Film Director Michele Mitchell (5th right) at the UN screening of "The Uncondemned" with the four women who testified before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Godeliève Mukasarasi of the SEVOTA support group for widows and orphans. UN Photo/Evan Schneider Shame and stigma prevent many rape survivors in conflict zones from reporting the abuses they endure at the hands of war criminals whose sole aim in carrying out these horrific deeds is to torture and humiliate their enemy. Yet the courageous testimonies of women who survived rape during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda provided the evidence required for a United Nations war crimes tribunal to find Jean-Paul Akayesu guilty, four years after the shocking conflagration, marking the first judgment for the crime of genocide under international law. Rape was made a part of Akeyesu’s genocide conviction. In the latest episode of the UN Radio podcast series The Lid is On, Michele Mitchell, a co-director of the documentary film, The Uncondemned, was researching how and when rape was first prosecuted as a crime of war for her next project when she first heard about the so called ‘Akayesu’ case. She began by studying the wrong case. Most of the documentation she found had to do with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It was not until Ms. Mitchell spoke to a human rights lawyer Sara Darehshori, a senior counsel for the Human Rights Watch United States’ programme, that she found out about a historic trial that went before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). At the time, almost 20 years ago, Sara was a co-counsel for the prosecution. She is the one who found the ‘smoking gun’ that allowed the UN tribunal to amend its indictment against the former Mayor of Taba town in Rwanda, Jean-Paul Akayesu, and try him for rape as an act of genocide. During the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, in a span of one hundred days, between eight-hundred thousand and one million men, women and children were massacred by Hutu militia – a rate of killing four times greater than at the height of the Nazi Holocaust. Michele said she did not want to do “just another prosecutor’s story.” She wanted to include the women who had testified during this historic trial. She said that she wanted to understand what motivated these women who had suffered so much to say “enough” and to take action. “They were killed simply because of who they are; because they are Tutsis. Hutus protecting Tutsis or those married to Tutsis were also killed,” said Adama Dieng, the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide said during a screening of the film on the ground-breaking trial, organized by the Outreach Programme on the Rwandan Genocide and the United Nations. In the same judgement, the ICTR also defined the crime of rape in international criminal law and recognized rape as a means of perpetrating genocide. Akayesu was sentenced to life and found guilty of crimes against humanity for “ordering, aiding and abetting” rape. Delivering a statement following the ruling, Judge Navanethem “Navi” Pillay, who went on to become the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said the UN tribunal wanted to “send out a strong message that rape is no longer a trophy of war.” As the Rwandan women sat behind a curtain in a tiny court in Arusha, Tanzania and recounted in painful detail the brutal and violent sexual assaults they endured during the genocide, they had no idea they would make history. And that by doing so, they would give hope to survivors like them. To listen to the podcast please use the following link : https://soundcloud.com/unradio/the-lid-is-on-un-radio-podcast-how-rape-became-an-act-of-genocide _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 United Nations

Akinyi was only 11 years old when three men broke into her home in Kericho, Kenya, in December 2007, as post-election violence raged, and gang raped her and her mother. Akinyi became pregnant, but did not want anything to do with the baby girl she bore. Nafula K.,46, was gang raped together with three other women by four men in January 2008 while at an IDP camp. Her husband beats her, verbally abuses her, and refuses to sleep with her. Her family was also evicted from their home during the post-election violence. She says she wants to leave her abusive husband but wants the government to first build her a house so that she can have a place to go to. Many sexual violence survivors experience physical and verbal abuse in their homes. © 2015 Samer Muscati/Human Rights Watch “She left the child and went to Mombasa in 2009,” her mother, Aoko, said. “She has never returned. When she calls home and I mention the child, she disconnects the call…. I don’t think her heart will ever like this baby.” Last week, the United Nations and world leaders commemorated 20 years of work to protect children in conflict situations, stressing progress in the protection of girls who survive sexual violence. Unmentioned was the plight of children born from rape during conflict or political violence. Last year, I documented the difficulties faced by these children in Kenya. They were born following widespread rape of women and girls between December 2007 and February 2008, in the political violence and serious abuses that erupted in the wake of the disputed presidential election. Akinyi and her mother were among some 40 women and girls I spoke with. Women described complex relationships with children they had due to rape, often conflicting emotions of love and hate. “What should I do with this rape child?” one woman asked me. “I feel bad about having this child, but I love her. She reminds me of the rape but she is my child. Sometimes ... I want to hit her with an object and hurt her and she dies.” I found these children face stigma, rejection, and physical and verbal abuse by immediate and extended families, as well as the wider communities. Because of this, they may experience problems getting food, going to school, or accessing health care. Some do not have birth certificates that are important for accessing government services – officials will often demand the name of the father that they do not know when applying to get a birth certificate. Assistance to victims of Kenya’s 2007 election violence has largely ignored the particular vulnerabilities and needs of children born from rape. The Kenyan government needs to do more to protect these vulnerable children, in part by supporting their mothers. A woman who is abused, scorned, or abandoned following rape, or has lost her home and property during a conflict, is less likely to accept and support her child. The government should ensure these children have access to health care and education, as well as birth registration, and that their mothers and families can receive psychosocial care. Protecting children during times of political violence should include protecting children born from related rape, too. Kenya, and its development partners, should be strong voices for them and work to ensure they receive protection and assistance. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 human Rights Watch

Cambodia's King Norodom Sihamoni will preside over the premiere Saturday of Angelina Jolie's film based on a memoir from a Khmer Rouge survivor. Queen Mother Norodom Monineath Sihanouk and senior government officials will also attend the showing of "First They Killed My Father" at the centuries-old Angkor Wat temple complex, a spokesman for the government agency that oversees the archaeological site said Tuesday. Jolie, who directed the Khmer-language film on location in 2015-16, is also scheduled to attend. Two free public screens are planned at the site near Siem Reap in northwestern Cambodia. The film is based on Loung Ung's account of her survival as a child under the 1975-79 communist Khmer Rouge regime, believed to be responsible for the deaths of 1.7 million Cambodians from starvation, disease and execution. Jolie has had an affinity for Cambodia since she began goodwill work for the U.N.'s refugee agency in 2001, and her eldest son, Maddox, was adopted from the country. She also has established a foundation to promote social development in rural Cambodia. King Sihamoni's late father, Norodom Sihanouk, produced, wrote, directed and sometimes even acted in more than two dozen films made when he was in and out of power. Sihamoni has a deep interest in art and culture, focused on dance, both ballet and classical Cambodian dance. Long Kosal, the spokesman for Apsara Authority, the agency that oversees the temple complex, said he is pleased that the movie will have its premiere at Angkor Wat. "As a Khmer Rouge survivor, I am very proud that this movie is to be screened here, as the film will recall how the atrocities and harm caused to the Cambodian people under the Khmer Rouge regime," he said, explaining that it would be a good lesson to younger generations not to let such a brutal type of regime take power. Jolie's previous directorial projects include the 2015 marriage drama "By the Sea," in which she starred alongside then-husband Brad Pitt, and the 2014 survival story "Unbroken." _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 the Associated Press

Humanitarian crises like those in Syria’s Aleppo sometimes make headlines. But how do we identify such atrocities when they are occurring thousands of miles away? A new program at UC Berkeley is training students to leverage social media, geolocation and other high-tech tools to document human rights abuses, and their findings have been brought to the UN. Special correspondent Cat Wise reports. JUDY WOODRUFF: As we near the gruesome sixth anniversary of the war in Syria, daily documents of the carnage there now flood the Internet. Photos and videos posted by both civilians and combatants catalogue the shocking depths of human cruelty and possible war crimes. Now human rights investigators are increasingly turning to the Internet to track what’s happening, not only in Syria, but in other conflict zones. As part of our Breakthroughs coverage of invention and innovation, special correspondent Cat Wise reports on a new university program training students to become human rights investigators in the digital age. And a warning: This story contains some disturbing images. CAT WISE: For decades, human rights investigators have relied on tools like shovels and backhoes to uncover mass graves and mass atrocities in places like Bosnia, Iraq, and Rwanda. But in today’s smartphone-filled world, videos and images of people killed or suffering thousands of miles away take only a couple of clicks to find on YouTube, Facebook, Twitter. The front lines of human rights work have shifted in the digital age, and a new generation of investigators is beginning to employ high-tech tools. STUDENT: We can probably screen-shot that. STUDENT: Yes. STUDENT: And reverse-image it. STUDENT: Yes. STUDENT: And we should look up the name of that pharmacy. STUDENT: Can anyone translate that? CAT WISE: These students are part of the recently launched Human Rights Investigations Lab at the University of California, Berkeley’s Human Rights Center. The university and partner organization Amnesty International are training the students to verify videos and other publicly available social media content coming out of areas like Syria, where human rights violations have been occurring. For the first time, students are using open source investigation methods used previously by journalists and human rights professionals. YOUSTINA YOUSSEF, Student: Oh, those are uniforms. CAT WISE: Youstina Youssef is a 20-year-old political science major in the program. She’s become a highly skilled digital detective. And her native language, Arabic, also comes in handy. Youssef grew up in Cairo, Egypt. She and her family are Coptic Christians, a religious minority in Egypt. They came to the U.S. in 2010 shortly before the revolution began. YOUSTINA YOUSSEF: I didn’t have a minute of hesitation about this. I jumped right on it. I think it has a lot to do with my background of coming from Egypt, being a regular person, and then being affected by the political scene in the country, and having your life upended. This project gives me an outlet, gives me a way to feel like I am contributing in some way. ALEXA KOENIG, Executive Director, Berkeley Human Rights Center: Welcome to the spring 2017 launch of the Human Rights Investigations Lab. CAT WISE: The 60-plus student volunteers are a diverse group from different majors and the law school. They speak more than 20 languages. Alexa Koenig is the executive director of Berkeley’s Human Rights Center. She says the lab was a natural progression for the organization, which has been advancing human rights work, around the world, for more than 20 years. ALEXA KOENIG: We have noticed over and over that there are a number of front-line human rights advocates that are really trying to figure out, how do you ensure that the videos they’re getting from survivors on the ground are what they purport to be? So, one of the things we were thinking is, couldn’t we leverage our position here to provide the labor that so many of these organizations really can’t afford, but also provide a pipeline of students who are skilled in an area that’s increasingly in demand, front-line human rights workers? CAT WISE: And it appears the human rights movement is eager for help. Since the lab began in September, students have been asked by Amnesty and other groups to look at material coming out of Yemen, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Myanmar. But the bulk of their work has been focused on Syria, specifically Aleppo. HALEY WILLIS, Student: This is very deep in Aleppo. CAT WISE: Haley Willis is a sophomore in the program from Texas. She showed me one of the key methods she and the other students use to verify videos. HALEY WILLIS: Geolocation is essentially, did this take place where it says it took place? We’re really used to being able to say, here’s this store, and you type it into Google, you get an address, and you’re done. In Syria, there’s not easily accessible addresses. There’s no Google Street View. In this particular video, the thing that stood out to me the most is a white dome sticking out from behind this building right here. CAT