Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide Adama Dieng. UN Photo/Manuel Elias The United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, expressed alarm today at public comments by President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, in which he reinforced a campaign to kill millions of drug addicts in the Philippines and compared it to the massacre of millions of Jews by Hitler during the Holocaust in Nazi Germany during the Second World War. The Special Adviser qualified the comments as “deeply disrespectful of the right to life of all human beings,” said a statement issued by his Office. Mr. Dieng reminded everyone that the Holocaust was “one of the darkest periods of the history of humankind and that any glorification of the cruel and criminal acts committed by those responsible was unacceptable and offensive,” the statement said. He added that such comments were also undermining the efforts of the international community to develop strategies to prevent the recurrence of those crimes, to which all countries around the world should be committed to. The Special Adviser also called on Mr. Duterte to exercise restraint in the use of language that could “exacerbate discrimination, hostility and violence and encourage the commission of criminal acts which, if widespread or systematic, could amount to crimes against humanity.” Mr. Dieng also requested the President of the Philippines to support the investigation of the reported rise of killings in the context of the anti-crime and anti-drug campaign targeting drug dealers and users to ascertain the circumstances of each death, the statement said. Last month, two UN-appointed human rights experts expressed concern about measures instituted in the country to crack down on drug offenders. More than 850 people have been killed since 10 May, when Mr. Duterte was elected President of the Philippines vowing to crackdown on crime. COPYRIGHT © UNITED NATIONS 2016

Civilians and rescuers at the site of an airstrike in Aleppo, Syria, on Tuesday. Credit Karam Al-Masri/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images The effects of Russia’s bombing campaign in the Syrian city of Aleppo — destroying hospitals and schools, choking off basic supplies, and killing aid workers and hundreds of civilians over just days — raise a question: What could possibly motivate such brutality? Observers attribute Russia’s bombing to recklessness, cruelty or Moscow’s desperate thrashing in what the White House has called a “quagmire.” But many analysts take a different view: Russia and its Syrian government allies, they say, could be massacring Aleppo’s civilians as part of a calculated strategy, aimed beyond this one city. The strategy, more about politics than advancing the battle lines, appears to be designed to pressure rebels to ally themselves with extremists, eroding the rebels’ legitimacy; give Russia veto power over any high-level diplomacy; and exhaust Syrian civilians who might otherwise support the opposition. This approach could succeed even if pro-government forces never retake Aleppo. A yearlong siege of the city has not brought President Bashar al-Assad’s forces closer to victory. Too weak to win outright, they appear instead to be hedging, trying to weaken the rebels so that they cannot win either, and to ensure any final settlement would be more favorable for Moscow and its allies. Though killing civilians often backfires in war, in this case it may be all too effective. Blurring Rebels and Jihadists Aleppo is a metaphor for the larger war. The northern Syrian city is one of the few remaining strongholds for non-jihadist rebel groups. But months of siege forced them into a terrible choice: turn to extremists for help, or starve. It was no choice at all, and groups such as the jihadist-linked Ahrar al-Sham helped briefly break the siege in August. Genevieve Casagrande, an analyst with the Institute for the Study of War, said this was a victory for Russia, and likely its goal. Forcing Aleppo’s rebels to cooperate with jihadists would taint them, making it harder for the West to provide them arms or include them in any peace deal. “Russia and the regime are driving the radicalization of the opposition on purpose,” Ms. Casagrande said. This will unify and strengthen the opposition in the short term, but in the long term will blur any distinction between jihadists and other rebels. The United States has tried to counteract this by persuading rebels to reject jihadists, in part by promising support for the opposition and by targeting jihadist militants. But the American approach has drawn the Syrian factionscloser together, because rebels like those in Aleppo need urgent support on the ground and only extremist groups are available to provide it. Removing Alternative Leaders The endurance of non-jihadist rebel groups poses an even greater threat to the Syrian government than the jihadists because they challenge the Syrian government’s legitimacy. That legitimacy has been weakened by years of killing civilians, and by the government’s strategy of fostering sectarianism, which leaves it with little support among the country’s majority Sunni population. As long as non-jihadist Sunni Arab rebels are on the battlefield, they can credibly claim to better represent Syrians. This leaves the Syrian leadership, which is dominated by the Alawite religious minority, vulnerable to any peace deal or military intervention that would install a rebel government in its place. By forcing the rebels to unite with the jihadists, Syria’s government aims to deprive the world of any acceptable alternatives for leading the country. Russia has a similar weakness. Syria, its last remaining ally in the Middle East, will remain that way only as long as it is led by the Alawite religious minority. Any democratic Syrian government would prominently feature Sunni Arabs, who are unlikely to look kindly on Russia after its role in the civil war. Moscow has probably concluded it cannot force a military victory for the Syrian government. Its yearlong intervention has focused heavily on Aleppo, but pro-government ground forces are too weak to retake the divided city. Radicalizing the opposition, then, can ensure that there is no viable alternative to Syria’s current government. Forcing a Seat at the Table This also accomplishes a diplomatic goal for Russia: making itself crucial for any cease-fire or peace deal. Earlier in the war, it had less sway on the international stage — and perhaps with Damascus — because it played a smaller role than other countries that had intervened. Russia was unwilling to commit ground troops, making it secondary to Iran, which had sent many. Aleppo has been an opportunity because Russian warplanes are instrumental in maintaining the siege, and because that siege has become one of the war’s most terrible calamities. Russia has forced itself to the negotiating table, ensuring it will have a greater say in any outcome. That is important to Moscow for image purposes — a way to convince Russians that their government is strong and capable — as well as to ensure that any negotiated deal protects Russian interests in Syria. Denying the Rebels Support — and Victory Still, Russia and the Syrian government could have achieved these political goals without devastating the city and its population so drastically. Why go to such extremes? The answer has to do with a fundamental imbalance between insurgent groups and foreign interventions. In any civil war, indigenous forces rely on the local population, which gives them money, food, shelter, intelligence and recruits. Rebels, including Syria’s, are only as strong as their local support. But Russia has no need for local support; its warplanes keep flying whether Syrian civilians want them there or not. The Syrian government does need popular support to survive, but it draws that from elsewhere in the country and had already functionally destroyed its support in rebel-controlled eastern Aleppo. This subverts the normal dynamics of war, such that Russia and the Syrian government stand to benefit from mass killings. The destruction of Aleppo will not persuade its residents to support the government, of course. Rather, it will inhibit their ability or willingness to help the rebels, often by forcing them to flee their homes. This weakens the rebels — not necessarily enough that pro-government forces can retake eastern Aleppo, but enough that rebels there will struggle to push beyond the city if the siege ends. This parallels Russia’s conduct during its second war in Chechnya, from 1999 to 2009, when it besieged and devastated entire cities. While analysts stress that Moscow deployed very different strategies in Chechnya than in Syria, both wars reflect Russia’s willingness to target civilians for military gain. All this also sends a message to Syrians outside Aleppo: Opposition groups cannot keep you safe, and siding with them puts you at risk. The goal is not to galvanize Syrians in support of the government — impossible after years of sieges and barrel bombs — but to exhaust them. These dynamics have been building for years. In early 2014, as government forces besieged rebel-held areas, threatening those communities with starvation, a Syria analyst named Aron Lund warned in a brief for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that rebel-held Aleppo could be next. “Imposing starvation on civilian populations is a war crime, yet like most war crimes it is also very effective,” he warned. © The New York Times 2016 A version of this article appears in print on September 29, 2016, on page A13 of the New York edition with the headline: Russia’s Brutality in Aleppo May Be Calculated, and Effective.

The Commission for International Justice and Accountability September 22, 2016 Please let me begin by thanking you, Chairman Smith, Co-Chairman Wicker, distinguished Commissioners, and the U.S. Helsinki Commission, for your steadfast support over the decades for the establishment of the rule of law and the promotion of human rights around the world. Let me also thank the Chairman and all the members of this Commission for their continued engagement to address the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq, specifically the mass atrocities being inflicted upon the people by their own government as well as by militant extremist groups like the Islamic State. In this regard, I am honored to testify before this august Commission on efforts to combat these mass atrocities through individual criminal accountability. By way of introduction, my name is Chris Engels and I serve as Deputy Director for Investigations and Operations at the Commission for International Justice and Accountability, or CIJA for short. In my testimony today, I will begin by introducing CIJA, how the organization came about in response to a serious lack of engagement by public institutions, and the intricacies of our atrocity investigative work in Syria and Iraq. Thereafter, I will discuss how CIJA’s work relates to the subject of today’s hearing, the Iraq and Syria Genocide Relief and Accountability Act of 2016, a much-needed, not to mention overdue, piece of legislation sponsored by Chairman Smith, with the co-sponsorship of other distinguished Members of the House of Representatives. Finally, I will conclude by putting forth recommendations for U.S. action that support U.S. interests in Syria and Iraq, namely the cessation of atrocities, the establishment of long-term peace and security, and the eradication of terror being unleashed by the Assad regime, the Islamic State, and other parties to this horrid conflict. This Commission is already familiar with the extent of the mass atrocities occurring in connection with the Syrian civil war and its spill over into Iraq. Some members of this Commission personally heard testimony from the Assad regime defector, known as “Caesar”, who smuggled thousands of images from Syria showing the Assad regime’s systematic torture and murder of individuals – deemed “enemies” – in security centers throughout Syria. By passing House Resolutions 75 and 121 so overwhelmingly, Representatives have denounced the horrific war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide (collectively called atrocity crimes) being perpetrated by the Islamic State, the Assad regime, and others militant actors in Syria and Iraq. For years now, human rights groups, as well as the United Nations, have sounded alarm bells in the wake of the blatant disregard for humanity and catastrophic displacement occurring in Syria and Iraq. In addressing the Commission, my role today is not to elaborate on these facts which, unfortunately, are known all too well. Instead, I am here to talk about individual criminal accountability for these terrible crimes and the current, as yet untapped, opportunities for the U.S. government to support organizations working to ensure those responsible see the inside of a courtroom. My role is, further, to highlight the concrete steps being taken, as well as additional steps that can be taken, now to secure justice for the victims of the continuing atrocities in Syria and Iraq. Like CIJA, I am sure this Commission and other members of Congress want to see such discussion take the form of concrete action. So, what is CIJA? In short, CIJA is a non-governmental organization that carries out criminal investigations of atrocity crimes that adhere to the highest standards found in any international or domestic jurisdiction. Its senior leadership is made up of individuals with many years of experience in international and hybrid courts and tribunals as well as domestic war crimes units. Operating in active conflict zones, CIJA’s 130 personnel collect evidence, ensure its safe storage, and undertake legal analysis with a view to preparing trial-ready case files for present-day and future criminal prosecutions in domestic and international jurisdictions. The fact that CIJA does this work as a non-governmental organization, as opposed to a domestic or international legal authority, is truly unprecedented. With respect to our evidence collection, I would like to emphasize that our analytical interest extends beyond merely documenting the crimes themselves, something the UN Commissions of Inquiry and a number of human rights NGOs already do very well. Rather, CIJA’s focus is on collecting, corroborating, and storing “linkage evidence”, which is information that “links” superiors, national leaders and remote organizers of atrocities to the atrocity crimes committed on the ground. This “linkage evidence” is the most pivotal part of an atrocity crimes investigation, and as any good prosecutor or criminal investigator knows, criminal investigations done contemporaneously with the criminal acts are essential to ensuring later accountability. Otherwise, as we have seen in the past, evidence is lost and those responsible for these mass human rights violations go unpunished, able to commit more crimes and create more instability in the current or future conflicts. Whether in Syria, Iraq or beyond, the goal of this work is to prevent such mistakes from reoccurring once accountability mechanisms are in place – be it in the short term or in the next ten years. However, it should be made clear that accountability options exist today and they do not require the establishment of an international court or tribunal to have impact. Evidence collected today is key to facilitating present-day accountability efforts in national jurisdictions where perpetrators can be prosecuted without the need for an international justice mechanism. For instance, CIJA currently assists various countries in their domestic prosecutions of regime officials found in their jurisdictions, Islamic State foreign fighters returning home, and other members of extremist groups who have been apprehended. This assistance takes various forms. In Syria, CIJA has roughly 40 investigators on the ground, handling multiple operations throughout the country. The primary mission of these investigators is to collect voluminous amounts of evidence on the Assad regime for later exploitation for evidentiary and legal analysis at CIJA’s headquarters. To date, this operation has resulted in the accumulation and safe storage of over 600,000 pages of regime documentation, including a significant amount of regime military and security intelligence records, all while ensuring chain of custody to a criminal law standard. With this wealth of information, CIJA has been able to create a names database of over one million regime officials – including individuals from the highest to lowest levels of its military, security intelligence, and political bodies. This type of database has long-term potential as an information resource for countries, such as the United Sates, in support of their criminal accountability, immigration, and targeted sanctions efforts as well as future state-building and lustration efforts. This evidence is the basis for multiple “pre-trial” legal case files, developed by CIJA’s legal team, which a domestic or international prosecutor could present to judges before trial. For example, the first three case files contain evidence against twenty-five high- ranking Assad regime officials – including President Assad, himself – establishing the role of these governmental officials in the mass torture, the likes of which the House of Representatives saw in the aforementioned Caesar testimony. In Iraq, CIJA works according to a memorandum of understanding with the Kurdistan Regional Government that provides us with logistical and security support as well as human resources. Approximately 20 CIJA personnel are currently deployed in Iraq, with teams in three different locations. CIJA’s work in Iraq focuses squarely on atrocities perpetuated by the Islamic State, including those against ethnic Yazidis, Christians, and other minority groups in the Ninevah Governorate. In its first Iraq-oriented case file, CIJA identified two dozen suspects involved in orchestrating Islamic State slavery operations that resulted in appalling rates of sexual violence and servitude, primarily against minority women and girls. Again, the brave victims who have spoken out, as well as the work of NGOs and UN reports, have highlighted the plight of these women and girls. Through our work, we have established the patterns of these crimes and, in turn, have identified a number of responsible individuals. In addition to the abovementioned file, CIJA continues to build a number of legal dossiers against Islamic State fighters and senior leaders behind these atrocities. In sum, the six case files completed by CIJA to date identify over 60 individual perpetrators, reaching up the hierarchy of the Syrian regime and the Islamic State, who are responsible for a wide array of atrocity crimes. Of course, many more individuals are responsible for crimes in the region, and CIJA continues to investigate and build case files to address ongoing atrocities. However, the number of suspects in our legal briefs is already too high to be addressed by the ICC, even in the case of the referral of both Syria and Iraq. Indeed, prosecuting such cases would keep any future ad hoc or hybrid court busy for many years. I will now refer to a few, key recommendations for incorporating individual criminal accountability within the international, as well as the U.S., agenda on Syria and Iraq. Recommendation #1 – Support atrocity accountability efforts despite the lack of an international court with criminal jurisdiction in Syria or Iraq. With intervention by the ICC or any other international tribunal for Syrian and Iraqi atrocity crimes still unlikely, many question the point of criminal accountability work today. Examples from the past 25 years demonstrate that even in conflicts where accountability is not addressed during the conflict, discussions often turn to justice soon after a return to peace. Preparing for that possibility today, before evidence is destroyed or made otherwise unavailable, is key to ensure these future efforts are successful. There is no need to wait for an international court of tribunal, however. There are criminal accountability options available, which should be utilized today. At CIJA, for example, we receive a dozen requests for assistance each month from war crimes, counter- terrorism, and immigration authorities throughout Europe. While the Syrian conflict continues, these efforts constitute a credible recourse to criminal accountability and, indeed, demonstrate to Syrians and the world that perpetrators found in European and North American jurisdictions will be prosecuted for their crimes. Recommendation #2 – Support the creation of competent local courts to try atrocity crimes based on already collected evidence demonstrating the culpability of individuals for these crimes. In addition to accountability in European and North American criminal courts, there is an even more immediate road to justice in Iraq. A number of high-ranking IS officials could be put on trial in a specially equipped court in Erbil, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). An Iraqi chamber would hear complex cases against members of the Islamic State, applying the Iraqi penal code. With the assistance of international experts and professionals, such a chamber would be mandated to hear those cases in line with the highest international standards of fair trial and due process. Placing the court in KRI would ensure security guarantees which cannot be currently replicated in Baghdad while at the same time provide an opportunity to hear sexual enslavement of Yazidis cases in the vicinity where those atrocities took place, closer to the victims’ home, and where most of the perpetrators are currently held and likely to be in the future. Such a chamber could be established swiftly and efficiently, at minimal cost. What is more, depending on the changing security situation, the court could be replicated in other Iraqi cities. Based on our experience on the ground, based on interviews with a wide swath of affected groups, the majority want legitimate criminal justice, whether in an international or domestic court, or both. After enduring shocking atrocities, these groups are eager to cooperate and await a judicial forum to do so. CIJA’s proposal has already garnered support from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and it is possible that similar support may come from Baghdad soon. We are currently engaged in discussions with the KRG on training their judges, prosecutors, attorneys, and other relevant professionals to get this chamber up and running. In sum, all elements are in place to start the prosecution of IS members in a competent court of law. Recommendation #3 – Support criminal investigations to ensure that individual criminal accountability for atrocity crimes and all of its attendant benefits that flow from it can be realized. Congress’s clear intent in the Iraq and Syria Genocide Relief and Accountability Act of 2016 is to hold individuals, whether from the Assad regime, the Islamic State, or other parties to atrocities in Syria and Iraq, criminally responsible for atrocity crimes. This intent is reflected not only in this bill, but in many resolutions passed over the past five years. Yet, to effectuate this intent, criminal investigations into these atrocity crimes must be supported and bolstered. The atrocities are unfortunately not waning, but expanding. As Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman, and each Commissioner have seen for themselves, before this most recent ceasefire, the Assad regime has continued its use of barrel bombs, and a retreating Islamic State has left behind more mass graves than previously thought. Collecting evidence, storing, analyzing, and preparing it for trial, and doing all of the above to the highest international standard available, is essential to present day and future accountability aspirations. No matter how critical, the above efforts require further support. Some of the U.S.’s closest allies have helped make these atrocity crime investigations a reality, because they see the present-day and future benefits. Canada and Germany, in particular, were the first to support efforts to ensure accountability for Islamic State crimes in Iraq. One such tangible benefit is the bolstering of the overall rule of law capacity in Syria and Iraq. Training and mentoring Syrian, Iraqi, and other regional investigators, lawyers, and analysts to do atrocity crime work today will have a significant impact on the quality of justice tomorrow. With a view to a post-conflict scenario, sustained capacity-building support in both countries will not only reinforce the legitimacy and efficacy of whatever existing or new international tribunal is bestowed jurisdiction, but it will also be an investment in the long-term establishment of the rule of law in a future Syria and Iraq. Recommendation #4 – Unwavering support of individual criminal responsibility for atrocity crimes, regardless of policy complications, is the most proven way of establishing durable peace and security. Otherwise, the risk of future atrocities and destabilization increases greatly. Why does atrocity accountability and criminal justice in Syria and Iraq matter to the United States and, more importantly, to its interests in the region? As Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., proclaimed, and is now inscribed in marble just down the street from here at his national memorial, “[t]rue peace is not merely the absence of tension; it is the presence of justice.” Dr. King’s words echoed those of the American founders who, likewise, knew that a properly developed society does not rest solely on security, but on a rule of law that applies to all equally regardless of stature. For the violence to end, but more importantly for Syria and Iraq to evolve into stable, peaceful, and just societies, it is simply not enough to broker a political settlement to the Syrian civil war, nor to defeat the Islamic State and reclaim the territory it has taken in Iraq and Syria. Assad regime leaders and Islamic State fundamentalists must face a court of law, confront credible evidence of their criminality, and if proven beyond a reasonable doubt, found guilty. These trials have the power to serve as tangible examples to all in the region that the rule of law is here, and here to stay. Without actual and symbolic justice, the seeds of future conflict, cataclysmic destabilization, unprecedented human displacement, and militant terrorism lay undisturbed and ready to grow. These considerations may sound like lofty ideals, but the United States serves as the best example that respect for the rule of law and human rights results in a thriving, stable, and just society. The same principles undoubtedly apply elsewhere. Recommendation #5 – Ensuring individual responsibility for atrocity crimes is an untapped resource for Countering Violent Extremism efforts that will help tilt public relations power away from militant extremist groups like the Islamic State. Holding militant extremists criminally responsible for atrocity crimes is drastically underutilized as a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) tool, and this Act will help reverse this trend. To explain, for the U.S. and its allies to better serve its interest in stamping out violent extremism – whether in the form of Islamic State or other like groups – governments must broaden their conception and use of the rule of law. Currently, the vast majority of militant radicals are prosecuted under terrorism laws, often for material support to terrorism. An unintended consequence of prosecution under these laws is that it sends the message to vulnerable youth – in particular Muslim males – that the “West” labels them as “terrorists.” In turn, fundamentalist enablers are empowered to push the “clash of cultures” narrative. An alternative to the above is to support and complement anti-terrorism laws with domestic and international mechanisms devised to prosecute members of militant groups, such as the Islamic State, as murders, torturers, rapists, slavers, war criminals, or even génocidaires. With these individuals seen as criminals of epic proportion, vulnerable youth will be far less likely to see them as “defenders of the Muslim faith,” but rather those who twist Islam for criminal ends. Prosecution of these individuals as atrocity criminals provide fact-based counter-messaging to the “clash of civilizations” narrative that is currently so effective. With access to quality evidence of these specific crimes, such prosecutions before more effective and more likely. In summation, please let me conclude with the statement that this Act is emblematic of some of the United States’ best values: adherence to the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. These values underpin a just and peaceful society, especially those trying to transition out of the throes of chaos and tragedy. It is for these and other reasons that CIJA and a broad range of humanitarian organizations, including faith-based groups, support the prompt passage of this legislation. Thank you.

