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  • Foreign Policy: 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2017

    The world is entering its most dangerous chapter in decades. The sharp uptick in war over recent years is outstripping our ability to cope with the consequences. From the global refugee crisis to the spread of terrorism, our collective failure to resolve conflict is giving birth to new threats and emergencies. Even in peaceful societies, the politics of fear is leading to dangerous polarization and demagoguery. It is against this backdrop that Donald Trump was elected the next president of the United States — unquestionably the most important event of last year and one with far-reaching geopolitical implications for the future. Much has been said about the unknowns of Trump’s foreign-policy agenda. But one thing we do know is that uncertainty itself can be profoundly destabilizing, especially when it involves the most powerful actor on the global stage. Already, jittery allies from Europe to East Asia are parsing Trump’s tweets and casual bluster. Will he cut a deal with Russia over the heads of Europeans? Will he try to undo the Iran nuclear accord? Is he seriously proposing a new arms race? Who knows? And that is precisely the problem. The last 60 years have suffered their share of crises, from Vietnam to Rwanda to the Iraq War. But the vision of a cooperative international order that emerged after World War II, championed and led by the United States, has structured relations between major powers since the end of the Cold War. That order was in flux even before Trump won the election. The retrenchment of Washington, for both good and ill, began during Barack Obama’s presidency. But Obama worked to shore up international institutions to fill the gap. Today, we can no longer assume that a United States shaped by “America first” will provide the bricks and mortar of the international system. U.S. hard power, when not accompanied and framed by its soft power, is more likely to be perceived as a threat rather than the reassurance that it has been for many. In Europe, uncertainty over the new U.S. political posture is compounded by the messy aftermath of Brexit. Nationalist forces have gained strength, and upcoming elections in France, Germany, and the Netherlands will test the future of the European project. The potential unraveling of the European Union is one of the greatest challenges we face today — a fact that is lost amid the many other alarming developments competing for attention. We cannot afford to lose Europe’s balancing voice in the world. Exacerbated regional rivalries are also transforming the landscape, as is particularly evident in the competition between Iran and the Persian Gulf countries for influence in the Middle East. The resulting proxy wars have had devastating consequences from Syria to Iraq to Yemen. Terrorism is just a tactic, and fighting a tactic cannot define a strategy. Jihadi groups exploit wars and state collapse to consolidate power, and they thrive on chaos. Many world leaders claim that the way out of deepening divisions is to unite around the shared goal of fighting terrorism. But that is an illusion: Terrorism is just a tactic, and fighting a tactic cannot define a strategy. Jihadi groups exploit wars and state collapse to consolidate power, and they thrive on chaos. In the end, what the international system really needs is a strategy of conflict prevention that shores up, in an inclusive way, the states that are its building blocks. The international system needs more than the pretense of a common enemy to sustain itself. With the advent of the Trump administration, transactional diplomacy, already on the rise, looks set to increase. Tactical bargaining is replacing long-term strategies and values-driven policies. A rapprochement between Russia and Turkey holds some promise for reducing the level of violence in Syria. However, Moscow and Ankara must eventually help forge a path toward more inclusive governance — or else they risk being sucked ever deeper into the Syrian quagmire. A stable Middle East is unlikely to emerge from the temporary consolidation of authoritarian regimes that ignore the demands of the majority of their people. The EU, long a defender of values-based diplomacy, has struck bargains with Turkey, Afghanistan, and African states to stem the flow of migrants and refugees — with worrying global consequences. On the other hand, Europe could take advantage of any improvement in U.S.-Russia relations to reset arms control for both conventional and nuclear forces, which would be more opportune than opportunistic. Beijing’s hardheaded approach in its relationship with other Asian countries and with Africa and Latin America shows what a world deprived of the implicit reassurance of the United States will look like. Such transactional arrangements may look like a revival of realpolitik. But an international system guided by short-term deal-making is unlikely to be stable. Deals can be broken when they do not reflect longer-term strategies. Without a predictable order, widely accepted rules, and strong institutions, the space for mischief is greater. The world is increasingly fluid and multipolar, pushed and pulled by a diverse set of states and nonstate actors — by armed groups as well as by civil society. In a bottom-up world, major powers cannot single-handedly contain or control local conflicts, but they can manipulate or be drawn into them: Local conflicts can be the spark that lights much bigger fires. Whether we like it or not, globalization is a fact. We are all connected. Syria’s war triggered a refugee crisis that contributed to Brexit, whose profound political and economic consequences will again ripple outward. Countries may wish to turn inward, but there is no peace and prosperity without more cooperative management of world affairs. This list of 10 conflicts to watch in 2017 illustrates some of the broader trends but also explores ways to reverse the dangerous dynamics. Syrian Abu Khaled looks at the rubble of his destroyed house in the rebel-held town of Douma on Dec. 30, 2016. (Photo credit: ABD DOUMANY/AFP/Getty Images); Displaced Iraqis from Mosul's eastern neighbourhoods arrive in the Al-Quds neighborhood on January 3. (Photo credit: AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP/Getty Images) 1. Syria & Iraq After nearly six years of fighting, an estimated 500,000 people killed, and some 12 million uprooted, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad appears likely to maintain power for now, but even with foreign backing his forces cannot end the war and regain total control. This was evident in the recent recapture of Palmyra by the Islamic State, just nine months after a Russian-backed military campaign had expelled the group. Assad’s strategy to cripple the non-jihadi opposition has worked to empower radical Islamist groups like the Islamic State and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly the Nusra Front). Non-jihadi rebels have been further weakened by the recent defeat in Aleppo; they remain fractious and undermined by their state backers’ divergent approaches. The regime’s December recapture of eastern Aleppo marked a cruel turning point, with the regime and its allies succeeding by relentlessly besieging and bombarding civilians. Western diplomats expressed horrorand outrage yet failed to muster a concrete response. The evacuation of civilians and rebels ultimately proceeded, haltingly, only after Russia, Turkey, and Iran struck a deal. This troika followed up with a meeting in Moscow to “revitalize the political process” for ending the war. Neither the United States nor the United Nations was invited or even consulted. A cease-fire deal brokered by Russia and Turkey at the end of December appeared to fall apart within days, as the regime continued military offensives in the suburbs of Damascus. Despite the significant challenges ahead, this new diplomatic track opens the best possibility for reducing the level of violence in Syria. The war against the Islamic State is likely to continue, and there is an urgent need to ensure it will not fuel further violence and destabilization. In Syria, two competing efforts against the group — one led by Ankara, the other by the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — are entangled with the conflict between the Turkish state and PKK inside Turkey. Washington has backed both efforts while trying to minimize direct clashes between them. The incoming Trump administration should prioritize de-escalating the conflict between its Turkish and Kurdish partners above the immediate capture of territory from jihadis. If violence between the two spirals, the Islamic State will be the first to gain. The Islamic State still claims a caliphate across parts of Iraq and Syria, although it has lost significant territory over the past year. Even if it is defeated militarily, it or another radical group may well re-emerge unless underlying governance issues are addressed. The Islamic State itself grew from a similar failure in Iraq. It is spreading an ideology that is still mobilizing young people across the globe and poses threats well beyond the borders of Iraq and Syria, as recent attacks in Istanbul and Berlin have shown. In Iraq, the fight against the Islamic State has further undermined the state’s ability to govern, caused enormous destruction, militarized youth, and traumatized Iraqi society. It has fragmented Kurdish and Shiite political parties into rival factions and paramilitary forces dependent on regional backers and competing over Iraq’s resources. The fight to defeat the Islamic State, whose rise has fed on deep grievances among Sunni Arabs, has compounded the damage done by the group’s rule. To avoid worse, Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government need support and pressure to rein in paramilitary groups. Success in the current U.S.-backed military campaign to retake Mosul, if mishandled, could turn into failure. Besides the regular Iraqi Army, special counterterrorism forces, and federal police who are leading the effort inside the city, local groups are also involved, seeking spoils of victory. Moreover, Iran and Turkey are competing for influence by using local proxies. The longer the battle drags on, the more these various groups will exploit opportunities to gain strategic advantage through territorial control, complicating a political settlement. Iraq, with support from the United States and other partners, should continue military and logistics support to Iraqi forces pushing into the city and establish locally recruited stabilization forces in areas retaken from the Islamic State to ensure that military gains are not again lost. They will also need to jump-start governance involving local, and locally accepted, political actors. First aid officers carry an injured woman at the site of a terrorist attack on January 1 in Istanbul.(Photo credit: IHLAS NEWS AGENCY/AFP/Getty Images) 2. Turkey A New Year’s Day attack in Istanbul — which killed at least 39 people — seems like a harbinger of more violence to come. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack, a departure from the group’s general practice in Turkey that could signal an escalation. In addition to worsening spillover from the wars in Syria and Iraq, Turkey also faces a spiraling conflict with the PKK. Politically polarized, under economic strain, and with weak alliances, Turkey is poised for greater upheaval. The conflict between the state and PKK militants continues to deteriorate following the collapse of a cease-fire in July 2015. Since then, the PKK conflict has entered one of the deadliest chapters in its three-decade history, with at least 2,500 militants, security forces, and civilians killed as both sides opt for further escalation. Clashes and security operations have displaced more than 350,000 civilians and flattened several city districts in Turkey’s majority Kurdish southeast. A PKK-linked double bomb attack killed 45 people near a soccer stadium in Istanbul in December. In response, the government is once again jailing representatives of the Kurdish movement, blocking a crucial channel to a political settlement that must include fundamental rights protections for Kurds in Turkey. Though rooted in local sentiments, the escalation is also driven by Ankara’s growing concern over Kurdish gains in northern Syria and Iraq. This, and the danger posed by the Islamic State, persuaded Ankara to send its first detachments of troops into both countries, sucking it further into the Middle East maelstrom. Domestically, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government continues its crackdown on political opposition and dissent and is pushing for constitutional changes to usher in a presidential system — likely to be put to a public referendum in early spring. In the wake of the coup attempt last July, the government launched a massive crackdown, purging more than 100,000 officials. Turkey’s Western allies, though dependent on a strong NATO partner on Europe’s southern border, have been strongly critical of the government’s authoritarian bent. This adds to the tensions created by stagnating negotiations between the EU and Ankara over Turkey’s accession to the bloc. In November, Erdogan responded angrily to criticism from Brussels, threatening to tear up the March 2016 refugee deal by which Ankara agreed to prevent the flow of Syrian refugees from moving onward to Europe. More than 2.7 million Syrian refugees are currently registered in Turkey; their integration poses significant challenges for the state and for host communities. Relations with Washington are strained by Turkey’s military escalation with U.S.-allied Kurdish forces in Syria and by Turkey’s call for Washington to extradite alleged coup mastermind Fethullah Gulen. Ankara has reached an uneasy rapprochement with Moscow, and the December assassination of Russia’s ambassador to Turkey has, for the moment, brought the two countries closer together. Ankara is increasingly downplaying its Western alliances and scrambling to make arrangements with Russia and Iran. However, Turkey and Iran are still on a dangerous course, fueled by profound disagreement over their respective core interests in Iraq and Syria. Newly recruited Houthi fighters mobilize in the Yemeni capital of Sanaa to fight pro-government forces on January 3. (Photo credit: MOHAMMED HUWAIS/AFP/Getty Images) 3. Yemen The war in Yemen has created another humanitarian catastrophe, wrecking a country that was already the poorest in the Arab world. With millions of people now on the brink of famine, the need for a comprehensive cease-fire and political settlement is ever more urgent. Yemenis have suffered tremendous hardships from air bombardments, rocket attacks, and economic blockades. According to the U.N., approximately 4,000 civilians have been killed, the majority in Saudi-led coalition airstrikes. All parties to the conflict stand accused of war crimes, including indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas. Saudi Arabia entered the conflict in March 2015 to counter advances made by the Houthis, a predominantly Zaydi Shiite militia viewed by Riyadh as a proxy for its archrival, Iran. Although the Houthis are not closely tied to Iran, it serves Tehran’s interests to have Saudi Arabia stuck in a vicious stalemate in Yemen. Both sides appear locked in a cycle of escalating violence and provocations, derailing U.N. peace talks. In November, the Saudi-backed Yemeni government led by President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi rejected the U.N.’s proposed roadmap. That same month, the Houthi movement and its allies, mainly forces under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, formed a new government. Despite the challenges, it may still be possible to convince the parties to accept the roadmap as the basis for a compromise that would end regional aspects of the war and return it to an inter-Yemeni process. Much depends on Saudi Arabia’s calculations and the willingness of its international sponsors, especially the United States and Britain, to encourage Riyadh to fully support the political compromise on offer. Failure to get the process back on track carries risks for all involved, as violent jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State, are thriving in Yemen’s chaos. Women and children queue to enter a Unicef nutrition clinic at the Muna informal settlement on the outskirts of Maiduguri in northeastern Nigeria on Sept. 15, 2016. (Photo credit: STEFAN HEUNIS/AFP/Getty Images) 4. Greater Sahel and Lake Chad Basin Overlapping conflicts across the Greater Sahel and Lake Chad Basin have contributed to massive human suffering, including the uprooting of some 4.2 million people from their homes. Jihadis, armed groups, and criminal networks jockey for power across this impoverished region, where borders are porous and governments have limited reach. In 2016, jihadis based in Central Sahel launched deadly attacks in western Niger, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire, underscoring the region’s vulnerability. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al-Mourabitoun remain active while a new group claiming affiliation to the Islamic State is developing. All appear likely to continue attacks targeting civilians, as well as national and international forces. Mali is the U.N.’s most dangerous peacekeeping mission, with 70 personnel killed by “malicious acts” since 2013. Mali could face a major crisis this year, as implementation of the 2015 Bamako peace agreement threatens to stall. The recent fracturing of the main rebel alliance in the north, the Coordination of Azawad Movements, has contributed to a proliferation of armed groups, and violence has spread to central Mali. Regional powers should use the upcoming African Union summit in January to revive the peace process and possibly bring in groups that are currently left out. Algeria, an important broker of stability in the region, has a key role to play as the deal’s chief mediator. In the Lake Chad Basin, the security forces of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad have stepped up their fight against the Boko Haram insurgency. At the end of December, the Nigerian president announced the “final crushing of Boko Haram terrorists in their last enclave” in the Sambisa Forest, yet the group has not been vanquished. A leadership quarrel has split the jihadi movement, but it remains resilient and aggressive. Although international attention has focused on Boko Haram’s kidnapping and abuse of women and girls, policymakers should also note that some women joined the movement voluntarily in search of economic and social opportunities. Understanding the various ways women experience the conflict should directly inform strategies to tackle the roots of the insurgency. The Boko Haram insurgency, the aggressive military response to it, and the lack of effective assistance to those caught up in the conflict threaten to create an endless cycle of violence and despair. If regional governments do not react responsibly to the humanitarian disaster, they could further alienate communities and sow the seeds of future rebellion. States should also invest in economic development and strengthen local governance to close off opportunities for radical groups. A man screams as people gather to protest in the neighbourhood of Yolo in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, on Dec. 20, 2016. (Photo credit: EDUARDO SOTERAS/AFP/Getty Images) 5. Democratic Republic of Congo The Democratic Republic of the Congo received some good news shortly before midnight on New Year’s Eve when Catholic bishops announced that a deal had been reached to resolve the country’s political crisis. President Joseph Kabila has not yet signed on to the agreement, which requires him to step down after elections are held, sometime before the end of 2017. Despite high levels of mistrust between the parties, the deal mediated by the Congolese Catholic Church remains the best chance for a path forward. The overarching challenge now is to prepare for elections and a peaceful transition in short order, for which solid international backing is essential. Kabila’s determination to cling to power beyond his second term, in defiance of the Congolese Constitution, met with significant opposition and volatile street protests throughout 2016 — and threatens more widespread violence to come. Congo’s endemic corruption and winner-takes-all politics mean Kabila’s entourage has much to lose, so they may not let go easily. African and Western powers need to coordinate efforts to pull Congo back from the brink and prevent further regional instability. MONUSCO, the U.N.’s largest peacekeeping mission, does not have the capacity to deal with such challenges and would be more effective with a narrower mandate, moving away from institution building and toward good offices and human rights monitoring. Last September, at least 53 people were killed, mostly by security forces, when demonstrations against Kabila’s rule beyond the end of his mandate turned violent. Clashes between security forces and protesters in several cities around the end of his term, on Dec. 19 and 20, reportedly killed at least 40 people. Violence is likely to continue if the elections are again postponed. The main opposition coalition, the Rassemblement, will be prepared to harness the power of the street to try to force Kabila out. The political tension in Kinshasa is also contributing to increased violence in pockets throughout the country, including the conflict-ridden east. A woman walks outside her shelter in the Protection of Civilians site in Malakal, South Sudan, on June 14, 2016. (Photo credit: ALBERT GONZALEZ FARRAN/AFP/Getty Images); A billboard featuring portraits of South Sudan's President Salva Kiir and the opposition leader Riek Machar stands in Juba, South Sudan, on April 14, 2016. (Photo credit: ALBERT GONZALEZ FARRAN/AFP/Getty Images) 6. South Sudan After three years of civil war, the world’s youngest country is still bedeviled by multiple conflicts. Grievances with the central government and cycles of ethnic violence fuel fighting that has internally displaced 1.8 million people and forced around 1.2 million to flee the country. There has been mounting international concern over reports of mass atrocities and the lack of progress toward implementing the 2015 peace agreement. In December, President Salva Kiir called for a renewed cease-fire and national dialogue to promote peace and reconciliation. Whether or not these efforts succeed depends on the transitional government’s willingness to negotiate fairly with individual armed groups and engage with disaffected communities at the grassroots level. The internationally backed peace agreement was derailed in July 2016 when fighting flared in Jubabetween government forces and former rebels. Opposition leader and erstwhile Vice President Riek Machar, who had only recently returned to Juba under the terms of the deal, fled the country. Kiir has since strengthened his position in the capital and the region as a whole, which creates an opportunity to promote negotiations with elements of the armed opposition, including groups currently outside the transitional government. The security situation in Juba has improved in recent months, although fighting and ethnic violence continue elsewhere. International diplomatic efforts are focused on the deployment of a 4,000-strong regional protection force — a distraction that would do little to quell an outbreak of major violence and pulls energy away from the deeper political engagement needed to consolidate peace. The existing U.N. peacekeeping mission in South Sudan, UNMISS, needs urgent reform — which is especially clear following its failure to protect civilians during last July’s spasm of violence in Juba. A glimmer of hope in the country’s tragedy is the delicate rapprochement underway among South Sudan, Uganda, and Sudan that might one day help guarantee greater stability. Afghan security personnel inspect a damaged vehicle after a roadside bomb explosion at Dasht-E-Barchi in Kabul on Dec. 28, 2016. (Photo credit: WAKIL KOHSAR/AFP/Getty Images) 7. Afghanistan War and political instability in Afghanistan pose a serious threat to international peace and security, more than 15 years after U.S.-led coalition forces ousted the Taliban from power as part of a broader campaign to defeat al Qaeda. Today, the Taliban are gaining ground; the Haqqani network is responsible for attacks in major cities; and the Islamic State has claimed a series of attacks targeting Shiite Muslims that appear intent on stoking sectarian violence. The number of armed clashes last year reached the highest level since the U.N. started recording incidents in 2007, with large numbers of civilian casualties. Further weakening of the Afghan security forces would risk leaving large ungoverned spaces that could be exploited by regional and transnational militant groups. America’s longest war barely registered as a policy issue during the U.S. presidential election. Trump’s intentions on Afghanistan remain unclear, though he has repeatedly expressed skepticism about nation building. His controversial choice for national security advisor, retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, served as director of intelligence for Joint Special Operations Command in Iraq and Afghanistan. Flynn’s proclaimed focus on “radical Islamic terrorism” as the single-most important global threat misdiagnoses the problem, with worrying implications in Afghanistan and beyond. The strategic direction over time must be toward a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, which will require greater regional convergence as well as Chinese involvement. Meanwhile, Russia, Pakistan, and China have formed a working group on Afghanistan with the stated aim of creating a “regional anti-terrorism structure.” Kabul so far has been left out of the trilateral consultations. Afghanistan’s relations with Pakistan have long been strained due to Islamabad’s support for the Taliban and other militant groups. Tensions increased last fall as thousands of Afghan refugees in Pakistan were forced to flee amid increased violence, detentions, and harassment. Afghanistan’s refugee crisis was made worse by the EU’s plan to deport 80,000 asylum-seekers back to Afghanistan — a politically driven response to a humanitarian emergency. All this on top of the country’s economic crisis adds heavy pressures on a dangerously weak state. Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar, who tried to cross the Naf river into Bangladesh to escape sectarian violence, are kept under watch by Bangladeshi security officials in Teknaf on Dec. 25, 2016. (Photo credit: AFP/Getty Images) 8. Myanmar The new civilian government led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi promised peace and national reconciliation as its top priorities; however, recent flare-ups of violence have jeopardized efforts to end nearly 70 years of armed conflict. In November, a “Northern Alliance” of four armed groups carried out unprecedented joint attacks on urban targets in a key trade zone on the Chinese border, triggering military escalation in the northeast. This does not bode well for progress at the next session of the 21st-Century Panglong Conference slated for February, part of a renewed peace process to bring together most of the country’s major ethnic armed groups. Meanwhile, the fate of the Muslim Rohingya minority is drawing renewed international concern. The population has seen its rights progressively eroded in recent years, especially following anti-Muslim violence in Rakhine state in 2012. The latest round of violence in Rakhine was sparked by a series of attacks in October and November targeting border police and military in an area near Myanmar’s northwestern frontier with Bangladesh. Security forces hit back hard in a campaign that made little distinction between militants and civilians, with allegations of extrajudicial executions, rapes, and arson. By mid-December, the U.N. estimated that around 27,000 Rohingya had fled to Bangladesh. More than a dozen fellow Nobel laureates issued an open letter criticizing Aung San Suu Kyi for her failure to speak out about the abuses and calling for full and equal citizenship rights for the Rohingya. The initial attacks were carried out by an armed group known as Harakah al-Yaqin (“Faith Movement”), whose emergence is a potential game-changer in Myanmar. Although the Rohingya have never been a radicalized population, the government’s heavy-handed military response increases the risk of spiraling violence. Grievances could be exploited by transnational jihadis attempting to pursue their own agendas, which would inflame religious tensions across the majority Buddhist country. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko speaks at a ceremony marking the positioning of the New Safe Confinement sarcophagus over Chernobyl nuclear power station's destroyed reactor on Nov. 29, 2016 (Photo credit: BRENDAN HOFFMAN/Getty Images) 9. Ukraine After almost three years of war and roughly 10,000 deaths, Russia’s military intervention defines all aspects of political life in Ukraine. Divided by the conflict and crippled by corruption, Ukraine is headed for even greater uncertainty. Trump’s professed admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin scares Kiev, as do rumors that the United States may decide to scrap sanctions against Russia. Implementation of the February 2015 Minsk peace agreement is stalled, effectively bringing Russia closer to two of its goals in the Ukraine conflict: the establishment of permanent pro-Russian political entities in eastern Ukraine, as well as normalization of its annexation of Crimea that started the war in 2014. Across Ukraine, there is growing disillusionment with leaders who were brought to power by the Maidan demonstrations of early 2014 but who now increasingly resemble the corrupt oligarchs thrown out. Western support for President Petro Poroshenko is ebbing due to Kiev’s unwillingness or inability to deliver promised economic reform and robust anti-corruption measures. Poroshenko’s problems may be compounded if early parliamentary elections are held in 2017, in which pro-Russia parties could gain ground. The United States and EU must press Kiev harder for reforms while using strong diplomacy with Moscow, including maintaining sanctions. Putin must be convinced that there cannot be a return to normalcy in Europe so long as various forms of hybrid warfare are used to keep the situation in Ukraine unsettled. Russia’s tactics — including the use of force, cyberattacks, propaganda, and financial pressures — send a chilling message across the region. U.S. Border Patrol agents watch over immigrants who crossed the U.S.-Mexico border on January 3 near McAllen, Texas. (Photo credit: JOHN MOORE/Getty Images) 10. Mexico A high level of tension between the United States and Mexico might seem inevitable after Trump’s campaign pledges to build a border wall, deport millions of undocumented immigrants, and terminate the North American Free Trade Agreement. He also famously characterized Mexican immigrants as drug dealers, criminals, and rapists and drew on support from white nationalist groups. In an early effort to avoid future confrontation, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto invited candidate Trump to visit the country in September — a move that initially backfired with a Mexican public already angry about high crime, corruption, and a weak economy. Peña Nieto knows Mexico cannot afford to make an enemy of its mighty neighbor. Mexico’s political and business elites are reportedly out in force to convince Trump and his advisors to modify stated positions on immigration and free trade. If the United States were to pursue a policy of massive deportations, this would risk triggering an even worse humanitarian and security crisis. Refugees and migrants from Mexico and Central America are fleeing epidemic levels of violence combined with endemic poverty. A 2016 survey found that armed violence in Mexico and the Northern Triangle had killed around 34,000 people, more than were killed in Afghanistan over the same period. Stepped-up deportations and border enforcement tend to divert undocumented migration into more dangerous channels — benefiting criminal gangs and corrupt officials. The United States can better serve its own interests by strengthening its partnership with Mexico to address the systemic failings that give rise to violence and corruption. Jean-Marie Guéhenno is president and CEO of International Crisis Group. He served as the United Nations under secretary-general for peacekeeping operations between 2000 and 2008. He is the author of The Fog of Peace: A Memoir of Peacekeeping in the 21st Century. © 2017 Foreign Policy

