(AP Photo/ Gemunu Amarasinghe, File) Interethnic divisions in a young democracy cannot be downplayed or wished away, and it’s time Myanmar’s government and the international community acknowledge strong evidence that genocide is being perpetrated against the Rohingya and act to end it, Katherine Southwick writes. Violence in Myanmar’s western Rakhine State escalated after a 9 October attack on border guard posts, leaving nine officers dead. Humanitarian assistance and media access to the area have been cut off for weeks while the Myanmar authorities conduct a counterinsurgency operation against allegedly Rohingya assailants. Responsibility for the initial attack remains unclear, however. More than a hundred people are thought to have died already, with 30,000 internally displaced adding to the 160,000 people who have been subsisting in squalid displacement camps since previous outbreaks of violence in 2012 and 2013. Human Rights Watch has released satellite imagery showing that over 1,200 buildings in Rohingya villages have been razed in the past month. Government soldiers have reportedly gang-raped Rohingya women and girls. Bangladesh, which for 30 years has permitted more than 230,000 registered and unregistered Rohingya refugees to shelter in its territory, has been turning people back who seek refuge across the border. Thousands have already crossed and continue to gather at the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. These events mark a dramatic deterioration in what has long been a desperate situation for a minority that many have identified as among the most persecuted in the world. Most of them are stateless, with the government designating them as “Bengalis” or “illegal immigrants,” despite many having had citizenship in the past and having lived in the region for generations. They have been subjected to forced labour and confined to displacement camps where they do not receive adequate food and medical care, leaving pregnant women and children particularly at risk of agonising illness and death. Rohingya are subject to harsh restrictions on marriage, family size and movement. Their religious buildings have been destroyed, and those who flee on rickety boats to other countries such as Malaysia or Thailand have, in the past, been turned back to the open seas to die or suffer at the hands of traffickers or languish in indefinite detention. More on this:myanmar-temples-1800 Busting the myth that Myanmar is a sanctions success story A question that haunts Myanmar’s government, and the international community, is whether what is happening to the Rohingya constitutes genocide. By now a credible claim can be raised that the internationally recognised crime of genocide is taking place in Myanmar. Accordingly, based on international legal obligations, the Myanmar government and other nation states should be taking all necessary actions to stop and avert the gravest kind of humanitarian catastrophe. Under Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention, which Myanmar has ratified, “genocide” is defined as “…any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” The Yugoslav tribunal has elaborated further on Article II (c) that deliberately inflicting conditions calculated to bring about a group’s destruction can include “subjecting the group to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and denial of the right to medical services. Also included is the creation of circumstances that would lead to a slow death, such as lack of proper housing, clothing, and hygiene or excessive work or physical exertion.” There is little doubt that for years the Rohingya population has suffered the acts listed in Article II (a) – (d) of the Genocide Convention. On the intent requirement of the crime – that the acts are committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnic or religious group – courts have taken a highly contextualised, case-by-case approach, to determining whether intent can be inferred from factual circumstances. Such an inference must be “the only reasonable one available on the evidence.” Additionally, as the Rwandan tribunal has stated: “The offender is culpable because he knew or should have known that the act committed would destroy, in whole or in part, a group.” This case-by-case approach to intent, along with the high burden of proof requiring the evidence to be “fully conclusive,” renders genocide determinations unavoidably contestable. Other analyses could suggest that the overall intent of perpetrators in Myanmar is better understood as “ethnic cleansing,” which reflects the idea that the actual intent is to forcibly transfer or expel the Rohingya rather than physically destroy them. In the 2015 case of Croatia v. Serbia, which also included evidence of killings, sexual violence, forced labour, and displacement, the International Court of Justice did not find genocidal intent on the part of the Serbs against the Croats in the context of the Yugoslav war. Key considerations were that the conflict was seen as territorial and the Serbs had organised transportation for Croats to evacuate the territories that Serb forces had occupied. The difference in the Rohingya case is that there is no clear escape from the abject misery and high risk of death or extreme abuse at the hands of traffickers or by other countries’ immigration authorities. There are no systematic measures to officially deport the population, either through providing transportation or agreeing to formal arrangements with receiving countries. Moreover, Rohingya are deterred from departing through restrictions on movement and punishments for leaving, such as by the removal from household lists, the extortion of family members left behind and imprisonment for “illegal” re-entry. Hundreds, possibly thousands of babies born in squalid camps have suffered preventable deaths due to lack of food and medical care. The overall conditions are such that those persons imposing them over a prolonged period either know or ought to know, that the eventual outcome will be the physical destruction of the group, in whole or in part. The complexity of proving genocide is ill-matched to the urgency of preventing and responding to genocidal situations when they arise. We could be waiting years for an international tribunal or a panel of experts to conclude authoritatively that genocide is or is not taking place. This scenario would come as too little too late for the many victims and their families, not to mention the domestic political fallout and economic disaster which would ensue after the fact. At the same time, the moral and political costs – the enduring stigma and potential criminal liability – of not acting to stop genocide are severe. International law and institutions extricate us from this quandary through their emphasis on genocide prevention as an obligation that is at least as equally strong as protection. The 1948 Convention obligates states to prevent and punish genocide. The widely affirmed Responsibility to Protect doctrine requires states to prevent and protect victims from war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in the absence of a meaningful government response. This official White House photograph is being made available only for publication by news organizations and/or for personal use printing by the subject(s) of the photograph. The photograph may not be manipulated in any way and may not be used in commercial or political materials, advertisements, emails, products, promotions that in any way suggests approval or endorsement of the President, the First Family, or the White House.Ê The US, the new Myanmar and the dragon in the background We can now draw on ample scholarship and case law to identify situations that look very much like genocide and compel robust responses to live up to these obligations to prevent and protect. In 2015, the London-based International State Crime Initiative released a report based on a social scientific study and concluded that, “genocide is taking place in Myanmar” and warning of “the serious and present danger of the annihilation of the country’s Rohingya population.” Others have made a legal case for genocide, or the high risk of genocide, such as scholars Zarni and Cowley, Yale Law School’s human rights clinic, and former deputy prosecutor of the Yugoslav Tribunal, Sir Geoffrey Nice, among others. Some might argue that the label for a crime should not matter, and in a sense they are right. These crimes too often occur along a spectrum that, without corrective action, can lead to the same calamitous result; massive loss of life and destruction. We might think the responses would be the same, regardless of the words we choose to define the crime. However, too many international conferences and diplomatic meetings over the years have lamented the long list of persecutions and suffering this group has endured over decades, resulting in responses that are disproportionately inadequate to the gravity of the Rohingya’s plight. Tepid policies toward Myanmar and the Rohingya betray a deep-seated reluctance to label these crimes as genocide for fear of subverting the narrative so many in the world have waited for; an enlightened democratic transition. The notion of genocide in Myanmar risks turning the country back into an international pariah rather than an international darling. But the current violence painfully illustrates that interethnic divisions in a young democracy cannot be downplayed or wished away. It is time for Myanmar, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the United Nations and others to face facts, to confront the prospect of genocide being perpetrated against the Rohingya. They must be open to judgment for their inaction, or more hopefully, take action and commit the resources needed to save lives throughout the region and preserve Myanmar’s future. _____________________________________________

Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak addresses a news conference after talks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the chancellery in Berlin, Germany September 27, 2016. REUTERS/Hannibal Hanschke Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak called for foreign intervention to stop the "genocide" of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar on Sunday, as he joined thousands of Rohingya protesters in Kuala Lumpur. Muslim-Majority Malaysia has been increasingly critical of Myanmar's handling of violence and allegations of state abuses in northern Rakhine state, which has driven hundreds of ethnic Rohingya to flee across the borders to Bangladesh. It described the violence as "ethnic cleansing" on Saturday. Najib called on the United Nations, the International Criminal Court and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation to intervene. "The world cannot just sit by and watch genocide taking place," he told the crowd. Najib's attendance came despite warnings from Myanmar that Malaysia risked violating the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) principle of non-interference in other members' internal affairs. In response, Najib said ASEAN, which agreed to declare itself a single community last year, had also pledged in its charter to uphold basic human rights. He also accused Myanmar leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi of inaction, saying that she had declared the Rohingya issue off-limits during bilateral discussions. "How can this be? We should be allowed to discuss everything," he said. The gathering, organised by Najib's ruling United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, attracted around 10,000 people, mostly Rohingya. Malaysia summoned Myanmar's ambassador last week to express concern over the crackdown on Rohingya. It also cancelled the national soccer team's friendly under-22 matches with Myanmar in protest. Rohingya Society in Malaysia president Faisal Islam Muhammad Kassim said he appreciated Malaysia's efforts to find a solution to the crisis. "We want the Malaysian government to (send a) message to the Muslim world and the Western countries, to pressure the Myanmar government to solve this Rohingya issue," he said. The violence in Myanmar is the most serious bloodshed in Rakhine since communal clashes in 2012 that killed hundreds. Persecution and poverty led thousands of Rohingya to flee Myanmar following the violence between Buddhists and Muslims there four years ago. Many of them were smuggled or trafficked to neighbouring countries, mostly to Thailand and Malaysia. Najib, who has been buffeted by graft allegations he denies, vowed on Thursday to fight to the end for Malays and Islam, as he called on UMNO to prepare for elections that are "coming soon". (Reporting by Rozanna Latiff; Editing by Nick Macfie) © 2016 Reuters. All Rights Reserved.

