by Amnesty International © Michèle Cattani/AFP via Getty Images The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and Amnesty International condemn the extrajudicial executions of around 20 civilians committed, according to witnesses, by the Malian armed forces (FAMa) accompanied by Dozo militia fighters in Diafarabé, a commune in the cercle of Ténenkou in the Mopti Region. The two organizations are calling on Malian judicial authorities for an independent, impartial and diligent investigation to shed light on these incidents and bring the perpetrators to justice. FIDH and Amnesty International denounce the serious crimes repeatedly committed against civilians by the warring parties in the context of the conflict in Mali. The events that occurred in Diafarabé may constitute war crimes. The two organizations are warning the international community and Mali’s international partners about the urgent need to take concrete measures to support both the fight against impunity and victims’ rights to truth, justice and reparations. "Initially, they arrested at least 30 people […] they released anyone who wasn’t Fulani." - A survivor On Monday, 12 May, the day of the weekly market in Diafarabé, during a patrol around 10 Malian soldiers accompanied by Dozo militia fighters from Diafarabé and surrounding areas arrested at least 30 men at the local livestock market, according to witnesses interviewed by the two organizations. Though some were released immediately, between 23 and 27 men were taken, bound, blindfolded and transported onto canoes on the south bank of the river, before their throats were slit and their bodies buried in mass graves. One survivor recounted: “ On Monday, at around 11am, six soldiers in plain clothes arrived at the small livestock market, followed by uniformed FAMa soldiers. They surrounded the market and started arresting people. Initially, they arrested at least 30   people, but after quickly checking their ethnicity, they released anyone who wasn’t Fulani. They tied our arms and blindfolded us. They led us to the opposite bank, near the Danguere Mamba cemetery some distance from the village. Once we arrived at the place where they had already dug pits, the soldiers and the Dozo militia fighters began slitting people’s throats one by one. I wasn’t tied up properly, so I lowered the blindfold covering my eyes and saw them slitting the throat of my older brother, who was the third victim. I fled as they slit the fourth person’s throat. They tried to shoot me twice, but I managed to reach the river and swim across. I want to make it clear that Dozos, including some from Nouh Bozo, participated in these executions .”  Immediately after 12 May, the people of Diafarabé denounced the arrests and organized spontaneous protests to demand information about the fate of their husbands and relatives. Some of us were able to identify our relatives from among the victims. - A member of the delegation that went to the site One of the female protesters explained to FIDH and Amnesty International: “ We tried to go to the scene of crime to see for ourselves because we had heard two gunshots, but the soldiers stopped us. They told us that the people who had been arrested were alive and promised to bring them back to us the next day. This did not happen. On 14 May, a delegation of military authorities came from Mopti to listen to the locals. That’s when we received confirmation that our loved ones were gone forever, because they acknowledged their execution and promised to punish the perpetrators. ” At around 5pm on 15 May, with the military’s permission, local councillors, traditional authorities and victims’ relatives crossed the river to view the victims’ remains. One of the members of the delegation told FIDH and Amnesty International: “To prevent us from filming the crime scene and bodies, the military prevented us from carrying smartphones to the scene. When we arrived, we saw the stacked, rotting corpses of our slaughtered loved ones. Some of us were still able to identify our relatives from among the victims. There were about 22   bodies. When we returned, the women began the ritual mourning of their husbands because everyone now knew that they had been killed by the military .” No denial from the Malian army To date, the Malian army has neither confirmed nor denied the facts. In a press release dated 16 May , the Malian army chief of staff confirmed the visit of the commander of the field of operations on 14 and 15 May, which was “ organized following the allegations of civilian disappearances on 12 May.” According to the army chief of staff, “ the allegations are being taken very seriously by the military command [.  . . ] preliminary information gathered from locals will inform the gendarmerie’s investigation, which will make it possible to confirm or disprove the allegations.” We regret that once the launch of an investigation has been announced, generally information on the results of the investigation or trial are not subsequently released. - Marceau Sivieude, Amnesty International’s Interim Regional Director for West and Central Africa “In view of the seriousness of the alleged facts and the testimonies of victims and their relatives, we are calling on Malian authorities to conduct an independent, transparent and speedy investigation. It is essential to see such an investigation to the end, meaning with a trial before the courts having jurisdiction, to end the cycle of impunity and provide justice for the victims ,” said Drissa Traoré, FIDH Secretary General.  “ We regret that once the launch of an investigation has been announced, generally information on the results of the investigation or trial are not subsequently released. There has been a backlog of several emblematic court cases for several years. This time, we would like to believe that the prompt response from military authorities indicates a willingness to give effect to the rights of the Malian people to truth, justice and reparations,” said Marceau Sivieude, Amnesty International’s Interim Regional Director for West and Central Africa. Background Diafarabé (Cercle of Ténenkou, Mopti Region) is in an area where the Katiba Macina, affiliated with Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), is active and exerts a strong influence over the villages. On 27 March 2025, JNIM claimed responsibility for an ambush on a joint patrol of FAMa and Dozo militia fighters between Diafarabé and Nouh-Bozo. According to local and humanitarian sources, the ambush resulted in the deaths of 11 soldiers, including an officer, and 30 Dozo militia fighters.Several Diafarabé locals had also been arrested before the 12 May roundups. Locals continue to be concerned about the fate of nine other individuals arrested on 6 and 13 April 2025. According to information cross-checked by FIDH and Amnesty International, it appears at least four of them were also executed, and five are in detention in Ségou. According to a Diafarabé resident, without any “hope of seeing them again,” “their wives have already begun grieving them.” As part of Operation Dougoukoloko launched on 25 April 2025, a contingent of FAMa soldiers arrived in Diafarabé on 10 May to take over. The purpose of this operation, under the leadership of the armed forces chief of staff, is to “restore the State of Mali to its sovereign functions across the entire country,” according to the decree establishing it. The central field of this operation in the area where the Diafarabé incident occurred, covering the regions of Ségou, San, Mopti, Bandiagara, Douentza, Timbuktu and Taoudéni, was reorganized on 8 May, in the presence of the deputy army chief of staff.        © 2025 Amnesty International

By Maggie Michael, June 30, 2025 Alawite families and community leaders painstakingly assembled lists of those killed in March by armed forces. The pro-government attackers often looted, burned or vandalized victims' homes, leaving behind menacing graffiti such as this message scrawled on a home in the village of Sonobar: "You were a minority and now you are a rarity." Photo illustration by Catherine Tai. The young man’s heart was sliced from his chest and placed on his body. His name was No. 56 on a handwritten list of 60 dead that included his cousins, neighbors and at least six children from their coastal Syrian village. The men who killed 25-year-old Suleiman Rashid Saad called his father from the young victim’s phone and dared him to fetch the body. It was next to the barbershop. “His chest was wide open. They cut out his heart. They put it on top of his chest,” said his father, Rashid Saad. It was late afternoon on March 8 in the village of Al-Rusafa. The killings of Alawites were nowhere near over. The slaughter of Suleiman Rashid Saad was part of a wave of killings by Sunni fighters in Alawite communities along Syria’s Mediterranean coast from March 7 to 9. The violence came in response to a day-old rebellion organized by former officers loyal to ousted President Bashar al-Assad that left 200 security forces dead, according to the government. A Reuters investigation has pieced together how the massacres unfolded, identifying a chain of command leading from the attackers directly to men who serve alongside Syria’s new leaders in Damascus. Reuters found nearly 1,500 Syrian Alawites were killed and dozens were missing. The investigation revealed 40 distinct sites of revenge killings, rampages and looting against the religious minority, long associated with the fallen Assad government. The days of killing exposed the deep polarization in Syria that its new government has yet to overcome, between people who supported Assad, whether tacitly or actively, and those who hoped the rebellion against him would ultimately succeed. Many in Syria resent Alawites, who enjoyed disproportionate influence inside the military and government during Assad’s two-decade rule. The Reuters findings come as the Trump administration is gradually lifting sanctions on Syria that date back to Assad’s rule. The rapprochement is an awkward one for Washington: Syria’s new government is led by a now-dissolved Islamist faction, formerly known as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, which was previously al-Qaeda’s Syria branch, known as the Nusra Front. The group, formerly led by new Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, has been under U.N. sanctions since 2014. Al-Sharaa, a Sunni Muslim like the majority of Syrians, became president in January after leading a surprise offensive that culminated in the collapse of Assad’s government and the capture of Damascus. At least a dozen factions now under the new government’s command, including foreigners , took part in the March killings, Reuters found. Nearly half of them have been under international sanctions for years for human rights abuses, including killings, kidnapping, and sexual assaults. Syria’s government, including the Defense Ministry and president’s office, did not respond to a detailed summary of the findings of this report or related questions from Reuters about the role of government forces in the massacres. In an interview with Reuters just days after the killings, al-Sharaa denounced the violence as a threat to his mission to unite the country. He promised to punish those responsible, including those affiliated with the government if necessary. "We fought to defend the oppressed, and we won't accept that any blood be shed unjustly, or goes without punishment or accountability, even among those closest