WISE: Oh, I see that. HALEY WILLIS: That is a good place to start for geolocating, because a dome is round. That’s a very distinct shape that you will be able to see from above. CAT WISE: Wills then began looking for a needle in a haystack: a tiny dome in pre-war satellite images of Aleppo. HALEY WILLIS: I combed through this neighborhood, and I basically looked for every white circular object that I saw. I ended up narrowing it down to about two. You can’t always be 100 percent sure, and you should never say you’re 100 percent sure unless you are. CAT WISE: After getting as far as they can, the students turn over their research to the partner organizations for final analysis. Screening hours and hours of disturbing images can obviously take a toll. It’s an issue that’s taken very seriously within the program. SAM DUBBERLEY, Amnesty International: The most important thing you can do to look after yourself personally is just have awareness, understanding how you normally respond to things and how are you responding after spending a couple of hours looking at and verifying videos. CAT WISE: Sam Dubberley works for Amnesty International. The lab partnership with Berkeley was actually his idea. He’s now running three similar programs at universities in South Africa, the United Kingdom, and Canada, and each group is required to go through regular resiliency training. SAM DUBBERLEY: Just watching a video without sound is actually less distressing than watching it with sound. And very often, the audio is not necessarily important for verification. It’s very important to us to make sure the students are trained and given a safe environment, so that they do not suffer any adverse effects of trauma. The reality is, the world of human rights investigation requires you to look at this content today. So, if in two years’ time, three years’ time, you want to move into that field, I think it’s very good for them that they actually understand the skills and the resiliency required to do this job. CAT WISE: Under that guided leadership, the students have been cranking away, more than 1,500 hours of verification work thus far. And some of that work has even made it all the way to the United Nations, according to Syrian activist Hadi Al Khatib. HADI AL KHATIB, Syrian Activist: The students found a specific type of cluster munitions that has been used in Aleppo City and its countryside. And this has been all included in a verified data set that we have sent to the U.N. CAT WISE: Al Khatib runs an organization called the Syrian Archive. He and his colleagues are creating a large database of verified videos documenting human rights violations on all sides since the start of the Syrian civil war. I spoke to him on Skype about why he asked Berkeley for help. HADI AL KHATIB: With the archive, we have about more than 3,800 videos that have been verified. We still have a backlog of more than 30,000 of videos that we need to go through. So this is why we need the help of Berkeley university students. CAT WISE: But the big question, of course, on the minds of both the students and others doing this type of work: Will any of it actually be presented in an international court of law one day? Could a YouTube video lead to the downfall of a leader? BEN TAUB, The New Yorker: If there is no geopolitical will to actually help people, then you can have all the videos in the world, and it won’t actually garner support to save people’s lives. CAT WISE: Ben Taub is a contributing writer at The New Yorker who has written extensively about human rights violations in Syria. We caught up with him recently on the Columbia University campus, where he talked about the pluses and minuses of open source evidence. BEN TAUB: It’s extremely useful for advocacy. It’s also extremely useful for putting the crimes before the international community to try to garner the kind of political pressure that could result in a trial taking place to begin with. But it doesn’t necessarily link the actor that you’re trying to prosecute to the crime. Footage of, for instance, a hospital being blown up doesn’t show that that was ordered by Assad or by his highest-level security committee. The kind of evidence that really would get them would be a document, an order, something that’s signed. CAT WISE: That’s an issue that is very much on the mind of the Human Rights Center’s Alexa Koenig. ALEXA KOENIG: One of the biggest hurdles about using these new methods is that they are so new. So, judges often don’t know how to evaluate, and give any kind of weight to information you’re pulling off Facebook, or Twitter, or these other platforms. One of the things we’re hoping to do for kind of investing in the long-term use of these methods is just begin to build an international standard for how to evaluate what constitutes an effective and a good investigation. CAT WISE: In the months ahead, the students will continue their work on Syria and start new projects in Africa and Central America. For the PBS NewsHour, I’m Cat Wise in Berkeley, California. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 PBS

Iraqi Christians launched a protest outside the UN regional headquarters in Beirut yesterday, demanding a quicker resettlement process. Thousands of Iraqi Christian refugees fled to Lebanon to escape fighting and persecution in Iraq. Lebanon has the highest per-capita concentration of refugees worldwide, where one out of every four people is a refugee. Despite such a high number of refugees, Lebanon has adopted a "no camp" policy which means that refugees are not allowed to settle in large scale camps. This means that they are forced to live in temporary shelters, often on waste land. Refugees are also not entitled to work in Lebanon and have difficulty accessing schools and healthcare. According to Associated Press, at least 200 Iraqis took part in Monday's protest. One banner read: "The future of our children is wasted." Just a few days after Trump's order to stop refugees from countries including Iraq and Syria, Lebanese President Michel Aoun renewed calls for Syrians to be repatriated to their home country. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 V

FEBRUARY 20-21, 2017 Symposium on Holocaust Research Yad Vashem, Mount of Remembrance, Jerusalem Monday, February 20 Afternoon session: The State of Academic Research on the Holocaust Today: Insights, Challenges and Nurturing the Future - Roundtable Discussion 13:00 to 17:30 | Graduate students and junior scholars from all universities and research institutions are welcome | RSVP to khegburg@ushmm.org | This session is not open to the general public | ushmm.org/future-research Participants: Havi Dreifuss, Tel Aviv University, Krista Hegburg, US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Elana Heideman, Israel Forever Foundation, Arieh Kochavi, University of Haifa, Dan Michman, Yad Vashem, Iael Nidam Orvieto, Yad Vashem, Dalia Ofer, Hebrew University, Dina Porat, Yad Vashem Keynote Lecture: Mothers and Daughters in the Holocaust, Sara R. Horowitz, Professor of Comparative Literature, York University Moderated by Dan Michman, Yad Vashem, with a response by Dina Porat, Yad Vashem 18:00 | Free and open to the public | RSVP at ushmm.org/holocaust-symposium Tuesday, February 21 9:00 to 16:30 | Free and open to the public | Lunch buffet will be provided | Full schedule and RSVP at ushmm.org/holocaust-symposium Panel 1: New Historiographies of the Holocaust Between Religious Life and the Life of the Religious Havi Dreifuss, Tel Aviv University Nazi Reactions to the Przytyk Pogrom (1936-1942) Idit Gil, The Open University Respondent: Hagit Lavsky, University of Haifa (invited) Panel 2: The Turn to the East Refugees without Refuge: The Warsaw Ghetto Lea Prais, Yad Vashem The Creation and Liquidation of the Kishinev Ghetto, 1941-42 Paul A. Shapiro, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Respondent: David Silberklang, Yad Vashem Panel 3: The Memory of Memory and the Future for Survivors “Iran’s Children” in the Shadow of World War II Orly Rahimiyan, Ben Gurion University Life in the Shadow of the Holocaust Abraham Sagi-Schwartz, University of Haifa The Survivor as Educator: The Impact of Momentary Survival in the Transmission of Holocaust Memory Elana Heideman, Israel Forever Foundation Respondent: Sara R. Horowitz The proceedings will be held in English with simultaneous translation. This program has been co-organized by the International Institute for Holocaust Research at Yad Vashem, the Jack, Joseph and Morton Mandel Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and the Heideman-Greenberg Fellows for Holocaust Research at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Funding for the Symposium has been provided by Phyllis Greenberg Heideman and Richard D. Heideman. The Symposium is taking place through the generous support of the Gutwirth Family Fund at Yad Vashem.

Towards the end of her long chapter on the Rwanda genocide in “A Problem From Hell” (2002), Samantha Power renders a moment from this terrible international failure that has long haunted me. It is both unforgettable in its implications and points to far too much that is unforgivable. The moment occurred in late July 1994 as the U.S. under then-President Bill Clinton finally managed to step away from its absurd sophistries and the moral cowardice that had defined American policy during the horrific months of carnage, which were at this point essentially over. Prior to the deployment of 200 U.S. troops to protect the Kigali airport, the UN force commander of UNAMIR, Lt.-General Rómeo Dallaire, received a phone call: A U.S. officer was wondering about precisely how many Rwandans had died. Dallaire was puzzled and asked why he wanted to know. “We are doing our calculations back here,” the U.S. officer said, “and one American casualty is worth about 85,000 Rwandan dead.” (page 381, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide) I see no reason to doubt Dallaire’s recollection, offered less than eight years after the events of spring 1994—and certainly not having met with Dallaire and encountered the searing authority and detail of his soul-destroying memoire, Shake Hands with the Devil: Humanity’s Failure in Rwanda. Moreover, what struck me as such an obscene calculus on the part of the U.S. military in 1994 no longer seems so strange. Indeed, in one form or another, it governs current actions by the U.S. military—in all its dimensions and guises—every day. The assessment of civilian casualty risks in U.S. drone strikes on suspected terrorist locations is only one example. No, what seems strange to me now is that any U.S. military officer would venture to be so specific about a calculus that included such a ratio: “one American casualty is worth about 85,000 Rwandan dead.” UN force commander of UNAMIR, Lt.-General Rómeo Dallaire Perhaps the savage cynicism in such a calculus was simply too conspicuously in evidence. Certainly Susan Rice, then young in her government career, came to regret an equally cynical comment—recorded by Power in the same chapter, about actually “doing something,” even daring to use the word “genocide” (this in late April of 1994): …Susan Rice, a rising star on the NSC…stunned a few of the officials present when she asked, “If we use the word ‘genocide’ and are seen as doing nothing, what will be the effect on the November [congressional] elections?” Lieutenant Colonel [Tony] Marley remembers the incredulity of his colleagues at the State Department. “We could believe that people would wonder that,” he says, “but not that they would actually voice it.” (page 359) [Power’s paragraph concludes: “Rice does not recall the incident but concedes, ‘If I said it, it was completely inappropriate, as well as irrelevant.’” – Yes…yes indeed…] What I attempt here is an overview analysis of the quantitative implications that follow from continuation of such a ghastly and cynical calculus in other forms, specifically the forms it takes in the Sudan policies of various international actors of consequence. For in fact, this cynicism lies behind the disingenuousness, mendacity, and deliberate ignorance of so much that defines the Sudan policies of Western nations, the UN, the African Union, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Conference. It is finally the same cynicism as experienced by General Dallaire and given voice by Susan Rice. The Savage Calculus at Work The calculus I adumbrate is certainly not peculiarly American. European countries, particularly the UK and Germany, are desperate to stem the flow of African refugees to the European continent; and they have calculated that the benefits to stanching this flow justifies a policy of rapprochement with the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime in Khartoum. To be sure, European policy is also animated by commercial and other economic interests. Europe has never seen an obligation to impose economic sanctions on the Khartoum regime, even when in 2004 the Parliament of the European Union, almost unanimously, declared that the actions of that regime in Darfur were “tantamount to genocide.” Economic and commercial interests have long prevailed, despite unctuous public pronouncements of concern by various European leaders. So conspicuous has the hypocrisy of Europe been that French banking giant BNP Paribas was emboldened, in the interest of huge profits, to abandon all concern for any atrocities committed by the Khartoum regime. In doing so it deliberately chose to violate U.S. financial sanctions on a massive scale—from within the U.S. itself. This led to the 2015 criminal conviction of BNP Paribas by the U.S. Justice Department—for violations so flagrant that the Deputy Attorney General described BNP Paribas as Khartoum’s “central banker” abroad, thereby insulating the regime from the most serious consequences of the most significant element of U.S. sanctions. There was no moral calculus at all—no regard whatsoever for the destructive consequences of providing “financial save haven” to a regime has engaged in brutal, finally genocidal counter-insurgency wars on Sudan’s peripheries since 1989. The details for the years 1997 – 2007 are outlined in extraordinary detail in a class action civil suit filed on behalf of Sudanese victims (in U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, Case 