  • Army conducts mass arrest and sexual abuses on women in Maungdaw South

    AT Correspondent, Maungdaw Myanmar brutal military forces have been carrying out intense crackdown against the Rohingya villagers where dozens of innocent people have been arrested and the women have been sexually assaulted by army in Guduthaya village of Southern Maungdaw since yesterday. The army members have besieged the village and started arresting people arbitrarily and making attempt to conduct mass rape on women in the village. All the male members of the village fled from the village and several women have been sexually assaulted by army members who have been found inside their houses. A woman says they could not sleep at night due to violence of army against the Rohingya in the village since yesterday. “We are fleeing from the village to escape sexual rape of army. We are going where we can see. If we stay at home in the village, we will also be raped by military forces”, said another woman who could escape rape. The arrested people have been cruelly tortured by army to severe injury on different parts of their bodies in the custody. Now, all the residents of Goduthay village tract are scattered outside the village, some have been arrested many other men including women and children fled away from the village., source said.

  • Myanmar's Malicious Propaganda: framing Rohingyas as "Islamic militants" and launching

    "While the Burmese government is justifying its actions in the alleged pursuit of Islamic militants, this claim is suspect at best. “There is absolutely no credibility in the claim made by Aung San Suu Kyi government,” Maung Zarni told me. Zami is a longtime critic of the Burmese government and an advisor to the (European) Center for the Study of Extremism in Cambridge, UK. According to Zarni, men “armed with only sticks, swords and homemade guns, attacking 3 armed border guard posts” did not amount to terrorism by any definition." However, he cautioned against “possible future terrorist attacks” that maybe imminent as the situation becomes “fully visible to the Islamic world, as well as the larger international community of world citizens”. Read the full text of the article here. ======================================= Army conducts mass arrest and sexual abuses on women in Maungdaw 8 Jan 2017 ========================================= Swedish National Radio Sunday Special Program on Myanmar's Rohingya persecution & Aung San Suu Kyi's moral cowardice and anti-Rohingya racism Har Burmas Aung San Suu Kyis gloria hamnat på sned? Publicerat tisdag 3 januari kl 18.32 8 Jan 2017

  • Cambodia: Long walk home recalled as Khmer Rouge fell

    Victims of the Khmer Rouge on the long journey home Jan. 7, 1979 after Vietnamese troops liberated the capital, Phnom Penh (Photo: Documentation Centre of Cambodia) Jan. 7 marks 38 years since fall of ultra-Maoist regime that saw at least 1.5 million people die, many of whom were executed PHNOM PENH Youk Chhang can’t remember the exact day the Khmer Rouge left, but rumors that their end was nigh were rife in the Cambodian village to which he had been forcibly evacuated and put to work more than three years before. “We were told that the Khmer Rouge village chiefs with black uniforms had left the village, and there was a rumor that if you got to the highway, you would see liberation army troops and they would take you home,” he told Anadolu Agency on Saturday, the 38th anniversary of the fall of the ultra-Maoist regime. Chhang is the executive director of the Documentation Centre of Cambodia -- a repository for thousands of documents related to the Khmer Rouge years -- and was around 16 when the regime finally fell to advancing Vietnamese troops that began advancing into Cambodia at the end of 1978, liberating different pockets of the country as they went. Today -- the anniversary of the Jan. 7, 1979 liberation of the capital, Phnom Penh -- the date is marked as an annual holiday; touted by the ruling party as one of its greatest triumphs [some of its founding members defected from the Khmer Rouge and were part of the liberation wave] and others as a day of reflection. Chhang doesn’t know how long it took him, but he walked -- barefoot -- the approximately 400 kilometers (248 miles) back to Phnom Penh, from where he had been caught up in the April 17, 1975 forced evacuation of the city by Khmer Rouge soldiers. “I never thought of dying or of losing hope, but I’ve heard from friends, they are amazed how I walked barefoot from [he northwestern province of] Banteay Meanchey to Phnom Penh city,” he said. “I drive it now and I can’t imagine. You jump from hell, and suddenly you’re in heaven.” Interpretations of the importance of the day vary. Sam Rainsy, exiled leader of the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party, wrote on Facebook on Saturday that the day was “a military and political show organized by the communist Vietnamese”. “If the communist Vietnamese did not help the Khmer Rouge in the early 1970s there would be no 17 April 1975,” he said, in reference to the day that the Khmer Rouge sacked Phnom Penh. The ruling Cambodian People’s Party holds an event every year at its headquarters to extoll the virtues of those who were part of the liberation front. For others, Chhang said, it’s a quieter day of reflection. “It's been a long struggle for everyone here in Cambodia since the fall of the Khmer Rouge, and I think the reflection is rather personal now,” he said. “It doesn’t mean it’s no longer significant, but it’s been some time.” For three years, eight months and 20 days, the Khmer Rouge -- whose forces had toppled the previous Lon Nol regime following a bitter and bloody civil war in the early 1970s -- set about implementing an agrarian regime that pushed people to breaking point. During the period, at least 1.5 million are estimated to have died or been executed. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ © 2017Anadolu Agency