Prime Minister Najib: World don't sit by idly as Myanma commits a "genocide" "I will not close my eyes and shut my mouth. We must defend them (Rohingya) not just because they are of the same faith but they are humans, their lives have values." - Malaysia PM Najib The United States's head of Asia desk asked Malaysia to NOT stage protest over genocide! And Suu Kyi's message to Najib: you are welcome to meet with me on bilateral matter, but not welcome to raise other issues (Rohingya). __________________________________________________________________________________________ MALAYSIAN PM LEADS PROTEST AGAINST 'GENOCIDE' OF ROHINGYA Eileen Ng | Associated Press Dec 4, 2016 KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia (AP) -- Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak led a protest rally Sunday against what he called a "genocide" of Myanmar's Muslim Rohingya minority, as he urged Asian neighbors and the world to step up the pressure to stop the violence. (read more)

Illustration: Craig Stephens Aung San Suu Kyi held a large town hall meeting in Singapore December 1. She LAUGHED OUT LOUD at allegations of massacres of Rohingya. She said they are 'external fabrications'. Amidst protests in Asian capitals over ongoing atrocities against the Rohingya in Myanmar committed by government troops, Adama Dieng, United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, issued a sternly worded alarm over the “allegations of extrajudicial executions, torture, rape and the destruction of religious property” in Rohingya villages. He firmly urged the Myanmar government to “demonstrate its commitment to the rule of law and to the human rights of all its populations.” Human Rights Watch has presented satellite images of over a thousand charred buildings in Rohingya villages where government troops have carried out ‘clearance operations’ since 9 October when Rohingya militants, armed with swords and sticks and a ‘few hand-made’ guns, attacked three Burmese border posts near the country’s border with Bangladesh, killing nine policemen. For nine weeks, the government has locked down the entire northern Rakhine state, blocking the flow of humanitarian assistance, both food and medicine, to 160,000 Rohingya. Witnesses smuggle out grainy images of burning rice supplies in the areas of the military’s mop-up operations, evidence that the government intends to deprive the entire Rohingya population in the locked-down area of their food supply. The government’s intention can only be understand as induced starvation of the Rohingya population, an act of genocide. Reminiscent of past genocides, the government troops separate men of all ages from their families for torture and murder, while raping women with blanket impunity. A woman who survived this horrendous sexual violence phoned a relative in Malaysia, and begged, “Just wish us to die fast death. We can’t bear this any more. They (the Burmese troops) are killing our men and boys. They are doing anything they please with us, women. We don’t want to be carrying babies of these monsters. Please, please, send us birth control pills.” Weeks of wanton slaughter, arson and rape have resulted in the forced displacement of over 30,000 Rohingya from their villages in northern Rakhine. UNHCR has estimated that at least 10,000 Rohingya fleeing death and destruction have gathered along the 170 mile long land and river borders with Bangladesh. The government of Bangladesh has tried to keep its borders shut, and forces the refugees back to the Burmese side. A small number who have made it across to the nearest refugee camp tell tales of horror in Rakhine, confirming the widely reported allegations of mass atrocities. These are just the most recent testimonies of a well-documented, systematic program of state-organized persecution of the Rohingya over the last four decades. Ex-General Khan Nyunt, former Head of Military Intelligence with 25 years of intimate involvement in these violent operations against the Rohingya, recorded that in the first large scale campaign against the Rohingya in 1978, nearly 280,000 Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh. When General Zia Rahman of Bangladesh threatened to arm the Rohingyas if Burma refused to take them back, the Ne Win government of Burma grudgingly accepted UNHCR’s managed repatriation of the majority of those who fled. Following this repatriation, Burma’s military rulers enacted a new Citizenship Law in 1982, stripping the Rohingya of all citizenship and legal rights, making Rohingyas instant aliens on their own ancestral land. The law excludes from citizenship any Rohingya who cannot prove their ancestors were already in residence in Burma on the eve of the first Anglo-Burmese War of 1824. Few people have such records. This requirement is enforced only against the Rohingya. The Citizenship Law excluded Rohingya from the list of groups recognized as ethnic minorities in the multi-ethnic Union of Burma. The parallel to Nazi Germany is exact. The Nuremberg Laws stripped German citizenship from all Jewish people in the Third Reich. The official estimate of the Rohingya population is 1.33 million. Over 800,000 of them have no legal status in Myanmar. They are effectively stateless. An estimated 60,000 Rohingya children have no birth certificates because the Myanmar government refuses to grant each newborn the right to a nationality, in direct violation of its obligations as a party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. State-sponsored violence against the Rohingya, Karen, Kachin, Shan and other minorities in Burma from 1978 to 2012 went largely un-reported in the world’s media because the Burmese military junta closed off Burma from the outside world. Since the commercial opening of Myanmar (as Burma is now called) in 2012, the government of President (ex-General) Thein Sein has framed its persecution as ‘communal or sectarian violence’ between Muslim Rohingyas and Buddhist Rakhine. The world has come to view the violence against the Rohingya as if it were the clash of religious communities. It is actually ethnic persecution. By releasing Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest and permitting her party to win a majority of seats in Parliament, the Thein Sein military junta has lulled the world into the view that Myanmar is “democratizing.” In fact, the junta still holds a quarter of the seats in Parliament as well as the key ministries of Defense, Home Affairs and Border Affairs. Western governments normalized relations and rolled back economic, military and diplomatic sanctions. In sharp contrast to the official explanation of violence in Rakhine as communal, the present government of Aung San Suu Kyi has sought to tell the world that her government is fighting Rohingya Muslim extremists, who are spreading Islamic terrorism. In fact, there is no evidence of penetration of radical Islamist terrorism amongst the Rohingya. In disappointment with Aung San Suu Kyi’s silence over the plight of Rohingyas, fellow Nobel Laureates and world leaders have called on her to stop the genocide being perpetrated by the Myanmar Army, whose partnership and cooperation she depends on for her influence. Not only have these calls fallen on her deaf ears but they have become a laughing matter for Suu Kyi and much of the Burmese population who remain enthralled with the woman whom they call Mother. Adama Dieng, UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, and Yanghee Lee, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, have requested independent UN investigations on the alleged ‘ethnic cleansing’ and other mass atrocities in the Rohingya region of Rakhine state. Instead, Ms Suu Kyi’s government announced the establishment of a “national inquiry commission” with Vice President and ex-Lt-General Myint Swe, as the chair. Myint Swe is former head of Military Intelligence. He coordinated the Border Affairs Army Division, one of the worst persecutors of the Rohingya. Aung San Suu Kyi and her government brazenly deny that genocidal massacres are being perpetrated against the Rohingya. When a Nobel Peace Prize winner laughs out loud at allegations of genocide, she should give back her prize. In fact she should be prosecuted for complicity in the crimes. Dr. Maung Zarni coordinated the consumer boycott of Burma in support of the National League for Democracy from 1995-2004. He now lives in England. Dr. Gregory Stanton is founding President of Genocide Watch and Research Professor at George Mason University, USA. He drafted the UN Resolutions that created the Rwanda Tribunal (ICTR) as well as the Rules of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (ECCC.)

Boko Haram’s rise and insurgency have dramatically changed the lives of thousands of women and girls, often casting them voluntarily or by force into new roles outside the domestic sphere. Some joined to escape their social conditions; others were abducted and enslaved. Seven years of war have caused gender-specific suffering. While men have disproportionally been killed, women are an overwhelming majority among the estimated 1.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the North East. As former wives, slaves or fighters, many bear the stigma of association with the insurgents and are barred from reintroduction into their communities, in part because the lines between militant, sympathiser and forced accomplice are blurred. Although Boko Haram faces strong pushback, it remains capable of launching attacks and conducting multiple suicide bombings. Understanding how women experience the conflict, not only as victims but also as actors, needs to directly inform policies and programs to tackle the roots of the insurgency and strategies for curbing it, as well as facilitate women’s contribution to lasting peace. Since its emergence in 2002, Boko Haram has paid particular attention to women in rhetoric and actions, partly because of the intense debate surrounding their role in society in the North East. Among other revivalist Islamic movements, the sect called for tighter restrictions on them in some areas of life but also promoted their access to Islamic education and offered financial empowerment. With patriarchy, poverty, corruption, early marriage and illiteracy long thwarting their life chances, some women saw an opportunity in Boko Haram to advance their freedoms or reduce their hardship. Many valued the religious and moral anchoring. Thereafter, Boko Haram began to abduct women and girls for both political and pragmatic ends, including to protest the arrest of female members and relatives of some leaders. The seizure of more than 200 schoolgirls near Chibok in 2014 was a much publicised spike in a wider trend. The group took Christian and later Muslim females to hurt communities that opposed it, as a politically symbolic imposition of its will and as assets. By awarding “wives” to fighters, it attracted male recruits and incentivised combatants. Because women were not considered a threat, female followers and forced conscripts could initially circulate in government-controlled areas more easily, as spies, messengers, recruiters and smugglers. For the same reason, from mid-2014, Boko Haram turned to female suicide bombers. Increasingly pressed for manpower, it also trained women to fight. As vigilante militia members, including with the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), hundreds of women help security forces, particularly to frisk females at checkpoints, gather information and identify suspects, and also sometimes to fight Boko Haram. Others work in non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and women’s associations or care privately for war victims. In some cases, the war has opened opportunities for women’s activism, illustrated by the establishment of several new women-led NGOs in Maiduguri and the Nigerian involvement in the Bring Back Our Girls international campaign. Boko Haram attacks, the military’s persecution of suspects and its strategy of emptying contested areas have forced over a million women and girls to flee homes. Some suspected supporters are in detention. Hundreds of thousands of females are in government camps where food is scarce and healthcare dismal; in unofficial camps, the situation can be even worse. Separated from husbands and sons conscripted or killed by Boko Haram or arrested by security forces, many women are now fully responsible for their families’ protection and economic wellbeing. Harsh treatment of IDPs in camps and detention centres could undermine military gains. If corruption in aid delivery and abuses persist, communities may harbour grievances that could lead them to reject state authority. Meanwhile, the stigma carried by women and girls known or suspected to have been Boko Haram members risks leaving them and their children isolated and alienated, generating new frustration and resistance of the kind that gave rise to Boko Haram. How gender dynamics play a part in fuelling the Boko Haram insurgency should be a clear warning that women’s integration into decision-making processes at all levels is critical to a durable peace. Countering the sect and rebuilding a peaceful society in the North East requires the government and its international partners to tackle gender discrimination, better protect women and girls affected by the violence and support women’s economic and social reintegration, as well as enhance their role in building sustainable peace. In the short term, reunification of families should be a priority. In the longer term, improvements and gender balance in accessing education, in both state schools and upgraded Quranic schools, is vital. Recommendations To better protect women and girls affected by the violence and respond to immediate humanitarian needs To the Government of Nigeria: Screen the predominantly female adults from areas formerly controlled by Boko Haram with diverse teams that include protection officers provided by national civil society organisations and trained by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to ensure adequate treatment of both suspects and victims. Implement urgently greater accountability in distribution of food and gender-sensitive assistance in IDP camps and host communities, including access to sexual and reproductive health information and services for women and girls; give local and international humanitarian organisations access to IDP camps and transfer their management to civilian organisations as soon as possible. Develop urgently programs to increase women’s recruitment in local police forces and deploy them in IDP camps as soon as possible. Activate referral mechanisms for women and girls to report sexual and gender-based violence in IDP camps and host communities and ensure that authorities, including the judiciary and police, properly investigate allegations of abuses by security forces and/or the vigilantes that assist them. Develop special support programs, in partnership with women’s organisations, religious associations and health centres, for women victims of sexual abuse to ensure they and their children are free from discrimination, violence and stigmatisation. Distinguish Boko Haram ideologues from those who joined for other motives and ensure transparent and fair investigation of both male and female Boko Haram suspects according to international law, including taking account of the level of involvement and seriousness of their crimes; hold all detainees, including women, in humane conditions monitored by humanitarian agencies; and ensure children are granted adequate care. To support women’s economic and social reintegration, as well as enhance their role in building sustainable peace To the Government of Nigeria: Commit to greater representation of women in government-funded programs and support inclusive peacebuilding initiatives in the North East. Ensure that public and private development and reconstruction plans are based on a gender-sensitive analysis of the insurgency and counter-insurgency. Make reunification of families a priority, including by allocating more resources to the task and establishing a federal database to facilitate the search for missing persons. Facilitate access to credit and land for women, recognising that single