Austria is planning to ban Islamic full-face veils in courts, schools and other public places. World-Wide Religious News (31.01.2017) – http://bit.ly/2kpUV6B – The prohibition will apply to the niqab and burqa, the full-face or face-and-body coverings worn by some Muslim women. It comes as part of a package of reforms drawn up by the country’s governing coalition to counter the rise of the far-right Freedom Party, which has topped opinion polls for months. “We believe in an open society that is also based on open communication. Full-body veils in public spaces stand against that and will therefore be prohibited,” the agreement said. The country’s coalition also agreed to prohibit police officers, judges, magistrates and public prosecutors from wearing head scarves in the interest of appearing “ideologically and religiously neutral” while serving the state. The French parliament passed an act more than six years ago that made France the first European Union country to ban the niqab and burqa in public places. Belgium and some parts of Switzerland followed France’s lead and similar bans have been considered in other European countries. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________(c) 2017 Human Rights Without Frontiers

Following the closure of Yazda, a Yazidi humanitarian and human rights organization, by the KDP asa’ish (security police affiliated with Kurdistan’s largest political party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party) on January 2, 2017 in Dohuk, people have been asking many questions about why this took place. Fortunately, the government has now reversed its position on the closure and Yazda has reopened. Nevertheless, this episode points to some serious political issues that impact the status of the Yazidi minority in Kurdistan. I will explore these issues in this article. Having left the country last August after a year of leading Yazda’s Iraq and Kurdistan-based operations, I will not speak for Yazda now. But I will present my opinions on the Yazidi situation and discuss the feelings of the Yazidi people, which may shed light on why Yazda was persecuted by the authorities. A Broken Relationship Understanding the tension between the KDP government and the Yazidis requires investigating why the KDP generally has an adverse relationship with the majority of the Yazidis. In fact, those Yazidis who become close to the KDP political establishment usually lose favor and respect among much of their community. This is because the agendas of the KDP often conflict with the welfare of the Yazidi people, and a number of crucial issues jeopardizing the future of the Yazidis have come to a head this past year. What do I mean by a clash of interests between the Yazidis and the KDP? Ever since the fall of Saddam, Kurdistan has worked hard to expand the boundaries of what is hoped will be a future independent Kurdistan. These aspirations and efforts are noble considering the many ways that Kurds have been victimized by the various regimes in Iraq through history. But many Kurds today do not realize that despite this history of victimization, their newfound power also creates the possibility and risk of victimizing others—especially the minorities who often inhabit the disputed territories that Kurdistan would like to appropriate. The Sheikhan district in the Nineveh Plain used to be a Yazidi-majority area, but just since the fall of Saddam, it has been targeted with a program of demographic change that has involved settling Sunni Kurds in the area in order to strengthen the claim that it should be included within the Kurdistan Region. This program is similar to the Arabization schemes to which Saddam subjected the Kurds, and Yazidis call it “Kurdification.” Sheikhan, a historic Yazidi homeland, is now a Muslim-majority area, a change that occurred entirely post-Saddam. Even the Mir, the highest Yazidi religious authority, spoke to US officials about this problem. In Shingal (“Sinjar” in Arabic) after 2003, the KDP quickly became a powerful presence. Many Yazidis were open to pursuing a future for Shingal as part of Kurdistan, hoping that life under Kurdish government would offer greater rights for minorities than had been the case under Ba’thist rule. But from those early days, the KDP asa’ish began systematically arresting and intimidating Yazidi civilians who joined competing political parties, especially those who favored keeping Shingal’s administration under the authority of the central government. Though services in Shingal are almost entirely paid for by Baghdad, the KDP bullied non-KDP Nineveh officials out of Shingal so that it could maintain administrative control. Shingal’s “mayors” (qaymaqam), including the current one, are never elected by the local people, but are appointed by the party and are, of course, always party loyalists. Despite the fact that the KDP completely dominated Shingal, it remained one of Iraq’s least developed and most marginalized districts. Because of this legacy, by 2014 the majority of the Yazidis of Shingal already resented KDP control; the Peshmerga withdrawal the morning of the genocide was simply the final straw, severing trust with the KDP forever. But because of KDP policy, the Yazidi situation has become even worse following the genocide, which is the main issue that this article will explore. Today there is a bitter political standoff in Shingal that is exacerbating the already poor relations between the Shingali Yazidis and the KDP. In order to understand the development of this conflict, we must first clarify some key aspects of how the genocide unfolded, and also debunk several myths propagated by government officials regarding the day of the genocide. Setting the Record Straight on Shingal Though everyone is familiar with the Peshmerga withdrawal on August 3, 2014, the day the Yazidi Genocide began, many citizens of Kurdistan and Iraq have been led to accept three key excuses advanced by KDP officials trying to justify the withdrawal: 1) that the IS (Islamic State) invasion of Shingal was a surprise attack; 2) that the Peshmerga lacked adequate weaponry to defend local Yazidis from IS; and 3) that the Peshmerga defended but IS was just too powerful and the front line collapsed. The first claim is obviously false since everyone knows that Mosul was conquered in early June, almost two months prior to the attack on Shingal. During the period between the conquest of Mosul and the Yazidi Genocide, IS gradually solidified control over the Arab areas south and east of Shingal. Tel Afar was conquered during that period, and IS forces grew increasingly close to Shingal. In fact, several small attacks occurred on outlying Yazidi villages southeast—and even north—of Shingal, prior to August 3. Tel Banat was attacked several times. In other words: The IS threat was well-known and there was plenty of time to prepare for any potential conflict, and to put an evacuation plan in place for civilians. The second claim is an attempt to side-step responsibility for the failure to defend the Yazidis. It ignores the fact that after the Iraqi military dissolved in the areas near Mosul, Kurdish forces seized control of Iraqi weapons depots and snatched up all of the weaponry and ammunition. This included Kesek, which housed the “regional ammunitions center” that provided weapons and ammunitions to the 2nd and 3rd Iraqi army divisions and to military academies in Zakho and Sulaimani. Moreover, when Iraqi army forces were retreating from Tel Afar and leaving the Shingal area, they were unable to retreat to Baghdad without passing through Kurdish-controlled territory. KDP-affiliated forces, therefore, forced these sections of the Iraqi army to hand over all of their weapons, ammunition, equipment, and military vehicles—at the KDP headquarters in Shingal, no less. This included the 10th brigade of the 3rd division and the 11th brigade of the 3rd division of the Iraqi army. Despite holding out and defending Tel Afar for some time, once these troops were pushed out by IS, they were effectively looted by KDP forces and sent back to Baghdad wearing civilian clothing. But beyond this evidence contravening the claim that the Peshmerga lacked adequate weaponry, the question should be asked as to how the Syrian YPG forces, who have smaller weapons, inferior vehicles, and are generally less equipped than the Peshmerga, were able to enter an unfamiliar area that they had never controlled, without the high-ground advantage, and fight through IS lines after IS had already established itself in the area and surrounded the mountain. The point is that the alleged superiority of IS weaponry had nothing to do with the withdrawal. Keep in mind that there are numerous locations in the foothills of Shingal Mountain where just a handful of Yazidi farmers with old rifles were able to prevent the jihadists from ascending into these enclaves—such is the advantage of the higher ground. The idea that the Peshmerga had to flee to Dohuk, rather than move to the protection of the mountain while providing cover to the evacuating civilians, is patently absurd. But most important is the third claim, that the Peshmerga’s lines were overwhelmed by the might of the IS jihadists. This claim is demonstrably false in light of the way that the withdrawal was conducted. The withdrawal was not a chaotic, haphazard fleeing after engaging the enemy; Shingal Mountain is 72 kilometers long, and with the security presence in many of the towns all around, it would be nearly impossible that every single “front line” would collapse simultaneously. If troops had been overwhelmed in one location, many other troops would have been able to hold their ground in other locations. But the withdrawal was collective (involving almost all security and militia personnel in the entire district), and was conducted in an organized fashion, with all weapons and military vehicles being transported out of Shingal and back to Kurdistan. When local Yazidi civilians saw that the Peshmerga were abandoning them, they begged them to at least leave behind the weapons so that they could defend their own families. But the Peshmerga refused. According to hundreds of survivor accounts, this planned withdrawal occurred before the jihadists reached Shingal. These countless testimonies of civilian eyewitnesses were corroborated by a Peshmerga leader named Sime Mulla Muhammad, responsible for troops in Shingal, who disclosed to the Xendan newspaper in an interview published August 3, 2016 that he withdrew his men without engaging the enemy, prior to the arrival of the jihadists, after it was known that IS was moving on the area. Beyond all of this, not only did Qasim Shesho (the current leader of the KDP Peshmerga in Shingal) state for the record that the Peshmerga fled before the civilians could evacuate, but President Barzani’s reaction to the withdrawal also dispelled any notion of the front line breaking, as in early August 2014 he referred to the “negligence” of those in command and formed a committee to investigate possible desertions. The facts presented above become even more painful when considering that the day before the genocide, August 2, 2014, local people in Shingal knew that IS was mobilizing. They could sense that an attack might be imminent. Yazidis asked those responsible for security if the people should evacuate. Peshmerga leaders gave assurances to the people that they would be protected, and told them to stay in their villages. In some cases, asa’ish even prevented families from evacuating; some families had loaded up their cars and were attempting to drive to Kurdistan but were turned back at the checkpoints guarding village entrances. I have presented this background to make it perfectly clear why the trust of the Shingali Yazidis in the KDP was irreparably shattered on August 3. This should also explain why the YPG and PKK forces that entered Shingal to defend the Yazidis won so many hearts and minds. Not only did those forces save the lives of tens of thousands of Yazidis that had been left to die, but they enabled the local Yazidis to hold the front line against IS for the next 15 months, killing more jihadists than any other militia. Preventing Yazidis from Returning and Rebuilding: The Economic Blockade This brings us to the present political conflict that is victimizing the Yazidis. As is common knowledge, after the PKK-affiliated forces rescued the Yazidis in the absence of the Peshmerga, they helped the Yazidis form a local militia known as the YBŞ. This force is affiliated with the PKK but is primarily comprised of local Shingali Yazidis who came together to defend their own families and homes. The KDP wants the YBŞ to disappear. They want all non-KDP militias to dissolve so that the KDP Peshmerga can again enjoy full control of Shingal and return to business as usual. But the KDP knows that if the displaced Yazidis now living in the camps in Dohuk return to Shingal, they will be more likely to support a rival militia, like the YBŞ, because they have no loyalty for the KDP. And that brings us to the most discouraging of facts, the economic blockade of Shingal, which is the KDP’s disgraceful strategy to keep Yazidi families, who survived a genocide, trapped in camps that they have lived in for over two and a half years, rather than allowing them to return to Shingal. The north side of Shingal Mountain has been free of the IS presence since December 2014, without any IS-related security incident. The north side has eight major towns and over 25 smaller locations inhabited by Yazidis. It