  • NOBEL LAUREATES CALL ON SECURITY COUNCIL TO AID ROHINGYA

    On December 29, Jody Williams, Shirin Ebadi, Mairead Maguire, Leymah Gbowee and Tawkkol Karman joined Nobel Laureates and leaders from around the world in an open letter to the United Nations Security Council. The letter called on Security Council member countries to end the violence against the Rohingya in Burma. Offensives by the Myanma Army in Rakhine State have caused the displacement of 30,000 people and killed hundreds — but access to humanitarian aid has been denied. Read the full letter here. OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE COUNCIL TO END THE HUMAN CRISIS OF ROHINGYAS IN MYANMAR Dear President and Members of the Security Council, As you are aware, a human tragedy amounting to ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity is unfolding in Myanmar. Over the past two months, a military offensive by the Myanmar Army in Rakhine State has led to the killing of hundreds of Rohingya people. Over 30,000 people have been displaced. Houses have been burned, women raped, many civilians arbitrarily arrested, and children killed. Crucially, access for humanitarian aid organisations has been almost completely denied, creating an appalling humanitarian crisis in an area already extremely poor. Thousands have fled to neighbouring Bangladesh, only to be sent back. Some international experts have warned of the potential for genocide. It has all the hallmarks of recent past tragedies – Rwanda, Darfur, Bosnia, Kosovo. The head of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the Bangladesh side of the border, John McKissick, has accused Myanmar’s government of ethnic cleansing. The UN’s Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar Yanghee Lee has condemned the restricted access to Rakhine State as “unacceptable.” The Rohingyas are among the world’s most persecuted minorities, who for decades have been subjected to a campaign of marginalisation and dehumanisation. In 1982, their rights to citizenship were removed, and they were rendered stateless, despite living in the country for generations. They have endured severe restrictions on movement, marriage, education and religious freedom. Yet despite the claims by government and military, and many in society, that they are in fact illegal Bengali immigrants who have crossed the border, Bangladesh does not recognise them either. Their plight intensified dramatically in 2012 when two severe outbreaks of violence resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands and a new apartheid between Rohingya Muslims and their Rakhine Buddhist neighbours. Since then they have existed in ever more dire conditions. This latest crisis was sparked by an attack on Myanmar border police posts on 9 October, in which nine Myanmar police officers were killed. The truth about who carried out the attack, how and why, is yet to be established, but the Myanmar military accuse a group of Rohingyas. Even if that is true, the military’s response has been grossly disproportionate. It would be one thing to round up suspects, interrogate them and put them on trial. It is quite another to unleash helicopter gunships on thousands of ordinary civilians and to rape women and throw babies into a fire. According to one Rohingya interviewed by Amnesty International, “they shot at people who were fleeing. They surrounded the village and started going from house to house. They were verbally abusing the people. They were threatening to rape the women.” Another witness described how her two sons were arbitrarily arrested: “It was early in the morning, the military surrounded our house, while some came in and forced me and my children to go outside. They tied my two sons up. They tied their hands behind their backs, and they were beaten badly. The military kicked them in the chest. I saw it myself. I was crying so loudly. When I cried, they [the military] pointed a gun at me. My children were begging the military not to hit them. They were beaten for around 30 minutes before being taken away”. She has not seen them since. Despite repeated appeals to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi we are frustrated that she has not taken any initiative to ensure full and equal citizenship rights of the Rohingyas. Daw Suu Kyi is the leader and is the one with the primary responsibility to lead, and lead with courage, humanity and compassion. We urge the United Nations to do everything possible to encourage the Government of Myanmar to lift all restrictions on humanitarian aid, so that people receive emergency assistance. Access for journalists and human rights monitors should also be permitted, and an independent, international inquiry to establish the truth about the current situation should be established. Furthermore, we urge the members of UN Security Council to put this crisis on Security Council’s agenda as a matter of urgency, and to call upon the Secretary-General to visit Myanmar in the coming weeks as a priority. If the current Secretary-General is able to do so, we would urge him to go; if not, we encourage the new Secretary-General to make it one of his first tasks after he takes office in January. It is time for the international community as a whole to speak out much more strongly. After Rwanda, world leaders said “never again”. If we fail to take action, people may starve to death if they are not killed with bullets, and we may end up being the passive observers of crimes against humanity which will lead us once again to wring our hands belatedly and say “never again” all over again. Sincerely, Professor Muhammad Yunus 2006 Nobel Peace Laureate José Ramos-Horta 1996 Nobel Peace Laureate Máiread Maguire 1976 Nobel Peace Laureate Betty Williams 1976 Nobel Peace Laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu 1984 Nobel Peace Laureate Oscar Arias 1987 Nobel Peace Laureate Jody Williams 1997 Nobel Peace Laureate Shirin Ebadi 2003 Nobel Peace Laureate Tawakkol Karman 2011 Nobel Peace Laureate Malala Yousafzai 2014 Nobel Peace Laureate Leymah Gbowee 2011 Nobel Peace Laureate Sir Richard J. Roberts 1993 Nobel Laureate in Physiology or Medicine Elizabeth Blackburn 2009 Nobel Laureate in Physiology or Medicine Romano Prodi Former Prime Minister of Italy Emma Bonino Former Italian Foreign minister Arianna Huffington Founder and Editor, The Huffington Post Sir Richard Branson Business Leader and Philanthropist Paul Polman Business Leader Mo Ibrahim Entrepreneur and Philanthropist Jochen Zeitz Business Leader and Philanthropist Richard Curtis SDG Advocate, Film Director Alaa Murabit SDG Advocate, Voice of Libyan Women Kerry Kennedy Human Rights Activist ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Nobel Women Initiative

  • NOBEL LAUREATES CALL ON SECURITY COUNCIL TO AID ROHINGYA

    On December 29, Jody Williams, Shirin Ebadi, Mairead Maguire, Leymah Gbowee and Tawkkol Karman joined Nobel Laureates and leaders from around the world in an open letter to the United Nations Security Council. The letter called on Security Council member countries to end the violence against the Rohingya in Burma. Offensives by the Myanma Army in Rakhine State have caused the displacement of 30,000 people and killed hundreds — but access to humanitarian aid has been denied. Read the full letter here. OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE COUNCIL TO END THE HUMAN CRISIS OF ROHINGYAS IN MYANMAR Dear President and Members of the Security Council, As you are aware, a human tragedy amounting to ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity is unfolding in Myanmar. Over the past two months, a military offensive by the Myanmar Army in Rakhine State has led to the killing of hundreds of Rohingya people. Over 30,000 people have been displaced. Houses have been burned, women raped, many civilians arbitrarily arrested, and children killed. Photo: Lynsey Addario Crucially, access for humanitarian aid organisations has been almost completely denied, creating an appalling huanitarian crisis in an area already extremely poor. Thousands have fled to neighbouring Bangladesh, only to be sent back. Some international experts have warned of the potential for genocide. It has all the hallmarks of recent past tragedies – Rwanda, Darfur, Bosnia, Kosovo. The head of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the Bangladesh side of the border, John McKissick, has accused Myanmar’s government of ethnic cleansing. The UN’s Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar Yanghee Lee has condemned the restricted access to Rakhine State as “unacceptable.” The Rohingyas are among the world’s most persecuted minorities, who for decades have been subjected to a campaign of marginalisation and dehumanisation. In 1982, their rights to citizenship were removed, and they were rendered stateless, despite living in the country for generations. They have endured severe restrictions on movement, marriage, education and religious freedom. Yet despite the claims by government and military, and many in society, that they are in fact illegal Bengali immigrants who have crossed the border, Bangladesh does not recognise them either. Their plight intensified dramatically in 2012 when two severe outbreaks of violence resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands and a new apartheid between Rohingya Muslims and their Rakhine Buddhist neighbours. Since then they have existed in ever more dire conditions. This latest crisis was sparked by an attack on Myanmar border police posts on 9 October, in which nine Myanmar police officers were killed. The truth about who carried out the attack, how and why, is yet to be established, but the Myanmar military accuse a group of Rohingyas. Even if that is true, the military’s response has been grossly disproportionate. It would be one thing to round up suspects, interrogate them and put them on trial. It is quite another to unleash helicopter gunships on thousands of ordinary civilians and to rape women and throw babies into a fire. According to one Rohingya interviewed by Amnesty International, “they shot at people who were fleeing. They surrounded the village and started going from house to house. They were verbally abusing the people. They were threatening to rape the women.” Another witness described how her two sons were arbitrarily arrested: “It was early in the morning, the military surrounded our house, while some came in and forced me and my children to go outside. They tied my two sons up. They tied their hands behind their backs, and they were beaten badly. The military kicked them in the chest. I saw it myself. I was crying so loudly. When I cried, they [the military] pointed a gun at me. My children were begging the military not to hit them. They were beaten for around 30 minutes before being taken away”. She has not seen them since. Despite repeated appeals to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi we are frustrated that she has not taken any initiative to ensure full and equal citizenship rights of the Rohingyas. Daw Suu Kyi is the leader and is the one with the primary responsibility to lead, and lead with courage, humanity and compassion. We urge the United Nations to do everything possible to encourage the Government of Myanmar to lift all restrictions on humanitarian aid, so that people receive emergency assistance. Access for journalists and human rights monitors should also be permitted, and an independent, international inquiry to establish the truth about the current situation should be established. Furthermore, we urge the members of UN Security Council to put this crisis on Security Council’s agenda as a matter of urgency, and to call upon the Secretary-General to visit Myanmar in the coming weeks as a priority. If the current Secretary-General is able to do so, we would urge him to go; if not, we encourage the new Secretary-General to make it one of his first tasks after he takes office in January. It is time for the international community as a whole to speak out much more strongly. After Rwanda, world leaders said “never again”. If we fail to take action, people may starve to death if they are not killed with bullets, and we may end up being the passive observers of crimes against humanity which will lead us once again to wring our hands belatedly and say “never again” all over again. Sincerely, Professor Muhammad Yunus 2006 Nobel Peace Laureate José Ramos-Horta 1996 Nobel Peace Laureate Máiread Maguire 1976 Nobel Peace Laureate Betty Williams 1976 Nobel Peace Laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu 1984 Nobel Peace Laureate Oscar Arias 1987 Nobel Peace Laureate Jody Williams 1997 Nobel Peace Laureate Shirin Ebadi 2003 Nobel Peace Laureate Tawakkol Karman 2011 Nobel Peace Laureate Malala Yousafzai 2014 Nobel Peace Laureate Leymah Gbowee 2011 Nobel Peace Laureate Sir Richard J. Roberts 1993 Nobel Laureate in Physiology or Medicine Elizabeth Blackburn 2009 Nobel Laureate in Physiology or Medicine Romano Prodi Former Prime Minister of Italy Emma Bonino Former Italian Foreign minister Arianna Huffington Founder and Editor, The Huffington Post Sir Richard Branson Business Leader and Philanthropist Paul Polman Business Leader Mo Ibrahim Entrepreneur and Philanthropist Jochen Zeitz Business Leader and Philanthropist Richard Curtis SDG Advocate, Film Director Alaa Murabit SDG Advocate, Voice of Libyan Women Kerry Kennedy Human Rights Activist _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 Nobel Women Initiative

