Governments should pledge political and financial support for sexual and reproductive health to counter the United States’ “Global Gag Rule,” Human Rights Watch said today. The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden are hosting a summit in Brussels on March 2, 2017, to strengthen support for the “She Decides” funding initiative, which will support organizations affected by US restrictions and resulting cuts. Women and girls wait with their children outside a doctor’s office in Chitwan, Nepal. Child marriage and adolescent pregnancy is widespread in Nepal, and access to comprehensive reproductive health services and information is crucial. April 12, 2016.© 2016 Smita Sharma for Human Rights Watch On his first full day in office, US President Donald Trump issued an expanded “Global Gag Rule,” or “Mexico City Policy,” which strips foreign nongovernmental organizations of all US health funding if they use funds from any source to offer information about abortions, provide abortions, or advocate liberalizing abortion laws. US law already prohibits using US funds for abortion in foreign family planning assistance. “Governments, nongovernmental groups, and the private sector should stand with women and girls to protect their right to health,” said Nisha Varia, women’s rights advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “The Trump administration’s damaging policy restricts women’s choices, pushes censorship of information about critical health options, and will reduce a wide range of health services in many countries that desperately need them.” On his first full day in office, US President Donald Trump issued an expanded “Global Gag Rule,” or “Mexico City Policy,” which strips foreign nongovernmental organizations of all US health funding if they use funds from any source to offer information about abortions, provide abortions, or advocate liberalizing abortion laws. The US is the largest donor to health initiatives globally. When previous versions of the Global Gag Rule were imposed by past US Republican presidents, it applied only to US family planning funds, or roughly US$575 million of the current US global health funding. The Trump administration’s version has dramatically expanded its restrictions to include all US global health assistance. These funds, up to US$9.5 billion, support not only family planning, but also maternal and child health, nutrition, and the treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS, infectious diseases, malaria, tuberculosis, and neglected tropical diseases. Foreign organizations that receive US health funds will have to choose between losing their US funding or complying with the rule’s restrictions, which prevent healthcare providers from sharing full and accurate health information with their patients or providing them with potentially lifesaving care. The last time the Global Gag Rule was in effect – affecting a far smaller amount of funding – healthcare providers that often provide a wide range of health services in under-resourced areas had to close clinics and cut staff. Human Rights Watch has documented the harm caused by a lack of comprehensive health care for women and girls. For example, unintended pregnancies contribute to child marriage in Nepal, Tanzania, and Malawi and often lead to ending a girl’s education. In Kenya, Human Rights Watch documented that girls who give birth before they are physically mature may get obstetric fistulas, resulting in lifelong health problems and stigma. In countries where abortion is highly restricted, such as Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Haiti, Human Rights Watch has documented that women risk their lives with unsafe abortions and that doctors feel helpless as the restrictive laws drive higher maternal morbidity and deaths. “Access to comprehensive health care, including contraception, and to safe and legal abortion, results in fewer unintended pregnancies, fewer abortions, and fewer women and girls dying from pregnancy and childbirth,” Varia said. “While it’s too early to determine how much US funding will be cut, a large gap could have devastating consequences for women’s health and lives if other donors don’t step up their funding.” The Dutch government established the “She Decides” international fundraising initiative to support organizations providing comprehensive sexual and reproductive health care. Governments that increase their bilateral assistance on sexual and reproductive health care can announce this as support for the “She Decides” initiative. Private donors can contribute to a “She Decides” fund that crowd-sources donations from individuals, foundations, and corporations. Belgium, Canada, Cape Verde, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden have already announced their support for the “She Decides” initiative, and several other governments have indicated they will announce their support at the March 2 multi-stakeholder summit in Brussels. A European parliament resolution, adopted on February 14, called on the European Union and its member states to “counter the impact of the gag rule by significantly increasing sexual and reproductive health and rights funding…using both national as well as EU development funding.” Several countries that have a strong record of supporting women’s health in their foreign assistance have yet to announce their plans, including Australia, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Almost 225 million women and girls have an unmet need for contraception. While maternal mortality dropped 44 percent between 1990 and 2015, it remains a serious problem. The World Health Organization estimates that every day, approximately 830 women and girls die from preventable causes related to pregnancy or childbirth. It also estimates that nearly 7 million women in developing countries are treated for complications from unsafe abortions annually, and at least 22,000 die from abortion-related complications every year. Comprehensive sexuality education, access to contraception, and access to safe abortion is particularly important for girls, as complications due to pregnancy and childbirth are a leading cause of death for girls ages 15-19 globally. With less funding for sexual and reproductive health information, services, and supplies, the death toll could climb higher. Draft legislation introduced in the US Congress – the Global Health, Empowerment, and Rights (HER) Act – would permanently repeal the Global Gag Rule. While there is no reason to expect the legislation would be adopted under the current administration, it has gathered increased support as a long-term strategy. “President Trump’s expanded Global Gag Rule is anti-woman, anti-family, anti-health, and anti-free speech and threatens to roll back hard-fought health gains around the world,” Varia said. “Donors should protect the investments they have been making in global health by pledging new funds to help fill the gap.” ________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Human Rights Watch

The ICRC described the port of Hudaydah as a "lifeline" for the people of Yemen The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has had to halt deliveries to the Red Sea port of Hudaydah. It said this was partly because it had not received security guarantees. The port has also been targeted by warplanes from a Saudi-led coalition which is backing Yemen's government in its war with the rebel Houthi movement. UN attempts to bring in five cranes to replace those damaged in the attacks have not been successful. The ICRC's Middle East regional director Robert Mardini warned that Yemen, which depends on imports for 90% of its food supplies, was now living on its "reserves" and that the "day will come very soon" when they run out. He said that despite the focus on the damage and casualties caused by the fighting, thousands of people were dying "silently" of complications due to malnutrition, or of minor illnesses or injuries which were not being treated at the 45% of health facilities that are still functioning. The conflict, which escalated in March 2015, has left at least 7,500 people dead and 40,000 injured, according to the United Nations. But almost 19 million people are in need of some form of humanitarian assistance. Seven million people do not know where their next meal is coming from and more than three million, including 2.1 million children, are suffering from acute malnutrition. The UN's emergency relief co-ordinator, Stephen O'Brien, called on the warring parties to guarantee more access to ports to let in food, fuel and medicine imports on Monday. Speaking to reporters in the government-controlled southern port city of Aden, he also said the international community needed to "step up its funding". Earlier this month, the UN appealed for $2.1bn (£1.7bn) to provide life-saving assistance to 12 million people in Yemen over the next year. But it has so far received only $43m. Almost 19 million people in Yemen are in need of some form of humanitarian assistance On Tuesday, Mr O'Brien was forced to cancel a visit to the city of Taiz, which is besieged by rebel fighters, reportedly after his convoy came under fire. In a separate development on Tuesday, UN human rights officials said they had evidence of the recruitment of child soldiers in Yemen, mostly by groups affiliated with the Houthis. In all, the UN managed to verify the recruitment of 1,476 children, all boys, between March 2015 and the end of January 2017. However, it said the numbers were likely to be much higher. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 BBC News Middle East

Yanghee Lee (C), the UN's Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, visits the Balu Khali Rohingya camp in Cox's Bazar on Feb 21, 2017. (Photo: STR/AFP) The Myanmar government has hit out at UN Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee's latest comments on people who have fled Rakhine state, saying it disagrees with her statements and finds them "unfortunate". Responding to Channel NewsAsia's queries, Myanmar Foreign Ministry Deputy Director General Aye Aye Soe said Ms Lee appeared to be defending the rights of only one group of people and to appease this group in the community, without referring to the Rohingyas. Ms Aye Aye Soe said this shows Ms Lee's "bias" as she was not speaking for both Rakhine Buddhist and Rohingya Muslim communities affected by the Oct 9 attacks in Maungdaw, Rakhine. After making a four-day visit to Bangladesh camps housing Rohingyas, Ms Yanghee Lee said what she heard during her interactions with the Rohingyas "was worse than I had anticipated. The magnitude of violence that these families witnessed and experienced was far more extensive than I had originally speculated." Ms Lee recounted a number of experiences told to her by Rohingyas who fled Myanmar, such as one of a mother who assumed her son had been brought out of a burning house, only to realise he was still inside. Another account told of how a woman lost sight in both eyes because of a fire allegedly caused by security personnel. "There was not a single account I heard which was not harrowing," said Ms Lee. Ms Aye Aye Soe said the UN Special Rapporteur appeared to have a "twisted" interpretation of the situation in Rakhine, making it sound worse than it is. The attacks against three border posts in northern Rakhine state in October led to a lockdown and security operations in Maungdaw which lasted about four months. According to the UN, the operations forced over 70,000 Rohingyas to flee, leaving over 20,000 newly displaced Rohingyas still within the Maungdaw district. The incident also led to a number of allegations of atrocities such as summary killings, rape and destruction of Rohingya properties. The UN Special Rapporteur also pointed out that the Oct 9 attacks appeared to have given the security forces "the perfect cover to amplify and accelerate actions they had previously carried out through policies, rules and laws - with the apparent objective of expelling the Rohingya population from Myanmar altogether." Based on Ms Lee's latest comments, the UN envoy's report to be presented to the UN Human Rights Council on Mar 13, "will not be fair", said Ms Aye Aye Soe. The Myanmar government-appointed 13-member Rakhine Investigation Commission, led by Vice President Myint Swe, hopes to visit Bangladesh next week, said Ms Aye Aye Soe. The commission members are "willing to investigate" and hope to get a "wider picture" by speaking with the Rohingyas who have fled Rakhine after the Oct 9 attacks. She pointed out that the commission wants to get the "truth" and will study the degree of the violations committed if there are any. She added that the government will take necessary actions if violations are determined to have taken place. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Channel News Asia

A refugee from Eritrea plays an electric piano at a recreation room for refugees in Dresden, Germany. People of African descent suffer discrimination in Germany, according to a U.N. report | John Macdougall/AFP via Getty Images Germans aren’t aware of the scale of the problem, according to United Nations group. People of African descent suffer widespread discrimination and racial profiling in Germany, a U.N. panel concluded Monday. “The repeated denial that racial profiling does not exist in Germany by police authorities and the lack of an independent complaint mechanism at federal and state level fosters impunity,” said Ricardo Sunga, the leader of the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent. The working group visited multiple cities across Germany earlier this month to conduct the research, meeting human rights activists and government officials. Last week, a German interior ministry report estimated there were nearly 10 attacks per day on migrants in 2016. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Politico