females and especially widow-headed households need particular support to restart productive activities, for example in traditional crafts, trade or agriculture. To the affected northern-state governments, especially Borno state: Engage community leaders, including religious groups, to facilitate reintegration and rehabilitation of all women released from Boko Haram and provide psycho-social support as possible. Design programs to strengthen women’s participation in politics and local governance. Prioritise increasing girls’ access to primary and secondary schools; and develop a program to upgrade Quranic education, ensuring equal access for girls. Develop community-based approaches and sensitisation to address social stigma around former Boko Haram wives and slaves as well as children fathered by Boko Haram members, including by dramatically increasing investment in schools in the North East so as to allow the latter to attend school with other children in the region; and improve coherence and open a public debate by producing a blueprint for reintegration of these groups. To donors, UN agencies and international NGOs: Expand and improve gender-sensitive aspects of aid programs in all Boko Haram-affected areas. Strengthen programs, in partnership with women-led NGOs, to tackle gender stereotypes and raise awareness about women’s roles, including in relation to peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. I.Introduction President Muhammadu Buhari, elected in 2015, has reached out to neighbouring Lake Chad basin countries, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, and, despite the army’s structural weaknesses, mobilised a more powerful military campaign against Boko Haram, the jihadist insurgency that has destabilised Nigeria’s North East since 2010. The regional effort seems to have put the movement on the defensive, but it still holds some ground, launches deadly attacks on civilians and security forces and has deep roots in certain communities. Even as the fight continues, the government, at state and federal levels, and its international partners must think carefully about how to address the war’s diverse effects on the region’s heterogeneous population, lest Boko Haram or similar groups remain a long-term regional threat. This report analyses experiences of women and girls in the North East in order to inform interventions to better alleviate their suffering, facilitate their contribution to lasting peace and mitigate the threat from female Boko Haram members. It examines patriarchal norms the sect exploited to attract recruits and tracks the diverse, changing female roles, as valuable abductees, combatants’ wives and slaves, forced or willing fighters, heads of displaced families, community leaders, mothers, wives and daughters. It identifies policy priorities tailored to women’s experiences, including immediate humanitarian aid and protection, longer-term reintegration into normal life of those stigmatised by Boko Haram association and women’s roles in a peaceful North East. The analysis is based on research in the North East, the federal capital, Abuja, and south-eastern Niger with Boko Haram victims, captives or supporters, as well as community leaders, government officials, humanitarian workers and academics. Scores of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees were interviewed in formal and informal camps in Nigeria and Niger and a rehabilitation centre for ex-sect members in Maiduguri, as well as Boko Haram suspects held in Niger. II.Women, Patriarchy and Islam in the North East Boko Haram’s appeal to some women and the significance of women and girls for the group should be understood in the context of the North East’s heavily patriarchal societies, a widespread adherence to Islamic tenets and challenges to established beliefs and practices. The region’s religious and cultural norms, codified in law, have defined women’s status through marriage and childbearing and largely confined them to a domestic role. Their private and public places have been hotly contested by both the male-dominated political and religious elite and civil society, including female activists. What Islam says and what should be codified have been at the debate’s centre. A.Entrenched Patriarchy Male dominance has by and large been entrenched in law. Colonialism did little to challenge patriarchal structures in the mostly Muslim north, and independence altered little. At the urging of religious conservatives, Borno and eleven other northern states enacted a stricter version of Sharia (Islamic law) in 2003, with elements of Islamic criminal law. Other provisions reinforced male dominance and further restricted women’s freedoms and rights, including access to education and jobs. As is the norm throughout Nigeria, Muslim women in the North East do not usually own land or homes. While Nigeria does not recognise polygamous unions under federal civil law, the twelve northern states did so under state law at the beginning of the 2000s. Northern Muslim women are politically marginalised. In 2007, only six of 360 state representatives in the twelve northern states were women, none in Borno. Wives of politicians and traditional rulers generally have no prominent public role, partly due to the practice of purdah (secluding women from society). This power imbalance, combined with high poverty, has contributed to a disproportionately lower socio-economic status for women and girls. Marrying soon after puberty is a main reason the North East has Nigeria’s lowest school attendance ratio and very high female illiteracy. This correlates with large age gaps between husbands and wives, reinforced male dominance and some of the world’s highest fertility rates. The average marriage age has increased slightly in cities and other places with girls’ access to education. Many women and girls in the North East have long experienced oppression and gender-based violence, but stereotyped views need qualification. Despite a cultural, religious and legal setting that disproportionately restricts them, many women are economic providers in their own right; some sell goods in the market or from home, or perform farming activities, while others work in offices. B.Contested Womanhood Womanhood has become a central theme in male-dominated political debate, especially with the rise of revivalist Islam and its increasing influence on northern politics. Religious revivalists perceive the female body as a battleground in a global conflict between Islam and “the West”. All North East states thus refused to sign the 2003 Child Rights Act (CRA), which set eighteen as the minimum marrying age for men and women, thus preventing its implementation on their territory. Some Islamic revivalist groups also push for full purdah, long limited to religious and political elites. In what may seem to foreign observers a paradox, many women engage with non-violent Islamic movements such as Izala, Nigeria’s largest Salafi group. Salafi Islam embraces conservative interpretations, including on women’s public roles and relations with established Sufi Islam and non-Muslims. But it promotes women’s education, Islamic and Western, and allows believers to free themselves from an Islam mediated by established Sufi clerics. Many women find it useful for advancing in their lives on an Islamic basis on their own terms. In a context of endemic corruption, widespread poverty and social anomie, many value the moral order Islam provides. Civil society groups in the North East occasionally invoke Islam to challenge patriarchal structures and gender inequalities. While men have dominated the political and religious debate on the place of women in society, some women have also raised their voices. In Borno state, women in a number of civil society organisations and professions such as law, academia and health, and some female civil servants (including the few directors in state ministries) have advocated greater women’s rights and freedom. Boko Haram leaders made use of the opening created by patriarchy, constraints on women and girls (particularly by patriarchal family members) and grinding socio-economic hardship in the North East to attract followers. Similarly, the debate over a female’s place and role offered opportunity to invoke religious authority to back up the movement’s claims and made women and girls significant for its rhetoric and actions. III.Boko Haram and Women’s Changing Roles Boko Haram and the subsequent insurgency and counter-insurgency have dramatically changed the lives of thousands of women and girls, casting them voluntarily, by force or for lack of other options into new, evolving roles outside the domestic sphere. Some joined the movement, first as members of a religious community, later as insurgents, while many are targets of its violence. Some fight against it within local vigilante units; others play critical roles in relief and reconciliation, while many displaced by fighting find themselves with new responsibilities. How roles evolve and relate to discrimination or empowerment have significant implications for North East recovery and stability. A.Mohammed Yusuf’s Female Supporters Well before Boko Haram turned to mass violence, when it was essentially one of a variety of revivalist Islamic movements in the Nigerian North, its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, attracted female followers. A reason Boko Haram, not unlike Izala, appealed to many, especially young women, was the opportunity to study the Quran and learn Arabic. Some had received Western education in government schools and, like men, tore up their certificates to show their new allegiance and rejection of the Nigerian state, which they deemed immoral and disappointing. Other factors were Yusuf’s encouragement of marriage within the sect and alleviation of traditional financial demands and social obligations, which gave young women some relief from family pressures. For women involved in hard labour such as farming or fetching water, purdah as promoted by the group may have been an attractive alternative. Like many other Islamic Salafi leaders worldwide, Yusuf put special emphasis on treatment of the female body to show adherence to correct Islam. He encouraged wearing the niqab, a Saudi-style dress introduced in Nigeria in the 1970s that fully covers face and body. Initially, women could hear him preach at the mosque, where they sat apart from the men. Subsequent debate among Boko Haram clerics over whether to allow women in public led to the decision they should be taught at home and not allowed in mosques. Yusuf considered mixing of sexes a proof of unbelief. A mixed Western style was a major reason to consider a school impure (haram). Unlike in Izala, purdah was required for female followers. B.The Insurgency A government crackdown after violent confrontations in June and July 2009 in Maiduguri and several other cities led to the extrajudicial execution of Yusuf by the Nigerian police, as well as the killing of a number of other sect leaders and at least 1,000 supporters. Many members fled to rural areas and neighbouring counties, where they reorganised and began to engage in revenge terror and guerrilla attacks, led by Abubakar Shekau, a Yusuf deputy. Boko Haram recruited women and men, primarily from Maiduguri and other urban areas, with a mixture of coercion and incentives. In 2013, the security forces and civilian vigilantes (the Civilian Joint Task Force, CJTF) forced it out of Maiduguri, but as its insurgency spread to rural areas, more women were recruited or forced to join from villages, cutting across classes. Many married Boko Haram members. 1.Women in Boko Haram’s insurgency Women’s and girls’ importance for Boko Haram stems from their roles and how they are perceived in society – both in the North East and in Nigeria as a whole. As wives, they enhance social status and provide sexual or domestic services (sometimes forced), thereby becoming valuable incentives for potential male recruits. Their adherence, willing or forced, to the movement’s version of Islam can also contribute to the spreading of its ideology among other women, but possibly also young men. Women can perform roles very different from traditional stereotypes. As the war evolved, women have become recruiters, spies, domestic labour, fighters and forced or willing suicide bombers. Targeting of women and girls in certain communities helped to attract supporters, establish a political ideology in opposition to the state and sometimes attack Nigerian institutions in areas where it was perceived it would hurt the most. During the insurgency’s early phase, from late 2010, militants targeted individuals, mostly men, suspected of assisting the security forces in their initial crackdown on the sect. Boko Haram began kidnapping women and children in mid-2013, initially Christians in the Gwoza area of south east Borno. Shekau publicised the captures, demanding the government release the wives and children of several Boko Haram leaders, including his own spouses, arrested in 2012, an issue he had repeatedly raised. A deal was negotiated between the authorities and Boko Haram and an exchange was organised, but abductions of women became a core tactic. On 14 April 2014, Boko Haram seized more than 200 schoolgirls in the town of Chibok, southern Borno state. This became a global affair, with leading female civil society activists throughout Nigeria joining in the Bring Back Our Girls international campaign. The state’s response was apathetic. It took three weeks for President Goodluck Jonathan to make a statement, and his wife, Patience, speculated that the abduction never happened. This so fed into a mounting debate on Jonathan’s performance that some of his allies claimed, without basis, that the abduction was a ploy by northern elites to weaken his government. Boko Haram said it would force the mostly Christian schoolgirls to convert, while trying to use them as bargaining chips. They remain a major symbolic issue. Shekau’s release of 21 Chibok girls in October 2016 after negotiations has been good news for President Buhari. There have been many more kidnappings. In April 2015, a well-documented report estimated Boko Haram had taken more than 2,000 girls and young women, most unmarried, over the previous twelve months alone. But that figure is a mere indication. Boko Haram probably controlled a few hundred thousand women at the height of its insurgency, and abductions were many. The practice remained extensive well into the second half of 2015, when the movement further expanded its territorial control in Borno state. Reports show that militants mostly killed men (civilian and military), but generally abducted women. In a video, Shekau told followers to kill men but “spare the old, women, the lunatic, and the repentant”. Beyond trying to free its own female detainees, Boko Haram’s reasons for abducting women and girls are probably mixed. In some local contexts, its actions have ethnic underpinnings; since it recruits more in certain communities than others, the history of hostility between communities has occasionally become part of its jihadist struggle. That it first abducted women in mainly Christian communities and pressured them to convert suggests it sought to spread its version of Islam as well as punish local adversaries. There are early reports of gang rape of Christian women, while Muslims were spared. There is much ex-captive testimony about insurgents trying to obtain allegiance through a mix of threats, preaching and enticements. In so doing, Boko Haram seems to follow a pre-colonial Lake Chad-area pattern of raiding and enslavement, whereby women and children are captured and integrated into the victorious group. With the state-sponsored emergence from 2013 of civilian vigilante groups to fight Boko Haram in all communities, the jihadists turned on both Christian and Muslim communities, killing men and capturing women, including Muslim women. For instance, when they captured Kareto, Borno state, in 2015, they treated Muslim women harshly because they had taken part, under military pressure, in desecrating the bodies of killed comrades. Economic motives may also explain the increase in abductions. As in the nineteenth century wars