to us," he said. Among the units Reuters found to be involved were the government's General Security Service, its main law-enforcement body back in the days when HTS ran Idlib and now part of the Interior Ministry; and ex-HTS units like the elite Unit 400 fighting force and the Othman Brigade. Also involved were Sunni militias that had just joined the government’s ranks, including the Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade and Hamza division, which were both sanctioned by the European Union for their role in the deaths. The EU has not sanctioned the ex-HTS units. The United States hasn’t issued any sanctions over the killings. President al-Sharaa has ordered a committee to investigate the violence and set up “civil peace” mediations. Yasser Farhan, the spokesperson of the committee, said the president will receive its findings in two weeks as the committee is currently analyzing information then writing its final report based on testimonies and information gathered from over 1,000 people, in addition to briefings from officials and interrogations of detainees. He advised Reuters against publishing its findings before the report's release. “We are unable to provide any responses before completing this process in respect for the integrity of the truth,” he said, adding, “I expect that you will find the results useful, and that they uncover the truth." Killings continue to this day, Reuters has found. Syria’s new government has said it feared losing control of the coast to the uprising of Assad supporters. It issued unequivocal orders on March 6 to crush an attempted coup of “ Fuloul , ” or “remnants” of the regime, according to six fighters and commanders and three government officials. Many men who received the commands had been wearing government uniforms for just a few months and shared an interpretation of Sunni Islam notorious for its brutality. Some that day eagerly interpreted the word “ fuloul ” to mean any and all Alawites, a minority of 2 million people whom many in Syria blame for the crimes of the Assad family, who are Alawite. One official of the new government, Ahmed al-Shami, the governor of Tartous province, told Reuters that Alawites are not being targeted. He acknowledged “violations” against Alawite civilians, and estimated around 350 people died in Tartous, in line with what Reuters also found. That figure has never been published by the government. “The Alawite sect is not on any list, black, red or green. It’s not criminalized and it’s not targeted for retaliation. The Alawites faced injustice just like the rest of the Syrian people in general” under Assad, the governor said. “The sect needs safety. It’s our duty as a government which we will work on.” In response to a request for comment on Reuters’ findings, Anouar El Anouni, a spokesperson for the European Union, noted that the EU had condemned “horrific crimes committed against civilians, by all sides,” but did not say why former HTS units were not also sanctioned. Spokespeople for the U.S. State and Treasury Departments did not respond to requests for comment. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians are estimated to have been killed since 2011, when Assad’s crackdown on protests descended into civil war. He went after any suspected dissidents. But Sunnis, who fielded the most visible of the armed groups arrayed against Assad, were disproportionately targeted. Reuters spoke with over 200 families of victims during visits to massacre sites and by phone, 40 security officials, fighters and commanders, and government-appointed investigators and mediators. Reuters also reviewed messages from a Telegram chat established by a Defense Ministry official to coordinate the government response to the pro-Assad uprising. The news agency’s journalists examined dozens of videos, obtained CCTV footage and reviewed handwritten lists of victims’ names. Some of the attackers responding to the March uprising carried lists of names of men to target, including former members of Assad militias who had been temporarily amnestied by the new government. Entire families with those surnames would later appear on lists of the dead handwritten by village elders. Multiple survivors described how the bodies of their loved ones were mutilated. The fighters, many of them masked, mustered in the new government’s heartland of Idlib , Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. And when armored convoys rolled out to western Syria, the militias’ cries of “Sunnis, Sunnis” rose in the night along with rhyming slogans calling for people to “slaughter the Alawites,” according to videos verified by Reuters. Many of the videos showed fighters humiliating Alawite men, forcing them to crawl and howl like dogs. Others, some filmed by the fighters themselves, showed piles of bloodied bodies. Among the dead were entire families, including women, children, the elderly and disabled people in dozens of predominantly Alawite villages and neighborhoods. In one neighborhood, 45 women were among the 253 dead. In another village, 10 of 30 killed were children. In at least one case, an entire Alawite town was emptied almost overnight, its hundreds of residents replaced by Sunnis. The first question arriving fighters asked residents was telling, according to more than 200 witnesses and survivors: “Are you Sunni or Alawite?” THE UPRISING Ubaida Shli and his twin brother were the youngest of a Sunni family of nine boys and girls from Idlib, a city in northwest Syria, according to their older sister, Yasmine. The twins traveled to Libya as mercenaries. Two years ago they joined the HTS law enforcement body known as General Security Service in Idlib, where HTS was essentially running its own parallel administration. That was how Shli found himself, at age 23, wearing the black GSS uniform and guarding a checkpoint near the town of Baniyas, according to Yasmine and the WhatsApp voice notes he sent her, which Reuters reviewed. Around sundown on March 6, the checkpoint and other GSS posts across Latakia and Tartous provinces came under attack and dozens of security forces died. According to the new government and residents of the regions, the attackers were led by officers still loyal to Assad. The officers were joined by young men who lost their livelihoods when the new government fired thousands of Alawite employees and dismantled Assad’s security apparatus, according to interviews with residents. One community leader described the uprising as a spontaneous decision of desperate people. Shli sent his sister a voice message around 8:30 p.m. to tell her half the men around him were dead. He sounded calm and resigned to his fate. “He said he was helping find ways to get the bodies of the men out,” she said. She asked why he didn’t run away. His response: There is no escape. Yasmine learned her brother was dead two hours later. Pro-Assad forces also staged attacks in Baniyas, the biggest city in Tartous. They seized the main road and hospital and attacked the new government’s security headquarters, according to Aboul Bahr, a security official stationed in Baniyas who was spending that night in Idlib. Reuters could not independently verify his account. Al-Sharaa said 200 security forces were killed in the uprising but the government has not released names or an updated tally. The Defense Ministry did not respond to questions from Reuters about an updated number of forces killed or the role of government-affiliated forces in the massacres of Alawites. The EU on June 23 imposed sanctions on three pro-Assad officers, saying they were responsible for leading militias that “fueled sectarian tensions and incited violence.” Supporters of the fallen leader “wanted to stage a coup and declare an autonomous region along the coast,” said Hamza al-Ali, the GSS officer in charge of the town of Al-Qadamous, nearly 30 kilometers to the east. The Defense Ministry called for reinforcements from all the factions that had recently joined President al-Sharaa’s forces. Mosque megaphones across the country sounded calls for jihad. Mohammed al-Jassim, commander of the Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade told Reuters he was hospitalized in Turkey for health reasons when the fighting erupted. Reuters could not confirm al-Jassim’s location during the massacres. He denied his men had any role in the violence. He said he was soon added to a chat group led by a top Defense Ministry official, whom he said he knew only as Abu Ahd. Abu Ahd al-Hamawi is the pseudonym of Hassan Abdel-Ghani, the Defense Ministry spokesman. Al-Jassim’s brigade, which is also known as Amshat, was ordered to reopen the coastal M1 highway linking Latakia and Jableh. He said his militia took up positions outside the city of Jableh. As the massacres of Alawites unfolded, the Defense Ministry spokesman Abdel-Ghani said publicly the operation on the coast was proceeding as planned with the goal of keeping control of the region and “tightening the noose on the remaining elements of officers and remnants of the fallen regime,” according to the state-run news agency SANA . Behind the scenes, Abdel-Ghani was running the Telegram chat of militia leaders and military commanders that coordinated the government response to the pro-Assad uprising, according to a dozen text and audio messages in an exchange between him and a senior commander from another faction. Two people confirmed the Telegram handle was Abdel-Ghani’s and that Abu Ahd is his nom de guerre. Reuters contacted him directly on Telegram at the handle. He told Reuters he has been questioned by the committee investigating the killings but declined to comment further. The messages referred to force locations and movements, including one from Abdel-Ghani at the bridge leading to the village of Al-Mukhtareyah, where massacres were taking place. Nanar Hawach, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, said the killings eroded the new government’s legitimacy among Syrians, especially minorities. “Deploying units known for hostility toward communities they view as adversaries, and with a track record of abuse, led to predictable outcomes,” Hawach said. “They failed to uphold their basic duty to protect.” In a sign of the government’s tenuous control over its own fighters, newly integrated factions faced off in village streets at times, according to witnesses in three different locations who all described seeing one side trying to protect bewildered civilians from uniformed men trying to kill them. MARCH 7 578 DEAD, 26 LOCATIONS The M4 highway leads inland from the Mediterranean Sea. The M1 leads south, paralleling the coastline before veering east near Lebanon. The massacres that began before dawn on March 7 would mostly follow those two arteries. Many of the towns were farm communities, with citrus orchards hanging heavy with lemons and oranges in March and fields of vegetables that grow abundantly year-round in the Mediterranean climate. Al-Mukhtareyah, the first village off the M4 highway connecting Idlib and Latakia, came under attack around 6 a.m. Swarms of men, including many in GSS uniforms, broke down doors to pull men outside, forcing some to crawl and dragging others away, eight witnesses told Reuters. The shooting lasted about an hour. When it was over, 157 people were dead – nearly a quarter of Al-Mukhtareyah’s population, according to a list from a community leader that Reuters verified with multiple surviving residents. They included 28 members of the Abdullah family; 14 from the