Muslim Women in Modi’s India: Hindutva’s Weaponization of Gender-based Violence against India’s Muslim women, 2002 to Today    July 2025 By Olivia Cash Muslim women in India today face a significant genocidal threat from the rise of Hindu Nationalism. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's leadership, patriarchy and religious discrimination intersect to drive sexual violence against India’s minority ethnic women. While the use of women’s bodies as battlegrounds is neither new nor unique to India, it is a fundamental characteristic of India’s communal violence. This sad reality is explored in Megha Kumar’s doctoral dissertation, Communal Riots, Sexual Violence and Hindu Nationalism in Post-Independence Gujarat (1969-2002). Her research was later published as a book, Communalism and Sexual Violence in India: The Politics of Gender, Ethnicity and Conflict (2016 and reissued by Bloomsbury in 2022). Kumar’s work identifies the critical facilitators of sexual violence in India’s communal conflicts by addressing three major pogroms that took place in Gujarat in 1969, 1985, and 2002. Taking up from where Kumar left off, this report draws comparison between riots in Gujarat 2002, those in Muzaffarnagar in 2013, and the current culture of Modi’s India, including the riots in Delhi in 2020. Three key conditions for religiously-motivated sexual attacks against Muslim women within these riots are presented: Hindutva ideology, political coordination, and impunity for violent attacks. These three factors also manifest in rising levels of hate speech, social media abuse, and conspiracies like “Love Jihad.” Together, these conditions create fertile ground for future sexual violence against Muslim women. Download & Read the Report Below:

Investigate Violence, Ensure Freedom of Assembly Ahead of September Elections A policeman stands outside a hotel in Blantyre, Malawi, May 6, 2020. © 2020 AMOS GUMULIRA/AFP via Getty Images (Johannesburg) – On June 26, 2025, about a dozen weapon-wielding men in  Malawi attacked demonstrators peacefully protesting the government’s handling of upcoming national elections, Human Rights Watch said today. The police’s apparent unwillingness to intervene to stop the violence or to arrest those responsible raises grave concerns about the government’s ability to conduct the September general election in a fair and impartial manner. The incident occurred when Citizens for Credible Elections, a local nongovernmental organization,  held protests calling for an independent audit of the voters’ roll and the resignation of top officials of the Malawi Electoral Commission. While people were protesting in Lilongwe, the capital, 10 to 20 men—some wearing masks and carrying sticks, sjamboks (heavy leather whips), and large knives—attacked the demonstrators, injuring several and damaging property as well. Civil society groups and the main opposition Democratic Progressive Party  allege that the assailants had links to a youth militia aligned with the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP). The MCP is being accused of using fear and intimidation against citizens expressing themselves in the lead-up to the September election. “Malawian authorities need to investigate this brutal attack on peaceful demonstrators and ensure that those responsible are appropriately punished,” said  Idriss Ali Nassah , senior Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch. “For Malawians to have confidence in the fairness of the upcoming election, they need to be sure the police will respond promptly and impartially to threats or acts violence, no matter who is responsible.” Government and law enforcement agencies are responsible for upholding the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly and for ensuring that demonstrators can safely protest in line with Malawi’s  constitution and international standards. The electoral commission’s  unwillingness to allow various local organizations access to voter rolls to inspect it for any inconsistencies that can lead to vote rigging has heightened citizens and civil society’ s concerns about the fairness of the elections . Sylvester Namiwa, head of the Center for Democracy and Economic Development Initiatives and the chief organizer of the protests, told Human Rights Watch that as the protest was about to begin, assailants attacked those who had gathered. He said that while police and other law enforcement officers looked on, the men severely beat him, dragged him toward a Toyota SUV, and attempted to abduct him. He added that he escaped the attempted abduction when police fired tear gas. The attackers then stole a public address system that the protesters were using, damaged several vehicles, and set two cars on fire. Namiwa was treated for his injuries at a local hospital. A member of Citizens for Credible Elections said that as assailants beat her up, she pleaded with the police for protection. They did not intervene, and the attack left her with a cut on her hand and back injuries. Local human rights activists and  journalists covering the demonstrations corroborated demonstrators’ accounts, saying that they witnessed police officers watching and not doing anything to protect the protesters, even when it was clear that protesters’ lives were in danger. No assailants were arrested; additionally, police  did not respond to media queries about law enforcement’s response to the attacks. In November 2024, opposition parties and civil society organizations alleged that the MCP had organized the  violent attack of a demonstration for electoral reforms by masked men with weapons. At that time, witnesses accused law enforcement officers of standing by while the masked men assaulted peaceful protesters, just as they did at the June 26, 2025 protests. Governments have an obligation under international law to respect, facilitate, and protect the right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Malawi is party to the  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights , which sets out these rights. The United Nations Human Rights Committee, the international expert body that monitors compliance with the ICCPR, has stated in a  general comment that governments have “positive duties to facilitate peaceful assemblies and to make it possible for participants to achieve their objectives.” The  African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly state that “the rights to freedom of association and assembly are fundamental rights that should underpin all democratic societies in which individuals can freely express their views on all issues concerning their society.” Furthermore, when people express these rights, states are mandated to “protect associations, including their principal and most visible members, from threats, harassment, interference, intimidation or reprisals by third parties and non-state actors.” “The Malawian government needs to uphold human rights and the rule of law by investigating, arresting, and appropriately prosecuting both the attackers and those behind the violence,” Nassah said. “Ahead of a crucial general election in September, authorities need to send a strong message that human rights violations will not be tolerated.” © 2025 Human Rights Watch

A bombed shopping centre lies in ruins in Odesa. © UNOCHA/Serhii Morozov 30 June 2025 I Human Rights Civilian casualties and violations in Ukraine have significantly escalated in recent months, including a sharp rise in often deadly drone attacks, the UN human rights office, OHCHR, said in a report published on Monday.   It covers the period from 1 December 2024 to 31 May 2025, during which 986 civilians were killed and 4,807 injured – a 37 per cent increase compared to the same period the previous year. “ The war in Ukraine – now in its fourth year – is becoming increasingly deadly for civilians ,” said  Danielle Bell, Head of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU). “We continue to document patterns of violence that are inconsistent with obligations under international humanitarian law.” Concern over use of short-range drones Most casualties occurred in areas under Ukrainian Government control, primarily due to Russian attacks using long-range explosive weapons in populated areas and short-range drones near frontline locations. Nearly half of all casualties were caused by missiles, loitering munitions and air-dropped bombs in densely populated areas. At least three attacks involved the use of missiles with fragmentation warheads which detonated above ground and scattered fragments across large open areas, killing and injuring many civilians at once. The use of short-range drones is driving the rise in civilian casualties, the report said. OHCHR  verified that 207 civilians were killed and 1,365 injured in these attacks. Among the deadliest incidents was a Russian drone strike on a civilian bus transporting employees of a mining company to work in the Dnipropetrovsk region. Eight women and two men were killed, and 57 people were injured. “The high number of civilian casualties from the use of short-range drones, which allow operators to see their targets in real time, raises grave concerns,” Ms. Bell said . “ Our findings strongly suggest a failure to distinguish between civilian and military targets, and to take all feasible precautions to verify the military nature of those targets – or worse, an intentional decision not to. ” During the same period, Russian forces struck at least five hospitals directly. Some of the attacks used multiple loitering munitions, suggesting potential deliberate targeting of the hospitals in violation of international humanitarian law. Prisoners of war Serious violations against prisoners of war (POWs) also remain a major concern, according to the report. OHCHR documented credible allegations that at least 35 Ukrainian POWs and one Russian POW were executed during the reporting period. Staff interviewed 117 recently released Ukrainian POWs and two detained medical personnel, nearly all of whom described being tortured and ill-treated in captivity. This included severe beatings, electric shocks, sexual violence, dog attacks, and deliberate humiliation, often carried out by personnel wearing balaclavas to conceal their identities. Ms. Bell said the continued brutalization of Ukrainian prisoners of war is not only inhumane, but a serious violation of international law. “ These are not isolated incidents - they point to well-documented patterns of widespread and systematic torture that demand urgent and unambiguous accountability, and measures toward prevention ,” she said. Meanwhile, more than half of the Russian POWs and third-country nationals held by Ukraine also reported abuse – including torture, ill-treatment, threats, and internment in unofficial facilities – which mostly occurred in transit places before arrival at official places of internment. Rights concerns in Russian-occupied areas The report highlights ongoing human rights concerns with Ukrainian civilians unlawfully detained by Russian authorities, predominantly in occupied territory. People who have been released described torture, ill-treatment, and dire conditions of detention. Ukrainians in occupied territory faced increased coercion to adopt Russian citizenship. OHCHR documented over 16,000 homes listed by Russian occupation authorities as potentially “abandoned” and therefore at risk of being confiscated. Displaced residents faced severe legal and logistical obstacles, as well as security risks, to reclaim their property. Ukrainian children recruited Another issue covered in the report is the recruitment and use of Ukrainian children “for sabotage activities of increasing gravity against Ukrainian military objectives.” The children reportedly were recruited by unidentified actors, likely affiliated with Russia, according to Ukrainian law enforcement authorities. Some of these youngsters were killed or injured, while others are facing prosecution after being enticed via social media to commit arson or plant explosives. “Using children to commit acts of sabotage or violence exploits their vulnerability and endangers their lives,” Ms. Bell said. “ It compounds their suffering by exposing them to violence, coercion, and harsh legal consequences. ” OHCHR also voiced concern over the situation of older people, mainly women, as well as persons with disabilities, who remain at disproportionate risk, particularly in frontline areas. Many are unable to evacuate due to poverty and limited housing options, while those who can often face long stays in shelters that lack appropriate facilities, or they are placed in institutional settings due to the absence of suitable alternatives. © 2025 United Nations.