in the Lake Chad area, Boko Haram used women and girls as rewards to fighters, a significant enticement since raising the resources for marriage is not easy. A former captive reported overhearing lengthy conversations between fighters over marriage prospects. That Boko Haram has occasionally released older women, for instance when food stocks were low or the war moved on, but not younger women demonstrates the latter’s value. Management of marriageable women and girls, including widows, appears to have been a prerogative of leaders and a contentious issue within the sect. In a 2016 recording, Mamman Nur, a Boko Haram splinter faction leader, criticised Shekau for betraying his promise to marry the Chibok girls to sect members. Boko Haram seems to have distinguished between slaves and wives based on religion, protecting the latter more from abuse. But even that has been controversial, with Nur criticising Shekau for enslaving Muslim women he deemed unfaithful to his version of Islam. Captured women have generally been kept under surveillance, required to wear the niqab and often compelled to listen to sermons and Quranic education. Eventually, they could be put to work, for instance as carriers, including in attacks, or cooks. While the sect’s claims to moral rigour may have given captive women some protection from sexual violence, as seems to have been the case for several Chibok girls, there have been reports of clandestine, extra-marital rapes in Boko Haram camps. Rape seemed more frequent after captives, sometimes quite young by local standards, were pressured to marry fighters. After the 2009 crackdown, some women already loyal to Boko Haram left Maiduguri, following their husbands to other towns or the Sambisa forest, a large savanna area south of Maiduguri where Boko Haram has bases. Others stayed behind to care for families or clandestinely support husbands. Yet others continued to join Boko Haram willingly. In Boko Haram-controlled areas, marriage could bring a measure of security and well-being for women and their extended family. In a village near Kerenowa in the Local Government Area (LGA) of Marte, Borno state, insurgents married 80 girls, offering dowries of 15,000 naira (about $70 in 2014), a considerable sum in a war-torn rural area. Some fathers gave their daughters to fighters under pressure from Boko Haram, and at times women chose such marriages against family wishes. A woman from Walasa, a Kanuri village near Banki, Bama LGA, divorced her husband and married the Boko Haram naqib of Banki. She said her new husband looked after her better and gave her a higher stipend than her first husband. She lamented losing the money she had saved when the military took back her village, burned their house and arrested her. In 2014, Kanuri elders and officials in Niger became increasingly worried about a small but increasing number of single women leaving the Diffa region for Boko Haram-controlled areas in search of business opportunities or a “lucrative” marriage. Some may have become Boko Haram wives more inadvertently. A nineteen-year-old from Banki said that when she married, in 2013, she did not know that her husband, a trader selling suitcases who would leave for weeks at a time, was in Boko Haram. She never saw him with a weapon until there was fighting nearby with the military, and they had to leave for the Sambisa forest. Her parents told her to go with him, possibly fearing violence from Boko Haram if they prevented her from accompanying her husband. The sect values Quranic education for women so they can take part in the religious community and obey its rules. Some women joined because they found this attractive and were eager to “acquire knowledge, to memorise the Quran and to learn about Islam more deeply … [all] unique opportunities”. As they grew in militancy, they considered any non-supporter an apostate or non-Muslim and an enemy to be fought. Many were involved as domestic labour, but also recruiters of other women, their husbands or young men, as spies, messengers and smugglers (including of food). For a time, as the army and CJTF focused on male suspects, women were well suited for these roles, as their supposed innocuousness allowed them to circulate more easily than male militants in government areas. Unlike other West African insurgent groups, such as those in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Boko Haram has nothing like a women’s brigade. Yet, under manpower pressure, particularly from 2014, some women and girls were trained and joined in attacks. The wife of a Boko Haram leader in the Gwoza Hills reportedly carried a gun and killed a vigilante. Armed female militants were sighted in the Sambisa forest, riding their own motorcycles. Women were said to be involved in a 2016 ambush on the military. On 10 July 2014, armed females between fourteen and 21 and fighting “like professionals” attacked Kirenowa in Marte LGA, Borno state. Use of young females as suicide bombers, the first instance of the tactic in Nigeria’s history, has attracted much publicity. The attacks, which have killed hundreds, have become symbolic of the insurgency’s brutality. The first suicide bombing was in 2011, but women bombers, usually with improvised explosives strapped to their bodies, became prominent only in the second half of 2014. Attacks grew in frequency and severity, but declined from mid-2015, mainly due to the army’s cutting of Boko Haram’s supply lines and improved prevention measures, including at checkpoints. The youngest female bomb-carriers are often victims themselves, with little awareness, duped by relatives and possibly drugged. But the older bombers seem to have volunteered. A woman who spent two years as a captive in Gwoza LGA said she saw seven such women who were recruited as suicide bombers and deployed to Maiduguri around March-April 2015. They reportedly were moved by commitment to jihad and apparently indoctrinated over a long period, including with promise of direct admission to al-jinnah (paradise). Some were widows of fighters. Overall, there was supposedly no shortage of volunteers. 2.Fighting back Some women have fought Boko Haram as part of the vigilante groups that emerged throughout the Lake Chad basin under various forms, notably the Borno state-based Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). This seems to have been a late development, partly related to the fact women were increasingly active in the insurgency. At the onset, there were none, but as time went on, females started joining for various reasons. Some joined out of outrage and bitterness, seeking vengeance after they had seen Boko Haram slaughter their loved ones. Other volunteered to help the CJTF at checkpoints following protests against men touching women’s bodies. Some offered the CTJF information discreetly on Boko Haram members and their activities within Maiduguri but did not join the group. There are presently 122 registered female CJTF members in Borno state, though more may work with the CJTF informally. Some have received military training, are armed with shotguns and other weapons and fight alongside men, at times in operations with the military. Female vigilantes also guard IDP camps and help identify Boko Haram suspects, for example by examining women and girls at checkpoints to prevent suicide attacks. 3.Working for peace Though they may have been obscured by the violent shock between Boko Haram and the state, there has been non-violent female engagement for conflict resolution in the North East. Some women, often from prominent families which valued and could offer daughters an education, have long been active on the place of women in public and private life. They have usually been so from within Islam, rather than via external critique. That has been so for the Federation of Muslim Women’s Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN), which has combined propagation of Islam with attempts to improve the socio-economic status of women, youths and children through training, education, health and humanitarian services, micro-enterprise and advocacy. Women’s Rights Advancement and Protection Alternative (WRAPA) has been active against domestic abuse, female genital mutilation and child marriage and played a major part in the successful defence of two young women condemned to death under Sharia in the early 2000s. More recently, it has sought to engage imams over preaching on the rights of women. As the Boko Haram conflict grew, these organisations have been involved in advocacy, notably over the Chibok abductions. They have found powerful allies in other international and nationwide campaigns, such as Bring Back Our Girls, a gathering of female activists (and some men) with particular anchoring in the political and economic capitals, Abuja and Lagos, that has kept the issue alive. 4.Forced to flee Together, the insurgency and counter-insurgency have forced nearly two million people in the North East, more than half women and girls, to leave their homes. Widespread killing of civilians, the destruction of towns and villages by Boko Haram and the military, loss of livelihoods and lack of food in an increasingly ruptured economy are the main factors driving this displacement. Initially, people fled to urban centres, where they thought the government would protect them, or to neighbouring states or countries. As the insurgency gained ground, some have been forced to move several times. Maiduguri, repeatedly attacked but never captured by Boko Haram, hosts about a million IDPs. The counter-attack by the army, the vigilantes and Nigeria’s regional allies, which gained steam in 2015, created hundreds of thousands more IDPs, the civilians who had hitherto survived in Boko Haram-controlled areas and then fled for safety or were relocated by the army. In many areas, women and children were the only ones left after Boko Haram either forcibly recruited or killed the men and older boys or the military arrested them. The security forces and state have had difficulty deciding what to do with thousands of survivors. The need to survive in Boko Haram areas and the blurred lines between victims and perpetrators have fed suspicion of IDPs. That suspicion, and the poor performance and abuses of Nigerian officials – and of some of their international partners – who are meant to assist the IDPs have combined to create a humanitarian crisis with serious long-term risks. People found in areas “liberated” by the military are screened to pick out Boko Haram members. In Borno state, soldiers and the CJTF lead the process locally, often in consultation with community leaders, leaders of wards in towns and village heads. While Boko Haram suspects are transferred to detention centres in military barracks or elsewhere, others caught up in the conflict are sent to official IDP camps, where further screening can take place. Most IDPs then move into host communities or informal camps. Others are transferred to experimental deradicalisation programs. Only one such site caters for women at present, a “safe house” in Maiduguri, discussed below. There is also a rehabilitation centre in Maiduguri which functions as a transit point. In September 2016, 500 women and children held in military detention were sent there for social support, accommodation and food before release to families in November. The basis for the distinction is unclear. Screening is difficult, because in areas Boko Haram controls most people are compelled for their safety to have some association with the insurgents. Determining who is an active member is prone to error. The military can, therefore, end up incarcerating vulnerable women who were abducted, captured or prevented from leaving their communities by Boko Haram, along with women who actively supported the insurgency. Detention of suspected insurgents occurs extra-judicially, with hardly any external scrutiny. Suspects, including some women and children in a separate section, are reportedly still held in Giwa Barracks in Maiduguri. Amnesty International in June 2015 reported extensive allegations of torture, starvation and thousands of deaths at the site between 2011 and 2015. In May 2016, it insisted conditions remained terribly poor, noting a high mortality rate among detainees and the children and babies confined with them. International agency access to and monitoring of conditions has improved slightly since, but each entry is “a new negotiation” with the military. For those who make it through screening, conditions as an IDP depend on the security situation and type of settlement. More than 80 per cent are in host communities, the rest in government-run and informal camps throughout Borno state and in neighbouring states and countries. The camp in Bama, a deserted city surrounded by Boko Haram to the south east of Maiduguri, looks almost like an open-air jail, while IDPs in Monguno, north east of Maiduguri, are free to move around and have brought the market back to life. IDPs are generally guarded by the military, often in collaboration with police and CJTF. Movement in and out of the camps is monitored in locations like Bama, Banki or Maiduguri. Mobility restrictions are ostensibly for security reasons, to prevent attacks on IDPs outside the camps and stop Boko Haram infiltration. In parts of central Borno, some women have been returned to their LGAs from camps in Maiduguri and elsewhere, but they are usually held in camps because their houses have been destroyed, and there is still a high security risk in more remote areas. Elsewhere, as in much of southern Borno, Yobe and northern Adamawa, the rural areas are becoming more accessible, and IDPs are beginning to return to their villages. The humanitarian situation for IDPs is harsh, though varied by area. Massive food shortages and serious health issues have been reported. A blame game is being played by state agencies, federal government agencies, donors and international NGOs (INGOs). Some government officials hold Boko Haram responsible, and certainly violence has ravaged agricultural production and health structures. But counter-insurgency has also deliberately stifled economic activity to deprive Boko Haram of supplies, trade and protection rackets. Other officials play down the humanitarian situation or accuse international organisations and IDPs of exaggeration. Corruption and diversion of food aid and relief funds by officials, as well as a shortfall in assistance, have certainly been part of the problem. IDPs have denounced mismanagement and corruption a number of times. IDPs outside government-run camps have generally received even less food and medical help, but several government-run camps have very high rates of mortality and children’s malnutrition and low rates of vaccination. This is true not only of camps close to remaining Boko Haram areas, where understandable movement restrictions constrain economic activity and access to health services, but also of those supposedly safe from Boko Haram, around Maiduguri city. Women and girls in the camps face specific problems. Locked up in compounds where most guards and much of the staff are men, many have experienced sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) or resorted to “survival sex” with camp officials and security personnel in exchange for food, money or permission to leave the camp. In several sites, sexual exploitation was said to be so frequent that parents preferred to marry their daughters at an early age. IV.Stigmatisation and the Dilemmas of Reintegration The blurred lines between Boko Haram member, abductee, slave, wife, supporter, victim and sympathiser have left many women and girls with the stigma of association. That stigma – heightened if they have children born to Boko Haram fathers, even if the pregnancy was against their will – is a major obstacle to reintegration into community life. Children born to women who were raped or married (by force or choice) to Boko Haram fighters are seen in IDP camps and host communities in Maiduguri and elsewhere in the North East as having “bad blood” from their fathers and potential future security risks. President Buhari publicly sought to counter this attitude by holding a Boko Haram child in his arms. The consequences of exclusion from mainstream