  • The ethics of exhumation

    To dig or not to dig? Experts are polarised on whether the possibility of making important forensic finds is worth disturbing the bones at Choeung Ek. Skulls held within the Choeung Ek stupa. AFP Beyond the stupa stacked high with skulls and the simple wire fence that rims one of the Khmer Rouge’s bloodiest killing fields, a number of mass graves lie untouched. And according to archaeologist Voeun Vuthy, for now they will remain that way, despite his scientific urge to investigate. Under oath before the Khmer Rouge Tribunal last month, Vuthy, who is also a director within the Cambodian Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts, said he had identified three to five mass graves he wanted to unearth near Choeung Ek killing field, a request that has been denied by the government. “My team was not allowed to do the excavation, they rule they cannot allow us to dig any more,” Vuthy later told the Post. “They said it was because it is not good [to excavate] under the Buddhist religion. [The deceased] are in a good place already and should not be disturbed.” The revelation that his own ministry would not permit further exhumation was a frustrating blow. “It’s very hard for my group to research; we need to excavate a pit, we want to show the structure of the filling-in when they were killed,” Vuthy says. Unveiling this stratigraphy of death might bring to light more answers about the methods of the brutal regime, which reigned from 1975 to 1979, but it would also give Cambodian researchers a chance to take more charge of the forensics of their gruesome past; the exhumations in the 1980s were carried out only with the assistance of Vietnamese forensic specialists, or informally by desperate people looking for clothing in the years after the fall of the Khmer Rouge. Vuthy’s team of researchers has been analysing the already-unearthed crania of people executed at the hands of the regime. Those studies yielded results; by examining the trauma imprinted on the bone, Vuthy has been able to determine how they met their ends. Him Huy, one of those who carried out the killings, has told the Khmer Rouge tribunal and several interviewers since that victims were murdered with a blow to the back of the head and a slice across the throat. Vuthy’s research, however, has shown that crania bear 1,686 marks that were caused by bullets, and almost 1,000 marks from being pierced with bayonets weapons Huy has never admitted to using. Exhumations at Choeung Ek have not always been for research purposes: More than 80 of a suspected 130 mass graves in the vicinity were dug up with the mingled motives of memory, education and political expediency. And the debate surrounding whether to excavate more sees opinion divided along surprising lines. Youk Chhang, director of the Documentation Centre of Cambodia (DC-Cam), said there are some 20,000 such mass graves dotted across the kingdom. DC-Cam identified several undisturbed graves at different provinces for the tribunal, but Chhang thinks that there is already enough evidence to see those most responsible for crimes against humanity jailed for life. “There are plenty of memorial sites with piles of victims’ bones to study from. I personally do not want to disturb any graves. I feel like it belongs to one of my sisters who died brutally [at the hands of] the Khmer Rouge. I want her to rest in peace,” he says. On the other hand, activist Buddhist monk Bun Buntenh has advocated excavation and preservation for study purposes. “After they concretely study them, then they should dig them up and keep them on display for the public to respect and learn from those unwanted lessons,” he says. But for historian Henri Locard, who last year testified before the tribunal as an expert witness, the practice of putting skeletal remains on display was inextricably entwined with politics. Voeun Vuthy under oath at the ECCC last year. Photo supplied “As to exhibiting human skulls and other bone remains for the populace and the tourist to gloat on, this has never been done originally for historical purposes. Or even as signs that there was a prison-extermination centre nearby,” he says. “No, this was just, in the People’s Republic of Kampuchea [PRK] days, a main component of the revisionist image of the Democratic Kampuchea regime.” It showed, he said, a perversion of communism to the point where it was “genocidal”. “Just as the world public opinion has been aghast by films showing heaps of bodies found in the Nazi concentration camps after the fall of Nazi Germany, so skulls and bones have been meticulously collected and exposed for all to witness the horrors of ‘Polpotism’.” Beyond the act of digging itself, a fraught debate exists about what to do with human remains once they are above ground. In a 2010 article titled Buddhist cremation traditions for the dead and the need to preserve forensic evidence in Cambodia, Wynne Cougill tackled the competing claims of study and spirituality. At first, she writes, the bones were viewed as evidence of crimes and were indeed used to justify the Vietnamese-backed PRK control of the country at a time when the United Nations continued to consider the Khmer Rouge the legitimate government. And while memorial efforts were generally supported by the government - Hun Sen issued a directive in 2001 ordering authorities to cooperate with preservation - the religious community and the people, it was the late King Norodom Sihanouk who began raising objections and calling for mass cremations of the bones. “Many Cambodians believe that cremation and other rituals for the dead help ease the deceased’s transition to rebirth,” Cougill writes. “In the case of especially inauspicious deaths, such as by violence or accident, it is widely believed that the dead person’s spirit or ghost remains in the place where he or she died.” Cougill goes on to quote a researcher who said “to have uncremated remains on display is considered by some to be a great offence, and tantamount to a second violence being done to the victims”. King Sihanouk’s views saw the removal of a gauche map of Cambodia crafted from 300 skulls of the dead with rivers rendered in blood-red paint from the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum. Also in line with his wishes, a DC-Cam exhibit of 10 skulls in 2004 was placed in a private room, not on public display, after weighing their social function as a reminder with the King’s wishes, driven by spirituality. “Although the spirit no longer lives in the bones, people feel the bones should not be sealed so the spirit can access them,” Chhang wrote in a note on the exhibition at the time. “Ideally, families should cremate the remains of the dead and store the ashes in a stupa to liberate the victims’ souls for reincarnation.” But as identifying individuals has so far been elusive, Locard sides with the late King, especially when considering the image Cambodia projects in the future. “I really am of opinion that digging, or examining more remains, will not be of much use, as researchers have already found what weapons were used to slaughter victims. And that some bear traces of torture,” he said. He added once the tribunal concluded, there should be mass cremations for those bones, which he hoped would mean Cambodia would “stop being identified to these ghastly skulls that stare at us from their empty sockets”. But for Vuthy, unearthing more remains is not for show; it’s about scientific substance. The denial to excavate further means certain answers may always be buried. “We are researchers; we are interested in the science we work for our research, not for other reasons. We are only thinking of finding out the real evidence,” Vuthy says. Copyright © 2013 The Phnom Penh Post.

  • Turkish border police reportedly told to wave through bomb supplies for Islamic State in Syria

    Turkish intelligence officers ordered the nation’s border police not to inspect truckloads of bomb-making materials shipped by companies in Turkey to Islamic State operatives in Syria in recent years, a former top Turkish counterterrorism official said. Although Ankara denies it ever allowed private companies to supply the terrorist group, Ahmet S. Yayla, who held high-level Turkish law enforcement posts from 2010 to 2014, said the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had a clandestine policy to facilitate cross-border transfers of explosive materials to the group. “Police were told to close their eyes when large shipping container trucks rolled across the Syrian border with Turkey,” Mr. Yayla told The Washington Times. “The protocol was that if national intelligence was arranging the movement, there was [no] stopping for inspection.” Mr. Yayla, an adjunct professor at George Mason University and an outspoken critic of the Turkish government, made the assertions amid growing scrutiny of Ankara’s suspected role in arming the Islamic State, also known as ISIS and ISIL. Turkish diplomats strenuously denied the charges during a half-hour meeting at the Turkish Embassy late last month. The diplomats insisted that they could speak only on background and therefore could not be quoted by name. In a national address this week after the New Year’s massacre at an Istanbul nightclub claimed by the Islamic State, Mr. Erdogan strongly rejected charges that his government aided the jihadi terrorist group operating in neighboring Iraq and Syria. “To present the country — which is leading the greatest struggle against [the Islamic State] — as one that is supporting terrorism is what the terror organization wants,” Mr. Erdogan said. But a report last month by the Britain-based tracking group Conflict Armament Research said terrorists operating out of numerous workshops and factories in the Mosul area produced tens of thousands of mortar rounds, rockets and improvised explosive devices using precursor materials originating in Turkish factories. “IS forces have a robust supply chain, whereby the group can repeatedly procure chemicals from the same supplier — almost exclusively from the Turkish domestic market,” the report concluded. “CAR’s findings continuously reinforce evidence that the group operates a major acquisition network in Turkey and has a direct line of supply from Turkey, through Syria, to the Mosul area.” The research team in November found no evidence that Turkish companies were shipping directly to Islamic State agents and stopped short of detailing how the weapons supplies reached Mosul. It also did not find evidence of Turkish government complicity, but it suggested a lack of government oversight over the border. “The appearance of these components in possession of IS forces, as little as one month following their lawful supply to commercial entities in the region, speaks to a lack of monitoring by national governments and companies alike,” the CAR report stated. U.S. officials said they had concerns about the materiel supply flows but that the Erdogan government had moved to cut off the supply chain. “For some time, we expressed serious concern about [the Islamic State’s] access to the Turkish border and its ability to use that as a way to replenish personnel and equipment,” State Department spokesman Michael Lavallee said this week. “The coalition worked with Turkey to finally close that border in September, and ISIL no longer has easy access to an international border.” The accusations are not new to Turkish media owned by the opposition to Mr. Erdogan’s AK Party. A widely reported scandal erupted early in 2014 after a prosecutor from Adana court ordered police there to stop and inspect three trucks after receiving tips about weapons transfers to the terrorist groups in Syria. After the trucks were stopped, an officer with the national MiT intelligence service in one of the trucks refused to allow the search and said the cargo belonged to the MiT. A prosecutor on the scene searched the trucks and found concealed military-grade weapons and mortars hidden beneath medicine boxes. Copyright © 2017 The Washington Times, LLC. Douglas Burton is a former U.S. State Department official in Kirkuk, Iraq and writes news and commentary from Washington, D.C. queries to Burtonnewsandviews@gmail.com