I.Overview The peace dialogue between Thailand’s military government and some Malay-Muslim separatist leaders in exile has foundered. Coordinated bombings in August on tourist areas outside the customary conflict zone in the deep south bear the hallmarks of the separatists and indicate that the government’s approach of containing the insurgency is not working. The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), which seized power in the 2014 coup, professes to support dialogue to end the insurgency but avoids commitment, and the prime minister has questioned the talks. The main insurgent group has rejected the process, and the number of fighters the umbrella entity set up to negotiate in 2015 controls is unknown. A decentralised political system could help resolve the conflict by giving respect to Malay-Muslim identity and aspirations while preserving the unitary state, but a pernicious stalemate prevails, with both state and militants preferring hostilities to compromise. The August bombings in the upper south should encourage the government to seek talks for a comprehensive settlement. Since seizing power, the NCPO has been preoccupied with running a politically divided country slipping toward the uncertainties of the approaching end of King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s seven-decade reign. Though the army opposed the dialogue process when it began under Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s government in 2013, the NCPO pledged to restart talks and invited Malaysia to resume facilitation. However, the NCPO appears caught between the imperative of talking to show locals and the international community that it does the right thing and an abiding fear that dialogue will legitimise the separatists and pave the way for international intervention and eventual partition. In March 2016, after two plenaries and three rounds of technical talks, the NCPO’s dialogue team and the MARA Patani – the Majlis Syura Patani (Patani Consultative Council) umbrella body established in 2015 to negotiate with Bangkok – reached preliminary agreement on an eight-point Terms of Reference (ToR) that would open the way for official talks. But the next month, the army abruptly transferred the secretary for the Thai dialogue team, who had led efforts on the ToR. At a 27 April meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the Thai team declined to sign, saying it needed to review the document, and questioned MARA Patani’s standing to engage in official talks. Despite a further meeting on 2 September, dialogue remains at a preliminary, unofficial stage. The NCPO’s preferred approach has more to do with convincing militants to surrender than achieving a settlement with leaders in exile. It has suppressed political engagement countrywide, suspending elections and curtailing civil liberties, while seeking to establish a foundation for long-term control after the general election promised for late 2017. Its argument that rebels should give up violence and work for peaceful change rings hollow, since it allows no political activity. With local civil society increasingly stifled, prospects for bringing popular pressure to bear for genuine dialogue are slim. Serious talks are also hindered by the militants’ disunity and parochialism. While proponents of the dialogue argue that other factions will join once the process gains momentum, many observers doubt MARA Patani currently can speak for a critical mass of fighters. Professed members of the main insurgent group, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (Patani-Malay National Revolutionary Front, BRN), hold leading positions in MARA Patani, but do not have the sanction of the group’s leadership. BRN has questioned NCPO sincerity and emphatically rejected talks without foreign observers, a stipulation that stokes the regime’s fears of internationalisation. There are no indications that Islamic State (IS) or proponents of its global jihadist ideology have made inroads with Thailand’s ethno-nationalist Malay militants. Divisions and capacity constraints pose major challenges but are a less immediate obstacle than lack of determination to negotiate a settlement. The NCPO appears interested primarily in mere semblance of dialogue and opposed to any solution involving devolution of political power. BRN has not advanced a political platform that could serve as a basis for talks. MARA Patani has yet to demonstrate an ability to influence events on the ground. The stalemate is insufficiently painful to induce the parties to seek a negotiated end to the conflict with a sense of urgency. The 11-12 August bombings indicate the militants’ capacity to inflict greater damage on lives, property and the economy, however. The government should recognise this threat and reconsider its approach to dialogue. The militants should recognise that a wider conflict and continued targeting of tourist areas is likely to bring an uncompromising military response from Bangkok and international opprobrium. II.The Second Dialogue Process The ethno-nationalist insurgency stems from the region’s 1902 incorporation into Siam. Beginning in the 1960s, but dormant for most of the 1990s, when BRN, the major militant group, was building a clandestine network in the southernmost provinces, it re-emerged with new vigour in 2004. Since then, more than 6,670 have been killed and 12,231 wounded; some 6,000 children have lost a parent and 3,000 women been widowed. BRN and other Malay nationalist movements cast their struggle as one of self-determination and liberation from Thai rule. BRN recruitment appeals emphasise the discrepancy between an idealised, prosperous and pious past with what they portray as present degradation and injustice resulting from Thai subjugation. Support is hard to measure, but the insurgents’ ability to sustain operations over twelve years in the face of determined countermeasures is telling. While Bangkok has eschewed overtly assimilationist policies since the 1980s, BRN continues to harness disaffection arising from the rigid emphasis on Thai identity at the expense of Malay identity. Its aims are above all local and nationalist. It has spurned foreign jihadist efforts to establish links, and there is no evidence of such presence in the deep south. A.Legacy of the Kuala Lumpur Process The dialogue process the NCPO military government initiated is a legacy of the Yingluck Shinawatra government (2011-2104). On 28 February 2013, in Kuala Lumpur, its representatives, identified as Party A, and BRN, then recognised as Party B, signed a “General Consensus on Peace Dialogue Process”, inaugurating the first official talks between Bangkok and Malay-Muslim separatists. Malaysia facilitated via Datuk Seri Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim, ex-director general of the prime minister’s department. This dialogue collapsed after three plenaries amid disarray on both sides and political turmoil in Bangkok that preceded the May 2014 coup. But it was also a breakthrough: Bangkok’s first public acknowledgement of the need to negotiate an end to the conflict with “those with different views and ideologies from the state who use violence”. Another outcome of this process was that BRN issued five conditions for continuing talks: Malaysia must mediate, not just facilitate; the Thai state must recognise the talks as between it and Patani Malays, represented solely by BRN; the Association of South East Asian Nations, the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) must observe; the state must release all insurgent suspects and revoke all arrest warrants; and it must recognise BRN as an independence, rather than separatist movement. In spite of the army’s well-advertised opposition to the Kuala Lumpur process, the NCPO, headed by General and Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, publicly committed to a second dialogue process. On 26 November 2014, Prayuth issued Prime Minister’s Order 230/2557 establishing a three-level dialogue mechanism: at the policy level, the Steering Committee for Peace Dialogue, chaired by him; a peace dialogue delegation, headed by General Aksara Kerdpol; and at the local level, an interagency coordination working group, headed by the commander of the 4th Army Region, Ltieutenant General Wiwat Pathompak. The order authorises the dialogue panel to hold official talks with “those who think differently”. The NCPO set out three phases of dialogue: confidence building, an agreement, and a roadmap for its implementation. B.Re-starting Preliminary Talks The second dialogue process started in Prayuth’s 1 December 2014 meeting with Prime Minister Najib Razak, when he asked that Malaysia again facilitate. In March 2015, militant-group representatives established the MARA Patani for united participation in talks with Bangkok. It nominally brings together five groups: BRN, Barisan Islam Pembebesan Patani (Islamic Liberation Front of Patani, BIPP), two factions of the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), and Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (Patani Islamic Mujahidin Movement, GMIP). MARA’s leaders are senior figures with long ties to the separatist movement who have been in exile, often for decades and mostly in Malaysia. The top positions are held by professed BRN members – Awang Jabat is chairman, Shukri Hari delegation chief and Ahmad Chuwo a steering committee member. However, that group’s senior leaders have not endorsed their participation. Movement sources say these MARA delegates were senior BRN figures but were suspended after violating its code of secrecy to participate in the dialogue. They may keep unofficial links to BRN and followers in the region, but their participation in MARA is freelance. The other MARA groups are not known to command significant numbers of fighters. Supporters have played this down, arguing that as the process shows progress, BRN will eventually join. The sides convened for a low-key introduction on 8 April 2015 in Kuala Lumpur. At the first “unofficial meeting” of the Joint Working Group (JWG)-Peace Dialogue Process on 8 June, Aksara, the Thai delegation head, proposed creating safety zones in which the militants would cease attacks. MARA said these could only be discussed after an agreement to begin official talks. At the second JWG meeting, 25 August, each side tabled three proposals. MARA Patani demanded, as preconditions for an official process, that the government acknowledge it as Party B, rather than merely “those who have different views from the state”; the legislature endorse the process, thus making it part of the “national agenda”, to ensure continuity; and MARA members receive immunity from prosecution to facilitate visits to Thailand. The Thai delegation proposed to identify priority areas for development to improve life quality; mutually determine safety zones; and ensure equal access to the judicial process. These are standard formulations of NCPO policy for resolving the region’s problems, but, a Malay-Muslim noted, development, security and justice are existing governmental responsibilities, so not appropriate peace dialogue topics. The facilitator circulated a draft ToR, intended to set guidelines for official talks. On 27 August, MARA Patani met the press in Kuala Lumpur. Abu Hafez Al-Hakim of BIPP said sovereignty remained the ultimate goal, but MARA was “considering other options”, and the independence issue would be determined by negotiations. He conveyed MARA’s intention to be a platform for all Patani liberation movements and civil society organisations, including Buddhist and women’s groups. MARA, as well as non-MARA BRN representatives, have said that Patani independence would benefit all those native to the region, including Chinese and Thais, and that an independent Patani would protect freedom of religion. C.BRN Opts Out With MARA’s unprecedented press conference and the exchange of proposals, the dialogue appeared at last to be making modest progress, but insurgent unity did not last. BRN broke its silence with a 7 September 2015 video declaring its intention to continue fighting for Patani independence. Its message was unequivocal rejection of the process, but not of dialogue in principle. Abdul Karim Khalib, speaking as a representative of its information department, noted the suspension of political rights under the military government and asserted that “establishment of a democratic government that respects the will of the people is the way out of the conflict” in the deep south. He also accused the “Siamese colonisers” of lacking sincerity and mentioned the challenge posed to Thailand by imminent royal succession. In a rare interview on 11 October 2015, another information department representative criticised discontinuity with the 2013 dialogue process and declared “BRN is categorically not involved”, and “the way in which this process has been set up is flatly rejected”. Its statement the next day referred to the five conditions submitted under the previous dialogue and reaffirmed willingness to participate in peace talks if there was “engagement of a mediator and observers from other states”. Echoing Abdul Karim, it cited UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (1960) on decolonisation as a basis for Patani self-determination and rejected “a peace process used as a form of political subterfuge in order to deceive and undermine the strategy of the Patani-Malay people’s advancement”. A few days after the video, Prayuth said he had not accepted MARA’s conditions, would not be pressured, and dialogue was already a national priority, codified in national security strategies for resolving the conflict. Recognising MARA as Party B, he added, was not needed; trust had to be built first. D.Technical Team Meetings In October 2015, MARA received a more detailed response to its proposals that reportedly linked its three conditions to each of Thailand’s proposals in a manner that a member called “vague and not up to our expectation”. MARA did not respond, preferring to wait for the next JWG meeting. In view of substantive disagreements, the sides decided to hold separate technical talks on the sticking points of the draft ToR. Unsourced Thai-language media later reported that the meetings produced agreement on safety zones in Narathiwat’s Bacho and Cho Airong districts. From the Thai perspective, this would help establish which groups were able to control fighters. However, on 22 November, MARA Patani’s Shukri Hari described reports that the meeting addressed safety zones as “untrue and baseless”, and a deliberate effort to undermine the dialogue. MARA, he said, would not discuss safety zones until the dialogue was official. On 10 January 2016, MARA Patani met in Kuala Lumpur with the OIC secretary general, Iyad Ameen Madani, at, according to Abu Hafez, the OIC’s initiative. Several civil society representatives from the deep south also attended. Madani went on to Bangkok, meeting on 12 January with Prayuth, who said Madani praised Thai efforts and sincerity in solving the problems of the southernmost provinces; however, the OIC meeting rankled Thai officials. A retired army officer speculated that Malaysia organised it to help MARA gain OIC observer status as part of a strategy to achieve “special administration”, or autonomy, like Mindanao’s Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines, an OIC observer since 1977. The technical teams met again on 25-27 January to address the conflict parties’ names; geographical scope of the conflict area; promotion of justice; and facilitation and logistics. In February, Major General Nakrob Bunbuathong, the Thai delegation secretary, said a ToR document was 95 per cent set. Recognition of MARA Patani was resolved by a footnote that Thailand would refer to Party B, though Party B refers to itself as “MARA Patani”. Immunity for MARA members and arrangements for travel to Thailand remained open, but Nakrob said he expected ToR agreement in June. MARA was similarly optimistic. On 28 February, a Pattani university hosted a Peace Media Day to mark the third anniversary of the General Consensus on Peace Dialogue at which Nakrob spoke for the Thai delegation and Malaysian facilitator Zamzamin Hashim and MARA Patani’s Awang Jabat sent video statements. Zamzamin acknowledged the high mutual mistrust: MARA, he said, had concerns about NCPO sincerity and its interim government status; Thais had misgivings about whether Awang Jabat had a mandate from BRN’s leadership, though he is “the best available BRN leader that had agreed to come out in public to initiate the process”. Awang Jabat said, “MARA Patani is not confident of the Thai government’s commitment to seek fair, holistic and sustainable solution to the conflict”. After three rounds of technical meetings over five months, the sides agreed to an eight-section ToR on 23 March, covering guidelines for talks, including identification of dialogue parties, formation of a Technical Working Group and security for Party B. III.BRN Weighs In A.Spike in Violence In February, after several years of declining violence, militants stepped up operations. Over the course of the insurgency, violence has regularly risen and fallen, conditioned by insurgent strategy and resources and state countermeasures. Improvised explosive device (IED) and shooting attacks left 44 dead between 10 February and 1 June. On 27 February, a 100kg bomb exploded in a stolen car in front of a roadside restaurant next to a police post in Pattani’s Muang district, injuring seven police officers and five civilians. The site was just metres from a main security checkpoint leading into Pattani town, near to the university where the Peace Media Day was to be held the next day and the hotel where many participants were staying. This suggested the bomb was a BRN statement of opposition to the dialogue process. In a bold 13 March raid in Cho Airong district, Narathiwat, some 50 militants seized a hospital for more than an hour, detained staff and fired almost 2,000 rounds at a ranger base. Seven rangers and one militant were wounded; rangers did not return fire on the hospital. Diversionary attacks took place in the district the same day. It was the largest militant operation since February 2013, when sixteen militants were killed attacking a marine base in Bacho district. A military officer said a “hard-core” BRN faction sought to commemorate the BRN’s 56th anniversary and signal opposition to the dialogue process. Several sources said the intent was to embarrass the security forces, if not entice them to fire on the hospital. It was also widely viewed as a repudiation of the military’s unilateral designation of Cho Airong as one of two prospective safety zones. Thai authorities, local human rights and international organisations and MARA Patani all condemned the raid. The attack on a health facility highlighted belligerent obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which applies to non-state as well as state armed groups. Reproof fell on militants, but attention was also drawn to the military’s practice of stationing forces in or near public buildings, including schools and health facilities. B.Pondok Jihad A decision to seize the land of a small pondok (traditional Islamic boarding school) in Yaring, Pattani, gave militants a cause and helped drive another wedge between the state and ordinary Malay Muslims. Authorities closed Pondok Jihad, the Jihad Witaya school, in 2005 on suspicion its grounds were used to train militant fighters. The Anti-Money Laundering Office filed a case against the school in 2013. On 14 December 2015, the court ordered confiscation of its 14 rai (2.24 hectares). The verdict echoed Bangkok’s efforts in the early 1960s to control Islamic schools that helped spur armed resistance to the state and disturbed many locals, who regard pondok as repositories of Malay identity. Recognising popular blowback from the ruling, Thai officials attempted to persuade Balyan Waemano, son of the school’s former administrator, and his family to appeal and offered to allow them to rent the land. The family, in consultation with villagers, decided not to seek legal redress, but to accept the court’s authority and vacate the property. In so doing, it sought an end to the case and formally demonstrated due regard for the judiciary. But it also ensured that the land seizure would be a cause célèbre. The authorities contributed to this by prevailing on religious leaders and the Pattani Provincial Islamic Council to issue a statement urging the family to heed the advice to appeal and complaining that local civil society organisations were causing confusion. This coordination with the military tarnished the Council and associated religious leaders in the eyes of many Malay Muslims. The school’s history added a political dimension. Dolloh Waemano became headmaster after the founder, his father-in-law, was murdered in 1979. Dolloh, whom authorities believe is a senior BRN leader, fled Thailand in 2005, before the shutdown. In June 2005, his son, Ridwan Waemano, was killed in his Pattani apartment, with two other men, in what many locals consider an extrajudicial killing. On 19 March 2016, Pondok Jihad supporters organised an event to raise funds for the owner’s family, featuring traditional local food and a panel discussion. Such fundraisers are common in the region, but the school’s purported links to BRN charged it with political significance. Roughly 50,000 people attended, donating 3.9 million baht ($110,740). It was the largest gathering of Malay Muslims since the 1975 Pattani protests that precipitated a new era of Patani-Malay activism. Many liken the Pondok Jihad issue to earlier state blunders that excited public contempt and played into BRN’s hands, such as the Kreu Se mosque massacre and the Tak Bai incident, both in 2004. IV.Bangkok Balks Faced with an uptick in attacks and widespread disaffection, the