1:16-cv-03228-AJN; full text of the Complaint is available upon request). Senior official of BNP Paribas--before the guilty plea that would cost the bank some $9 billion in forfeitures and fines The Sudanese Economy Without BNP Paribas as de facto Central Banker The Sudan policies of most European governments are guided by the willfully ignorant and self-serving economic “calculation” that somehow the people of Sudan will be helped if a savagely repressive, self-enriching, and genocidal regime is preserved. The evidence to the contrary here is simply overwhelming and makes nonsense of any such calculation as it informs European policies, whatever fig-leaf of “country concern” is provided. The realities are that the regime continues to function conspicuously as an extremely powerful kleptocracy, with policies of self-enrichment that are now badly undermining the country’s economy . That economy is in an irreversible nose-dive, a collapse catalyzed by the desperately inadequate investment policies of the past decade and more, indeed since oil revenues began pouring into Khartoum in 1999. There has been no meaningful investment in agriculture; the sector that should be the backbone of the economy is collapsing, even the famous Gezira Scheme. At the same time, severe water shortages are constantly reported from around the country; these are but one reflection of the regime’s refusal to invest in infrastructure projects than benefit the general population of Sudan. The current, widespread outbreak of deadly cholera in Sudan can be traced directly to the failure to provide adequate supplies of clean water, especially in places like Port Sudan, where the minority Beja population is so numerous. Nor was any adequate refining capacity built during the years flush with petro-dollars; now Sudan is forced to import large quantities of refined petroleum products, including cooking fuel, prices for which have skyrocketed for a number of years. In refusing to plan for the loss of oil revenues that came with the 2011 secession of South Sudan, Khartoum set in motion a series of cascading economic crises. Foremost among them was the sharp decline in the influx of hard currency. Without the foreign exchange currency (Forex) that had been generated by large oil exports, Khartoum has been unable to purchase sufficient quantities of critical items from abroad, including not only cooking fuel, but urgently needed medicines, and even wheat to make into flour for bread, the staple food for many. Bread prices have also seen an enormous spike, and there are severe shortages as well as long lines for purchase. Broader inflation is likely in the range of 50 percent, and perhaps higher. There are no reliable inflation figures from either the regime or the IMF, the latter another corrupt actor in international policy views of Sudan. In an October 2013 “IMF News Release,” Edward Gemayel, the IMF's Mission Chief for Sudan, declared that: "Sudan has a long track record of implementing sustainable economic policies” (http://www.4-traders.com/news/IMF-International-Monetary-Fund-Press-Release-Sudan-Meeting-of-the-Technical-Working-Group-on-E--17345158/). Preposterous and demonstrably false declarations such as this have served the Khartoum regime well for the past two decades. But economic realities are not hard to discern, despite the mendacity of men like Gemayel. How, we must wonder, would Gemayel characterize the current military and security budget for the Khartoum regime as demonstrating “a long track record of implementing sustainable economic policies,” particularly in light of the allocation percentages and the final remark by President al-Bashir? — Sudan allocates $1.8 billion for defense in 2017 | Sudan Tribune, December 23, 2016 (KHARTOUM) - Sudan has appropriated more than 29 billion pounds (SDG) (about $1.8 billion) to defense and security which represents the largest single spending item in the 2017 budget. According to Sudan’s 2017 budgetary estimates seen by Sudan Tribune, 5 billion pounds have been allocated to the sovereign sector while 2.3 billion was appropriated for agriculture and forests spending. Other budget spending items includes 1.9 billion for the economic sector, 5.5 million for culture and information, 5.3 million for health, 828 million for education, 1.7 billion for minerals and 1.7 billion for transport, roads and bridges. It is noteworthy that the combined education and health spending represents about 3% of spending on defence and security. The Sudanese army has been fighting Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/North (SPLM-N) rebels in Blue Nile and South Kordofan since 2011 and a group of armed movements in Darfur since 2003. Sudan’s security apparatus has expanded vastly and military expenditure continued to rise as the government relies increasingly on militias such as the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) and the Rapid Support Forces (SRF) in military operations. Last year, Sudan’s President Omer al-Bashir said, “If 100% of the state’s budget was allocated to the army to secure the country, then that is still not enough.” The Khartoum regime's leading "economist," indicted génocidaire and President Omar al-Bashir Given such budgetary priorities, it is hardly surprising that the value of the Sudanese Pound—the best barometer of the general availability of hard currency (inside and outside the Central Bank of Sudan)—has been declining precipitously for several years, reaching record low after record low—all thoroughly reported. Only cash infusions from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States keeps the economy from utter catastrophe. These infusions are seen as the necessary cost of preserving estrangement between Khartoum and Iran, formerly the regime’s “key strategic ally” If Europe, the UN, the IMF and others would only look honestly at the economic policies of the NIF/NCP regime, going back to the military coup that brought it to power in 1989, they would of course see that whatever putative gains may be realized by normalizing relations with this junta, the policies of rapprochement only provide support for economic self-destruction destruction and ongoing genocidal tyranny. The regime feels emboldened because of the widespread, deliberate ignoring of news from Sudanese news sources, news that if taken seriously would interfere with the counter-productive international policies now firmly in place. So spectacular is the ignorance required to justify European policy views, that it is finally not credible: what we are witnessing is not true ignorance (although there is plenty of this) but “ignorance by selectivity.” By picking and choosing which reports seem to justify current policies, the Europeans have effectively created their state of ignorance. The three major human rights reports on Sudan of the past two years by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have gained no real traction, despite the horrific atrocities documented on the basis of countless interviews conducted by researchers for these reports. In the end the conclusion is inevitable: the European economic and refugee policies in place and being implemented are simply the European version of a statement made by the U.S. Special Envoy for the Sudan, Princeton Lyman, in December 2011: “We [the Obama administration] do not want to see the ouster of the [Khartoum] regime, nor regime change. We want to see the regime carrying out reform via constitutional democratic measures.” (Interview with Asharq al-Awsat, December 3, 2011 | http://english.aawsat.com/2011/12/article55244147/asharq-al-awsat-talks-to-us-special-envoy-to-sudan-princeton-lyman) Former Obama administration special envoy for the Sudans, Princeton Lyman The U.S. Calculus for Sudan In the case of the U.S., at least since the terrorist attacks of September 11, Sudan policy has increasingly reflected a trade-off between, on the one hand, the putative value of Khartoum’s providing counter-terrorism intelligence and, on the other, the knowledge that in providing critical diplomatic cover for the survival of the NIF/NCP regime, the U.S. is complicit in the repression and atrocity crimes of that regime. Certainly any survey of what has transpired between Lyman’s interview of December 2011 and the present, certainly in the way of political “reform,” makes clear how preposterous his assertion was. Also clear are the brutal consequences of his deliberately false suggestion about what the NIF/NCP regime is capable of. For of course Lyman was not so ignorant as to have believed that the regime could actually preside over “reform [of Sudan] via constitutional measures.” Rather, it was a statement made to preserve the status quo in relations between Khartoum and the Obama administration, which was continuing policies begun under the Bush administration and which have been consistently defined by demands from the U.S. intelligence community. Khartoum, as a senior regime official recently boasted, now is home to one of the largest and most important U.S. intelligence listening posts in the Middle East (see photo). To put the matter in terms that would be familiar to General Dallaire, Lyman was implicitly declaring that such a trade-off was “worth it” in terms of American lives saved from potential terrorists threats, working on the problematic assumption that Khartoum could help us avert such threats. Lyman made this calculation on behalf of the Obama administration, knowing that he was speaking about a regime that would continue to impose catastrophic humanitarian embargoes on many hundreds of thousands of Sudanese civilians, embargoes that continue to this day; a regime that would mercilessly and continuously bomb civilians in various regions of the country; a regime that soon after Lyman’s statement would replace the Janjaweed of Darfur with the much better armed and organized militia force known as the Rapid Support Forces wreaking even more terrible havoc; and a regime that would be perfectly capable of using chemical weapons, as it did during the 2016 military campaign of extermination in the Jebel Marra region of Darfur: (“Scorched Earth, Poisoned Air: Sudanese Government Forces Ravage Jebel Marra, Darfur,” Amnesty International | 109 pages; released September 29, 2016). And as for political “reform,” what we have seen in Sudan during the five intervening years is a dramatic growth in repression, increasing numbers of arrests and torturing of human rights advocates (singling our Darfuri students in the greater Khartoum area in particular), a severe curtailment of the press, the killing of civilians in September 2013 by security forces that had been issued “shoot to kill” orders—and a re-issuing of the threat to institute such orders by President Omar al-Bashir in December 2016. Lyman and the Obama administration knew, could not possibly have been ignorant, of the implications of the deal that Lyman was announcing with his interview statement of December 2011. Khartoum, of course, readily accepted the deal—one that has progressed to the point where, in its closing days, the Obama administration decided to lift economic sanctions on Khartoum, a decision subject to review in July 2017 but which the ignorant and malignant Trump administration is hardly likely to reverse, should it even taken notice of the obligation of review—an increasingly unlikely prospect, given the chaos evident in every quarter of the new administration. Khartoum’s recent boast, reported by Sudan Tribune, January 31, 2017— The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) office in Khartoum is the largest one in the Middle East, said the Sudanese intelligence General Hanafi Abdallah, to give an idea about the importance of intelligence cooperation between the two countries— —even if somewhat hyperbolic, reflects confidence that the U.S. will not dare surrender the relatively recent activation of its Khartoum-based intelligence listening post. In lifting sanctions on Khartoum, the Obama administration was so eager to justify its decision that it resorted to permitting outright falsehoods to be deployed. One apt response to the decision came from Leslie Lefkow, deputy Africa director at Human Rights Watch, who called the decision simply "inexplicable”: “There has been no progress on human rights. Sudan's government has failed to make progress on core benchmarks, from its ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur and other conflict zones, to its extensive repression of independent voices, [Lefkow said].” (Reuters, Washington DC | January 13, 2017) But most conspicuous among these falsehoods was the claim by Obama administration Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power, who declared in her final press interview that there had been a “sea change” of improvement in humanitarian access in Sudan. This is patently false, as the State Department has privately made clear. Conspicuously, there has been no public explanation—from any official of either the Obama or Trump administration—of how this claim comports with facts on the ground in Sudan. It is a falsehood that stands as the official view of the U.S. government. Here we should note that this means a correction has not been offered by key former officials of the Obama administration, including Power herself and National Security Advisor Susan Rice, who is a former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and knows Sudan well—and knows that Power’s claim is deeply and consequentially false. Why hasn’t she spoken out to offer a correction? And why haven’t we heard from Gayle Smith, formerly a senior official for African Affairs in Obama’s National Security Council and who was Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development until January 20, a week after Power’s press interview? She knows perhaps better than anyone in the former Obama administration how false Power’s claim is: why has she said nothing? Why has she offered no correction? Obama administration National Security Advisor, and former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice: she surely knows there has been no "sea change" in improved humanitarian access in Sudan...why won't she say as much? This is hardly a small matter. Khartoum—which knows perfectly well that it has done nothing to earn the praise that it has been accorded (a “see change” in improved humanitarian access)—will prove only more intransigent in truly improving access for relief workers and supplies. Particularly hard hit will be the areas of the Nuba Mountains that remain, to this very day, under Khartoum’s savagely cruel humanitarian embargo. An experienced and highly knowledgeable humanitarian on the ground in the Nuba conveyed to me his reaction to Power’s “sea change” claim: “…there’s been absolutely no change in humanitarian access [in the Nuba Mountains—suffering under Khartoum’s humanitarian embargo for over five and a half years]. Not a single grain of sorghum nor one tablet of medicine has entered Nuba from any of the usual humanitarian agencies.” (email from Dr. Tom Catena, the only surgeon operating in the Nuba Mountains; received January 17, 2017) In an email received today (February 12, 2017) Dr. Catena offered a grim update on the consequences of the humanitarian embargo: “The situation here is still the same. Everyone had a poor harvest and is running short of food. The food available in the market is unaffordable for all but a few people. It's going to be a long year.” Dr. Tom Catena, the only surgeon currently working in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan As this communication makes clear, the consequences of Khartoum’s denial of humanitarian access may well be measured in thousands of lives lost, perhaps tens of thousands if we bear in mind the humanitarian embargo on large parts of Blue Nile and many locations in Darfur. A very recent “Flash Update” from the “South Kordofan/Blue Nile Coordinating Unit” (#14 | February 11, 2017) offers a very grim account that comports all too fully with Dr. Catena’s: "Deteriorating Food Security Outlook Following Poor Harvest Assessment" The recently released Food Security Monitoring Unit (FSMU) report for the period of December 2016 describes a “bleak food security outlook” based on declining harvests compared to the same period last year. According to an early harvest assessment and a decrease in rainfall reported by FEWSNet*, there is a strong indication the region will experience a decline in food production in 2017. This will further increase strain on traditional coping methods and indicates an early onset to the annual lean season… [Famine Early Warning Systems Network and the US Geological Survey release satellite data on regional evapotranspiration and deviation from historical norms. This measure, the Evapotranspiration Anomaly Index, is a reliable proxy indicator for rainfall. As facilities to directly measure rainfall throughout the area are not available this serves as the best measure for seasonal rains.] Presumably this, too, is all part of the Obama administration’s Sudan policy “calculus.” For if Khartoum believes that the Obama administration has in fact credited the regime with what it has not done, this powerfully diminishes the incentive for a supremely canny regime to meet the supposed “benchmark criterion” for keeping sanctions lifted (one of only two meaningful criteria in President Obama’s Executive Order lifting sanctions). Moreover, it seems extremely unlikely that the character of humanitarian access in Sudan will become an issue during the confused opening months of a Trump administration, an administration that seems incapable of appointing anyone to any position who will taken seriously this critical issue, with life and death implications for many hundreds of thousands of people. The man who will ultimately decide whether economic sanctions on Khartoum should be lifted permanently The Ultimate Cynicism The countries of the West—particularly in North America and Europe—like to think that they are morally superior to such ruthlessly and destructively self-interested actors as Russia and China—and increasingly the African Union, especially its Peace and Security Council. They like to think that the UN would function effectively but for the obstructionist roles of Russia and China on the UN Security Council. But Western “outrage” at the undeniable obstructionism on the part of Russia and China is largely belied when the same “outraged” countries engage in policies that in their way are all too similarly self-interested, offering Sudan only a veneer of moral concern. The U.S. Criteria for Continuing with Lifting of Sanctions Besides humanitarian access, the benchmarks for Khartoum to meet in maintaining a suspension of U.S. sanctions are three: [1] No longer supporting the maniacal Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which has been reliably reported in the Kafia Kingi enclave—part of South Sudan but controlled militarily by Khartoum; for years Khartoum used the LRA as a fantastically brutal proxy in its war with the South and subsequently—this as a means of gaining leverage with Uganda; the LRA appears to be in its death throes in any event, and even if it were to attempt to reconstitute itself as a consequential threat in the region, it would take much more than six months to do. [2] No longer interfering militarily in the affairs of South Sudan. Although such military support was to have ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 2005, until very recently Khartoum was assisting so-called “Other Armed Groups” (OAG) in South Sudan. This has been conspicuous and well-documented and includes assistance after January 2014 to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/In Opposition, one side in the extraordinarily destructive civil war that has wracked South Sudan for the past four years. Given the self-destruction South Sudan is inflicting upon itself, it costs Sudan very little to commit to “non-interference.” [3] Ending violence in Darfur and the Two Areas (South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile). Aerial bombardment of civilians is highlighted as a form of violence that will be closely monitored; and there has been a very significant diminishment of this indiscriminate and particularly brutal form of counter-insurgency warfare over the past six months (although for a historical view of Khartoum’s bombing practices see | http://wp.me/p45rOG-Pv/). But ending violence is supposed to include a halting of new military offensives in the regions being monitored, and to understand what levels of violence persists requires taking reporting by Sudanese news organizations seriously, something that the Obama administration has seemed determined to avoid. And it requires taking seriously the September 29, 2016 report (see above) by Amnesty International, which records atrocity crimes that occurred during the 180-day “look back” period: this was the period of time supposedly monitored in making the decision to lift sanctions. Looking Honestly at Khartoum A subsequent and considerably more detailed compendium of recent violence will be forthcoming. What is offered here are simply some of the most striking recent examples, highlights, and reports on violence by Khartoum or its militia proxies, strongly suggesting that criterion [3] has already been consequentially violated, and that the Obama administration assessment excludes a tremendous amount of violence orchestrated or sanctioned by the Khartoum regime in the period July 2016 – January 2017 (the most recent example comes from February 2017). APPENDIX: Comporting with “Criterion Three”? A compendium of violence in Sudan committed or orchestrated by the Khartoum regime (2017 and later 2016) [1] One especially valuable reporting resource on violence in South Kordofan and Blue Nile is the Sudan Consortium (African and International Civil Society Action for Sudan), working with National Human Rights Monitors Organisation. Their most recent report (October/November 2016)—in the very middle of the Obama administration’s “look back” period in assessing Khartoum’s behavior—tells us the following: During the months of October and November 2016, incidents of human rights violations in Southern Kordofan (SK) seemed to be on the rise following a lull in the fighting over the previous few months and the humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate. There were nine shelling incidents, generating 89 shells, one looting incident, one bombing incident and one abduction, with three people injured. The shelling incidents created a lot of fear among the population, discouraging some from going to the fields. Antonov planes have been seen circling several times in both SK and Blue Nile (BN) states but our monitors did not report any incidents in BN during the period. All incidents mentioned in this report constitute a breach of the four-month unilateral ceasefire declared by the President of Sudan, Omar Al Bashir, on 17 June 2016, and extended in October to the end of 2016. SOUTHERN KORDOFAN Um Dorein County • On 14 October 2016, at 8.00am, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) fired four shells on Alnugra village, Tangal Payam, and injured a four month old baby. • On 16 October 2016, at 1.00am, SAF fired three shells on Alnugra village, Tangal Payam, and damaged a farm belonging to a woman in the village. The same day at 3.00pm, SAF fired 27 shells on Umserndiba village, Tangal Payam, but no casualties were reported. Delami County • On 5 October 2016, at 2.18pm, from Umhetan town, Umhetan Payam, SAF fired two shells into the area controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/AN). These were civilian settlements but no casualties were reported. • On 21 October 2016, at 4.13pm, the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) – a militia allied to the Sudan government - looted 180 cows from three families in Hadara village, Umhetan Payam. Kadugli County • On 21 October 2016, at 8.00am, a 60 year old widow was shot and seriously wounded in the left thigh by the PDF while working on her farm. The Sudan Consortium has been working with a group of trusted local Sudanese partners who have been monitoring human rights violations committed against the civilian population in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile since the current conflict began in 2011. We believe that the information provides strong evidence that civilians are being directly and deliberately targeted by the Sudanese government in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile as all the attacks referred to in this report were launched against areas that were clearly identifiable as civilian in character. Um Dorein County • On 19 November 2016, at 8.00pm, SAF fired 23 shells on Alnugra village, Tangal Payam, but there were no casualties. The same day, at 8.00pm, SAF also fired five shells on Umserndiba village, Tangal Payam, but there were no casualties. • On 24 November 2016, at 12.00am, SAF fired four shells on Umserndiba village, Tangal Payam, and fired seven shells on Alnugra village, Tangal Payam, but there were no casualties in either incident. Heiban County • On 17 November 2016, at 2.00pm, a man was abducted by the PDF while working on his farm in Tembera village, Kumbur Payam. There was no news of his whereabouts by the end of 2016. • On 23 November 2016, at 3.15pm, eight rockets were fired on Ardicanan village from Umbrabeta village where government troops are based. The rockets fell within 10 metres of Ardicanan Model Primary School but the pupils had already gone home for the day and none were injured. However, shrapnel from the rockets broke the hand of a civilian who was travelling to the village market. Additionally, three huts belonging to three families were completely burnt with all property inside. • On 24 November 2016, at 2.00pm, nine shells were fired from Umbrabeta village, Rashad Payam, to Nyakima village in Alazrag Payam but there were no casualties and nothing was damaged. • On 28 November 2016, at 2.13pm, two MiG jet fighters dropped two bombs on Lula village in Alazrag Payam but there were no casualties and nothing was destroyed. For video clip showing civilians under aerial attack in the Nuba Mountains, see: https://twitter.com/sudan_wa3ai/status/811520514141409280 [2] The previous report provides the context for assessing the charge by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-N) that Khartoum has engaged in major military operations in Blue Nile: SPLM-N says Sudanese army attacking its position in Blue Nile | (Sudan Tribune) | January 9, 2017 (KHARTOUM) The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North Monday accused the Sudanese government forces of attacking its positions in the Blue Nile State. "Today 9th of Jan 2017 at 6:00 am, National congress party (NCP) forces and militias in Blue Nile region attacked SPLM/N controlled area of Arum," said Arnu Nugultu Lodi, the SPLM-N spokesperson. "The fighting is continue up to the moment," he added in a statement extended to Sudan Tribune on Monday evening. Sudanese government and the Sudan Revolutionary Front factions in the Two Areas and Darfur have announced unilateral cessation of hostilities. President Omer al-Bashir recently extended it for one month while the rebel factions said they are committed to the truce until the end of April. Arnu said this attack is a violation of the one-month ceasefire announced at the beginning of this year adding "the so-called ceasefire is media propaganda to mislead public opinion." The Sudanese Armed Forces spokesperson was not reachable for comment on this claim. Last November the SPLM-N said the army attacked its positions in the Blue Nile State, but the army didn’t comment on the claim. Given the terrible record of lies—and denials of confirmed facts by spokesmen for the SAF—we hardly need wait for the inevitable and perfunctory denial. Moreover, other evidence and reports confirm the SPLM/A-N account. See also: Radio Dabanga, SPLM-N: ‘Sudan's armed forces violate ceasefire in South Kordofan’ (November 27, 2016 | UM DORAIN Radio Dabanga, SPLM-N: 'Sudan soldiers repulsed from Blue Nile outpost' | (January 17, 2017 | EL TADAMON [3] Jonathan Loeb, the lead author and researcher for the September 29, 2016 Amnesty International report on Khartoum’s military offensive in the Jebel Marra region, speaks of a time-frame that extends well into the supposed “look back” period for the Obama administration’s assessment of Khartoum’s “improved behavior” (“Time to Get Serious About Civilian Protection in Darfur,” Inter Press Service, December 20, 2016): The large-scale violence that