Darfur Women Action Group, in partnership with Darfuri and Sudanese diaspora, and civil society in the United States, cordially invites you to join GLOBAL WEEK OF ACTION AGAINST THE GENOCIDE IN DARFUR For more information please contact outreach@darfurwomenaction.org. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Darfur Women Action Group

The bloodstain outside Peresi Saima’s house told her what she already knew. Still, she pushed the door to her home open just far enough to see her dead husband’s body slumped against a chair, dragged inside as a cruel joke by the South Sudanese soldier who had shot him multiple times in the chest. “I couldn’t even bury him,” she said recently from the safety of the Parolinya refugee settlement in northern Uganda. “I knew that if I stayed for five more minutes, I would be next.” Saima found her husband dead in January, two days after troops loyal to South Sudanese President Salva Kiir attacked the village of Loka Round in Lainya County, some 60 miles southwest of the capital of Juba. For months, Saima had followed the news of a government offensive, tracing the army’s rampage through the country’s southern equatorial regions and wondering when it would reach her. When it finally did, she hid with her five children in nearby brush. Her husband stayed behind, believing that as a peaceful farmer he would be spared. Saima and her children are now among the more than 740,000 South Sudanese living as refugees in Uganda, most of whom have arrived in the last seven months. Civilians are fleeing attacks by government and rebel troops alike. They are also fleeing the crippled economy and growing food insecurity that the two sides have left in their wake. On Feb. 20, the United Nations declared a famine in parts of the country, saying that some have already died from hunger and another 100,000 people are on the brink of starvation. One million more are headed toward the same fate. “Our worst fears have been realized,” Serge Tissot, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization’s representative in South Sudan, said in a news release. “Many families have exhausted every means they have to survive.” “Many families have exhausted every means they have to survive.” More than 4.9 million people need urgent food-related assistance, while the number of South Sudanese refugees in Uganda has surpassed the number who crossed the Mediterranean in 2016. “This crisis is man-made,” acting State Department spokesman Mark Toner said in a statement, calling famine “the direct consequence of a conflict prolonged by South Sudanese leaders who are unwilling to put aside political ambitions for the good of their people.” Fighting has prevented farmers in parts of the country from planting and harvesting crops for the last three years, and Kiir’s government has routinely obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In places where food is still available, skyrocketing inflation — which peaked at 836 percent in October — make it difficult for the average South Sudanese to purchase staple goods. A power struggle between Kiir, from the Dinka ethnic group, and his former Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer, sparked the civil war in December 2013. Mass violence ensued, with troops loyal to each man targeting civilians from the opposing ethnic group, but the majority of atrocities being carried out by Kiir’s troops. A peace deal signed in August 2015 offered some hope that the war would end. But Kiir signed it under the threat of sanctions, and appended a list of reservations to the document that raised questions about his commitment from the outset. Machar then took until April to return to the country to take up his post in the unity government, citing concerns about his safety. When he finally did, he lasted only until July, when fighting between government and former rebel troops in the capital killed hundreds and effectively scuttled the peace agreement. Government forces bombed Machar’s camp in Juba, forcing him to flee on foot to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He is now in South Africa, but his troops still control territory in South Sudan and have continued to clash with government forces, particularly in the region previously known as Central Equatoria (South Sudan’s states were divided and renamed in 2015 under a controversial presidential decree.) Refugees from Central Equatoria say Dinka soldiers are now carrying out a campaign of mass rape, executing civilians they accuse of aiding the rebels, and burning entire villages to the ground. Although most of those living in Central Equatoria are neither Nuer nor Dinka, they say government troops see them as loyal to Machar’s cause. They say these troops are trying to exterminate them. On Feb. 6, Rose Tabu, who is 20, crossed a rickety, wooden bridge that separates South Sudan from Uganda and registered herself and her 5-year-old daughter as refugees. Together they had walked for three days from the town of Yei, where their neighbors, including a girl the daughter’s age, were raped and then killed by Dinka troops. That same week, Emmanuel Lodu, a 22-year-old teacher, fled his home in Kajo-Keji County, where some of the worst fighting has taken place. He walked for days with his wife and infant daughter after a friend warned that government soldiers were shooting civilians at random in a nearby village. “South Sudan is not safe for non-Dinkas,” he said, recalling how a woman from his neighborhood was raped and shot by troops wearing government uniforms when they found her washing clothes alone in January. Grace Kolong fled her home in Kajo-Keji around the same time. During an assault by government soldiers, the 46-year-old saw a group of them gang-raping a woman. “I could see it happening, but I was helpless,” she said. “When they capture a woman, each one takes a turn.” Even some members of Kiir’s government have begun to speak out about the uptick in violence. In recent weeks, multiple officials, including the minister of labor and two army officers who oversee South Sudan’s military court, have resigned, citing corruption and ethnic motivation behind the country’s perpetual conflict. In his resignation letter, Lt. Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka, the army’s deputy head of logistics, said he believes the conflict was “planned and orchestrated by design” and accused Kiir of turning the military into a “tribal army.” South Sudanese presidential spokesman Ateny Wek Ateny did not immediately respond to requests for comment. After a visit to South Sudan in November, U.N. Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide Adama Dieng toldthe Security Council that he saw “all the signs that ethnic hatred and targeting of civilians could evolve into genocide if something is not done now to stop it.” But the international community has continued to sit on the sidelines. For years, there has been talk of targeted U.N. sanctions and an arms embargo — yet the U.N. Security Council has failed to impose either. Now, as refugees pour into northern Uganda, where some of the world’s largest refugee settlements have materialized almost overnight, it is clear that the Ugandan government will pay the price. “At some point, people have to take responsibility and send the right messages,” said Jonathan Pedneault, a South Sudan researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Those messages need to be ones of consequence, that you cannot constantly and repeatedly abuse your own people.” But it’s not just the government that stands accused of carrying out horrific abuses. Refugees in northern Uganda say that rebels operating in Central Equatoria have also attacked civilians, though on a smaller scale than Kiir’s troops. When Dinka soldiers invaded Moses Ayilla’s hometown of Morobo in October and slaughtered his brother-in-law, he considered it a stroke of luck he was at work and they didn’t find him, too. Rebel fighters didn’t see it that way. They thought it proved he was a government collaborator. After questioning him with a gun to his head, they executed him in front of his wife and two young children. “Neither side cares,” said Ayilla’s widow, Lillian Poni, who buried him the next day and then fled on foot to Uganda, where she is now caring for their two children and her niece and nephew alone. “They kill you and move on to the next.” Thomas Magok Chuol, Machar’s deputy representative in Uganda, denied in an interview that opposition troops had targeted civilians. “We are hungry for peace,” he said. “We don’t kill civilians. We don’t even kill Dinkas. Human beings are human beings.” That claim would likely ring hollow to many of the refugees fleeing attacks by militants on both sides of this war. Saima, whose husband was killed by government troops, said it’s hard to believe that her community once trusted Kiir and Machar to lead the country in peaceful independence. “This war is only for two people,” she said. “We don’t know what’s happening or why. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 The Magazine

For two straight weekends, thousands have gathered in the streets of Manila to condemn the deterioration of the human rights situation in the Philippines. On February 18, the Catholic Church mobilized an estimated 20,000 people to participate in a “Walk for Life” as a form of protest against the rising “culture of violence” in the country. A week later, more than 5,000 people commemorated the 31st anniversary of the Edsa uprising, which toppled the Marcos dictatorship. But the event also became a venue to criticize the “authoritarian” tendencies of President Rodrigo Duterte. The “Walk for Life” challenged the proposal to revive the death penalty, the lowering of the minimum age of criminal responsibility, the implementation of the Reproductive Health l=Law, and most importantly, the continuing drug-related extrajudicial killings. Some analysts described it as the first major church-led protest against the killings that worsened under Duterte According to unofficial estimates, more than 7,000 have been killed already after Duterte launched the “war on drugs” last July. The police and other state forces are accused of committing extrajudicial killings, which have victimized mainly the poor and petty drug personalities. A week after the “Walk for Life,” various groups organized different activities across the country to celebrate the anniversary of Edsa and to denounce the “Marcosian” tactics of Duterte. Leftist groups assembled in the morning in front of a military camp where they demanded the resumption of the peace talks between the government and communist rebels. They claimed that some army officials were sabotaging the peace process by pursuing an all-out war campaign targeting innocent civilians and unarmed activists. They urged Duterte to remember his campaign pledge of subverting the rule of oligarchs in the country, and to address the roots of the armed conflict. In the afternoon, groups associated with the previous administration reunited at Edsa to highlight the worsening political persecution in the country. They cited the case of Senator Leila De Lima, who was arrested last week for allegedly supporting illegal drug trade in the past. De Lima, a former human rights lawyer and justice secretary, is a fierce critic of Duterte. These rallies were organized by competing political forces, which explains their seeming lack of coordination. The church refused to call their event a protest action, the Left focused on the issue of reviving the peace process, and the yellow groups which conducted the rally in the afternoon of February 25 denied that they are fomenting destabilization against the Duterte government. But the lack of unity in opposing the draconian policies of Duterte is not necessarily bad for the opposition. What should be pointed out is the emergence of a movement that is not afraid to expose the anti-people programs of the president, the military, police, and other institutions of the state. After only seven months in power, Duterte is already being held accountable for the human rights abuses of state forces. Despite Duterte’s reputation as a strongman who dislikes criticism, various groups chose to air their grievances against him in the streets. Perhaps recognizing the potential of People Power, pro-Duterte forces countered the Edsa protest by organizing a two-day vigil and assembly at Luneta Park. About 200,000 people reportedly joined this event, which was presented as a united stand of Filipinos against crime, illegal drugs, and corruption. There is no doubt that this pro-Duterte event attracted a bigger crowd. But it was also leaked that government agencies had a role in persuading constituents to join the event. Duterte may be popular, but the state machinery was still used to guarantee that people would show up to prove their loyalty to the president. An event which was organized to validate Duterte’s popularity exposed the paranoia of a government, which sees voices of dissent as proof of a coup plot or destabilization conspiracy. Indeed, there are groups clamoring for the ouster of Duterte, even though they do not necessarily reflect the views of everyone who joined the rallies in the past two weeks. Most are concerned citizens who simply wanted Duterte to stop the ill-conceived “war on drugs.” Others joined the rallies to push for social and economic reforms and the resumption of the peace process. The Duterte government should not be complacent because it succeeded in drawing a large supportive crowd last weekend. On the contrary, it should inspire the president to work for better transparency, better governance, and hopefully, better record in protecting human rights. (c) The Diplomat