is viable for return and reconstruction, and several thousand Yazidi families have already taken up residence there, trying to rebuild their destroyed homes and farms. However, for over a year now, the KDP asa’ish have been effectively starving these families—and preventing the return of thousands more who would like to begin rebuilding a normal life—through an economic blockade. At the primary checkpoint controlling access to Shingal from Dohuk (Fishkhabour, near Suheila village), asa’ish do not allow Yazidis to bring goods to Shingal upon which a basic economy depends, such as livestock or most products for retail shops. Even beyond the commercial level, Yazidi families are not allowed to bring into Shingal basic household goods and foodstuffs upon which any family depends for their livelihood. There are countless examples of what is not allowed though. Here are a few examples that I gathered personally through my own conversations with affected families, farmers, and shop owners: - Auto mechanics are not allowed to bring in spare parts for vehicles, including parts for pickup trucks and tractors, both depended upon by farmers. - Small amounts of bulk food items for the use of a single family (such as a single bag of sugar, flour, or rice) are generally not allowed through. - Farmers report not being allowed to bring motor oil through which is needed for their harvester machines (Shingal depends on wheat and barley farming). Fuel (for gas stations) is also occasionally restricted. - Cement and cinderblocks needed for the rebuilding of homes destroyed by IS are often not allowed through. - Many families have been prevented from bringing a single sheep or lamb through the checkpoint. - Fertilizer is not allowed through. The asa’ish claim that it is to prevent terrorists from making bombs; this is not a risk among poor Yazidi farmers. Without fertilizer, farmers lose 50% to 70% of their yield. - Farmers are not being allowed to being ordinary farming equipment, such as irrigation supplies, to Shingal. - The headmasters of schools in Shingal have not been allowed to bring basic school supplies (such as paper, a single printer, or a single laptop) through the checkpoint, and have also been prevented from bringing fixtures for the schools, such as well pumps for the schools’ water systems. - Displaced families trying to return have been turned back to the camps when attempting to transport their own furniture or tents in which they need to live while rebuilding their destroyed homes. - Veterinary medicine has not been allowed through. Shingal’s families live off of herds but shop owners who sell veterinary medicine are not able to reopen their shops in Snune or the other collective villages because of the restrictions. As an unannounced and therefore “unofficial” blockade, it is selectively enforced. Those with close ties to the government, asa’ish, or Peshmerga are sometimes allowed to bring some goods through. A few basic retail items are allowed through for the shops in Snune. This allows government officials to deny the existence of the blockade when challenged about it. But even when certain goods are allowed through, drivers are often treated roughly and humiliated by the asa’ish, being forced to unload their entire delivery (crates of vegetables, for example) in the sun. Many drivers for hire have simply given up trying to transport goods to Shingal. When some farmers complained about the restrictions on moving ordinary goods, government officials told them that they must apply for certain permits in order to bring goods to Shingal (permits that never existed before and that no one had heard of). Farmers that have tried to navigate this process are given a runaround, being sent from office to office, and the process—just to get official authorization to take farming supplies to one’s small farm—can take months. This can mean missing a planting or harvesting season. Most people simply give up trying. One farmer who finally succeeded in securing a permission document from the Dohuk governorate was still blocked from transporting the goods to Shingal by the asa’ish at the checkpoint: there’s no guarantee that the asa’ish will respect government documents. Human Rights Watch investigated this blockade and recently issued a report, condemning the government for actively preventing reconstruction. I have personally always been in favor of reconstruction so that Yazidis can have a future in their homeland instead of being forced to emigrate. Emigration destroys the traditional diversity of the local society and puts the heritage of small minorities at risk. However, current policies actively prevent Yazidi families from returning and rebuilding, which produces hopelessness and prompts greater emigration from the country. Political Violence toward Yazidis This situation becomes even worse. Not only are families who were targeted with genocide and are now in their third year of living in camps prevented from returning home to resume normal lives, they are also punished severely if they complain about this situation. The asa’ish maintain strict control of Yazidi activities in the camps. Yazidis in the camps are generally not allowed to organize a public meeting unless it is for an activity related to an official political party. This included memorial gatherings to commemorate the anniversary of the genocide, last August, which asa’ish feared could turn into opportunities where dissent would be expressed. Yazidis in the camps holding peaceful demonstrations or speaking out on social media to protest the political policies that harm them have often been arrested, beaten, or threatened. In general, the asa’ish have succeeding in suppressing the voices of Yazidis who are broken and frustrated about their situation. Worst of all is the political violence targeting Yazidis who join rival militias. These young people—and their families—can be persecuted through arrests, jailing, interrogations, and beatings. Young Yazidi men and women who join the YBŞ cannot visit their displaced relatives in the IDP camps in Dohuk, or else they will be arrested. In fact, KDP asa’ish have arrested poor taxi drivers accused of carrying YBŞ-affiliated passengers as customers in their taxis. Some taxi drivers have no knowledge of the identities of their paying customers, but have been arrested and jailed all the same. Some young men and women have not seen their families in the camps—only a three-hour drive away—for over two years for fear of being arrested. One of my employees when I was leading Yazda in Iraq and Kurdistan was an uneducated, destitute man who worked as a cleaner in Yazda’s health care center. He had no interest in politics, but several of his grown children decided that they would join the YBŞ to defend their homeland. One day, he was taken by the asa’ish to an office where he was interrogated and told that he would be made to disappear (i.e., imprisoned without charges or trial) if he did not convince his children to disaffiliate from the YBŞ. He could not convince them to leave their cause of defending Shingal, so he had to leave the Kurdistan Region. He moved back to Shingal where he has no work and no resources, out of fear for his safety. Such stories are commonplace. The political persecution of Yazidis who voice criticism of the government is so severe that it has prompted many families to immigrate to Europe. A number of Yazidi activists and journalists, not affiliated with any party, received threats against their families from the asa’ish because they spoke out. They chose to leave the country rather than live in fear. Individuals and families are not the only ones targeted; organizations are also victims of the crackdown on free speech. Yazda Iraq is not the first local Yazidi organization to be shut down by the KDP since the genocide. Rainbow, a Yazidi-created project doing activities with children in Mamilian camp, was shut down in late 2015 after some of its volunteers joined peaceful demonstrations against the treatment of the Yazidis. Hezar Dinar, or the “Thousand Dinar” campaign, was an influential project with a huge impact. Yazidi volunteers collected small donations from large numbers of local people to redistribute to the needy in the camps. The project was apolitical but was shut down just before summer 2016 by KDP asa’ish after some of its members were seen in a photograph holding a non-KDP flag. Yazda was simply the latest casualty in an ongoing campaign to silence the free expression of any critical sentiments among the Yazidis. While working in the KRI, I was frequently attacked by Kurdish officials if I voiced even the smallest concern about the situation and how it was affecting the survivors of the genocide. If I mentioned in a UN cluster meeting that the asa’ish were preventing certain goods from being transported to Shingal, I was ridiculed publicly by the government representative and accused of being a “troublemaker.” Of course, it was the government that was making trouble for the victims of the genocide. Individuals or organizations expressing any criticism of KDP policy in Shingal were often accused of “supporting the PKK.” This is a strange allegation; critiquing harmful KDP policy does not constitute support for the PKK. Aside from the competition in Shingal, the political dynamics inside the Kurdistan Region were also unhealthy. In the spring of 2016, I was visited by a PUK Peshmerga captain who commanded the small contingent of PUK Peshmerga in Shingal. He described to me how he had a large shipment of medicine that he was trying to bring to Shingal but was being prevented from doing so by the KDP asa’ish, despite being a Peshmerga leader. During my period of work in the country, the primary health centers in the Shingal region suffered from a lack of medicine. I am not speaking of the health centers created by the PKK to serve displaced Yazidis on top of the mountain; I am referring to the established, government-run health centers serving the collective villages on the north side of the mountain. These health centers are part of Nineveh administration and are responsible for the health care of several thousand local Yazidi families that had returned to Shingal. However, the managers of those health centers frequently disclosed to me that they were not being allowed to bring any shipment of medicine originating with the Nineveh government to their centers. I visited such centers personally and saw that their stores of medicine were empty. In the spring, I also spoke with a member of the Kurdish parliament who visited camps in Dohuk to inquire about the needs of genocide survivors and learn how she could help support them. She asked a camp manager what the needs were of the people in the camp. Knowing that she belonged to the PUK, he replied, “Nothing—they have everything they need.” The Risk of Demographic Change Like the program to change the demographics in Sheikhan, Shingal is at risk of being targeted with a similar project. Yazidis are very afraid that the KRG may inhibit them from returning home and instead try to settle them within the Kurdistan Region where they will be easier to rule, leaving Shingal open for settlement by KDP loyalists, making the district easier for the KDP to control. As a disputed territory that still officially belongs to the central government, it would be far easier for Kurdistan to gain permanent control of Shingal if it could be populated with Kurdish party loyalists, rather than by an “unruly” minority. As soon as the mass displacement of Shingal occurred in 2014, Yazidis began voicing fears of a possible long-term strategy to prevent them from returning home. Yazidi suspicions of a plan among high-level Kurdish officials to resettle Shingal’s Yazidis inside the Kurdistan Region were corroborated when I and some other Yazda volunteers met with Dr. Fuad Hussein, Chief of Staff to the Presidency of the Kurdistan Regional Government, on November 3, 2015. In our meeting, I pressed Dr. Fuad about the need to rebuild Shingal so that Yazidis could return home. Dr. Fuad told me that it would be too expensive and said that “those people need to be resettled elsewhere.” I responded that it would be less expensive to rebuild their existing homeland than it would be to construct an entirely new home for the Yazidi people. Of course, if the Kurdish government continues to prevent the Yazidis from returning to Shingal, the real tragedy will be for the Yazidis to lose their historic homeland, with all of its sacred religious and cultural sites. The Future That the Yazidis Need Recently, Kurdish officials have intensified calls for the PKK to “leave” Shingal. The PKK itself has only a minimal presence in Shingal. What they mean is that they want PKK support for the Yazidi YBŞ forces to be eliminated so that the YBŞ will dissolve. Kurdish Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani is presenting this as a prerequisite for the ending of the blockade. By saying that the PKK presence prevents peace from returning to Shingal, Nechirvan Barzani is pretending that the KDP has no choice in its implementation of the blockade. He is effectively saying, “We are helpless in victimizing the Yazidis unless we get the political outcome we want.” But of course the KDP has control over its actions and could lift the blockade today, whether or not it gets its way. Nechirvan Barzani’s remarks do not acknowledge that the YBŞ’s forces are primarily local, consisting of Yazidis from Shingal—not a foreign force that has invaded the country. (The largest