occurred in Jebel Marra between January and September 2016 is the most recent example of the UNAMID’s egregious failure to report. Jebel Marra is a 5,000-square kilometre volcanic massif in the centre of Darfur, consisting of approximately 1,500 villages and hamlets. The area has been a stronghold for armed opposition groups throughout the conflict; in 2016, portions of Jebel Marra were the only significant territory in Darfur still held by an armed opposition movement. Access to Jebel Marra has been largely cut-off since 2009, when the Government of Sudan responded to the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir by expelling nearly all the aid agencies operating in the area. No journalist, human rights investigator, humanitarian actor or peacekeeper has been granted any meaningful access to the most conflict-affected parts of Jebel Marra for years. Notionally, the “look back” period of assessing Khartoum’s military actions began in July 2016; but the lead researcher for Amnesty International’s report on the Jebel Marra offensive, which may well prove to be the final stage in the genocidal counter-insurgency campaign in Darfur, extends into September 2016. (See Radio Dabanga, February 6, 2017 for an account of the comprehensive success of the Jebel Marra campaign as perceived by the Rapid Support Forces.) [4] In my assessment of “the Nertiti Massacre” (January 1, 2017), I argued that we could see in this brutal event the real meaning of al-Bashir’s declared “cease-fire”: We learn today from a wide range of sources just how meaningful Omar al-Bashir’s declaration of a one-month extension of his nominal “cease-fire” really is (see Sudan Tribune, January 1, 2017 | http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article61265/). Radio Dabanga, Sudan Tribune, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North, and the Darfur Union in the UK have all reported within the last 24 hours on the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) massacre of civilians in Nertiti, Central Darfur (formerly West Darfur). Figures for casualties vary but suggest that some 60 – 70 civilians were killed or wounded during the vicious SAF rampage (Darfur Union UK lists the names and ages of 11 people killed—five of them under the age of 17). Notably, Radio Dabanga reports that the UN/African Union "hybrid" Mission in Darfur did not respond in any way to the massacre—the perfect image of impotence and indifference that now define UNAMID. A victim of the "Nertiti massacre" Distinguished Sudanese human rights expert Suliman Baldo offered a telling assessment of the same event (“Sudan’s armed forces stand above the law,” reported by Radio Dabanga, January 9, 2017 (El Geneina): According to the Sudanese Minister of Defence, Awad Mohamed Ibn Auf, the recent army attack on the town of Nierteti should be considered as a criminal case. Analyst Dr Suleiman Baldo denies his claim. Last week, the Minister told reporters in Khartoum last week that the attack by the military on South Darfur’s Nierteti on 1 January should not be considered part of a government policy, but should be taken up as any other criminal case. Dr Suleiman Baldo contradicted Ibn Auf’s words in an interview with Radio Dabanga to be broadcast today. The internationally acclaimed political analyst explained that the Defence Minister by calling the Nierteti incident a criminal case, “attempted to transfer the responsibility of the armed forces in their attack on civilians in Nierteti to the police.” He noted that the Sudanese armed forces have gained full impunity. “The military leaders have given their staff full mandate to attack civilians, especially the militias that operate under the command of the armed forces.” By shifting responsibility from the military to the police, Khartoum hoped to diminish the significance of the Nertiti massacre in the Obama administration’s assessment of violence in Darfur. There is considerable evidence that the ruse was successful. The epidemic of sexual violence, primarily rape, continues unchecked and is regularly reported by Radio Dabanga. Last year (January 2016), collating all incidents of sexual violence recorded by Radio Dabanga and other sources, I published a brief monograph on this terribly neglected reality and its many destructive consequences: “Continuing Mass Rape of Girls in Darfur: The most heinous crime generates no international outrage,” January 2016 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1QG/. In it, I mapped all the data contained in a lengthy spreadsheet. The mapping was for North Darfur, South Darfur, and West Darfur---and the maps if the were to reflect current realities would look much the same. The key for interpreting the maps is as follows (click on maps to enlarge): Dots of 50pt in size represent a single event: if in red, it represents the rape of a girl; if in orange, it represents the rape of a woman 18 – 25; Dots of 100pt size represent 10 events: again, if in red, it represents the rape of ten girls; if in orange, it represents the rape of ten women 18 – 25; Dots of 200pt size are found only in the map of North Darfur: if the large dot is grey, it represents the rape of 100 girls; if black, it represents the rape of 100 women 18 – 28; North Darfur (above) South Darfur (above) West Darfur (above) [6] Examples of recent reports of rape in Darfur from Radio Dabanga: • Two West Darfur teachers raped at gunpoint | February 2, 2017 | EL GENEINA • West Darfur: Protest spreads after teachers raped | February 5, 2017 | EL GENEINA • Minor raped in South Darfur | February 3, 2017 | MANAWASHI • Militiamen assault displaced woman in North Darfur | January 30, 2017 | FATA BORNO • 12-year-old girl abducted in North Darfur | January 22, 2017 | DUBBO EL OMDA A potential rape victim [7] The UK Parliamentarian Baroness Caroline Cox recently (January 23, 2017) reported to Parliament and the UK government on her courageous assessment mission to the Nuba Mountains: …I have just recently returned from the Nuba mountains… I saw there first-hand evidence of the Sudanese Government’s continuing destruction of homes and schools in military offensives and aerial bombardment of civilians who have been forced to live in caves with deadly snakes. I met a girl who had bitten by a cobra and a father whose five children had been burnt alive when a shell hit the cave in which they were sheltering. They have no healthcare, acute shortages of food and there has recently been a measles epidemic in which at least 20 children are known to have died. Will Her Majesty’s Government urgently reconsider the obligation to provide cross-border aid to save the lives of these innocent civilians, as the people of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile cannot accept aid from the Khartoum Government, who are killing them? Unsurprisingly, Baroness Cox received only a boilerplate response from the designated Foreign Office official. [8] Irregular militia forces, countenanced and even supported by Khartoum, have frequently been the violent means for blocking humanitarian access, something that Radio Dabanga has reported frequently, as has Sudan Tribune. Particularly notable was the blockade of humanitarian access to Sortony IDP camp, to which many of those displaced from Jebel Marra fled. Sortony camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) The blockage, beginning last February, has had consequences that are now painfully obvious: Darfur’s Jebel Marra hit by disease, displaced need winter aid | January 15, 2017 | JEBEL MARRA / KHARTOUM People in Darfur’s Jebel Marra complain about the spread of a hitherto unknown fever. Jebel Marra displaced who fled the fighting in the region last year and are currently taking refuge in various locations in Central Darfur are in dire need of winter supplies. Multiple sources reported to Radio Dabanga from Golo, Keranja, Ultra, Rokorwa, and Nierteti that dozens of children, women, and elderly people died of fever last week, the source of which has not yet been identified. The symptoms are high fever, severe headache, bleeding from the ears, nose, and mouth, and the loss of hair. The sources called on the health authorities and humanitarian organisations to visit these areas and investigate the cause of the fever and provide treatment to the patients. Displaced persons in Jebel Marra face extreme conditions Winter supplies The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Sudan reported in its first weekly bulletin of this year that many displaced people from Jebel Marra who are currently taking refuge in various locations in Central Darfur need winter supplies. With temperatures dropping to 7-8 degrees Celsius or lower at night, many Jebel Marra displaced need appropriate shelter and winter household supplies -including blankets and warm clothes- as they left their homes with almost nothing, the bulletin reads. The displaced people also said they need fuel for heating and cooking, as firewood collection outside camps in some areas poses protection risks. Four children die during cold wave in Darfur | January 10, 2017 | DERIBAT Darfuri villagers hide in a cave high in Mount Marra in March 2016, when the Sudanese military and air force launched attacks to draw back the armed rebels in Jebel Marra (RD) A cold wave has the western region of Sudan in its grip, resulting in the death of four children on Monday morning. Two weeks ago, malnourished children also succumbed to the cold. Speaking from Jebel Marra, a relative of one of the children reported that Dola, south of Deribat, has witnessed a severe cold wave these days. There is a shortage of food, blankets and warm shelter, amid the absence of health centres and medicines in the mountainous area, he said. The four children who died on Monday are Mohsen Hassan Ibrahim (1 year), Yagoub Adam Abdelkarim (3), Halima Ibrahim Adam (3) and Mariam Yousif Hamid (7). Two weeks ago, three children died in Souni in East Jebel Marra. They were suffering from malnutrition and their health was worsened by the severe cold, a family member said. To avoid the cold, Sheikhs in camps in East Jebel Marra then said that parent councils in most of the schools have delayed the start of school for pupils of basic schools for one hour in the morning. In addition, food security is proving even more critical in Jebel Marra than it is in the rest of Darfur, for one because farmers risk confrontations with gunmen who let their cattle graze on the fields. Aerial bombardments on villages and farmlands have forced many residents to flee to the camps for displaced people or take refuge in the mountains. See also, Sudan Tribune| December 7, 2016 | http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article61044 [9] More broadly, Khartoum refuses to rein in the various Arab militia forces that are continuing the work of violently expropriating farmland from African farmers. Not using the regular Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) or the heavily armed, primary militia force known as the Rapid Support Forces (and now under SAF command), allows Khartoum to deny that it is responsible for what continue to be extremely high levels of violence in various parts of Darfur. That denial seems to have figured heavily in the Obama administration’s assessment of violence in Darfur. Most violence is reported only by the easily ignored Radio Dabanga: • Attacks cause new displacement from Darfur’s Jebel Marra | Radio Dabanga, February 9, 2017 | SHANGIL TOBAYA 40 families representing a total of 530 people who have fled from Darfur’s East Jebel Marra arrived at camp Shaddad of Shangil Tobaya in North Darfur at the beginning of this week. A leader of the camp told Radio Dabanga that these families came to the camp on February 2. They were fleeing militia and herder attacks on Balidy Serif, Libi, and Swanee. The camp elder said that the new arrivals have not received any aid thus far. He said that a team from UNAMID visited the newly displaced on Tuesday, and “promised to notify the humanitarian organisations to provide them with aid.” • Tabit in North Darfur ‘besieged by armed herders’ | Radio Dabanga, January 26, 2017 | TABIT The residents of Tabit and its neighbouring villages in North Darfur complained of a continued siege by armed herders, which prevent them from going out to collect firewood and straw. The herders assert that the land is specified for their cattle to graze. Callers who spoke to Radio Dabanga from Tabit expressed concern that the continuing siege and aggression by the armed herdsmen would lead to starvation, displacement, and death of livestock. They demand that the state Government and Tawila locality Commissioner intervene immediately to stop the abuses and violations by the militant herdsmen. • North Darfur village threatened with fire | Radio Dabanga, January 24, 2017 | TABIT • Displaced contradict Sudanese envoy’s statement to UN | Radio Dabanga, January 15, 2017 | EL GENEINA El Geneina, capital of West Darfur, witnessed fierce fighting on 5 January, when a group of 17 local paramilitaries of the Rapid Support Forces and the Border Guards attacked the home of a man accused of stealing livestock, and shot him dead. Five people who attempted to flee the shooting were killed as well. The police intervened but had to withdraw after one of them was injured. • Farmer murdered by land grabbers in Central Darfur | Radio Dabanga, January 5, 2017 | GARSILA A farmer was shot dead near Garsila in Central Darfur on Wednesday when he refused to leave his farm to its ‘liberators’. A witness told Radio Dabanga that three gunmen found Ibrahim El Sancjek tending his farm north of Garsila and ordered him to leave the farm immediately, “as the area is liberated and belongs to them.” When El Sancjek refused, they shot him dead. He said the incident coincided with a visit by state Governor Jaafar Abdelhakam to Garsila. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________(c) 2017 SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