society are significant for both the individual’s social, political and economic prospects and north-eastern society’s cohesion and stability. Isolation and alienation risk generating new frustration and resistance of the kind that gave rise to Boko Haram. Children of stigmatised females may in time reject state institutions. There is no evidence to confirm the suspicion of some observers that the harsh camp conditions are a deliberate attempt by some authorities to punish women and their children recently retrieved from Boko Haram areas. Yet, even women captured, abused or forced into “marriage” by the sect bear the stigma of association. Fear of “contagion” and, more concretely, suicide attacks, is part of the problem. As a result, there are restrictions in some areas on new influxes of IDPs into Maiduguri. In Bama camp, only children needing sustained medical support are allowed to go, sometimes without their caretakers. However understandable, this fear must be balanced against its cost. Restricting movement encourages official neglect, offers opportunities for abuse and extortion and can feed resentment. Stigmatisation can also inhibit reintegration into normal community life. In Maiduguri’s IDP camps even women who were abducted and raped or enslaved are often socially isolated, labelled “Boko Haram wives” and “Sambisa women”. Given the prevailing norms, with sex outside marriage socially unacceptable, they may be rejected by their family, and their lot is likely to be worse if they have had children outside marriage, as they have no way to hide the situation. One should, however, beware of generalisation: social judgments can take into account the degree of support the individual gave Boko Haram. Those perceived to have been coerced are not necessarily seen in the same way as women believed to have stayed more willingly. An ex-captive recounted how soldiers welcomed her at their outpost after she escaped Boko Haram. Muslim and Christian women interviewed for this study in host communities and IDP camps who had escaped after being held for months or even years by Boko Haram, or who had been liberated by the military, were socially integrated with other IDPs and recounted their experiences as victims of the insurgency. It helped that many had been through similar experiences and sometimes were freed or escaped together. Thus while many cases of stigmatisation have been recorded, some women are traumatised, not stigmatised. The problem of stigmatisation and trauma varies between families, individuals and communities. A few of the wives and children of Boko Haram members have been placed in a centre for “deradicalisation”, a “safe house” established in Maiduguri for that purpose by Borno state authorities in May 2016. From the outset, it accommodated 62 women and adolescents from two villages in Bama and Dikwa LGAs, Borno state, most of whom, as wives of insurgents, are regarded as security risks, and their 26 children. They are under the responsibility of female social workers and are prohibited from leaving the premises, which are under armed guard. This pilot project exemplifies the dilemmas of reintegration and deradicalisation. The challenge lies in defining what aspect of “radicalism” the programs seek to counter: use of violence, certain violence, the ideology or an aspect of an ideology? Only some Boko Haram women handled guns and fought. Most seem to have had a more domestic role and were not necessarily involved in or exposed to mass violence. They were indoctrinated to differing degrees, with some still holding to the creed, while others had discarded it. It seems some could be more easily reintegrated into society than others, but there could be resistance from local populations. They still showed some reluctance to acknowledge atrocities, which they often saw as part of a two-sided conflict. Some “deradicalisation” work in the safe house is meant to educate on the effects of violence, notably suicide attacks. Islamic preachers visit to teach counter-narratives to sect doctrine, and female social workers interact with them daily. Some expressed a wish to go to school to supplement their Islamic education; and some were attending classes in the safe house. V.Taking Women into Account: A Policy Agenda Given the situation of women in the North East, the state and its international partners should quickly address the full spectrum of challenges. Action is needed to tackle the immediate protection and humanitarian issues, as well as the longer-term subject of reintegration. All this is required in the context of a larger drive to improve the condition of all women in the North East. Like many wars, that against Boko Haram has worsened the economic situation. Disruption of established patterns gives some women opportunity to find more fulfilling roles, but the effect for most is more disempowerment. Violence has scattered families. Many women are isolated in camps or urban centres, without news of husbands, parents or children. Their homes are too dangerous for return, and in most areas their property has been destroyed or looted by Boko Haram or the army. Single female-headed households are a majority in some IDP camps. The tragedy of war and challenges of recovery and reconstruction are strong arguments for efforts to meet women’s immediate needs, but also to empower them as agents of change. A.Upgrade Screening In a war in which one side has relied massively on forced recruitment, the distinction between victim and perpetrator is not easy. The authorities should ensure that the army does not systematically detain all women found in areas newly recovered from Boko Haram. The ambiguous tactics some women have had to adopt to survive should not be held against them indiscriminately. Necessary security screening should also make use of protection officers of both genders who are provided by national civil society organisations and trained by UNHCR. Those in charge should be sensitive to the difficult situation many women faced. B.Provide Appropriate Care and Protection for Female Victims Camps may seem an appropriate solution for people found in areas newly seized from Boko Haram, if only to protect them from retaliation and community suspicion until reintegration is worked out. It is essential, however, to give appropriate assistance to these new IDPs, as well as to the ones long settled in safer areas, and their host communities. There should be greater accountability in distribution of food and aid and to facilitate the access of local and international humanitarian organisations. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), which runs the official camps, should ensure IDP protection, notably from SGBV. The management of access to the camps, currently controlled by the military, should be transferred to civilian organisations as soon as possible. Addressing the particular vulnerability of the predominantly female IDP population requires special attention to sexual and gender-based violence and ensuring access to sexual and reproductive health information and services. The authorities should activate referral mechanisms for women and girls in IDP camps and host communities. Allegations of abuses committed by security forces and/or CJTF should be properly investigated, with attention to ensuring proper judicial procedures and publicising appropriate cases. The predominantly male composition of organisations involved in protecting and managing mostly female IDP camps is a weak point. Federal and state governments and international partners should cooperate urgently to develop programs to increase women’s recruitment in local police forces and other bodies involved in operating IDP camps. International experts should also provide gender-sensitive civilian-protection training to soldiers, police and NEMA officials and the Borno state Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) deployed to the camps. C.Treat Suspected Female Perpetrators of Violence Fairly While not ignoring accountability for suspected female perpetrators, the government should ensure a fair and transparent process in handling all Boko Haram cases; distinguishing Boko Haram ideologues from those who joined from other motives will be vital. Detention of those who, after screening, are held before they appear in court should be civilian, not military, and in acceptable conditions, with access to humanitarian agencies. Children should be granted adequate care. Given the scope of the violence, involvement in abuses by both the insurgents and security force elements and judicial system weaknesses, a proper adjudication procedure must be devised for all suspects, who cannot be left in legal limbo indefinitely. That procedure should include participation of women, particularly from the North East. D.Reintegrate Female Victims into Community Life The reunification of families, the only safety net for many, should be a priority. A federal database should be established to facilitate the search for missing persons and more resources made available to reunite families. Likewise, an effort is needed to combat stigmatisation. To help with reintegration and rehabilitation of women and girls released from Boko Haram, a community-based reconciliation process with significant female participation should be encouraged, notably by inviting women’s groups from different parts of Borno to participate in dialogue. All development and reconstruction plans, public and private, should be based on gender-sensitive analysis of the insurgency and counter-insurgency. Programming should acknowledge that in the North East religion can facilitate assistance and be a driving force for promoting positive change for women generally. Muslims and Christians should be involved together, to help bridge the divisions that have increased with the insurgency. Programs are needed to ease women’s access to credit and land. Single female-headed households require particular support to restart productive activities, for example in crafts, trade or agriculture. Widows should receive special attention, because isolated women are more susceptible to manipulation by jihadists. As in Rwanda, plans should be made to provide a monthly allocation to war widows for a number of years, and local NGOs should be supported to give free legal assistance for inheritance and property matters. That the families of soldiers killed in the conflict often receive little support has the potential to damage military morale. The widows of soldiers should receive a stipend from the federal government, eventually covering accommodation if they are made to leave the barracks. Children fathered by Boko Haram members and their mothers must not be allowed to become outcasts. Community-based approaches and sensitivity training are needed, as is a significant increase in educational investment overall and prioritisation of the integrated education of these children with other children in the region. E.Step Up Efforts to Empower Women in the North East With a view to more structural changes in gender imbalances, effort is needed in three main directions. Attention should be paid to programs to strengthen women’s participation in politics and local governance, including consideration of an affirmative action policy with quotas, as in many other West African countries. Increasing girls’ access to primary and secondary schools should be a priority, but given the interest in and legitimacy of Quranic education in the North East, it should also be upgraded by introducing a dual curriculum (as in Kano state) and paying teachers’ salaries so pupils do not need to beg for upkeep. Strict provisions should apply to the intake of supported schools in order to encourage gender balance. Mainstream Islamic groups should empower female members to do their part to help alleviate the humanitarian crisis. They could also play an important role in countering violent religious ideologies and building support for women’s education and civic participation. Lastly, the state should take steps to combat gender discrimination and stereotypes rooted in law and practice, to ensure women and girls have more control over their lives. VI.Conclusion Women in the North East suffer from appalling violence and abuse that add to the burdens of stifling patriarchy. Boko Haram’s exploitation of them, including sexual and gender-based violence, markedly deviates from modern mainstream Islamic social norms and is closer to nineteenth century and earlier patterns of enslavement and raiding. Nevertheless, the view of women as Boko Haram’s passive victims that became widely accepted after the Chibok girls’ abduction is misleading and needs substantial revision. Violence against women should not obscure the fact that many are also actors in the conflict and at times perpetrators. Many have been exploited, abused and displaced, while others have played active roles in the insurgency and the counter-insurgency. Conversely, Nigeria’s recovery of Boko Haram-controlled territory does not necessarily alleviate women’s suffering. In a deeply divided, traumatised society, it also fuels new forms of violence, exclusion and coercion against those suspected of complicity with the insurgents. Recognising the military’s improved efforts to tackle Boko Haram under President Buhari should not mean turning a blind eye to official abuses that could sow the seeds for renewed rebellion. The multiple ways women experience and engage with the conflict need to be fully understood and directly inform policies for alleviating their suffering and paving the way for reconciliation and rebuilding society. Women need help from the authorities and their international partners, but careful thought and planning is required to ensure its effective delivery. All should take into consideration the historical context of gender discrimination rooted in law and cultural practice, and how the insurgency has further affected women in various ways, from sexual abuse to lost economic opportunities, and diversify programs accordingly. They should also make sure that development and reconstruction plans are based on a gendered analysis of the conflict. Finally, women need support not only to gain more control over their lives, but also to become actors and decision-makers in reconstructing the North East. Federal authorities and their partners should recognise that although the state has a central role to play, religion too can be a resource for facilitating this process and for promoting positive change for women more generally. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2016 International Crisis Group