foreign force in the area is actually the Peshmerga Rojava, a KDP-affiliated militia created by the KDP by recruiting from the Syrian refugee camps inside the Kurdistan Region.) Though I do not support the YBŞ or any other partisan militia, or any of the parties with which these militias are affiliated, I nevertheless firmly believe in the Yazidis’ freedom to choose their political affiliation—this is democracy. But this issue is about much more than the right to choose a party. What most Yazidis want now is not to choose a party, but to build their own administrative infrastructure, independently of any major party. Most Yazidis from Shingal are worried about the PKK becoming the next KDP in Shingal. They do not want to see the PKK replace the KDP as a new hegemon in Shingal—the next chapter in single-party authoritarianism maintaining complete control over a population. But Yazidis are even more fearful about an end to PKK support for Yazidi militias, because this will result in the return of KDP hegemony, which is viewed as the worst-case scenario. Yazidis therefore recognize that PKK influence is creating balance for the moment; neither the KDP nor the PKK are strong enough to gain full control of Shingal. This deferment of an outside force again taking complete control of Shingal is allowing the Yazidis time to plan their own form of local administration, security, and governance, but they need better support and guidance from the U.S. and European countries to accomplish this. This is what the vast majority of Yazidis want. Rather than leaving their security to party-affiliated forces originating outside of Shingal—forces that failed to protect them in the past—Yazidis want to oversee their own affairs, by building local, nonpartisan institutions of administration and security that will be officially recognized under the Iraqi legal framework. Yazidis want to maintain a relationship between the Shingal district and the Kurdistan Region, but they prefer to be in charge of their own security and infrastructure, while promoting the development of an environment of political pluralism. This is very reasonable. Therefore, the desire of most of the Yazidis who join the YBŞ is not to support the pan-Kurdish ideology of the PKK, but rather to protect their own homeland and strengthen their capacity for local governance. They simply do not see an alternative sponsor qualified to defend Yazidi interests at the moment. For the Yazidis, the issue is not a choice of loyalty between Erbil versus Baghdad, but is about creating a framework for self-administration—something that Erbil will never tolerate. By rejecting Erbil’s claims to Shingal (something the vast majority of Shingali Yazidis are united in), Yazidis are not expressing some kind of preference for a special relationship with Baghdad. Rather, they simply want to work within the framework of the government that will best provide the opportunity for self-administration. The KDP had a decade to convince the Yazidis to join with them instead of seeking their own administration under Baghdad. They failed in this endeavor because they used excessive intimidation rather than extending goodwill and respecting the right of the Yazidis to choose. When I was in Shingal in the summer of 2015, I spoke to wheat and barley farmers who had left the camps in Dohuk to temporarily return to their farms on the north side of the mountain, in order to harvest their fields that had been left standing after the genocide. They hoped to sell their grain and return to the camps. But instead of facilitating this effort on the part of the poor families, Peshmerga leaders in charge of the area after the liberation of the mountain’s north side were not allowing Yazidis to bring their grain to Dohuk. (This was prior to the economic blockade discussed in this article.) The Peshmerga leaders were forcing the Yazidi farmers to sell their grain within Shingal, below the current price, to the Peshmerga leaders themselves, who were then transporting it to the Kurdistan Region to sell for a large profit. This is only one example of the kind of corruption that Shingal suffers under single-party rule and it was heartbreaking to see a broken people continue to be subjected to such exploitation even after the genocide. Today should mark the end of these abuses. The desire of the Yazidis for self-administration within Iraq’s legal framework should now be respected by all sides. The wishes of the Yazidis are not unreasonable or unrealistic. They are not asking to secede from Iraq and create their own country. They simply want to work within the parameters of the Iraqi constitution to effectively manage and protect their historic region. Such goals are sensible—if this minority is to survive in its homeland—and achievable with local and international support. A New Message from Kurdistan to the Yazidis At this stage, the KDP has lost the contest for Yazidi loyalty. The best thing for the KRG to do now is to approach the Yazidi community with a new message. Here is the message that President Barzani, the KDP, and all of Kurdistan should give to the Yazidis of Shingal: - First, we would like to take responsibility for abandoning you in your hour of need, and for allowing the genocide of the Yazidis to take place. We want to apologize in humility for the terrible negligence that left your people defenseless. We should have apologized to you directly, long ago, and we are sorry for the long delay in giving you this honest message. Apologies are painful, but the pain of humility is worth the chance to rebuild trust and good faith with you. - Second, we recognize that it was not a genocide targeting all Kurds for their ethnicity, but rather targeting Yazidis specifically, for their religious identity. As your brothers and sisters, we stand with you, and we recognize that you alone were targeted with a special project of extermination and enslavement. - Third, we recognize that no one has the right to choose your leaders for you, except you. Shingal has always been your historic homeland, and you have the right to shape its future. Even after the way that we have broken trust with you, we hope that you will still want seek a future with Kurdistan, but we recognize that the choice is yours, and we will respect whatever decision you make, and will always seek to maintain friendship with you. - Fourth, we will immediately lift the economic blockade that we have levied against your homeland, Shingal, for the entire past year. We recognize that our actions have further victimized you and inhibited your recovery, even after the terrible trauma of the genocide that you have endured. We do not have the right to tell you not to return to your homeland, or to keep your population in camps for years at a time, while your children grow up hopeless about their lack of a future. - Fifth, regardless of what political loyalties you democratically choose within your homeland, we pledge to not only allow you free passage with your personal goods from the Kurdistan Region to Shingal, but we also pledge to assist your reconstruction in whatever way we are able, recognizing that after our own negligence, we are now responsible to do what we can to help you rebuild, regardless of whether you place your political loyalties with our parties or not. Kurdistan is contending with economic crisis now, which limits our ability to perform significant reconstruction, but we will do our best to assist you. - These positions represent the goodwill of the Kurdish people who believe in democracy and justice and this statement represents the Kurdish values of fairness, equality, and integrity. The purpose of this article has not been to attack Kurdistan, but to address some problems that are weakening social cohesion among communities in Kurdistan and northern Iraq. Kurdistan is a wonderful place with wonderful people who have fought very hard for their own rights and freedoms. On my first visit to Kurdistan years ago, I visited a prison that Saddam had built in which he would imprison Kurds who expressed dissent about their situation. The prison was turned into a museum and I was moved by the depictions of human suffering that the Kurds had endured at the hands of Saddam, and by the bravery of the Peshmerga that had labored so tirelessly to liberate their people. Being honest in our confrontation of new political realities of this generation, and the failure of the Peshmerga in Shingal, does not constitute a denial of the heroism of the Peshmerga over the many years that they have defended Kurdistan. Nevertheless, it is essential that we confront the Ba’thist-like behavior of the asa’ish toward the minority populations, and the political system that looks the other way when abuses occur. Sadly, I have lost some valued friendships with Kurds who are very dear to me, because of the position that I have taken on these issues. It is sad to lose those friendships, but in this context of genocide, I cannot compromise on the truth. In America we say “friends don’t let friends drive drunk.” We can critique government action in Kurdistan because we love Kurdistan and want to see it thrive, just as it is our duty to critique the treatment of minorities in the U.S. whenever our government abuses freedoms. Because of campaigns for the rights of minorities, many people in America today have rights that they did not have a few short years ago. Those rights are always placed in jeopardy when we stop speaking out. My involvement in the Yazidi situation is not that of someone with any stake in political factions. I have never had an affiliation with or affinity for any political group in Iraq, Syria, or Turkey. Rather, I am approaching this situation as a historian who understands how fragile the existence of a minority group like the Yazidis is, and how real the possibility is that the Yazidi people could disappear from the region. We have witnessed the recent decline of many minority communities in the Middle East, not only because of the threat of extremist violence, but also because of the harmful politics of nationalism. It is vital that citizens of Iraq and Kurdistan work to ensure that the Yazidis are not another casualty of politics. You—the people of Kurdistan—must speak out and let your government know that their treatment of the Yazidis is unacceptable and contrary to your values. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________(c) 2017 NRT

__________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies

Under President Donald Trump’s new executive order, religious minorities claiming persecution will take priority over other applicants once the refugee program resumes. Last weekend on the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), Trump indicated that the policy will particularly advantage persecuted Christians from the Middle East: They’ve been horribly treated. Do you know if you were a Christian in Syria it was impossible, at least very tough to get into the United States? If you were a Muslim you could come in, but if you were a Christian, it was almost impossible and the reason that was so unfair, everybody was persecuted in all fairness, but they were chopping off the heads of everybody but more so the Christians. And I thought it was very, very unfair. So we are going to help them. Since 2011, between 1 and 3 percent of Syrian refugees admitted to the US were Christians, while the proportion of Christian refugees from the country is estimated to be much larger. (CT previously looked at explanations for the disparity.) Overall, 1 in 4 refugees resettled from the seven Muslim-majority nations now restricted under Trump’s order were Christians. While some evangelicals agree with Trump’s efforts to course-correct on behalf of persecuted brothers and sisters, many others worry about the ramifications of privileging Christians above other faiths. Arab Christian leaders in the Middle East told CT they appreciate Trump’s sentiment, but disagree with his strategy. CT asked four evangelical experts in international affairs, religious persecution, and refugee resettlement to weigh in below. America’s Christian Preference Can Hurt Religious Freedom Elsewhere David Curry, president and CEO of Open Doors USA At Open Doors, we feel that it is crucial for Christian refugees and those belonging to other religious minority groups throughout the Middle East to have a safe pathway to refuge in the United States. But we stand for a need-based resettlement approach that treats all faiths equally. We can’t support a religious test in the United States, or in any other country. Policies akin to this drive horrendous persecution of Christians around the globe. A process that prioritizes one religion over another, as the Trump administration has proposed, can have negative effects not just in America, but around the world. Throughout the Middle East, there’s a commonly construed notion linking Christians with the United States, or the West in general. The plan to prioritize Christian refugees, while refusing or postponing entry for Muslims, is not likely to improve the situation on the ground for minority Christians in these areas. Even worse, it could tragically result in a backlash against Christians in countries plagued by Islamic extremism. Open Doors is dedicated to holistically addressing the needs of persecuted Christians in more than 60 countries around the world. But we’re doing more than meeting needs: we’re equipping and empowering the persecuted church to be the church, reaching out in love and compassion within their communities--whether those communities are comprised of other Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Yazidis, or those belonging to another faith or no faith at all. Every day, we see the courage of persecuted Christians living out the life of Jesus. Their lives are a shining example of the words from 1 John 4:18: “There is no fear in love. But perfect love drives out fear.” As American Christians, we currently face a series of policies driven perhaps more by fear than by love. We encourage Christians in America to look to the persecuted church for an example of steadfast courage and radical love—and to reject the temptation to allow fear to rule our lives. We must not allow fear to blind us to the suffering of those belonging to a faith different from ours. Instead, our faith should compel us to be the first to speak out for the oppressed and displaced among us—regardless of their religion or the country they come from. If the Trump administration wants to get religious freedom right, perhaps President Trump can apply his words of “America first” to this crucial issue. We cannot compromise on religious freedom within our own borders and expect to hold other countries accountable for protecting freedom of religion. We encourage the Trump administration to seek to address the root causes of violent religious persecution throughout the world. This means integrating international religious freedom at the very core of United States foreign policy—and ensuring that we uphold religious freedom within our own borders. The US Must Do More for Minority Faiths Facing Genocide Abroad Nina Shea, director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom The fact that President Trump’s executive order allows the government to prioritize individual claims of religious-based persecution from religious minorities—whether Christian, Yazidi, Jew, Muslim, Bahá’í, Buddhist, etc.