  • Amnesty International releases report on the persecution of the Rohingya

    Read the report: “WE ARE AT BREAKING POINT” ROHINGYA: PERSECUTED IN MYANMAR, NEGLECTED IN BANGLADESH

  • Myanmar whitewashes ethnic cleansing

    Credit: Council on Foreign Relations An official report into last year's violence in Rakhine State, launched on April 29 at the government's foreign donor financed Myanmar Peace Center, is intellectually, ideologically, empirically and analytically flawed, underscoring President Thein Sein's bid to whitewash the recent ethnic cleansing of Muslim Rohingya in the western state, which borders Bangladesh. Established on presidential order, the Inquiry Commission has been conflicted from the day of its inception on August 17 last year. The five individuals who were hand-picked to launch the report on Monday were a curious mix themselves: the country's most famous political comedian, the former daughter-in-law of the late despot General Ne Win, a well-known former student leader, a well-known former exile, and the president's personal adviser and interpreter. Thein Sein and his allies are increasingly using various crisis inquiry commissions, including the Aung San Suu Kyi-led Letpadaung Mountain Copper Mine Inquiry Commission and now the Rohingya Ethnic Cleansing Inquiry Commission, as public relations instruments to deflect public attention from its spectacular failures in handling popular discontent, state-sponsored violence against civilian populations, and mass ethno-religious violence. In instances where the role of government institutions was instrumental, for instance in last year's pogroms in Rakhine State, inquiry commissions have become useful tools of deflection for Naypyidaw. The latest official report, originally classified as "secret", of the Rakhine Sectarian Violence Inquiry Commission was strategically released to counter the damning and credible April 22 report "All You Can Do is Pray: Ethnic Cleansing and the Crimes Against Humanity in Myanmar", released by US-based rights lobby Human Rights Watch. The Inquiry Commission was stacked with cooperative technocrats, ethnic minority leaders, socialites, religious leaders and so-called human rights activists who were prepared or compelled to sign off on the report despite knowing it contained verifiably false and distorted facts about important issues under investigation. As a product of such an unholy alliance, the commission's report is patently un-professional, non-independent and unprincipled. Devoid of crucial truths, it is a document utterly uninformed by any well-established analytical concepts such as "ethnic formation", "identity formation", "state's mobilization" in genocide studies, "discourse", "nationalism", "history" - through which all scholars and researchers of the social world attempt to make sense of even ordinary human affairs, including genocides. Ethnic labels in Myanmar, including for the Chin and the Kachin, were externally imposed by British colonial administrators and American Baptist missionaries on the "natives". These were disparate groups who originally identified themselves tribally, as clans and along geographic lines. The new ethnic labels were less than 50 years old upon independence in 1948. Mal-informed by the prevailing pseudo-scientific knowledge about race and ethnicity in Europe, the British colonials and American missionaries grouped these "tribal peoples" in borderlands together for administrative expediency. As Indian economist and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen correctly pointed out during a public seminar on Myanmar at Columbia University last September, the geographical areas now known as Arakan or Rakhine State frequently changed hands among neighboring feudal rulers, and boundaries were always elastic in the pre-colonial era. The Rohingya Ethnic Cleansing Inquiry report officially stresses how the Rakhine feudal lords expanded their reach over territories in what was then Bengal, while making light of the fact that there were Bengali kings who ruled what was then the Kingdom of Arakan. Academics, especially establishment ethno-nationalist historians, have long proven capable of recounting the past only from a victor's perspective. The two leading scholars on the Inquiry Commission are no exception. For a commission that was led by two historically trained Burmese and a retired Rangoon [now Yangon] University history professor, the report's treatment of the history of a people whom the commission insisted on referring to as "Bengali" is anything if not "ethnocidal" - that is, an attempt to erase concrete historical evidence that the Rohingya, a self-referential identity, existed as an ethnic community and was officially recognized by the state under the democratic government of prime minister U Nu. This recognition of the Rohingya as an official constitutive ethnic group of the country, as well as their full citizenship status, was not confined to civilian politicians from the ruling political parties. During its two-year caretaker government (1958-60), the army's senior most leadership of General Ne Win and his deputies including Brigadier Aung Gyi officially recognized the Rohingya by their own self-chosen ethnic name: the Rohingya. While Thein Sein's commission's historians claimed to have poured over the archival records at the country's National Archives relevant to these "Bengalis", to borrow the standard Rakhine reference to the Rohingya of western Myanmar, they violated professional ethics as researchers by blatantly omitting any concrete evidence that the Rohingya were both an official ethnic group and citizens of Myanmar. In fact, one doesn't need to bother going to the archives to verify the Rohingya's ethnic identity and their citizenship status. Photographic copies of the verifiably authentic official records (for instance, Burma's Encyclopedia published by the Government Printing Press in 1964, official transcripts of speeches by the Burmese generals bearing the Rohingya's name, Burmese state newspaper clippings announcing a national radio program for various ethnic languages including the Rohingya language, parliamentary records, etc) are easily accessible in numerous social media sites and on-line archives. But the commissioners, either as anti-Rohingya Islamophobes or under duress from the government that appointed them to the Inquiry Commission, especially the professional historians among them, evidently chose to weed out any historical evidence that contradicts Myanmar's racist Citizenship Act of 1982, which was designed with input from Rakhine nationalists and earlier anti-Muslim elements in the Ministries of Defense and Immigration to strip Muslim Rohingyas both of their ethnic identity and citizenship standing. Forgotten history In the hands of the commission's Cornell- and Harvard-trained historians, including the likes of chairman Myo Myint, secretary Kyaw Yin Hlaing and Professor Tun Aung Chain, the Rohingya's migratory history began only in 1824 and going on to the Japanese advent in 1942, when large scale communal violence between the Rakhine and the Rohingya took place. The entire two decades of the 1950s and 1960s, during which the Rohingya were both official ethnic peoples and had citizenship rights, were completely skipped in the report's historical section. This omission highlighted the anti-Rohingya Rakhine nationalist version of history which denies that the Rohingya ever existed. State-sponsored ethnocide, which began with the brutal immigration campaign of 1978 which drove out nearly 200,000 Rohingya from the Rakhine state across to neighboring Bangladesh, was "unproblematized" by the commissioners, all of whom insisted that they were "politically independent". The ethnocide is all the more shocking considering the commission's ethnic diversity, including representatives from the ethnic Kachin, Chin, Karen, Shan and other communities that have experienced oppression from state authorities. Ethno-religiously, the commission was a good mix - that is, except that there was no Rohingya - nay, "Bengali" - representation. Dr Myo Myint (Bama or Bama-identified), Khun Tun Oo (Shan), Jana Lahtaw (Kachin), Dr Salai Andrew (Chin), U Soe Thein (Bama), Dr Yin Yin Nwe (Shan-Bama), Dr Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Shan-Bama), Zarganar (Bama), Aung Naing Oo (Bama), Ko Ko Gyi (a national security race?), Tin Aung Moe (Bama), Daw Than Than Nu (Bama), (Vet) Dr Aye Maung (Rakhine with neo-Nazi views), Aye Thar Aung (ultra-nationalist Rakhine), Reverend Margay Gyi (Karen), U Tun Aung Chain (Karen). There are also Myanmar Muslims (ethnically Indians) and Myanmar Hindu. With the exception of the Muslim commissioners, none of these ethno-religious diverse commissioners fought against the state-sponsored ethnocide of the Rohingya in the form of the commission's vehement opposition to the word "Rohingya". The two Muslim leaders who challenged this ethnocide and stood up for the Rohingya's own "imagined identity" were kicked out. Their crime? - frivolous charges of speaking to the press about the inquiry while others who also spoke to the media were left untouched. As to be expected, the report made no mention of how politics got in the way of establishing truths about the mass violence in Rakhine State. In fact, the commission sought to confirm the popular anti-Muslim racism without problematizing the recent growth of this increasingly virulent strain of Islamophobia and anti-Bengali sentiment across all indigenous national races of Myanmar. The commission did raise passing concern about the 969, a neo-Nazi movement ostensibly led by Buddhist monks from Myanmar's leading teaching monasteries, and its divisive impact on ethnic and social relations in society. But it fell far short of pointing out the need to take seriously the new neo-fascist turn in the country's well-known anti-Muslim, pro-Buddhist racism. The report's authors chose to describe the now world infamous 969 rather mildly as "a campaign among the Buddhist to defend their own faith and to encourage intra-Buddhist commerce and trade". All this is troubling but not unexpected. It was under the Religious Affairs Director-Generalship of Commission chair Dr Myo Myint that there was a proliferation of anti-Muslim quasi-religious publications, long before the previous crop of ruling generals allowed for greater freedom of press, assembly and speech. The leading voice of 969, Buddhist monk Wirathu, recently told the Associated Press that his views were formed as early as 2001. Sadly, nearly half of the commissioners are my old, and now former, friends. Their collective document is unmistakably Bama racist/Orientalist in orientation, treating both communities in the conflict with a typical popular Bama contempt and dislike. This is adding insult to injury for both parties in the conflict, namely the Rakhines and the Rohingya. The Rakhines are portrayed essentially as lazy natives who can not compete with the thrifty, business-savvy, hard-working "Bengalis" without the intervention of the state and its blood-based neo-fascist 1982 Citizenship Act. The Rohingya are described as elementary school children-like people who, having obtained commission members' hand-phone numbers from their Muslim contacts in Yangon, kept on calling the commission members to blabber on about their sufferings and whine about their grievances. These portrayals repeat a crucial racially charged popular narrative that turns out to be factually incorrect, namely that three Bengalis raped and brutally murdered a 28-year-old Rakhine Buddhist woman, the supposed first spark of the following pogroms. This was pointed out to me personally by a more honest commission member, Myanmar's most famous political comedian and former political prisoner, Zarganar. This rape case is vitally important because the commission identified it as a key trigger for anti-"Bengali" mobilization by Rakhine nationalists, politicians and parties, including some of the Rakhine members of the Inquiry Commission, including Aye Maung, a vet-cum-MP in Naypyidaw from the Rakhine National Development Party, an ultra-nationalist group that has claimed to be working for the "purification of Rakhine state". But the arrested and alleged rapists were officially registered as two Kaman Muslims and a Rakhine adopted by a Rohingya Muslim family in Pauk-taw Township. Zarganar, one of the five members who was one of the leading spokespersons for the commission at the press conference where the report was launched, told this writer in no uncertain terms that he interviewed the doctor in Rakhine state who performed the post mortem of the raped woman's corpse. According to this videotaped interview, the alleged Rakhine rape victim bore no sign of having been raped. Yes, she was brutally murdered and her jewelry was gone. But she was certainly not raped, recounted Zarganar, based on his one-on-one recorded interview with the doctor. The doctor was eventually forced by the authorities to sign the official post-mortem report that established the rape that did not take place. Then there was no mention of the "suicide in police custody" of one of the alleged rapists - Htet Htet, a non-Bengali adopted son of a Bengali family. Nor was there any mention of the fact that his freshly widowed wife was also found dead, allegedly having "drowned" in a local well. Was there foul play? It appears that Zarganar, the well-respected political comedian and dissident who went to jail four times since the 1988 pro-democracy uprisings crushed by the military, was compelled to put his name to the official commission report which contained statements and misinformation which he himself knows are patently and verifiably false. The entire report is riddled with inter-contradictions and