A Muslim woman wears an Aung San Suu Kyi mask during a rally against the persecution of Rohingya. Photograph: Dita Alangkara/AP Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi accused the international community on Friday of stoking resentment between Buddhists and Muslims in the country’s northwest, where an army crackdown has killed at least 86 people and sent 10,000 fleeing to Bangladesh. Aung San Suu Kyi appealed for understanding of her nation’s ethnic complexities, and said the world should not forget the military operation was launched in response to attacks on security forces that the government has blamed on Muslim insurgents. “I would appreciate it so much if the international community would help us to maintain peace and stability, and to make progress in building better relations between the two communities, instead of always drumming up cause for bigger fires of resentment,” Aung San Suu Kyi told Singapore state-owned broadcaster Channel News Asia during a visit to the city-state. “It doesn’t help if everybody is just concentrating on the negative side of the situation, in spite of the fact that there were attacks against police outposts.” The violence in the northwest poses the biggest challenge so far to Aung San Suu Kyi’s eight-month-old government, and has renewed international criticism that the Nobel Peace Prize winner has done too little to help the country’s RohingyaMuslim minority. Her comments come as Malaysia said Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya amounted to “ethnic cleansing”. “The fact that only one particular ethnicity is being driven out is by definition ethnic cleansing,” Malaysia’s foreign ministry said in a statement. “This practice must stop, and must be stopped immediately in order to bring back security and stability to the Southeast Asian region.” Muslim-majority Malaysia has been increasingly critical of Myanmar’s handling of violence in northern Rakhine state. Soldiers have poured into the north of Rakhine State, close to the frontier with Bangladesh, after attacks on border posts on 9 October that killed nine police officers. Humanitarian aid has been cut off to the area, which is closed to outside observers. Myanmar’s military and the government have rejected allegations by residents and human rights groups that soldiers have raped Rohingya women, burned houses and killed civilians during the operation. Aung San Suu Kyi’s remarks came as a commission led by former United Nations chief Kofi Annan arrived in the state, where ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims have lived separately since clashes in 2012 in which more than 100 people were killed. Despite often having lived in Myanmar for generations, most of the country’s 1.1 million Rohingya are denied citizenship, freedom of movement and access to basic services such as healthcare and education. The UN’s human rights agency said this week that abuses suffered by the Rohingya may amount to a crimes against humanity, repeating a statement it first made in a June report. The Rohingya are not among the 135 ethnic groups recognised by law in Myanmar, where many majority Buddhists refer to them as “Bengalis” to indicate they regard them as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. In northern Rakhine, one of the poorest parts of the country, Muslims outnumber the ethnic Rakhine population. “In the Rakhine, it’s not just the Muslims who are nervous and worried,” said Suu Kyi. “The Rakhine are worried too. They are worried about the fact that they are shrinking as a Rakhine population, percentage-wise.” UN officials said this week more than 10,000 people have fled the recent fighting to Bangladesh. There are continuing reports of people fleeing across the river border in flimsy boats, bringing accounts of razed villages, uprooted communities and separated families. Still, Aung San Suu Kyi said the government has “managed to keep the situation under control and to calm it down”. © 2016 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE REBUTTAL TO THE “MYANMAR TIMES” ON THE STATEMENT MADE BY U ZAW HTAY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PRESIDENT’S OFFICE, MYANMAR The Ministry of Foreign Affairs views with concern the humanitarian crisis in Rohingya, the spillover effect of which will affect the safety, security and standing of Malaysia, as Myanmar's ASEAN neighbour. It is in this context that Malaysia has allowed the Solidarity March to take place. As a neighbour and a responsible member of the international community, it is Malaysia's obligation to ensure that its ASEAN colleague takes proactive steps to prevent the matter from further deteriorating. Malaysia is well aware of the principles upon which ASEAN was built, being a founding member of the regional organisation. In 2008, all ten member states of ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Charter, which binds the members to the international principles of the protection and promotion of human rights. Furthermore, all member states of ASEAN agreed to respond effectively, in accordance with the principle of comprehensive security, to threats, which the Rohingya issue poses to Malaysia's own security. The high number of Rohingya people in Malaysia (approximately 56,000) under the UNHCR banner, coupled with the hundreds of thousands in other neighbouring countries, makes this matter no longer an internal matter but an international matter. The fact that only one particular ethnicity is being driven out is by definition ethnic cleansing. This practice must stop, and must be stopped immediately in order to bring back security and stability to the Southeast Asian region. Malaysia need not remind U Zaw Htay of the 2015 boat people crisis which eventually became a regional issue with Myanmar's neighbours taking the brunt of the burden. It is with this in mind that Malaysia has repeatedly offered its assistance to the Myanmar government in finding a solution for a just and durable immediate solution to the persecution of the Rohingya in Northern Rakhine. This in keeping with Malaysia's position that this is not a religious issue but an immediate humanitarian concern. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PUTRAJAYA 3 December 2016

"They (the Rohingyas) are ill-treated only because they are weak. If we (all Muslims) come together as one and voice our concerns, we may be able to end this. "Today, we pray and call upon Allah to be with us. Insyaallah, with Allah with us, our voice will be louder and heard (by those concerned)." Pas' Nik Abduh rallies Muslims, M'sians to stand behind Rohingya By NST TEAM - 4 December 2016 @ 10:28 AM http://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/12/194259/pas-nik-abduh-rallies-muslims-msians-stand-behind-rohingya ================================= Burma’s Soldiers Beware Military commanders on both sides of Burma’s civil war need to know that they will be held accountable for any war crimes they commit. One obstacle to peace has been impunity for human-rights abuses. REUTERS By MATTHEW SMITH Dec. 3, 2014 12:43 p.m. ET http://www.wsj.com/articles/burmas-soldiers-beware-1417628602 It didn’t take long for military attacks to resume in Burma following President Barack Obama’s visit last month. Less than a week after Air Force One departed, the Burmese army shelled a rebel training camp in Kachin State, killing 23 cadets. Just days later, it bombarded an area near a camp for displaced civilians, prompting rare public protests in Rangoon and a statement of concern from the U.S. Embassy. This is the gritty truth of the “new Myanmar.” The story of successful cease-fire agreements and burgeoning democracy is giving way to disillusionment as the peace process stalls and violence escalates. One obstacle to peace in Burma’s war-torn ethnic-minority states is impunity for human-rights abuses. In the northern reaches of the country, the Burmese army, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and smaller ethnic militias have been fighting a deadly civil war for the past three and half years, destroying untold lives. More than 100,000 civilians have lost everything—land, homes, loved ones and social-support structures. Deep ethnic divisions and competition for natural resources, including jade deposits valued at billions of dollars, drive the conflict. Soldiers in the Burmese army have targeted and killed civilians, employed forced labor on the front lines, and pillaged and destroyed properties. Battalions have used men, women and children as human shields, forcing them to walk through landmine-infested jungles between remote villages. “They pointed their guns at us, and we had to point our faces toward the ground,” a 38-year-old Kachin mother of four told me. She and her children were taken twice by dozens of Burmese troops who forced them to walk through dense terrain in the conflict zone, for no discernable reason other than to protect them from KIA ambushes. “We thought they were going to kill us. We were all crying,” she said. In June my organization, Fortify Rights, released a 71-page report describing more than 60 instances of torture by the army, police and military intelligence. The government was quick to disavow our findings. President Thein Sein’s spokesperson, Ye Htut, responded that torture isn’t government or military policy, telling CNN the army would “never use torture as a weapon in the conflict areas.” To his credit, Mr. Ye Htut vowed that perpetrators would be punished “if we find they’ve committed these crimes.” However, to date no one has been held accountable and the practice continues. More than a dozen ethnic armies have also committed abuses in recent years, albeit on a lesser scale. Several continue to use child soldiers and plant landmines, and some have been accused of executing prisoners of war and abusing civilian populations. These abuses are hardly new. Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic recently identified three senior army commanders responsible for war crimes during an offensive in Karen State in 2005 and 2006, including attacks on civilians, killings, and forced labor on the front lines. All three of the named commanders received promotions after the offensive, including Burma’s current home-affairs minister, Lt. Gen. Ko Ko. To date, none have been held accountable. President Thein Sein’s administration and his “peace brokers” simply avoid serious discussions of human rights abuses and accountability. Let bygones be bygones, they argue. That’s easy for them to say. Ethnic survivors of abuses have a different view. They consistently tell us they want both peace and justice, and they want the world to know the truth. “We want accountability,” a Kachin woman in the conflict zone told me. “We want to use the courts, but we’ve been stifled.” If Burma is ever going to achieve a lasting peace and regain the lost trust of its ethnic populations, political and military leaders need to change course. For starters, military commanders on both sides of the conflict need to know that international law applies to their actions, and that they could face arrest and trial in domestic or international courts for any crimes they commit or oversee. Accountability for war crimes in Burma may seem distant now, but history shows that justice is steadfast. In recent years, those who oversaw wartime abuses in Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe have faced prosecution in domestic and international courts. The same will come to perpetrators of war crimes in Burma. Current commanders in the country can avoid liability by ordering their soldiers, clearly and specifically, to cease and avoid unlawful conduct and by taking prompt and meaningful action against soldiers who commit abuses. If they do these two things, and refrain from committing unlawful acts themselves, they can’t be held accountable for war crimes. But in Burma’s war zones today, this isn’t happening. Burma’s leadership and military commanders have some decisions to make. The actions they take in the coming months and years will have momentous implications for their country’s future—and their own. Mr. Smith is the executive director of Fortify Rights. ============================= Suu Kyi must stop Rohingya 'genocide': Mayalsia PM 4 Dec 2016 at 13:45 530 viewed0 comments WRITER: AFP http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/1151497/ KUALA LUMPUR - Aung San Suu Kyi must step in to prevent the "genocide" of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, Malaysia's prime minister said Sunday as he mocked the Nobel laureate for her inaction. Rohingya Muslim refugees offer prayers during a gathering in Kuala Lumpur on Dec 4, 2016 against the persecution of the ethnic minority in Myanmar Addressing a 5,000-strong rally in Kuala Lumpur, Najib Razak said the Myanmar government must stop the bloody crackdown in its far west that has sent thousands of Rohingya fleeing, many with stories of rape, torture and murder. “What’s the use of Aung San Suu Kyi having a Nobel prize?" Najib asked a raucous crowd. “We want to tell Aung San Suu Kyi, enough is enough... We must and we will defend Muslims and Islam," he said as supporters chanted "Allahu Akbar" ("God is greater"). "We want the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) to act. "Please do something. The UN do something. The world cannot sit and watch genocide taking place," said Najib. More than 10,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh in recent weeks, the United Nations said on Wednesday, escaping a bloody army crackdown in the north of Rakhine state. Arrivals in Bangladesh have told AFP horrifying stories of gang rape, torture and murder at the hands of Myanmar's security forces. Myanmar has denied allegations of abuse, but has also banned foreign journalists and independent investigators from the area. Muslim-majority Malaysia has recently upped its criticism of Myanmar for its handling of the crisis. Last month it summoned the Myanmar ambassador, while around 500 Malaysians and Rohingya marched to the embassy in the Malaysian capital carrying banners denouncing the "genocide." A senior minister has called on Asean, the ten-country Southeast Asia bloc, to review Myanmar's membership, while a strongly worded statement from the foreign ministry Saturday accused Myanmar of engaging in "ethnic cleansing." But analysts said Sunday the issue is a convenient smokescreen for Najib, who is fighting allegations he took part in the looting of billions of dollars of public cash through state fund 1MDB. Both he and the fund deny any wrongdoing. James Chin, director of the Asia Institute at the University of Tasmania, told AFP that Najib "is there (at the rally) to boost his standing as an Islamic leader," with a general election looming. "Najib is looking for anything to make him look good and the Rohingya issue is simply a tool," said Bridget Welsh, a Malaysia politics expert with Turkey's Ipek University. She added that if Najib's government really cared for the Rohingya, they would "reexamine their own treatment of the community within Malaysia." Malaysia might be a beacon for Rohingya fleeing Myanmar but many have said they end up in a precarious and stateless limbo and suffer a new kind of marginalisation. ================================ BANGLADESH Protests at atrocities on Rohingyas continue http://www.thestateless.com/2016/12/03/protests-at-atrocities-on-rohingyas-continue/ ​Sunday, 4 December 2016 ‘Rohingya woes a global issue now’ http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/12/04/rohingya-woes-a-global-issue-now-wisma-putra-high-refugee-numbers-in-msia-make-it-an-international-m/ PUTRAJAYA: The high number of Rohingya refugees in Malaysia, coupled with hundreds of thousands in neighbouring countries, means the issue is no longer an internal matter in Myanmar, said Wisma Putra. It said in a statement that the 56,000 Rohingya people in Malaysia and in other Asean countries made it an international matter. “The fact that only one particular ethnicity is being driven out, is by definition, ethnic cleansing. “This must stop and it must stop immediately in order to bring back security and stability to the region,” it said. Wisma Putra added that Malaysia need not remind deputy director-general of the Myan­­mar Presi­dent’s Office, U Zaw Htay, of the 2015 boat people crisis which eventually became a regional issue, with Myanmar’s neighbours taking the brunt of the burden. “It is with this in mind that Malaysia has repeatedly offered its assistance to the Myanmar government in finding a solution for a just and durable immediate solution to the persecution of the Rohingya in Rakhine state,” it said in the statement. The statement was in response to Zaw Htay’s comment to the Myan­mar Times on Friday that Malaysia should respect sovereign affairs. This came as several protests took place in Malaysia against Myan­mar’s treatment of the Ro­­hingya people recently. There are also plans to hold a solidarity march on the issue. Wisma Putra said that it viewed with concern the humanitarian crisis involving Rohingya, the spillover effect of which will affect the safety, security and standing of Malaysia, as Myanmar’s Asean neighbour. “It is in this context that Malaysia has allowed the solidarity march to take place. “As a neighbour and responsible member of the international community, it is Malaysia’s obligation to ensure that its Asean colleague takes proactive steps to prevent the matter from further deteriorating,” Wisma Putra said. It further added that as a foun­ding member of the regional body, Malaysia was well aware of the principles on which Asean was built. “In 2008, all 10 member states of Asean adopted the Asean Charter which binds members to the international principles of protection and promotion of human rights. “Furthermore, all member states of Asean agreed to respond effectively, in accordance with the principle of comprehensive security, to threats, which the Rohingya issue poses to Malaysia’s own security,” Wisma Putra said. — Bernama​