—should be welcome news to every Christian and everyone concerned with human rights and religious freedom. ISIS has waged genocide against Christians and other minorities for nearly three years. The terror group carried out its slogan, “We will break your crosses and enslave your women,” with literal precision against the ancient Christian community of several Middle Eastern countries. The Yazidis, another ancient religion, saw ISIS abduct more than 3,000 of its women and girls for sexual enslavement, and mass graves of their men are now being unearthed. In March 2016, the US government officially designated ISIS as responsible for genocide against various religious minorities, but adopted no new policies to help them. The State Department argued it was already prioritizing the “vulnerable minorities.” But in several aspects, the Christians were in reality put at the back of the line. Of the 12,587 Syrian refugees admitted under the ramped-up refugee program during the last fiscal year, a mere 0.5 percent were Christians, equivalent to about a dozen families. Yet, by State Department estimates, Christians accounted for up to 10 percent of Syria’s population. The marginalization against Christians extends to key UN programs for refugee camps, humanitarian aid, and resources to reconstruct their destroyed towns and villages. Trump’s prioritization is critically needed as religious persecution and terror targeting religious minorities spreads in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa—and especially in Syria and Iraq. Some argue the religious minority provision is unworkable; that the vetting process can’t identify Christians. But in Iraq and Syria, this should not be a problem. Many Christians speak Aramaic, the language of Jesus of Nazareth. Most belong to hierarchical churches with local bishops and priests or small evangelical churches that can vouch for them. Much of the uproar surrounding the order is based on the misconception that it prioritizes Christians per se and functions as a “Muslim ban.” Instead, priority is given to persecuted individuals from religious minorities. Rohingya Muslims from Burma, Ahmadi Muslims from Pakistan, Iraqi Yazidis, Iranian Bahá’ís, and Vietnamese independent Buddhists could all qualify. Furthermore, similar efforts to prioritize minorities have not precluded the country from accepting compelling cases from majority groups. Temporary suspensions of entry from seven predominantly Muslim countries while security vetting is reviewed over three months hardly constitutes a ban on Muslims. Those countries were taken from a 2016 list drawn up by the Obama administration—not because they were Muslim, but because they were “countries of concern” for terrorist travel prevention. These suspensions seem justifiable given last year’s CIA warning that ISIS threatens to infiltrate refugees to attack the West. Temporary suspensions from some of these countries occurred under Obama with little protest. This is not to say that there should be no concern or criticism over Trump’s policy. The Christian versus Muslim mischaracterizations could feed terrorist propaganda. The hasty application of the suspensions without notice, its application to green card and dual passport holders (a provision now reportedly rescinded), and the indefinite suspension of Syrian refugees are unfair and should be changed. But giving priority to persecuted religious minorities—minorities of any religious background—is not an injustice. Rather, it will serve justice, by upholding our highest ideals of offering refuge to genocide survivors and others among the world’s most vulnerable. Fewer Refugees Means Fewer Christians Matthew Soerens, US director of church mobilization for World Relief I appreciate the president’s goal to assist the persecuted. I believe the Bible teaches that all people (not just fellow Christians) are made in God’s image with inherent human dignity, and that the neighbor whom Jesus commands us to love cannot be narrowly defined to exclude those of other religions. My faith compels me to continue to welcome carefully screened Muslim and other non-Christian refugees. Yet, I am also particularly concerned about the well-being of persecuted Christians. The US refugee resettlement program has been a lifeline for these persecuted brothers and sisters. Over the past decade, more Christians have been admitted to the US as refugees than those of any other religious tradition, including many persecuted because of their faith from countries like Iraq and Burma. I’m concerned that the language of the executive order will actually be harmful to the persecuted Christians the president is seeking to help. By reducing the total number of refugees resettled to the US by more than half—from 110,000 to 50,000—it will necessarily mean that fewer persecuted Christians will be admitted to the US this year than last year. So far, more than 32,000 refugees have already been admitted toward that 50,000 maximum (about 43 percent of whom have been Christians). Even if every slot left were filled by a Christian—which I believe would be a serious error—at least 5,000 fewer Christian refugees would be allowed in this year. While the executive order notes a particular preference for persecuted religious minorities, other elements of the order work against these groups. The order also bars all Syrian nationals—both Muslims and Christians—from the resettlement program indefinitely. And countries from which a significant share of refugees in recent years have been persecuted religious minorities—such as Iran, where Christians and religious minorities have made up 95 percent of refugees in recent years—are blocked for at least 90 days and possibly longer. Most importantly, though, by prioritizing refugees based on religion—rather than on vulnerability, as has been our government’s policy—this policy plays into the narrative of anti-Christian extremists who paint all Christians as enemies of Islam. Ultimately, it stokes anti-Christian sentiment, feeds extremism, puts religious minority Christians at risk globally, and harms gospel witness. Our Muslim Neighbors Bear the Brunt of Violence Jeremy Courtney, cofounder and executive director of the Preemptive Love Coalition in Iraq When it comes to the question of whether Christians should favor a refugee policy that prioritizes fellow Christians, we should first think about what it really means to “take care of our own.” How do we take care of our Christian sisters and brothers in Syria and Iraq? Have we stopped to ask them what that would look like? I don’t mean just being a safe haven to run to when their churches and homes are destroyed by violence, but whether we as a nation are pursuing the policies and diplomacy that give them the greatest chance of surviving and flourishing where they are—so they don’t have to flee their homeland. If we’re serious about taking care of fellow Christians, we need to have a hard conversation about some of our interventions in places like Syria and Iraq, and the impact they’ve had on the ancient Christian communities there. Second, we have to get past this zero-sum thinking that says either we take care of “our own” or “the other”—that it’s our security or their well-being. We belong to each other. The well-being of my Christian neighbors in Iraq and Syria is tied up in the well-being of my Muslim neighbors. Sometimes, they understand that better than we do. A couple of weeks ago, I was in Mosul with a friend named Marwan, an internal refugee who had to flee violence inside his own country. Standing in a church that had been destroyed by ISIS, he found two pieces of metal from the rubble and fashioned a makeshift cross. He wanted to send a message to his Christian neighbors: “You belong here. I am for you.” I hope we can do the same for people like Marwan. Christians have suffered immensely in Iraq and Syria and are extremely vulnerable, but Muslims have borne the brunt of the violence here. When ISIS snipers shot at women and children as they tried to flee Fallujah, after holding the city hostage, those fleeing were Sunni Muslims. When ISIS captured Mosul, they allowed almost all the Christians to leave. They took their homes and desecrated their churches, but mostly allowed them to go. The Muslim population was not so fortunate; they’ve had to endure more than two years of terror under ISIS. Muslims have spilled more blood than anyone else fighting ISIS. It’s not even close. So, to ask the question: Are there times when it makes sense for the church to take care of its own first? I think Jesus had a parable for that. When somebody wanted to know who counted as a neighbor—a thinly veiled way of asking, “Who am I allowed to exclude?”—Jesus told a story about a Samaritan who stepped across enemy lines to love “the other.” Today, the Samaritan could just as easily be played by a Muslim. Will we stick to the narrowest definition of neighbor? Or will we aspire to the example of Jesus, reject the zero-sum game, and recognize that we belong to each other? How that plays out in foreign and domestic policies is something that good people of character can disagree on respectfully and in love. But we must keep working to give ourselves away on the front lines to those who need it most. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________(c) 2017 Christanity Today

Sputnik Arabic obtained documents confirming the atrocities committed by Daesh against Iraqi Christians. The documents mention a female under the pseudonym “T,” who was forced to endure inhuman suffering, until she was bought and rescued. She was captured in al-Hamdaniya district on August 7, 2014, where for more than a thousand years, Christians had been living. “T” was raped, forced to abandon her faith and wear a hijab. The 29-year-old woman, together with her child, was taken to Mosul where she was resold three times and ultimately ending up in Raqqa, Syria. After she was bought she was raped by multiple men for two days in front of her child. After her terrible ordeal “T” is now free. There was a man who paid the money for her ransom and now she hopes that someday she will be able to return that money to her savior. This is just one story from a document archive uncovered after the town’s liberation. The archive contains information on 100 Christians who were killed or captured by the terrorists in Iraq or Syria. The fate of many residents still remains unknown. More than 55 thousand people hailing from all faiths were living in the Hamdaniya District, located 32 kilometers south-east of Mosul before the terrorists took over the city. The brutal captors took women as slaves and young men were told to change their faith and join the ranks of the terrorists. If they refused to do so, they were forced convert or die. The terrorists also robbed residents of their possessions and took their gold, jewelry and money. According to one resident, “On August 6, 2014, Daesh militants entered the district of Hamdaniya. I together with my wife and kids decided to stay in the field. But the terrorists found us and started shooting over our heads. They ordered us to go to the mosque.” He said that afterwards they were led to a Sharia court where they were beaten and forced to convert to Islam. “Daesh took everything we had: the gold jewelry of my wife totaling 13 million dinars, that is about 12 thousand dollars, they also took our sheep, the price of which exceeded 50 million dinars. It was yet another attempt to make sure that we did not run away,” the resident told Sputnik Arabic. He further said that the terrorists wanted him to join Daesh. However, he refused to do so and together with his family he went to Mosul. From there on to Hawija which is still occupied by the terrorists. Then by some miracle they managed to get to Kirkuk. Nine elderly people aged 66 to 90 refused to leave their homeland in which they were born and raised. The terrorists left them to die of hunger and terror in their own homes. Those who converted to Islam received some medication. Three of the dead men were buried in the yard of their homes, whereas, the bodies of other people were sent to the local cemetery. No one knows exactly where their graves are. Since the beginning of the operation for the liberation of Mosul in October 2016, Iraqi forces which include the Nineveh defenders, have liberated the town of Hamdani and released four women and two men from Daesh prisons. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________© 2017 Sputnik