inconsistencies that are not explained. For instance, the report raises the issue of the lack of or weak inter-agency coordination among the army, intelligence, civil administration, immigration, attorney general's office and Rakhine chief/prime minister's office. It discusses how and why the security forces and constitutive agencies only listened to direct orders from Naypyidaw. But the commission chose not to ask why Naypyidaw failed to issue orders to provide adequate measures to protect the targeted Rohingya communities. Instead, the National Defense and Intelligence Council (or Kar-lon in Burmese) did nothing to mobilize security forces to protect the Rohingya, troops which Thein Sein and his deputies knew would obey only direct orders from ministerial headquarters. Perhaps one silver living in the dark episode is that the report accurately states that local authorities in Rakhine State have absolutely no power to order security forces, including army, police, and border-control interagency troops, to do anything to quell mass violence. This was and still is something only Thein Sein's central government can do. Command questions That begs the question: why did the union level leadership of Thein Sein and his deputies on the Council in Naypyidaw choose not to mobilize the troops to restore order while the same security troops were called in to firebomb sleeping Buddhist monks protesting a China-invested mining project at 2 am using canisters containing white phosphorous? Alas, this is a question that fell outside of the purview of the presidential commission. Furthermore, vague if not imaginary statistics are cited throughout the 186-page document without accompanying narratives or explanations. The commission did not even bother to account for its own official statistics from the government. The fact is that the greatest number of deaths and destruction were borne by the Rohingya. And yet a highly disproportionate number of the Rohingya vis-a-vis the Rakhine have been tried. In the first wave of Rohingya-Rakhine violence in June last year, 4,188 Rohingya homes were destroyed while the Rakhine suffered the loss of 1,150 homes. In the second wave of violence in October, 2,371 Rohingya homes were destroyed as opposed to only 42 homes that belonged to the Rakhine. And again, out of a total of 1,835 arrested in connection with the mass violence, 1,589 are Rohingya and only 246 are Rakhine. Perhaps the scholarly presidential investigators on the commission could advance and test a hypothesis that the economic productivity of Rakhine Buddhists (all Buddhists in Myanmar?) must be inversely correlated with the destructive capacity of the group. For the report orientalized the Rakhine as a low-productivity group, or more crudely, lazy natives. The commission's official statistic implies the awesome power of a small group of Rakhine - 246 to be exact - to destroy thousands of homes and dozens of mosques in about a dozen different towns and cities and make over 120,000 Rohingya refugees homeless, shelter-less, internally displaced persons in a span of just five months. If this number of Rakhine terrorizers, arsonists and slaughters does not seem quite convincing given the magnitude of death and devastation they had wrought throughout northern and southern Rakhine State, then who else aided and abetted the principal terrorizers among the Rakhine who wanted a Rakhine State only for the Rakhine? There is no mention in the report of a single case wherein any official, security or civil, was held accountable for his or her leadership failure, or worse, participation in the pogroms. According to Zarganar, his official request that the investigators be allowed unfettered access to all the important officials alive, past and present who have served in western Myanmar over the past 25 years was never granted. He told me that many of the officials were transferred to remote places after the commission was formed on August 17. So what is Naypyidaw trying to hide? That question, of course, also lied outside the mandated scope of the Presidential Inquiry Commission. The spread of rumors and hate-speech against Rohingya on social media was touched on as an important issue, and yet no attempt was made to point out that Thein Sein's spokespersons, Major Zaw Htay and Deputy Minister of Information Ye Htut, are internationally known figures who use social media to disseminate deliberately false news and engage in hate and fear-mongering. At the time of the crisis, Zaw Htay was spreading grossly inaccurate news, including that "a group of armed radical Muslims have entered Rakhine from [the] Bangladesh side". Meanwhile, Ye Htut spread official lies, including the notion that there was "no need for further provision of shelter for the Bengali IDPs because the government has provided them with everything for the coming rainy season". The report rightly recommends urgent provision of adequate shelter and other humanitarian assistance because of the dire, overcrowded IDP camps for 100,000-plus "Bengali". Echoing the International Crisis Group's monocausal explanation that communal violence often accompanies democratic openings, the report sees greater freedom of speech as a causal explanation for the spread of hate speech. The commission decided it was not worth noting that it purged U Nyunt Maung Shein and U Tin Maung Than, the two prominent and non-pliant Muslim members of the commission who were actually pushing for truths about the communal violence. That push obviously did not go down well with chairman Dr Myo Myint and Border Control Minister Lt-General Thein Htay. According to U Tin Maung Than, two days after a 15-minute heated phone conversation last autumn over what should be reported to commission patron Thein Sein and how frequently reporting should be done, he was expelled from the commission in the same manner he was appointed - that is, with no prior knowledge nor explanation. Chairman Myo Myint was on record saying to U Tin Maung Than that "the welfare and security of these people are not the commission's responsibility, nor do you need to send President Thein Sein important updates." Although Zarganar pushed to get access to crucial heads of security forces stationed in Rakhine State to conduct a proper inquiry, he later complained that both the commission's chairman and secretary did their best "to derail the inquiry". Inquiry commissions are generally not about seeking or finding incriminating evidence that will lead their commissioning presidents to the gallows. Thein Sein may be a liar with a straight face but he ain't dumb. Preemptively, the eight mandates outlined by Thein Sein in fact did not include any study of the role of the state, its institutions, or the responsibilities of the national leadership. Above all, the report simply reinforced the state-sponsored Rohingya ethnocide and chose to overlook the elephant in the room: the military-led state and its crucial role in the Rohingya ethnic cleansing. Instead of shedding light on the utter inaction of the characteristically trigger-happy Myanmar security forces, the commission focused instead on highlighting the need to modernize these already heavily and happily armed troops. Rigged recommendations The first dozen recommendations in the four-page English-language Executive Summary of the report are all about security sector modernization, not security reform, while lip service is paid to the need to act in line with international human rights standards and Myanmar's international treaty obligations. The report recommends that the international community, spelled Washington, help to equip security forces with new toys, including CCTV capacities, assault speedboats, and various new weapons to deal with the cross-border problem of Bangladesh's "population explosion". Certainly, the US Pentagon would love to help bring the Tatmadaw (Myanmar's army) and other auxiliary units up to the human rights standards exercised at the US-run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq or Guantanamo Bay detention facilities in Cuba. For a report that bore the signatures of 24 technocrats, establishment historians and academics, wealthy local merchants and traders, socialites and religious leaders, the recommendations about security sector modernization are rather impressive, so much so that one wonders if the report was the commission's gift to the Ministry of Defense and its next generation of generals. For a report littered with references to "human rights" and "international legal norms", its contents shows no sign that commissioners even bothered to glance at the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the UN Conventions on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Nor did the commission deem it worthwhile to consult with either the research findings and reports from the Arakan Project or the National University of Galway's authoritative "Crimes Against Humanity in Western Burma". In fact, the commission considered the use of the term "ethnic cleansing" as part of an attempt to unduly internationalize local issues and an act of international nongovernmental organization (INGO) exaggeration. Or, perhaps, the commissioners felt human rights documentation was out of their professional depth without such training or an official political mandate. The commission must have known, however, that other non-native organizations such as Human Rights Watch were going to do an independent and more professional job of investigating the violence. Meanwhile, the commissioners seemed very much at ease when advocating "voluntary" population control of the Rohingya. The commissioners were of the view that this rapid procreation or "population explosion" among the people they insisted on calling "Bengalis" made worse the already acute sense of collective existential insecurity among the Rakhine. There is detectable patriotic sentiment in the reports finding that 80% of the fertile agricultural acreage in certain locations of Rakhine State are now in the hands of hard-working and thrifty "Bengali" agricultural workers and land-owners while landless and lazy Rakhine have fallen deeper into destitution. Even Myanmar's civil society, manufactured by the European Union and international donor funding, must be pleased with the commission's emphatic framing of the genocide as simply "communal violence". Alas, this is the civil society that refuses to call ethnic cleansing in their midst by its proper name. In the words of Aung Myo Min, a Myanmar human rights educator from the Human Rights Education Institute: "In such a sensitive situation, the use of the phrase 'ethnic cleansing' is unacceptable. Ethnic cleansing means eliminating other ethnic groups. This is not the case [in Rakhine State]." George Orwell, the inventor of the phrase "double-speak", worked in Myanmar during the colonial period in the 1920s. Orwell's ghost continues to roam in "democratic" Myanmar, possessing the dissidents, technocratic and intellectual mountebanks, ethnic nationality leaders, religious figures, human rights educators, and civil society leaders. In sum: Allah bad, Buddha good. Buzzword phrases such as "clean government", "good governance" and "transparency" perversely litter the commission's report. No doubt the new policy of this soon-to-be clean government will be to approach the issue of "communal violence" holistically, including through the preventative use of the "weapons of conflict resolution" the report recommends the international community provide to Myanmar's ethnocide-complicit security forces. A truly independent inquiry would have recommended the establishment of an early warning system of future genocidal waves. It also would have recommended more empirical research that probed the deeper causes of last year's "communal violence" in Rakhine State. The commission's varnished findings suggests the need for a new resolution research center, located perhaps near the Rohingya mass graves which Human Rights Watch uncovered. Scholars in the field of genocide studies have established that extraordinary mass violence, including ethnic cleansings, are seldom simply domestic or internal events in nation states. Rather, they frequently have an international dimension. These dark events generally take place in an international environment where external players are more concerned with their own strategic and commercial interests than large scale human sufferings, be they in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, and now Myanmar. Donor governments of the pro-human rights West have reacted with hostility to Human Rights Watch's characterization of their newfound business and strategic partners in Myanmar as "ethnic cleansers" and "criminals against humanity". Thein Sein's inquiry, on the other hand, is sprinkled with the liberal discourses of conflict resolution, humanitarian management, and national reconciliation. It is thus no doubt more palatable to the international community of diplomats, investors and military strategists determined to cozy up to his self-proclaimed "democratic" regime. If anything, the Rohingya Ethnic Cleansing Inquiry Commission report offers a hint of things to come out of Thein Sein's Myanmar Peace Center, into which foreign donors have already poured millions of dollars to pursue state-sponsored "peace" with the Kachin, Karen, Shan, Chin and other ethnic victims of over 50 years of state-sponsored terror. One can only hope that these ethnic communities are not given similar racist treatment as that suffered by the Rohingya. Maung Zarni is a Burmese activist blogger (www.maungzarni.com) and visiting fellow of Civil Society and Human Security Research at the London School of Economics. (Copyright 2013 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