As grim genocide by attrition in Darfur is set to enter its fifteenth year, as Khartoum’s claim of a purely nominal “cease-fire” in South Kordofan is belied by repeated reports of Sudan Armed Forces shelling areas of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North, and as repression in Sudan reaches a crescendo—this in response to the regime’s allowing a collapse of the national economy—it seems almost beyond comprehension that nations of the world accept all this as a “new normal.” But in fact, the view of all too many countries is that this is a new “normality,” one that shouldn’t be allowed to interfere with various worldly economic interests, or arms sales to the regime, or the most expedient deals made in pursuit of putative counter-terrorism intelligence—something of which the Obama administration is guilty. To be sure, relationships with the regime established over many years are not similar in all ways. China and Russia, veto-wielding Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, have long been major sources of weapons to Khartoum—and reflexive supporters of the Khartoum regime at the UN. They make impossible, for example, enforcement of the arms embargo on Darfur imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 1591 (March 2005)—one of countless obstructionist policies and stratagems by which these cynically self-interested world powers protect what is in effect a client state. The relationship of Arab countries toward Sudan has also changing, becoming much more “accepting. As economic conditions have forced the regime to forgo its many years of “eternal strategic relationship with Iran,” this has left an opening for (Sunni) Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States—particularly Qatar—to wield greater influence by means of financial assistance. Given the need felt especially by Saudi Arabia to counter Iranian influence in the region, it has been an opportune moment. I have recently written at length on the history of the Obama administration’s relationship with Khartoum, seen through synoptic accounts of the three disastrous special envoys for Sudan: Scott Gration, Princeton Lyman, and Donald Booth (“Obama Administration Special Envoys for Sudan: A Succession of Failure, Duplicity, and Cynicism,” November 24, 2016 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Yq ). I have also written about the implications for American Sudan policy of Donald Trump’s victory, a man elected president by running on a platform of xenophobia, exclusionism, hatred of Islam, and a pull-back from internationalism (“Sudan in the Wake of a Trump Victory,” November 15, 2016 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Yh ). It would seem appropriate, then, to look to European nations—and especially the European countries so eagerly pursuing policies of rapprochement. Europe and Khartoum’s Génocidaires Differently motivated, but sharing a supreme callousness, European countries have found various ways to ignore massive evidence that the regime has not only waged relentless war on the people of Sudan’s periphery, but is a giant, seasoned kleptocracy, and that 27 years of economic mismanagement have brought the Sudanese economy to the point of collapse. Inflation for food, medicine, cooking fuel, electricity, and transportation is skyrocketing; the Central Bank of Sudan suffers from an almost total lack of Foreign Exchange Currency (Forex) with which to enable the purchase essential commodities such as wheat (for bread, the staple food for a great many Sudanese); the agricultural sector—neglected for more than two decades—is in permanent decline; water shortages, a symptom of failure to invest in infrastructure maintenance, are now rampant. Moreover, despite the disingenuous, finally mendacious views of former Obama administration special envoy for Sudan Princeton Lyman— “we [the Obama administration] do not want to see the ouster of the [Khartoum] regime, nor regime change. We want to see the regime carrying out reform via constitutional democratic measures.” http://english.aawsat.com/2011/12/article55244147/asharq-al-awsat-talks-to-us-special-envoy-to-sudan-princeton-lyman) (These words have never been retracted by the Obama administration--ER) —there is not shred of evidence that the regime is engaged in “reform via constitutional democratic measures.” Former U.S. special envoy for the Sudan, Princeton Lyman, who claims to believe that the current regime in Khartoum is capable of "carrying out reform via constitutional democratic measures.” On the contrary, all evidence is that the regime is engaged in increasingly repressive measures as civil unrest continues and grows, the inextinguishable legacy of the September 2013 uprising in a number of Sudanese cities (protests were put down only when the regime gave “shoot to kill” orders to police and security officials). Newspaper shutdowns and confiscations have reached an unprecedented scale, as revealed in dispatches of just the past week: Sudan security seizes 16 print-runs in one week, Radio Dabanga, December 4, 2016 | KHARTOUM Sudanese security seizes two newspapers, Sudan Tribune, 4 DECEMBER 2016 Sudan security seizes three dailies from the printing press again, Radio Dabanga, December 2, 2016 | KHARTOUM Sudanese Security continues crackdown on press, journalists strike, Sudan Tribune, December 01, 2016 | KHARTOUM Sudan: Newsrooms strike against confiscations, Radio Dabanga, November 30, 2016 | KHARTOUM Day 3 of Sudan civil disobedience: More newspapers seized, Radio Dabanga, November 29, 2016 | KHARTOUM Crackdown on SCP: Two more members arrested, November 29, 2016 | KHARTOUM Sudan: Print-runs of El Ayam and El Jareeda confiscated, November 28, 2016 | KHARTOUM Sudan closes TV channel, warns another, November 28, 2016 | KHARTOUM European countries know all this—and they know full well that the regime survives only because of external financial and investment support, much of which comes from European business and corporations. None of it matters to them—not if Khartoum can be useful economically, or politically in stanching the flow of African migrants to Europe. It is not accidental that as rapprochement with Khartoum accelerates throughout Europe, we are witnessing an increase in xenophobia, directed primarily against people from Africa and the Middle East. I have seen this personally in working with a great many asylum seekers in Europe, especially those have emigrated from African countries—typically people with fewest resources. Italy, France, Germany, the UK all seem governed more and more by the view on racial matters once notoriously expressed by current British Foreign Secretary in 2002 (in a column he wrote for The Telegraph): "What a relief it must be for Blair to get out of England. It is said that the Queen has come to love the Commonwealth, partly because it supplies her with regular cheering crowds of flag-waving piccaninnies," [Boris Johnson] wrote in The Telegraph. Johnson also referred to "watermelon smiles.” (The Guardian, January 22, 2008) Johnson claimed to have been “quoted out of context”—the last expedient of those convicted by their own words. Boris Johnson, current UK Foreign Secretary...a disgrace to a once distinguished office But recent political developments elsewhere in Europe are equally ominous. The New York Times recently spoke of the growing power of Marine Le Pen in France (November 17, 2016): Well before the attacks that killed 129 people in Paris on Friday, Marine Le Pen, the president of the far-right National Front party, was parlaying fear of Islam, migrants and open borders into political support. Now, with France angry and in mourning, she is seizing the opportunity to expand her appeal and show her clout, underscoring how far-right messages are resonating across Europe. “France and the French are no longer safe,” Ms. Le Pen said in a speech the day after the attacks, demanding a crackdown on Islamists in the country. The ascendancy of Matteo Salvini in Italian politics—described by one informed observer as a master of using “the language of so-called infotainment,” in short, an Italian Donald Trump—is another trend in the worrying rise in dangerous nationalistic tendencies (Politico, February 3, 2016) The Case of Germany and Industrial Giant Siemens But Germany in particular seems to warrant a first close look in this series. Last May, Der Spiegel—one of Germany’s leading news sources—published an explosive exposé of European policy toward African migrants, one that put Germany squarely at the center of a campaign to provide Khartoum with the high-tech equipment necessary to create “closed camps” in Sudan—closed as in “camps of incarceration.” And people incarcerated would inevitably be “concentrated” in these camps on the basis of ethnicity, region, nationality, and religion. The Der Spiegel report began bluntly: In an effort to help keep refugees from Africa at bay, the EU is planning to deliver personal registration equipment to Sudan, whose president is wanted on war crimes charges [more accurately, President Omar al-Bashir faces arrest warrants from the International Criminal Court charging with massive crimes against human and genocide in Darfur—ER]. Germany is leading the way. ("Questionable Deal: EU to Work with [Sudan’s] Despot to Keep Refugees Out" | http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/eu-to-work-with-despot-in-sudan-to-keep-refugees-out-a-1092328.html ) What made the article especially disturbing was what was reported next: The ambassadors of the 28 European Union member states had agreed to secrecy. "Under no circumstances" should the public learn what was said at the talks that took place on March 23rd, the European Commission warned during the meeting of the Permanent Representatives Committee. A staff member of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini even warned that Europe's reputation could be at stake. (emphasis in bold added) EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini There could hardly be clearer evidence that Ms. Mogherini and her colleagues knew full well the obscene nature of the “deal with the devil” that was being concocted. And yet despite the viciousness of the policies she was pushing, Mogherini was evidently too trusting of those being enjoined to secrecy: someone at the meeting in question spoke to Der Spiegel. Under the heading "TOP 37: Country fiches," the leading diplomats that day discussed a plan that the EU member states had agreed to: They would work together with dictatorships around the Horn of Africa in order to stop the refugee flows to Europe—under Germany's leadership. And so just what would this “work” involve? Citing minutes to the meeting in question as well as classified documents, Der Spiegel gives a sense of just what is entailed: [D]ocuments relating to the project indicate that Europe want to send cameras, scanners and servers for registering refugees to the Sudanese regime in addition to training their border police and assisting with the construction of two camps with detention rooms for migrants. The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development has confirmed that action plan is binding, although no concrete decisions have yet been made regarding its implementation. It should go without saying, but let’s be perfectly clear about the true “end recipients”—and “beneficiaries—of this equipment, training, and the benefit of camp construction: it will the Khartoum’s already brutally efficient National Intelligence and Security Services, with Military Intelligence no doubt a beneficiary as well (Military Intelligence for most of the years of genocide in Darfur was the primary security service and still has a highly significant presence). The Mogherini staffer who “warned that Europe's reputation could be at stake” was more prescient than he/she realized; but Europe’s reputation is sinking so fast among those who care for the people of Sudan that there would seem to be little if anything to salvage. In any event, the plan appears to be proceeding apace. Der Spiegel concludes its article by noting: Germany and the other EU member states … seem determined to push ahead with their pact with the despot. Sudanese authorities say there have been numerous visitors from Germany in recent weeks who were there to discuss the construction of closed camps. This chronic German indifference to the suffering of the vast majority of Sudanese, the willingness to countenance acute deprivation—more than half of Sudan’s people live below the international poverty line and Sudan’s malnutrition rates are among the very worst in the world—is the context in which to see the significance of a very large deal made by Germany’s Siemens with the Khartoum regime—the regime that will be running German-built “concentration camps.” Siemens and Germany History My focus on the present occasion—the first of its sort but far from last—is the German industrial giant Siemens, which Sudan Tribune reported yesterday is committing to a major deal with the regime-owned “Sudanese Thermal Power Generating Company” (STPGC); five gas-turbine electricity generating plants are to be built by the end of 2017. Financial details of the deal were not revealed, as is often the case when Khartoum makes arrangements such as this one; but we may be sure that financial arrangements will be beneficial to the regime. And since Siemens is a distinctly “for profit” entity, we must wonder just how the plants are being financed. Siemens CEO Willi Meixner said only that, "Our power plant engineering is making a decisive contribution to very rapidly improving the power supply system in Sudan.” But he said nothing about why Siemens was making this “decisive contribution,” and speculation may lead in a variety of ways. But perhaps relevant here also is a brief history of Siemens during the great genocide in Germany and eastern Europe known as the “Holocaust”; perhaps “corporate culture” has not changed as much as Siemens would have the world believe. For of course Siemens subsequently made apologies, offered expressions of regret for its role the Holocaust; but this is history not easily wished away; and there are some actions for which no apology can be remotely adequate. Both the German and Khartoum delegations seem well pleased with the deal, suspicious in itself... Siemens was of course far from alone it accommodating Hitler’s ambitions; but for the moment, given the continuing genocides in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, Siemens’ history during the Holocaust seems to have particular relevance. I leave it to the reader whether the comparison is appropriate; what can’t be in disputed is that Siemens’ corporate management knows full well of the 14 years of ethnically-targeted destructions and displacement in Darfur; it knows full well of the near daily aerial assaults on civilian targets in not only Darfur but South Kordofan and Blue Nile; it knows full well the consequences of the savage humanitarian embargoes imposed by the Khartoum regime on vast populations in these three regions. And it knows of the escalating repression throughout Sudan, the rapidly growing civil unrest prompted by decades of kleptocratic self-enrichment—and the acute suffering that is a consequence of gross economic mismanagement. If we think of the history of Germany from 1931 to 1945—14 years again—there are enough parallels to present-day Sudan have given Siemens reason for being more restrained in its dealing with Khartoum. What follows is a brief edited excerpt from the Wikipedia entry on “Siemens,” and specifically its role in the era of Nazism; the sentences are terse, factual, and extremely well sourced (the footnotes are unusually authoritative for a Wikipedia entry). Siemens (at the time Siemens-Schuckert) exploited the forced labour of deported people in extermination camps. The company owned a plant in Auschwitz concentration camp.[14][15] Children at Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp--part of Siemens "working environment" during the Holocaust During the final years of World War II, numerous plants and factories in Berlin and other major cities were destroyed by Allied air raids. To prevent further losses, manufacturing was therefore moved to alternative places and regions not affected by the air war. The goal was to secure continued production of important war-related and everyday goods. According to records, Siemens was operating almost 400 alternative or relocated manufacturing plants at the end of 1944 and in early 1945. The company supplied electrical parts to Nazi concentration camps and death camps. The factories had poor working conditions, where malnutrition and death were common. Also, the scholarship has shown that the camp factories were created, run, and supplied by the SS, in conjunction with company officials, sometimes high-level officials.[17][18][19][20] [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siemens ] Should Siemens be doing business with another genocidal regime? That is a question Siemens itself appears to have already answered. Sadly, Sudan reveals all too fully the poverty of the international sense of “should.” Prayer shawls warehoused at Auschwitz-Birkenau; German ambitions for Jewish destruction could not have been greater, and these ambitions were supported by the presence of Siemens. The destruction of Jews has been a common theme in Khartoum's international propaganda...is Siemens aware? Eric Reeves, Senior Fellow at Harvard University’s François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights ereeves@smith.edu www.sudanreeves.org Twitter@SudanReeves About Eric Reeves: http://sudanreeves.org/about-eric-reeves Philanthropy: goo.gl/Ii4buw

