to be optimistic and you do learn from things that happen to you, you do learn from the world around you," says Sharot. In other words: a person's outlook on life comes from both their genetic predisposition and life experiences. If a person has many negative experiences, they may come to believe that negative things are always going to happen, she says. And that would be a reason for someone to just not feel positive anymore — to lose hope. This could explain why the Rohingya refugees we interviewed had difficulty talking about their future. For decades, the Rohingya have been terrorized and persecuted by the Myanmar military simply for being an ethnic and religious minority — something the military mostly denies. Hundreds of thousands have fled their homes in waves. It is estimated that some 500,000 Rohingya refugees live in Bangladesh alone. "I know that for many, many refugee populations like the Rohingya who've been living for years in situations of great uncertainty there's an erosion of hope," says Pindie Stephen, who works with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to help refugees move out of camps. Stephen, who worked with refugees for 12 years in Kenya, says it's hard for people to think about the future when they're concerned about immediate needs — identity papers, school for their children and safe housing. "So I think a question like, 'What are your hopes?' takes them off guard," says Stephen. "A lot of our refugee population lives in this limbo for such a long time that I think they no longer even have the luxury of being able to hope." Traumatized And Trapped A recent trauma can also have an effect on a person's ability to hope, says Peter Ventevogel, a psychiatrist with the United Nations Refugee Agency. "We often see at the beginning very high stress levels and levels of uncertainty," he says. "They [newly arrived refugees] don't know what are their options, they don't have enough information to make decisions about what they want." Ventevogel is part of a team that conducted interviews with Rohingya in the two government registered refugee camps in Bangladesh. The team's forthcoming article, expected to be printed next month in the journal Transcultural Psychiatry, details findings of high levels of mental health concerns, such as PTSD and depression, among the 148 Rohingya interviewed. With those feelings comes a feeling of being trapped, he says. Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are truly trapped. They are stateless. Their home country of Myanmar does not want them, nor does Bangladesh — or any other country they flee to. In Bangladesh the Rohingya are not allowed to leave their camps, get a passport in order go to another country or even legally work because they aren't citizens. They have no good options. "They had to leave their country because of the troubles they were in and [move] into an environment that they don't perceive as welcoming and they can't get out," Ventevogel says. "And that's not good for your mental health. That creates demoralization and loss of hope." But Ventevogel says in his experience talking to refugees who have been displaced for many years — whose shock and trauma is not fresh — he's found they have a lot of hope for the future. "Often it is framed in indirect ways," he says. "People hope their children can get a good education or they can get a resettlement [to another country] and build a new life, to get back to the country they came from," he says. Ventevogel believes the humanitarian community can help the hopeless find hope again. It starts, he says, with helping refugees regain control of their lives. Then they're more likely to see prospects for the future. "Sometimes it's very simple, it's just giving people a piece of land and materials to build their own house again because people can recreate something that's their own," he says, pointing to refugees in Uganda and Tanzania who are allowed to farm. One Man's Hope Near the end of our time in Bangladesh we spoke with a Rohingya who backs up Ventevogel's claim that refugees who have been displaced for a longer time are better able to think about their future. Twenty-five-year-old Mohammad Nur, a name he chose to protect his identity, has been a refugee his whole life. He was born in a government-run refugee camp. When we asked if he had any future in Bangladesh, he replied: "I think not. Not at all." He said he knew if he didn't leave, his brain would die. "I will not die, my body will not die but ... I will be like a disabled guy," he says. And so in this hopeless situation, he has one clear hope for the future: "I must leave." Ashley Westerman spent a week and a half in Bangladesh in March producing radio stories on the Rohingya with reporter Michael Sullivan. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 NPR