A woman fleeing the fighting between Islamic State and the Iraqi army in the Intisar district of eastern Mosul.Reuters An Iraqi Christian leader and a senior academic have warned that Christians may not return to Mosul for years to come, if at all, as some residents of the war-torn city celebrate their new freedom from Islamic State. Father Emanuel Youkhana, a priest of the Assyrian Church of the East, spoke out after visiting Mosul in a military convoy on January 27, the day Iraqi officials raised the national flag over the eastern part of the city. "I don't see a future for Christians in Mosul," he was reported as saying by Catholicphilly.com. Fr Youkhana talked to residents and soldiers and visited two heavily damaged churches inside the city which was seized by ISIS in 2014, causing Christians and other minorities to flee. "The churches were used as warehouses by Daesh," he said. "They used the churches to store what they looted from Christian and Yezidi villages, but as the end neared they sold the buildings to local contractors, who started tearing down the walls to reuse the steel inside. If the army hadn't entered for another couple of weeks, the buildings might have been completely destroyed." Father Emanuel Youkhana visited Mosul with a World Council of Churches delegation.Paul Jeffrey/WCC He added: "Christians aren't going to come back to stay. The churches I saw were not destroyed with bombs, but by the everyday business operations of the community. How can Christians return to that environment? It's unfortunate, because Mosul needs their skills. Most Christians were part of the intellectual and professional class here, they were doctors and lawyers and engineers and university professors. But I don't see how they can return." Separately, World Watch Monitor reported similarly pessimistic comments by Charlie Winter, a senior research fellow at the International Centre for Radicalisation Studies at King's College, London. Winter said "there is no such thing as a post-IS world" and added that ISIS had used propaganda "audaciously" to liken Mosul to the Saudi city of Medina in the days of Mohammed who, in 622 AD left Mecca for Medina after hearing of a plot to kill him. Winter said that ideological measures will be needed after military victory is achieved. He warned that it is the Iraqi Government's responsibility to provide for all its citizens and that unless this can be achieved stability will be "many, many years" away. Winter was sharply critical of the pledge by the new US President Donald Trump to "bomb the hell out of ISIS", suggesting that a mere focus on a military response is "damaging" and displays a "foolish and naive and superficial" understanding of the problems in the region. The Middle East Advocacy Coordinator for global charity Open Doors said: "Open Doors believes that equal citizenship, dignity in different aspects of life and enhanced and inclusive peace and reconciliation efforts – which give faith-based organisations a leading role – are the key three elements for achieving sustainable peace in Mosul and Nineveh." Open Doors has produced a detailed report on the vital contribution that Christians make in Iraq (and Syria). The report's coordinator, who declined to be named, said: "We need recognition for the vital role of the Church in rebuilding and reconciliation... Maintaining the presence of Christians is not only about them; it is for the good of society as a whole. In the reports and research we've conducted, we have mapped, in a way, all the contributions Christians have given to Iraq." The report states: "When Christianity spread across what we now call the Middle East and we see that since then until now Christians have contributed to societies in literacy, in health, in translating and contributing to the Arabic language. Some of the best early centres of learning in the world were founded by Christians. Christians were among the first to introduce charitable works and NGOs. We see them involved in politics, and in the development of the Iraqi state. Christians are among the most well-known business people. And in the future Christians, alongside other numerical minorities, are vitally important for the stability of [Iraq]. Policy-makers and researchers agree that we need to maintain diversity in order to counter extremism and radicalisation. We need diversity to ensure sustainable peace and lasting stability in the Middle East." ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Christian Today

Blue Nile refugees living in South Sudan’s Maban County remain at odds with the local host community, as both groups struggle to get by. Three days of deadly violence over Christmas prompted a large number of refugees to return to Blue Nile state, several sources said, despite limited or no access to farmland in a region where one-quarter of the population is displaced. With the promise of a six-month ceasefire, more Sudanese refugees from Blue Nile as well as the Nuba Mountains may play the odds and leave South Sudan for the conflict zones they fled. What happened… Tensions persist between the host community and Blue Nile refugee community in Doro camp in Maban County, South Sudan. Three days of violence erupted between the two communities over Christmas. The refugees, who are ethnic Uduk, and the host community are living in complete segregation: Refugees are no longer visiting the host community’s market or hospital, according to local sources and aid workers. The conflict between the two communities stems from December 24-26 fighting last year. It constituted the bloodiest violence recorded between the refugees who fled the conflict in Blue Nile State, Sudan and the Maban host community. The number of casualties is disputed. Official sources claim around 32 people were killed while other sources claim the number is higher, reaching 70 in total from the two communities. According to Doro camp coordinator Tila Musa, 58 refugees are still missing and their whereabouts are unknown. Who actually started the conflict is unclear, as both sides accuse the other of triggering the violence. According to human rights activist Ibrahim Yassin and other aid workers in Maban, the conflict started after National Security arrested six refugees on December 22 who work as traders, accusing them of transporting goods without paying taxes. One trader attempted to escape and the security forces reacted and beat the individual to death. This sparked into a wider conflict. The refugee community killed a local militia leader and burnt down his home, the same sources said. The conflict between the Uduk tribe and the Maban host community started in June 2016 when three people were killed from both communities. Violence erupted again in November and led to the killing of more than 12 people from the host community. From 2012 to 2015, sporadic conflicts, largely between the Ingassana tribe and host community, took place in three refugee camps in Maban (Kaya, Gendrassa and Yousif Batil) resulted in at least 100 deaths, Yassin said . The more recent fighting, however, is based in Doro refugee camp. What it means… Several sources in Maban claim a large number of refugees from Doro camp have fled the violence in Maban to return to Blue Nile State in Sudan – the very place they originally escaped from. If these sources are accurate, the returnees will add to an already high number of internally displaced in Blue Nile State. Over a quarter of Blue Nile’s population are internally displaced, according to UN data, while approximately 21 percent of the population is in refugee camps in South Sudan and Ethiopia. Those returning to Blue Nile State will have limited or no access to farmland and livelihood opportunities. The conflict in Maban reflects a wider problem Sudanese refugees emanating from the Two Areas face: an increasingly volatile and hostile host community due to ongoing insecurity in South Sudan. Now that President Omar al-Bashir announced a six-month ceasefire following the removal of U.S. economic sanctions, far more of these refugees may leave the restive refugee camps in South Sudan and return to Sudan. Several refugee sources and the SPLM-N spokesperson, Arnu Ngutulu, claim Khartoum is backing a local militia in Maban – the Maban Defense Force – to incite violence between the refugees and host community. Maban is based near the internal conflict between the SPLA and SPLA-IO whereupon fighting took place just eight kilometers outside of Bunj town, Maban’s capital. The root cause of the conflicts between the refugees and host community remains unclear. Several sources believe the conflicts largely stem over competition for limited resources. Many from the host community, for instance, resent the fact the refugees are receiving support from aid agencies while they do not receive consistent assistance despite the fact there are roughly 15,000 Maban locals internally displaced from South Sudan’s internal conflict, a local aid worker said __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________(c) 2017 Sudan Insider

Civilians in Sudan’s rebel-controlled Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile may experience their first dry season without bombings in six years of war, thanks to a ceasefire condition tied to U.S. sanctions relief.Yet an estimated 600,000 remain in need of humanitarian aid, and food security is a major concern this year. Efforts to secure aid delivery in the last days of Obama’s presidency fell short, to the frustration of outgoing U.S. Special Envoy Donald Booth. The government and rebels continue to clash on whether 20 percent of the aid will come cross-border, a sticking point in the last talks as well. What happened… Donald Booth, the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan under the Obama administration, on January 16 met with the rebel SPLM-N in Paris along with representatives from France, Norway and Britain to discuss humanitarian access for the two conflict areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Washington proposed USAID would deliver assistance from Khartoum directly to the Two Areas after Sudanese authorities inspected the aid. The issue of humanitarian access is sensitive – so much so that the last peace talks in August collapsed over a disagreement concerning aid access routes. Both sides suspect the other of misusing aid deliveries to smuggle arms. The rebels do not want all aid to emanate from Khartoum, while the government refuses that any aid to come from outside the country. Last August, Khartoum refused to sign the rebels’ compromise agreement whereby 80 percent of aid would be delivered across frontlines from government-controlled areas while 20 percent would come cross border from Asosa, western Ethiopia, with Sudanese government supervision. The same issue marred November 2015 peace talk negotiations. The USAID proposal, originally made in November last year, adheres to the stance of the government over that of the SPLM-N. SPLM-N Secretary General Yasir Arman said they requested an amendment to the proposal but lacked sufficient time to implement due to the U.S. change in administration. Since then, Arman has said humanitarian and political issues should be separated in future talks. Booth criticized the SPLM-N in a public lecture for not directly accepting the proposal, accusing the rebel leadership of putting their own personal political ambitions ahead of their people. The UK Ambassador to Sudan, Michael Aron, also expressed his disappointment at the SPLM-N for not accepting outright the USAID proposal. Sudan has never allowed humanitarian agencies to work in the Two Areas in the past. Khartoum has gone as far as bombing aid agencies that have attempted to help the war-affected rebel controlled areas. In 2015, for example, Khartoum bombed a hospital run by the international medical organization, Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders) in the Nuba Mountains. What it means… The rebel movement’s concerns over Sudan manipulating are not unfounded. Khartoum routinely denied aid to war-affected civilians in Darfur, according to the former UN-AU peacekeeping force spokesperson Aicha Al-Basri. Between December 2004 and April 2005 alone, the Sudan government arrested or detained at least 20 aid workers in Darfur. This government tactic of blocking aid but denying such actions publicly as witnessed in Darfur is exactly what the SPLM-N want to avoid, says spokesperson Mubarak Ardol. By insisting 20 percent of aid stems from outside the country is the only aid the SPLM-N suspect will actually reach the war affected in the rebel-controlled areas. Further, the Sudan government has reneged on past humanitarian access agreements. The SPLM-N and Khartoum signed two memorandums with the UN, in February 2012 and August 2013, to allow unhindered access for humanitarian aid. Despite signing the documents, the government never upheld its commitments. In 2016, America and other western countries made a policy shift in regards to Sudanese foreign relations, showing more engagement and support to Khartoum. The recent lifting of U.S. economic sanctions and insistence that the SPLM-N follow the government’s humanitarian access plan are indicative of this trend. Whether this policy will continue under U.S. President Donald Trump is still under debate. Trump issued an executive order on January 28 banning citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries – including Sudan – from entering America. Sudan’s Foreign Minister summoned U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Steven Koutsis the following day to protest the decision to restrict Sudanese nationals access to the United States. While politicking continues between the government and SPLM-N over humanitarian access points, the civilians in the war-affected areas continue to suffer. According to the UN, 600,000 people are in need of assistance in the Two Areas, especially in the southern and western parts of the Nuba Mountains and in southern Blue Nile State. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Sudan Insider