  • Myanmar panel rejects claim that Rohingya are being persecuted

    ohingya women and children wait to collect water at the Leda camp, an unregistered camp for Rohingya in Teknaf, near Cox's Bazar in southern Bangladesh, on Dec. 3. | AP YANGON – Human rights groups said Myanmar’s government is trying to cover up abuses against civilians in a Muslim-majority part of Rakhine State after an investigation panel dismissed claims a government crackdown there amounts to “genocide.” A commission appointed by the government of Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi issued interim findings refuting allegations of abuses by security forces on Wednesday, even as authorities were still investigating alleged police abuses after a video emerged appearing to show officers beating and kicking Rohingya villagers. Troops have poured into northern Rakhine since insurgents believed to be from the mostly stateless Rohingya minority attacked border posts on Oct. 9, killing nine police officers. At least 86 people have died and an estimated 34,000 have fled across the border to Bangladesh. Rohingya residents and refugees accuse security forces of summary executions, arbitrary arrest, rape and burning down homes as part of what the government has termed its “clearance operations” in search of attackers. Myanmar’s government has flatly denied allegations that abuses have been committed, but has prevented independent journalists and aid workers from accessing parts of northern Rakhine. Under international pressure Suu Kyi ordered the commission to investigate the attacks and the abuse allegations. “The Bengali population residing in Maungtaw region, the increasing population of Mawlawi (Islamic scholars), mosques and religious edifices are proof that there were no cases of genocide and religious persecution in the region,” said the report. Many in Myanmar refer to the Rohingya as “Bengalis” as they see them as interlopers from Bangladesh. The panel also said it had so far found “insufficient evidence” for legal action on allegations of rape by soldiers. “No cases of malnutrition were found in the area, due to the area’s favorable fishing and farming conditions,” it added, despite concerns from international aid organizations that tens of thousands of people who were receiving food aid before Oct. 9 are now cut off. Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at New York-based Human Rights Watch, said the panel was “looking more and more like the Myanmar government whitewash mechanism that we feared it would be,” highlighting that the panel chair Vice President Myint Swe, is a former army lieutenant general. Robertson said it was “astonishing” that the commission could conclude from the presence of mosques that the Rohingya are not being persecuted. “Judging by what is written in this interim report, the commission has so far acted to discount out of hand what it calls ‘external allegations’ rather than seriously investigate them and risk uncovering the litany of rights violations against the Rohingya,” he said by email. Matthew Smith, founder of campaign group Fortify Rights, said the commission’s report was sharply at odds with accounts collected by researchers interviewing civilians in northern Rakhine and those who have fled to Bangladesh. “The army has committed atrocity crimes and this commission is attempting a whitewash. Ministries led by Suu Kyi have charted the path of denial, waging a shameful propaganda campaign,” Smith said by email. THE JAPAN TIMES LTD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

  • ‘Convert or we will shoot you’: survivor account of a Christian mother and son held captive by ISIS

    A CHRISTIAN mother and son in Iraq have told their story of survival after two years of terror living under Daesh (ISIS). With two images of Ismail and Jandark Behnam Mansour (© Aid to the Church in Need/Jaco Klamer) In an interview with Catholic charity Aid to the Church in Need, widow Jandark Behnam Mansour Nassi, 55, and her son, 16-year-old Ismail, describe their experiences at the hands of Daesh extremists. Ismail, who the militants jailed, recounts seeing gun-wielding Jihadi children kill orange-clad Daesh prisoners and how he witnessed a woman bound hand and foot being stoned to death. The teenager goes on to describe how Daesh threatened to kill him if he refused to convert to Islam. He recalls the pain of later converting to Islam against his will and how he went to a Daesh “correctional camp” where the Jihadi militants tried to force him to marry in spite of him being only 15 at the time. When Daesh found the cross he was wearing round his neck, they beat him and he was hit again when he was unable to answer questions while being forced to study the Qur’an. Ismail’s mother was “stung with long needles” for her failure to study the Islamic sacred text. The climax of their account comes after the two were abandoned by Daesh forces. They tried to get away but were caught again. When they made a second bid for freedom, they came under Daesh sniper fire. They took cover in a house and when they appeared waving a white flag they were rescued by forces fighting Daesh. Two months later, mother and son are in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish Autonomous Region, in northern Iraq, where Aid to the Church in Need is providing pastoral and emergency aid. It is in Erbil that this ACN interview took place. The account begins with the Daesh invasion of their home village of Bartella, in the Nineveh Plains in August 2014: “My mother and I were at home in Bartella, one of the Christian villages in the Nineveh Plains,” says Ismail. “When we woke up one August morning, the city had been taken by Daesh (ISIS). We tried to get away, but we were robbed by the Jihadists, captured and taken to Mosul.” “I was very afraid,” says his mother, Jandark, a widow. “Our names were written down, and we had no idea where we were and what would happen to us. We were completely shut off from the outside world. Shortly after, we received permission to return to Bartella, but at a check point we had to convert to Islam and when we refused, they hit us. My son was put in prison. He was only 14 years old.” “I was put in the prison of Bartella,” confirms Ismail. “One day a Shi‘a [Muslim] was shot right in front of me. The terrorists told me: ‘If you do not convert to Islam, we will shoot you as well’. That is when I converted to Islam. From that time on, we concealed that we were Christians.” Ismail was released and, with his mother, dragged from pillar to post: from Bartella, to many neighbourhoods in Mosul, and to the small village Bazwaya, very close to Mosul. “We received a paper from Daesh stating that we were Muslims,” continues Ismail. “That way, I could go on the street in Mosul, but on the streets, you could not be sure of your life. Once, I was beaten up because my trousers were too long. Once, when I was going to the mosque with the Jihadists early in the morning, our path was blocked. Suddenly we were passed by men in orange suits, held at gunpoint by a group of Daesh children. The children executed them with pleasure. “Another time I ran into a big crowd on the street. There was a woman; her hands and feet were tied. The Daesh terrorists drew a circle around her. If she got out of the circle, she would live, but that was impossible because she was tied. While her relatives were crying and begging for a pardon, the Jihadists threw stones at her until she died. “Daesh made me go to a correctional camp. I had to grow out my hair and grow my beard. My mother got a black, concealing robe, but was not allowed to go on the streets. Daesh warriors wanted me to marry, so I would be one of them. I objected, stating that I was too young: 15 years. They were not impressed, because even boys of thirteen were married. The terrorists wanted me to join them. They were convinced: ‘Our state will survive everything.’” “My son was forced by Daesh to practise Islam and I was tortured for not knowing anything about Islam and the Qur’an,” says his mother, Jandark. “Yes, I am embarrassed for having had to profess Islam,” affirms Ismail. “Daesh warriors made me pray,” says Ismail. “I received a prayer rug on which I could call upon Allah. Men were obligated to pray in the mosque on Friday. Anyone who would walk on the streets during the Friday prayer would be beaten. In the mosque, we were told that Assyrians were evil and that Christians did not believe in the right way. My mother should have to pray at home but she did not pray to Allah. “Then the Daesh warriors found my necklace with a cross, a sign that I am a Christian. The Jihadists beat me and I had to study the Qur’an for a month. I was hit whenever I could not answer their questions the way they wanted me to, and my mother was stung with long needles because she had not studied anything from the Qur’an. “One day we heard that Qaraqosh – another Christian village in the Nineveh plain occupied by Daesh – had been freed, and that the liberation troops had chased the Jihadists out of Bartella. Soon after that, the air attacks on Mosul started, and many people fled. Daesh also fled and, in the hurry, even left some weapons. However, they did take people with them on their way through Mosul, including my mother and me. For three days, we were under the control of a Jihadist. “When the terrorists grew too busy with the battle, they abandoned us. Again, we heard about the advancing army. We took a taxi to the front, heading towards our freedom, but Jihadists blocked us. Later, we tried to escape again. On our way, we ended up at the front: Daesh snipers tried to shoot us. We ran for cover into a house. After hours of fighting, my mother and I were able to leave the house, waving a white flag. Soldiers of the Iraqi liberation army welcomed us. We were free.” Aid to the Church in Need has supported the Christian refugees in Erbil and Baghdad with more than £19.6 million since the outbreak of the crisis in August 2014. Among the most important projects are the food programme for internally displaced people (IDPs) from Mosul and the Nineveh Plain, which benefits up to 13,000 families, and a housing scheme for about 1,800 Christian IDPs in Kurdistan. ACN charity is appealing for donations to provide ongoing food, heating, clothing and shelter during the winter months. Editor’s Notes www.acnuk.org Aid to the Church in Need is a Pontifical Foundation directly under the Holy See. As a Catholic charity, ACN supports the faithful wherever they are persecuted, oppressed or in need through information, prayer, and action. Founded in 1947 by Fr Werenfried van Straaten, whom Pope St John Paul II named “An outstanding Apostle of Charity”, the organisation is now at work in 140 countries throughout the world. Undertaking thousands of projects every year, the charity provides emergency support for people experiencing persecution, transport for clergy and lay Church workers, Child’s Bibles, media and evangelisation projects, churches, Mass stipends and other support for priests and nuns and training for seminarians. Aid to the Church in Need UK is a registered charity in England and Wales (1097984) and Scotland (SC040748). ACN’s UK office is in Sutton, Surrey and there is a Scottish office in Motherwell, near Glasgow and another office based in Lancaster that covers the North-West. Please always acknowledge Aid to the Church in Need as the source when using our material. For more information, contact ACN Head of Press and Information John Pontifex on 020 8661 5161 or ACN Press and Digital Media Officer Murcadha O Flaherty on 020 8661 5175.

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