After nearly five years of bitter fighting, bombardment, and siege, the Bashar al-Assad regime, Iran, and Russia finally broke Aleppo on December 22, 2016, defeating the opposition and displacing much of the local population. This represented a critical turning point in the Syrian civil war and shifted the balance of power between the United States, its Syrian and regional local allies, and its adversaries in Syria. The fall of Aleppo was the culmination of a humanitarian disaster, and a case study in the new challenges the United States and its allies face in diplomacy, security, and strategy. Aleppo’s story is bleak, but offers crucial lessons for how the United States can secure its interests in Syria, bolster its allies, defeat terrorist groups, protect vulnerable populations, and restore its weakened global standing. This report details the tactics and strategy that the regime coalition used to break Aleppo, but beyond Aleppo’s implications for Syria, it bears highlighting what it means for the United States. Firstly, despite being party to US-sponsored ceasefires, the regime used them to prepare offensives or freeze some frontlines in order to concentrate on others. Instead of being punished for this, the regime was actually rewarded with more phony ceasefires, which it then exploited in the same fashion. These embarrassing breaches weakened the United States’ moderate opposition partners and undermined regional US allies opposed to Iranian dominance. The United States itself suffered a loss of credibility and became a marginal diplomatic player in Syria, taken less seriously by allies and adversaries alike. Breaking Aleppo also involved a pernicious misinformation campaign—nothing less than a war on objective facts by the regime, Russian officials, and media. This was aimed less at convincing than at confusing and disorienting rivals, sapping confidence, sowing disunity, and making truth entirely subjective, such that one party’s lie became just as good as another’s fact. This obfuscation, even in the face of clear evidence of regime or Russian wrongdoing, exposed the “post-truth” era of international relations. In this world, the United States and its allies proved ill-equipped to vocally, visibly, and consistently drive the counter narrative despite frequent, severe, and well-documented atrocities by the regime side. Finally, the regime’s war in Aleppo showed that Assad would be a poor if not harmful partner against the Islamic State of al-Sham (ISIS) and other extremists. He was unable to rein in sectarian Shia militia even after Aleppo fell, his regime more closely resembles an unwieldy coalition of sectarian and organized criminal elements. He and his allies deliberately conflated extremist groups with Syrians holding even legitimate grievances against the government, and rather than use ceasefires to deploy forces against extremists, the regime coalition chose to attack mainstream rebels, in some cases actually losing territory to ISIS as a result. Aleppo’s fall was catastrophic for Syrians of course, but it was not only a humanitarian tragedy. The events surrounding Aleppo seriously damaged the interests and standing of the United States and its allies, but also offer important lessons. It was a reminder that diplomacy without credibility is dangerous, that the new information wars waged by US adversaries demand a new counter-strategy, and that the victors in Aleppo are not our allies against terrorism. The Assad regime is incompetent, unreliable, and shares none of the United States’ core interests in Syria; it is also deeply implicated in well-documented atrocities. - Website- http://www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/breakingaleppo/ - Report- http://www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/breakingaleppo/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/BreakingAleppo.pdf ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Atlantic Council

JUDY WOODRUFF: Now: a rare look at life under the rule of the Nigerian militant group Boko Haram, as filmed by the group itself. Audie Cornish of NPR’s “All Things Considered” recorded this conversation for us last week. AUDIE CORNISH: Last year, Voice of America News Service, which is funded by the U.S. government, received a stunning trove of videos from Nigeria, 18 hours of footage recorded by Boko Haram’s own cameras in 2014. The pictures comes from northeastern Nigeria. Now, at the time, Boko Haram had total control of the region. The videos take us behind Boko Haram’s assault on the Nigerian military and into villages where their leaders administer rough justice. VOA has produced a series of four reports based on the videos. And joining me to talk about what we can learn from these images is VOA’s Ibrahim Ahmed. He hosts a weekly program for their service broadcast in Nigeria. Thank you for joining us. IBRAHIM AHMED, Voice of America: It’s my pleasure. AUDIE CORNISH: Now, tell us a little bit about how you were able to verify these videos. IBRAHIM AHMED: When the Voice of America got these videos, first of all, we sat down and went through almost all of them. And we were able to determine that they came from northeastern Nigeria because the people in the videos speak in Kanuri, which is the predominant language there, and which is also the language of most of the Boko Haram leadership and the members. That was the first thing. Then there are references to Boko Haram and to events that only Boko Haram will know, like the attacks carried in some areas of Northeastern Nigeria. AUDIE CORNISH: Your reporting shows a couple of things, one, the faces of some leaders and participates in Boko Haram, which I understand is very uncommon. It also shows how they are able to basically bring whole villages into their ideology using violence. And in one clip, there is a tribunal where they exert their justice. How do these tribunals work? IBRAHIM AHMED: Well, in order to control the people, when Boko Haram captures a place and they want to bring people in line, they will hold these kind of tribunals. And they will force everybody from the village or the town to attend the tribunals. They will bring people they’re accusing, whether they are drug users or drug sellers, according to them. They will bring them to these tribunals, and they will read out a statement that you are guilty of this or guilty of that. Do you accept your guilt? Well, if you accept it, fine. You just go and lay down and get killed. AUDIE CORNISH: They do something similar with young boys and men who they conscript into fighting. You have a video that is unusual, in that it shows a Boko Haram leader basically getting everyone to gear up to fight. Let’s watch that. NARRATOR: Awaz says the best of the martyrs are those that fight in the front. They are the ones who do not turn back until they are killed. IBRAHIM AHMED: When Boko Haram started in 2009, initially, their membership were made up of the original followers of the Boko Haram. But when they started capturing territory, they started conscripting people. AUDIE CORNISH: There is video of a failed attack, essentially, on an army barracks. And you see fighters looking for weapons. You see fighters not necessarily able to use the weapons they have. What are the fighting capabilities of Boko Haram at this point? IBRAHIM AHMED: Initially, Boko Haram was kind of going into fights with the military with much more powerful weapons then what the military had. The military had AK-47 rifles, while the militants come with heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft guns. So, the military had to run away at the time. But, in 2015, the present government in Nigeria, when they started taking the fight to Boko Haram, they were able to adapt themselves and to get those kind of weapons that Boko Haram was using on them. And that is when they started winning the war and kicking Boko Haram out of these major cities and towns. AUDIE CORNISH: Do you feel as though these are areas that can rebuild? IBRAHIM AHMED: It is possible, but it’s going to be really difficult, because the crisis or the carnage that Boko Haram has done in the area is just unbelievable. AUDIE CORNISH: Ibrahim Ahmed of Voice of America, thank you so much for speaking with us. IBRAHIM AHMED: Thank you so much. My pleasure. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 NPR | PBS

Syrian government forces conducted coordinated chemical attacks in opposition-controlled parts of Aleppo during the final month of the battle for the city, Human Rights Watch said today. Through phone and in-person interviews with witnesses and analysis of video footage, photographs, and posts on social media, Human Rights Watch documented government helicopters dropping chlorine in residential areas on at least eight occasions between November 17 and December 13, 2016. The attacks, some of which included multiple munitions, killed at least nine civilians, including four children, and injured around 200. Syrian government forces conducted coordinated chemical attacks in opposition-controlled parts of Aleppo during the final month of the battle for the city. The attacks took place in areas where government forces planned to advance, starting in the east and moving westwards as the frontlines moved, Human Rights Watch said. “The pattern of the chlorine attacks shows that they were coordinated with the overall military strategy for retaking Aleppo, not the work of a few rogue elements,” said Ole Solvang, deputy emergencies director at Human Rights Watch. “The United Nations Security Council shouldn’t let Syrian authorities or anyone else who has used chemical weapons get away without consequences.” The UN Security Council has yet to take action since a UN-appointed investigation, known as the Joint Investigative Mechanism, identified military units responsible for earlier attacks using chlorine in Syria. The Security Council should impose sanctions on senior leaders in the chain of command, Human Rights Watch said. Human Rights Watch called on the Syrian government to immediately stop using chemicals as weapons and fully cooperate with the UN-appointed investigation. The 192 state parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention should take steps to address Syria’s continued violation of the treaty’s most basic prohibitions and ensure compliance in order to bolster the customary international norm against chemical warfare, Human Rights Watch said. Syrian government helicopters have dropped chlorine on opposition-controlled territory at least since April 2014. Chlorine has many civilian uses, but the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, which Syria joined in October 2013, bans the use of the toxic properties of any chemical as a weapon. Human Rights Watch has also documented that Syrian government forces used sarin in attacks in August 2013, and that the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) has used mustard agent as recently as August 2016. The most recent chlorine attacks took place during a final push by Syrian government forces and its allies to wrest control of eastern Aleppo from armed opposition groups. After a period of relative calm, Syrian government forces and its allies resumed military operations in Aleppo on November 17, starting with intensive aerial bombardment. The battle continued until December 13, when the parties agreed to a ceasefire and many of the fighters and civilians in eastern Aleppo were evacuated. The actual number of chemical attacks in Aleppo between November 17 and December 13 could be higher than the eight documented in this report, Human Rights Watch said. On social media, journalists, first responders, medical personnel, and others reported at least 12 attacks in the period. Human Rights Watch included in this report only attacks it has corroborated through both real-time reporting on social media and interviews with at least one witness. Identifying with certainty the chemical used in the attacks without laboratory testing is difficult, but the odor, signs, and symptoms that victims and medical personnel reported indicate that government forces used chlorine. Local residents who were close to the impact site and medical personnel reported a strong odor of chlorine, similar to that of bleach-based household cleansers, near the impact sites. “Those affected had trouble breathing, they were coughing hard, they were nauseated, some people fainted, some had foam coming from their mouth,” a first responder for several attacks said. “The chemicals would affect children most severely…they inhale these smells and they end up suffocating.” Describing the smell as a stronger version of the cleaning detergent, one local resident said: The smell isn’t something you can handle. The moment you’re exposed to it, your throat burns, it’s like a fire rod going in. It won’t let you swallow or breathe. Your neck starts boiling. You feel nauseated. Your eyes burn and you are not able to control the tears. Eventually, you are not able to breathe. It’s not like having your nose and mouth blocked, rather, your body won’t let the air in anymore. High level of exposure to chlorine can lead to suffocation, as the chemical injuries produced from the dissolution of chlorine in the mucous membranes of the pulmonary airways result in severe buildup of fluid in the lungs. Children and older people are particularly susceptible to the effects of chlorine gas. Witnesses also said that they observed a yellow or yellow-green smoke near the impact site of at least four attacks. In two attacks, journalists nearby captured the smoke on video. Chlorine is yellowish-green in its gaseous form. Since chlorine is heavier than air, it sinks, making basements where people sheltered against attacks with explosive weapons potential death traps. One journalist, who decided to leave his neighborhood after a chlorine attack, said: “We got used to bombing and shelling. But with chlorine there is no way to protect yourself. It will suffocate you.” For five of the chemical attacks, Human Rights Watch reviewed photographs or video footage of remnants of the chemical-filled improvised munitions posted online or shared directly with Human Rights Watch. Witnesses sometimes referred to the munitions as barrels or bombs. In all five incidents, the footage shows the same type of yellow gas cylinder. A label still visible on the remnant from one attack shows a warning that the cylinder contained gas. Opposition-affiliated groups, first responders, activists, and journalists reported that government forces conducted chemical attacks in other locations in Syria in the same period as well. While there is no evidence that Russia, the only