From critical minerals to M23 and grassroots exclusion, experts weigh in on whether the US-brokered agreement can succeed. US President Donald Trump holds up a document after DRC's Foreign Minister Therese Kayikwamba Wagner, right, and her Rwandan counterpart Olivier Nduhungirehe, left, signed a peace agreement on June 27, 2025 [Manuel Balce Ceneta/AP] By Gershwin Wanneburg Cape Town, South Africa – Five months ago, with a single social media post, United States President Donald Trump put half a million people in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) at risk when he announced the closure of USAID – the single biggest aid donor in the country. A few days ago in Washington, DC, the same administration claimed credit for extricating the Congolese people from a decades-long conflict often described as the deadliest since World War II. This year alone, thousands of people have died and hundreds of thousands have been displaced. While the White House may be celebrating its diplomatic triumph in brokering a peace deal between tense neighbours DRC and Rwanda, for sceptical observers and people caught up in conflict and deprivation in eastern DRC, the mood is bound to be far more muted, experts say. “I think a lot of ordinary citizens are hardly moved by the deal and many will wait to see if there are any positives to come out of it,” said Michael Odhiambo, a peace expert for Eirene International in Uvira in eastern DRC, where 250,000 displaced people lost access to water due to Trump’s aid cutbacks. Odhiambo suggests that for Congolese living in towns controlled by armed groups – like the mineral-rich area of Rubaya, held by M23 rebels – US involvement in the war may cause anxiety, rather than relief. “There is fear that American peace may be enforced violently as we have seen in Iran. Many citizens simply want peace and even though [this is] dressed up as a peace agreement, there is fear it may lead to future violence that could be justified by America protecting its business interests.” The agreement, signed by the Congolese and Rwandan foreign ministers in Washington on Friday, is an attempt to staunch the bleeding in a conflict that has raged in one form or another since the 1990s. At the signing, Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe called it a “turning point”, while his Congolese counterpart, Therese Kayikwamba Wagner, said the moment had “been long in coming”. “It will not erase the pain, but it can begin to restore what conflict has robbed many women, men and children of – safety, dignity and a sense of future,” Wagner said. Trump has meanwhile said he deserves to be lauded for bringing the parties together, even suggesting that he deserves a Nobel prize for his efforts. While the deal does aim to quell decades of brutal conflict, observers point to concerns with the fine print: That it was also brokered after Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi said in March that he was willing to partner with the US on a minerals-for-security deal. Experts say US companies hope to gain access to minerals like tantalum, gold, cobalt, copper and lithium that they desperately need to meet the demand for technology and beat China in the race for Africa’s natural resources. But this has raised fears among critics that the US’s main interest in the agreement is to further foreign extraction of eastern DRC’s rare earth minerals, which could lead to a replay of the violence seen in past decades, instead of a de-escalation. M23 and FDLR: Will armed groups fall in line? The main terms of the peace deal – which is also supported by Qatar – require Kinshasa and Kigali to establish a regional economic integration framework within 90 days and form a joint security coordination mechanism within 30 days. Additionally, the DRC should facilitate the disengagement of the armed group, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), after which Rwanda will lift its “defensive measures” inside the DRC. According to the United Nations and other international rights groups, there are about 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops on the ground in eastern DRC, as Kigali actively backs M23 rebels who have seized key cities in the region this year. Rwanda has repeatedly denied these claims. M23 is central to the current conflict in eastern DRC. The rebel group, which first took up arms in 2012, was temporarily defeated in 2013 before it reemerged in 2022. This year, it made significant gains, seizing control of the capitals of both North Kivu and South Kivu provinces in January and February. Although separate Qatar-led mediation efforts are under way regarding the conflict with M23, the rebel group is not part of this agreement signed last week. “This deal does not concern M23. M23 is a Congolese issue that is going to be discussed in Doha, Qatar. This is a deal between Rwanda and DRC,” Gatete Nyiringabo Ruhumuliza, a Rwandan political commentator, told Al Jazeera’s Inside Story, explaining that the priority for Kigali is the neutralisation of the FDLR – which was established by Hutus linked to the killings of Tutsis in the 1994 Rwanda genocide. “Rwanda has its own defensive mechanisms [in DRC] that have nothing to do with M23,” Ruhumuliza said, adding that Kigali will remove these mechanisms only once the FDLR is dealt with. But the omission of M23 from the US-brokered process points to one of the potential cracks in the deal, experts say. “The impact of the agreement may be more severe on the FDLR as it explicitly requires that it ceases to exist,” said Eirene International’s Odhiambo. “The M23, however, is in a stronger position given the leverage they have from controlling Goma and Bukavu and the income they are generating in the process.” The US-brokered process requires the countries to support ongoing efforts by Qatar to mediate peace between the DRC and M23. But by including this, the deal also “seems to temper its expectations regarding the M23″, Odhiambo argues. Additionally, “M23 have the capacity to continue to cause mayhem even if Rwanda decided to act against it,” he said. “Therefore, I think the agreement will not in itself have a major impact on the M23.” In terms of the current deal’s effect on the two countries, both risk being exposed for their role in the conflict, he added. “I think that if Rwanda manages to prevail on the M23 as anticipated by the deal, it may prove the long-suspected proxy relationship between them.” For DRC, he said Kinshasa executing the terms of the agreement will not augur well for the FDLR, but suggested calls to neutralise them may be a tall order. “If [Kinshasa] manage to do it, then they remove Rwanda’s justification for its activities in the DRC. But to do so may be a big ask given the capacity of the FARDC [DRC military], and failure to do so will feed into the narrative of a dysfunctional and incapable state. Therefore, I think the DRC has more at stake than Rwanda.” On the other hand, Tshisekedi’s government could score political points, according to Jakob Kerstan, DRC country director for the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Foundation (KAS), which promotes democracy and the rule of law. “The sentiment … of the Congolese population, it’s very much like the conflict has been left behind: No one really cares in the world; the Congo is only being exploited, and so on. And the fact that there is now a global power caring about the DRC … I think this is a gain,” he said. He feels there is also less pressure on Kinshasa’s government today than earlier this year when M23 was first making its rapid advance. “There are no protests any more. Of course, people are angry about the situation [in the east], but they kind of accept [it]. And they know that militarily they won’t be able to win it. The Kinshasa government, they know it as well.” ‘Peace for exploitation’? Although Kinshasa appears to have readily offered the US access to the country’s critical minerals in exchange for security, many observers on the continent find such a deal concerning. Congolese analyst Kambale Musavuli told Africa Now Radio that reports of the possible allocation of billions of dollars worth of minerals to the US, was the “Berlin Conference 2.0″, referring to the 19th-century meeting during which European powers divided up Africa. Musavuli also bemoaned the lack of accountability for human rights abuses. Meanwhile, Congolese Nobel laureate Denis Mukwege called the agreement a “scandalous surrender of sovereignty” that validated foreign occupation, exploitation, and decades of impunity. An unsettling undertone of the deal is “the spectre of resource exploitation, camouflaged as diplomatic triumph”, said political commentator Lindani Zungu, writing in an op-ed for Al Jazeera. “This emerging ‘peace for exploitation’ bargain is one that African nations, particularly the DRC, should never be forced to accept in a postcolonial world order.” Meanwhile, for others, the US may be the ones who end up with a raw deal. KAS’s Kerstan believes Trump’s people may have underestimated the complexities of doing business in the DRC – which has scared off many foreign companies in the past. Even those who welcome this avenue towards peace acknowledge that the situation remains fragile. Alexandria Maloney, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s US-based Africa Center, praised the Trump deal for combining diplomacy, development and strategic resource management. However, she warned against extraction without investment in infrastructure, skills and environmental safeguards. “Fragile governance structures in eastern DRC, particularly weak institutional capacity and fragmented local authority, could undercut enforcement or public trust,” Maloney told the think tank’s website. Furthermore, China’s “entrenched footprint in the DRC’s mining sector may complicate implementation and heighten geopolitical tensions”, she added. For analysts, the most optimistic assessments about the US’s role in this process appear to say: Thank goodness the Americans stepped in; while the least optimistic say: Are they in over their heads? Overall, this Congo peace agreement seems to have few supporters outside multilateral diplomatic fora such as the UN and the African Union. For many, the biggest caution is the exclusion of Congolese people and civil society organisations – which is where previous peace efforts have also failed. “I have no hopes at all [in this deal],” said Vava Tampa, the founder of grassroots Congolese antiwar charity Save the Congo. “There isn’t much difference between this deal and the dozens of other deals that have been made in the past,” he told Al Jazeera’s Inside Story. “This deal does two things really: It denies Congolese people – Congolese victims and survivors – justice; and simultaneously it also fuels impunity,” he said, calling instead for an international criminal tribunal for Congo and for perpetrators of violence in both Kigali and Kinshasa to be held accountable. “Peace begins with justice,” Tampa said. “You cannot have peace or stability without justice.” © 2025 Al Jazeera Media Network