South Africans have a certain reputation for public robustness. We fight, scream, and shout at each other, all in the name of deciding what would make for a better country. At times, though, this robustness threatens to derail us at a time when many people could be vulnerable to serious harm. On Friday in Pretoria, violence broke out during a march planned by people who were "opposed to illegal immigrants". The police struggled to maintain order. And instead of speaking with one voice, everyone in a leadership position was busy pointing fingers, particularly at Joburg Mayor Herman Mashaba. There was plenty of notice that xenophobic violence was coming. In stark contrast to the violence that claimed nearly 60 lives in 2008, and the awfulness that marked the violence in KwaZulu-Natal two years ago, last week we knew that a group of people in Mamelodi were going to march against the presence of foreign nationals in their community. They said that it was a march against crime, but when pushed on their motives it became clear that the real issue was simply that they did not like people who were not like them. When the marching and the clashes started on Friday, the police immediately moved to contain the protests. A group of Somali men grouped together, partly perhaps for protection, partly perhaps to cause their own violence. This was the kind of thing that only leads to trouble. One of the oldest insults among human beings can be boiled down to this: He is a foreigner, and therefore a barbarian. And it is also universal among societies everywhere; when people feel their lives are getting worse and hopeless, they will turn on people they see as different, or somehow not being "like them". Situations like these need cool heads, and plenty of disciplined force from the police. But a problem of this kind also needs leadership. On Friday morning, the ANC released a statement about the xenophobic violence, essentially calling for calm. But by the third paragraph of the statement, it was already attacking Johannesburg Mayor Herman Mashaba, saying he should be "singled out for particular mention", and attempting to blame him for the violence. They claimed further that "it was the reckless statements of Mayor Mashaba that lit the tinderbox of hatred in the first place". Where the ANC is absolutely correct is to criticise Mashaba for his words and actions on this issue in the last few months. His comments about "illegal immigrants", and his almost wilful and deliberate conflation of the words "immigrants" and "criminals", was wrong, perhaps bordering on the criminal. As a public representative, he should be ashamed of himself, and the DA should be ashamed of itself for not smacking him down in public. His comments in this regard are surely against everything the DA claims to stand for. It is hard to know why Mashaba made them in the first place. Maybe he genuinely believes there is a problem and that it needs to be addressed. Perhaps he feels that it's a way to get votes. As the US and other places have recently demonstrated again, being "antiimmigrant" can play successfully to prejudice. Or he could just be prejudiced himself, like so many other South Africans, and people all over the world. But to say that he is responsible is to utterly miss the greater context of what is happening in South Africa these days. And, worse, it is to forget the role the ANC government played over the last few years. Last week, before the march, Home Affairs Minister Malusi Gigaba held a press conference specifically about the xenophobic tensions. He said he had met with the organisers of the march, and had pleaded with them to act responsibly. It was the kind of act that you would expect someone in his position to do; it was the right thing to do. Unfortunately, his department could also be accused of playing a role in demonising foreign nationals in the first place. It is his officials who deport people, and decide which foreign nationals get to stay and which get to be kicked out. And, depending on where you stand on these things, it is also his department that has largely failed to deal with the problem. The perception has grown that people who are foreign are here illegally, because government has failed to stop them from being here. But it is not only Gigaba's fault. It is impossible to police this properly, the dynamics of economics, geography and the human nature to desire a better life for yourself and your children are all against him. With the best will in the world, Gigaba is going to be unable to change those perceptions, or even make much of a difference on the ground. Stopping human migration requires the kind of a control over a population that North Korea has. Anything less will just not work. Gigaba himself has a fairly decent track record in this regard. He at least is not afraid to call xenophobia what it is, and to label a xenophobic march a xenophobic march. His political boss, President Jacob Zuma, appears unable to do even that, claiming on Friday that there were even foreign nationals in these marches, because they were actually "anti-crime". Proof, once again, that it's not only the facts that are alternative, sometimes it's the entire universe. Gigaba once did something that very few other ministers have done on this issue. He raised the ire of Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini. In 2015 Zwelithini had been accused of making comments that were seen as an incitement to commit violence against foreign nationals. A few days later, violence did in fact erupt in KwaZulu-Natal. Gigaba made a comment that leaders should behave responsibly, which appeared to have angered the king. In the end, the SA Human Rights Commission decided, controversially, to exonerate Zwelithini. And the ANC, certainly in public, has failed to publicly criticise the king for these comments. Which surely suggests they do not believe that there is a link between what he said and the violence that followed. It is important to follow this logic through to the bitter end. If the Zulu king makes comments like this and does not incite violence against foreign nationals, while the mayor of Joburg makes similar comments and does incite violence, then who has more power? Is the ANC seriously suggesting that Herman Mashaba, as a DA mayor, has a greater moral authority and plain old influence over people in Tshwane than King Goodwill Zwelithini does in KZN? And if that is the case, it surely follows then that the ANC is actually in much greater political trouble than we thought. In politics, it is usually a mistake to build your enemy up, to make them look powerful. In their haste to be seen to condemn Mashaba, that is exactly what the ANC is doing. It made him look powerful, as if he had the ability to shape events, that he has this magical authority over people. Who, for the record, weren't even in "his" city, but in Pretoria. But what is also being forgotten here is the other actions of national government. As the CEO of the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation, Neeshan Balton, pointed out on Friday, it was national government that decided to roll out "Operation Fiela", whose aim was action against foreign nationals. And it is national government alone that controls the police. And thus the officers who are famous for rounding up foreign nationals and stealing cash from them. It's not about what you say as a leader, it's also about what you do. Our government has failed to do much to change attitudes, to present any kind of example. Mashaba himself said, in a statement issued on Monday, that he had tried to set up several meetings with Gigaba to discuss this entire issue, and invited him to a city lekgotla on the issue. Mashaba says he declined that invitation. But it would appear Gigaba is happy to discuss the issue, just not with Joburg's DA mayor. Rather, according to Mashaba, he has accepted an invitation to speak at an event hosted by the Joburg ANC, and its leader, and former Joburg mayor Parks Tau. No matter how you look at it, that is playing politics in times when the national government should know better. To look at this situation from a neutral standpoint, should such a place exist, is to realise that everyone is at fault here. Mashaba should not have said what he said. The ANC national government has not provided an example of how to treat foreign nationals, despite often saying the right words. People of influence who say things that are xenophobic are let off the hook. Very few of the people who call themselves leaders in our society can escape blame here. And if any of them think that they can blame someone else, it's time they took a look in the mirror. - See more at: http://www.africafocus.org/docs17/migr1703.php#sthash.mL35v5Za.dpuf ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Africa Focus

The UN Human Rights Council must set up a commission of inquiry into Burma’s human rights record, as it has done for North Korea and Eritrea, and not spare its leader because of her iconic status, a former US human rights envoy said on Monday. Keith Harper, who served as US President Barack Obama’s ambassador to the Geneva-based council from 2014 to January this year, said Burma’s de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi had “utterly failed” to address the plight of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Arakan State. But he said Western diplomats and human rights advocates saw her as a hero and might let Burma off the hook, and he feared the new US administration, which has not yet named his replacement in Geneva, might seek to play down the situation. “For far too many, her iconic status as pro-democracy crusader makes it difficult to hold accountable a Suu Kyi-led government no matter the well-documented human rights violations,” Harper wrote. “Her Nobel Prize has become a most awful kind of shield from proper scrutiny.” The Human Rights Council is expected to debate Burma during a three-week session starting on Monday, and Harper said it should order a full inquiry, which he described as “heavy medicine reserved for the most horrendous human rights cases.” A report by the UN human rights office, based on testimony of Rohingya Muslims who had fled to Bangladesh, said Burma’s security forces had probably committed crimes against humanity with a campaign of killings and gang rape. Senior UN officials later told Reuters they believed more than 1,000 people had been killed. Harper, writing on the Just Security online forum, said many had hoped Suu Kyi, the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, would tackle the human rights crisis when she took power a year ago. But it had become clear that although she was happy to be lauded as a pro-democracy icon, she was not prepared to stand up for an unpopular and persecuted Muslim minority, and it would be wrong to spare her from scrutiny. “Even accepting that Suu Kyi does not sufficiently control the military, she has utterly failed to utilise her considerable bully pulpit, which would undoubtedly be impactful,” he wrote. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 REUTERS

Executive Summary For the last two years, Niger has been at war with Boko Haram. The conflict has disrupted this poor country’s development, especially public finances, and destabilised the south east, the main scene of armed clashes. In this region, located some 1,350km from the capital and faced with an economic collapse, the battle against Boko Haram has stoked up local intercommunal tensions and exacerbated violence over access to resources. Despite direct support from Chadian troops since 2015 and improved collaboration with the Nigerian army, Nigerien forces have been unable to put a stop to attacks by insurgents, some of whom have links to the Islamic State (IS). The military option has produced results but has also shown its limits. The war effort must be accompanied by an approach that would allow demobilisation of the movement’s militants and promote a political solution to the tensions that have stimulated its local spread. The government must also prioritise economic revival and public service provision to bring relief to an exhausted population, whose suffering fuels the insurrection. Despite alarmist scenarios, Boko Haram has failed to extend its influence beyond the south-eastern Diffa region. This relatively wealthy territory has a special relationship with the Nigerian state of Borno. Close historical, religious, and economic ties explain the resonance of the message spread by Mohamed Yusuf, the Nigerian founder of Boko Haram. Many Nigeriens, especially young men, became his supporters after they travelled to Maiduguri, the capital of Borno, only 425km away from Diffa, in search of religious training or business opportunities. When Nigerian armed forces massacred more than 1,000 of his Nigerian followers in July 2009, many members of Boko Haram found refuge in south-eastern Niger. The movement has long avoided conducting military operations in the country to build up Diffa as a refuge and a place to seek funds, supplies and recruits. Nigerien authorities initially responded to the Boko Haram threat by keeping the movement under surveillance. They believed that it was essentially a Nigerian problem. This attitude changed in 2014, when the threat became more pressing. Boko Haram’s territorial expansion toward the Niger border was accompanied by a new push to recruit hundreds of young Nigeriens. Persuaded by its regional and international partners to become more actively involved, Niger joined the military efforts of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The war effort has since proved to be a burden on the national budget and the judicial system and kindled tensions between the government and the military hierarchy. The Diffa region is suffering from both Boko Haram attacks and counter-insurgency measures taken by the Nigerien authorities, such as the extension of the state of emergency introduced in February 2015 that includes a ban on some commercial activities. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced people only survive thanks to foreign aid. Recourse to local vigilante committees and reprisals by Boko Haram against anyone who collaborates with the army have created a difficult atmosphere in which local score-settling, collective fear and informants are all ingredients of a dangerously toxic brew. On the shores of Lake Chad, in the extreme east of Diffa region, Boko Haram’s presence has aggravated intercommunal tensions, which have degenerated into deadly conflicts since May 2016. Mediation between communities by the authorities since June 2016 is a welcome initiative but has yet to dissipate all of these tensions. On the lake’s islands, a group of combatants who have broken away from the Boko Haram faction led by Abubakar Shekau, head of the movement since the death of Mohamed Yusuf, is exploiting these local tensions. This group is currently trying to take root more permanently and allegedly has close ties with IS. Faced with Boko Haram’s resilience, the Nigerien government can no longer restrict itself to an approach solely based on military operations and commercial restrictions. In December 2016, the establishment of demobilisation sites signalled a change in the policy of repression that had prevailed since 2015. The government is also drafting a special plan for the resolution of the crisis in the Diffa region. With the support of regional and international partners, it must continue in this direction and expand its counter-insurgency strategy that goes beyond a mainly military response. This is all the more important given that some insurgents have rejected the excesses of Abubakar Shekau and may try to regain the support of the local population by avoiding the targeting of Muslims. The government must also increase cooperation with its neighbours and make contingency plans for the possible disengagement of international partners, whose public finances are deteriorating and who could opt for more isolationist policies in the months to come. Recommendations To reduce violence by going beyond the security response To the government of Niger: Discourage the development of armed community militias. Pursue and strengthen the efforts to mediate between communities on the shores of Lake Chad started in June 2016. Ensure equitable and fair access to the lake’s resources, including, if necessary, through a thorough reform of the system of chiefs in the lake area. Propose quickly a plan for resolving the crisis in south-eastern Niger, prepared in close partnership with civil society and elected representatives in the Diffa region, and paying particular attention to reconciliation, the reintroduction of public services and economic revival. To ease the pressure on the judicial system and prepare for the reintegration of Boko Haram militants To the government of Niger: Formulate demobilisation and reintegration policies for former Boko Haram combatants, especially those who have not been involved in serious crimes, while consulting Boko Haram’s victims and their representatives to avoid a cycle of score-settling. The recent establishment of demobilisation sites is welcome but the reintegration of former insurgents is a sensitive issue that requires skilful handling and major long-term investment by the government and its partners. Increase the resources allocated to the judicial system to ensure improved treatment of Boko Haram-related cases, including those dealing with suspects of involvement in serious crimes, which are currently clogging up the country’s courts. Insist that the security services make a strong case to justify the transfer to Niamey prison of people who have been arrested on the basis of intelligence provided by informants. To Niger’s partners: Provide advice and human resources to boost the resources allocated to the judicial system. To suspend economic restrictions linked to the state of emergency and launch a plan to revive the economy of the Diffa region as early as possible To the government of Niger: Redirect suspended economic flows by channelling them through the town of Diffa and encouraging exporters to use more secure roads toward Nigeria until the southern Komadougou area becomes stable again. Build the capacities of the public administration to provide the population with tangible judicial, health and education services, encourage the recruitment of local civil servants and the granting of temporary bonuses to civil servants working in the regions affected by the insurrection. To supervise more effectively the security forces and their budgets To the government of Niger: Encourage the High Authority for the Fight Against Corruption (HALCIA) to investigate the use of funds allocated to the war effort. Provide the armed forces on the ground with the resources they need to conduct counter-insurgency military operations, while tightening supervision of the armed forces and requiring that military personnel found guilty of abuses and other crimes against civilians are held accountable. Supervise the vigilante committees to limit their role to the collection of intelligence; prepare policies immediately for their complete or partial demobilisation if the insurrection’s decline is confirmed. Brussels/Dakar, 27 February 2017 I.Introduction Niger, located at the heart of an area subject to intense geopolitical turbulence, remains a weak link in the Sahel. The March 2016 re-election of President Issoufou provided some political stability but the country has yet to deal with the immense economic and demographic challenges it faces. Pointing to the cross-border threats from Mali, Libya and Nigeria, the government has focused on security rather than the Renaissance socio-economic plan put forward by President Issoufou when he was first elected in 2011. For the last two years, Niger has been waging open war against Boko Haram, a jihadist insurrection founded in north-eastern Nigeria that has spread to neighbouring countries. The government has mobilised the armed forces and adopted a harsh policy aimed at depriving it of its economic resources that has curbed the movement’s advance in Niger. But counter-insurgency operations have deeply disrupted the Diffa region, located in the south east, where the conflict is raging. Boko Haram is certainly on the back foot in Niger but that does not mean it has been defeated. In any case, this insurrection, joined by hundreds of people, has generated a conflict that will leave a lasting mark on the country’s south east. This report analyses the dynamics of Boko Haram’s penetration into Niger and assesses the authorities’ response. It describes the different stages of this process and highlights the local circumstances that the jihadist insurrection is taking advantage of. It is essential to understand these dynamics to ensure lasting stability in the Diffa region. The report therefore calls on the authorities and their partners to develop a strategy that goes beyond the current military response. It is based on interviews with a wide range of political, religious and community leaders and eyewitnesses, including militants and former Boko Haram supporters met in detention or in the Diffa region, conducted during two research visits to Niger in 2016. It forms part of a series of Crisis Group publications on the jihadist threat in the Sahel and Lake Chad basin. II.South-eastern Niger: Fertile Soil for Boko Haram Diffa’s geographical and cultural proximity to Maiduguri, the cradle of Boko Haram in Nigeria, makes it particularly vulnerable to the movement’s ideas. The teachings of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, had a special resonance there. Inevitably, the fierce war Boko Haram leaders and the Nigerian authorities started to fight in July 2009 affected south-eastern Niger. A.A Region Leaning Toward Nigeria’s North East In terms of geography, Niger’s south east is very specific. Diffa is the regional capital most distant to Niamey (more than 1,300km by road). Along with Agadez, it is the country’s most sparsely populated region, but its population is growing the fastest. It consists of three unequally populated areas. Most of the population, estimated to be 591,000 (less than four per cent of the country’s population), is concentrated in two different border areas: one on the banks of the Komadougou River, which delineates the Niger-Nigeria border, and includes the town of Diffa (48,000 inhabitants), and another around Lake Chad, which Niger shares with its neighbours Chad and Nigeria. The region’s interior is almost a desert and mainly inhabited by nomadic Fulani, Tebu and Arab herders. However, the Diffa region is not poor, at least in comparison to the rest of Niger. It combines the natural resources from the Komadougou River and Lake Chad with its proximity to the large Nigerian market. Until the conflict interrupted trade, Nigeria was by far the main consumer of its agricultural products (peppers and rice from the Komadougou area, livestock from the interior and fish, livestock and corn from the Lake Chad area), and in return supplied it with manufactured goods and smuggled fuel. The Diffa region is also located on long-distance trade routes that lead to Chad, Libya and Sudan, often bypassing Niamey. Nigeria, especially Borno state, holds great sway over the Diffa region. The Nigerian currency, the naira, is widely used in the area and competes with the official currency, the FCFA – “[Diffa] uses the naira; the FCFA is used by officials and [development] projects”. The region’s inhabitants are often less familiar with Niamey than with the Borno state capital, Maiduguri, which is closer (175km) and therefore more accessible. These ties are rooted in history and culture. The Diffa region in its current boundaries and north-eastern Nigeria were part of Kanem-Bornu, a political entity that started shaping the area in the eighth century. The language (Kanuri), identity and old religious tradition (“Kanuri Islam”) long enjoyed much prestige as indicators of affiliation to a powerful political and economic entity. The latter influenced and attracted surrounding groups to various degrees, sometimes incorporating them.The fall of the last sovereigns of Bornu at the beginning of the twentieth century, the division of the area by the French and English empires and then independence movements have not weakened the links between south-eastern Niger and north-eastern Nigeria. Islam from northern Nigeria therefore spread quickly to Niger and even beyond Kanuri territory. A major commercial centre, Maiduguri is also a sub-regional crossroads for Islamic education, which attracts many Nigeriens. The reformist Islamic movement Izala, where Mohammed Yusuf received his education before turning away from it and fighting it, is very influential in Niger, especially around Diffa. It controls two of the towns’ six main mosques. B.The State in South-eastern Niger Relations between the Komadougou area, where the Kanuri are dominant, and the Nigerien state are paradoxical and to state that the government has marginalised the area would be simplistic. Despite being far from the capital of Niger and having much more in common with Nigeria, the Kanuri are well represented among the political and military elite in Niamey. Former president, General Mamadou Tandja, is from Maïné Soroa, in Kanuri territory, and President Issoufou’s administration includes many Kanuri. Relations with the state are different in the more ethnically diverse Lake Chad area, which has long resisted government projects, including those from Kanem-Bornu. In addition to the Kanuri, there are large Buduma, Arab, Tebu and Fulani communities. This diversity is all the more significant because the lake’s natural resources – fish, pastures for livestock and alluvial basins for agriculture – have for decades attracted migrants from the rest of Niger and even from other African countries. Unlike the Kanuri, these population groups are unequally represented among the Nigerien political and military elite. Although members of the Tebu community have had a role in the state administration since their rebellion in the 1990s, the Mohammedan Arabs, who arrived from Sudan during the last third of the twentieth century, and the Buduma communities are not so well represented in either Niamey or local government. Many factors fuel tensions in this region: the population movements that accompany the lake’s changing water levels; the importance of transhumance; disagreements between local government administrations (chefferies) and locally elected representatives, who play a role in regulating access to natural resources; the resentment felt by people who consider themselves to be natives of the region, notably the Buduma, and do not have the financial and political capital to profit from the growing sectors of the economy. Moreover, the area has been the scene of intercommunal conflicts and even outbreaks of armed rebellion. The lake is a border area that the government finds difficult to control: it is endowed with rugged topography, a place where four countries meet, a pioneering front, an area where smuggling and trafficking is common and a migratory melting pot. The state has not displayed much interest in this distant region, whose economy is more integrated with that of neighbouring countries. It lacks resources to invest in the area, but it is not completely absent. The state has acquired expertise in conflict resolution in the course of the crises that have afflicted the northern Tuareg areas, but also the southern Diffa region. The High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace (HACP), created in October 2011 to take over from the High Authority for the