Interethnic divisions in a young democracy cannot be downplayed or wished away, and it’s time Myanmar’s government and the international community acknowledge strong evidence that genocide is being perpetrated against the Rohingya and act to end it, Katherine Southwick writes. Violence in Myanmar’s western Rakhine State escalated after a 9 October attack on border guard posts, leaving nine officers dead. Humanitarian assistance and media access to the area have been cut off for weeks while the Myanmar authorities conduct a counterinsurgency operation against allegedly Rohingya assailants. Responsibility for the initial attack remains unclear, however. More than a hundred people are thought to have died already, with 30,000 internally displaced adding to the 160,000 people who have been subsisting in squalid displacement camps since previous outbreaks of violence in 2012 and 2013. Human Rights Watch has released satellite imagery showing that over 1,200 buildings in Rohingya villages have been razed in the past month. Government soldiers have reportedly gang-raped Rohingya women and girls. Bangladesh, which for 30 years has permitted more than 230,000registered and unregistered Rohingya refugees to shelter in its territory, has been turning people back who seek refuge across the border. Thousands have already crossed and continue to gather at the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. These events mark a dramatic deterioration in what has long been a desperate situation for a minority that many have identified as among the most persecuted in the world. Most of them are stateless, with the government designating them as “Bengalis” or “illegal immigrants,” despite many having had citizenship in the past and having lived in the region for generations. They have been subjected to forced labour and confined to displacement camps where they do not receive adequate food and medical care, leaving pregnant women and children particularly at risk of agonising illness and death. Rohingya are subject to harsh restrictions on marriage, family size and movement. Their religious buildings have been destroyed, and those who flee on rickety boats to other countries such as Malaysia or Thailandhave, in the past, been turned back to the open seas to die or suffer at the hands of traffickers or languish in indefinite detention. A question that haunts Myanmar’s government, and the international community, is whether what is happening to the Rohingya constitutes genocide. By now a credible claim can be raised that the internationally recognised crime of genocide is taking place in Myanmar. Accordingly, based on international legal obligations, the Myanmar government and other nation states should be taking all necessary actions to stop and avert the gravest kind of humanitarian catastrophe. Under Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention, which Myanmar has ratified, “genocide” is defined as “…any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” The Yugoslav tribunal has elaborated further on Article II (c) that deliberately inflicting conditions calculated to bring about a group’s destruction can include “subjecting the group to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and denial of the right to medical services. Also included is the creation of circumstances that would lead to a slow death, such as lack of proper housing, clothing, and hygiene or excessive work or physical exertion.” There is little doubt that for years the Rohingya population has suffered the acts listed in Article II (a) – (d) of the Genocide Convention. On the intent requirement of the crime – that the acts are committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnic or religious group – courts have taken a highly contextualised, case-by-case approach, to determining whether intent can be inferred from factual circumstances. Such an inference must be “the only reasonable oneavailable on the evidence.” Additionally, as the Rwandan tribunal has stated: “The offender is culpable because he knew or should have known that the act committed would destroy, in whole or in part, a group.” This case-by-case approach to intent, along with the high burden of proof requiring the evidence to be “fully conclusive,” renders genocide determinations unavoidably contestable. Other analyses could suggest that the overall intent of perpetrators in Myanmar is better understood as “ethnic cleansing,” which reflects the idea that the actual intent is to forcibly transfer or expel the Rohingya rather than physically destroy them. In the 2015 case of Croatia v. Serbia, which also included evidence of killings, sexual violence, forced labour, and displacement, the International Court of Justice did not find genocidal intent on the part of the Serbs against the Croats in the context of the Yugoslav war. Key considerations were that the conflict was seen as territorial and the Serbs had organised transportation for Croats to evacuate the territories that Serb forces had occupied. The difference in the Rohingya case is that there is no clear escape from the abject misery and high risk of death or extreme abuse at the hands of traffickers or by other countries’ immigration authorities. There are no systematic measures to officially deport the population, either through providing transportation or agreeing to formal arrangements with receiving countries. Moreover, Rohingya are deterred from departing through restrictions on movement and punishments for leaving, such as by the removal from household lists, the extortion of family members left behind and imprisonment for “illegal” re-entry. Hundreds, possibly thousands of babies born in squalid camps have suffered preventable deaths due to lack of food and medical care. The overall conditions are such that those persons imposing them over a prolonged period either know or ought to know, that the eventual outcome will be the physical destruction of the group, in whole or in part. The complexity of proving genocide is ill-matched to the urgency of preventing and responding to genocidal situations when they arise. We could be waiting years for an international tribunal or a panel of experts to conclude authoritatively that genocide is or is not taking place. This scenario would come as too little too late for the many victims and their families, not to mention the domestic political fallout and economic disaster which would ensue after the fact. At the same time, the moral and political costs – the enduring stigma and potential criminal liability – of not acting to stop genocide are severe. International law and institutions extricate us from this quandary through their emphasis on genocide prevention as an obligation that is at least as equally strong as protection. The 1948 Convention obligates states to prevent and punish genocide. The widely affirmed Responsibility to Protect doctrine requires states to prevent and protect victims from war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in the absence of a meaningful government response. We can now draw on ample scholarship and case law to identify situations that look very much like genocide and compel robust responses to live up to these obligations to prevent and protect. In 2015, the London-based International State Crime Initiative released a report based on a social scientific study and concluded that, “genocide is taking place in Myanmar” and warning of “the serious and present danger of the annihilation of the country’s Rohingya population.” Others have made a legal case for genocide, or the high risk of genocide, such as scholars Zarni and Cowley, Yale Law School’s human rights clinic, and former deputy prosecutor of the Yugoslav Tribunal, Sir Geoffrey Nice, among others. Some might argue that the label for a crime should not matter, and in a sense they are right. These crimes too often occur along a spectrum that, without corrective action, can lead to the same calamitous result; massive loss of life and destruction. We might think the responses would be the same, regardless of the words we choose to define the crime. However, too many international conferences and diplomatic meetings over the years have lamented the long list of persecutions and suffering this group has endured over decades, resulting in responses that are disproportionately inadequate to the gravity of the Rohingya’s plight. Tepid policies toward Myanmar and the Rohingya betray a deep-seated reluctance to label these crimes as genocide for fear of subverting the narrative so many in the world have waited for; an enlightened democratic transition. The notion of genocide in Myanmar risks turning the country back into an international pariah rather than an international darling. But the current violence painfully illustrates that interethnic divisions in a young democracy cannot be downplayed or wished away. It is time for Myanmar, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the United Nations and others to face facts, to confront the prospect of genocide being perpetrated against the Rohingya. They must be open to judgment for their inaction, or more hopefully, take action and commit the resources needed to save lives throughout the region and preserve Myanmar’s future. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2017 New Mandala

Former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan arrives as he visits in his capacity as Myanmar government-appointed Chairman of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, at Sittwe airport, Rakhine state, Myanmar December 2, 2016. REUTERS/Soe Zeya Tun Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi accused the international community on Friday of stoking resentment between Buddhists and Muslims in the country's northwest, where an army crackdown has killed at least 86 people and sent 10,000 fleeing to Bangladesh. Suu Kyi appealed for understanding of her nation's ethnic complexities, and said the world should not forget the military operation was launched in response to attacks on security forces that the government has blamed on Muslim insurgents. "I would appreciate it so much if the international community would help us to maintain peace and stability, and to make progress in building better relations between the two communities, instead of always drumming up cause for bigger fires of resentment," Suu Kyi told Singapore state-owned broadcaster Channel News Asia during a visit to the city-state. "It doesn't help if everybody is just concentrating on the negative side of the situation, in spite of the fact that there were attacks against police outposts." The violence in the northwest poses the biggest challenge so far to Suu Kyi's eight-month-old government, and has renewed international criticism that the Nobel Peace Prize winner has done too little to help the country's Rohingya Muslim minority. Soldiers have poured into the north of Rakhine State, close to the frontier with Bangladesh, after attacks on border posts on Oct. 9 that killed nine police officers. Humanitarian aid has been cut off to the area, which is closed to outside observers. Myanmar's military and the government have rejected allegations by residents and human rights groups that soldiers have raped Rohingya women, burned houses and killed civilians during the operation. Suu Kyi's remarks came as a commission led by former United Nations chief Kofi Annan arrived in the state, where ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims have lived separately since clashes in 2012 in which more than 100 people were killed. "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY" Despite often having lived in Myanmar for generations, most of the country's 1.1 million Rohingya are denied citizenship, freedom of movement and access to basic services such as healthcare and education. The U.N.'s human rights agency said this week that abuses suffered by the Rohingya may amount to a crimes against humanity, repeating a statement it first made in a June report. The Rohingya are not among the 135 ethnic groups recognized by law in Myanmar, where many majority Buddhists refer to them as "Bengalis" to indicate they regard them as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. In northern Rakhine, one of the poorest parts of the country, Muslims outnumber the ethnic Rakhine population. "In the Rakhine, it's not just the Muslims who are nervous and worried," said Suu Kyi. "The Rakhine are worried too. They are worried about the fact that they are shrinking as a Rakhine population, percentage-wise." U.N. officials said this week more than 10,000 people have fled the recent fighting to Bangladesh. There are continuing reports of people fleeing across the river border in flimsy boats, bringing accounts of razed villages, uprooted communities and separated families. Still, Suu Kyi said the government has "managed to keep the situation under control and to calm it down". ANNAN'S TASKFORCE Suu Kyi identified Rakhine as one of the areas that required special attention from the outset of her term, nominating Annan in August to lead a taskforce to come up with long-term solutions to the problems of the divided state. The six Myanmar and three foreign commissioners, on their second trip to Rakhine, met community leaders, local government representatives and Muslims from camps for displaced people in the state capital of Sittwe. "There have been security actions there, but security actions should not impede humanitarian access to those in need," Annan told reporters after the meetings, referring to the north. "We have discussed it and I expect progress to be made. Some agencies have been able to go in, but there's a great deal of needs, and I expect to see further progress in the next few days or so." The U.N. has said some 30,000 people have been internally displaced by the fighting and, while nearly 20,000 have had their deliveries of aid restored, around 130,000 are still not getting food and other assistance they had been receiving prior to the outbreak of violence. Suu Kyi bowed to weeks of international pressure late on Thursday to appoint a commission to investigate the original attacks and allegations of human rights abuses in the military operation that followed. However, she raised eyebrows with her pick for the chief of the team, vice president Myint Swe, who headed the feared military intelligence under former junta leader Than Shwe. Myint Swe, a close confidant of the former junta supremo, was the chief of special operations in Yangon when Than Shwe ordered a crackdown on anti-junta protests led by Buddhist monks in 2007, known as the Saffron Revolution. (Writing by Antoni Slodkowski; Editing by Paul Tait and Alex Richardson)