What happened… U.S. President Barack Obama, in one of his final actions in office, issued an executive order on January 13 provisionally lifting most sanctions on Sudan. This move was a reversal from his October signature to renew the sanctions. Former President Bill Clinton first imposed sanctions on Sudan in 1997 for its role in supporting international terrorism and efforts to destabilize neighboring governments and human rights violations. Individual sanctions placed on seven government, militia and rebel leaders in connection with the conflict in Darfur issued in 2006 will remain in place, as will bans on trade in weapons. The move was reportedly based on progress in: a decrease in military operations in the three conflict areas, improved humanitarian access, refrain from assistance to rebels in South Sudan and counter-terrorism intelligence support to the West. The January executive order provided for the issuance of a general license, allowing open trade over a provisionary six-month period. By July 12, 2017, the secretary of state is to provide a report to the president that will provide the basis for reviewing the sanctions suspension. Obama’s foreign policy of engagement, as witnessed in other countries such as Cuba and Iran, argues that open trade – linked with the threat of renewing sanctions – will offer more leverage than blanket sanctions alone. President Trump will have the option of re-enacting sanctions, issuing another temporary reprieve, or permanently removing the sanctions. Obama administration officials have reportedly consulted the Trump administration on the policy shift. What it means… The U.S. move has sparked intense debate. Many who oppose the removal of sanctions argue that the situation has not changed and that the administration is taking too much on faith. President Omar al Bashir, for instance, has pledged and breached at least six ceasefire agreements since the conflict in the Nuba Mountains began six years ago. The same government reneged on two signed internationally brokered humanitarian access agreements, in February 2012 and August 2013. With little trust in the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), critics believe Sudan will not fulfill its pledge to desist military operations and allow humanitarian access to war-affected areas. And in the absence of independent media and civil society reporting, the U.S. government may find itself hard-pressed to challenge the government’s account of the situation on the ground. Critics question the official reasons given for lifting the sanctions. The State Department cited reforms to Khartoum’s humanitarian directives under the government Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and access to Golo in the restive Jebal Marra, Central Darfur region. Given HAC’s reputation for blocking international aid into Darfur, critics suggest little weight can be given to written amendments to their humanitarian access procedures. Further, access to Golo only comes after Sudan achieved a military victory in the area where Amnesty International alleges the potential use of chemical weapons. The sanctions lift comes at a time where there is no peace process, much less an agreement, and still no agreement over humanitarian access in the two war-affected areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. The State Department appears to be rewarding Sudan over select criterion for the sanctions lift, including its alleged counter-terrorism intelligence and non-interference in South Sudan, over other humanitarian considerations beyond a cessation in hostilities and marginal improvements to access in some areas. The former U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, Donald Booth, has said counter-terrorism efforts alone would not have been enough to yield this shift in U.S. policy. The question of how to even assess progress is problematic, as Khartoum continues to crack down on independent voices. In November and December of 2016 alone, 32 newspaper print runs were confiscated in Khartoum with devastating financial impact for affected papers (by way of comparison, 33 were confiscated throughout the first nine months of the year). In addition, arrests under the IT Crime Act increased in 2016, seeing journalists arrested for messages posted on social media. Meanwhile, human rights monitors and reporters continue to be banned from the conflict areas. With rocketing inflation rates reaching 29 percent and currency account deficits reaching nearly $4 billion, coupled with disparate budget expenditure for security purposes, the ruling NCP was facing an economic crisis and potentially subsequent political collapse before the U.S. sanctions were lifted. Critics claim the State Department’s decision has provided a notorious regime a chance to retain a fragile hold on power by avoiding further protests from a growing opposition. The debate is still ongoing over whether mass civil disobedience protests against fuel subsidy cuts last year had any political influence. The wide-ranging level of participants in the protests, however, that includes many young Sudanese with no former political background, cannot be disputed. The six-month probationary period for the lifted sanctions has, however, undoubtedly improved conditions for civilians living in the war affected regions of the Two Areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. President Bashir announced a six-month ceasefire for all conflicts within Sudan directly after the U.S. decision to lift sanctions. While this ceasefire has already been breached in Blue Nile and Darfur, no bomb attacks against civilians have been reported. This may mean a well-deserved respite for citizens during crucial planting seasons in the two conflict areas. Supporters of the U.S. policy shift point out that the 20-year old sanctions were ineffective: the conflicts in Darfur and Two Areas – replete with gross human rights abuses – continued unabated despite American sanctions. This is partly due to the fact America has failed to lift sanctions in the past for requirements that Sudan has fulfilled such as agreeing to the separation of South Sudan in 2011. The United States had lost political leverage vis-à-vis Sudan in this regard. Supporters also pointed out that generalized sanctions had unintended consequences. Instead of harming the leadership, they argue, sanctions harm ordinary people by denying citizens access to goods. While the State Department set up exemptions to curb this, many financial institutions insisted on a blanket ban on trade with Sudan, fearing heavy fines for breaching the sanctions. In May 2015, a judge ordered the French bank BNP Paribas to pay $8.83 billion for violating U.S. sanction on Sudan over an eight-year period. The sanctions provided the NCP a useful scapegoat to redirect criticism over poor governmental economic policies largely designed to help the regime maintain power with little consideration for growth. By lifting the sanctions, Sudan authorities may no longer be able to downplay the impact of the regime’s costly wars and corruption. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Sudan Insider

Civilians in central and western Darfur experienced this first-hand at the beginning of 2017, just days after President Bashir extended a ceasefire. In two separate incidents, a total of 16 people were reportedly killed and more than 75 wounded. While the government disputes it, eyewitnesses told Nuba Reports soldiers indiscriminately attacked residents of Nertiti town, in the restive Jebel Mara region of central Darfur, after a soldier was killed. To the south, government and rebel forces clashed in Blue Nile in December and again in January. What happened... On the first day of 2017, gunmen killed nine civilians and injured 69 others in a town in central Darfur, Nertiti, within the restive Jebel Marra area, according to eyewitnesses and news reports. The government and the Darfur rebel group operating in this area, the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdel Wahid (SLA-AW), have both traded accusations as to who perpetrated the attack. Sudan’s General Aboud Mansour claimed only two civilians were killed in the incident. According to eyewitnesses and local organizations, however, government soldiers indiscriminately attacked the Nertiti residents in a reprisal attack for the alleged killing of a soldier whose body was found on the outskirts of the town the previous day. The soldiers were under the command of Col. Mohamed El Tayib when they attacked civilians, local resident Adam Rijal and Abubakr Mohamed told Nuba Reports. Authorities relocated the army unit based in Nertiti and replaced them with another force due to the incident, the same sources said. The attack took place just a day after President Omar al-Bashir announced a one-month ceasefire extension for the conflict in Darfur and the Two Areas: South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. The extension follows a four-month ceasefire announcement last June that was extended for another two months in October. Violence in El-Geneina town, western Darfur, took place only four days later in the Al Jebel neighborhood of the town, leading to the death of seven people, including one child, and wounding eight others, local residents and reportssaid. The reasons behind the violence remain unclear. A press statement by State Governor Fadl al-Mula says the violence erupted over a livestock dispute. A UN officer working in Geneina, however, claims authorities used stolen livestock as a pretext to target a former opposition group leader residing in the town. What it means… Bashir’s ceasefire pronouncements appear routinely hollow to events on the ground. The violence in Nertiti took one day after the ceasefire announcement. On January 9, government forces attacked the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North rebels in Arum, Blue Nile State. This attack followed a prior conflict on December 9 in Jarden, Deim Manusr area in central Blue Nile State between the warring parties. It is unclear, however, who perpetrated the second attack. If orders did not come from the top, such incidents raise questions about how much Bashir and his generals truly can control their soldiers on the ground. Before the U.S. State Department lifted economic sanctions, the ruling National Congress Party seemed committed to continued warfare for Darfur and the Two Areas. President Bashir declared during a Christmas day speech to the army that he would continue to seek a military solution for the internal conflicts. State Department officials then announced in January relief from U.S. sanctions that would become permanent in six months’ time, given sustained “positive actions” by Sudan that include a continued cessation of hostilities in the conflict areas. Despite hosting a base in Nertiti town, the UN peacekeeping force, UNAMID, failed to protect civilians during the attack. The Darfur rebel leader Abdel Wahid denounced in a statement the lack of UN support as the “worst form of collusion with the Khartoum regime.” UNAMID has intensified its daily patrols in and around Nertiti following the reports of violence, UNAMID Media Relations Officer Priyanka Chowdhury said. The conflicting information regarding the attack – with local eyewitnesses accusing SAF while the government accuses the rebels – exemplifies the lack of reliable information available on the ground. Khartoum effectively blocksjournalists, both local and foreign, from covering the conflicts in Darfur and the Two Areas, creating an inevitable and dangerous information vacuum. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________(c) 2017 Sudan Insider