Restoration of Peace (created in 1994), and which reports directly to the presidency, is the institution that has and uses this experience. Under the leadership of a senior Tuareg official, it administers a range of programs on everything from intercommunal dialogue to the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants and development projects aimed at promoting cohesion and peace in various regions. The government does not enjoy particularly strong popular legitimacy and the political elites do not hesitate to manipulate ethnic and regional loyalties at election time, but these elites are relatively united and mixed as inheritors of nationalist sentiment and great sociability. In the field of religion, many observers consider the Nigerien state’s support for pluralism and secularism to be a decisive factor. But Islam’s hegemony in Niger might as well make it less divisive, unlike in Nigeria, where competition between Christianity and Islam generates tensions. C.Mohammed Yusuf’s Nigerien Militants In the 2000s, Mohammed Yusuf’s preaching had an impact on the Diffa region. Many of the thousands of Nigerien men and women who went to study or work in Maiduguri heard Yusuf’s message and some attended his mosque. Back in Niger, they disseminated his thoughts in electronic format but also more directly: Yusuf’s assistant and future successor as Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, reportedly has family contacts in the area and preached in Diffa before 2009. From the start of the 2000s, some of Yusuf’s Nigerian supporters formed an isolated sectarian community in Kannama village, on the border with Niger. They were violently dispersed by Nigerian forces in October 2003 after they entered into conflict with the local authorities and population, and some found refuge in Niger. In either 2007 or 2008, a small movement formed around Diffa’s central mosque, influenced by Yusuf and sharing his interpretation of Islam. It mainly comprised young people who had broken with the Izala current, which had gradually been establishing itself in Diffa since the start of the 2000s, especially among traders. Yusuf’s young followers adopted a more radical attitude than Izala members. In particular, they condemned Izala for only criticising the state’s corruption while maintaining its links with the government. They also made contact with the faithful near places of worship, urging people to join them. The Yusufiyya opened its own place of worship in October-November 2008 in the district of Diffa Koura, in Diffa, with financial support from El Hadj Kakabuno, a prosperous young Kanuri trader whose business network extended to Maiduguri and Kano, northern Nigeria’s great metropolis. He acted as leader of the community in Diffa, helped by a young Fulani preacher, Sayedi, a native of Fulatari (a pastoralist zone in the interior of Diffa) who had also been an assiduous visitor to Maiduguri. As tension increased in Maiduguri in July 2009, most of Yusuf’s Nigerien supporters in Diffa sold their belongings, some of them divorced their wives if they baulked at accompanying them and joined their mentor with the idea of “starting a jihad against the Nigerian government”. D.Diffa, Boko Haram’s Support Base The situation started to deteriorate in 2009, as the escalating confrontation between the Nigerian security forces and Yusuf’s supporters led to massive violence in Maiduguri and other towns in northern Nigeria. Yusuf was arrested and killed in detention by the police. Some of his Nigerian and Nigerien supporters found refuge in Niger, either to distance themselves from Boko Haram or, on the contrary, to sustain the violent strategy of its new leader, Abubakar Shekau. For example, about twenty militants returned to Maïné Soroa in 2009. They formed the basis of a cell that has counted up to a hundred members. The Diffa region became a place to raise funds and stock up on petrol, weapons and food supplies. Boko Haram sold some of its looted goods. This economy created a network of people who benefitted from the insurrection without necessarily joining it or even sharing its ideology – suppliers, dealers, and transporters. Boko Haram sometimes used violence to control its network. For example, it is generally acknowledged that the killing of the president of Diffa’s Chamber of Commerce in May 2015 was related to the fact that the movement subjects the region’s major businessmen to extortion. Boko Haram has used its funds to recruit members, combining its call to jihad with practical material benefits: credits to open small businesses or buy vehicles, money when combatants enlist, promises of wages and motorcycles and prospects of marriage. The latter is particularly attractive in a cultural context where marriage is an essential characteristic of identity. In the villages of Komadougou, starting in 2014, young Nigeriens tried to identify, persuade and escort young women from Kanuri villages to areas held by Boko Haram on the other side of the border. Meanwhile, the ostentatious prosperity of combatants on their return from Nigeria, rich from looting and the rewards granted by the movement, has attracted new recruits. Between several hundred and a few thousand young Nigeriens have reportedly joined the organisation, some out of conviction but a growing number out of opportunism and greed. III.Niger at War A.From Surveillance to War Niger’s initial response to Boko Haram was “an approach that combined relative tolerance, surveillance of preachers and targeted actions”. At that time, the authorities viewed Boko Haram as a Nigerian problem which was not a direct threat to the country, though they needed to monitor its impact on Nigerien soil. Some security sources said there was a non-aggres­sion pact between the Nigerien authorities and Boko Haram before 2014, but it is difficult to confirm this. True or not, it did not stop the Nigerien security services from making arrests in areas that supported the insurrection in and after 2010. Moreover, their concern increased after the jihadist advance in Mali at the start of 2012 and the arrest in the following months of Nigerien and Nigerian supporters of Boko Haram who were linked with northern Mali. Collaboration with Nigeria was then minimal. It was limited to the extradition of a few suspects at the request of the authorities in Abuja and joint border patrols that produced little results. Despite the conflict’s growing impact on Niger, notably the influx of tens of thousands of people fleeing the fighting and finding refuge in the Diffa region, the Nigerien elites remained divided about whether to take a more active stance against the movement. Senior military officials concerned about the extension of fighting to Nigerien territory advised Niger to remain neutral or offer to mediate between the movement and the Nigerian government. Many officials believed they should focus on gathering intelligence and maintaining public order rather than mobilising the military against Boko Haram. Niger decided to go to war with Boko Haram in 2014. There were two reasons for this: first, it was pushed in this direction by an international context that favoured the constitution of a regional military force, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The regional military option was revived in 2012 by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), which comprises Niger, and important international actors – the U.S., France and the African Union (AU) – supported it in 2014. Ever since he was elected in 2011, President Issoufou, who had maintained his stance as a reliable ally of the Western countries in the fight against the increasing terrorist threat in the Sahel, remained faithful to his commitment. The increasing threat was the other core factor in Niger’s military involvement. In 2014, Boko Haram conquered a vast area in northern Nigeria and thus began to represent a direct threat to neighbouring countries. Moreover, in a video dated 21 January 2015, Shekau threatened the presidents of Chad, Cameroon and Niger and criticised the latter for offering support to the French president after radical Islamists attacked the satirical periodical Charlie Hebdo in Paris. Boko Haram stepped up recruitment in the Diffa region in 2014: all along the Komadougou River, hundreds of young men and women, most of them Kanuri, joined the movement, attracted by its successes and the prospects of making easy money. In June 2014, the army mounted a defensive operation, codenamed Ngaa (which means shield in Kanuri), to strengthen its military position on the border with Nigeria and gather intelligence. B.Military Action in a Stalemate Although the Nigerian authorities were expecting a short war against people who Issoufou described as “amateurs”, the conflict escalated and military operations ended in a stalemate in 2015. At the start of 2015, the president authorised Chadian troops to enter Niger in their capacity as part of the MNJTF while on 6-8 February, Boko Haram launched violent attacks against the towns of Bosso and Diffa. In a way, the regionalisation of both the threat and the military response fed each other. For many months, the front stabilised along the border with Nigeria. In April, Boko Haram carried out a successful attack on Nigerien positions on Karamga island, which was the first reliable indicator that it had established itself in the northern part of Lake Chad. In July, its combatants attacked Diffa prison but failed to release any prisoners. Meanwhile, Nigerien authorities supported the creation of vigilante committees, not so much to undertake combat but rather to monitor the movements of combatants and try to prevent surprise attacks. Local public figures and village chiefs were asked to identify suspects. Suspicion and denunciations became pervasive and were accentuated by the killing of people suspected of collaborating with the army. Some civilian and military authorities were tempted to give the committees a greater military role and a few committees did indeed do more than gather intelligence, arresting suspects and building roadblocks. From its positions on the Nigerian side of the border, Boko Haram continued to launch raids into south-eastern Niger, particularly against villages close to the Komadougou River that had set up vigilante committees. After the presidential election in February and March 2016, which took place in relative calm in Diffa, the MNJTF prepared a new offensive in north-eastern Nigeria. Boko Haram was one step ahead and took control of Bosso for a few hours, inflicting heavy losses on the Nigerien army. The latter was only able to maintain its positions thanks to reinforcements from the west and the return at the end of June of Chadian troops, who concentrated their operations on Lake Chad’s shores and islands. From July onward, the Nigerian army gradually redeployed along the Komadougou River and Nigerien troops mobilised to provide occasional backup at Malam Fatori and Damasak. Although Boko Haram has been weakened, it has retained its strike capacity in Nigeria, as its attacks on Malam Fatori and Gashagar showed at the end of 2016. In Niger, in the communes of Gueskerou, Bosso and Toumour (extreme south east), Boko Haram combatants still cross the border freely to extort money from villagers and attack military positions, such as at Gues­ke­rou in 20 January 2017. In this area, the security forces, which retreated to the commune’s main towns, are a long way from eliminating the enemy. In rural areas, the population is “caught in the crossfire”: it lives in fear of attacks by Boko Haram, false accusations and arrests by the security forces. C.The State and the Burden of War Niger is not alone in its fight against Boko Haram, but the authorities feel that their Western partners do not help them enough. Niger benefits from major military assistance programs, particularly from France and the U.S. However, Western military aid and presence are more focused on the fight against jihadist groups in the Sahara than on the Lake Chad basin.The French and American military are present in Diffa but in smaller numbers than in Niamey and the Agadez region. Niger also receives financial aid as part of the MNJTF military operations against Boko Haram. But disbursement of some of this aid, which is managed by the AU, is slow and has had very limited impact on the ground. The fight against Boko Haram requires significant expenditure on domestic security and defence.Allocations made during preparation of the national budget have prioritised security over social services such as health and education. At the Abuja conference in May 2016, President Issoufou emphasised that “operations against Boko Haram place a heavy burden on public finances: Niger has had to increase its military expenditure fifteen-fold since 2010. It now spends more than 10 per cent of its GDP on defence and security”. The government, which has to pay the premiums of soldiers deployed to secure national territory, finds it difficult to pay civil servants in other sectors. In 2016, the education and judiciary sectors went on strike in protest at lack of resources and wage arrears. Like their Chadian counterparts, Nigerien officials complain that they have to bear the bulk of the financial burden of the war against the insurrection. Niger’s involvement in the war against Boko Haram has also put a lot of pressure on the judicial system. The number of detainees held because of their links with Boko Haram increased from about a hundred at the end of 2014 to more than 1,200 in 2016 and close to 1,700 at the beginning of 2017. Faced with this explosion in the number of cases and the lack of financial and human resources, justice officials are unable to make progress with investigations. The great majority of detainees have been arrested based on information supplied by