military tightened its grip on the deep south. The Pondok Jihad case convinced the army it had allowed a dangerous degree of political space there. The government was reportedly increasingly worried about BRN’s long-term strategy, purportedly based on indoctrination of tens of thousands of youths in Islamic schools who might, in a decade or two, form a broad base of support and pool of recruits. Tightened military control took various forms. The army barred the Federation of Patani Students and Youth (PerMAS) from staging an event on public participation in the peace process, scheduled for 13 February 2016. A spokesman explained it was prohibited because it concerned self-determination, meaning independence: “[PerMAS] is trying to internationalise the issue. Using the words ‘right to self-determination’ is against the law”. On 12 April, 4th Army Region Commander Lieutenant General Wiwat Pathompak, warned he would begin summoning for discussions those who “spread misinformation”, especially on Facebook. This was already the practice in other army regions since the coup. Release of two reports by human rights groups detailing allegations of torture and other mistreatment of detainees by security forces in the deep south elicited another combative army response. On 17 May 2016, the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) Region 4 filed criminal complaints against three authors of one report, accusing them of defamation and violation of the Computer Crimes Act. On 4 April, Prime Minister Prayuth completed subordination to the military of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), a special agency established in 1980 charged with coordinating civilian development and administration in the five southernmost provinces. The new regulations diminish its status, concentrating its budget with ISOC’s military officials. The move was presented as a way to increase efficiency, but the effect is that many local people are losing the confidence SBPAC had gained under its previous director. Through March and early April 2016, members of the Thai and MARA delegations were upbeat on the dialogue’s prospects. That changed on 20 April, when the army chief transferred Nakrob from his ISOC position and thus his post as secretary of the Thai delegation. NCPO officials insisted the move was routine, with no bearing on the dialogue but its abruptness, a week before a scheduled JWG meeting, appeared to signal something more, particularly given Nakrob’s energetic efforts to finalise the ToR and build public support for the process. It was at that next JWG meeting that Aksara declined to sign the ToR, saying Prime Minister Prayuth had not approved it. Foreign affairs and justice ministry officials reportedly persuaded the NCPO to reverse course out of fear the ToR would boost MARA’s international status and trap Bangkok into concessions. Explaining the refusal to sign, Aksara also questioned MARA’s standing to conduct negotiations. Questioned by reporters, Prayuth expressed annoyance with the dialogue, saying he had to contend with it as an inheritance from the old government. It had to be held abroad because the law and constitution prohibit negotiations with “lawbreakers”, he said; recognising Party B by name would encourage others to make similar demands, embroiling the state in difficulties. Abu Hafez conveyed MARA’s disappointment but said the delay would give Bangkok “ample time to reconsider and reverse that decision” and reminded Prayuth that he had requested Malaysia’s help to resume the process. MARA’s Shukri Hari expressed concern about Prayuth’s subsequent comments, which, he said indicated “that the peace talks are only a false promise despite the fact that we are in the process of confidence building”. Thai officials insist the process will continue. Aksara said the ToR would be reviewed by the National Security Council and other agencies, amended and submitted to the prime minister for approval. The sides reportedly exchanged letters stating their willingness to continue through facilitator Zamzamin on 1 June during his visit to Bangkok. V.Bombs of August On 7 August, voters approved a draft constitution prepared by the NCPO’s handpicked committee, with 61 per cent voting in favour and 59 per cent turnout. The three Malay-Muslim majority southern provinces, however, voted 60 per cent “no”. The draft codifies semi-democracy, including an appointed senate, the possibility of an unelected prime minister, and a continuing role for the NCPO after the next general election. That Section 67 enjoins the state to propagate Buddhist principles does not sit well with many Malay Muslims. The deep south experienced a wave of bombings, at least 50 in the first ten days of August, and graffiti condemning the draft appeared across the three provinces. On 11-12 August, coinciding with Mothers’ Day and Queen Sirikit’s birthday, seventeen coordinated bombing and arson attacks in tourist destinations in seven provinces of the upper south killed four and wounded 35. Targets included Phuket, Phang-nga, and Hua Hin, which suffered four bombings and two fatalities. NCPO officials were quick to blame domestic political foes ostensibly upset at the referendum, and to dismiss the possibility Malay-Muslim militants were involved. Consistent with BRN operations, there was no claim of responsibility, but the attacks bore its hallmarks. Investigators considered the devices and tactics, including coordination over wide areas and blasts in sequence to hit responders to the initial bombing, the same as those employed in the deep south. Arrest warrants were issued for suspects associated with the insurgency. These attacks were not the first by militants outside their customary operations area of the four southernmost provinces. In addition to periodic attacks on Hat Yai in Songkhla province, the largest city and commercial centre of the south, militants deployed a truck bomb to Phuket, which did not explode and was discovered in December 2013. A car bomb on Samui Island in April 2015 wounded seven. But the scale of the August attacks, geographic reach and choice of targets mark a clear shift, and apparent decision to expand the conflict. Speculation about the timing of the August attacks has centred on BRN’s displeasure with Bangkok’s approach to dialogue. Proximity to the referendum and the bombings that preceded it suggest a political message to the NCPO. An experienced analyst said, “it was a signal to warn the government that [dialogue] is a big issue for them … and the government will pay more attention from now on”. Diminishing returns from twelve years of insurgent operations in the deep south may also have factored into the unprecedented scale and choice of targets beyond the traditional area of the insurgency. In the wake of the Mothers’ Day attacks, the dialogue process began to move again. A technical meeting took place on 16 August, and on 23 August, Prayuth told reporters a plenary meeting could take place on 2 September. That night, a car bomb – the fourth of 2016 – exploded in front of a hotel and nightclub in Pattani, killing one person and wounding more than 30. The dialogue teams met on 2 September in Kuala Lumpur. The day before, women from 23 deep south civil society organisations marched in Pattani calling for safety zones, a longstanding NCPO precondition for official talks. The Thai delegation tabled a proposal from one such group, Women’s Agenda for Peace, on a safety-zone concept, which MARA said it would evaluate. The sides reportedly reached preliminary consensus on a revised ToR, but nothing was signed, and the meeting ended with agreement to continue the unofficial dialogue. VI.Intractability and Other Obstacles to Dialogue The conflict has characteristics of a “soft, stable, self-serving stalemate”, which is “generally bearable to both parties, both in the absolute and relative to any likely solution on the table at the moment”. The protagonists still seem inclined to preserve the status quo rather than opt for the uncertainties of compromise. This is evident in the military’s tacit aversion to substantive dialogue and political change and BRN’s explicit opposition to the current talks. MARA’s uncertain influence over fighters and civil society’s limited role complicate matters. The NCPO and army are guided by two imperatives in their approach to dialogue. The first is that the conflict is and must remain domestic. They harbour an abiding fear it will be internationalised, leading to foreign intervention and, eventually, partition. The second is that it must be resolved without political reform or devolution of power, which many officials regard as a potential precursor to national fragmentation. Proposals for “special administration”, such as a regional governing council or popularly elected provincial governors, were widely discussed in the region prior to the 2014 coup but today are again taboo. Asked if autonomy was needed, Aksara replied: “What year is this? Is there anyone still talking about this?… We passed beyond the old context”. The government needs to relinquish the wish to resolve the conflict without devolution. A recent regional survey found 61 per cent of respondents considered new administrative arrangements appropriate to local conditions necessary to end the insurgency. Thus, many regard dialogue with MARA as little more than the NCPO’s “flagship public relations project”. Some military officers share the view it is primarily about improving the regime’s image. Many officials understand dialogue as a means to persuade militants to lay down arms and accept an amnesty or plea bargain rather than a process aimed at achieving an agreement with militant leaders. This is the army’s traditional approach to talks with militants, currently embodied in the “Bring the People Home Project”. The aim is to reach out via family or civil society organisations to sway insurgents to give up violence. “The idea”, an army officer said, “is to coax them out to talk; that’s real dialogue”. The NCPO’s lack of a democratic mandate and restrictions on civil liberties are another problem. Those who oppose the NCPO or the political status quo do not enjoy the right to call for political change without fear of reprisal, not only in the deep south, but also nationwide. This renders hollow army arguments that militants should abandon armed conflict to pursue peaceful change. The NCPO has promised a 2017 general election, but the draft constitution provides for a five-year transition during which the military regime retains broad powers. Protracted military tutelage bodes ill for decentralisation prospects. A related issue is the diminishing space for civil society to engage on political issues. For various reasons, locals are less interested in the current dialogue than they were in the previous process. The army is on one side, a separatist diaspora leadership on the other, and they are excluded. Zamzamin’s encouragement of them to get involved with MARA Patani, even elect representatives to its central committee “to synchronise your demands and aspirations with those of the Armed Groups”, misapprehends conditions in Thailand: authorities would not permit collaboration with armed rebels. After more than a decade of conflict, many in civil society who work on peace issues are exhausted, and their groups lack space and resources to push for greater popular engagement with dialogue. Another critical impediment is BRN’s refusal to participate. A process that does not include its armed wing will not deliver a lasting resolution. It questions Bangkok’s seriousness and has reiterated in public statements its demand for international organisations to observe the talks. A lack of technical capacity and a detailed, long-term political platform also inhibit it. “In terms of personnel, preparation, platform, BRN is not ready”, a sympathiser said. This must change. BRN should subordinate military operations to pursuit of viable political ends and observe its obligations under IHL, including an end to targeting civilians. Many militants have misgivings about Malaysia’s facilitation. A PULO member said the dialogue has failed twice, and new personnel and procedures in facilitation, such as including third-party observers and advisers, could help rebuild confidence. Though MARA has some support in the southernmost provinces, it also faces indifference and antagonism. Many locals know little about it. Only 21.8 per cent of respondents to a recent survey in the region reported having heard of MARA Patani. This is one reason it emphasises proposals for immunity and safe passage, without which it cannot build links to its ostensible constituents. Some locals consider MARA a creature of Malaysia, lacking the local support BRN has cultivated over two decades. A prominent Muslim human rights activist said MARA must prove itself, and that people need more than a binary choice between it and the government. The extent to which MARA might eventually represent BRN’s militant wing, as well as separatists in exile, remains an open question. Popular support will ultimately be determined by its ability to deliver a deal, which requires buy-in from BRN and local people. Given NCPO aversion to participatory politics and fear of internationalising the insurgency, near-term scope for breaking the stalemate is narrow. But the Mothers’ Day attacks illustrate the risks of attempting to preserve the status quo while engaging in a pro forma dialogue that leaves out the main insurgent group. The attacks should also encourage the NCPO and any successor government to develop avenues of exchange with BRN’s leaders so as to start official peace talks. The alternative could be further, more damaging attacks outside the customary conflict zone as BRN seeks leverage. BRN should facilitate and reciprocate overtures from Bangkok. It should also be prepared to implement a ceasefire or safety zones to satisfy the government’s preconditions for talks. MARA Patani should be candid about the extent of its influence inside Thailand and encourage a broader dialogue with BRN. The NCPO should also restore rights to freedom of expression and assembly. A lasting resolution to the conflict is unlikely without sustained public participation. VII.Conclusion The protracted conflict is more than twelve years old, with no signs of abating. The dialogue process is beset by deep mutual mistrust that a year of preliminary talks has done little to dispel. The failure to sign a ToR agreement and comments by Thai officials questioning MARA Patani’s status cast doubt on NCPO willingness to engage in an official dialogue. The assumption that the dialogue’s momentum will sway BRN to join is improbable at best. The belligerents need to take seriously their obligation to those they claim to represent to find a peaceful resolution, based on a political order that accords with local aspirations. The August bomb attacks in the upper south raise the spectre of a wider conflict, with more attacks in tourist areas. That should prompt the NCPO to reconsider its approach of containing the insurgency and seeking militant capitulation rather than a comprehensive political solution. In view of the military government’s antipathy to decentralisation and determination to keep control after the promised 2017 election, however, there is little scope for a breakthrough. An earnest attempt to decentralise power, the best hope for resolution of the conflict, is unlikely to materialise under the current government. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2016 International Crisis Group

Lebanon, a small country whose population hovered around four million, has gained an astounding million and a half more residents in under four years, mostly refugees from neighbouring Syria. By contrast, the U.S. government proudly announced that it reached its target this year of granting asylum to 10,000 Syrians – to be settled in a population of more than 320 million – in the face of opposition from citizens worried about a flood of refugees and migrants. Any serious attempt to deal with the global refugee crisis should acknowledge these startling disparities. The UN and U.S. are hosting back-to-back summit meetings on the refugee emergency on 19-20 September in New York, but advocates are pessimistic that the discussions will result in more equitable resettlement among the world's richest countries or adequate support to front-line states. To frame an international response commensurate with the Syrian catastrophe, it is vital to understand what is happening in a front-line state like Lebanon. As the Syrian war escalated, Syrians began fleeing primarily to neighbouring Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. Lebanon, in particular, received the swiftest and largest refugee influx in its history. Around one million are registered with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), while an additional 500,000 unregistered refugees, migrant workers and wealthier Syrians have melted into the local population. Such a sudden influx would pose a big challenge to any country, but Lebanon is without an effective government or significant resources, and has historically been unstable. Its resilience so far in the face of this shockwave is therefore remarkable. Yet the inflow has exposed a series of worrying fault lines. The state’s endemic dysfunction is glaring: Syrian refugees arrived in a country sunk in a deep malaise. In recent years, Lebanese politicians have been unable to agree on electing a president or holding parliamentary elections, or even on a policy to collect garbage from city streets, whose pungent smell wafted through the capital last year. In view of such a dismal state of affairs, seeing the government implement a policy to address the refugee crisis would have been nothing less than a miracle. Beirut’s default response of inaction has had serious consequences. In the absence of official camps established specifically for refugees, the majority of Syrians have sought shelter in Lebanon’s most deprived areas. This has put new strains on places that already lacked infrastructure and whose population was already struggling. Gradually, and not surprisingly, host communities have become resentful toward the refugees. In turn, many Lebanese officials have used the refugee issue to deflect criticism for the state’s failings, further feeding tensions. Changing demographic realities are another source of concern. The arrival of refugees who are, for the most part Sunni Muslims, has alarmed Christians, Shias and Druze eager to preserve a delicate sectarian balance in a multiconfessional political system. Even Lebanese Sunnis, however, share their compatriots’ concerns about an enduring refugee presence. The refugee crisis has produced an uncommon consensus among Lebanon’s communities: everyone blames the Syrians for the country’s many ills. Add to this Lebanon’s history with Palestinian refugees, estimated at 300,000 to 400,000 and mostly living in camps created after 1948. What was envisioned as short-term refuge turned into a seemingly permanent exile for these Palestinians, whose militarisation became a major trigger for the civil war a generation ago. As the Syrian war continues without an immediate end in sight, there are concerns that Syrian refugees may likewise become a long-term presence. The spectre of renewed conflict has led the Lebanese authorities to adopt a heavy-handed security approach toward the refugees. They have repeatedly raided whatever encampments exist and arrested hundreds of men. Moreover, they have allowed local councils to impose discriminatory measures, such as night-time curfews, on Syrians. Lebanon needs help to cope with the refugee crisis, both to aid Syrian refugees and to preserve the unity of the state. What refugees need most immediately is an easing of visa requirements to regularise their status. The international community should focus on long-term development projects that would benefit both Syrians and deprived host communities. Moreover, it should condition any security assistance to the army and police – the only functioning parts of the state – on the conduct of these forces toward the refugees in a manner consistent with international law and human rights standards. If the world stands by as Lebanon dissolves under the extraordinary burden it has shouldered with remarkable magnanimity, we may be confronted with a much greater international refugee crisis – as well as new rounds of violence, which in turn will generate more refugees. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2016 International Crisis Group