Darwish family; and 11 from the al-Juhni family, according to the lists compiled by survivors and community leaders. “The bullets were raining down on us, sister. We didn’t know where to go and how to escape,” said a woman who lost her father and brothers. Another woman who lost 17 relatives shared a screenshot from a video verified by Reuters. She pointed to a pile of bodies in the screenshot and said: “This is my family.” She traced an arrow onscreen toward a dead man in a pale jacket and sent it to Reuters. “This is my husband.” The village was all but empty days after the massacre, residents said. With no one to harvest, oranges rotted on the trees. The villages with the most bloodshed were those whose residents belonged to a subset of Alawites called al-Klazyia, according to Ali Mulhem, founder of the Syrian Civil Peace Group, an organization that documents abuses and mediates disputes. The Assad family were al-Klazyia Alawites, as were many of the dictator’s ranking security officials, said Mulhem and a senior Alawite community leader. Among the places linked to the al-Klazyia sub-sect was Sonobar, a farming community of around 15,000 whose homes are interspersed with fields of vegetables. The elite HTS force called Unit 400 moved into Sonobar in December, promising that the town would be left in peace under the new leadership, three villagers told Reuters. They described life as tense, but bearable. Early on March 7, the Unit 400 men and hundreds of reinforcements converged and started killing. In all, according to 17 witnesses, nine separate factions attacked. One young man said he saw Unit 400 fighters opening fire as they entered his house. Eleven relatives died. He survived by hiding in an upstairs pantry. Another faction that attacked was the Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade, according to survivors who recognized the brigade’s badges. The brigade came to prominence as a Turkish-backed militia during the civil war and has been under American sanctions since 2023, accused by the U.S. Treasury Department of “harassment, abduction, and other abuses.” Al-Jassim told Reuters those allegations were “fabrications” and described his men as highly disciplined.Spokespeople for the GSS and the Defense Ministry, which oversees Unit 400, didn’t respond to questions about the attacks. Turkey, asked to comment on the role of Sultan Suleiman Shah and other Turkish-backed militias in the killings, did not respond. Turkey's government hasn’t issued a public response to the EU sanctions imposed on the militias in May. In a selfie video from Sonobar, a uniformed fighter shows bodies and proclaims: “Suleiman Shah defeated the remnants of the former regime. God is great and thanks to God.” The camera later pans to 11 unarmed men in civilian clothes, lying dead on some of Syria’s most fertile soil, now tinged with blood. Among the dead pictured were a motorbike repairman, two students, two farmers and an amnestied policeman, according to relatives of the dead, who identified them by name. Al-Jassim, the commander of Sultan Suleiman Shah, denied that his men were responsible for killings in any of the villages they entered. “As a commander of a military unit, I know that any order must be obeyed in its entirety,” he told Reuters. “Commands are carried out verbatim, no more, no less.” In April, the militia – by then rebadged as the 62nd Division of Syria’s army – said the man who filmed the video had no connection with Sultan Suleiman Shah and accused him of impersonating a fighter “to tarnish the reputation of the Division and distort its record.” Reuters could not independently confirm the man’s identity or affiliation. Another group identified themselves as fighters for the Jayish al-Islam militia. Jayish al-Islam’s media officer posted pictures on Facebook of fighters heading to the coast on March 7. He also posted a copy of an amnesty document he claimed was found on the body of the Assad-era policeman indicating that the dead man had broken the pledge he signed not to take up arms against the new government. “There is no safety, no stability in our country except by purging them,” wrote Hamza Berqidar, the media officer. The post received 160 likes. One woman from Sonobar told Reuters the fighters commandeered her living room. “Do you know who we are?” one asked her. She said she replied: “You’re the army!” No, she said they told her. “We are jihadists from Jayish al-Islam. We came to teach you Islam.” Media officer Berqidar and Jayish al-Islam didn’t respond to requests for comment on the violence. In all, 236 residents of Sonobor were killed, according to lists reviewed by Reuters and verified with multiple residents. They were mostly young men, ranging in age from 16 to 40. The injured included a pregnant woman, who miscarried but survived her gunshot wounds. One young mother said her husband was at a neighbor’s when her door was smashed down. The gunmen went upstairs and started breaking things, looking for him. The group left and was replaced by another faction, she said. Then a third, whose leader embraced her children and promised they would be unharmed. A fourth faction opened fire on the building. A fifth group of fighters, wearing green headbands, arrived with a translator. They didn’t speak Arabic. She didn’t recognize their language. “Three militants came and pointed rifles at my head,” she said. They told her: “You are Alawite pigs. You deserve what is happening to you. If you cry you will be shot dead, and your body will be on top of the other dead bodies.” All the time, she said, she was trying in vain to reach her husband. After sunset, the woman ventured out. She found him on the ground, shot in the eyes and heart. Witnesses said the fighters stole food to break the Ramadan fast, celebrating outside as terrified women peeked through the windows. A photo from Sonobar, confirmed by two surviving Alawites from the town, showed a message scrawled on the wall of one home: “You were a minority, and now you are a rarity.” MARCH 8 828 DEAD, 10 LOCATIONS The first group of armed men to arrive Saturday in the town of Al-Rusafa numbered around a dozen. It was a little after 10 a.m. Some wore black fatigues and sneakers. Residents had been trapped inside since the day before, when a government convoy of around 50 vehicles, including a tank, had set up positions around the village, cut the electricity and started shooting, sometimes at people and sometimes at random. Now, on Saturday, this new group of fighters seemed unsatisfied when they peered inside the Saad family home. “They ordered the boys to lie on the floor, which they did. They dragged them outside,” said Ghada Ali. She watched helplessly as they stepped on the prone body of 17-year-old Saleh, her youngest. “They told them to howl like dogs while filming them,” she said. After a time, they sent Saleh to his mother, and then one of the fighters asked why she still wept. “I want my children,” she responded. “We sent you one back,” she said they told her. As for her elder son, 25-year-old Suleiman Rashid, they said perhaps he’d return soon. Instead, his father Rashid Saad received a phone call. “We killed him and cut out his heart,” they told him. “Come get your son before the dogs eat him.” Saad and his brother, who lost four sons that day, grabbed blankets and called on Saleh to help. They carried all five bodies home, and the women buried them in the garden, Saad said. The community leader said the attackers identified themselves as from the Hamza, Sultan Suleiman Shah and Jaysh al-Ezza factions. Representatives of Hamza and Jaysh al-Ezza declined to comment on the violence in the town. Al-Jassim denied his men were ever in Al-Rusafa. In all, 60 Alawites died in Al-Rusafa, according to lists seen by Reuters. The youngest was a 4-year-old. ust as in Sonobar, survivors said the attackers left a message on the walls: “Sunni men passed through here. We came to shed your blood.” Nearer the coast, the residents of Qurfays despaired. The town and the white-domed shrine at its center are named for Ahmed Qurfays, a revered Alawite religious figure. Forces from the Othman Brigade, along with Unit 400, had taken up positions in the village after Assad's fall, according to two survivors and one person with relatives there. On Friday, with news of the killings spreading around the region, villagers chose four respected residents to mediate with the Othman Brigade fighters. They sat in a semicircle on a farmhouse balcony outside Qurfays, and the villagers tried to persuade the fighters that the town harbored no Assad supporters and there was no need for them to stay and fight. “They insisted on staying, because they said there was a plan already in place,” said a person familiar with the talks. The sound of automatic weapons and anti-aircraft guns rattled in the distance. The fighters and mediators left the farmhouse and headed back to the village. While they had been talking, a half-dozen men were shot to death there, and their bodies were strewn across the shrine’s yard and steps, according to two witnesses. The Defense Ministry, which directly oversees the Othman Brigade and Unit 400, did not respond to requests for comment about the killings in Al-Rusafa and Qurfays. “None of these men were carrying weapons, and no one was part of the former army. One of the men was mentally ill,” one of the witnesses said. Around 50 worshippers were beaten inside the shrine, said the other witness, who was among the injured. Still, it felt like perhaps they’d escaped the mass death they’d heard about elsewhere. On Saturday morning, the witnesses said, they realized they were wrong. A new convoy of 80 vehicles arrived. Someone fired once in the air, and then, as though awaiting a signal, the militia members opened fire. In all, 23 people died over two days, according to photos of the dead shared with Reuters. Looting continued as Qurfays mourned, said the witness who was beaten inside the shrine. The man said his brother was killed. He said one of the Unit 400 men told him crying was banned and that the village should be thankful just for being allowed to bury their dead. “I couldn’t cry,” the man said. “I didn’t have the courage to cry.” MARCH 9 74 DEAD, 4 LOCATIONS By Sunday, the frenzied killings were subsiding. It was time to bury the dead, fearfully and often in secret. For 48 hours or more, grieving Alawite women had stood guard over the bodies of fathers, brothers, husbands and children. Many families only discovered the scale of the violence when they emerged to streets reeking of death, or tried to beat away dogs ripping apart corpses. In Baniyas, near where the pro-Assad attack on the checkpoint touched off the revenge killings, there were 253 bodies to bury, according to the lists of the dead shared with Reuters. In the town of Jableh, the toll stood at 77 Alawites, according to 30 family members. The town was targeted by Unit 400 and the Othman Brigade, along with Sultan Suleiman Shah, Hamza and the Turkistan Islamic Party, made up of Uyghurs and other foreign fighters, according to six witnesses and one security official in Jableh. Suleiman Shah commander Al-Jassim said his men entered Jableh and left because they saw “many violations” and did not want to take the blame for killings that weren’t their fault. Representatives of the other forces didn’t reply to questions. The Telegram chat showed the Defense Ministry’s spokesman, Abdel-Ghani, was notified about “breaches” in Jableh. His response, in the