informants and the dossiers are often thin or empty. Some justice and security officials claim that most detainees have only tenuous links with the insurrection. This generates a lot of frustration among detainees and their families. Detainees have little awareness of their rights and most of them do not have the means to cover the costs of their defence. The law on counter-terrorism allows the extension of preventive detention for up to two years. There is some concern that the explosive mixture of small numbers of hardcore jihadist militants and hundreds of wrongfully arrested people may turn prisons into a focus for radicalisation. The prison authorities, aware of this problem, have put under surveillance or in isolation some detainees suspected of preaching and recruiting other detainees. This policy of isolation is inadequate given the large and growing number of detainees. The complicated and sometimes conflict-ridden relations between politicians and the military are not helping the war effort. The arrest of senior officers accused of organising a coup in December 2015, a few weeks before the presidential election, illustrated the recurring tensions.Although the government is allocating an increasing proportion of its resources to the defence and security forces, the army is troubled by rumours of poor administration, especially of funds allocated to efforts in the Diffa region. These rumours were reportedly behind the replacement of the former defence minister shortly after President Issoufou’s re-election. They stir up resentment and frustration, especially among those on the front line of the fight against Boko Haram. The army’s defeat in Bosso at the beginning of 2016 reportedly caused a wave of discontent against the military hierarchy, accused by the rank and file of misappropriating government funds. The war against Boko Haram has also highlighted Niger’s dependence on the Chadian army, without whose support the army would be finding it even more difficult to contain the advance of combatants. The Nigerien army has certainly strengthened its position in the Diffa region since the attack on Bosso but incursions attributed to terrorist groups from Mali in October and November 2016 prompted the redeployment of troops toward the north west. Niger is having difficulties dealing with all the threats it faces on its borders. IV.Diffa and the Lake: The Long-term Impact Until now, the insurrection has affected Niger much less than Nigeria and Cameroon. The conflict remains limited to the south east and, in fact, to the southern part of this area, which is closest to Borno, the historic epicentre of the insurrection. The situation in this region is worrying and the population has been hit hard by two years of war. A.A Continuing State of Emergency The state of emergency declared in Diffa on 10 February 2015 is still in force. It is accompanied by restrictive measures that seek to cut off the financial resources flowing to Boko Haram and prevent its expansion into Nigerien territory. The authorities banned the sale of peppers and fishing on Lake Chad after claiming that these resources were filling the movement’s coffers. The government imposed a curfew and banned motorbikes, which Boko Haram has used for lightning cross-border raids. The government also closed markets suspected of supplying the insurgents. Chad and Cameroon have taken similar measures but later and in a less systematic and restrictive way. It is difficult to assess their effectiveness. They hit Boko Haram but also punish the entire region, leaving tens of thousands of people without occupation and without income, and dependent on foreign aid. They fuel resentment toward the authorities. If the government continues with this blockade, it risks pushing other young Nigeriens into the arms of Boko Haram, one of the few employers in the area. Moreover, the government has orchestrated massive displacement of people in the hope of cutting Boko Haram off from civilians who, whether voluntarily or not, support the insurrection. In May 2015, shortly after the Nigerien army’s defeat on Karamga island, the authorities brutally and hastily displaced the entire population living on the Nigerien islands and shores of Lake Chad, totalling 81 villages and hundreds of hamlets.Tens of thousands of people had to leave behind almost all their belongings, including thousands of head of cattle. Near the Komadougou River, villages in areas suspected of collaborating with Boko Haram have also been displaced. In theory, these relocations are voluntary, but the population does not really have a choice because of pressure from official announcements about the imminence of military operations. In September 2016, there were more than 300,000 displaced people in the Diffa region, including about 118,000 Nigerian refugees.Most of them are spread over various spontaneous sites along Route nationale 1 (RN1) or refugee camps or are hosted by Nigerien relatives.These displaced people move around in response to Boko Haram’s attacks or the availability of humanitarian aid. Officially, for security reasons, the relocation of displaced populations aims to cut Boko Haram off from potential support from lakeshore communities. In reality though, it is also driven by political calculation, due to competition for access to the lake’s islands and their natural resources. Some actors, in particular community chiefs, who have land interests on the Lake Chad islands, encourage the relocation of the shoreline populations, especially the Buduma, to the camps close to Kablewa in the interior and to the official site at Sayam Forage. Assistance to displaced populations poses major challenges to the authorities and aid agencies. Although the dispersion of most displaced people along the RN1 facilitates humanitarian initiatives, the high level of insecurity disrupts the targeting of aid and access to remote areas remains difficult (north east of Nguigmi, on the lakeshore, Toumour and Bosso communes). Moreover, the local authorities and many Diffa residents suspect some of the displaced population of supporting Boko Haram and even of diverting aid to the movement. The distribution of aid takes place in uncertain conditions amid frequent rumours of misappropriation, especially in at risk and remote areas.The difficulty of distinguishing between the host population, Nigerian refugees, Nigerien internally displaced people and returnees poses problems for aid organisations, whose work is structured around fixed operational and technical categories. Aid workers have found it difficult to identify the beneficiaries. They have taken a pragmatic approach and decided against using such distinctions to concentrate on identifying and gaining access to the most vulnerable people, whatever their origin. B.Beyond Boko Haram: Access to Resources and Intercommunal Tensions The conflict increases the risk of intercommunal tensions and strengthens the tendency to create militias, especially in the Lake Chad area. The tensions between communities for access to local resources have recently become more acute as a result of Boko Haram’s arrival in the southern part of the lake basin in April 2015 and the counter-insurgency measures that followed. The massive population displacements organised by the authorities have exacerbated rivalries, especially with regard to the ownership of cattle. On the one hand, Fulani and Mohammedan Arab herdsmen accuse the population groups living along the lakeshores, in particular the Buduma, of being allies of Boko Haram and stealing cattle (and abducting women). The Fulani militia that fought alongside Nigerien forces against the Tebu rebellion in the 1990s began to remobilise in 2016, which led to deadly clashes in the lake basin. The Buduma and Kanuri communities accuse Fulani chiefs of manipulating the situation to create private militias and, on the pretext of supporting the security forces against Boko Haram, oust rival communities and seize the lake’s resources, notably by organising a profitable trade in cattle. In a memorandum to the justice minister in September 2016, Kanuri and Buduma representatives held Fulani and Mohammedan herders responsible for the death of 39 members of their communities and the theft of more than 3,000 head of cattle. The local authorities initially tolerated these auxiliaries who were opposed to the populations of the lake suspected of links with Boko Haram. They “turned a blind eye”. The security forces and local leaders have even been accused of facilitating the acquisition of automatic weapons by these militias but there is no credible evidence to confirm this. Moreover, after violent incidents in May and June 2016, the authorities, especially the Diffa governorate, changed their approach, and have since tried to find a more peaceful way of resolving differences and to discourage the creation of militias. The deployment of large contingents of Nigerien and mostly Chadian troops on the Nigerien shores of the lake at the end of June 2016 made the presence of a local militia less useful against Boko Haram. Through its real or imaginary presence, Boko Haram perhaps offers the Buduma an opportunity to take historic revenge against other communities who are being forced to move away from the lake basin.Some Buduma leaders admit that some members of their community have joined the movement but refute any massive recruitment of their people. Young Buduma reportedly act as guides, boatmen, receivers of stolen goods and even as combatants for Boko Haram. However, prudence is required to avoid stigmatising the entire community, all the more so as it forms a small minority that has no control over local government and has little access to the authorities. If it does not take into account the local dimension of the violence, the fight against Boko Haram may be counterproductive and exacerbate intercommunal conflict or facilitate the development of radical forms of protests. In addition to the tensions between the Fulani and the Buduma, the current climate could fuel rivalry between communities to gain recognition. That is perhaps how to interpret the announcement, in September 2016, of the formation of the Movement for Justice and Rehabilitation of Niger (MJRN), in the north of Diffa. The MJRN claims to be the heir of the Tebu rebellion of the 1990s, denouncing the persistent negligence of the Tebu and threatening the authorities with armed revolt. Moreover, the development of Lake Chad into a permanent “grey zone” may provide opportunities for other political-military enterprises. Chadian deserters, including a senior officer, have reportedly established themselves on the Nigerien side of the lake and made an alliance of convenience with Boko Haram. C.A New Jihadist Faction in the Lake Chad Basin? Weakened by the Lake Chad countries’ offensive, Boko Haram is undergoing a transformation. Niger is on the front line in this process. Tensions within the organisation, long evident, seem to have resulted in a split. This probably occurred in May 2016, when Mamman Nur, a former close associate of Mohammed Yusuf, and Yusuf’s son Habib, who was for a time a Boko Haram spokesman under the pseudonym of Abou Moussab al-Barnawi, hastily left a meeting of the Shura, the movement’s executive body, in the Sambisa forest, in the middle of Borno state. The wing led by Shekau, the movement’s historic leader, consolidated its position in the Sambisa forest and the Mandara Mountains, close to the border with Cameroon. Meanwhile, Nur and Barnawi won over or took control of a number of groups of Boko Haram combatants, including on Lake Chad and part of its shores as well as along the Komadougou River. However, the demarcation between the two factions is not clear, especially in the north west of Borno state, close to the border with Niger and on the lake, where Shekau reportedly has supporters and where the two factions have reportedly clashed. However, there is no doubt that the Nur/al-Barnawi wing has links with the Islamic State (IS). Recently, IS media have only covered this wings’ operations. Barnawi was officially designated leader of IS in sub-Saharan Africa in August 2016. But after the defeat suffered in Sirte in Libya, the IS seems less able to provide decisive assistance to its allies on Lake Chad. Nur and Barnawi have largely explained their disagreement with Shekau. They criticised his non-obedience to IS, his greed, the failure of his strategy and his readiness to use violence against Muslims. They accused him of ordering the execution of critics within Boko Haram. This faction, which is more cosmopolitan and aware of other jihadist movements’ difficulties, is apparently trying to rethink its combat methods and break with Shekau’s strategy of extreme violence. It has avoided attacking civilians and carrying out suicide attacks. In 2016, it conducted a series of audacious operations, notably the attack on Bosso in June and the counteroffensives against Mallam Fatori in September and Gashagar in October, which caused panic among MNJTF soldiers. This faction reportedly also made a new push toward the west, along the Komadougou, in the Nigerian state of Yobe. But like Shekau, who has been harassed by Nigerian troops in the Sambisa forest, it has suffered regular bombardments from the MNJTF. A dynamic new group, capable of tactical innovations, has thus emerged around the lake, on territory that is difficult to control, conducive to trafficking and in Niger’s immediate neighbourhood. Moreover, its rhetoric, which is different to that of Shekau, could attract local people. Many of them are tired of Boko Haram excesses but remain open to its religious message, especially when it criticises corruption and calls for the introduction of the Sharia to clean up society. V.Moving on From Counter-insurgency The Nigerien government, with the aid of