By Reporters Without Borders @ Canary Mugume / RSF At least 18 journalists were violently attacked by security forces while covering the legislative by-elections in Kawempe North, a northern neighbourhood in the capital Kampala. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) strongly condemns these aggressive assaults and calls on the authorities to guarantee journalists’ safety, namely by ensuring that the army’s commitments to press freedom are honoured. “They made us take off our shirts to cover our eyes, told us to lie down and hit us with sticks and the top of their guns,”  Abubaker Lubowa , a photojournalist for the independent daily  Daily Monitor , recounted to RSF. At least 13 journalists sent to cover the  by-elections in Kawempe North , a northern district of Kampala, on 13 March were severely beaten by Ugandan security forces, including the army – the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) – and the Joint Anti-Terrorist Task Force (JATT). Five other journalists had also been assaulted while covering the election campaign three weeks earlier and one of them  nearly lost sight in his left eye. All were identifiable as journalists at the time of the attacks. Faced with the shocking scale of violence committed by its members, on 13 March the UPDF issued a  press statement announcing investigations would be conducted into the assaults and the results “will guide the measures to be undertaken, including disciplinary processes.” When contacted by RSF, UPDF spokesman Chris Magezi said the violence was the result of a “misunderstanding and miscoordination,” and that “the journalists must have been mixed up with violent supporters.” He also supported the idea of providing UPDF members with more training on how to protect journalists during such events.  "The extreme violence shown by the forces of law and order towards clearly identified journalists confirms there are serious safety problems facing media professionals. Such treatment, by both the army and an anti-terrorist agency during an election period, is unacceptable. As the country will hold presidential elections in less than a year, it is vital that journalists are able to work in complete safety. RSF calls on the Ugandan authorities to ensure that the army fulfils its commitments to properly investigate and punish the perpetrators of these assaults and train its members to protect journalists." Sadibou Marong Director of RSF’s Sub-Saharan Africa Bureau Degrading treatment On 13 March, while covering the arrival of a candidate at the Kazo-Angola polling station in Kawempe, at least six journalists were attacked and held for over an hour in an army van. Among them were  Raymond Tamale , a journalist with the privately-owned  NTV Uganda television station, his cameraman  Dennis Kabugo and Abubaker Lubowa, who explained to RSF that, after confiscating their shoes, watches and equipment, the officers, whose faces were masked, hit them on the head, ribs, elbows and knees. "They told us to lie down in the van, then pretend to sleep, to snore. They forced us to count to 15 and hit us at each number. The windows were covered, it was very hot, you couldn’t see anything," explained Raymond Tamale. All their equipment was destroyed, and every journalist had to receive hospital treatment. Journalists Ibrahim Ruhweza  and  Isaac Nuwagaba  from  New Vision were also held blindfolded for 20 minutes in a van by masked members of the Ugandan security agency Joint Anti-Terrorist Task Force (JATT), who beat them with sticks and electric cables before forcing them to erase their videos. At least 13 journalists were severely beaten that day, at least ten of whom went to  hospital . Several reporters who  witnessed the violence chose to stop reporting and returned to their newsrooms while others  took off their press vests to avoid being targeted. Ultra-violent campaign On 26 February, while covering the  assault of an opposition party candidate by security forces in the run-up to the elections, journalist  Miracle Ibra  of the privately owned  Top TV almost lost his sight in one eye. Two JATT officers “hit him several times in the face with a truncheon,” according to the journalist, who was seriously injured. At least four other reporters – from  NBS TV  and  NTV Uganda  – were attacked while covering the election campaign. Two of them were assaulted by JATT officers who  opened fire several times in their direction. @ Reporters Without Borders (RSF) - 2021

by Amnesty International © Private The life sentence handed down to Anglophone peace activist Abdu Karim Ali is an affront to justice, and he should be released immediately, Amnesty International said today, after obtaining the judgment convicting him. Abdu Karim Ali, who was charged with “hostility against the homeland” and “secession”, was sentenced by the military Court in Yaoundé on 16 April. He had been arrested without a warrant in Bamenda in August 2022 after he denounced torture committed and broadcast online by the leader of a pro-government militia in the south-west region of the country. He has been arbitrarily detained since then. The authorities tried Abdu Karim Ali in a military court, in violation of Cameroonian law and international human rights law and standards. - Marceau Sivieude, Amnesty International’s Interim Regional Director for West and Central Africa “Abdu Karim Ali waited nearly three years before being tried by a military court and sentenced to an extreme punishment simply for exercising his right to freedom of expression. This shameful judgment breaches international human rights law and standards,” said Marceau Sivieude, Amnesty International’s Interim Regional Director for West and Central Africa. “The authorities unlawfully held Abdu Karim Ali in prolonged arbitrary detention, and tried him in a military court, in violation of Cameroonian law and international human rights law and standards. Amnesty International calls for his immediate and unconditional release.” In May 2024, Abdul Karim Ali challenged the jurisdiction of the military tribunal in a letter, refusing to recognize its authority. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia, after he refused to appear in the military court. His lawyer told Amnesty International: “To think that he was prosecuted for his thoughts, national origins, associations and political opinion is the quintessential case of political persecution.” The lawyer also said that he has appealed the sentence. Background Abdul Karim Ali ran the Peace Research Center in Bamenda and regularly delivered speeches and trainings on peace and security. He was a vocal advocate of the Swiss-led mediation process as a way out of the Anglophone crisis. On 11 August 2022, after being arrested in the city of Bamenda, he was held for 84 days – four of which were incommunicado – at a military police station in inhumane conditions. While no formal reason was given for his detention, he was interrogated repeatedly about a video he made on 9 July 2022 denouncing a Cameroonian military chief known as ‘Moja Moja’ for torturing civilians. In February 2023, Amnesty International denounced Abdul Karim Ali’s arbitrary detention and called for his release. Hundreds of people from the Anglophone regions are still being arbitrarily detained, including  for their participation in peaceful protests denouncing the perceived discrimination against them. Many of them have been convicted by military courts on charges that criminalize the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has ordered the immediate release of several detained Anglophone activists, including Mancho Bibixy Tse , Tsi Conrad and ten others illegally deported from Nigeria to Cameroon. The Cameroon authorities have been imprisoning supporters or activists of the opposition party ‘Movement for the Renaissance of Cameroon’ (MRC) for peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Thirty-eight of them who participated in a protest in September 2020 are still detained. © 2025 Amnesty International

The Intercept June 27, 2025 The Israeli military has killed at least 410 people trying to get food at Israeli-run aid sites in Gaza in the past month. Bodies of persons shot and killed by Israeli troops ordered to fire on Palestinian civilians seeking food. Intentionally shooting and killing unarmed civilians seeking food constitutes “a likely war crime” that violates international standards on aid distribution, according to the United Nations . “Desperate, hungry people in Gaza continue to face the inhumane choice of either starving to death or risk being killed while trying to get food,” the U.N. human rights office said. Palestinian health authorities reported that Israel killed 44 people waiting for aid in separate incidents in southern and central Gaza just on Tuesday, June 24. Israeli soldiers have reportedly killed over 410 aid-seekers with bullets, tank shells, and drone-mounted weapons since Israeli/US distribution centers were established May 27.  Israeli officers and soldiers said that they were ordered to deliberately fire at unarmed civilians waiting for humanitarian aid in an investigation published by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz on Friday, June 20. The military prosecution has called for a review into possible war crimes. The Israeli military has said reports about casualties at aid sites have prompted “thorough examinations … in the Southern command” and that “instructions were issued to forces in the field following lessons learned.” “The aforementioned incidents are under review by the competent authorities,” an unnamed spokesperson for the Israeli military said in a statement emailed to The Intercept. The aid distribution sites are run by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, a nonprofit formed earlier this year for the purpose of distributing aid in collaboration with the Israeli government and American private military and security companies, under a plan created by the U.S. and Israeli governments. An open letter published earlier this week by more than a dozen human rights and legal advocacy groups, including the Center for Constitutional Rights and the International Commission of Jurists, condemned the organization of the Israeli/American Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, The letter stated that the privatized, militarized aid distribution system — and close collaboration with Israeli authorities — undermines “the core humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.” They urged corporate entities, donors, and individuals to suspend action or support that undermines international humanitarian law and “to reject any model that outsources life-saving aid to private, politically-affiliated actors and to press for the urgent restoration of independent, rights-based humanitarian access for all civilians in Gaza.” The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation has been marred with controversy from the start; the former head, Jake Wood, quit in May , worrying that “it is not possible to implement this plan while also strictly adhering to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.” Boston Consulting Group, which helped run the business, also backed out .  