chat: “May God reward you.” Many survivors, especially in Baniyas, said they had Sunni neighbors who smuggled them to safety or who tried to protect them. In Jableh, a Sunni neighbor intervened to help evacuate the mortally wounded husband of Rasha Ghoson, over the objections of two General Security Service men. With her neighbor’s help, an ambulance agreed to take Ghoson's husband to Latakia, but doctors there couldn’t revive him. Standing alongside the body in the overflowing morgue, Ghoson said a GSS officer in charge of death records refused to issue a document to an Alawite. “He said: ‘infidel!’” and walked away, she recalled. Her legs and hands trembled as she recounted the ordeal. As with most of the massacre victims, there is still no death certificate for Ghoson’s husband. THE AFTERMATH Many Alawite villages and neighborhoods throughout the Latakia, Tartous and Hama regions emptied out after the attacks, and their residents camped by the thousands at a nearby Russian base for fear of new massacres. The targeting of Alawites continues to this day. Between May 10 and June 4, 20 Alawites were gunned down in the Latakia and Hama regions, according to the Syria Observatory for Human Rights. The perpetrators have not been identified. Authorities told the U.N. that dozens of alleged perpetrators were detained, according to Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, chair of the world body’s Syria commission, in his report to the U.N. Human Rights council on June 27. No one has been charged in the March Alawite deaths, however. The government has yet to share a tally of the dead, and the U.N. said its own toll of 111 dead was an undercount. In December, three months before the coastal killings, President al-Sharaa issued a series of promotions to try and unify the army. Among those elevated was the head of Jaysh al-Islam, and Sultan Suleiman Shah’s leader, al-Jassim, who rose to the rank of brigadier general with command of a formal Syrian army unit. The leader of Unit 400, Aboul Khair Taftanaz, was promoted in December to brigadier general and again in June and is now a general, according to announcements from the Defense Ministry. He assumed responsibility for the Latakia and Tartous regions, according to one of Unit 400’s fighters. Sayf Boulad Abu Bakr, the leader of the Turkish-backed Hamza division, was promoted to brigadier general after the killings, according to his Twitter account. The Turkistan Islamic Party, a militia with a large foreign contingent whose fighters were also found by Reuters to have carried out many of the attacks, was fully integrated in May into the army. Its leader was among those promoted in December. On May 30, the Defense Ministry issued a code of conduct prohibiting abuses against civilians, discrimination or misuse of power. The ministry had no comment on the promotions or the alleged links of the commanders’ units to the killings. Deliberately targeting civilians is a crime under international humanitarian law, and officers who fail to prevent or punish such attacks are considered accountable under the principle of command responsibility. The village of Arza stands as a grim reminder of the cycle of revenge that the government has yet to address. Arza was used by Assad as a staging ground to attack rebellious communities, such as the neighboring village of Khattab in 2013. And few clans were more prominently pro-Assad than the al-Suleimans. They made up a quarter of the 90-member pro-Assad militia from Arza, notorious for raiding Khattab more than a decade ago to detain rebels. On March 7, men from Khattab led an assault on Arza that left 23 people dead, including members from the al-Suleiman clan, and sent the town’s remaining 1,200 residents fleeing, according to four ex-residents and two videos verified by Reuters. The four witnesses told Reuters that the Khattab men brought victims to the main square and asked their leader, Abu Jaber al-Khattabi: “What do you think, Sheikh?” They said if he responded “Allahu Akbar” – which he did in nearly every case – the victim was shot. “They are all criminals,” al-Khattabi told Reuters. “It’s like the ultimate divine justice. Just as you made us homeless, you will be homeless, and just as you killed us, you will be killed.” When asked about his role in the deaths that day, he acknowledged he was in Arza but denied giving orders to kill. The attackers have taken over the abandoned homes. Arza is no more, al-Khattabi said. On Facebook, he posted a photo of the new village sign: “New Khattab.” COUNTING THE DEAD A Reuters investigation pieced together how the March 7-9 massacres of Syrian Alawites along the country’s Mediterranean coast unfolded, identifying a chain of command leading from the attackers directly to men who serve alongside Syria’s new leaders in Damascus. The investigation found 1,479 Syrian Alawites were killed and dozens were missing from 40 distinct sites of revenge killings, rampages and looting against the religious minority, long associated with the Assad government. Reuters counted the dead by gathering local lists of names of victims, many of them handwritten, from community leaders and families of the victims. Villagers also gathered pictures and personal details about the victims. For each list, written in Arabic, Reuters cross-checked the names with activists who are either in the relevant village, run Facebook pages, or in the diaspora and have relatives in the places that came under attack. For each massacre site, Reuters also gathered pictures of victims, and photos and locations of mass graves. On March 11, the U.N. said it had counted 111 deaths but acknowledged it as an undercount. It hasn’t updated its death tally since. The most recent count from the Syrian Network for Human Rights, an independent monitoring group, shows 1,662 people killed. Of that total, 1,217 were killed by government forces and armed groups while 445 were killed by pro-Assad fighters, it said. Of the 445, SNHR said about half were civilians and half were government forces. SNHR did not explain how it confirmed the identity of the perpetrators. Reuters could not confirm the SNHR toll for Alawites killed by Assad loyalists or that for the government forces. On March 17, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, another civil society organization, said it had tallied 1,557 civilian deaths but did not detail how it arrived at the figure. The group also counted 273 dead among government forces and 259 among Alawite gunmen affiliated with pro-Assad forces. President al-Sharaa has said 200 government forces died. The government has not released a tally of the dead among Alawite civilians. THE FACTIONS BEHIND THE KILLINGS On January 29, Ahmed al-Sharaa and more than 12 other commanders from armed factions that joined forces to overthrow Bashar al-Assad gathered in the presidential palace in Damascus in a show of unity among men who had fought each other almost as much as they’d fought Assad. Al-Sharaa was named president and abolished the constitution, along with disbanding the Assad government’s army and security apparatus. “The sun of a new Syria is rising,” he said. Each commander received an army division and a rank, and they pledged to integrate their factions into the new Syrian army. In theory, al-Sharaa dissolved his militia, formerly known as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, which was previously al-Qaeda’s Syria branch, known as the Nusra Front. A pro-Assad uprising in early March in Syria’s coastal regions was the first test of the tenuous unity. A few hours into the insurgency, the new government called for reinforcements to defeat the uprising of remnants of the Assad government, known in Arabic as “ fuloul. ” Tens of thousands of vehicles, fighters and weapons flooded the coast. The defense ministry divided the coast into sectors, placing them under the command of a top official to coordinate movements and positions, according to three security sources, including Mohammed al-Jassim, commander of the Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade, also known as Amshat. Five major groups were involved in the mass killings in Alawite towns and neighborhoods, many of which were struck by multiple groups over three days: HTS units These include Unit 400, the Othman Brigade, and its main law enforcement body, known as the General Security Service. Reuters found their involvement in at least 10 sites, where nearly 900 people were killed. Before Assad fell, the GSS was the main HTS law enforcement arm in the province of Idlib under its control. It is now part of Syria's Interior Ministry. In 2020, the U.N. described “deeply troubling” reports of executions and abuses at the hands of HTS law enforcement authorities. Human Rights Watch documented how HTS, then known as the Nusra Front, killed 149 Alawites in summary executions in Latakia in 2013. Unit 400 is mentioned in a handful of online posts, none of them from official Syrian government accounts. Several of them posted in early December, using identical language, say Unit 400 fighters were being deployed to western Syria. The posts describe Unit 400 as "among the strongest units" in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, having received "high levels of training and equipped with the most modern weaponry." Unit 400 was moved to the coastal regions after Assad's falll, according to multiple witnesses and a member of the unit. A foreign intelligence source said the unit set up its headquarters in the former Syrian naval academy and answers only to the top levels of the Defense Ministry. Turkish-backed militias Over the past decade, Turkey launched military incursions in Syria and backed rebels there to oppose both Assad and Kurdish forces it deems a threat. These factions were part of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, Syria’s second largest opposition coalition. SNA factions have a track record of abductions, sexual violence and widespread looting, according to Human Rights Watch and other rights groups. Among those Turkey backed during the civil war were the Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade and the Hamza division. In the Alawite killings, Reuters found the involvement of those two groups in at least eight different sites where nearly 700 people were killed. On his Facebook page, a militiaman affiliated with the Sultan Suleiman Shah division posted: “Turn off cameras. Kill every male. Their blood is as dirty as pigs.” Sunni factions These include the anti-Assad rebel forces of Jayish al-Islam, Jayish al-Ahrar and Jayish al-Izza. Reuters found they were present in at least four sites where nearly 350 people were killed. In 2013, Jayish al-Islam captured a number of Alawite women and men and put them in large metal cages to use as human shields from Syrian and Russian airstrikes in Damascus. The group is also blamed by rights groups for the disappearance of prominent activists during the revolution. Foreign fighters These include the Turkistan Islamic Party, or TIP, Uzbeks, Chechens, and some Arab fighters in six sites where Reuters found nearly 500 people were killed. Armed Sunni civilians Sectarian bitterness stemming from years of civil war and Assad's abuses led people to attack neighboring villages and neighborhoods of Alawites, a minority linked to the Assad family. Reuters found the two main sites of these revenge killings were the village of Arza and in the city of Baniyas, where a total of 300 people were killed. © 2025 Reuters.