More than 3,000 Yazidi women and girls remain in ISIS sexual enslavement. Credit: Independent.co.uk Amal Clooney Criticizes World Response To Yazidi Genocide | NBC News Renowned human rights lawyer Amal Clooney criticized the United Nations for failing to act on behalf of the persecuted Yazidi minority group, thousands of whom remain enslaved by the Islamic State militant group (ISIS). Clooney spoke during a ceremony for Nadia Murad Basee Taha, a 23-year-old Yazidi woman who was kept as an ISIS sex slave for three months before she escaped. On Friday, Murad was appointed as a Goodwill Ambassador for the Dignity of Survivors of Human Trafficking for the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Earlier this year, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said ISIS is committing a genocide against several minority groups in Iraq and Syria, including Yazidis, Turkmen and Christians. Sign up Sign up to our daily newsletter for up to date global news and features. "Make no mistake: What Nadia has told us about is genocide,” Clooney said during a speech on Friday. “And genocide doesn't happen by accident. You have to plan it." Clooney, a barrister at Doughty Street Chambers in London who focuses on international and human rights law, will represent the Yazidis in an International Criminal Court case, in which she plans to seek accountability for the genocide, sexual enslavement and trafficking of Yazidi women and girls by ISIS. ISIS believe Yazidis are non-believers as they follow an ancient religion and are not Muslim. "I am ashamed, as a supporter of the United Nations, that states are failing to prevent, or even punish, genocide because they find that their own interests get in the way. I am ashamed as a lawyer that there is no justice being done and barely a complaint being made about it," Clooney said on Friday, which was also the International Day of Peace. "I am ashamed as a woman that girls like Nadia have their bodies sold and used as battlefields. I am ashamed as a human being that we ignore their cries for help," said Clooney, before strong applause broke out. Murad retold her story of rape and torture at the hands of ISIS fighters during the ceremony on Friday, which was attended by a number of trafficking survivors as well as members of the Yazidi community. Six of her brothers were among a group of 600 men who were killed on a single day when ISIS militants stormed her village in August 2014. Her mother was one of 80 older women who were executed and buried in unmarked graves, and members of her community were given the choice by ISIS to flee, convert to Islam or be killed. It was, said Murad, “an act of collective genocide against our society." “I am a farmer, a villager and I was born to be such,” Murad said on Friday. "I was not raised to give speeches... Nor to represent a cause so heavy, so difficult." More than 3,000 Yazidis remain enslaved by ISIS; Murad said she “cannot feel free when thousands of other girls like me remain captive." "This slave market is still running today, just a few hours away by plane," said Clooney. She read out excerpts from a pamphlet published by ISIS in December 2014, which stated that sex with a child is permissible, as is the rape and selling and exchanging of non-Muslim women. The pamphlet stated it is acceptable to beat a female slave. U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon spoke during the ceremony and called Murad a "fierce and tireless advocate of the Yazidi people." He added that she "has shown exceptional courage in speaking out." Friday's event comes days before two high-level summits on refugees and migrants at the U.N. and the White House, both of which seek to improve the lives of more than 65 million displaced people around the world. Murad, who now lives in Germany, called on the world to take refugees and asylum seekers, particularly those who have been victims of genocide. "Nadia and others like her are not seeking revenge," said Clooney. "They're seeking justice, the opportunity to face their abusers in an international court in The Hague." © Newsweek 2016

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia — In a vast courtroom on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, a middle-aged Cambodian woman soberly described a night nearly four decades ago that she said she had never talked about before. The local leader of the Khmer Rouge government had assigned her to marry one man, but at the last minute decided on another, she told the court. On their wedding night in early 1977, she refused his advances. The man complained to the chief, who raped her and threatened to kill her, before sending her back to live with her new husband. “I bit my lips and shed my tears,” said the woman, identified at the tribunal only as 2-TCCP-274 to protect her identity. She eventually let her husband have sex with her. The United Nations-backed tribunal investigating the crimes of the Khmer Rouge has turned in recent weeks to an aspect of the radical Maoist regime that has often been overlooked amid its mass killings and other brutalities: regulations governing marriage. The panel is considering whether the policies amounted to forced marriage or led to sexual assault, both potentially crimes against humanity. The people who have testified so far, most in their 60s, have laid bare the scope of a practice that many Cambodians describe anecdotally, if sometimes reluctantly. A wide range of experiences has emerged in court: women set aside for disabled soldiers, militiamen spying on couples to confirm they were having sex, people corralled into group weddings who engaged in desperate ploys to be paired off with vague acquaintances rather than strangers. Some couples managed to find mutual compassion under the coercion, and built relationships that endured. Others continue to lead lives of quiet regret over the choices that were taken from them. Prosecutors have estimated, tentatively, that as many as several hundred thousand people were married in Khmer Rouge ceremonies between 1975 and 1979, though there have been no reliable surveys. The Khmer Rouge’s stated policy was to increase the country’s population, and in a society with a tradition of arranged marriage, the regime assumed the role of parent to an entire people as part of its utopian project to remake Cambodia. It held group weddings across the country, but without the customary Buddhist rituals and blessings from relatives and neighbors. The practice, some academics argue, was intended to assert totalitarian control by weakening the bonds of family, community and religion. Lawyers for the regime’s two surviving leaders, Khieu Samphan, 85, the head of state, and Nuon Chea, 90, the group’s chief ideologue, challenge the notion that the marriage regulations were inherently coercive. The defense has yet to present its case, but at least one lawyer has intimated that Khmer Rouge marriages were simply a variation on common, traditional arranged marriages. And any coercion or sexual abuse that occurred, both men’s defense teams have suggested, was the result of decisions by midlevel Khmer cadres, not state policy. The tribunal was established in 2006 to examine the effects of the Khmer Rouge’s radical policies, which historians say resulted in the deaths of some 1.7 million people. In 2014, Mr. Khieu Samphan and Mr. Nuon Chea were each sentenced to life in prison, primarily for crimes committed during the regime’s drive to move people out of cities to work in rural communes. That judgment is under appeal, and the court has moved on to crimes at detention centers and forced labor sites, and against two ethnic minority groups. The charge of forced marriage was included late in the development of the sprawling indictment, at the insistence of victims’ lawyers and women’s rights groups pushing for greater recognition of sexual violence and gender-based abuses in international criminal law. But the tribunal has heard evidence of the policy’s effects on men as well. One man with broad shoulders and a deep frown, known as 2-TCCP-232, told the tribunal how he had been forced to marry someone other than his fiancée. Speaking with his head down, he recalled that they had worked in separate mobile units in the same district, digging canals and carrying dirt. But they were politically suspect because he had been a police officer, and some of her relatives had been “smashed” — taken away and presumably executed — as enemies of the revolution, he said. A unit chief warned that he, too, would be smashed if he tried to marry his fiancée. When he was told one day in 1978 that the Khmer Rouge would arrange a family for him, he did not dare protest. A group wedding was held, in the dark, for about 50 men and 50 women. Some, perhaps people “with good biographies,” seemed to have some say in choosing their partners, he said. But that night, he was afraid to even look at the woman he was marrying. They were couple No. 42. The next night, they were directed to a flimsy shack. “We treated each other like brother and sister,” he said. “I did not touch her.” They were too exhausted to have sex, he said. He still had not seen her face. “It was only in the morning that we could see each other clearly,” he said. And then they were sent back to work. Some academics say the Khmer Rouge’s regulation of marriage was intended to attack traditional Cambodian belief systems. Peg LeVine, a medical anthropologist and fellow at the University of Southern California Shoah Foundation’s Center for Advanced Genocide Research, said it “broke down, mutated and eroded the ancestral rituals that Cambodians practice to placate the spirit world.” But Anta Guissé, a lawyer representing Mr. Khieu Samphan, said in an email that the government’s regulations explicitly required bride, groom and the community to agree to any marriage. “The variety of ways in which marriage was handled in different areas is a revealing sign of that,” she said. One of Mr. Nuon Chea’s lawyers, Liv Sovanna, sought to portray sexual abuse as a violation of state policy rather than the result of it. He argued in court that the Khmer Rouge had held officials to a strict code of conduct, and he read from a provision known as Code 6, which condemned immoral behavior and stated, “Do not take liberties with women.” Questioning the woman who said she had been raped by a local chief for refusing to consummate her marriage, Mr. Liv Sovanna asked if she understood that rape was a serious offense under the Khmer Rouge. “Of course it was a serious offense,” she replied, unfazed. “But who could I tell? If I told anyone, I would be dead. Nobody could help me. He was a person in authority.” And yet, she testified to staying with the husband selected by the local chief, partly at the insistence of relatives, long after Vietnamese forces ousted the Khmer Rouge in 1979. In 2014, the Transcultural Psychosocial Organization, a nongovernmental group providing mental health support for survivors of the Khmer Rouge era, interviewed 106 victims formally participating in the court proceedings. Most said they had refused a Khmer Rouge wedding at least once, but nearly all said they had married in the end, most after being threatened. About half said they remained in their marriages from the Khmer Rouge era, most of them because they had come to feel sympathy or affection for their spouses. Some couples held a second wedding, this time in keeping with Buddhist tradition. The man forced to marry a woman whose face he did not know, 2-TCCP-232, also stayed with his wife after the fall of the regime. But he could not forget his first love. He told the court about meeting his fiancée later. “I took her hand,” he told the court. “We embraced. We wept. And we told each other that in this life we needed to do good deeds — because maybe it was bad deeds in our previous lives that had kept us apart, and so if we did good deeds in this life, maybe in a future one we could be together.” © The New York Times 2016 A version of this article appears in print on September 11, 2016, on page A8 of the New York edition with the headline: Married Off by Khmer Rouge, Into Abuse and Anguish.

Global Overview AUGUST 2016 The month saw Yemen’s peace talks collapse with violence there intensifying, and the Syrian conflict escalate following Ankara’s launch of a cross-border ground offensive against Islamic State (IS) and Kurdish forces, days after a major terror attack in Turkey’s south east. Troop deployments in Western Sahara threatened to bring about clashes, and violence flared in the Central African Republic. In Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, security forces brutally suppressed anti-government protests, while in Gabon, the president’s disputed re-election triggered violent clashes. In Asia, a suicide bombing killed over 70 people in Pakistan, while suspected militants in Thailand’s southern insurgency launched attacks on targets outside the traditional conflict zone. In positive news, peace talks between the Philippines government and communist rebel groups resumed after a four-year hiatus. On 24 August, Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) declared that they had reached a final peace accord, paving the way for an end to 52 years of armed conflict. Trends and Outlook Yemen suffered a significant uptick in violence after UN peace talks in Kuwait collapsed in early August. Huthi rebels launched indiscriminate rocket attacks into Saudi Arabia, while the Saudi-led coalition resumed airstrikes on Sanaa, the capital, and Huthi strongholds in the north. In the south, an IS suicide bomb attack on a pro-government militia compound in Aden killed at least 60. The violence aggravated an already desperate humanitarian situation, with​ at least 10,000 people killed and more than three million internally displaced since the conflict began. As Crisis Group has warned, without an inclusive negotiated settlement Yemen risks sliding further “into state disintegration, territorial fragmentation and sectarian violence”. The war is increasingly threatening Gulf security, as violence spills over the Yemeni-Saudi border and​, in southern Yemen, play​s​ into the hands of violent jihadist groups. The conflict in Syria escalated and Turkey’s involvement grew, as Ankara launched a major offensive in northern Syria in an attempt to remove IS from the border area and contain Kurdish YPG forces’ territorial gains. Turkey’s military operation came days after a bomb attack on a Kurdish wedding in the country’s south east, assumed to be the work of IS, which killed 56 people, mostly children, and injured more than 90. In a significant gain for the Syrian regime, the rebel stronghold Darayya outside the capital Damascus surrendered to government forces on 25 August. Meanwhile, the battle for Aleppo between Russian-backed government forces and rebels continued to rage, reportedly killing over 600 civilians in August. A tense standoff developed in Western Sahara. Morocco’s deployment of troops and roadworks in the UN buffer zone angered the Polisario Front armed independence movement, which sent in its own troops. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said on 28 August he was deeply concerned by armed units from Morocco and the Polisario being “in close proximity”. In the Central African Republic, a convoy of former Séléka rebels, including leaders under arrest warrants, left the capital Bangui for their northern stronghold, shooting their way past security forces. The UN managed to arrest some, but others escaped, undermining already faltering efforts to disarm the country’s multiple armed factions. In Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, security forces’ brutal responses to mounting protests have led to new spikes in violence. In Ethiopia, at least 87 protesters were reportedly killed in Oromia and Amhara regions. In Zimbabwe, hundreds protesting against the government’s economic misrule and calling for electoral reforms fought running battles with police, with at least 50 injured. In Gabon, supporters of opposition presidential candidate Jean Ping took to the streets and clashed with security forces as soon as the government announced President Bongo winner in the 27 August election. In Asia, Pakistan suffered reportedly its worst ever attack targeting civil society. A suicide bombing at Quetta Civil hospital on 8 August killed over 70 people, mostly lawyers gathered to mourn Balochistan Bar Association President Bilal Anwar Kasi, who was killed the previous day. Tehreek-e-Taliban faction Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and IS both claimed responsibility for the attack. In Thailand, a series of deadly attacks on 11-12 August suggested the Malay-Muslim separatist insurgency in the Deep South may have entered a “disturbing new phase”, targeting locations outside the traditional conflict zone. Elsewhere in the region, the Philippines government and the National Democratic Front (NDFP), which includes the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People’s Army insurgent group, resumed peace talks and agreed to a ceasefire. The talks in Oslo are the first meetings since negotiations to resolve the 47-year-old conflict were suspended in 2012. After four years of talks in Cuba, Colombia and the FARC announced on 24 August that they had reached a “final, full and definitive” peace accord. The landmark agreement brings an end to one of the world’s longest-running armed conflicts. However, Crisis Group has cautioned that major challenges remain in the months ahead. The most immediate will be a binding plebiscite on 2 October, when Colombians will vote on whether to accept the peace deal. Search current and previous CrisisWatch latest updates. Latest Updates Africa Burundi President Nkurunziza consolidated control of ruling party as regime continued to repress opposition. Ruling party CNDD-FDD at congress 20 Aug replaced party president position with sec gen and appointed Nkurunziza’s former chief of staff and civil war commander Evariste Ndayishimiye to role. Commission for inter-Burundian Dialogue 23 Aug concluded from public consultations that most Burundians favour scrapping constitutional presidential term limit; opposition said findings fabricated. Govt 3 Aug rejected UNSC resolution to deploy 228 police to Burundi, calling it violation of sovereignty. UN Committee against Torture 12 Aug condemned forced disappearances of govt’s political rivals and its “genocidal rhetoric”. Govt repression targeted security force members believed opposed to Nkurunziza’s third term: police 20 Aug arrested and beat Major Clément Hamenyimana in Gitega; army 19 Aug said eleven officers refused to return after missions abroad fearing arrest. Search for journalist Jean Bigirimana, missing since 22 July, found two bodies in Mubarazi river, Muramvya province early Aug, neither identified as Bigirimana. Third body reportedly found in neighbouring Gitega province. Police 21 Aug arrested 54 members of WhatsApp group in Bujumbura for spreading false rumours. Cameroon Boko Haram (BH) continued deadly attacks in Far North, including: gunmen attacked Gambarou 10 Aug, killing five; suicide bombing at Mora 21 Aug killed four and injured 24. Military reportedly killed five BH members at Bourvari-Plateri 5 Aug in operation supported by civilian vigilante groups. Local media 16 Aug published open letter purportedly from “elites” of Adamawa region denouncing marginalisation of region. Central African Republic Over 30 ex-Séléka rebels, including leaders under arrest warrants, 12 Aug left capital Bangui and exchanged fire with security forces at checkpoints, stopped by MINUSCA next day 50km south of Sibut, ten arrested; Popular Front for the Central African Renaissance (FPRC) leaders Abdoulaye Hissène and Aroun Gaye escaped and 17 Aug reportedly arrived in Kaga Bandoro in north. Police 16 Aug raided Hissène’s house in Bangui, seized around 700 weapons and ammunition. 22 representatives of ten armed groups 20 Aug formed disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) platform in Bangui. MINUSCA 5 Aug arrested Jean-Francis Bozizé, son of former President François Bozizé, under 2014 international warrant for torture, involvement in assassination and personal use of public funds; court 9 Aug granted him provisional release. Chad Security forces used tear gas to disperse banned opposition rallies in N’Djamena 6-7 Aug; one protestor killed 7 Aug, day before President Déby’s inauguration for fifth term. French President Hollande received Déby in Paris 20 Aug, reaffirmed support for fight against terrorism and development in Lake Chad region. Four soldiers killed when vehicle hit Boko Haram landmine 27 Aug at Kaiga Kindji near Niger border. Democratic Republic of Congo President Kabila and electoral commission (CENI) delayed setting electoral calendar, while some opposition groups continued to reject dialogue. Kabila 4 Aug said electoral calendar would not be published before end of voter registration, launched 31 July; CENI 20 Aug said elections could not be held before July 2017 due to lack of finances and voter list. In support of political dialogue Catholic Church 10 Aug began consultations with ruling party and major opposition groups. To ease tensions Kabila 18 Aug met youth activists Lutte pour le Changement (Lucha) and govt 19 Aug said it would free 24 political prisoners; opposition claimed twenty of those 24 already free. Dialogue preparatory committee convened 23-27 Aug, set dialogue for 1-14 Sept. Some opposition parties, including Union for the Congolese Nation (UNC), took part in preparatory meetings; main opposition coalition Rassemblement boycotted committee and called for general strike to be held 23 Aug, with limited success: police arrested 32 people. Police dispersed with tear gas opposition rally in Lubumbashi, Haut-Katanga 29 Aug. Armed groups continued violence against civilians in N Kivu: army said Mai Mai and Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) 6-7 Aug launched attacks in several places in N Kivu, killing fourteen people; suspected Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) members reportedly killed 51 people in Beni, N Kivu night of 13-14 Aug; suspected ADF 22 Aug reportedly killed two people in Kiteya, N Kivu; crowd in Butembo, N Kivu killed two women suspected of supporting ADF. Attacks sparked protests in east; violent protest in Beni 17 Aug left three dead, including policeman and woman suspected of being ADF member. Gabon Violent protests broke out after opposition candidate Jean Ping rejected President Bongo’s victory in 27 Aug presidential election, announced 31 Aug. Both candidates 28 Aug claimed victory and accused each other of fraud; govt same day said process “satisfactory” despite irregularities. Govt 31 Aug announced Bongo won with 49.80% of votes, with Ping garnering 48.23%; opposition rejected results and called for recount in Haut-Ogooué province, Bongo stronghold where turnout was reportedly 99.93%. Ping supporters protested 31 Aug-1 Sept in Libreville and second city Port-Gentil, clashed with security forces, set fire to buildings including parliament building in Libreville; security forces dispersed protests with live rounds and tear gas; same night helicopters and presidential guard on ground attacked opposition HQ, reportedly killing two and injuring nineteen. Ping called for international assistance to protect population. UNSG Ban expressed “deep concern” about violence. Rwanda Police 17 Aug shot dead one suspected terrorist in Kigali and 19 Aug killed three more and arrested three others in Bugarama, Rusizi district. Ethiopia Clashes between anti-govt protestors and police and security forces 6-7 Aug in Amhara (NW) and Oromia regions (centre-south) reportedly left at least 87 protestors dead and hundreds arrested. At least seven protestors reportedly killed in clashes with police in Gondar, Amhara region 6 Aug and at least 30 protestors killed in clashes in Bahir Dar, Amhara capital 7 Aug. Residents in Gondar and Bahir Dar reportedly held strikes (“stay-home protests”) from mid-Aug. Security forces 6 Aug reportedly killed over 50 protestors across Oromia and dispersed protest in Addis Ababa. OHCHR 10 Aug stressed need for investigations into allegations of excessive use of force in both regions. Kenya Al-Shabaab attacks decreased: militants 6 Aug attacked police camp in Basuba, Lamu county, injuring four officers. Anti-terror police 28 Aug arrested two men suspected of links to Islamic State at Malindi, Kilifi county. Clan militias killed four and injured one in two attacks 28 and 29 Aug on border between Eldas and Wajir North constituencies, Wajir county. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) 3 Aug agreed to resign following months of protests against its perceived pro-govt bias. Somalia Al-Shabaab continued attacks against civilians and police, and govt postponed elections. In Mogadishu, militants tried unsuccessfully to assassinate MP with hand grenade 8 Aug; suspected Al-Shabaab killed local govt official 12 Aug in drive-by shooting; militants 25 Aug attacked beach restaurant killing at least ten and detonated car bomb prematurely outside Turkish embassy; AMISOM and Somali National Army (SNA) 28 Aug arrested two suspected Al-Shabaab militants in joint operation; suicide car bombing 30 Aug outside presidential palace checkpoint killed 22 people and partly destroyed nearby hotel. Elsewhere, Al-Shabaab militants fired mortars in residential areas of Baidoa, Bay region 6 Aug, killing one; militants 21 Aug carried out twin suicide attacks in market and next to local govt HQ in Galkayo, Mudug region, killing at least twenty and injuring 30; militants’ roadside bomb 26 Aug injured three in Bardhere, Gedo region; Al-Shabaab 29 Aug launched assaults on four SNA checkpoints in Muri and K-50 neighbourhoods, Lower Shabelle, killing at least six. U.S.-assisted SNA troops 10 Aug attacked Al-Shabaab checkpoint in Saakow, Middle Juba region, killing three militants; SNA 12 Aug killed one Al-Shabaab commander and arrested three militants in Beledweyne, Hiraan region; SNA and AMISOM 16 Aug recaptured from Al-Shabaab four locations close to Bardhere, Gedo region. AMISOM 22 Aug said eight militants killed when Al-Shabaab ambushed its convoy near Baidoa, Bay region; SNA and AMISOM 27 Aug killed seven Al-Shabaab militants 15km from Burdhubo, Gedo region. Govt 7 Aug announced new electoral timetable: legislative elections scheduled between 24 Sept and 10 Oct, presidential vote 30 Oct. Talks to merge Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions collapsed 18 Aug after Middle Shabelle elders refused to select proposed state’s congress before presidential vote. South Sudan President Kiir contested UN-mandated regional protection force and former first VP Riek Machar travelled to Sudanese capital Khartoum, as limited fighting continued. Taban Deng Gai, who replaced Machar as first VP 26 July, received official welcome from presidents of Kenya and Sudan 16 and 21 Aug; U.S. Sec State Kerry 22 Aug and former Botswana President Mogae, chair of peace monitoring body, 28 Aug said leadership of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) was internal matter; SPLA-IO loyal to Machar say his replacement violate Aug 2015 peace agreement. After fleeing Juba in early July, Machar late month crossed into Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and, at request of DRC President Kabila, UN provided flight within DRC; he subsequently travelled to Khartoum where he received medical treatment. Govt 5 Aug agreed in principle to deployment of regional protection force in S Sudan. Uganda 11 Aug said neither it nor Sudan would contribute troops to force. Govt 12 Aug announced new process to integrate armed groups into national army. UNSC same day authorised deployment of 4,000-strong regional protection force until 15 Dec; govt rejected resolution, 15 Aug said parliament would consider resolution. Kiir 15 Aug said govt would discuss with international community how implementation could serve “mutual interests”. Limited fighting between former SPLA-IO rebels and govt forces continued in several places in Equatoria region, most intensely in and around Yei, former Central Equatoria state. Sudan “Sudan Call” coalition of armed and unarmed opposition groups 8 Aug signed “roadmap” peace agreement, signed by govt in March. Govt 10-14 Aug engaged in direct talks with Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) on cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access in Two Areas (S Kordofan and Blue Nile) and with Darfuri rebel groups, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudan Liberation Movement-Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM), on Darfur. Govt and SPLM-N rebels 10-11 Aug failed to agree on agenda of cessation of hostilities talks, 13 Aug accused each other of hampering process; talks faltered due to disagreements on direct transportation of humanitarian aid from outside country to Two Areas and govt’s insistence on discussing security arrangements. JEM and SLM-MM accused govt of refusing to make concessions. Thabo Mbeki, African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) mediator, 14 Aug suspended talks indefinitely; govt 20 Aug said talks will resume in Sept. Govt 23 Aug said Riek Machar, S Sudan rebel leader and former first VP, receiving medical treatment in Khartoum (see S Sudan). Uganda Inspector General of Police and regime loyalist Kale Kayihura and seven senior police officers failed to appear in court 10 Aug to answer accusations of police brutality against opposition supporters in July. After lawyer 26 Aug issued petition challenging Kayihura’s prosecution, court 29 Aug halted proceedings. Govt 11 Aug said neither Uganda nor Sudan would contribute troops to regional protection force that UNSC 12 Aug authorised to deploy in S Sudan (see S Sudan). UNHCR reported at least 97,947 S Sudanese refugees arrived in Uganda between 1 July and 30 Aug. Angola Clashes between rebel Front for the Liberation of Cabinda Enclave (FLEC) and Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) intensified late July and 4-6 Aug in several areas reportedly killing at least two FLEC and 42 FAA. Ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) party at congress 17-20 Aug re-elected sole nominee President dos Santos party leader and named his daughter Welwitschia and son José Filomeno to MPLA Central Committee. Mozambique Govt and armed opposition Renamo 17 Aug agreed to set up committee to draft new laws that could enable appointment of Renamo governors in six central and northern provinces where party claimed it won 2014 elections. Delegations suspended talks late month until 12 Sept having failed to agree ceasefire. Renamo continued attacks on civilians and police in Tete, Sofala, Manica, Zambezia and Niassa provinces including freeing 23 prisoners in Morrumbala, Zambezia 12 Aug; killing six at Nangue, Sofala 12 Aug; and wounding four in ambush between Vanduzi and Luenha river, Manica 22 Aug. Zambia President Lungu won another five-year term in 11 Aug elections with 50.35% of vote; Hakainde Hichilema of United Party for National Development (UPND) came second with 47.67%. Hichilema 19 Aug filed court petition challenging result claiming vote rigged, denied by ruling party and electoral commission. Police 16 Aug said it had arrested 133 people protesting against Lungu’s re-election for destroying property; govt late month shut down three private broadcasters. Zimbabwe Clashes between anti-govt protestors and police intensified as opposition parties joined forces. Police 3 and 17 Aug broke up anti-govt protests in Harare using batons, tear gas and water cannon. Main opposition leaders Morgan Tsvangirai and ex-Deputy President Joice Mujuru held joint rally 13 Aug, called for protest in Harare 26 Aug to demand electoral reforms before 2018 vote. Police 26 Aug fired tear gas and water cannon at opposition leaders and hundreds of demonstrators sparking running battles between protestors and police in large parts of Harare, at least 50 people injured; police arrested 68 people for public violence including burning buses, police vehicles and shops. Opposition call for protest strike 31 Aug not heeded in Harare, minor clashes broke out in second city Bulawayo. Burkina Faso Koglweogo civilian self-defence group members 6 Aug demanded govt free members arrested following late June clashes with youths in Zongo near Ouagadougou. Koglweogo member arrested for murder in Koulpelogo province (centre-east) 23 Aug. Koglweogo 27 Aug handed over to security forces 130 weapons they had seized. Côte d’Ivoire Following 22 July National Assembly vote in favour of constitutional referendum, President Ouattara 7 Aug said proposed new constitution will include creation of VP position and senate; opposition reiterated rejection of referendum process and proposed amendments. Voter rolls displayed 20-27 Aug in preparation for Sept/Oct referendum and Nov/Dec parliamentary elections. Antoinette Rouissa Mého, opposition party Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) member and defence witness for former President Gbagbo and his wife Simone, arrested 10 Aug, indicted 17 Aug for crimes including breach of state security. Gambia Govt crackdown on dissent continued: Tina Faal, opposition Gambia Democratic Progress party member, arrested 8 Aug. Solo Krummah, opposition United Democratic Party official detained since arrest in May, admitted to hospital 8 Aug under guard and died after operation 20 Aug, party said govt did not explain why he needed operation; Krummah second party member to die in custody since May; U.S. 22 Aug called for independent investigation. Guinea Estimated half a million people took part in largely peaceful opposition rally in Conakry 16 Aug; police reportedly shot dead one onlooker. Opposition party Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) MP Ousmane Gaoual Diallo 12 Aug received two-year suspended prison sentence for insulting President Condé. Guinea-Bissau Amid ongoing parliamentary standoff, ECOWAS Commission chair Marcel Alain de Souza and new ECOWAS representative in G-B Blaise Diplo met PM Djá, President Vaz and main political leaders 14-15 Aug in effort to restart political dialogue, said regional bloc’s mission (ECOMIB), deployed since 2012, will withdraw, citing high costs and pressure from African heads of state. Mali After significant deterioration in security late July, rival Tuareg armed groups clashed again in Kidal region and suspected jihadist groups continued attacks in north and centre. Ethnic Imghad Self-Defence Group of Imrad Tuareg and Allies (GATIA), member of pro-unity Platform coalition, 8 Aug clashed with ethnic Ifoghas High Council for Unity of Azawad (HCUA), member of main rebel alliance Coalition of Azawad Movements (CMA); informal talks between parties in Bamako failed to reach agreement. Unidentified armed men attacked two army convoys near Tenenkou, Mopti region 8 Aug killing at least five soldiers; forced gendarmes to evacuate position in Nantaga, Mopti region 19 Aug; attacked Gathi Loumo, Mopti region, burning city hall 21 Aug; same day attacked security forces on Gossi-Hombori axis in Timbuktu region. One MINUSMA peacekeeper killed when vehicle hit mine 7 Aug in Kidal region. Inter-ethnic clashes left five dead near Tenenkou, Mopti region 27 Aug. Arrest of radio presenter Mohamed Youssouf Bathily or “Ras Bath” in Bamako 16 Aug for criticising govt sparked riots, police killed demonstrator; Ras Bath released 18 Aug but judicial process ongoing. Former Ansar Dine member Almed al-Faqi al-Mahdi appeared before International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands 22 Aug charged with destruction of mausoleums in Timbuktu. Niger Alleged Boko Haram attack at Kimégana, Diffa region (SE) 15 Aug killed at least five, injured one. Opposition party National Movement for Development of Society-Nassara mid-Aug decided to join ruling majority, responding to President Issoufou’s call to form unity govt. Nigeria Military continued offensive against Boko Haram (BH) in NE of Borno state, vandalism eased in Niger Delta, communal and religious violence flared in several areas. Islamic State 3 Aug named Abu Musab al-Barnawi new BH leader, replacing Abubakar Shekau, who rejected appointment. Army said it killed sixteen insurgents 14 Aug repelling BH attack in Kangarwa; air force said it killed some 300 insurgents including three key commanders 19 Aug. BH attacked Kuburubu 20 Aug killing six and abducting thirteen; next day burnt down Shawa village near Chibok. BH 14 Aug released video showing some 50 of over 200 girls abducted in Chibok in 2014, demanding govt free captured fighters in exchange for their release; President Buhari 28 Aug said govt ready to negotiate. In Niger Delta, attacks on oil installations declined relative to July. Unidentified gunmen 7 Aug killed three soldiers in Nembe area, Bayelsa state. New armed group Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate claimed three attacks on oil pipelines in Delta state 18, 19 and 30 Aug. Niger Delta Avengers and other groups late Aug suspended attacks, laid out conditions for talks. Herder-farmer clashes continued: suspected herders killed 30 in Kodomun, Adamawa state 29 July-1 Aug; killed two in Ndiagu Attakwu, Enugu state 25 Aug. Communal and religious violence flared in five other states killing at least 47: unidentified gunmen killed eleven near Godogodo, Kaduna state 2 Aug; at least five killed in clash between Share and Tsaragi communities in Kwara state same day; ten soldiers, seven civilians killed in clash between military and civilians in Kpaidna, Niger state 4 Aug; at least six killed in clash between ethnic Igbo indigenes and Hausa residents in Akokwa, Imo state 11 Aug; mob 22 Aug burnt eight to death over alleged blasphemy against Islam in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara state. Military launched operations against armed groups in Benue and Bauchi states 6 and 20 Aug, and in Niger Delta 29 Aug. Asia China (internal) People’s Liberation Army Daily 16 Aug reported govt tested 21 new pieces of “security equipment” including drones and assault helicopters in five-day counter-terrorism exercise in S Xinjiang. Xinjiang regional govt 5 Aug passed new counter-terrorism law prohibiting spread of “distorted Islamic ideas”. China/Japan Tensions escalated as Japan protested increasing Chinese activities in disputed East China Sea (ECS). Japan defence ministry 2 Aug released annual defence white paper; reported interception of record high of 571 Chinese aircrafts in 2015 fiscal year; also cited “deep concern” over Chinese maritime assertiveness. China responded accusing Japan of distorting China’s “justified and reasonable defence work” and “attempting to deceive” international community. Tokyo lodged series of complaints to Chinese ambassador throughout month on Chinese activities in disputed waters in ECS: Japanese FM said Chinese Coast Guard vessels had entered contiguous zone around Senkaku/Diaoyu; Japan Coast Guard 6 Aug said some 230 Chinese fishing vessels had entered contested waters in ECS since 5 Aug, escorted by Chinese Coast Guard; Japan’s Kyodo News 7 Aug reported a record thirteen Chinese Coast Guard vessels sighted in contested waters since 5 Aug. Tokyo 5 Aug issued protest against China’s installation of first radar unit on offshore gas platform near disputed waters in ECS. Group of Japanese cabinet members and political leaders 15 Aug visited controversial Yasukuni Shrine to commemorate anniversary of Japan’s WWII surrender; China condemned visit, urged Japan to “face up to and reflect upon the history of aggression”. Japanese and Chinese FMs 24 Aug met in Tokyo, agreed to “make efforts” to resolve disputes and build “good atmosphere” for talks between President Xi and PM Abe at Sept G20 Summit in Hangzhou. Korean Peninsula DPRK 3 Aug test-launched ballistic missile into Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off coast of N Japan; PM Abe called test “serious threat” to Japan. U.S. Strategic Command and ROK military said second missile was fired simultaneously, exploding immediately after launch. DPRK 24 Aug test-fired third missile from waters off NE coast; reportedly first instance of DPRK missile landing in Japan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ), prompting further condemnation from Japan; ROK FM said ROK prepared to “thoroughly respond” to any provocation from DPRK. UNSC 26 Aug issued unanimous statement condemning DPRK’s missile launches. In first ever response to foreign media inquiries, Pyongyang 17 Aug confirmed resumption of plutonium production in interview with Japan’s Kyodo News. U.S. responded same day, calling DPRK’s plutonium production “clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions”, urged DPRK to cease uranium enrichment. Following 24 Aug trilateral meeting in Tokyo, FMs of China, Japan and ROK urged DPRK “to exercise self-restraint regarding its provocative action, and to observe the UN Security Council's resolutions”. ROK unification ministry 17 Aug confirmed defection of DPRK deputy ambassador to London, Thae Yong Ho, to South Korea, reportedly most senior DPRK official to defect since 1997; 31 Aug reported that DPRK had executed high ranking Minister Kim Yong-jin and banished two others for re-education in July. Afghanistan Taliban 10 Aug captured four strategic districts surrounding Helmand provincial capital Lashkar Gah; Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) prevented capture of city. Taliban 14 Aug captured Dahan-e-Ghori district, Baghlan province; 20 Aug temporarily captured Khanabad district, Kunduz. After five days of fighting, Taliban 26 Aug reportedly took control of Janikhail district, Paktia province. Hizb-e-Islami representative Ghairat Baheer 6 Aug said peace talks with Kabul govt expected to resume shortly. Unidentified militants 24 Aug attacked American University in Kabul, killing at least thirteen, mostly students. President’s office reportedly said National Directorate of Security (NDS) had “reliable evidence” attack was coordinated from Pakistan; President Ghani 25 Aug asked Pakistani Army Chief General Raheel Sharif to take action against culprits in Pakistan. Ahead of end of National Unity Government’s (NUG) two-year arrangement in Sept, oppositions groups reportedly criticised NUG for failure to deliver on key reforms. CEO Abdullah Abdullah 11 Aug denounced Ghani as unfit to govern, intensifying inter-factional tensions. Abdullah 8 Aug said NUG had developed roadmap for electoral reforms; President Ghani’s press office 15 Aug said finalised electoral law amendments would be sent to cabinet for approval. Bangladesh Govt crackdown on suspected jihadists including those responsible for July Gulshan and Sholakia attacks continued. Security forces 27 Aug killed three alleged militants in Dhaka, including Bangladeshi-Canadian, Tamim Ahmed Chowdhury, accused of masterminding Gulshan attack. Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) 4 Aug killed two alleged militants in Mymensingh district, reportedly linked to 7 July Sholakia attack. Law enforcement arrested at least ten alleged Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JMB) operatives throughout month, including five reportedly arrested with explosives and detonators 11 Aug. Police 5-6 Aug detained at least eighteen suspected jihadists in four different districts, including fourteen Jamaat-e-Islami leaders and activists allegedly possessing jihadist propaganda. Police 4 Aug detained Bangladeshi-UK national Hasnat Karim and Bangladeshi Canadian permanent resident Tahmid Hasib, both present at café during attacks, for suspected involvement. Officials 13 Aug said investigation had yielded evidence of Karim’s involvement, Hasib interrogation ongoing. Police 12 Aug said they had identified another “top-level militant organiser” responsible for coordinating attack. Following July announcement of plans for national convention against militancy, Bangladesh National Party (BNP) continued efforts to forge “national unity” against jihadist violence; smaller opposition parties raised objections to participating in platform that would include BNP ally Jamaat-e-Islaami, several of whose members were detained for suspected involvement in attacks. BNP 6 Aug constituted new national executive committee, prompting criticism from PM Sheikh Hasina for inclusion of family members and personal staff of convicted war criminals Salauddin Quader Chowdhury and Abdul Alim. Dhaka court 17 Aug issued arrest warrants for 67 leaders and activists of BNP-led opposition alliance, in connection with Feb 2015 arson case. Two separate Dhaka courts 10 Aug granted BNP chief Khaleda Zia bail in sedition and nine arson cases. International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) 10 Aug sentenced one former Jamaat-e-Islaami lawmaker to death, seven others to life imprisonment for crimes committed during 1971 war. India (non-Kashmir) Suspected Bodo militants 5 Aug opened fire on market in Kokrajhar, Assam, killing at least thirteen civilians; security forces reportedly killed one alleged militant following attack. National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) denied accusations of involvement. Security forces 17 Aug reportedly killed four alleged Maoists in raid in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh. All Bodo Students Union (ABSU), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and People’s Joint Action Committee for Bodoland Movement 25 Aug said they would relaunch non-violent agitation for separate statehood, claiming that despite promises of talks, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) govt was “neglecting and ignoring” them. Kashmir Tensions between India and Pakistan rose as clashes between Indian police and protesters continued in wake of Indian security forces’ 8 July killing of Hizbul Mujahideen leader Burhan Wani. At least five people reportedly killed 15 Aug in clash with police following India Independence day protests in Srinagar. Alleged militants 17 Aug killed one police officer, two soldiers following police ambush. Fresh protests erupted in several parts of Kashmir including Srinagar after Indian authorities 29 Aug lifted 52-day curfew in most of Kashmir; parts of Srinagar remained under lockdown. Security forces 31 Aug reportedly fired at protesters in Nadihal village, killing one and bringing civilian death toll to at least 69 since protests broke out in July. Protesters 3 Aug staged sit-in in Pakistan-administered Kashmir after Pakistan security forces blocked aid convoy of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD – the renamed Laskhkar-e-Tayyaba, LeT) activists reportedly attempting to cross LoC with food and medical supplies. Pakistani Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan 4 Aug accused India of “open terrorism” in Kashmir at South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) ministerial summit in Islamabad. Indian PM Modi 12 Aug accused Pakistan of encouraging “cross-border terrorism” in Kashmir. Pakistan foreign secretary 15 Aug extended formal invitation to New Delhi for dialogue on Kashmir, Indian govt said talks should focus on cross-border terrorism; rejected Pakistan’s “self-serving allegations” of misconduct in Kashmir. UN human rights chief 17 Aug released statement requesting “full and unhindered access” to population affected by violence in Pakistan and India-administered Kashmir in order to investigate alleged human rights violations. Nepal CPN (Maoist Centre) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal elected prime minister 3 Aug; joined by Nepali Congress (NC) in new ruling coalition with UML in opposition. Dahal claimed addressing demands of dissenting Madhesi, Tharu, and Janajati groups and broadening buy-in for new constitution among govt’s top priorities. CPN(MC) and NC 2 Aug signed three-point deal with alliance of Madhesi and Janajati parties agreeing to compensate families of those killed during constitution-related protests in southern Tarai plains, and to register constitutional amendment in parliament to address demands on federal boundaries and inclusion. In exchange, alliance supported Dahal’s nomination for PM. Deputy PM Bimalendra Nidhi visited New Delhi 18-23 Aug, met with Indian PM Modi and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj; visit underscored Dahal govt’s efforts to repair ties with India following difficult relations during KP Oli-led regime. Transitional justice mechanisms on truth and reconciliation and disappearances completed their case-registration period 10 Aug, have until Feb 2017 to investigate over 60,000 registered cases. Truth and Reconciliation Commission Chairperson Surya Kiran Gurung 30 Aug threatened to resign if transitional justice-related legislation was not amended in accordance with international standards, criticised govt for lack of cooperation. Pakistan In largest attack since March Lahore bombing, suicide bomb at Quetta Civil hospital 8 Aug killed over 70 people, mostly lawyers gathered at hospital to mourn 7 Aug killing of Balochistan Bar Association President Bilal Anwar Kasi; reportedly country’s worst attack ever targeting civil society. Pakistan Bar Council 9 Aug called for nationwide strike by lawyers demanding additional security; strikes and protests by lawyers continued throughout month. Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) faction Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Islamic State (IS) both claimed responsibility for attack; Balochistan chief minister accused Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of coordinating attack. Military also suggested Indian involvement, calling attack “attempt to undermine CPEC [China Pakistan Economic Corridor]”, PM Sharif 8 Aug echoed concerns that “enemies of Pakistan are after CPEC”. No concrete evidence of RAW involvement found. Sindh Chief Minister Murad Ali Shah 1 Aug authorised extension of Rangers’ policing authority for another 90 days, limited to Karachi. Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) leaders 6 Aug concluded two-day hunger strike, criticised Rangers’ continued detention of party’s mayoral candidate Waseem Akhtar. MQM worker Mohammad Waheed died 7 Aug allegedly from torture sustained during imprisonment Chief Minister Shah 18 Aug ordered release of six MQM activists, reportedly warning Rangers against detaining innocent people. Civilian and military leadership 11 Aug agreed to establish “high-level task force” to oversee implementation of 2015 National Action Plan (NAP) on terrorism; General Raheel Sharif 12 Aug said lack of progress on NAP was “affecting the consolidation phase” of Operation Zarb-i-Azb in N Waziristan. PM Sharif 15 Aug approved creation of additional Frontier Corps units in KPK to manage cross-border security. Military 16 Aug launched Operation Khyber-3 in Rajgal Valley near Pakistan-Afghanistan border; Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) 22 Aug said security forces had killed 40 militants, destroyed 43 hideouts since launch. U.S. Congress 3 Aug rejected release of $300m in Coalition Support Funds (CSF) reimbursements to Pakistani military after U.S. Sec Defense Ashton Carter declined to certify that Pakistan had taken “sufficient action” against Haqqani Network. Sri Lanka Parliament 11 Aug passed bill on establishment of Office of Missing Persons (OMP) to investigate cases of enforced disappearance. Civil society activists criticised govt for absence of formal consultations with victims of conflict; families of missing persons 18 Aug staged protest in north demanding OMP be based in conflict-affected areas. Govt responded to protests confirming OMP local offices would be set up in conflict-affected parts of N and E. Zonal Task Forces (ZTF) comprised of local civil society organisations held public consultations on transitional justice across country during month; some participants in N and E reported intimidation and threats from military, one man allegedly tortured for testifying to ZTF in NW town Mannar. Govt pledged additional security to participants. Tamil National Alliance (TNA) politicians, including Northern Provincial Council (NPC) chief minister, claim that 107 former LTTE cadres had died from possible poisoning in govt rehabilitation centres. State Minister of Defence Ruwan Wijewardene criticised Tamil politicians for falsely accusing military, while cabinet spokesperson 10 Aug said govt would investigate allegations. In 15-16 Aug meeting in Geneva, UN Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination urged Sri Lanka to improve protection of ethnic and religious minorities following reports of continuing human rights violations against Muslims and Tamils of Indian origin. UNSG Ban began three-day visit 31 Aug. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, former defence secretary and brother of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, charged with corruption 31 Aug over alleged illegal transfer of state-owned weapons. Indonesia Police 5 Aug arrested 6 suspected militants, allegedly planning rocket attack on Singapore’s Marina Bay from Batam Island, Indonesia. Officials reportedly identified suspects as members of Katibah Gigih Rahmat (KGR) network with possible ties to Islamic State (IS). Myanmar Four-day Panglong-21 peace conference began 31 Aug between govt and armed groups, including UNFC alliance of armed groups; UNSG Ban gave opening address. Negotiations to include three smaller, previously excluded groups unsuccessful and they did not attend. Armed clashes between Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and govt forces took place near group’s Laiza HQ 7 Aug, while KIO front-line posts were reportedly shelled 18 Aug. Followed clashes in Kachin State’s Hpakant and Tanai townships starting 8 Aug; Hpakant fighting reportedly began with KIO ambush of police convoy. Govt 23 Aug appointed high-profile joint national-international Advisory Commission to find “lasting solutions” to “complex and delicate issues” in Rakhine State, where first phase of revamped citizenship verification process – issuance of “national verification cards” that can later be used to initiate citizenship claims – continues to proceed slowly due to low interest/resistance from Muslim communities. Commission to be chaired by former UNSG Kofi Annan; international members include former special advisor to UNSG Ghassan Salame, national members include Buddhists and Muslims, but no Muslims from Rakhine State. Aung San Suu Kyi visited China 17-21 Aug, met with Premier Li and President Xi, discussed major Chinese projects including Myitsone Dam, Chinese support for Myanmar peace process. Philippines Govt and communist rebel group National Democratic Front (NDFP), which includes the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People’s Army (NPA) insurgent group, resumed peace talks in Oslo 22-27 Aug, first meetings since negotiations to resolve 47-year-long conflict were suspended in 2012. Parties 21 Aug agreed ceasefire for duration of talks, 26 Aug extended ceasefire indefinitely and agreed to continue negotiations 8-12 Oct. Govt and MILF negotiators conducting peace talks in Malaysia 13-14 Aug signed joint statement agreeing to increase membership of newly reconstituted Bangsamoro Transition Committee (BTC) from previous fifteen to 21 members, including new representatives from Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and indigenous communities. Meetings reportedly focused on developing more inclusive implementation plan for peace roadmap, including plans to draft new version of Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), which President Duterte hopes to implement as part of country’s move toward federalism. In lead-up to talks, presidential peace adviser Jesus Dureza 4 Aug said negotiations complete, committee now entering implementation phase of new peace roadmap approved by Duterte 18 July. MILF chair Al Haj Murad Ebrahim 13 Aug said MILF has “new solidified relationship” with new administration, hopes to see “final closure” to Mindanao conflict. Duterte announced crackdown on Abu Sayyaf group after it beheaded teenage hostage 24 Aug; over 1,200 military troops reportedly raided several areas of Sulu province 26-29 Aug, killing at least 21 alleged Abu Sayyaf militants including one commander. Abu Sayyaf reportedly kidnapped at least three other hostages in Sulu province during month. Army spokesman 29 Aug reported twelve soldiers killed in clash with Abu Sayyaf in Patikul, Sulu. Philippine National Police (PNP) chief Ronald dela Rosa 23 Aug said over 1,900 people had been killed since 1 July in Duterte’s “War on Drugs” crackdown; police claimed responsibility for approximately 900 deaths. UN 18 Aug condemned crackdown and extrajudicial killings. South China Sea Following contentious July arbitration ruling by Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, Philippine Special Envoy to China Fidel Ramos 10-11 Aug met informally with Fu Ying, chairperson of Foreign Affairs Committee of China’s National People’s Congress, to “renew” Sino-Philippine relations; joint statement said discussion focused on trust building and opportunities for cooperation. Philippine President Duterte 23 Aug said talks on territorial dispute with China expected to start this year. At 13th Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) on implementation of 2002 Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea, 15-16 Aug in Inner Mongolia, Chinese and ASEAN officials agreed on guidelines for senior diplomat’s hotline for emergencies at sea and joint statement on Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), to be discussed at China-ASEAN Summit in Sept; also set first formal timeline for binding Code of Conduct (COC) in SCS, with framework to be complete by mid-2017. U.S. think-tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 9 Aug released satellite photos allegedly showing China’s construction of reinforced hangars on Fiery Cross, Subi Reef and Mischief Reef in disputed Spratly islands; said size and structural features of hangars suggest military purpose. Reuters 18 Aug released report accusing Vietnam of secretly sending mobile rocket launchers to five bases in Spratly islands; Vietnam said report “inaccurate”. Thailand Month saw escalation of separatist violence in Deep South with deadly attacks targeting areas outside traditional conflict zone. Series of IEDs and incendiary devices exploded in seventeen locations across seven provinces of peninsular Thailand 11-12 Aug, killing four people and wounding at least 35; attacks targeted tourist locations including Krabi, Phang-nga, Phuket, Hua Hin. National police chief General Chakthip Chaijinda 21 Aug said bombings were work of New Generation of Malay-Muslim militants. Voters 7 Aug approved draft constitution prepared by National Council for Peace and Order’s (NCPO) drafting committee; Electoral Commission reported 59% turnout, with 61% voting in favour. Voters also approved by 58% second measure allowing Senate to help select PM together with lower house. Result reflected persistent regional divide, with Bangkok and south (except for three southernmost provinces) voting in favour of new charter, most north and NE provinces rejecting it. New constitution enshrines period of “guided democracy” following general election scheduled for late 2017. PM Prayuth Chan-ocha, who has repeatedly denied any ambition to serve as PM after an election, told reporters 17 Aug that he would accept position if no other qualified candidates could be found. Prayuth visited Deep South 25 July to unveil six-year plan to develop agro-industry, sustainable energy, trade with Malaysia. At least 35 small IEDs exploded across three southernmost provinces 6-7 Aug, eve of constitutional referendum, no casualties. Two bombs exploded at hotel in Pattani 24 Aug, one person killed; third Pattani bomb same day caused no casualties. Europe & Central Asia Bosnia And Herzegovina Bosnia’s international partners and Bosniak and Croat parties expressed increasing concern over referendum scheduled for 25 Sept in Serb-majority Republika Srpska (RS) entity on whether to continue to celebrate annual 9 Jan “RS day”, which Constitutional Court (CC) in Nov 2015 ruled was unconstitutional and discriminatory. Kosovo Row erupted over nepotism after media website Insajderi 1 Aug released what it claimed were parts of wire-tapped conversations in late 2011 between high-level ruling Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) party officials, including President Thaci (then PM), showing influence over appointments including senior prosecutors and judges. Further leaked conversations released 4, 5 Aug, prompting protests in Pristina. PDK chief Adem Grabovci resigned 17 Aug; chief prosecutor 26 Aug announced investigation into him. Rocket-propelled grenade fired at parliament 4 Aug; police 30 Aug arrested six members of Self-Determination (Vetevendosje) party, which denied role in attack. Hand grenade thrown at public TV station 22 Aug and in Pristina suburb reportedly targeting head of state broadcaster 28 Aug; no injuries. Opposition MPs again released tear gas in parliament 9 Aug during session scheduling vote on controversial Montenegro border agreement 1 Sept. Several hundred ethnic Albanians staged protest preventing Kosovo Serb pilgrims visiting church in west 28 Aug. Macedonia Four main political parties 31 Aug agreed to hold early parliamentary elections, already postponed twice, on 11 Dec; interim govt to be elected in Sept. Greek FM visited Skopje for meetings to improve communications between Greece and Macedonia, amid ongoing dispute between countries over official name of Macedonia, which has blocked Macedonia’s EU accession progress. Armenia Following July Yerevan hostage crisis and anti-govt protests, President Sargsyan 2 Aug promised to form govt of “national accord”, said it would not include “terrorists and their defenders”. Hundreds continued to protest in Yerevan calling for release of arrested members of Sasna Tsrer, group responsible for hostage-taking. Three opposition Heritage Party figures arrested late July in connection with protests released after Heritage Party 15 Aug pulled out of upcoming local elections. Yerevan police chief sacked early Aug for “failing to prevent violent attacks on protesters and journalists”; over a dozen police reprimanded/suspended. Azerbaijan Prominent opposition movement figure Natig Jafarli arrested 12 Aug on charges of “illegal entrepreneurship and abuse of power”; several activists arrested 13 and 15 Aug on various charges. EU condemned arrests, said debates surrounding constitutional referendum scheduled for 26 Sept should be pluralistic. Govt 16 Aug launched criminal investigation into alleged supporters of Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen, who Turkish govt holds responsible for 15 July failed coup attempt; arrested four Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (AHCP) activists on charges of ties to Gülen. Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) Armenia and Azerbaijan continued to accuse each other of violating ceasefire. Facing domestic opposition over speculation of his govt’s concessions to Azerbaijan (see Armenia), Armenian President Sargsyan 1 Aug asserted that there would be “no unilateral concessions” in N-K peace process. Russian President Putin 8 Aug met with Azerbaijani and Iranian presidents, 10 Aug with Armenian president, with talks focused among others on N-K settlement. Russia/North Caucasus Four suspected militants killed during counter-terrorism operations in Botlikh district, W Dagestan 11 Aug; judge murdered in Shamil district 11 Aug, two police killed near Izberbash city 12 Aug. Russian special forces 17 Aug killed four militants in St Petersburg counter-terrorism operation reportedly targeting N Caucasus militant leaders suspected of responsibility for terrorist attacks. Two Chechen men same day attacked police in Moscow region with axes, injuring two; both attackers killed. Islamic State (IS) 18 Aug claimed men were IS supporters, marking first known declaration of IS attack in Russia outside N Caucasus, according to Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs. Russian National Guard service 23 Aug reported it had destroyed fifteen terrorist facilities over previous week during more than 120 special operations, seized small arms and ammunition, detained over 12,000 citizens including for public order breaches. Human Rights Watch report 30 Aug accused Chechen authorities of crackdown on critics ahead of 18 Sept parliamentary and regional elections in which republic head Ramzan Kadyrov is running for office as governor of Chechnya. Ukraine Tensions increased between Kyiv and Moscow after Russian security forces in Crimea 10 Aug reported clash with alleged groups of Ukrainian state saboteurs planning attack on infrastructure; two elite Russian troops reported killed, seven alleged Ukrainian saboteurs captured. Russia accused Ukraine of state terrorism, PM Medvedev suggested severing diplomatic relations; President Putin said that in current situation Normandy Group consultations are “senseless”. However later in month Kremlin confirmed Putin would meet his French and German Normandy counterparts as planned early Sept, and Putin made clear he would not cut relations with Kyiv. Ukrainian President Poroshenko 17 Aug said he did not exclude possibility of military mobilisation in Ukraine if situation in eastern Ukraine deteriorated following Crimea incident, which he called fabricated. Russia announced major military exercises, including near Ukrainian border and around Crimean peninsula 25-31 Aug. Elsewhere clashes continued between Ukrainian forces and separatists with daily exchanges of small arms and heavy artillery fire, focused around heavily populated Zaitseve, Avdiivka and Mariinka in Donetsk region. Discussions in the Minsk format showed modest progress as Minsk Tripartite working group 26 Aug called for indefinite ceasefire on front line with Donbas starting 1 Sept. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 29 Aug announced release of thirteen civilians from Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)-run secret detention centre in Kharkiv who had allegedly been abducted and tortured. Luhansk and Donetsk separatist leaders Igor Plotnitsky and Alexander Zakharchenko both survived alleged assassination attempts during month. IMF again delayed release of third $1.7bn loan tranche as Kyiv lagged in reform efforts. Cyprus Weekly meetings between Turkish Cypriot leader Akıncı and Greek Cypriot leader Anastasiades continued, with new round of seven meetings initiated 23 Aug. Akıncı late July reported significant steps have been taken in economy, EU, property, governance and power-sharing. Turkish Cypriot media early Aug reported disagreements between Akıncı and northern Cypriot PM Ozgürgün on conduct of talks after Ozgürgün publicly criticised Akıncı, accused him of being weak. Turkey Month saw major terrorist attack in SE, assumed to be work of Islamic State (IS), and launch of major cross-border ground offensive against IS positions in N Syria. Bomb attack on Kurdish wedding in Gaziantep province in SE 20 Aug killed 56, mostly children, and injured more than 90; came as govt continued domestic crackdown on IS-linked individuals, with scores detained during month suspected of preparing attacks, recruiting for IS. Turkish policy on Syria continued to shift: President Erdoğan 9 Aug met with Russian President Putin for first time since Turkey’s downing of Russian jet in Nov 2015, reportedly discussed coordinating on Syria. Military 24 Aug began air and ground offensive “Euphrates Shield” on IS positions near Jarablus in N Syria, with Turkey-backed Syrian rebels taking control of town same day. Amid concern over recent U.S.-backed Syrian Kurdish YPG gains in N Syria, Turkish shelling also targeted some YPG positions (see Syria). PM Binali Yıldırım 20 Aug stated that President Bashar al-Assad could remain in power for transitional period. Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Govt President Barzani visited Ankara on 23 Aug for high-level talks. U.S. VP Joe Biden visited Ankara 24 Aug, expressed support for Turkish operations targeting IS in Jarablus. Ankara continued to press U.S. on extradition of Fethullah Gülen. PKK further escalated fight against Turkish security forces with intensification of IED attacks in Aug, two-fold increase in deaths of security forces compared to July. Violence continued to be concentrated in rural areas, mostly targeting police and military posts. 64 state security force members, at least 51 PKK/PKK-affiliated militants, and eighteen civilians killed during month; attacks included vehicle-borne IED targeting police station in SE Elazığ province 18 Aug, killing three police and injuring over 200 including at least 60 civilians. Another vehicle-borne IED attack on police checkpoint in Şırnak’s Cizre district 26 Aug killed eleven police, wounded 78. Senior PKK figure 8 Aug warned group will “spread its war to the cities”. Ankara continued to restructure state institutions and remove individuals thought to be linked to Gülen network (state-christened FETÖ/PDY) it blames for July failed coup; some 80,000 public officials reported to have been suspended since coup attempt. Govt 31 July closed all military academies, land, air and ground commands that were subordinated to defence minister. Kazakhstan Visiting Turkey 5 Aug, President Nazarbayev said Kazakhstan would extradite anyone who has “terrorist connections” with Fethullah Gülen, cleric blamed by Ankara for coup; also said schools financed by Gülen would be inspected. Govt 18 Aug extended until 2021 moratorium on selling and renting of land to foreigners, introduced May following April/May protests in major cities. Head of journalists’ union and chair of National Press Club put on trial on corruption charges 23 Aug; rights organisations claim charges politically motivated. Authorities 22 Aug announced arrest of four suspected members of radical group allegedly plotting terrorist attacks; 26 Aug announced arrest of Russian citizen suspected of recruiting for Islamic State (IS); Committee for National Security (KNB) 31 Aug announced detention of 21 alleged Islamic militants. Three more police died early Aug from injuries sustained during 18 July attack in Almaty, bringing total killed to nine. Five Central Asian FMs met with U.S. Sec State Kerry in Washington DC 3 Aug under multilateral C5+1 format; discussed security, economic integration, counter-terrorism, climate change. Kyrgyzstan President Atambayev 28 July controversially proposed amending constitution; draft of amendments to be put to referendum published 29 July, despite 2010 moratorium prohibiting any change to constitution until 2020. Amendments officially intended to expand powers of executive and legislative branches, particularly PM, and advance judicial reform. Proposals include introduction of “Supreme Values of the Kyrgyz Republic” to tackle foreign ideological influences; requirement for judges to permit auditing of their telecommunications; prioritisation of Supreme Court decisions over international agreements; and permission for special parliamentary disciplinary committees to dismiss Supreme Court and local judges. President Atambayev 31 July denied intention to become PM after his term ends in 2017. Amendments have support of four parliamentary parties, however several high-profile political figures publicly criticised them; Atambayev delivered Independence Day speech 31 Aug denouncing critics. Chinese embassy struck by alleged suicide car bomber 30 Aug, killing attacker, wounding three Kyrgyz employees; Atambayev ordered govt to step up counter-terrorism measures, China to assist with investigation. Five Central Asian FMs met with U.S. Sec State Kerry in Washington DC 3 Aug under multilateral C5+1 format (see Kazakhstan). Tajikistan Tajikistan 3 Aug joined China-led counter-terrorist alliance together with Afghanistan and Pakistan, Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism. Concerns about border security increased after Taliban in Afghanistan recaptured territory close to border. Afghan National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar 10 Aug discussed regional and border security issues with Tajik govt in Dushanbe. General prosecutor 4 Aug called for restoration of death penalty for those convicted of terrorism or attempting military coups; some 170 alleged supporters of former Deputy Defence Minister Abduhalim Nazarzoda, accused of coup attempt in Sept 2015, still detained. Govt issued decree giving it right to “regulate and control the content of all television and radio networks”. Five Central Asian FMs met with U.S. Sec State Kerry in Washington DC 3 Aug under multilateral C5+1 format (see Kazakhstan). Turkmenistan Amid shortage of foreign currency, Central Bank 25 July introduced tight restrictions on currency conversion; independent Turkmen media outlets (reporting from outside country) report citizens stockpiling food. Five Central Asian FMs met with U.S. Sec State Kerry in Washington DC 3 Aug under multilateral C5+1 format (see Kazakhstan). President Berdymukhamedov visited Germany 29 Aug, first visit since 2008; said country was working on constitution reform, will introduce human rights ombudsman; is looking into new gas export routes. Uzbekistan Govt 28 Aug reported long-serving President Karimov, 78 years old and rumoured to be seriously ill, had been hospitalised. Amid growing speculation over his state of health, Karimov’s youngest daughter Lola 31 Aug reported he was recovering from a brain hemorrhage. Tensions increased with Kyrgyzstan after Uzbekistan 22 Aug detained four Kygyz nationals in disputed border area. Five Central Asian FMs met with U.S. Sec State Kerry in Washington DC 3 Aug under multilateral C5+1 format (see Kazakhstan). Latin America & Caribbean Colombia Govt and FARC 24 Aug signed “final, full and definitive” peace accord ending more than five decades of conflict, culmination of four years of talks; includes measures aiming to deal with conflict causes, including comprehensive rural reform, reforms to drug policy and coca crop substitution; truth commission and special judicial apparatus to provide redress for victims; reintegration of FARC into Colombian political system and of its fighters into civilian life. FARC to contest 2018 congressional elections, will be guaranteed ten seats in legislature. Ceasefire came into effect 29 Aug. President Santos announced plebiscite on agreement will take place 2 Oct. Opinion polls regarding plebiscite displayed contradictory results, with some showing high likelihood of defeat for peace deal; opposition 3 Aug announced it would carrying out “no” campaign rather than promote abstention. Six-month weapons abandonment process to begin following official signing of agreement late Sept. Joint groups of delegates from govt, FARC and UN verification mission 9-23 Aug carried out technical visits to 30 villages to verify they could be adapted for use as cantonment sites for FARC guerrillas. ELN guerrilla group stepped up violence: 16 Aug kidnapped four rice growers in eastern province Arauca; President Santos stated group was holding hostages in Venezuela. ELN also killed alleged rapist in small town in north 16 Aug. Clashes between ELN and Clan Úsuga drug trafficking group displaced over 170 people in west; ELN threats displaced several families in north-central Colombia; combat between armed forces and guerrilla groups, believed to be ELN and EPL (Popular Liberation Army, small regional former guerrilla group mainly dedicated to drug trafficking), displaced nearly 1,000 in NE. ELN criticised govt-FARC peace agreements for maintaining “violent, exclusionary, unequal, unjust and predatory [govt] regime”. ELN also stated it supports FARC decision for peace but maintains its “right to rebellion”. Venezuela National Electoral Council (CNE) 9 Aug presented timetable for recall referendum against President Maduro, specifying that signature gathering for referendum will take place late Oct. Timetable would likely push potential poll (to be held only if 20% of electorate sign petition) to no earlier than Feb 2017 – too late to trigger new elections, instead allowing ruling party to replace Maduro until his term ends in 2019. Opposition alliance MUD immediately called for major protest march in Caracas 1 Sept. Organization of American States (OAS) Sec Gen Luis Almagro backed opposition, 22 Aug made public letter to imprisoned opposition leader Leopoldo López declaring recent events “end of democracy” and “termination of rule of law” in Venezuela. Maduro 18 Aug warned of harsh response to any “attempted coup”. Ahead of 1 Sept planned protest interior ministry 28 Aug returned opposition leader Daniel Ceballos to jail. As economic crisis continued to intensify, IMF late July predicted Venezuela will be world’s worst performing country of 2016, with economy likely to shrink up to 10%, inflation to reach 700% by year’s end. UNSG Ban early Aug called situation in Venezuela “humanitarian crisis”; Venezuela’s ambassador to UN denied. Colombia and Venezuela 13 Aug officially reopened five pedestrian border crossings, sealed for over a year, for 15 hours a day; over 150,000 Venezuelans reportedly crossed border first weekend, stocking up on food, medicines. Guatemala Amid mounting tensions over perceived undue influence of former military officers on govt of President Morales, El Periódico newspaper 16 Aug reported accusations of illegal surveillance operation managed by President’s security office; plot allegedly controlled by group of former military officers serving as close advisors to president. Cases against corruption continued. High-risk court judge Miguel Ángel Gálvez 29 July indicted 53 of 57 suspects in “Co-optation of the State” case, including former President Otto Pérez and former VP Roxana Baldetti, plus members of political and business elites; accused will face charges of illicit association, illicit electoral financing, bribery, money laundering. Supreme Court (CSJ) 18 Aug lifted Congressman Luis Rabbé’s immunity, opening possibility for prosecutors to investigate him on allegations of irregular contracts during his period as president of Congress; Rabbé subsequently absconded. President Morales agreed with El Salvador and Honduras counterparts to launch new force to combat criminal gangs and drug traffickers. Haiti Ahead of first round of repeat presidential elections set for 9 Oct, Organization of American States (OAS) 2 Aug stated it will again serve as electoral observer, but issued list of recommendations to reform election process ahead of polls including more training for poll workers to identify irregularities, changing indelible ink used to identify who has voted. 9 Oct ballot to feature 27 candidates for president plus candidates for legislative seats; campaigning opened 23 Aug. Election funding remained uncertain, with President Privert reportedly reaching out to private sector to raise $55m budget announced 17 Aug. Leaked UN report appeared to confirm organisation’s responsibility for 2010 cholera outbreak which killed over 10,000 people, believed to have originated with contingent of peacekeepers from Nepal. Mexico Human Rights Commission (CNDH) 18 Aug published report holding Federal Police, attorney general’s office and Michoacán state’s attorney general’s office accountable for violating human rights of scores of alleged criminals during May 2015 confrontation between govt forces and purported members of Jalisco New Generation Cartel; said 22 out of 42 dead civilians were victims of extrajudicial executions, announced it will pursue criminal and administrative actions against those responsible. Chief of police sacked 29 Aug to allow “transparent investigation”. Suspected Sinaloa cartel operator and son of prominent drug kingpin Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, Jesús Alfredo Guzmán Salazar, kidnapped 15 Aug in Puerto Vallarta along with five others by armed group allegedly belonging to rival Jalisco New Generation Cartel, prompting concerns over increasing power of New Generation, renewed drug trafficking-related violence. New scandal revealing possible conflict of interest involving first lady’s use of $2.05m luxury apartment in Florida owned by potential govt contractor interested in running Mexico’s ports; President Peña Nieto denies any wrongdoing on his or his wife’s part. His approval ratings slid to 23%, lowest level yet. Free speech group Article 19 issued report showing 2016 already deadliest year for journalists in Mexico since 2010, eight killed during first six months including three in Veracruz. National statistics agency announced 2.6% increase in homicides from 20,010 in 2014 to 20,525 in 2015, first rise in four years. Paraguay Armed group 27 Aug reportedly killed eight soldiers in roadside attack in Arroyito, N Paraguay. Interior minister said small Marxist group Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP) believed to be responsible; president vowed to “personally lead the fight against these terrorists”. Middle East & North Africa Israel/Palestine After a lull, month saw attempted stabbings and other attacks resume, including 24 Aug incident in which Israeli soldier shot Palestinian assailant dead; also Israeli raids in West Bank, dozens injured and one killed during raid in Fawwar refugee camp 17 Aug, while Israeli soldiers killed reportedly unarmed Palestinian near Ramallah in West Bank 26 Aug. Israel 21-22 Aug launched some 50 strikes on targets in Gaza in response to rocket fired from Gaza 21 Aug, claimed by Salafi group Ahfad al-Sahaba and landing in Sderot town causing no injuries. Several Palestinians reported injured in Israeli strikes. Israeli military investigation 24 Aug cleared Israeli army of wrongdoing in incidents in which dozens of civilians were killed during 2014 Gaza war, including shelling of UN school; Palestinian officials urged International Criminal Court to act. With preparations underway for Palestinian municipal elections scheduled 8 Oct, Hamas and Fatah accused each other of obstructing one another’s campaigns. West Bank saw worsening water shortages. Egyptian President Sisi 23 Aug said Russia’s President Putin has offered to host Israeli-Palestinian summit to find a solution; Israel reiterated it is ready for talks without preconditions, Palestinian officials remained firm on demands for talks. No date set yet for France’s proposed international peace conference to convene sides for talks before end of 2016; meeting between FMs to discuss peace process reportedly scheduled for sidelines of UNGA in Sept. Israel reportedly approved 464 new homes in Jewish settlements in W Bank 30 Aug. Likud MP David Amsalem proposed law that would prevent any future criminal investigation into PM Netanyahu while he is in office, drawing opposition condemnation. Lebanon Visiting Egyptian FM Sameh Shoukry 16-17 Aug met with counterpart and Lebanese political parties, expressed concern over lack of president and resulting political vacuum and offered support to find compromise. Election of president postponed again early Aug until 7 Sept due to lack of quorum in parliament. One person killed, eleven wounded in bomb attack in Beqaa Valley 31 Aug. Armed forces continued raids of Syrian refugee camps on Beqaa Valley, arresting dozens 22 Aug over suspicious activity, lack of proper identification. U.S. 9 Aug delivered $50m military aid package to help Lebanon fight militant threat from Syria, bringing 2016 total military aid to $220m. Hizbollah early Aug reported it had deployed hundreds of reinforcements to Aleppo to support Syrian regime fighting rebels (see Syria). UNSC 30 Aug extended mandate of UNFIL peacekeeping force in south for another year. Syria Month saw new escalation as Turkey launched major offensive in north, while regime seized an opposition stronghold outside Damascus and battle for Aleppo continued. U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) dominated by Kurdish YPG fighters captured Manbij from IS 6 Aug, capping twelve-week campaign west of Euphrates river. YPG seized some areas of Hasaka in NE from regime forces 23 Aug, expanding their hold within city despite regime’s first ever use of airstrikes against YPG forces. Seeking to remove IS from border area and contain growing YPG control in N Syria, Turkey 23 Aug launched air and ground offensive on Islamic State (IS) positions near Jarablus together with Turkish-backed rebels and U.S. fighter jets; next day took control of city, as operation continued west of city to seize last remaining IS-held territory along border. U.S. said Kurdish forces must retreat from Menbij area to east of Euphrates river, key Turkish demand to which U.S. agreed prior to Manbij campaign. SDF forces linked to YPG clashed with Turkey-backed forces near Jarablus; latter seized several villages from SDF 29 Aug. Battle for Aleppo between Russian-backed govt forces and rebels continued: coalition of rebel groups (including Jabhat Fath al-Sham, formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) 6 Aug broke month-long siege on east Aleppo. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported over 600 civilians killed in Aleppo during month as fighting including further regime and Russian airstrikes continued. UN continued calls for regular 48-hour ceasefire in Aleppo to allow aid delivery; proposed third round of UN-mediated intra-Syrian peace talks previously planned for late Aug deferred. Negotiations continued between Russia and U.S. on restoring cessation of hostilities agreement and initiating military cooperation against Fath al-Sham. IS-affiliated media 30 Aug reported IS chief strategist Abu Muhammad al-Adnani killed in Aleppo province. In significant gain for Assad regime, rebel stronghold Darayya outside Damascus surrendered to govt forces 25 Aug ending four-year siege; regime reported evacuation of residents and fighters complete 27 Aug. UN and Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) investigation determined regime and IS responsibility for specific chlorine and mustard chemical attacks in 2014 and 2015; separate report by OPCW also suggested that regime maintained chemical weapons agents in violation of Chemical Weapons Convention and 2013 agreement brokered by U.S. and Russia. Bahrain Govt crackdown on dissent targeted Shia clerics, including court sentencing 18 Aug of Sheikh Ali Humaidan to one year in prison for taking part in “illegal gathering” in Diraz village. UN rights experts 16 Aug urged govt to stop persecution of Shias. Iran Russia 16-18 Aug used Nojeh air base near Hamadan in NW to launch airstrikes against rebels in Syria; some MPs said move breached constitution which prohibits foreign militaries from being based in Iran, govt 22 Aug said Russia had stopped using base “for now” and criticised Russia for publicising its use. Govt said security forces 15 Aug killed Islamic State (IS) senior member and 16 Aug killed three IS-linked militants in Kermanshah province bordering Iraq. Naval boats manoeuvred around U.S. warships in Persian Gulf area 23 and 24 Aug, provoking warning shots. Local media 28 Aug reported that member of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team suspected of espionage had been questioned and released on bail. Iraq Leadership struggle between PM Abadi and former PM Maliki intensified as security forces continued to prepare to retake Mosul from Islamic State (IS). MPs in Maliki’s State of Law coalition 3 Aug questioned Defence Minister Khaled al-Obeidi on corruption case; Obeidi released documents implicating parliament speaker Salim al-Jibouri and two State of Law MPs. Jibouri filed defamation lawsuit against Obeidi and Supreme Judicial Council 9 Aug closed case against Jibouri for lack of evidence. Obeidi dismissed 25 Aug following parliamentary vote of no confidence. Abadi continued cabinet reshuffle: parliament 15 Aug approved five new ministers. IS attacked border guard base between Rutba and Trebil near Jordan 16 Aug killing at least nine; attacked Shiite wedding party 28 Aug at Ain al-Tamer, 50km from Karbala, killing eighteen. Saudi Arabia Huthi rebels in Yemen increased rocket attacks into Saudi Arabia as Saudi-led coalition increased bombing of rebel-held territory in Yemen (see Yemen). Yemen Peace talks collapsed and fighting escalated. UN envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed 6 Aug announced talks suspended for one month; govt and Huthi rebels disagreed over sequencing of withdrawal of rebel forces from cities, disarmament and formation of unity govt. Huthis increased rocket attacks into Saudi Arabia and tried to hold territory there as Saudi Arabia-led coalition resumed airstrikes on capital Sanaa