its partners, must ensure that its counter-insurgency strategy is able to deal with a crisis that is going to last for a long time. Boko Haram’s military retreat, although real, does not mean it has been defeated. The surrender of about fifty Boko Haram members at the end of December 2016 is encouraging. As in neighbouring Chad, dozens of the movement’s militants may follow this example, especially those who were forced to join the in­surrection or who saw it as a chance to get rich. However, the most radical elements remain determined to fight, as demonstrated by the 31 December 2016 attack on the military post of Barwa, on the Lake Chad shore, 90km from Diffa. The jihadist insurrection, defeated or not, is going to have a lasting impact on the region. It has profoundly disrupted the economy, forced massive population displacement, changed intra and intercommunal balances of power and widened the gap between the government and some communities, especially those along the shores of Lake Chad. The government must start to develop an ambitious strategy that aims to consolidate its military advantages and remedy the conflict’s negative impact on the Diffa region. A.A Security and Political Approach 1.Increased supervision of the security forces The government should improve the management of the funds allocated to the fight against Boko Haram. It should encourage the High Authority for the Fight against Corruption and Assimilated Offences (HALCIA), created by President Issoufou, who chairs its consultative council, to investigate the use of these funds and take steps to prevent any wheeling and dealing by the military. Relations between political leaders and senior military officers are a particularly sensitive question in Niger, which affects the stability of the country. Political leaders understandably hesitate to discuss this issue. However, they need to gradually extend their efforts to control the use of public funds to include the military, as the spending on defence is increasing. The credibility and consolidation of the Nigerien Seventh Republic depends on it. In return for transparency, Niger’s partners should increase financial aid and contribute directly to lightening the burden of a war that the country cannot finance on its own. They should also encourage the AU to accelerate the disbursement of European Union aid to countries participating in the MNJTF. The defence forces would increase their credibility if they accepted greater supervision of their management. Troops deployed in Diffa could receive greater logistical support, notably in the field of war medicine and assistance to the families of soldiers killed in action. The defence forces have committed abuses against civilians suspected of collaborating with the insurgents but, in the opinion of most specialists consulted by Crisis Group, the Nigerien army has behaved better than its counterparts in the MNJTF. The authorities must strengthen their supervision and combat these abuses by initiating disciplinary procedures in cases of violence and criminal procedures in the case of serious crimes. The appointment in June 2016 of a civilian governor in Diffa region, who also has a PhD in law and is an expert on decentralised management, is a positive sign that indicates the authorities in Niamey do not want to leave Diffa only in the hands of the defence forces. Moreover, although vigilante committees in Niger are not as widespread as in Nigeria and Cameroon, there is a real temptation to arm them in difficult times, such as after the attack on Bosso in June 2016. Niger security forces should resist this temptation and restrict the use of vigilante committees. They act as useful auxiliaries in gathering intelligence but should not play an active role in counter-insurgency operations. Efforts must also be made to ensure that these groups’ actions and the intelligence they provide do not increase tension either within or between communities. If it is confirmed that Boko Haram is losing strength, these groups should be demobilised, and some of their members could be integrated into local security forces. This would require the provision of professional training, as these committees are mainly comprised of untrained volunteers. 2.A political approach to local conflict resolution The detention of hundreds of Nigerien residents and returnees who have supported Boko Haram in one way or another is not tenable in the long term. Just as it is not possible to eliminate the tens of thousands of Nigeriens who have expressed support for the movement at some point or another or have joined it under duress. Niger can take inspiration from the recent example of Chad and help citizens who want to leave Boko Haram to return to their country, by creating a demobilisation site and introducing reconciliation and pardoning policies for all those who are not suspected of involvement in blood crimes. Such a program is being prepared and could boost demobilisations, especially of those who joined Boko Haram in the hope of easy money. It would benefit from drawing on the intra and intercommunal dialogue developed by Diffa University with the support of regional authorities, government representatives and international partners. On a visit to Diffa on 27 December 2016, after the surrender of about 30 insurgents, the interior minister, Bazoum Mohamed, announced an amnesty and reintegration program for former Boko Haram combatants. Niger’s partners should support this step, especially the establishment and supervision of one or more of the transit camps announced by the minister. A well-designed and funded pardoning and reintegration policy could encourage a wave of demobilisation and disarmament of insurgents and help to heal wounds on a lasting basis. But it must not neglect the movement’s victims, who may feel frustrated if they see the government helping people who they view as aggressors. The government must also ensure it maintains a coherent policy: it cannot pardon deserters from Boko Haram while continuing to detain hundreds of suspects who have only a tenuous connection with the insurrection. Plans to demobilise Boko Haram militants should also take into account the diversity of the Diffa region. Along the Koma­dougou River, in Kanuri territory, where many young people joined the movement due to a taste for adventure and a desire for wealth more than conviction, it is necessary to put an end to the atmosphere of denunciation and suspicion that divides villages. The authorities should design demobilisation, pardoning and reintegration policies that make a distinction between individuals depending on the reasons why they joined the insurrection. They should involve local chiefs and religious leaders in the mediation and pardoning process and consult them on how best to implement it. Such a contribution would make them more valuable than gathering intelligence or informing on others. In the lake area, a demobilisation plan will not be enough if it is not accompanied by measures to calm intercommunal tensions generated by conflicts over access to resources. Boko Haram managed to establish itself by exploiting these tensions and has, in turn, exacerbated them, just as the counter-insurgency policies have done by turning a blind eye to the formation of ethnically-based militias. It is first necessary to support the governor’s mediation efforts, whose effects are hardly being felt on the ground. In the long term, the government must demonstrate its capacity to peacefully regulate the tensions that the coveted lands of the Lake Chad basin generate. To avoid any perceptions that it favours one group against another, it must not impose its vision in an authoritarian way, but offer a framework for peaceful mediation in which the communities concerned can discuss how to regulate access and share resources. It will then be up to the authorities to guarantee continuity and compliance. They must reconcile the interests of different communities that require access to the lake’s resources. A reform of local governance could be considered to ensure representation of the Buduma. Pacifying the area and ensuring equitable access to natural resources will do more to reduce Boko Haram’s influence than policies to promote “deradicalisation” or prevent “violent extremism”. B.Relieve the Pressure on the Justice System and Reintegrate Former Insurgents The increase in arrests since February 2015 has put pressure on the judicial and prison system. In the prisons, where inmates await a hypothetical trial, suspects arrested on the basis of denunciation mingle with hardline jihadists. They may therefore become a recruitment hotbed for armed groups that reject the state’s authority. The authorities need to do more than isolate the most fervent preachers to counter this threat. Niger should increase the resources allocated to the judicial system to improve the processing of Boko Haram-related cases. In particular, judges must insist that the security services provide sufficient evidence before transferring to Niamey suspects arrested on the basis of an accusation. The government should increase the resources available to the services responsible for conducting investigations in the Diffa region and encourage civil society organisations and their partners to provide legal aid to detainees to ensure a quicker and more equitable treatment of their cases. This would speed up the release of wrongly arrested individuals and of those who have only committed minor offences, for example, small-scale smuggling deals with the insurgents. Finally, while the government deserves support in its battle against Boko Haram, it must resist the temptation to indulge in the political manipulation of the tools used to fight violent extremism. The laws against terrorism should not be used to curtail the debate about the current situation in the south east and the impact on the population of the armed struggle against Boko Haram. C.Revive the Region’s Economy The restrictive economic measures introduced in February 2015 have had dramatic consequences for the population. Some people are tempted to return to the fertile areas that Boko Haram still controls on Lake Chad, while others must soon resolve to undertake a hazardous journey and migrate to Nigeria or Libya. However, the Diffa region has relatively good economic prospects. The authorities should quickly recognise the limits of the economic weapons they are using to curb the insurrection and suspend these restrictive measures. At the very least, they should authorise the conditional sale of fish as they have already done for peppers. They could take this opportunity to make Diffa a commercial crossroads for produce exported to Nigeria. The four main LCBC countries affected by Boko Haram, all of which are willing to launch development plans in the Lake Chad region, should share their plans and, for example, design a joint customs policy. In Diffa, the authorities and aid agencies also face the classic dilemma of choosing between short-term aid and long-term development. In theory, all actors support the idea of a continuum from emergency aid to development. In practice, resources are limited and decisions have to be made about spending priorities. To respond to this dilemma, the government should not wait for the hypothetical end of the military phase and publish a strategic plan to end the crisis in the region. Although NGOs and Niger’s partners have an important support role to play, the government should entrust the management of the plan to specialised bodies like the HACP as well as Diffa’s regional and local authorities and civil society. These bodies and their partners should ensure the good management and equity of reconstruction plans, especially with regard to the delicate issue of access to land. The HACP has taken the initiative and is currently preparing a plan to end the crisis in Diffa. It has the advantage of long experience in post-conflict areas, which could be useful to everyone. However, the authorities must recognise that Diffa needs specific responses and that solutions implemented in the north will not necessarily work there. The approach should be participatory, with the local population playing a role to design a plan that takes account of their needs, according to their age, gender and social origin. Unless this happens, the region’s inhabitants could feel that the local elites, or worse, the Niamey elites, are trying to get their hands on the aid. Such a plan, driven by the aim of stamping out the Boko Haram insurrection, should not use development initiatives to try to prevent violent extremism, which would impose blinkers on reconstruction policies. Similarly, development cannot be considered a miracle solution. It must be accompanied by a political process designed to reconcile communities affected by the insurrection and make a precise assessment of the reasons why people turned against the state and, sometimes, their own society. Otherwise, development plans will flounder, miss their targets and may even foment new tensions and frustrations. In this context, the central and local authorities, community chiefs and civil servants must recognise their share of responsibility for the crisis. The Diffa region will not be able to make the most of supplementary funding if the authorities do not first show their capacity to peacefully and equitably regulate the many conflicts over access to agropastoral and fishing resources. The government must also demonstrate its utility by guaranteeing more equitable access to social services (education, health, justice) in a region that has more in common with Nigeria. Local recruitment of civil servants and the temporary payment of bonuses to civil servants deployed in the regions affected by the insurrection could help revive basic services. However, all that has a cost. If