Rohingya refugees at a camp in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. © UNHCR/Susan Hopper 11 July 2025 I Migrants and Refugees Escalating conflict and targeted violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine state have forced some 150,000 Rohingya refugees to flee to Bangladesh over the past 18 months – the largest exodus to the neighbouring country in years.   As armed clashes intensify and conditions worsen inside Myanmar, thousands continue to cross the border seeking safety in the overcrowded camps of Cox’s Bazar, where nearly one million Rohingya refugees already live in densely populated camps. “ This is the largest movement of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh since 2017, ” said Babar Baloch, spokesperson for the UN refugee agency, UNHCR , briefing journalists in Geneva on Friday.   He clarified that unlike the mass influx in 2017, when some 750,000 Rohingya fled deadly violence in Rakhine state, this uptick in refugees has unfolded more gradually. Advocating for asylum UNHCR is working closely with local authorities to respond to urgent humanitarian needs.   “As the conflict in Myanmar continues unabated, we are advocating with the Bangladeshi authorities to provide managed access to safety and asylum for civilians fleeing the conflict,” he said. Bangladesh has long provided refuge to the Rohingya, a mostly Muslim minority community in Myanmar, which is mainly Buddhist.  The country currently hosts nearly one million people in the refugee camps and the recent arrivals – many of them women and children – are placing further strain on resources. Many are relying heavily on local solidarity and sharing limited resources with those already living in the camps. Appeal for support By the end of June, nearly 121,000 newly arrived refugees had been biometrically registered, although many more are believed to be residing informally in the camps. Access to adequate shelter remains a major concern as facilities struggle to absorb the new population. “These new arrivals join another nearly one million Rohingya refugees crammed into just 24 square kilometres,” said Mr. Baloch. “ More humanitarian support is urgently required .” Aid partners have been able to provide basic services including food, medical care, education, and essential relief items. However, the response is now under serious threat due to a lack of funding. UNHCR warned that the 2024 humanitarian appeal for $255 million is only 35 per cent funded. Without immediate financial support, the entire operation could face systemic collapse. Action needed now Unless additional funds are secured, health services will be severely disrupted by September and essential cooking fuel — liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) – will run out by December. Food assistance will stop and education for some 230,000 Rohingya children, including 63,000 new arrivals, is in danger of being discontinued. Despite a strictly controlled and officially closed border, the Government of Bangladesh has allowed new arrivals to access emergency services in the camps. The UN agency expressed deep appreciation for this humanitarian gesture under highly challenging conditions. “We don’t have the resources to take care of the new arrivals and also those who were there before them,” said Mr. Baloch. “Everything will be impacted.” As displacement from Rakhine state continues, UNHCR and its partners are urging the international community to act swiftly. Without immediate and sustained support, the already fragile humanitarian response in Cox’s Bazar could begin to unravel  - with devastating consequences for more than one million people who rely on it for survival.  © United Nations

© Chedly Ben Ibrahim/NurPhoto via Getty Images In response to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announcing sanctions against the UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Francesca Albanese, Amnesty International’s Secretary General Agnès Callamard said: “This is a shameless and transparent attack on the fundamental principles of international justice. Special Rapporteurs are not appointed to please governments or to be popular but to deliver their mandate. Francesca Albanese’s mandate is to advocate for human rights and international law, essential at a time when the very survival of Palestinians in the occupied Gaza Strip is at stake. These sanctions come just days after she published a new report detailing how companies have profited from Israel’s illegal occupation, its brutal system of apartheid and its ongoing genocide in Gaza. “Following the recent sanctions against the International Criminal Court, the measures announced today are a continuation of the Trump administration’s assault on international law and its efforts to protect the Israeli government from accountability at all costs. They are the latest in a series of Trump administration policies seeking to intimidate and silence those that dare speak out for Palestinians’ human rights. Instead of attacking the Special Rapporteur and further undermining the rule-based order, the US government should focus on putting an end to its unconditional support to Israel, enabling total impunity for its crimes in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. “States must forcefully reject these disgraceful, vindictive sanctions and exert maximum diplomatic pressure on the US government to reverse them. The United Nations must also fully support her as an independent UN expert appointed by the UN Human Rights Council. Governments around the world and all actors who believe in the rule-based order and international law must do everything in their power to mitigate and block the effect of the sanctions against Francesca Albanese and more generally to protect the work and independence of Special Rapporteurs.” © 2025 Amnesty International

Geopolitical ambitions, ethnic divisions and contested access to the sea and fresh water are intensifying anxieties in Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Tigray region. July 7 2025 Teresa Nogueira Pinto The port of Massawa is one of the largest natural deepwater ports on the Red Sea and is one of two key ports in Eritrea that handle imports and exports for neighboring states. Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993, making Ethiopia landlocked. © Getty Images Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have intensified this year, fueled by regional disputes and instability in the Tigray region. These developments raise concerns about the possible resurgence of conflict in the strategic Horn of Africa and in Tigray, an area rich in gold where war recently claimed over 600,000 lives and caused widespread displacement and infrastructure destruction. Although a full-scale return to armed conflict has not yet materialized, the convergence of deep-rooted political fractures within Tigray and mounting geopolitical strains across the Horn of Africa – not least related to landlocked Ethiopia’s quest for a port and water rights − increases the risk of renewed violence and regional destabilization. Shifting allegiances in the Horn of Africa The prospect of renewed conflict between Addis Ababa and Asmara will largely depend on how both governments interpret the risks and potential gains of escalation within a shifting regional landscape. At the heart of current situation lies Ethiopia’s ambition − with a population of over 128 million, it is the most populous landlocked country in the world − to regain access to the Red Sea, which it lost in 1993 after Eritrea’s secession. This aspiration, driven by economic and geopolitical concerns, is viewed in Asmara as a threat to Eritrean sovereignty and regional stability. At the heart of current situation lies Ethiopia’s ambition to regain access to the Red Sea, which it lost in 1993 after Eritrea’s secession. Ethiopia’s ambitions are reflected in the “Grand Strategy of the Two Waters,” a national policy according to which the Abay River (in the Blue Nile) and the Red Sea are critical areas for the country’s development. As Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali pursues these goals, Ethiopia faces rising hostility from its longstanding rival, Egypt, and two neighbors in the Horn of Africa, Eritrea and Somalia. In 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding according to which Addis Ababa would recognize Somaliland’s claim to independence in exchange for access to the Red Sea. Unsurprisingly, the move infuriated Somalia . Egypt sided with Mogadishu, reflecting a decade of tense diplomatic relations with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam , which Cairo continues to see as an existential threat to its water supply. May 2019: The site of the then under-construction Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region of Ethiopia. Although Ethiopia insists the dam is for hydropower and development, neighboring countries fear it could significantly reduce their water supply from the Nile. © Getty Images In October 2024, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki hosted a trilateral meeting between Eritrea, Somalia and Egypt. Diplomatic pressure worked, leading to the Ankara Declaration , in which Ethiopia committed to respect Somalia’s territorial integrity. A view of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on Feb. 19, 2022, when it started to produce electricity. Ethiopia’s dam on the Nile has caused a row with both Egypt and Sudan. © Getty Images Ethiopia is heavily dependent on the small coastal country of Djibouti, whose port handles over 90 percent of Ethiopia’s trade as the main gateway for imports and exports in the region. This dependency has deepened with the development of infrastructure, including port facilities, a pipeline and the Addis-Ababa-Djibouti Corridor − new roads and railways connecting the capital of Ethiopia to the port in Djibouti. Ethiopia’s ambitions continue to fuel tensions with several countries, including Eritrea, which fears that its neighbor will eventually seek to reclaim the Port of Assab on the Red Sea coast. Underlying triggers and context To understand the profound shifts in Ethiopia’s internal power dynamics in recent years and why its volatility causes waves around the Horn of Africa, it is essential to understand the country’s internal challenges and revisit the pivotal moment of 2018. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power that year. This marked a significant turning point in the decline of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which had long dominated the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The TPLF had ties with Eritrean liberation movements but originally formed as a guerrilla movement in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, aiming to secure self-determination for Tigrayans within Ethiopia. The erosion of the TPLF hegemony , however, had already begun in 2012 with the sudden death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia’s longtime political strongman. The TPLF consolidated its power after the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991. However, its leadership was increasingly viewed by other regional groups, particularly the Amhara and the Oromo (the two largest ethnic groups in Ethiopia), as exclusionary and marginalizing. This perception fueled growing resentment and demands for political reform. Facts & Figures: Who are the Tigrayans? The Tigrayans are descendants of a Semitic people who intermixed with the Cushitic inhabitants of the region and founded the Christian kingdom of Aksum, which had its capital in the historic region of Tigray in northern Ethiopia. The Tigray are agricultural people who have their own language and are predominantly Orthodox Christian. In the early 21st century, the Tigray accounted for about half of Eritrea’s population and less than one-tenth of the population of Ethiopia. After assuming office, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed dissolved the EPRDF and established the Prosperity Party to replace it. The TPLF, however, refused to join the new party, viewing its creation as a threat to Ethiopia’s federal arrangement and, more specifically, to the status and political autonomy of the Tigrayan minority. While Tigrayans should not be seen as a monolithic political entity, the region’s distinct blend of strong ethnic identity, tradition of cohesive political leadership, and military experience (shaped by decades of war), provides them with significant leverage in both the domestic and regional spheres. Tigray shares internal borders with two of Ethiopia’s nine regional states, Amhara and Afar, and lies along critical export routes to the Red Sea. Internationally, it borders both Eritrea and Sudan. In 2018, the federal government, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, signed a peace agreement with Eritrea. The landmark development included a crucial concession: Ethiopia’s formal recognition of Eritrean sovereignty over Badme, a town located in Tigray and the original flashpoint of the 1998-2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea war. For the TPLF, this decision was viewed not as a step toward peace, but as a unilateral and politically charged compromise that undermined both regional integrity and Tigrayan interests, deepening mistrust between the federal government and Tigrayan leadership and laying the groundwork for renewed conflict. Despite the historical rapprochement between Addis Ababa and Asmara, which earned Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, hostility between Eritrea and the TPLF has grown after the peace agreement. In 2020, the TPLF held regional elections in Tigray, openly defying the federal government’s rule to postpone elections due to the pandemic. The Prime Minister described the polls as a “shanty election,” deprived of legal basis. Tensions further escalated in November when, after