The Israeli military said that they allow “the American civilian organization (GHF) to distribute aid to Gaza residents independently, and operate in proximity to the new distribution zones to enable the distribution alongside the continuation of IDF operational activities in the Gaza Strip” in a statement to the Intercept. The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation did not respond to a request for comment. The American government, however, appears to be committed to this way of providing aid. On Tuesday, the Trump administration authorized a $30 million grant for the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, according to documents viewed by Reuters . Finding food has become a horrific risk for many in Gaza. Rolla Alaydi, a Palestinian American, provided The Intercept with a voice note from her cousin, Maher Ahmed, detailing how he went to an aid site on June 1 and witnessed a fatal bullet strike his friend. Maher had gone three days without flour, so when the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation first opened its facilities, he went with three friends, prompted by an invitation from a food bank. At 6 a.m., on June 1, they went to Dewar Al’aalam for food distribution, and the Americans started to signal to them with their hands to enter and take the food, by shouting on a mic “Take only one box and go home,” Mahar said in the voice note. A group of about 1,000 people went inside. Suddenly, they heard the chaotic sound of gunfire. His friend, Mohammed, was shot in the head, chest, and belly — and killed immediately. They couldn’t move for about an hour because of heavy gunfire, so they tried to give Mohammed first aid but failed. The three of them managed to get Mohammed onto a donkey carriage before taking him to Nasser Hospital. “I survived by a miracle, by a big miracle,” Maher says. “And I lost my friend, Mohammed. Mohammed was only dreaming of getting a bag of flour for his mother and family.”  Maher wrote in a June 11 Instagram post accompanying a video of Mohammed’s funeral that they “survived the worst together … until a bag of flour took him from me.” For months, environmental researcher Yaakov Garb has been using satellite data to analyze the design, location, and expansion of these facilities. Garb, a professor at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, found in an analysis published earlier this month on Harvard Dataverse that most of Gaza’s population cannot access these centers in a safe and practical way. Doing so requires crossing the dangerous Netzarim Corridor, entering a buffer zone from which Israel has banned them from entering, or a long walk across a barren rubble field, while carrying a heavy box of food. Four Israeli-run aid compounds have already been widely reported on by the media, and Garb suspects a fifth is being formed on the coast —given that its construction features appear identical to the other four. All are close to fortified Israeli military positions, he says. “The fact that four of the five compounds lie south of the Morag corridor — repeatedly indicated by Israeli officials as the intended destination for concentration of Palestinians to be displaced from the remainder of Gaza in an impending intensification of the military attacks — is not reassuring,” Garb notes in his analysis.  Israel’s upheaval of Gaza’s existing aid distribution system amid warnings of famine has angered Garb. “To cloak this kind of tactical intervention in humanitarian wrapping rubs me the wrong way,” Garb says. “If you can’t do it properly then get out of the way and let the people who can do it get to work.” Humanitarian aid experts agree. “We all saw this coming. To anyone that knows this stuff, it’s not a surprise. It is tragic,” says Maryam Z. Deloffre, an associate professor of international affairs at George Washington University who has researched aid distribution systems globally; she explains that this is why multiple nongovernmental organizations and the U.N. said they would not be involved in this way of distributing aid.  Before the war in Gaza broke out, Garb was focused on reviewing satellite imagery to look into waste burning and land contamination in the West Bank and Gaza. But over the last year, he started posting his observations about confusing evacuation warnings , which did not clearly describe which areas populations should flee from, or the so-called humanitarian safe areas , as well as the expansion of these aid compounds. “They are part and parcel of the same callousness,” he says. “These evacuation maps — if a student gave me a map like that in an introductory GIS course they would fail — and these are maps where people’s lives are hanging in the balance.” Garb has grown increasingly skeptical of the Israeli government’s actions. “I learned to trust less what people are saying and instead trust what I could see from the satellite,” he says. “I learned to trust less what people are saying and instead trust what I could see from the satellite.” Garb first started seeing the emergence of these compounds in late April, when he spotted intensive work on some big clearings that seemed different in size and formation to other military installations. He wasn’t sure if they would be used to relocate refugees instead. But as Israeli government declarations and media reports started mentioning an alternative aid distribution model in Gaza, he realized that is what these sites were going to be.   Garb’s report unpacks how the physical layout of the compounds prioritizes control and surveillance over safety. The aid sites appear to lack key facilities — such as toilets, water, and shade for recipients — and involve crowds moving in narrow lines through fenced aisles. This creates a “chokepoint”: a predictable movement path that allows for no cover or concealment. For the visitor, this kind of design is supposed to induce stress and fear. “This setup would be particularly distressing for an already traumatized population, especially given the compound’s proximity to the Israeli army forces that have been sources of violence they have experienced for almost a year and a half,” Garb writes. Aid sites should ideally have multiple exit points and freedom of movement, as well as facilities, trained deescalation facilitators, and dedicated lanes for vulnerable groups.  Asked to respond to Garb’s study and broader criticisms of their conduct around aid sites, an unnamed spokesperson with the Israeli military said it had “recently worked to reorganize the area through the installation of fences, signage placement, the opening of additional routes, and other measures.” It did not provide further detail on how many routes have opened up, or where the routes are located. A small detail from Garb’s most recent paper has been turned into a meme in recent days. Some readers have interpreted population estimates he included in his report as proof that 377,000 people in Gaza are missing per official Israeli military statistics; Garb clarified to The Intercept that this is a misinterpretation. The numbers in his report refer to estimates for just three particular areas of Gaza, not its entirety; he also noted there was a typo in the map for the al-Mawasi area that he would promptly correct. The official death toll of Israel’s war on Gaza, as reported by the Gaza Health Ministry, stands at more than 55,000. Two reports published in the British medical journal Lancet estimated that the real number is likely closer to 64,000 dead from direct attacks, with the number of deaths from disease, malnutrition , and other health issues related to the conflict potentially climbing above 180,000. Deloffre, the GWU professor, points out that military involvement in handing out food can be problematic. Two of the key principles of humanitarian work are neutrality (not taking sides in a conflict) and impartiality (providing assistance to everyone without discrimination), Deloffre says. Militaries can’t be impartial and neutral when they are party to the conflict, she adds. What’s more, “people are generally afraid of the military; you don’t see the military and feel you can approach them.” Deloffre worries more broadly about backsliding to a time when humanitarian need was not the main driving force behind humanitarian action and decisions about who to help were driven by political interests. She also notes that the core humanitarian principles — mentioned in the open letter — are not legally binding, and are instead adopted by nonstate actors such as NGOs and the Internatinoal Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The principles are part of a Red Cross code of conduct, which was codified in the early 90s.  Israel claims that it needs this level of control to ensure aid doesn’t get diverted to Hamas . But humanitarian experts say that Israel could have used a good-faith effort to address any such concern through the existing system. © 2025 THE INTERCEPT. See also:

An aerial view shows a mass funeral ceremony being held at the Holy Cross Church in the Al-Qassaa neighborhood of Damascus, Syria, on June 24, 2025. (Izettin Kasim via Getty Images) Christians in Nigeria and Syria were hit with exceptionally brutal jihadi attacks on two consecutive weekends this month. While the circumstances differed, both have important implications for American interests. President Trump’s foreign policy team should be paying closer attention. In Nigeria’s Middle Belt state of Benue, which has a large Christian population, an estimated 200 displaced Christians were sleeping in the marketplace when they were attacked and then murdered “with extreme cruelty,” as Pope Leo XIV put it, around midnight on June 13. More than 200 Fulani Muslim herders swarmed into Yelewata on motorcycles and on foot, firing AK-47s indiscriminately and shouting “Allahu Akhbar,” diocesan priests in Makurdi (the capital of Benue) told Aid to the Church in Need. Two weeks before, 68 Christians were murdered in Fulani raids elsewhere in Benue, including the hometown of Catholic Bishop Wilfred Anagbe, who had recently testified before the U.S. Congress about earlier Fulani atrocities in Makurdi diocese. Similar Fulani attacks are frequently reported in the Nigerian states of Kaduna and Plateau, too. This continues a sickening pattern of mass murder that results in more Christians killed for their faith each year in Nigeria than anywhere else. Despite a decade of relentless carnage like this and indications that their attacks are coordinated and financed, little is known about these militants among the Fulani Muslim nomadic herders. Nigeria’s federal government has neglected to undertake a thorough, objective, and transparent investigation of their leadership, organization, and intent. Nor does it prosecute them. If federal troops show up, they are outgunned and poorly trained. Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu seems indifferent to the Christians’ plight. In Benue, Makurdi tribal and church leaders’ appeals for government protection have fallen on deaf ears. For example, a Makurdi Catholic priest emailed me that the government has ignored church pleas to have naval patrols at three points on the Benue River where Fulani raiders and kidnappers regularly enter from Nasarawa State. In Kaduna and Plateau, journalists report the militant Fulanis arrive from forest encampments and attack Christian villages unimpeded, or they arrive after crossing Nigeria’s wide-open borders from the Sahel, where, the New York Times recently reported, al-Qaeda is recruiting Fulani youth. These Fulani herders are not trying to simply graze cattle, but to eradicate the Christian presence. A recent U.N. report states that 3,790 survivors of Fulani attacks in displacement camps in Benue’s hard-hit Makurdi area were mostly “smallholder farmers” driven out “by violent land grabs.” Since authorities don’t work to return these lands, much less defend them from further attack, millions of Christian farmers are now left homeless and dependent on international aid. Many church observers see this as a coordinated effort to Islamize the area. A Makurdi priest told reporters: “It is all about seizing the lands and changing the demography of Benue State.” Emeka Umeagbalasi, who chairs the Nigerian International Society for Civil Liberties and the Rule of Law, is among those who conclude that the government’s inaction indicates complicity. “The government we have in Nigeria is for radical Islamism,” he told the Catholic media Crux, on March 8. The U.S. government does not acknowledge the Fulani’s persecution of millions of Middle Belt Christians. The Biden administration removed Nigeria from the State Department’s list of Countries of Particular Concern (CPC), the most egregious violators of religious freedom. State’s most recent religious-freedom report on Nigeria (from 2023) posits a neo-Marxist theory about the attacks; namely, climate changes is causing “clashes” between two rural socioeconomic groups over scarce natural resources. It overlooks the intent of the militant Fulani aggressors and Abuja’s apparent grant of impunity to them. The State Department’s climate-change narrative is echoed by the U.N. It has posted an article with the woke title: “Climate change fuels deadly conflict in Nigeria’s Middle Belt.” It describes a Benue farmer raped, widowed, and displaced by Fulani herders, then leads the reader to conclude that the Fulani are the real victims: “‘Climate change is a new challenge that we didn’t experience 20 or 30 years ago; it’s really impacting us,’ says Ibrahim Galma, Secretary of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association,” it reports without comment. Meanwhile in Damascus, on Sunday, June 22, an Islamist suicide bomber burst into Mar Elias Greek Orthodox Church and killed 25 worshippers and wounded dozens more. Social media showed horrifying photos of carnage inside a shattered church adorned with icons of early martyrs. This is the first major attack against the Christians since Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former head of the Islamist terror group Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), seized power last December (he became president in January). To get U.S. sanctions lifted, he rebranded as a nationalist and pledged toleration of the country’s minorities. This attack has tested that promise. The Christians fear that the church bombing is the opening salvo of a renewed genocidal assault against them. From its caliphate in Raqqa, ISIS waged genocide against the Christians, as the U.S. officially recognized in 2016. ISIS directed Christians to be killed, enslaved, taken hostage, or reduced to semi-slave status under Islamic dhimmi laws. Syria’s ancient Christian church mostly fled. Those remaining number only 300,000, down from more than 2 million in 2010. U.S. religious-freedom analysis narrowly focuses on persecution by the regime. It also needs to consider whether Sharaa protects Christians and other minorities from non-state persecutors. The Christians, lacking their own militias, are particularly vulnerable. ISIS is now recruiting from among HTS foreign militants. A looming threat stems from the U.S. agreement requiring tens of thousands of ISIS militants and their families under Kurdish guard there to be transferred to the regime. Thus far, Sharaa seems to be taking a page from Nigeria and passively watching as jihadis take matters of religio-ethnic cleansing into their own hands. Since the attack, he hasn’t visited the targeted Christians or strengthened protections for them. With no other political recourse, Christians defiantly demonstrated in Damascus this week, chanting “Christ is risen! Raise your crosses. We do not fear your death threats!” U.S. Syria envoy Tom Barrack denounced the attack, but otherwise the U.S. has not reacted. This month, Nigeria and Syria saw massacres of their defenseless Christians carried out by extremists intent on purifying those lands for Islam. In each case, the violence was met with indifference by their respective governments, either out of sympathy for the killers or weakness. Religious freedom is a pillar of American foreign policy. It’s a right we call unalienable. The Trump administration should speak out against these atrocities, designate Nigeria as a CPC, stop blaming climate change for the persecution of Christians, and otherwise effectively press these governments to protect their vulnerable religious communities, a primary government responsibility. This would not be pro-democracy nation building, but a necessary defense of a targeted minority. The endless slaughter of these defenseless Christians must be stopped. © 2025 Hudson Institute, Inc.

June 23 2025 By Girmay Gebru Relatives and friends came together for the first time in five years. Girmay Gebru / BBC There have been celebrations at the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea as communities from the frontier villages came together for the first time in five years. Separated by the closed border since the outbreak of the 2020 conflict in Ethiopia's northern Tigray region, and subsequent political tensions, Sunday's coming together was a symbolic moment of peace and reconciliation. The reunion of families and friends took place in the Ethiopian town of Zalambessa in the presence of village elders and religious leaders. The move to re-open a section of the border was organised by local activists and community figures without the official backing of the authorities on either side. But those behind it indicated that they had the blessing from officials in Tigray and Eritrea. Many at the celebration described it as an emotional and long-overdue gathering. For five years, relatives and friends whose communities straddled the international boundary had not been able to see each other across the militarised border. Many in Zalambessa and the nearby villages had suffered economic hardship and social fragmentation during the two-year war in Tigray that ended in November 2022. People had been forced to flee their homes, with more than 55,000 people now living in makeshift shelters in Adigrat, 30km (19 miles) south of Zalambessa, relying on relatives for survival. The border has officially remained closed despite the end of the war amid tensions between the two governments. "Enough of the past, let's sit at the table of peace and build a better future," people chanted on Sunday. In a symbolic move, people waved the flags of both Eritrea and Ethiopia's Tigray region. Girmay Gebru / BBC Cross-border trade near Zalambessa has also re-started with people using both the Ethiopian and Eritrean currencies. "As people, we want to eat, trade and attend social events as before. Their siblings are here, their siblings are there. What we need is peace," one woman from Tigray told the BBC. But a lot of work still needs to be done to repair the damage of the war. Zalambessa's infrastructure remains broken, with electricity, telephone and banking services completely destroyed. Much of the infrastructure is owned by Ethiopia's federal government, and residents say restoring it will require significant investment. Water, health and education facilities, also affected, are slowly being rebuilt by local communities and donors. Since Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia more than three decades ago, relations have been tense – the border has been closed for most of that time. It was formally reopened in 2018, shortly after Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power and signed a historic peace agreement with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki. The deal earned Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize. While the move initially brought hopes of normalised relations, the eruption of the conflict in Tigray in November 2020 derailed progress. Religious leaders were instrumental in making the meeting happen. Girmay Gebru / BBC People want things to return to how they were before the civil war. Girmay Gebru / BBC People hope that Sunday's celebrations will be the start of a process of reconciliation. Girmay Gebru / BBC "I am confident that the peace and reconciliation we started today will continue to grow," said Nebiat Woldegergis, who travelled from Senafe, Eritrea, to attend the ceremony. Amleset, a mother who had lived for five years in a refugee camp in Adigrat after fleeing Zalambessa, said: "Today I came to see my locked house. From now on, I will return with my children and continue living on my land." Local people recalled how families who once lived together had been torn apart by the conflict. Representatives from both communities declared that "peace and reconciliation has begun", encouraging residents to return home and rebuild their lives. However, challenges remain. Looted property, destroyed homes and lack of services continue to make resettlement difficult for thousands of displaced families. And it is not clear if this local arrangement will be translated into a wider reconciliation between the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea. © 2025 BBC. All rights reserved.