Ethiopia’s commitment to peace-making in South Sudan has been critical for regional stability. It has much to gain from continuing this engagement, including a secure border and trade with a stable neighbour. But achieving lasting peace after South Sudan’s two-year-long civil war is a long-term undertaking. Ethiopia has shown strong leadership and a level of direct involvement in peace efforts in Sudan and South Sudan that few countries can match. The African Union High Implementation Panel (AUHIP) peace talks on the conflicts are held in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa led the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, a regional body) peace process on South Sudan and is a guarantor of the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS). It deploys peacekeepers to the UN Mission in South Sudan and is the main contributor to the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (on the Sudan-South Sudan border). It is also expected to be the lead contributor to the 4,000-strong UN Regional Protection Force (RPF) based in Juba. Ethiopia’s two-year membership on the UN Security Council (UNSC) should be an opportunity to better connect regionally-led political processes to UN action. Implementing the ARCSS and the Regional Force Following the July 2016 fighting in Juba, ARCSS has been reshaped, and the RPF and national dialogue process created to reinforce its principles. Concerted support is required from Ethiopia, fellow IGAD member states, the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC, overseeing ARCSS implementation and reporting to the IGAD heads of state) and the UN to reduce conflict under an inclusive government. These processes, and the RPF’s role in supporting them, are fluid and interconnected. For example, a successful negotiation between the transitional government and an armed group increases the chances of successful dialogue between communities caught up in the conflict. There is now a window of opportunity to shape and provide capacity-building to efforts to make the new South Sudan transitional government more inclusive. Given the trust deficit that exists between South Sudan’s government and opposition figures, the UN’s RPF has a role to play in helping create conditions conducive to ARCSS implementation and national dialogue. Ethiopia’s support for talks between these parties makes it a critical partner in supporting inclusivity in Juba. For this to take place, the RPF must deploy and demonstrate its worth. In addition to JMEC, the RPF provides a direct link to Ethiopia and other IGAD leaders in their oversight of ARCSS and efforts to form a more inclusive government. On the sidelines of the forthcoming AU summit, Ethiopia and IGAD leaders should consider what can be done to expedite RPF deployment and how it can be better tied to political engagement to support genuine efforts toward greater transitional government inclusivity. Mutual Security and Prosperity Ethiopia’s mediation and peacekeeping efforts also support stability at home. During Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn’s 28 October visit to Juba, he and President Kiir made assurances that they would not support rebels in either country ­– a critical restatement of a mutual understanding between the two countries. Ethiopia’s border with South Sudan hosts cross-border communities that experience multiple, overlapping communal tensions that can lead to violence. A large Murle raid from South Sudan into the Gambella region last April required the Ethiopian army’s temporary deployment into South Sudan to secure the return of abducted children and to monitor both sides of the border. This took place during a separate period of intercommunal conflict in Gambella, which was exacerbated by the large numbers of refugees in the region. Supporting South Sudan to reduce political and communal conflicts along their shared border – which requires effective and inclusive governance from Juba – will improve security in Gambella and reduce refugee inflows, which tend to exacerbate intercommunal tensions in the border region. Violence and displacement are detrimental to the mutually beneficial cross-border trade that was growing fast before South Sudan’s civil war started in 2013. Stability and security can enable development rather than humanitarian crisis in the impoverished border regions and beyond. Ethiopia should not waiver in its commitment to ensuring a peaceful South Sudan and use the many tools at its disposal – IGAD, ARCSS, JMEC, the RPF and its term since January on the UN Security Council – to support an inclusive and stable government in Juba. Successful peace-making will ensure greater stability in Ethiopia and facilitate sustained trade and economic development – which is to everyone’s benefit. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 International Crisis Group

Editor's Note Kenya has long been a global technology leader for innovation in mobile and internet technology, including the use of mobile phones for uses as diverse as cash transfers and crowd sourcing of reports on election violence (in 2008). Kenya also features an active press and civil society accustomed to speaking out about national issues including corruption and human rights violations. With national general elections scheduled for August this year, these assets can play important roles in sustaining peace and democracy. But they may also be threatened by government restrictions or by use of social media for propaganda and incitement to violence. This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from a report on The State of the Internet in Kenya from the Bloggers Association of Kenya, released in November 2016, as well as two short articles with relevant updates on recent technological advances, including solar powered TV's aimed at rural markets. Growth of the Internet in Kenya For this report, we tracked the 36 most active blogs within the BAKE server and the stats from individual blogs for the period between October 2015 and October 2016. According to our analysis of the data collected, the blogging scene has seen a huge growth in the terms of monthly readership in the last one year. Overall monthly visits (readers) increased by 46 per cent from 12.4 Million to 18.1 Million. There are many factors which have contributed to the growth of blogs readership including the high increase of the number of Kenyans who can access Internet through their phones. But more importantly, blogs are seen by many Kenyans as authentic means to get news and opinions which mainstream media would normally shy away from. This could be described as Anti-Traditional Media Sentiment and the blogs are increasingly filling the gap. The growth in Kenya's Internet penetration has seen the media and entertainment economy significantly move online. The Communications Authority of Kenya (CA) quarterly sector Statistics Report Fourth Quarter for the Financial Year 2015-2016 (April-June 2016), indicates that the Data/Internet market reached 26.8 million during the quarter while the estimated number of Internet users grew to 37.7 million users during the period under review. The report further records that Internet penetration declined from 87.2 per cent recorded last quarter to 85.3 per cent. This drop is attributed to the revision of the base population figure used in the computation of penetration from 43.0 million to 44.2 million in line with the Economic Survey 2016. According to the Kenyan Entertainment and Media Outlook: 2013-2017 (Outlook) report by audit firm PricewaterhouseCooper (PwC), Internet access is a key driver of entertainment and media advertising and content dispersion in most segments. The Internet market consists of both consumer spending on Internet access and the revenues generated from Internet advertising. PwC estimates that the total entertainment and media expenditure in Kenya will exceed US$3 billion in 2017. Internet traffic in Kenya has increased due to the reinforcement of international bandwidth capacity. Increased capacity has benefitted both the fixed and mobile segments. The report further asserts that Kenyan Internet advertising is set to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 21.9 per cent over the forecast period, growing from a low base of only US$2 million in 2008. Search and mobile advertising will be the main growth-driving segments over the forecast period. Mobile Data and Smartphone Penetration Kenya's mobile penetration has increased from 89.2 per cent to 90 per cent according to the CA report. The report says that the continued growth in mobile subscriptions has been driven by proliferation of mobile data services such as m-commerce and mbanking services as well as handset affordability. According to the Consumer Barometer survey by Google, the percentage of people who use a smartphone to access the Internet in Kenya has increased from 27 per cent in 2014 to 44 per cent in 2016. Notable platforms in Kenya Facebook According to Facebook, there are 6.1 million Kenyans on Facebook. The visit by Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook's co-founder and CEO, in September 2016 was a validation of the growth of the platform in Kenya and also the ICT sector. In his visit, he announced that he wanted to learn from both the local developers and entrepreneur community. He visited the iHub, Twiga Foods and Andela on his first visit to Sub-Saharan Africa. Twitter According to a story published in the Economist in May 2014, it is believed that Twitter's co-founder, Evan Williams, sent the first ever tweet from the lounge of the Mount Kenya Safari Club in August 2007. According to Nendo, a digital research company, there are 2.2 million monthly active Kenyans on Twitter. 1 million of them use Twitter every day. WhatsApp According to Nendo estimates, WhatsApp has 10 million users in Kenya. It has become an important channel for person-to-person communication and has become a driver of conversations on other social media platforms as content shared on WhatsApp finds its way on Twitter and Facebook. Others Nendo also estimates that there are 3 million Instagram users in Kenya and 1.5 million LinkedIn users. The role of blogs and Social Media Blogging platforms and Social Media have become alternative news sources for Kenyans. Time and again, even mainstream media has either used the platforms to first air their news or rely on it to gather news. The government has used it to communicate and respond to critical issues. As alternative, reliable and dependable sources of news, Jackson Biko and Morris Kiruga have stood out in the past year for credibly showing the world society's ills and struggles. Crowdfunding had yet to get an impetus as did when Jackson Biko through his blog wrote about Mr. Emmanuel Otieno aka Jadudi who was fighting cancer. He told the story of the then 22-year-old university student from a humble background who had undergone three brain surgeries, but still had a lot of fight in him and sought financial help to go under the knife for the fourth time. As a result of Biko's piercing storytelling coupled with Zawadi Nyong'o's brilliant Social Media campaign, Ksh. 6.4 million was raised in 46 hours. Mr. Kiruga, popularly known as Owaahh, has cut a niche for himself as the best historical and research-focused blogger of our time. While he has been blogging for over six years, it is his serialized story on the corruption at Imperial Bank 17 in February 2016 that put him on the national radar. He continues to consistently write features that are well developed for online readers. The industry has also grown to be an environment with legitimate career paths which employ full-time writers. Platforms like HapaKenya, Techweez, Tuko, Ghafla! and Soko Directory among others continue to have full-time staff on their payroll. Most of these are in the media industry, but a few of them are secondary offline careers built around an online presence. Social Media has also claimed its stake as a force to reckon with its never ending fierce critiquing, highlighting and pushing policy makers to take actions on issues. Mark Kaigwa, in an academic article titled; From Cyber Café to Smartphone: Kenya's Social Media Lens Zooms In on the Country and Out to the World asserts that journalists now consider Twitter a part of their beat, using it as a core part of their job. Kaigwa says it has become common to see news broken on Twitter by a blogger - whether a hobbyist, informed industry insider, or cyberroving reporter pouncing on a story—legitimizing it (at times, plagiarizing it outright!). Kenyan media outlets routinely source and quote tweets and other comments from Social Media for their news stories. Nanjira Sambuli argues that going by the last decade of growth and contribution to public policy directly and indirectly, Social Media cannot be taken for granted. What is casually referred to as "hashtag activism" has considerable successes in bringing duty bearers to shame and account. Freedom of expression and the media in Kenya The last year and a half has been difficult for media freedoms in Kenya. Journalists and bloggers have felt the wrath of power and influence when doing their job in a manner that is striking similar to the old, dark days of Kenya. When Kenya promulgated the Constitution on August 27th 2010, with robust provisions for journalism practitioners, it was never imagined that these provisions will remain just on paper. Article 19 East Africa, last year documented that that each month from January to September 2015 had cases of intimidation. Over 60 journalists and bloggers were silenced, intimidated, harassed and some even killed in a spate of violence against freedom of expression, freedom of the media and access to information. The cases of threats against journalists and bloggers have been all over the country, with the fewest incidences being in the northern part of Kenya. Isiolo, Meru, Embu, Kiambu, Kitui, Mombasa, Kwale, Kajiado, Nairobi, Narok, Bomet, Kisii, Kisumu, Bungoma, Uasin Gishu and TransNzoia counties all