the TPLF attacked the Northern Command of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, the federal government launched a “law and order” military operation. Turning enemies into allies The conflict in Tigray was both a cause and a consequence of important shifts in domestic and regional allegiances. Eritrea, a historical adversary of Ethiopia, especially since gaining independence in 1993, unexpectedly allied with the federal government, joining military operations against the TPLF. Eritrean forces were subsequently accused of committing atrocities against civilians. Meanwhile, the TPLF, once the dominant force at the heart of Ethiopia’s political establishment, found itself in open combat not only with federal forces, but also with the Amhara regional army, local militias and Eritrean troops. The war ended with the 2022 Pretoria Agreement , which determined the disarmament of the TPLF and the withdrawal of foreign forces. However, the agreement overlooked the extent of the role played by Eritrean forces in the conflict. Despite formal stabilization, multiple tensions remain on the ground. Eritrean forces are still present in Tigray, and the Eritrean regime has connections with Amhara rebels, specifically the Fano militias . Moreover, while Amhara forces have sided with the federal army in Tigray, they rebelled against the federal government following the decision, in 2023, to dissolve regional special forces as part of a national security reform. Read more on the Horn of Africa Neither peace nor war in Ethiopia Prospects for stability in the Horn of Africa Djibouti remains well-positioned, despite uncertainty As for the TPLF, while the group was removed from the terrorist list after the Pretoria Agreement, it remained excluded from representation in Ethiopia’s parliament. The post-war context generated divisions within the TPLF, now split between those who signed the 2022 peace agreements and favor reconciliation with the federal government, and those who are considering an allegiance, even if implicit, with Eritrea, against the Abiy Ahmed regime. Split into two irreconcilable factions, the TPLF is blocked. Citing the party’s inability to hold a general assembly, the National Election Board recently banned the TPLF from political activity. It is important to note that besides longstanding ethnic and political cleavages, competition for control over Tigray is also intensified by its strategic location and significant gold reserves . Scenarios Most likely: Instability and proxy war ahead of 2026 elections in Ethiopia The most likely scenario is a period of fragile peace followed by a proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the Tigray region. This outcome is increasingly likely due to a convergence of internal and regional tensions. The TPLF leadership is fractured, the peace agreement remains only partially implemented and parts of Tigrayan territory are still under the control of Eritrean forces. Moreover, there is a risk of contagion and regional spillover. The Eritrean regime is reportedly backing insurgent movements in the Amhara region, while the Ethiopian government faces accusations of supporting Eritrean opposition groups such as the Blue Revolution, movements which are largely confined to the diaspora due to the country’s repressive political environment. Further instability is expected in the lead-up to the 2026 Ethiopian general elections , as Ethiopia remains divided between two opposing political visions: the ethnic federalism that has defined recent decades, and the centralized, nationalist and populist model championed by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Less likely: International mediation gives Ethiopia access to the sea A second, albeit less likely, scenario involves successful international mediation. Ethiopia, which joined the BRICS in 2024, maintains close ties with both Beijing and Ankara , two nations with substantial investments in the region and a strong interest in avoiding instability in the Horn of Africa. Diplomatic pressure from influential actors respected by both sides, such as China or Turkey, could help pave the way for a negotiated settlement. In such an outcome, Ethiopia might secure access to the sea without directly challenging the sovereignty of its neighbors. While external mediation could play a key role in preventing a renewed conflict between Asmara and Addis Ababa, it would be far more difficult to contain the internal unrest fueled by ethno-political tensions in Tigray and Oromia. These domestic fault lines may continue to drive instability, even in the absence of a regional armed conflict. © 2025 Copyright by Geopolitical Intelligence Services AG

Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan, once considered close, have sharply deteriorated amid a series of high-profile confrontations Deaths in custody, media offices raided, and beaten and bloodied suspects paraded in court — relations between Russia and Azerbaijan, once considered close, have sharply deteriorated in recent days amid a series of high-profile incidents. The latest tensions erupted over the weekend when Russian law enforcement officers detained over 50 Azerbaijani nationals in Yekaterinburg , Russia, as part of an investigation into a murder case from 2001. Two men — brothers Ziyaddin and Huseyn Safarov — were killed during the operation, and several others were injured. The incident prompted a sharp response from Baku. On June 28, Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry released a statement describing the killings as "ethnically motivated public and deliberate unlawful actions," adding that Russia's actions have "recently taken on a systematic nature." The incident is just the latest development in a years-long reshaping of the geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia were all Soviet republics, and Russia still views the region as its own backyard. But Russia's hold and influence over them has been challenged, a process which began before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and has continued to pick up speed in the following nearly three and a half years. Moscow's relationship with Baku has been particularly complex. Vadim Dubnov, a columnist for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Echo of the Caucasus project, told the Kyiv Independent that the latest confrontation is part of a broader and long-running shift in the bilateral relationship. "The deterioration of relations was systemic," he said. A view shows the main newsroom of Sputnik news, part of the state-run media group Russia Today, in Moscow, Russia, on April 27, 2018. (Mladen Antonov / AFP via Getty Images) Russia's decreasing clout Before 2020, Russia's closest ally in the region was Armenia, which had been locked in a decades-long, on-off conflict with Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. But after Russian " peacekeepers " failed to act in either the Second Karabakh War in 2020 or the Azerbaijani lightning offensive in 2023, both of which saw Azerbaijan reclaim its lost territory, this relationship soured greatly. "Armenia has realized that its only security guarantee is not Russia but peace with its neighbors," Dubnov said. Buoyed by its military success, Azerbaijan has been seeking to reassert influence over the region and redefine its relationship with Moscow. "After the Karabakh war, I think (Azerbaijan President Ilham) Aliyev may have believed that he had obtained everything he could from Moscow," Dubnov said. Armenia, which has lambasted Moscow for failing to help it during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, was now drifting closer to the West. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has suspended the country's membership in a Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) military alliance and announced plans to join the European Union. Recently, there has also been a crackdown on the pro-Russian opposition in Armenia. As Russia is losing its grip over Armenia and Azerbaijan, the only country in the region where its influence remains strong is Georgia. Dubnov said that Russia's position in the South Caucasus is weaker now, and Turkey, an ally of Azerbaijan, has emerged as a major regional player. Russian soldiers are deployed at the Lachin corridor, Nagorno-Karabakh region’s only land link with Armenia, in Nagorno-Karabakh, on Dec. 26, 2022. (Tofik Babayev / AFP via Getty Images) Russia-Azerbaijan tensions While recent incidents have brought tensions into the open, analysts say the rupture reflects a longer, structural shift in Azerbaijan's foreign policy. Dubnov described the shift as "systemic and inevitable," pointing to a gradual breakdown since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the beginning of its war in eastern Ukraine . "Azerbaijan was quite seriously concerned about its northern borders and the possibility of Moscow's influence on national minorities," Dubnov said. Dubnov said Baku's moves should not be seen purely as a pivot away from Moscow, but as an effort to restore geopolitical balance. "Aliyev began to improve relations with the West, especially after (U.S. President Donald) Trump returned to the White House, and to restore this balance," he said. "So, it's not so much about worsening relations with Russia or moving away from Russia, but about restoring that balance. And now there is simply a greater distance between the two." But as this distance increases, it's presenting itself in ever more dramatic fashion in what appears to be a series of tit-for-tat actions. Evidence collection efforts at the crash site of an Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) passenger plane near Aktau, Kazakhstan, on Dec. 27, 2024. (Meiramgul Kussainova/Anadolu via Getty Images) Crash of AZAL airliner The current deterioration goes back further than just this weekend and has its roots in a tragedy late last year when a Russian air defense system shot down an Azerbaijani passenger plane. The aircraft en route from Baku to Grozny in Russia's Chechen Republic suddenly changed course and crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan, on Dec. 25, 2024, killing 38 people out of 67 on board. While Russian President Vladimir Putin called Aliyev shortly after the incident to offer condolences, he did not take responsibility for the crash. Aliyev later criticized Russia's handling of the incident, accusing its agencies of suppressing evidence and spreading " absurd versions " of what happened. Dubnov noted that while the incident was not the origin of the diplomatic rupture, it served as a catalyst. "The story with the plane was not the primary issue," he said. "It was not the beginning of the quarrel, but rather an opportunity for Baku to start, legalize, and formalize this quarrel." President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev talks to the press at the European Political Community Summit in Woodstock, England, on July 18, 2024. (Carl Court / Getty Images) Aliyev's Moscown parade trip The fallout from the plane crash spilled over into symbolic diplomacy. In March, both Russian and Azerbaijan confirmed that Aliyev had accepted an invitation to attend Russia's May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow — a significant gesture, as he had last attended in 2015. But just days before the event, Aliyev abruptly canceled his trip without explanation. Dubnov said the decision sent a clear message. "I think that after Aliyev didn't come to Moscow on May 9, it became clear that there would be no apology for the downed plane," he said. "No one expected a direct apology. What everyone was really waiting for was a form of compromise that could substitute for one." Dubnov added that Aliyev's no-show served as a signal to Moscow that "no improvement in relations was coming — at least not publicly." U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House in Washington, DC, U.S. on June 10, 2025. (Saul Loeb / AFP via Getty Images) The current situation Tension has simmered since May 9 and erupted in recent days with the deaths in Yekaterinburg over the weekend, with Azerbaijan's reaction going well beyond just official statements. The government canceled all Russian-organized events scheduled to take place across Azerbaijan . A planned visit by a parliamentary delegation to Moscow was also suspended. The diplomatic rupture escalated further on June 30, when Azerbaijani police raided the Baku offices of Sputnik Azerbaijan , a Russian state-controlled media outlet that operates as one of the Kremlin's main propaganda tools. Several employees were detained, with Azerbaijani authorities claiming two of the individuals arrested were operatives of Russia's Federal Security Service ( FSB ). Among the detainees were Sputnik Azerbaijan's chief editor, Igor Kartavykh, and managing editor, Yevgeniy Belousov. In response, the outlet called the allegations "absurd." Russia retaliated by summoning Azerbaijani Ambassador Rahman Mustafayev to the Foreign Ministry on July 1, where he was informed of Moscow's formal protest over Baku's "unfriendly steps and deliberate measures to dismantle relations with Moscow ." A day later, Azerbaijan arrested eight Russian citizens described as "members of two organized crime groups" accused of cybercrimes and smuggling drugs from Iran. They were presented in court handcuffed, bruised, and bloodied. Reflecting on the sharp escalation in tensions — from deadly detentions to the raid on Sputnik's bureau — Dubnov suggested that while the fallout appears serious, it is unlikely to result in a full diplomatic rupture. "So I believe this will last for a while — not just a few days, but perhaps a few weeks — yet I don't think it will lead to anything truly consequential," he said. © 2025 The Kyiv Independent

