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How The Horn Keeps Power And Loses The Peace – OpEd

2 hours ago
4 min read

By Dr. Suleiman Walhad

November 12, 2026


Detail of map of Greater Horn of Africa. Credit: Wikipedia Commons
Detail of map of Greater Horn of Africa. Credit: Wikipedia Commons
Key Takeaways:
  • The Horn of Africa’s states remain locked in mutual suspicion, with leaders prioritizing personal regime survival over effective control of borders or delivery of basic services.

  • Ethiopia’s search for sea access, Eritrea’s isolation, Somalia’s weak central authority and Djibouti’s hosting of foreign bases illustrate how ethnic and clan networks often substitute for national citizenship.

  • Lasting stability requires independent institutions, respect for opposition and treatment of security as a shared domestic public good rather than a tool against rivals.


The Horn of Africa States region operates much like a highly volatile, codependent apartment complex where the tenants have lived together for millennia, lost the keys to their respective front doors, and decided that the best way to handle a leak in their own bathroom is to flood their neighbor’s kitchen.


In this dysfunctional sub-region, the art of leadership has historically been misconstrued as the art of personal survival. Leaders here do not merely hold power; they grip it with the white-knuckled desperation of a man clinging to a moving train, entirely aware that letting go means immediate disaster.


This relentless focus on regime security creates a paradox where a capital city might boast an imposing presidential palace, but its occupant exerts less control over the state’s sovereign borders than the local weather patterns. 


As the legendary Somali proverb wisely notes, “Rag wada fadhiya, lagama dhex waayo nin dhex dhiga dhib,” (Among a council of men, you will always find one who stirs up trouble). In the Horn of Africa, that trouble is almost always aimed across a border or at the opposition within.


Consider the neighborhood dynamic. You have Ethiopia, the landlocked giant constantly searching for a window to the sea, currently looking out over the landscape with the anxious energy of a tenant whose roommates control all the electrical outlets. Across the way sits Eritrea, a nation that transformed isolationism into a masterclass of regional stoicism. It is a place where politics are treated with absolute secrecy, embodying the old adage that the best way to avoid an argument with your neighbors is to build a wall, lock the gates, and occasionally throw a firecracker into their yard just to keep them on their toes.


Then there is Somalia, a nation that has spent decades proving that a society can possess an incredibly rich, shared cultural identity while simultaneously treating the centralized state apparatus as an optional, and often intrusive, lifestyle choice. In Mogadishu, political power is often a game of musical chairs where the music never stops and the chairs are frequently booby-trapped. 


Finally, tucked into the coast, sits Djibouti, the pragmatic landlord of the Red Sea. Djibouti looked at its larger, warring neighbors and wisely decided that the safest way to avoid being bullied was to invite the American, French, Chinese, and Japanese judo clubs to all open up dojos in its front yard simultaneously.


The core of the regional syndrome is that while these four states are structurally inseparable, the concept of national citizenship remains an elusive, under-delivered promise. When the state fails to provide security, justice, or a basic social contract, people naturally look elsewhere for protection. They turn to the clan, the ethnic group, or the local strongman. 


As an old Ethiopian proverb goes, “When spider webs unite, they can trap a lion.” Unfortunately, across the Horn of Africa, these webs are rarely woven together to nurture a shared civic and national identity. Instead, they form intricate networks of regional patronage, political allegiance, and proxy warfare. 


Power is too often consolidated by crushing rivals in the place of persuading voters, making each transition of power feel less like a democratic transfer and more like a hostile corporate takeover. Peaceful relinquishment of power remains the exception rather than the rule. 


Somalia, for a long time, appeared to be moving in the direction of an exception to this regional pattern. But even there, the current administration increasingly seems to be following the same script, treating the preservation of power as an end in itself instead of a mandate entrusted by the people.


To break this cycle, the region must move past the era of the Imperial Presidency,  and start building the boring, unglamorous foundations of functional governance: independent courts, predictable economic rules, and shared infrastructure. 


Until a citizen in Jigjiga, a merchant in Bosaso, a port worker in Tadjoura, and a fisherman in Massawa all feel that their local rights are protected by laws in the place of the whim of whoever happens to be sitting in the capital’s palace that morning, peace will remain a luxury the region cannot quite afford. 


True stability, and consequently meaningful development, will only become possible when leaders understand that security is not a commodity to be exported to neighboring countries as a weapon, nor an instrument to be deployed against domestic political opponents. It is a shared public good that must be cultivated at home, for the benefit of all citizens. 


Leaders must also recognize that those who oppose them are not enemies of the state, but fellow citizens exercising their right to challenge power and hold those in government accountable. Political opposition should be understood not as a threat to be eliminated, but as a necessary force for keeping governments grounded, accountable, and responsive to the people they serve.

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