Russia is holding an estimated 16,000 civilians in arbitrary detention at 180 separate facilities. Taganrog was the most notorious. After the outbreak of hostilities, pre-trial detention centre number 2 was repurposed as a torture centre for Ukrainian captives. Composite: Alex Mellon for the Guardian : AFP/Getty Images/Yandex Maps/Slidstvo.info By Manisha Ganguly , Shaun Walker , Pjotr Sauer , Tetyana Nikolayenko, Anton Naumliuk, Artem Mazhulin and Lucy Swan Some weeks after being detained as she attempted to leave a Russian-occupied part of Ukraine in January 2023, Yelyzaveta Shylyk was given a polygraph test. As her interrogators attached the lie detector’s wires to her, they calmly issued a threat about what would happen if she failed the test: “You’ll go to a place where you’ll regret being born.” That place, she would later find out, had a name: Sizo number 2, a pre-trial detention centre in the southern Russian city of Taganrog. Prior to the full-scale invasion in February 2022, the facility held juvenile inmates and mothers with young children. After the outbreak of hostilities, it was repurposed as a torture centre for Ukrainian captives, and it has since emerged as the darkest link in a network of detention centres across Russia and occupied Ukraine. Guards subjected not only combatants but also civilians to sustained violence and torture. The exact number of civilian detainees is impossible to ascertain, but the Ukrainian parliament’s commissioner for human rights, Dmytro Lubinets, said that as of April 2024 the number registered as having disappeared stood at 16,000. The majority are in legal limbo and have not been charged with any crime. Their locations are often undisclosed, although information sometimes filters out via released prisoners of war. Ukraine believes they are being held at as many as 180 separate sites. The Guardian and its reporting partners have identified the systematic use of torture at 29 of these sites – 18 in Russia and 11 in Russian-occupied territories. The most common methods used include electric shocks, waterboarding, mock executions, blows with wooden and metal hammers, and repeated beatings on the same body part, alongside bizarre humiliations such as a person being tied up with tape and then sat on as “human furniture”. Detainees have also reported a ban on speaking Ukrainian, severe food rationing, and being goaded to take their own lives. The worst of these sites have seen multiple fatalities. The use of torture to extract information or false confessions appears to have been organised and sanctioned by Moscow at the highest levels. These are the findings of the Viktoriia project, an investigation over six months involving 13 media outlets, including the Guardian, the Washington Post and Le Monde, led by the French group Forbidden Stories. Named for the Ukrainian journalist Viktoriia Roshchyna, who died in custody after spending months in Taganrog , it draws on more than 50 interviews with some of those who survived Russian captivity and with the families of some of those still held. Legal sources operating inside Russia and the occupied territories have also shared information, as have prison officials who resigned from the service in distress over what they had witnessed. Taken together, a picture emerges of a brutal and systemic assault on Ukrainian prisoners. “It is clear to me that torture is part of the Russian war policy and apparatus, both of Ukrainian civilians as well as of captured prisoners of war,” the UN’s special rapporteur on torture, Alice Edwards, said in an interview. “It’s being applied across all regions occupied by the Russian Federation, in all types of detention facilities. That level of organisation can only be approved at the highest levels.” Violence on arrival The birthplace of Russia’s cherished playwright Anton Chekhov, Taganrog is a quiet city on the Azov Sea. It is the closest Russian city to Mariupol, which was occupied by Moscow’s forces in May 2022 after fierce fighting. In the months after Mariupol fell, Russia transferred some of its most high-value prisoners to Taganrog, including soldiers from the Azov brigade who had defended the city. They featured heavily in Russian propaganda about the war as “neo-Nazis”, and Moscow had promised to hold show trials for them. Satellite imagery shows that as the prison filled up with Ukrainians, during the summer of 2022 it was reinforced with new steel roofs. Guardian graphic and analysis. Source: Maxar Technologies. Satellite imagery from August 2022 The violence at Taganrog began on arrival. The first Ukrainian prisoners were sent there in April 2022, often tied up and blindfolded onboard military trucks daubed with the Z symbol. Most were subjected to a “welcoming” procedure known as “reception”, where guards would punch, kick and beat them with batons. “This is a sacred ritual for them. Blindfolded, with your hands tied and your head bowed low, you are ordered to walk, and every dog standing there considers it necessary to hit you with something,” said Volodymyr Labuzov, the chief medic of a Ukrainian marine brigade, who arrived in Taganrog in April 2022. Over time, civilians were also taken to Taganrog, symbolic of a system that has blurred the lines between combatants and supposed “hostile elements” among the civilian population in occupied territories. Before 2022, the facility had held about 400 Russian detainees, but reports of overcrowded cells as well as analysis of its food procurement contracts suggest it may have held many more Ukrainian prisoners at the peak of its operations. A typical meal at Taganrog was about four and a half spoonfuls of food, according to former detainees. One counted a serving of pasta containing 15 small pieces. Sometimes they were given fish, but it was mixed with bones and entrails. Some would not eat during the day, saving their rations for a single evening meal just to feel full enough to sleep normally. Labuzov said men typically lost up to 25kg (4st) during detention. After the “reception”, the violence continued, with regular beatings during the twice-daily cell searches and, most viciously, during interrogations. Two buildings were identified as the main torture sites inside Taganrog. Former inmates recalled hearing the screams coming from these areas. Serhiy Taranyuk, a former Ukrainian marine detained in Taganrog, said he was often interrogated in a room sparsely furnished with a chair and a table. “You go in, you are immediately thrown on the floor, you start to get beat and cut … Then, when you are ready to tell them something, they tell you to sit down,” he said. Taranyuk said he was forced into making a false confession. All Ukrainian prisoners who passed through Taganrog reported horrifying and sustained torture, including civilians and female prisoners. Shylyk, a former soldier who was a civilian at the time of her detention, was beaten with batons all over her body, subjected to electric shocks, threatened with rape and attacked with dogs. Oleksandr Maksymchuk, a prisoner of war who spent 21 months in Taganrog across two separate stints, wrote in testimony obtained by the Guardian of repeated beatings, electric shocks, suffocation and a technique where guards wrapped prisoners from head to toe in sticky tape and then “used them as human furniture”. Shylyk mentioned a room containing an electric chair: “I was put in the electric chair twice … with a device that attached clamps between my toes. Then they turned on the current.” She described overhearing guards complaining about having to keep the electrocution time to under two hours to avoid killing inmates, as deaths meant more paperwork. Another dedicated torture room was used to hang handcuffed detainees upside down in a foetal position, their knees strapped to a bar, for 10-15 minutes while being severely beaten. In some locations, shocks were administered using a Soviet-era battery-powered field phone called a TA-57. The technique, nicknamed “Putin’s phone” by prisoners, involved attaching wires to earlobes, the nose or genitals. Detainees reported being tortured in a number of separate rooms. From left to right: room with tub for water torture, where one detainee described being held under water until she was convulsing and had to be brought back to life; an electric chair with restraints – one detainee overheard guards discussing having to keep electrocution sessions to two hours to avoid deaths; and a room with bars used to suspend handcuffed detainees upside down by their knees in an inverted foetal position, for 10-15 minutes while being beaten or shocked. Illustration: Jarrett Ley/Washington Post Labuzov was repeatedly assaulted by guards demanding he confess to mutilating Russian soldiers. “During one of the interrogations, the investigator asked me to state my rank and position. But he didn’t even listen to who I was … I was immediately hit on the head with a wooden hammer. “This investigator said: ‘Tell me something interesting so we can stop beating you.’” Labuzov said he was then shocked with electrical wires and hit with a baton and a chair leg. On another occasion, Labuzov recalled, his palms were burned with a lighter. Once, he was taken to the boiler room and pushed waist-deep into a stove used to heat water, then placed on the meat-cutting table in the kitchen, where he was threatened with a knife. Others recounted psychological pressure that included forced indoctrination, forced reciting of patriotic Russian poems, and repeated physical and sexual threats. The cells were overcrowded, with eight men squeezed into a space built to house half that number. Labuzov also recalled another presence constantly watching over the prisoners. “In all four cells where I was, there was a portrait of Putin,” he said. FSB Interogations Since November 2022, public information suggests the Taganrog facility has been headed by Aleksandr Shtoda, who took over from the previous head, Gennady Bodnar. Shtoda, the son of two postal workers, was born in a village not far from Taganrog, and before his current role he had held a management position at the prison in 2019 and 2020. One prisoner recalled Shtoda frequently advising detainees to take Russian citizenship. He was often polite, and even joked with some of the inmates. There is no evidence that he personally oversaw any interrogations or torture. But as head of the facility, he was ultimately responsible for the conditions in which prisoners were held. Reached by Telegram voice call, Shtoda, 44, hung up. He then read follow-up questions sent by text but did not answer them or a later formal request for comment. The consortium also made efforts to contact Bodnar and a further 35 current and former employees of the Taganrog facility identified through prisoner testimony and open-source research. Most either did not answer calls, immediately hung up or denied working there. Two claimed conditions at the jail were “excellent” while one denied Ukrainians were held there at all. While prison staff oversee the day-to-day running of the facility, officers from Russia’s FSB security service are in charge of the torture system and conduct the most important interrogations. They control the cases of known dissidents and push for confessions. To back up the FSB, Russia has deployed special units of the FSIN prison service to work on Ukrainians, and they reportedly carry out much of the actual violence. Testimony obtained from three sources formerly inside the system, shared exclusively by the human rights group Gulagu.net , all pointed to a decision taken in the early weeks of the war to encourage physical violence. Aleksandr Shtoda, the head of Taganrog. One former senior FSIN official recalled meetings in the spring of 2022 in which the head of the St Petersburg FSIN branch, Igor Potapenko, appears to have told commanders they would in effect have carte blanche to use violence. It seems unlikely Potapenko was acting on his own initiative, and international observers believe ultimate responsibility for these policies, which were applied across the prison service, lies with the Kremlin. “It wasn’t phrased explicitly as ‘go beat them’ but it was understood. It was communicated down the chain, from the general and his deputy to the commander of the special forces unit and then to the soldiers, that we were to ‘work hard, do everything possible’. That was the euphemism. But everyone understood what it meant. The message was: ‘Do what you want,’” claimed the source. In contrast to previous assignments inside Russian prisons, when officers wore body cameras to provide a semblance of accountability, now there would be none. “There would be no video recording of any violent actions. That was stated clearly. No documentation, no oversight,” the source recalled. FSIN and Potapenko, who was recently appointed deputy governor of St Petersburg, did not respond to requests for comment. The Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov also declined to comment. By analysing reports from the UN and Ukrainian intelligence, the collaboration located 29 Russian-run detention centres where torture had been reported. The facilities can hold an estimated 18,000 people in total, according to public directories. A total of 695 separate forms of torture were recorded. The information