Barnabas Tinkasiimire, a Ugandan member of parliament critical of President Yoweri Museveni, was abducted over the weekend and apparently tortured before his release, a member of the law society said on Monday. Uganda has seen increased pressure on opposition figures ahead of presidential elections in January. Museveni announced he will seek to extend his nearly 40 years in power. MP Barnabas Tinkasiimire speaks during an interview with NTV Uganda on July 1, 2025. PHOTO/SCREENGRAB by Radio France Internationale The Uganda Law Society raised the alarm over the "enforced disappearance" of Barnabas Tinkasiimire, a lawyer and MP, after his family told them on Sunday that he had been picked up by "heavily armed, drone-operating security operatives" at a petrol station in the capital Kampala . Tinkasiimire's wife said he had since been found in a suburb of the city. "They dumped him in Namungoona in the early morning hours," she said, adding that he went missing on Friday. "He is alive but very weak. We have taken him for medical attention," she said. Tinkasiimire's wife later told the law society that he had "torture marks on his body", according to its vice-president, Anthony Asiimwe. "We are concerned that a legislator and an advocate can be tortured," Asiimwe told news agencies. "It is disturbing and we demand that the government get to the root of what happened to him," he added. Outspoken critic Though Tinkasiimire is a member of Museveni's ruling party, the National Resistance Movement , he has been an outspoken critic of some aspects of the president's rule in Uganda . In a post on social media, opposition leader Bobi Wine said Tinkasiimire "has been very critical of Museveni's effort to impose his brutal son on our country, which his family believes is the reason he is being persecuted and held incommunicado". Museveni's son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, is the head of the Ugandan army and widely seen as the likely successor to his father. Kainerugaba last month boasted on social media that he had kidnapped one of Wine's aides and was torturing him in his basement. The United Nations and several rights organisations have expressed concern about repression against opposition groups ahead of the election. "Enforced disappearances are currently a serious problem in many parts of Uganda," the law society said. Almost half a century in power Meanwhile, Museveni has confirmed he intends to contest in next year's presidential election, potentially extending his rule in the east African country to nearly half a century. In a post on social media, late on Saturday, Museveni said he had "expressed my interest in running for... the position of presidential flag bearer," for his ruling National Resistance Movement ( NRM ) party. The 80-year-old has been ruler of Uganda since 1986 when he seized power after leading a five-year guerrilla war. The ruling party has changed the constitution twice in the past to allow Museveni to extend his rule, and rights activists have accused him of using security forces and patronage to maintain his grip on power. He denies the accusation. Museveni said he is seeking reelection to grow the country to a "$500 billion economy in the next five years." Uganda's GDP currently stands at about $66 billion, according to the finance ministry. The country will hold its presidential election next January, when voters will also elect lawmakers. © 2025 Copyright RFI

President Boluarte Should Veto Amendment and Support Deinstitutionalization Efforts Carlos Ríos Espinosa Associate Director, Disability Rights Division A view of the Congress building in Lima, Peru, September 17, 2018. © REUTERS/Guadalupe Pardo Having a disability should never result in a person being denied freedom. Yet across Latin America, thousands of people with disabilities are still forcibly institutionalized, often from a young age, with little control over their lives. A new  amendment to Peru’s General Law on Persons with Disabilities unfortunately exemplifies this problem. On April 2, 2025, Peru’s Congress added article 29.2 to the law, which states: “The State promotes the creation of specialized care centers and temporary and permanent shelters for persons with disabilities.” The amendment ignores the principles of the  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which Peru is a party to. In the years I’ve spent meeting people with disabilities in institutions across the region, I’ve encountered story after story like  Mariana’s . Blind since childhood, Mariana was put in an institution in Brazil at age 12. By 18, she still did not know how to read, write, or use braille due to her limited access to education. Her life was entirely controlled by others. Institutionalization is one of the  most widespread forms of segregation and discrimination against people with disabilities throughout Latin America. Although reliable data is scarce, the patterns are clear. Many people with disabilities in institutions remain there for years—often until death—where their lives are strictly controlled, including when and what to eat, the activities they can engage in, and whom they are allowed to interact with. Many countries continue to  publicly fund building or maintaining institutions, believing they are the only viable places for people with disabilities to live.  Peru has actually taken recent steps toward deinstitutionalization through a  strategy adopted in February 2025 by its National Council for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities (CONADIS). Though the strategy remains in its early stages, the introduction of article 29.2 this month and its authorization of “specialized care centers and temporary and permanent shelters for persons with disabilities,” permanent residential institutions by different names, achieves the very opposite of deinstitutionalization. People with disabilities in Peru often enter institutions as children, like Mariana did in Brazil, to leave only when they  die , according to CONADIS. Peru’s President Dina Boluarte can and should prevent increased institutionalization by vetoing the new amendment and affirming Peru’s commitment to all peoples’ dignity, autonomy, and the right to be free, including to choose where to live. © 2025 Human Rights Watch

Tensions in Angola's Cabinda exclave are mounting, as clashes between the government and separatist groups intensify. Each side has accused the other of standing in the way of peace. By Antonio Cascais Angola considers Cabinda a legitimate province of the country. This status has been maintained through heavy police and military presence since 1975 Image: Issouf Sanogo/AFP For weeks, disturbing images have circulated on social media showing mutilated men, women and children — victims of brutal attacks, according to the separatist Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC-FAC). They claim these civilians were abused by the Angolan army in retaliation for separatist assaults. FLEC-FAC spokesman Emmanuel Nzita, speaking to DW from exile in Switzerland , confirmed these allegations, describing systematic revenge attacks by government forces against civilians. "Whenever FLEC-FAC carries out operations against occupation troops, the army responds with brutal violence against innocent people," he said. Independent verification remains difficult. The Angolan government has denied the allegations, asserting that Cabinda is largely pacified and fully controlled by security forces. Official statements from the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights regularly emphasize that civilians are not harmed. The recent accusations and images refer to alleged abuses in villages near Mbamba in May 2025. DW's requests for comment from the relevant ministries went unanswered. Conflicting accounts  The Angolan government maintains that the situation in Cabinda is increasingly stable. State media recently reported that 202 young men voluntarily had surrendered their weapons and renounced the FLEC-FAC's independence struggle. Nzita dismisses this as staged propaganda. He alleged that most of these so-called "defectors" are unemployed men from the Democratic Republic of Congo  who were never members of FLEC-FAC and barely speak Portuguese. "The government lured these young men with promises of jobs and money to legitimize their propaganda show," Nzita told DW. Five decades of conflict Resource-rich Cabinda on Africa's west coast is wedged between Congo and the Republic of Congo  — without a direct land connection to the Angolan mainland. For roughly 50 years, local groups have demanded independence from Angola . Before Angola's independence in 1975, Cabinda was a Portuguese protectorate. Its integration into Angola occurred without local consent, an act still considered illegitimate by many inhabitants. FLEC-FAC is fragmented into mult iple factions with varying demands and methods. A 2006 peace agreement failed to end the conflict, as not all separatists adhered to it. Political claims and legal foundations Bartolomeu Capita, leader of the Cabindan National Movement (Movimento Nacional de Cabinda, MNC), a purely political independence movement, emphasized Cabinda's unique cultural and historical identity.  "Our region is geographically separated from Angola, culturally distinct, and historically independent," he told DW. Capita distances himself from the armed FLEC-FAC, which he claims is manipulated by foreign intelligence agencies. Now a stateless refugee living in Germany , he advocates a diplomatic solution grounded in "binding international agreements." The Cabindan National Movement primarily cites the 1885 Treaty of Simulambuco, which granted Cabinda protectorate status under Portugal and obligated Portugal to protect its territorial integrity. The incorporation of Cabinda into Angola in 1975 is therefore regarded as illegal under international law. Oil wealth amid social hardship Cabinda produces around 60% of Angola's oil, generating roughly $40 billion (€35.2 billion) annually. Yet the region's living conditions have worsened drastically over decades. Average life expectancy has plummeted from 75 years during colonial times to just 48 today. Child and maternal mortality rates rank among the highest worldwide. Oil spills off the coast have exacerbated environmental damage and further degraded local livelihoods. "Human rights and environmental protection in Cabinda are so severely violated that it amounts to near-genocide," said Capita. © 2025 Deutsche Welle

Inadequate Protection by Warring Parties By Human Rights Watch One of the buses burned in the attack in Kobe, Mali, February 7, 2025. © 2025 Private (Nairobi) – An apparent Islamist armed group attacked a civilian convoy escorted by Malian armed forces and allied militias in northeastern Mali on February 7, 2025, killing at least 34 civilians and injuring 34 others, Human Rights Watch said today. The loss of civilian life underscores the need for all parties to the conflict to better protect civilians from military operations. Witnesses said that in the early afternoon of February 7, Islamist fighters attacked a convoy of at least 19 civilian vehicles carrying over 100 civilians, mostly miners from Niger and traders from Mali, as they travelled from the towns of Gao to Ansongo, about 90 kilometers south, along a road where civilians had previously been attacked. At least five military pickup trucks and several motorbikes carrying Malian soldiers and militiamen escorted the convoy. Witnesses said that when the convoy reached the village of Kobe, the fighters opened fire on the convoy, and the soldiers and militiamen returned fire. “The attack at Kobe demonstrates the deadly risks civilians in Mali face just going about their daily lives,” said Ilaria Allegrozzi , senior Sahel researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Malian authorities should impartially investigate the incident to determine whether the attackers violated the laws of war and how their own security forces can better protect civilians at risk.” Human Rights Watch interviewed six witnesses to the attack, three people who assisted the injured, and several residents of Gao. Witnesses said the convoy stretched along about one kilometer of the road with two military vehicles in the front and three in the back. “All of a sudden we heard gunshots, there was intense shooting,” said a 51-year-old man who was injured as he jumped off a bus near the front of the convoy. “I felt something on my right thigh, then I saw blood, I lay down and played dead until soldiers rescued me.” A 50-year-old man, whose son, 20, and daughter, 10, were both wounded in the attack, said: “Bullets were flying over my head, terrorists were shooting and screaming ‘Allah Akbar,’ [and] people panicked and ran away. My son was shot in the buttocks and right thigh, my daughter in the legs and arms.” The attacking forces have not been conclusively identified. The Malian army chief of staff released an initial statement on February 7 saying that the attack on the convoy caused 25 civilian deaths, with 13 injured. The statement said that soldiers engaged in “violent combat” with the fighters and later recovered the bodies of “19 terrorists,” as well as weapons and other equipment. The number of Malian soldiers and militiamen killed and wounded was not reported. The attack occurred in an area where the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) armed group has been fighting Malian security forces for over a decade. The Islamist group has often clashed with Malian forces and fighters of the Russia-backed Wagner Group, which has supported the Malian government since December 2021 . Witnesses and residents said that a week before the attack at Kobe, Malian soldiers and Wagner fighters attacked ISGS fighters along the same road, killing several and recovering weapons and money. They said the ISGS has been present along the road linking Gao to Ansongo for at least three years and often imposed illegal tolls on travelers. The civilians killed in the attack included 13 Malian nationals