other party that conducted airstrikes on eastern Aleppo during this period, was directly involved in the chemical attacks, Russian aircraft played a crucial role in the military offensive against opposition fighters in eastern Aleppo. As a military ally of Damascus, it benefitted from the use of chemical weapons by Syrian forces. Furthermore, the UN-appointed Joint Investigative Mechanism found that helicopters that had previously dropped chlorine were operating from the Hmeymim airbase, which is under Russian control. Given this and other reports about past repeated use of chlorine as a weapon, Russian military authorities should have taken steps to ensure that such weapons were not used in their joint military offensive, Human Rights Watch said. The UN Security Council, including Russia, has condemned the use of any toxic chemical, such as chlorine, as a weapon in Syria and stressed that those who use such weapons must be held accountable. On August 7, 2015, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2235, establishing the investigation to “identify to the greatest extent feasible individuals, entities, groups, or governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons.” At the time, Russia said the investigation would close the gap in identifying those responsible for the use of chlorine as a weapon in Syria. The United States emphasized that “[p]ointing the finger matters.” On December 21, 2016, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing a mechanism to assist in the investigation of serious crimes committed in Syria since 2011. The General Assembly requested the UN system as a whole to fully cooperate and to promptly respond to any request for information. Peace talks between Syria’s warring parties are scheduled to resume in Geneva on February 20. “History shows that peace deals without any form of accountability for past abuses are often fragile,” Solvang said. “Accountability for the chemical attacks in Syria would be a good place to start.” The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the use of the toxic properties of common chemicals such as chlorine to kill or injure. Among other obligations, each member state agrees never to “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” The laws of war applicable in Syria prohibit the use of chemical weapons. The use of prohibited weapons with criminal intent, deliberately or recklessly, is a war crime. With 192 members, the Chemical Weapons Convention is one of the most universal international treaties on weapons. Only four UN member states are not party to the convention: Egypt; Israel, which has signed by not ratified the convention; North Korea; and South Sudan. “Almost the entire world has agreed that chemical warfare is so despicable that it should be outlawed entirely,” Solvang said. “Allowing the Syrian government to flaunt this prohibition with impunity runs the risk of implicitly condoning Syrian chemical attacks and undermining one of the most agreed-upon weapon bans in the world, potentially lowering the threshold for other countries to do the same.” Chlorine Attacks in Syria Human Rights Watch published reports on the Syrian government’s use of chlorine in May 2014, April 2015, June 2015, and September 2016. The Joint Investigative Mechanism between the UN and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) concluded, in a report published on October 21, 2016, that Syrian government forces had used chlorine as a weapon in three incidents in 2014-2015. The investigation determined that helicopters from Syria’s 63rd helicopter brigade, operating from Hama and Hmeymim airbases, carried out the attacks. The investigation also found the Islamic State (ISIS) responsible for using sulfur mustard, a type of blister agent. November-December Chemical Attacks on Aleppo Human Rights Watch interviewed in person or by phone 22 people with direct knowledge of chemical attacks in eastern Aleppo between November 17 and December 13, 2016. The witnesses were first responders, medical personnel, or people who lived in the affected neighborhoods. Human Rights Watch compared these witness accounts with photographs, video footage, and real-time information posted on social media. Several organizations such as the Syria Civil Defense, the Syrian Institute for Justice and Accountability, and the Syrian American Medical Society helped identify key witnesses. The open source investigative group Bellingcat first compiled and analyzed many of the videos and photographs from chemical attacks and their immediate aftermath. The intensive bombardment toward the end of the battle for Aleppo made thorough documentation of these attacks difficult. Some witnesses struggled to remember the dates and distinguish between the various attacks. First responders and medical personnel told Human Rights Watch that Syrian government forces confiscated phones and laptops with key information during the evacuation and that hospital staff had to leave records behind when they evacuated hospitals. The table below is a summary of the information currently available. The evidence for each attack is presented and analyzed in the subsequent sections of this report. November 18: Masaken Hanano In the morning on November 18, the Aleppo Media Center, a network of local journalists who documented the conflict in opposition-held Aleppo, and Thiqa Agency reported that a chlorine attack had struck Masaken Hanano and Ard al-Hamra. Abu Taim al-Halabi, a cameraman for the Aleppo Media Center, told Human Rights Watch by phone that three helicopters were flying in the air above Masaken Hanano, where he lived, at about 8 or 9 a.m. on November 18. Al-Halabi saw in the distance two of the helicopters dropping four objects, but there was no explosion, leading al-Halabi to believe that they were munitions filled with chlorine. About five minutes later, the third helicopter dropped an object that landed much closer to al-Halabi, on the border between Masaken Hanano and Ard al-Hamra. “After a few minutes I noticed the smell of chlorine so I ran home to warn my family to stay inside and breathe through a wet cloth,” he said. About one hour after the attack, al-Halabi said, he went to the impact site with his camera: The barrel had fallen in the middle of the street. There was still a very strong smell so it was difficult to stand close to it. It became difficult to breathe, my eyes started tearing up and nose started running. The effects were even worse for the children. Alaa Abu Ali, a staff member at Syria Charity, a Paris-based aid organization, gave a similar account by phone. He said that from his home on the morning of November 18 he saw helicopters drop five objects, none of which exploded. He believed four landed in Masaken Hanano and one in neighboring Sheikh Najar, which was on the front line. He said he went to the impact site of the one that landed on the border between Masaken Hanano and Ard al-Hamra. Abu Ali gave video interviews at the site to Al-Jisr News, Smart News Agency, and the Aleppo Media Center. Syria Charity later posted a photograph of Abu Ali with an oxygen mask. Abu Ali and a Syria Civil Defense staff member cited by Smart News Agency said that 12 people were injured in the attack. They did not report any fatalities. Al-Halabi said that about 20 people were injured, including an old woman and five children. Al-Halabi and Abu Ali said that some of the injured were taken to hospitals in the nearby Sha’ar neighborhood. Al-Halabi said he transported three civilians to the Daqaq hospital in Sha’ar. Abu Ali said that he took a woman and a child to the same hospital. Syria Charity posted on its Facebook page a video from the Children’s Hospital, also in Sha’ar, showing a boy wearing an oxygen mask. The boy, between coughs, says that an aircraft dropped a bomb near him in Ard al-Hamra, that there was yellow smoke, and that somebody took him to the hospital. Orient News posted a video of what appears to be the same boy. The same video also shows medical staff examining and giving oxygen to another child and a man. Mojahed Abu Joud, a staff member of the Aleppo Media Center, said that he saw about 30 civilians in al-Sakhour hospital who had been injured in the attack on Masaken Hanano. He said that the people were pale, coughed, and at least one person had foam coming from their mouth. Al-Halabi filmed and took photographs of the remnants of the munition at the site between Masaken Hanano and Ard al-Hamra. The video shows a piece of a yellow cylinder standing on end next to crater in the street. One end of the cylinder has been spilt open and strips of the cylinder have been bent outward, indicating that an explosive inside of it detonated and burst cylinder outwards, releasing its content. November 20: al-Sakhour In the early morning on November 20, the Aleppo Media Center, Shahba News Agency, and Halab Today TV reported that a chlorine attack had struck al-Sakhour. Abu Mohammed, an employee at the Ikhlas Medical Center, told Human Rights Watch that at least two munitions fell in al-Sakhour shortly after midnight on November 20. One fell 75 meters from his house, he said, and another about 200-300 meters away. He put a wet cloth over his mouth and went out to check the neighborhood. In one house, he saw five dead civilians, a mother, father and three children. Their faces were blue. Another 25 people were injured, Abu Mohammed said. One 22-year-old girl started vomiting. Abu Mohammed took them to a nearby house and gave them oxygen, he said. Mahmoud, a perfume seller who lived in al-Sakhour, said that he heard a bomb fall on the night of November 19-20. He went to the impact site the next morning because he had friends in the area. He said: “When I got close it became difficult to breathe, it felt like I had fire in my nose and throat. The bomb had hit a house near a vegetable market. The smell was like the liquid we use when we clean the house.” Friends in the area told him that the attack had killed six members of the same family. Reuters, citing two medics in Aleppo, identified them as members of the Baytounji family. Human Rights Watch has not been able to independently verify the names. A graphic video posted on Facebook by a member of Shahba Press Agency on November 20 shows four lifeless children lying next to each other. They do not appear to have any external wounds. The description says that an aerial attack with chlorine gas killed six people in al-Sakhour. Another graphic video posted by the Aleppo Media Center and archived by the Syrian Archive shows the bodies of the four children on the back of a pick-up truck together with the body of a man. The Local Coordination Committees in Syria reported on November 20 that helicopters had dropped two bombs with chlorine gas on al-Sakhour, leading to the death of six civilians from one family. Thiqa News Agency, Syria Civil Defense, and Aleppo Media Center posted video footage and photographs from what they said was the site of a chlorine attack in al-Sakhour on November 20. The video footage and photographs show the same rubble of a house and remnants of a yellow cylinder amid the rubble. November 20: Tariq al-Bab In the afternoon on November 20, the Aleppo Media Center and Shahba News Agency reported that a chlorine attack had struck Tariq al-Bab. Ismail Abdallah, a member of the Syria Civil Defense, told Human Rights Watch that he was sheltering in a basement in Tariq al-Bab because of ongoing airstrikes when he heard a loud noise. He rushed out and saw that a yellow gas cylinder had hit the street nearby. Abdallah described a very strong odor near the impact site and yellowish smoke. “Close to the site I started getting a headache, my eyes teared up, it became difficult to breathe,” he said. Mahmoud was with a friend who lived near the impact site, about 500 meters away. He said: “About an hour after the attack we tried to go there to pick up some of my friend’s belongings, but couldn’t get closer than 100 meters. It smelled like the same gas as in al-Sakhour [earlier in the day]. We had to turn back.” Mahmoud said that by the time of the attack there were very few civilians left in the district. Abdallah said that the Syria Civil Defense took at least one old woman to the hospital. Othman Khodr, a lawyer for the Syrian Institute for Justice and Accountability gave Human Rights Watch a similar account and said that the attack happened about 3:30 p.m. The Aleppo Media Center published a video on its YouTube channel showing a yellow cylinder that had split open. The Syrian Institute for Justice and Accountability published photographs and a video showing the same remnant. A partly visible label on the cylinder includes some letters, which the Syrian Institute for Justice identified as standing for a producer of chlorine gas. Based on the Syrian Institute for Justice video, Bellingcat concluded that the video had been filmed in the street separating the districts of Daheert Awwad and Tariq al-Bab. November 22: Karm al-Qaterji, Daheert Awwad, Karm al-Jazmati In the afternoon on November 22, the Aleppo Media Center and Shahba News Agency reported that a chlorine attack had struck Karm al-Qaterji. Thiqa News reported that an attack had also struck Daheert Awwad. Mojahed Abu Joud, a staff member of Aleppo Media Center, said that he and a colleague saw a helicopter drop three objects on Daheert Awwad and one on Karm al-Jazmati between 4:30 and 5 p.m. on November 22. There was no explosion, but they filmed yellow-green smoke rising from the place where the object landed. Abu Joud said that they tried to reach the impact site, but the odor was too strong. Abu Ali, the Syria Charity worker, said that several days after the Hanano attack, just before the sunset prayer at 4:32 p.m., he and Abu Taim al-Halabi from the Aleppo Media Center saw helicopters drop two objects on the al-Qaterji district, two on the Karm al-Myasser district, and two more, though he did not remember where they landed. They went to al-Qaterji, but couldn’t get close to the impact site because the smell was so strong. “It was the same smell as in Hanano,” he said. Al-Halabi confirmed the account. The time and location of Abu Ali’s and al-Halabi’s observations indicate that they witnessed the same attacks as Abu Joud and his colleague. Othman Khodr, the Syrian Institute for Justice