recorded threats to freedom of expression. The Police, state officials, politicians and other individuals have contributed to the silencing and intimidation of journalists. In the period this report covers, at least two journalists or bloggers were threatened every month. Kenyans online have also not been spared the wrath of excessive force and impunity. The use of 'improper use of licensed telecommunication gadget' under Section 29 of the Information and Communications Act was rampant. It criminalized publishing information online which is deemed unlawful by the authorities. The section has since been declared unconstitutional. Others were charged with "undermining authority of a public officer," for criticizing government officials on Social Media, a charge under section 132 of the penal code (Chapter 63 Laws of Kenya) which was enacted in 1948 during the colonial rule. Robert Alai, when charged under this section, filed a counter suit challenging its constitutionality. The case is ongoing. [extensive set of additional cases discussed in full report] Bloggers and Social Media concerns for 2017 In August 2016 after President Uhuru Kenyatta met Governors, they agreed to take stern actions against media houses and Social Media users who propagate hate. They argued that the reason for coming down heavily on incitement and hate speech was to maintain peace and a stable united country before and after the elections. The concerns are however, that these leaders will take advantage of the agreement to arrest, intimidate and prosecute their critics without any link to hate speech. The previous actions with how Governors have been against journalists and their critiques online who call them to order and journalists who highlight maladministration and corruption worry. For instance, West Pokot Governor, Simon Kachapin and Nakuru Governor Kinuthia Mbugua are some examples of how they have reacted to journalists who report on corruption. Governor Mbugua was also accused of using the police to silence critics. Another concern bloggers have is the possibility of the Internet being shut down during the 2017 General Election. This action has been an emerging trend by various African countries during elections and has cast doubts of the Kenyan government maintaining the Internet since they have closely associated themselves with these countries including Gabon, Uganda and Ethiopia. Additionally, Kenya was one of the countries that voted against the landmark UN resolution condemning Internet shutdowns. Mr. Walubengo, a lecturer at the Multimedia University of Kenya, Faculty of Computing and IT argues 66 that Kenya, having a more sophisticated leadership, can encroach on Internet freedoms in more subtle ways than many other African countries can. It is unlikely to orchestrate a countrywide Internet shutdown like what typically happens in Uganda or Zimbabwe. However, they can achieve the same effect by shutting down selected zones of the country as and when they deem it necessary. He says that, "mobile-based technologies are inherently geo-location based. It is therefore easy to propagate congestion or otherwise take down GSM base-stations in one or two targeted counties without affecting the rest. This could be done to contain perceived sources of "unrest" - be they of political, social or economic nature. Citizens within those zones would be without access for as long as it is considered necessary for government authorities to get on top of a situation." In addition, the executive has been critical of critics of its regime, especially its policies, sending alarm to whether they will accept criticism of election mistakes and mishaps if they were to happen. It has equally resented peaceful assembly and demonstration on political issues. The African School on Internet Governance (AfriSIG) in Durban, October 2016 made a statement as an outcome of a multi- stakeholder practicum regarding the practice of Internet shutdowns on the continent. The statement highlighted that shutdowns violate individual rights, companies and media organizations with content online. These institutions and individuals lose credibility, revenue, and audience when the Internet is shutdown while individuals can lose jobs. In their recommendations, they affirm that multi- stakeholder forums within countries should help determine when in extreme cases the Internet could be shutdown. A report by the Brookings Institute published in October 2016, affirmed that Internet shutdowns cost countries $2.4 billion last year. The report arising from 19 countries highlights reasons for ordering these disruptions as safeguarding government authority, reducing public dissidence, fighting terrorism, maintaining national security, or protecting local businesses. While they acknowledge that the economic loss is a conservative figure, the report underlines that Internet disruptions are creating significant detrimental impacts on economic activity in a number of nations around the world. Azuri Technologies offers solar 24 inch TV to Kenyan rural households and sees "real opportunities" in the other 12 countries it operates in 25 January 2017 Balancing Act: Telecoms, Internet and Broadcast in Africa http://www.balancingact-africa.com/news/broadcast-en/39503 Kenyans in rural areas are increasingly looking to buy solar TVs. Rising expectations mean that they want something similar to a Kenyan living in the city, not a downscaled product with less content and a smaller screen. Azuri Technologies is seeking to meet this need with an alliance with pay TV provider Zuku. Russell Southwood spoke to its CEO Simon Bransfield-Garth about its ambitions. Azuri Technologies' Bransfield-Garth has seen a major shift in the rural areas of Kenya:"We went to Kenya in 2011 and everybody was buying a little solar light. That was the big thing they wanted. Things have now moved way beyond that. They now want a reasonable approximation to mains electricity. It's moved to a need phone charging and wanting a TV." "It's a bit like PC buying in the 1980s in the UK. You had to put everything together. It's the same for a solar powered TV. You can get the TV but you're not sure what channels you can get. What we wanted to offer was an integrated solution and we've done that through a partnership with Zuku." The integrated solution includes a satellite dish, a decoder and solar power plus a content package. The Zuku Smart+ entertainment package gives the user 48 TV and 21 radio channels:"It's got all the national channels plus a bunch of international channels including BBC World. There are Zuku specific channels including Zuku Sports, Zuku Swahili, Zuku Kids, Zuku Life Glam and Zuku Nolly:" The TV is something that would not look out of place in the developed world and we're offering it on a Pay-As-You-Go basis." Priced at Kshs 149 ($1.50) per day, users can get a complete home power package including a 24-inch television (designed to work on low power and made in China) with built in Satellite TV service providing up to 5 hours of normal viewing per day, four room lights, mobile phone charging and a rechargeable portable radio:"We're bringing TV to people who've never had it before. It's a future market." Users make payment using mobile money. Once payment has been made to Azuri Technologies, the user gets a text message to his or her mobile phone. This gives them a code number that they type into the unit and this provides them with the amount of credit they've paid for. When the system runs out of credit, it locks the user out. Payment can be made for as little as a week. Only launched in December last year, it has so far - not surprisingly – only sold in the hundreds:"There are 12 million household and only 5 million have TVs. Most of them in rural and peri-urban areas don't have a TV. Our traditional markets are in rural areas and the Government is keen to get TV-take-up. Although there is no data yet, Bransfield-Garth estimates that there are between 0.5 million and 1 million households have solar lighting systems. Solar TVs of this sort will probably be smaller in number but around the hundreds of thousands. This package is the first of what is designed to become a family of products with different content and partnerships and even larger TVs:"We wanted to set a baseline and to offer a product that's not at the bottom of the range. It's not a case of 'it's better than nothing'." This is fighting talk and obviously aimed at the much smaller screen m-Kopa product that we covered last year: Azuri Technologies sells its other solar products in 12 countries including Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Togo, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Angola:"There's potential to roll-out in the balance of countries we operate in. We need to find the right content partnerships." What do you think the most promising out of these countries will be?:"There are real opportunities in all of them" Zuku Satellite TV CEO Jay Chudasama said: "This is a very exciting opportunity we are giving our customers and viewers to have more choices and enjoy the experience to watch over 40 Zuku TV channels that offers high-quality and affordable family entertainment with emphasis on the local content". Customers can enjoy local free-to-air channels, international channels and Zuku branded channels including Zuku Sports, Zuku Swahili, Zuku Kids, Zuku Life Glam and Zuku Nolly. Customers pay the top-up rate via mobile money, allowing customers to use the system as much as they want for the credit period. After as little as 2 years of payments, customers will own the equipment and continue to pay only for the satellite service. The service is initially available in selected regions of Central Kenya and will be rolled out progressively nationwide in 2017. Balancing Act: Telecoms, Internet and Broadcast in Africa http://www.balancingact-africa.com/news/telecoms-en/39325 Mobile Money helped 2 percent of households in Kenya rise out of poverty 6 January 2017 Being able to send and receive money by cell phone has helped lift 194,000 households in Kenya out of poverty, according to a study published Thursday in the journal Science. Women especially have benefitted from the spread of mobile money, which has helped many move from farming into business, economists say. With mobile money, people can transfer funds back and forth over text. By the end of last year, these services had reached 93 countries; in Kenya, they are now used by 96 percent of households. Kenya's dominant mobile money service, M-PESA ("M" stands for mobile, and "pesa" is Swahili for money), launched in 2007. There are only 2,700 ATMs in Kenya, but 96 percent of households use a cell phone. M-PESA is appealing, particularly in rural areas, because you don't need a bank account or internet connection to use it. Kenya now hosts more than 110,000 mobile money agents—people who can help users deposit cash into their accounts or pick up payments others have sent them. "You can think of them as simply human ATMs," says coauthor William Jack, a professor of economics at Georgetown University. The service is cheap (although not free), and can be used to purchase goods or send money to friends and family. "It's not integrated with another financial product like a credit card," Jack says. "There's only one institution involved, the cell phone company." Mobile money is also useful because many families in Kenya are dispersed across the country. "There will be a brother or son who works in Nairobi and sends money home to his mom, there'll be a husband who works in Mombasa an sends money up country for school fees," Jack says. Before the rise of mobile money, it was time-consuming and costly for these families to share funds. "There was no easy way to do that electronically; people would literally take two or three days off work and catch a bus 1,000 kilometers to deliver 30 or 40 dollars and then come back," Jack says. "Mobile money allowed that process to happen literally at the press of a button, and at relatively low costs." To find out how these services have helped people over time, Jack and his colleague, Tavneet Suri of MIT, surveyed households around the country between 2008 and 2014. The team examined how financial wellbeing changed as mobile money agents became more plentiful in certain areas. "It's kind of like saying, if you can get better access to an agent, how is your life different?" Jack says. "On average, they're a bit richer." Jack and Suri estimate that access to mobile money has helped bring 2 percent of Kenya's households out of poverty, with the most marked benefits seen in families headed by women. They believe that access to M-PESA has helped 185,000 women save more and start businesses. "Mobile money might have been more convenient, it might be safer, it might be more private," Jack says. Mobile money is also beginning to offer more sophisticated financial services like M-Shwari, a bank account that people can operate through M-PESA. "It has been integrated with a couple banks to provide a credit service and a savings service," Jack says. "People have talked about insurance being provided over the phone." Being able to use mobile money hasn't made people rich. "It's not clear how far above the poverty line they went," Jack says. But fewer homes are surviving on less than $2 a day. M-PESA gives people a way to safely store and manage money, and this directly improves their financial wellbeing, he and Suri concluded. Source: POPSCI ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________(c) 2017 Africa Focus