and 21 foreigners, most from Niger, according to people assisting victims as well as victims’ family members. The injured included 20 Malian nationals and 14 foreigners, also mostly Nigeriens. Human Rights Watch reviewed a list compiled by Gao residents with the names of the 13 Malian victims, including 5 women, ages 20 to 60. Witnesses and other local sources said that attacks against civilians along this road had become so common that the military authorities in Gao imposed armed escorts with travelers since late 2024. Some residents, including traders who frequently journey along the road, expressed concern that the escorts blurred the lines between military and civilians, exposing the latter to increased risks of attacks. “Soldiers just attract the attention of the armed groups,” said a 45-year-old trader from Ansongo. “Military escorts are a danger for us because if the military is attacked then civilians can be caught in the crossfire.” Since 2012, successive Malian governments have fought at least two Islamist armed groups, the Al-Qaeda-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen, JNIM) and the ISGS. The hostilities have resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians and the forcible displacement of more than 378,000 people. The departure of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in December 2023, at the  request of Malian authorities, raises grave  concerns about the protection of civilians and the  monitoring of abuses by all sides. Human Rights Watch has extensively documented widespread abuses by Islamist armed groups in Mali since 2012. It has also reported on violations of international law by Malian armed forces , allied ethnic militias , and Wagner fighters during counterinsurgency operations. All parties to Mali’s armed conflict are bound by international humanitarian law, notably Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary laws of war . Under the laws of war , attacking forces must take all feasible precautions to minimize loss of civilian life and property. Attacking forces are prohibited from carrying out deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian objects, as well as indiscriminate attacks that use methods of combat that cannot be directed at a specific military target. An attack in which the expected loss of civilian life is excessive compared to the anticipated military gain is unlawfully disproportionate. While the government forces and militia joining the convoy were legitimate military targets, the civilians and civilian vehicles were not subject to deliberate attack. The Malian government should investigate the attack on the convoy to determine whether the ISGS forces carried out a deliberate, indiscriminate, or disproportionate attack on civilians in violation of the laws of war. The military and militia forces taking part in the convoy may have failed to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians and civilian vehicles under their control against the effects of attacks. Civilian police and security personnel that guard convoys would not normally be subject to attack. “Given the countless atrocities committed by Islamist armed groups against civilians in Mali, it is understandable that the authorities want military escorts to guard civilian convoys,” Allegrozzi said. “Malian authorities should consider alternative means to protecting civilians on the roads, such as using police escorts that are not lawful military targets.” © 2025 Human Rights Watch

Hundreds put to death for non-violent drug offences over past decade, with little scrutiny of Saudis, says Amnesty Tom Levitt Saudi Arabia has executed 118 people for non-violent drug offences just this year. Nearly 600 people have been put to death since 2014, with 75% of them foreigners. Photograph: Getty Saudi Arabia has carried out a “horrifying” number of executions for drug crimes over the past decade, most of which were of foreign nationals, according to Amnesty International. Almost 600 people have been executed over the past decade for drug-related offences, Amnesty International has found, three-quarters of whom were foreign nationals from countries including Pakistan, Syria, Yemen, Nigeria and Egypt. After a temporary moratorium on drug-related capital punishments between 2021 and 2022, the executions jumped to record levels, with 122 in 2024 and 118 so far this year up until the end of last month. With little international scrutiny of what Amnesty describes as “grossly unfair trials” and a “chilling disregard for human life”, the rights organisation warned that the death toll would only increase. Dana Ahmed, Amnesty International’s Middle East researcher, said: “We are witnessing a truly horrifying trend, with foreign nationals being put to death at a startling rate for crimes that should never carry the death penalty. “Convincing states to call out and condemn Saudi rights abuses was never easy, given its deep pockets and geopolitical heft. With ongoing conflicts in the Middle East … scrutiny has dwindled even further,” she said. Amnesty said it had found foreign nationals who had been “deceived and exploited” after being lured into drug trafficking while migrating for work, with rewards that did not justify the risk of a death penalty for their crime. It highlighted the case of seven Ethiopians and a Somali man now on death row accused of trafficking 153kg of cannabis estimated to be worth about $3.8m (£2.79m). According to the men’s testimony in court documents, they were recruited with the promise of a “meagre $267 per person”. The limited education and disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds of some foreign nationals on death row increased their risk of exploitation and made it more difficult for them to access legal representation in Saudi Arabia, according to Amnesty. Its report found a lack of access to legal representatives, inadequate consular support and no access to effective interpretation. At least four cases documented by Amnesty involved people who reported being subjected to torture or other ill treatment during pre-trial detention to extract confessions. Many also did not know the status of their appeals or when their execution might occur, with some only informed by prison officials a day before they were put to death. Kristine Beckerle, Amnesty International’s deputy regional director for the Middle East and North Africa, said: “The death penalty is the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. “Saudi Arabia’s allies in the international community must exert urgent pressure on the authorities to halt their execution spree and uphold international human rights obligations.” Saudi officials were contacted for comment. © 2025 Guardian News & Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved. (dcr)

By: Vasif Huseynov (Source: TASS) A Russian raid in Ekaterinburg targeting ethnic Azerbaijanis on June 27 resulted in deaths, injuries, and allegations of torture. This ignited a severe diplomatic crisis, with Baku accusing Moscow of ethnic violence and launching a criminal investigation. Russia-Azerbaijan relations have been deteriorating since the crash of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 in December 2024, leading to canceled high-level visits, suspended bilateral commissions and Russian cultural events, and harsh criticism of Russia in Azerbaijani state media. Azerbaijan appears to be leveraging the crisis to push for a more equal relationship with Russia, although a complete break in relations remains unlikely due to strong political and economic ties. On June 27, Russian special forces conducted a violent raid in Ekaterinburg targeting ethnic Azerbaijanis. This sparked a significant escalation in tensions between Baku and Moscow, further straining an already fragile bilateral relationship ( Report.az , June 27). The operation, which focused on a group of Azerbaijanis suspected of murder in the early 2000s, resulted in the extrajudicial killing of two brothers, Ziyaddin and Huseyn Safarov, and injuries to several others, with nine individuals detained. According to Azerbaijani media, the raid involved brutal tactics, including beatings, electric shocks, and degrading treatment, prompting a fierce reaction from Baku ( Report.az , June 30). Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry issued a strong response, demanding a prompt investigation and prosecution of those responsible, and the country’s Prosecutor General launched a criminal case accusing Russian police of torturing and deliberately killing the brothers ( Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan , June 27; Report.az , July 2). Azerbaijani authorities and media have framed the incident as a deliberate act of ethnic violence, with the Prosecutor General’s office alleging that the brothers died from “post-traumatic shock” after severe beatings ( Azertag.az , July 2). Russia’s claim that one death was due to a heart attack has been met with skepticism in Baku, where family members and survivors reported torture and degrading treatment ( Report.az , July 1). Both sides summoned the other’s ambassadors and issued verbal notes of protest due to each other’s “unfriendly actions” ( Report.az , July 1 [1] , [2] ). In response to the Ekaterinburg raids, Azerbaijan took steps to signal its discontent. The government canceled a planned visit by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk, called off a session of the bilateral inter-parliamentary commission in Moscow, and halted all Russian cultural events in Azerbaijan ( Report.az , June 29 [1] , [2] , [3] ). State-run media outlets, such as AzTv and AZƏRTAC, unleashed unprecedented criticism of Russia and its leadership, accusing Moscow of pursuing a “systematic policy” of ethnic violence and comparing its actions to historical imperial oppression and even Nazi Germany in the 1930s ( Azertag.az , June 28; Facebook/aztvresmi , June 29). This rhetoric, combined with Azerbaijan’s arrest of two Russian journalists from Sputnik’s Baku office, underscored a deepening rift between the two countries. While the local media reported that the two were employees of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), the official charges against them were related to large-scale fraud, illegal business, and organized money laundering ( Report.az , July 1). Earlier this year, on February 24, Azerbaijan announced the closure of the Azerbaijani branch of Sputnik and reduced its accreditation to only one correspondent ( News.az , February 24). The agency appears to have disregarded the Azerbaijani government’s order and continued its operations. On July 1, Azerbaijani authorities stated that the agency was operating illegally ( Report.az , July 1). Additionally, on July 1, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs apprehended two organized criminal groups consisting of Russian citizens suspected of involvement in drug smuggling from Iran, online drug distribution, and cyber fraud operations ( Azernews.az , July 1). The publicized detention of Russian citizens, filmed and widely circulated, was largely perceived as Azerbaijan’s tit-for-tat response to the violent raids in Ekaterinburg. The Ekaterinburg incident is the latest in a series of developments that have eroded Azerbaijan-Russia relations, which began to deteriorate significantly following the crash of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 in December 2024 (see EDM , January 15). Despite repeated demands conveyed through various channels, Russia has yet to meet Azerbaijan’s requests for compensation, a thorough investigation, and an official apology. This situation has created a rather negative background for the overall bilateral relations and was accepted in Baku as Russia’s unwillingness to pursue relations with Azerbaijan on equal terms. This, coupled with subsequent events, has led to a steady erosion of trust, with Azerbaijan increasingly challenging Moscow’s regional dominance. On February 3, prior to the closure of the Baku office of the Sputnik agency, Azerbaijan had also closed the Russian Information and Cultural Center (Russian House) in Baku ( Report.az , May 2). This move was followed by a reported cyberattack on Azerbaijani media outlets that month, which Azerbaijan’s Parliamentary Commission on Countering Hybrid Threats later attributed to Russia ( Report.az , May 2). The attack was seen in Azerbaijan as retaliation for the closure of the Russian House and the shutdown of Sputnik’s Baku office. In May, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s decision to cancel his attendance at Moscow’s Victory Day parade, commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany during World War II, marked another significant snub (see EDM , May 20). The Ekaterinburg raids, combined with the unresolved airplane crash crisis and other grievances, have pushed Azerbaijan-Russia relations to their lowest point in the post-Soviet period. Baku’s response to perceived slights from Moscow, including the cancellation of cultural and diplomatic engagements, along with public criticism of the Russian leadership, signals that Azerbaijan is no longer willing to tolerate Russia’s perceived arrogance and imperial tone. This, along with the deterioration of Russia’s relations with other former Soviet countries, including Armenia, reflects Moscow’s waning influence in the former Soviet space in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine (see EDM, January 28 , February 6 ). The present level of tensions between Baku and Moscow is unprecedented in the post-Soviet period, making the future trajectory of the relationship unpredictable. While a complete break between the two is less likely due to deep economic and political ties, Azerbaijan appears to be leveraging the crisis to renegotiate its relationship with the country’s northern neighbor on more equal terms. © 2025 The Jamestown Foundation All rights reserved.