lawyer, also said that he saw three helicopters drop two munitions each in the course of one hour in late November, in the area where Karm al-Myasser, Karm al-Qaterji, Karm al-Jazmati and Daheert Awwad meet. In a daily report, Syria Civil Defense reported that chlorine attacks in Karm al-Qaterji and Daheert Awwad about 8 a.m. on November 22 injured 15 civilians. There are no other reports of chemical attacks in the morning on November 22, so the report might refer to the afternoon attacks. November 23: Karm al-Jazmati In the evening on November 23, Shahba News Agency and Halab Today TV reported that a chlorine attack had struck Karm al-Jazmati. Mojahed Abu Joud, a member of the Aleppo Media Center, said that he went to the site of the attack in Karm al-Jazmati the following day. There was still a very strong odor of chlorine in the area, he said. The munition had penetrated the roof of a house. Neighbors said that a woman had been in the house during the attack, but that nobody had been able to enter because of the gas. “The smell was still so strong that it felt like a fire in my throat when I got close,” Abu Joud said. “It felt like I would cough up my lungs. At one point, somebody opened the door to the house while I was interviewing a girl out in the street. The smell was so strong that we had to stop the interview to move further away.” Othman Khodr, the Syrian Institute for Justice lawyer, said that he also went to the site. The cylinder was stuck in the roof, he said, but still leaking gas. He saw four or five dead pigeons in a nest nearby. When he came down from the roof, he said, he inhaled some of the gas. “It had a terrible, suffocating small. It doesn’t let you breathe. It was painful. I was coughing and breathing nonstop.” Khodr said he and a journalist went to a nearby hospital where they were treated with oxygen. Syria Civil Defense reported that an attack with poisonous gas at about 10 p.m. on November 23 injured 10 people in Karm al-Jazmati and neighboring Ard al-Hamra. Orient News reported that 13 people were injured in the two districts and posted two photos, each of two young children receiving oxygen in what looks like a medical facility. In a video interview, a local resident said that the attack had killed their 55-year-old neighbor, a woman. The Violations Documentation Center also recorded that toxic gas had killed an unidentified woman in Aleppo on November 23. Syria Civil Defense reported the following day that toxic gases had killed one woman in Aleppo. The woman may have been killed in the November 23 attack, since there were no reported chemical attacks on November 24. November 28: Karm al-Qaterji, Qadi Askar In the early afternoon on November 28, the Aleppo Media Center and Shahba News Agency reported that chlorine attacks had struck Karm al-Qaterji and Qadi Askar. Thiqa Agency and Halab Today TV reported the attack on Karm al-Qaterji. The Local Coordination Committees in Syria reported the attack on Qadi Askar. Firas Badawi, a photographer with the Aleppo Media Center who used to live in Karm al-Qaterji, said that they ran to seek shelter when they saw a helicopter in the afternoon on November 28. There was a sound of something crashing into the ground, he said, but no explosion. When they emerged from their shelter they saw that the munition had hit a playground in a public park. Badawi said: There was smoke all over the place. It was yellowish, slightly greenish, moving around with the wind. The smell was incredibly strong. We rescued 11 or 12 people who had sought shelter in surrounding buildings, fearing an explosive barrel attack. Most had lost consciousness and there was foam coming from their mouths. We thought they had died. Others couldn’t breathe and were screaming from pain in the chest, coughing and burning in the eyes. Badawi said that another 11 people were injured even further away when a strong wind blew the gas towards the south. Badawi also said that two people died in the attack, but Human Rights Watch has not been able to independently verify this. Badawi shared with Human Rights Watch photographs and video footage showing an impact crater and a deformed, yellow gas cylinder in what appears to be a playground for children. Omar Arnaout, a photographer, said that he saw a helicopter drop an object near a cemetery in Qadi Askar at about 3 p.m. on November 28: Suddenly, yellow smoke started spreading followed by the smell of chlorine a few minutes later. It’s the smell of the liquid that we use to clean toilet, but more intense, much more intense. People were unable to breathe, they are coughing. Some children were throwing up. The smell was everywhere. Arnaout said that about 20 civilians were injured in the attack and taken to hospitals for treatment. December 8: al-Maghayer, al-Fardous, Kallaseh Between 4 and 5 p.m. on December 8, the Aleppo Media Center and Shahba News Agency reported that chlorine attacks had struck Kallaseh and Bustan al-Qasr. Human Rights Watch believes that these reports refer to possibly three chlorine munitions that struck al-Maghayer neighborhood in the Bab al-Maqam district, al-Fardous, and Kallaseh. Abu Nadim al-Khattat, who lives in al-Maghayer, said that one attack struck the street outside his home around 4 p.m. on December 8. About 15 minutes later, a second struck close to al-Hayat medical clinic in Kallaseh, where he was located at the time. He said that dozens of people, including his mother-in-law, her daughters, and their husbands, had gathered in the area, trying to leave the city: When the barrels fell, everybody went inside to hide, fearing that they would be hit by shrapnel. But the barrel didn’t explode. The chlorine gas leaked out and spread everywhere, seeping into places where people were hiding. They inhaled the gas and started experiencing shortness of breath, foam was coming out of their mouth, some experienced dizziness, headaches, they felt weary and drowsy, they were drained of energy. Al-Khattat said that around 50 people were injured, including 20 children. Abu Rajab, the former administrator of al-Sakhour hospital, confirmed that a chlorine attack struck about 100 meters from the al-Hayat clinic on December 8, saying that more than 70 people were brought there for treatment. “We could even sense a faint smell of chlorine from the clinic,” he said. Al-Khattat said that the attack killed two people: Ammar Shohaiber, around 40, and Mohammad Abrach, around 50: Ammar’s house was very close to the impact site and it was full of chlorine gas. We gave him first aid and he seemed to get better, but at night his conditions worsened. By the time we took him to the Bustan al-Qasr clinic he was barely alive and eventually passed away. Abrach seemed better at first, but his condition also worsened, al-Khattat said: “We took him to the al-Quds hospital, but it was so crowded they could barely help him. He died as well.” Dr. Salim Abu al-Nasser, a dentist working in the Bustan al-Qasr Medical Center, said that the center had received two civilians in the evening of December 8 who had been injured in a chlorine attack. He said he saw the body of one patient, a man he estimated to be in his sixties, lying lifeless in the corridor, apparently dead. The second patient was transferred to al-Quds hospital, he said, where he also died. The Violations Documentation Center, the Aleppo Media Center, and Shahba News Agency reported that toxic gas killed two civilians in Aleppo on December 8, a man and a woman. The reports likely refer to the deaths of Shohaiber and Abrach. Hazem, an employee at the al-Quds hospital, said that he also witnessed a chlorine attack that day near the vegetable market in al-Fardous. “We thought the bomb had failed to explode, but then we saw yellow smoke coming from the area. There was a strong smell of chlorine.” On the Ground News, an activist news organization, published a video showing a yellow-green gas spreading along the ground, saying that it had been filmed in al-Fardous. Hazem confirmed that the video was from the same attack he saw and provided the map coordinates of the impact site. In the early evening on December 8, a member of the Aleppo Media Center posted a photo of a yellow cylinder that he says hit eastern Aleppo. Human Rights Watch has not been able to establish the exact location where the remnant was found. December 9: Kallaseh Shortly after midnight on December 10, the Aleppo Media Center, Shahba News Agency, Thiqa Agency, and Halab Today TV reported that a chlorine attack had struck Kallaseh. Abu Rajab, the former administrator at al-Sakhour hospital, said that he heard a thump near the entrance of the al-Hayat clinic in Kallaseh at about 8 p.m. on December 9. Soon, he said, a very strong smell started spreading in the clinic. “It quickly became very bad,” he said. “It felt like I had a fire in my chest, my eyes became red. I couldn’t breathe properly. It smelled like chlorine.” About 30 medical staff and patients were in the clinic at the time of the attack, he said. All of them were injured, five of them seriously, he said. They covered their faces with wet cloth and moved to the upper floors. Abu Rajab said that some of the injured were sent to the Bustan al-Qasr Medical Center and the al-Quds hospital. Abu Muatassim, another doctor working in the al-Hayat clinic, gave a similar account, but saying that the attack was around 6 p.m. and that 50 civilians were injured, including people who had been outside the clinic. Abu al-Nasser at the Bustan al-Qasr Medical Center said that he heard about the attack on the hospital’s walkie-talkie. Injured patients started arriving shortly thereafter. He said that the center treated about 40 civilians for difficulty breathing and shock. “Many of them were shaking,” he said. The medical center published four videos of patients receiving treatment on its Facebook page. Abu al-Nasser showed Human Rights Watch a photograph of a boy being giving oxygen and another photograph of two small children, saying all three had been injured by the gas. Abdallah Mahmoud, an administrator working in the al-Quds hospital, said that the hospital treated 47 injured civilians. Their symptoms included red eyes, difficulty speaking and breathing, and coughing. On December 10, the Smart News Agency published on its YouTube channel a video showing a yellow gas cylinder that had been split open, saying that bombs containing toxic gases had killed five civilians and injured others on December 10, in Bustan al-Qasr, al-Fardous, and Kallaseh districts, which border each other. Human Rights Watch has not been able to independently verify any deaths or injuries from chlorine attacks on December 10. Abu Rajab shared three photographs with Human Rights Watch showing the same remnant and the crater where it landed. Human Rights Watch has not been able to determine whether the remnants stem from the December 9 Kallaseh attack or separate attacks on December 10. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Human Rights Watch

Dozens of Iraqi Christians have marched outside the U.N. regional headquarters in Beirut, demanding the speeding up of their resettlement process. Thousands of Iraqi Christians have fled the fighting in their country to seek refuge in religiously-mixed Lebanon. Many of them are waiting for resettlement in a third country. Some 200 Iraqis took part in Monday's march. One banner said: "The future of our children is wasted." There are no official statistics of Iraqi refugees in Lebanon but their number is believed to be in the tens of thousands. They include large numbers of Iraqi Christians who believe they will find safety among Lebanon's Christian communities. U.S. President Donald Trump's executive order, which seeks to restrict citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States, includes Iraq. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________(c) 2017 The Associated Press

South Sudanese refugee Nyarout Chuol with her children at a UNHCR-run refugee camp in Gambella, Ethiopia (Photo: William Davison) February 11, 2017 (JUBA) - More than three years of civil war in South Sudan has forced 1.5 million people to flee into neighboring countries, creating Africa’s largest refugee crisis and the third largest in the world, the United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR) said. Over 3.5 million people, it says, have been displaced since fighting erupted between the government of President Salva Kiir and rebel forces led by the country’s former First Vice-President Riek Machar in mid-December 2013. More than 2 million people have been displaced within the country, while more than 1.5 million have reportedly taken refuge in Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Congo, and Central African Republic. A spokesperson for the agency, William Spindler, said more than 760,000 people fled across borders after the collapse of a peace deal between the government and the armed opposition forces. "More than 60 percent of the refugees are children, many arriving with alarming levels of malnutrition — enduring devastating impact of the brutalities of the ongoing conflict," he said in statement. Some half-a-million had to flee the young nation in the last four months since September 2016, according to the U.N refugee body. The South Sudan crisis, Spindler said, adds to the numerous humanitarian challenges the agency is grappling with, yet the refugee body lacks enough funds to tackle all these world problems. He expressed concern about the South Sudan situation, citing the large size of its refugee crisis, which has also spread to its neighbours. Last year’s appeal for $649 million, said Spindler, was funded to only 33 percent, making it extremely difficult to provide critical services, such as clean drinking water, food, health and sanitation facilities. He, however, said that UNHCR was currently working with authorities in the host countries to provide life-saving support and basic needs for the many South Sudanese arriving in desperate condition. Uganda is reportedly hosting nearly 700,000 South Sudanese refugees and its authorities have been commended for helping them. Meanwhile UNHCR has appealed to the international community responded to the refugee agency’s appeal for $782 million to enable it could carry out its regional humanitarian operations. (ST) (c) 2017 Sudan Tribune