after three months’ break and on Huthi northern strongholds. Saudi-led coalition airstrikes 13 Aug killed nineteen people, mostly children in Saada province (NW), 15 Aug hit Médecins Sans Frontières hospital in Hajjah (NW) killing fifteen. Saudi-led coalition renewed efforts to retake Sanaa through NW entrance at Nehm. Tens of thousands rallied in Sanaa 20 Aug in support of Huthi rebels and ex-President Saleh; Saudi-led coalition same day bombed Sanaa, reportedly killing three civilians. U.S. Sec State Kerry 25 Aug proposed new peace plan to form unity govt; Huthi rebels 28 Aug said they would restart talks when Saudi-led coalition stopped bombing. Islamic State suicide bombing on pro-govt militia compound in Aden 29 Aug killed at least 60. Algeria Three suspected Islamist militants 3 Aug surrendered in Adrar province (S). Army found militant hideout 3 Aug in Skikda province (NE) and weapons cache 14 Aug in Boumerdes (N). Four killed by IED 5 Aug in Chechar (E). Security officials 24 Aug said Islamic State-affiliate Jund al-Khalifa had been dismantled. Egypt Military 4 Aug said it had killed Abu Duaa al-Ansari, leader of Islamic State-affiliate Sinai Province (SP), in al-Arish, N Sinai; group 18 Aug confirmed death, announced Sheikh Abdullah as new leader. Suspected SP militants continued to attack civilians and security personnel in al-Arish area: three IED attacks killed four civilians, injured four civilians and at least eleven police; sniper 22 Aug shot dead security officer; unidentified militants 23 Aug shot dead army officer and police. Govt 11 Aug announced $12bn agreement with IMF to support implementation of economic reforms. Libya Conflict deepened between supporters and opponents of UN-backed Govt of National Accord (GNA) of PM-designate Serraj. In controversial 22 Aug vote, Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) rejected GNA with 60 voting against, one in favour and 40 abstaining; other HoR members boycotted vote considering it illegal. GNA’s Presidential Council 24 Aug acknowledged HoR vote and said it would submit revised cabinet. In Tripoli, pro- and anti-Serraj armed groups early Aug fought over control of govt buildings. In Sirte, Misratan-led forces, nominally under Serraj’s command, continued to advance to retake control of city from Islamic State (IS) but suffered heavy death toll, with at least 34 killed 28 Aug. U.S. 1 Aug said it had begun airstrikes supporting anti-IS advance, carried out almost 100 in area throughout month. In Benghazi, General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) launched strikes against strongholds of Shura Council coalition in Ganfuda neighbourhood, claiming it is an IS-affiliate and therefore legitimate target; residents accused LNA of indiscriminate shelling. Suicide car bomb attack against LNA troops 2 Aug killed 23, Shura Council claimed responsibility. In oil crescent east of Sirte, forces under control of local strongman and GNA ally Ibrahim Jedran kept control of oil terminals despite threat of LNA advances. Mauritania Govt mid-Aug reportedly deployed short- and medium-range missiles at northern border with Western Sahara following Morocco’s deployment of gendarmes in area in anti-smuggling operation (see Western Sahara). Morocco Govt 16 Aug said it had arrested four suspected Islamic State members allegedly planning attacks in Casablanca. Govt anti-smuggling operation in southern Western Sahara that began 14 Aug sparked protests by Polisario Front independence movement and Mauritania (see Western Sahara and Mauritania). Tunisia President Essebsi 3 Aug named Nida Tounes (NT) party member Youssef Chahed as PM following 30 July parliamentary vote of no confidence in PM Essid. Chahed 20 Aug named 26 ministers and fourteen secretaries of state, including representatives of six major parties and independents. Parliament 26 Aug passed vote of confidence in govt even though NT MPs and Islamist An-Nahda party members 20-21 Aug expressed reservations about cabinet composition. New govt took office 29 Aug. Jihadist attack on Mount Semmama (NW) same day killed three soldiers, wounded seven. Police 31 Aug killed two Islamist militants in Karma near Algerian border, one civilian died in clash. Western Sahara Moroccan troop deployment and roadworks raised tensions with Polisario Front armed independence movement, which deployed its troops in area. Polisario Front 16 Aug accused Morocco of violating ceasefire by sending troops and military equipment into buffer zone near Mauritanian border, called on UN to intervene. Morocco same day said it was conducting anti-smuggling operation and paving road. UN 18 Aug reportedly said peacekeeping mission MINURSO found no sign of suspicious military activity by Morocco, but Polisario 28 Aug said in letter to MINURSO that it was deploying troops to area “to prevent further Moroccan activities” beyond its territory. UNSG Ban 28 Aug said he was deeply concerned by “introduction of armed units from Morocco and the Polisario in close proximity”. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________ (c) 2016 International Crisis Group

With global tensions rising and progress on nuclear disarmament hard to find, “the world needs the Hibakusha spirit more than ever,” United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said today, citing the determination and perseverance of those survivors of the 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bomb attacks as an example for championing peace and a seeking a better future for all. In a message delivered to the Peace Memorial Ceremony in Hiroshima, Japan, by Kim Won-soo, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, the Secretary-General commended the solemn gathering to remember the victims of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, the first use of nuclear weapons in war. Recalling his 2010 visit to Hiroshima taking part in the Ceremony, Mr. Ban said he had been moved and inspired by the determination of the survivors to ensure that such a tragedy would never happen again. That visit, noted the Secretary-General, reinforced his resolve to advance the efforts of the UN to work for a world free of nuclear weapons. “In Hiroshima, I saw a memorial to tragedy, but also a city of resilience and hope. The people of Hiroshima are striving to be defined not by the city that was destroyed, but by the world they are seeking to build. That spirit is exemplified in the Hibakusha,” the UN chief stressed in his message. Indeed, the Hibakusha have turned their tragedy into a rallying cry for humanity, he continued, noting that they have shared their stories so the horror experienced by Hiroshima will never be forgotten. You can count on me to continue spreading your message: No more Hiroshimas. No more Nagasakis. Never again “They have become true champions of peace and a better world,” he said, underscoring that this is the very spirit that is needed now, in a world where tensions are rising and progress on nuclear disarmament is hard to find. “At this sober memorial, I ask all States to heed the message of the Hibakusha and overcome their differences to galvanize global will for disarmament. This is essential to peaceful cooperation,” said Mr. Ban, explaining that those States with nuclear weapons have a special responsibility to prevent another Hiroshima. They must honour their commitments and lead the way to dialogue, and he called on all States to find common ground through inclusive dialogue. He went on to stress that the bombing of Hiroshima shows that nuclear weapons do not discriminate between gender, age, religion, ideology or nationality. “Let us keep striving together for a safer and more secure future and a better world for all. You can count on me to continue spreading your message: No more Hiroshimas. No more Nagasakis. Never again,” he concluded. © UN News Centre 2016

The United Nations human rights chief today deplored the execution of 20 people in Iran this week for purported terrorism-related offences. “The application of overly broad and vague criminal charges, coupled with a disdain for the rights of the accused to due process and a fair trial have in these cases led to a grave injustice,” UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein said in a news release. Reports suggest that most, if not all, of those executed were from a minority group – Sunnis from the Kurdish community. In many of the cases, there were serious doubts about the fairness of the trials, respect for due process and other rights of the accused. A man who was hanged yesterday, Shahram Ahmadi, had allegedly been beaten and coerced into signing a blank piece of paper on which his false confession was recorded. His family members were unable to visit him before he was executed, and were reportedly directed to the cemetery instead of Rajai Shahr Prison west of Tehran. Mr. Zeid also condemned the execution last month of Hassan Afshar, a 19-year-old who was 17 when he was arrested and convicted of rape. “The execution of juvenile offenders is particularly abhorrent,” Mr. Zeid said, urging Iran to respect the strict prohibition under international human rights law against this practice. © UN News Centre 2016

main image hover image Vetting Recruits The first port of call for new arrivals to the Islamic State is a network of dormitories in Syria, just across the border from Turkey. There, recruits are interviewed and inventoried. Mr. Sarfo was fingerprinted, and a doctor came to draw a blood sample and perform a physical examination. A man with a laptop conducted an intake interview. “He was asking normal questions like: ‘What’s your name? What’s your second name? Who’s your mom? Where’s your mom originally from? What did you study? What degree do you have? What’s your ambition? What do you want to become?’” Mr. Sarfo said. His background was also of interest. He was a regular at a radical mosque in Bremen that had already sent about 20 members to Syria, at least four of whom were killed in battle, according to Daniel Heinke, the German Interior Ministry’s counterterrorism coordinator for the area. And he had served a one-year prison sentence for breaking into a supermarket safe and stealing 23,000 euros. Even though the punishment for theft in areas under Islamic State control is amputation, a criminal past can be a valued asset, Mr. Sarfo said, “especially if they know you have ties to organized crime and they know you can get fake IDs, or they know you have contact men in Europe who can smuggle you into the European Union.” The bureaucratic nature of the intake procedure was recently confirmed by American officials after USB drives were recovered in the recently liberated Syrian city of Manbij, one of the hubs for processing foreign fighters. Mr. Sarfo checked all the necessary boxes, and on the third day after his arrival, the members of the Emni came to ask for him. He wanted to fight in Syria and Iraq, but the masked operatives explained that they had a vexing problem. Continue reading the main story “They told me that there aren’t many people in Germany who are willing to do the job,” Mr. Sarfo said soon after his arrest last year, according to the transcript of his interrogation by German officials, which runs more than 500 pages. “They said they had some in the beginning. But one after another, you could say, they chickened out, because they got scared — cold feet. Same in England.” By contrast, the group had more than enough volunteers for France. “My friend asked them about France,” Mr. Sarfo said. “And they started laughing. But really serious laughing, with tears in their eyes. They said, ‘Don’t worry about France.’ ‘Mafi mushkilah’ — in Arabic, it means ‘no problem.’” That conversation took place in April 2015, seven months before the coordinated killings in Paris in November, the worst terrorist attack in Europe in over a decade. While some details of Mr. Sarfo’s account cannot be verified, his statements track with what other recruits related in their interrogations. And both prison officials and the German intelligence agents who debriefed Mr. Sarfo after his arrest said they found him credible. Since the rise of the Islamic State over two years ago, intelligence agencies have been collecting nuggets on the Emni. Originally, the unit was tasked with policing the Islamic State’s members, including conducting interrogations and ferreting out spies, according to interrogation records and analysts. But French members arrested in 2014 and 2015 explained that the Emni had taken on a new portfolio: projecting terror abroad. “It’s the Emni that ensures the internal security inside Dawla” — the Arabic word for state — “and oversees external security by sending abroad people they recruited, or else sending individuals to carry out violent acts, like what happened in Tunisia inside the museum in Tunis, or else the aborted plot in Belgium,” said Nicolas Moreau, 32, a French citizen who was arrested last year after leaving the Islamic State in Syria, according to his statement to France’s domestic intelligence agency. Mr. Moreau explained that he had run a restaurant in Raqqa, Syria, the de facto capital of the group’s territory, where he had served meals to key members of the Emni — including Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the on-the-ground commander of the Paris attacks, who was killed in a standoff with the police days later. Other interrogations, as well as Mr. Sarfo’s account, have led investigators to conclude that the Emni also trained and dispatched the gunman whoopened fire on a beach in Sousse, Tunisia, in June, and the man who prepared the Brussels airport bombs. Records from French, Austrian and Belgian intelligence agencies show that at least 28 operatives recruited by the Emni succeeded in deploying to countries outside of the Islamic State’s core territory, mounting both successful attacks and plots that were foiled. Officials say that dozens of other operatives have slipped through and formed sleeper cells. In his own interactions with the Emni, Mr. Sarfo realized that they were preparing a global portfolio of terrorists and looking to fill holes in their international network, he said. He described what he had been told about the group’s work to build an infrastructure in Bangladesh. There, a siege by a team of Islamic State gunmen left at least 20 hostages dead at a cafe last month, almost all of them foreigners. Mr. Sarfo said that for Asian recruits, the group was looking specifically for militants who had emerged from Al Qaeda’s network in the region. “People especially from Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia — they have people who used to work for Al Qaeda, and once they joined the Islamic State, they are asking them questions about their experiences and if they have contacts,” he said. In his briefings with the German authorities, and again in the interview this week, Mr. Sarfo raised the possibility that some of the recent attackers in Europe who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State’s leader during their assaults might have a more direct link to the group than officials believe. Mr. Sarfo explained that the Emni keeps many of its operatives underground in Europe. They act as nodes that can remotely activate potential suicide attackers who have been drawn in by propaganda. Linking them are what Mr. Sarfo called “clean men,” new converts to Islam with no established ties to radical groups. “These people are not in direct contact with these guys who are doing the attacks, because they know if these people start talking, they will get caught,” he said of the underground operatives. “They mostly use people who are new Muslims, who are converts,” he said. Those “clean” converts “get in contact with the people, and they give them the message.” And in the case of some videotaped pledges of allegiance, the go-between can then send the video on to the handler in Europe, who uploads it for use by the Islamic State’s propaganda channels. The intelligence documents and Mr. Sarfo agree that the Islamic State has made the most of its recruits’ nationalities by sending them back to plot attacks at home. Yet one important region where the Emni is not thought to have succeeded in sending trained attackers is North America, Mr. Sarfo said, recalling what the members of the branch told him. Though dozens of Americans have become members of the Islamic State, and some have been recruited into the external operations wing, “they know it’s hard for them to get Americans into America” once they have traveled to Syria, he said. “For America and Canada, it’s much easier for them to get them over the social network, because they say the Americans are dumb — they have open gun policies,” he said. “They say we can radicalize them easily, and if they have no prior record, they can buy guns, so we don’t need to have no contact man who has to provide guns for them.” Training Days Since late 2014, the Islamic State has instructed foreigners joining the group to make their trip look like a holiday in southern Turkey, including booking a return flight and paying for an all-inclusive vacation at a beach resort, from which smugglers arrange their transport into Syria, according to intelligence documents and Mr. Sarfo’s account. That cover story creates pressure to keep things moving quickly during the recruits’ training in Syria, and most get a bare minimum — just a few days of basic weapons practice, in some instances. “When they go back to France or in Germany, they can say, ‘I was only on holidays in Turkey,’” Mr. Sarfo said. “The longer they stay in the Islamic State, the more suspicious the secret service in the West gets, and that’s why they try to do the training as quickly as possible.” Mr. Sarfo’s facility in both German and English — he studied construction at Newham College in East London — made him attractive as a potential attacker. Though the Emni approached him several times to ask him to return to Germany, he demurred, he said. Eventually, Mr. Sarfo, perhaps because of his burly build — 6-foot-1 and around 286 pounds when he arrived in Syria, though he has lost weight since then — was drafted into the Islamic State’s quwat khas, Arabic for special forces. The unit only admitted single men who agreed not to marry during the duration of their training. In addition to providing the offensive force to infiltrate cities during battles, it was one of several elite units that became recruiting pools for the external operations branch, Mr. Sarfo said. Along with his German friend, he was driven to the desert outside Raqqa. “They dropped us off in the middle of nowhere and told us, ‘We are here,’” he said, according to the transcript of one of his interrogation sessions. “So we’re standing in the desert and thought to ourselves, ‘What’s going on?’” When the two Germans looked more closely, they realized there were cavelike dwellings around them. Everything above ground was painted with mud so as to be invisible to drones. “Showering was prohibited. Eating was prohibited, too, unless they gave it to you,” Mr. Sarfo said, adding that he had shared a cave with five or six others. Even drinking water was harshly rationed. “Each dwelling received two cups of water a day, put on the doorstep,” he said. “And the purpose of this was to test us, see who really wants it, who’s firm.” The grueling training began: hours of running, jumping, push-ups, parallel bars, crawling. The recruits began fainting. By the second week, they were each given a Kalashnikov assault rifle and told to sleep with it between their legs until it became “like a third arm,” he said, according to his interrogation transcript. The punishment for failing to keep up was harsh. “There was one boy who refused to get up, because he was just too exhausted,” Mr. Sarfo told the authorities. “So they tied him to a pole with his legs and his arms and left him there.” He learned that the special forces program involved 10 levels of training. After he graduated to Level 2, he was moved to an island on a river in Tabqa, Syria. The recruits’ sleeping spots now consisted of holes in the ground, covered by sticks and twigs. They practiced swimming, scuba diving and navigating by the stars. Throughout his training, Mr. Sarfo rubbed shoulders with an international cadre of recruits. When he first arrived at the desert campus, he ran laps alongside Moroccans, Egyptians, at least one Indonesian, a Canadian and a Belgian. And out on the island, he learned of similar special units, including one called Jaysh al-Khalifa, or the Army of the Caliphate. A 12-page criminal complaint indicates that the Islamic State tried to recruit at least one American into that unit, but he declined to enroll. The man, Mohamad Jamal Khweis, a 26-year-old from Alexandria, Va., traveled to Syria in December, only to be captured by Kurdish troops in Iraq in March. In his debriefing with the F.B.I., he explained that early on, he was approached by members of the unit. “During his stay at this safe house, representatives from Jaysh Khalifa, a group described by the defendant as an ‘offensive group,’ visited the new ISIL recruits,” the complaint says. “The representatives explained that their group was responsible for accepting volunteers from foreign countries who would be trained and sent back to their countries to conduct operations and execute attacks on behalf of ISIL. The group’s requirements, among other things, were that recruits had to be single, would train in remote locations, must be free of any injuries and had to stay reclusive when returning to their home countries.” ________________________________________________________________________________ ©New York Times 2016

Please join the Darfur Women Action Group, Genocide Watch, and The Global Women's Institute for the 5th Annual National Symposium on Women and Genocide in the 21st Century: The Case of Darfur on October 21st-22nd, 2016. Register for the event here.