suggests Ukrainian detainees have been scattered across Russia, held as far as 600 miles from the border with Ukraine. The sources said FSIN special forces units were sent on month-long rotations around different Russian regions, ensuring they never formed a connection with prisoners. Valeriia Subotina, a press officer for the Azov brigade who spent months in Taganrog, confirmed that the guards would rotate roughly every month. According to a Ukrainian intelligence source, FSIN special forces units from Chechnya, Dagestan, North Ossetia and Rostov, with the group names Grozny, Orel, Bulat and Rosna, were deployed at various times to Taganrog. The guards took care to give little away about their identities. Blindfolds were frequently used for prisoners, and detainees were forbidden to look out of windows. Guards addressed each other using call signs instead of names. One called himself “wolf”, another “shaman”, a third used the codename “death”. All wore balaclavas or other face coverings, suggesting a systemic concealment of identities in order to avoid future accountability. One former senior FSIN official claimed the original rationale for using torture was to extract information that might be useful to Russia’s military forces or civil administrations in occupied areas. “Information about targets, training sites, preparations, the names of commanders, people who might have had useful connections, even civilians who could be of interest.” Reports suggest the abuse was also used as a tool for humiliating Ukrainians, often with a marked ethnic element of denigration. Oleg Orlov, the Nobel peace prize-winning Russian rights activist, said the basic system of kidnapping and disappearance of “disloyal” civilians was familiar from Russia’s Chechen wars. “But there is also something new. This continuous, regular cruelty and torture over months and years, this long-term torture for whole groups, I never heard of this in the Russian prison system before,” he claimed. Subotina said a few of the guards she encountered appeared torn: “They said quietly that they have no choice … that they had no options but to follow orders.” Most, however, seem to have carried out their work with enthusiasm. 'Outside the legal field' The majority of civilians are held, for months or years, without any charge. Families may eventually receive a terse confirmation that their relatives are being detained “for opposing the special military operation”, using the Kremlin’s term for the war. These prisoners are known as “incommunicado”. They do not have the right to send letters or receive parcels and Russia often will not even confirm at which prison they are being held. Often, the first that relatives will hear about where their loved ones are is when those released in an exchange give testimony about the people they shared a cell with. Legal experts say the framework by which Russia is holding the civilians it seized on occupied territories is unclear and not based in law. “There is no official crime in the Russian legal code of ‘opposing the special military operation’. All of this exists outside the legal field. It’s an absurd situation; even in Stalin’s time there were always charges,” said Vladimir Zhbankov, of Poshuk.Polon, an NGO that helps people look for their loved ones. One Russian lawyer who works on Ukrainian cases said: “There are people who have been imprisoned for years and we don’t even know where they are. There is no access to them. We periodically send requests to ask where they could be. But in response … they say according to their data there has never been such a person, never detained.” Access to prisoners in Taganrog is said to be even harder than in most facilities. “It’s impossible for a lawyer to get into Taganrog. I show up and they give me a written refusal: ‘I am declining the services of a lawyer.’ It doesn’t name any lawyer, just says ‘lawyer’ in general, and is signed and dated,” said one lawyer who tried to take on a case of someone held at Taganrog. The few who still do this work have to carry a huge burden. “Lawyers have to be social workers and psychologists too. It’s very high-risk, it’s emotionally extraordinarily difficult. We are the only people who have access,” said one legal source. “A lawyer I know saw their client who had been in Taganrog, and the prisoner was in such a bad condition that the lawyer cried for three days,” the source added. Enduring threat According to a Ukrainian intelligence source, as of autumn 2024 there had been at least 15 cases of Ukrainians dying at Taganrog, based on witness statements from detainees who returned in prisoner exchanges. One died from torture during interrogation, four collapsed and died during the violent “reception” upon arrival, and in a further 10 cases specific data was not available. “There was never a doctor in the colony, only a paramedic,” Labuzov said. “When prisoners were unwell, she would come and just ask what was wrong. And she didn’t even give them pills.” If the condition was serious, an ambulance was called from the local hospital, but it often came late, sometimes not until the next day. “I know for sure that one man died like that,” Labuzov said. In recent months there have been reports of improved conditions in Taganrog, and there are suggestions it has been returned to its prewar purpose. While the torture rooms may have fallen silent, they can still be used to instil fear. “Taganrog works as a threat now,” said the Russian legal source. “If they say ‘we’re going to send you to Taganrog’, many people will sign whatever you tell them to.” © 2025 Guardian News & Media Limited or its affiliated companies.

A deal freezing frontlines would be unacceptable for Serhiy Serdiuk, who was taken to Georgia in handcuffs with his family after refusing to teach the Russian curriculum Shaun Walker in Zaporizhzhia Serhiy Serdiuk fears for his former pupils in occupied Komysh-Zoria. Photograph: Julia Kochetova/The Guardian Earlier this year, Serhiy Serdiuk was deported from Russia , along with his wife and daughter. He was given a 40-year ban from re-entering the country. Serdiuk’s home town of Komysh-Zoria, in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region, was part of the territory occupied in the first weeks of Russia’s full-scale invasion in spring 2022. According to Moscow, it is now part of Russia. And because Serdiuk, the headteacher of a local school, refused to work for the new authorities, they decided he had no place living there. “I was born there, I’ve lived my whole life there, in the same place,” said Serdiuk, in a recent interview in the city of Zaporizhzhia, the regional capital still controlled by Kyiv, where he now lives. “Now I am kicked out of my own home and told I didn’t live in the country I thought I lived in? How is this possible?” The deportation of Serdiuk and his family is part of a continuing “cleansing” operation of the occupied territories, which may accelerate if US-led attempts to push Russia and Ukraine into a peace deal result in the freezing of the current frontlines, solidifying Russian control over the territory Moscow has seized over the past three years. Volunteers at a humanitarian hub show their ruined homes in Zaporizhzhia region. Photograph: Julia Kochetova/The Guardian In the early months of the invasion, Russian forces used lists to identify potentially troublesome pro-Ukrainian members of society in the occupied territories. Many were kidnapped, tortured and held in Russian jails . Perhaps wary of the cost and resources required to jail thousands more people, authorities have now employed a new tactic. “There were cases when they just came to people and said, ‘It’s in your interests to disappear from here, or we’ll have to take you to the basement,’ and then people left by themselves,” Serdiuk recalled. Ivan Fedorov, the governor of Zaporizhzhia region. Photograph: Julia Kochetova/The Guardian But in his case and some others the authorities did not leave it to chance. Ivan Fedorov, the governor of Zaporizhzhia region, estimated that “hundreds” of people had been deported from the occupied part of the region in recent months. Vladimir Putin signed a decree in March that stipulates “Ukrainian citizens who have no legal basis for living in the Russian Federation are obliged to leave” by 10 September, or take Russian citizenship. Serdiuk was born in Komysh-Zoria, a small town home to around 2,000 people, and had lived there his whole life, except for a few years studying in nearby Berdiansk. He started working at the local school, which had about 240 pupils, in 1999, beginning as a maths teacher and in 2018 being made headteacher. Pins on a map from people who moved or were deported from the occupied areas, at a humanitarian hub in Zaporizhzhia. Photograph: Julia Kochetova/The Guardian Komysh-Zoria was occupied, without major fighting, in the first days of the full-scale invasion, and by April 2022, the new Russian authorities called a meeting of the school’s 30 teachers, demanding that they open the school and teach the Russian curriculum. Serdiuk refused, and most of the teachers followed suit. In the ensuing weeks, Russian soldiers came to Serdiuk’s home and tried to persuade him to open the school. First, they were polite. Then, the threats started: “If you don’t want all your employees to have house searches, tell them to go to work.” One PE teacher agreed to work for the Russians immediately, but most of the others held out, he said. His school remains closed, and students now attend schools in one of two nearby towns. “I told them I’d never work for them and I kept to that,” said Serdiuk. For three years, he sat at home, unemployed, as Russian control solidified over the region. At the end of 2023, Serdiuk was told that he and his family would be deported. They were given three days to prepare, and packed their possessions into a few suitcases, but then were left waiting for more than a month. Their passports had been seized so they could not leave of their own volition. Eventually, at the end of January, they were driven to the regional capital of Melitopol and then put in a minibus with another family. Each deportee was sat on a pair of seats, handcuffed to a guard sitting beside them. The minibus drove for 20 hours until it reached the mountainous border between Russia and Georgia. Two drivers took turns at the wheel. At the border, the Ukrainians were handed back their passports and told to cross to the Georgian side. Serdiuk and his wife were given a 40-year ban from Russian territory; his 21-year-old daughter was given 50 years. From Georgia, they flew to Moldova, then back into Ukraine and all the way to Zaporizhzhia, to arrive at a spot around 90 miles (140km) away from their homes. Serdiuk is now teaching private maths lessons in the city, and plans to find a job at a local school. “At least here I can talk normally and not be scared of every passing car,” he said. At the humanitarian hub in Zaporizhzhia. Photograph: Julia Kochetova/The Guardian But the forced deportation brings with it a lot of pain, most notably that he had to leave behind his mother, who has advanced dementia, in occupied territory. Before 2022, she had been taking medication to slow the progression of the condition, but after the invasion the family was unable to get the pills and the effect was swift and devastating. “She can talk and walk but she can’t look after herself. It required constant vigilance, otherwise she would slip out of the house and walk back to the house where she was born,” said Serdiuk. When notice of the deportation came, Serdiuk drove his mother to his sister’s house and bade her farewell. He does not know if he will ever see her again. A woman at the humanitarian hub in Zaporizhzhia. Photograph: Julia Kochetova/The Guardian During a long interview, Serdiuk used humour and sarcasm to offset the depressing reality, but the one time he became visibly emotional was when asked for his thoughts on possible plans to freeze the frontlines as part of a peace settlement. The idea is something being pushed by the US, and many in Ukraine also support this, feeling that a temporary respite would be better than continuing the grinding, bloody fight. For Serdiuk, however, it would mean an unacceptable sacrifice. “How could I support this? How could I say that it’s fine that I was pushed out of my home and can’t go back?” He also fears for his former pupils. While Russia has sent in new teachers to the occupied areas, Serdiuk said this mainly concerned bigger cities. In the small settlements of his district, most of the teachers remained local, he said, and might be trying to avoid some of the harsher aspects of the new Russian curriculum. However, he said that with the pressure to conform to the needs of the new authorities, the respite would only be temporary. “They are demanding that there are portraits of Putin on the walls, that the children draw pictures and write wishes for their soldiers,” he said. “This all breaks the psychological balance of a child. A year ago we lived in Ukraine, and now Ukraine is bad and we are drawing pictures of our liberators? If we freeze this conflict, then in two or three years these children will already be lost.” © 2025 Guardian News & Media Limited or its affiliated companies.