the war against Boko Haram went on for a long time, the government could face an even more difficult budgetary situation. Niger’s partners, especially those who have encouraged it to play a role in the fight against Boko Haram, should help the government to avoid having “to prioritise security spending to the detriment of those who are building the country’s future”. The year 2016 was an election year, which also put a lot of strain on public finances. The fight against Boko Haram does not of course explain all the current cash flow problems and cannot exempt the government from a good management of public expenditure. VI.Conclusion In the fight against Boko Haram, the Nigerien government must go beyond the military approach that it has taken so far. Niger, which initially viewed Boko Haram as a Nigerian problem, went to war with the jihadist movement a little more than two years ago. With the support of its allies and not without suffering losses, it has contained the war in the south of the Diffa region, which has been under a state of emergency since February 2015. But the military option places a heavy burden on the stability of the government, public finances and the army. Although the economic restrictions imposed on Diffa and the Lake Chad region have weakened the logistics of the jihadists, they have also had a major impact on the population, especially young people. The increase in intercommunal tensions and the temptation to create militias around Lake Chad give cause for concern. There is no easy or short-term solution to the crisis provoked by Boko Haram: time will be needed to restore a lasting peace to the Diffa region. The reconciliation and reintegration policies announced by the government at the end of December 2016 following the first surrenders of insurgents were an encouraging sign but the authorities must continue to make progress in the months to come. Above and beyond these efforts, the attention focused on this long-neglected region must be the occasion for the government to take greater responsibility for its role as protector of the population and peaceful regulator of local conflicts. Niger’s partners, who encouraged it to take action against Boko Haram, must also provide practical assistance so that it is better able to deal with the threat. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) has called on the Federal Government to sanction the Republic of South Africa for Xenophobic attacks against Nigerians residing and working there. Mr Adetokunbo Mumuni, the Executive Director of the NGO, said in a statement on Sunday in Lagos that the development called for the intervention of the Nigerian government. SERAP said that it had already sent an open letter to His Majesty, King Mswati III of Swaziland and Chairperson, Southern African Development Community (SADC), over the issue. “The letter dated Feb. 24 urged Mswati to convene an emergency summit of the SADC heads of state and governments to discuss the persistent xenophobic attacks on Nigerians and other foreign nationals living in South Africa. “SERAP notes the persistent and longstanding xenophobic attacks on Nigerians and other foreign nationals in the letter. “The complete impunity of perpetrators and the failure of the authorities to provide an effective remedy and reparation to victims, directly undermine SADC mandates on regional integration and human rights,” it said. The letter stated that the immigration status of Nigerians and other foreign nationals residing in South Africa was not a justification for the attacks. “SERAP is seriously concerned about the apparent complicity of the South African authorities and officials in persistent and serious human rights violations and abuses against thousands of Nigerians living in the country.’’ The organisation expressed concern over failure of authorities to express due diligence to prevent the human rights violations and abuses against foreigners living in the country. “We are also concerned about the failure of the South African authorities to provide an effective remedy and reparation to victims, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.” The organisation urged Mswati to use his term as the chair of the SADC to pressurise the South African government to address the persistent occurrence of incidences of xenophobia in the country. “The SADC must remind the South African government of its obligations and commitments under the SADC treaties and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights to protect everyone, including Nigerians living in its territory. from violent attacks, regardless of their status.” “SERAP is calling on SADC to help South Africa demonstrates its leadership in addressing xenophobia and protecting the safety and rights of all, including Nigerians and other foreign nationals in the country.” The organisation expressed its concerns over the estimated 100 Nigerians that had been unlawfully killed and businesses destroyed during incidences of xenophobia in South Africa in the last two years. “SERAP noted that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted a resolution at its 56th Ordinary Session in Banjul, The Gambia, in April 2015 condemning xenophobic attacks in South Africa.” The organisation urged the SADC to convene an emergency summit of SADC heads of state and government to address the xenophobic attacks. It should also publicly condemn the attacks while urging the South African government to put measures preventing re occurrence, he said. It also told the SADC to urge the South African government to take steps to guarantee the safety of Nigerians and other foreign nationals residing in the country. SERAP urged the SADC to work with the African Union (AU) and the UN to consider the possibility of regional sanctions against South Africa for its failure to address the root causes of the xenophobic attacks on Nigerians and other foreign nationals. “It must identify and punish suspected perpetrators and provide an effective remedy and reparation to victims,’’ Mumuni said. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________(c) 2017 Daily Trust

On Thursday, Home Affairs Minister Malusi Gigaba held a press conference to address the recent spate of xenophobic violence that has sparked once more in South Africa. For those expecting some kind of political leadership on the issue, it was a crushing disappointment. He deflected blame, contorted logic to breaking point and denied the obvious in a ridiculous attempt to describe the violence as anything but xenophobia. Nobody has ever been attacked in South Africa purely because they're from another country? This is blatantly untrue. I am reminded of a comment once made by the former President Thabo Mbeki when the xenophobic violence reached a crescendo in 2008. He said, "When I heard some accuse my people of xenophobia, of hatred of foreigners, I wondered what the accusers knew about my people, which I did not know ... and in spite of this reality, I will not hesitate to assert that my people are not diseased by the terrible affliction of xenophobia which has, in the past, led to the commission of the heinous crime of genocide." The idea that South Africans are somehow above the impulses of xenophobia (and yes, eventually genocide) is political cowardice. It is precisely because the idea has purchase at every stratum of our society that condemning it in explicit terms would constitute political suicide. The monarch of the Zulu nation King Goodwill Zwelithini expressed the national mood as crisply as one could hope in 2015. He said: "We are requesting those who come from outside to please go back to their countries. The fact that there were countries that played a role in the country's struggle for liberation should not be used as an excuse to create a situation where foreigners are allowed to inconvenience locals. I know you were in their countries during the struggle for liberation. But the fact of the matter is you did not set up businesses in their countries." South Africa is a country of exclusionary nationalisms. We have done this in various forms for centuries. Apartheid was one such theory. Today, abantu are described differently to abantu bokuhamba (a phrase meaning "non-South Africans", but literally translates to "the goers-away") and this exclusion is violently enforced. Mido Macia wasn't protected by our South African human rights (apparently reserved for abantu) when he was tied to the back of a police van and dragged to his death, a murder of such inventive horror that it can't have just been criminality. It was an expression of hatred against umuntu wokuhamba, meted out by agents of the state. I could say this of every xenophobic crime. It wasn't insignificant that so much of the 2008 violence was carried out by mobs. This form of violence has a particular history in this country, and it is almost always reserved for the very worst forms of criminals: witches, rapists, izimpimpi and so on. It's not a mistake that foreigners were thus dealt with. The idea that we may someday return our country to a purified state by ejecting all the corrupting elements is by no means unique to our own country. The entire world is engulfed in increasing waves of xenophobic hostility. The talking points are all the same. U.S. President Donald Trump's xenophobic election platform was unoriginal. It is often useful for certain political entrepreneurs to use this national disgust at foreigners to boost their careers. Johannesburg mayor Herman Mashaba is one such opportunist. In December, he blamed criminality on the African National Congress (ANC) failure to prevent "foreign criminals" from coming into the country. His PR stunt in Rosettenville blew up in his face when several foreign-owned properties were burned by people claiming that these were drug dens. He has now attempted to row back on those comments. He either knew what he was doing when he donned a high-visibility police jacket to go play cops-and-robbers in the South Rand — an act of brute cynicism — or he didn't realise what he was doing and was being dangerously naïve and incompetent. I'm not sure which is worse. He has now tainted himself and must not be allowed to escape his share of the blame for whatever comes of this latest phase of xenophobic violence. South Africa has a serious crime problem, of course. Alan Dershowitz* is often credited with the expression that "A good working definition of antisemitism is taking a trait or action that is widespread, if not universal, and blaming only the Jews for it". Tweak this statement and apply it to criminality and foreigners, and the enormity of Mashaba's culpability becomes apparent. A certain Mario Khumalo has apparently registered a "South Africa First Party" with the Independent Electoral Commission. Students of global politics will find his talking points — including the name — painfully familiar. "We are not xenophobic but we work in the interest of South Africans. It is about national identity and pride. There is no nationality called African. You are either South African‚ Angolan or Ethiopian. My (identity document) states that I am a South African‚ not African‚" he told TimesLive. He apparently thinks there are 13 million foreign nationals in South Africa. (So many studies have shown that Americans over-estimate the numbers of minority groups including Muslims that reside in the United States.) This is wildly inaccurate. Fake news. Sad. But this willful belief in fantastic bullshit is a vital component of exclusionary, violent nationalism, both here and in the United States. If this continues, there will be retaliations in Nigeria and elsewhere. (Late on Thursday afternoon, we received word that the MTN offices have been vandalised in Abuja...) This will create reinforcing cycles of violence both here and in other African countries. Ryan Cummings, director of the political and security risk management consultancy Signal Risk, has alerted Huffington Post SA to a WhatsApp voice note** of someone who sounds like a Nigerian person condemning the inaction of the South African government against the steady killings of foreign nationals in the country since 2008, and calling for retaliatory attacks against South African businesses in Nigeria and all over the continent. This person also calls for foreigners living in South Africa to retaliate against the violence with violence of their own. Cummings said to me that the perception from the Nigerian government is that the South African government is unwilling to tackle the problem head-on. "The fact that the Nigerian government has requested intervention by the African Union to address alleged xenophobia in South Africa indicates that they perceive the government of South Africa of lacking the political will to address the issue," he says. "It is conspicuous that a communique delivered by the office of the Nigerian presidency specifically cited the number of Nigerians — said to be 116 — who have been killed in acts of xenophobic violence in South Africa over the past 12 months. "This citation — the veracity of which has yet to be confirmed — highlights that the Nigerian government likely perceives that the South African government has failed to stem the phenomenon of xenophobia within its borders and that their inaction may be facilitating the violence," Cummings says. Even though the various threats of retaliation appear to be limited to individuals, a new wave of xenophobic attacks in South Africa could make retaliatory attacks elsewhere a reality, Cummings warns. In the meantime, a xenophobic march is apparently planned for Friday February 24. Our government is not going to stop it. That's the reality. The air is thick with the flammable fumes of xenophobia. This march is very much a lit match. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________(c) 2017 The Huffington Post