A view shows the St. Astvatsatsin Church in the town of Meghri in the Syunik Province, Armenia May 14, 2025. Hayk Baghdasaryan/Photolure via REUTERS/File Photo Felix Light Every evening at around 10 p.m., automatic gunfire echoes through the tiny village in Armenia, locals say – the sound of Azerbaijani troops firing into the night sky from their positions across the border, high above. The bullets regularly hit houses, though no-one has been hurt, so far, the villagers say. Azerbaijan denies its troops have been shooting across the border, and has accused Armenian troops of violating the ceasefire. "It's very tense because at home we have the children, the little ones, and the elderly," said Karo Andranyan, 66, a retired mechanic. A hundred metres from his front door, on the hillside, an Azerbaijani military position with a flag fluttering in the breeze is a reminder of the proximity of Armenia’s bitter rival. The heavily militarized, 1,000-km border has been closed since the early 1990s. The countries have fought two major wars in the past 40 years, destabilising the Caucasus - a region that carries major oil and gas pipelines toward Europe, and is strategically important to Russia, Iran and Turkey. Rising tensions along the border are increasing the risk of new clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan as they approach a critical juncture in a tortuous peace process, two experts told Reuters. In March, the two sides said they had agreed the outline of a peace treaty that could be signed in 2026, raising hopes of reconciliation. The draft envisions the two sides demarcating their shared border, and requires Armenia to amend its constitution before Azerbaijan ratifies the deal. But since then, reports of ceasefire violations along the border have surged, following months of relative quiet. Andranyan said he thought the nighttime gunfire was meant to intimidate the villagers and the small garrison of Armenian troops stationed there. The village - which census data said had a population of 1,000 - was emptying as locals feared a return to conflict, he said. "What are we supposed to do?" Though there have been no fatalities on the border since last year, incidents of cross-border gunfire are reported regularly. Most of the accusations since March, which describe cross-border gunfire and occasional damage to property, have been made by Azerbaijan against Armenia. Both sides have repeatedly denied allegations of ceasefire violations. The simmering conflict has shifted decisively in Azerbaijan's favour since 2020, as the oil and gas producer recaptured territory lost in the 1990s and progressively re-established control over the breakaway Azerbaijani region of Nagorno-Karabakh where ethnic Armenians had established de facto independence since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 2023, it retook all of Karabakh, prompting the territory’s 100,000 ethnic Armenians to flee en masse to Armenia. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told a congressional hearing last month there was a "real risk" of war between the two. He said that the U.S. wanted Azerbaijan "to agree to a peace agreement that does not cause them to invade a neighboring country, Armenia." Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, in power since 2003, said in January that Armenia presented a "fascist threat" that needed to be destroyed. Laurence Broers, an expert on Armenia and Azerbaijan at London's Chatham House think tank, said that though a return to full-scale war was possible, more localised skirmishes were more likely. He said Azerbaijan, whose population of 10 million is three times Armenia's, has few incentives to agree swiftly to a peace treaty and may instead rely on smaller scale escalations to force its neighbour to make further concessions in the talks. “Escalation and militarization has been a very successful strategy for Ilham Aliyev,” he said. Armenian authorities have repeatedly insisted there will be no war. In a speech last month, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that the two countries would not resume fighting, “despite all the arguments, all the provocations”. In response to questions about the border tensions, Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry referred Reuters to its previous public comments. In a statement in May, it said that Baku is committed to peace and has no territorial claims on Armenia. It said that Yerevan's actions "call into question Armenia's commitment to peace". Azerbaijan's Defence Ministry has consistently denied Armenian reports of cross-border gunfire. TENSIONS IN THE SOUTH Armenia's southernmost province of Syunik is at the heart of the dispute and is where most ceasefire violations are reported. Syunik separates the main body of Azerbaijan to the east from the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan to the west. It also provides a vital trade route for Armenia to Iran, which it borders to the south. Azerbaijan has since 2020 demanded Armenia provide it with a corridor through Syunik to Nakhchivan. Baku has said that the passage would remain Armenian territory but have minimal controls from the capital Yerevan. Some Azerbaijani officials have also suggested that southern Armenia is historically Azerbaijani territory, though they have not pressed a formal territorial claim. In addition to its border with Azerbaijan, Armenia’s frontier with Turkey – a close ally of Baku’s – is also closed, making its boundary with Iran a lifeline for trade. A corridor through Syunik could risk shutting off its access to the remote, mountainous border. Armenia and Iran have warm ties, despite Armenia’s Christian religion, and increasingly pro-Western orientation. In 2022, Iran was Armenia’s fourth-largest source of imports. In May, Tehran’s defence minister visited Yerevan, with Iranian media quoting him as expressing Iran’s opposition to redrawing borders in the region. The dilemma is heightened by Armenia’s strained ties with traditional ally Russia, which opposes Armenia’s bid to draw closer to the West, and which has deepened its links with Azerbaijan. "Armenia has two open borders, one with Georgia, and the other one with Iran. And this keeps the country going,” said Tigran Grigoryan, director of the Regional Centre for Democracy and Security think tank, in Yerevan. Grigoryan said that Azerbaijan’s demands for the corridor could be the spark for future military escalation. He suggested that the ceasefire violations may be an effort to force Armenia into making concessions on the issue. "If Armenia loses its border with Iran, that would be a catastrophe,” he said. The Iranian and Russian foreign ministries did not reply to requests for comment. Throughout Armenia’s isolated south, the importance of the Iranian connection is clear. Along the single route that links the two countries, Iranian road workers are labouring to expand a narrow, zig-zagging mountainside road clogged with lorries from south of the border, heading north towards Georgia and Russia. Along the way, some locals sell plastic bottles full of red wine to truckers newly arrived from Iran, where alcohol is banned. At Armenia’s southernmost tip sits the historic town of Meghri, the gateway to Iran. Only 16 km away from Azerbaijan, the town of 4,000 has seen its daily life overshadowed by tensions with Baku, deputy mayor Bagrat Zakaryan said. “Given the recent events in Karabakh, and what the president of Azerbaijan has been saying, there is this feeling of fear,” he said. OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE Others are more optimistic about the prospect of peace. Until 1993, Armen Davtyan was the deputy director of Meghri’s railway station, which sat at a crossroads connecting Yerevan to Baku, and Iran to the Soviet Union, until the latter’s 1991 dissolution. But after the 1988-1994 Karabakh war and the closure of the frontier, the tracks connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan were ripped up and Davtyan went to work as a border guard. A rusted train, emblazoned with a Soviet emblem, lingers outside the station building, now a derelict shell metres from the Iranian border. Davtyan said he fondly remembered the pre-war days, when Armenians and Azerbaijanis worked together on the railways, and hopes that one day cross-border trains might again pull into Meghri station. "I do understand that some people are scared that if the railway reopens, the Azerbaijanis will return," he said. "But if in 2025, people are still scared of us opening transport links, I think that’s a little absurd." © 2025 Reuters