Special Report: U.S. Kurdish Policy in Iraq
- Genocide Watch
- May 6
- 2 min read
By Michał Jagielski
Senior Middle East and Iran Analyst
Genocide Watch
At various stages, the Kurdish community of Iraq was one of Washington’s most important regional allies. The KDP and PUK joined American wars, opposed the Baathist regime, and stood at the front lines against ISIS. Despite their commitment and immense sacrifices, they never became equals in the eyes of American policymakers. Countless times, the Kurds served as a tool for U.S. regional aspirations without adequate protection or compensation, a pattern viewed by many as betrayal.
It would be unfair to claim that Iraqi Kurds did not benefit from the relationship. The very existence of the KRG testifies to the immense life improvements now enjoyed by the community. Iraqi Kurdistan is the only semi-autonomous Kurdish region with freedom of cultural expression and self-governance, and, at various points, it has been the only stable part of the country.
Yet, the relationship has always been utilitarian, rather than ideological. Strategic considerations have driven U.S. policy toward the Kurds, backing Kurdish ambitions only when doing so aligned with its own goals. This has set in motion a recurring pattern of brief Kurdish empowerment followed by instability and a rollback of autonomy. This is not to suggest that the U.S.’ policy has been erratic. In fact, its overarching aims have remained consistent. What has shifted is not the underlying logic, but the methods through which it is achieved.
In March 2026, the Iraqi Kurds once again became central in the U.S. Middle Eastern policy. On February 28, 2026, the U.S. and Israel began striking Iran, igniting the ongoing war that, at the moment of writing, has killed over 3,000 people. Within a week, President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu began encouraging the Iranians to topple their regime, a call particularly aimed at Iran’s Kurdish population, which has long faced oppression under successive regimes. Various reports indicated that the CIA was arming Iranian Kurdish militias in Iraq, with plans to utilize Iraqi Kurds in a ground offensive against Tehran.
What influenced the militias’ decision not to intervene, and whether they eventually will, remains unclear. If they do, the outcome will likely follow the pattern of previous U.S-backed Kurdish insurgencies. The community’s situation could improve under different Iranian leadership, as it did in Iraq, but it will likely not receive the level of autonomy it desires. The U.S. has always favored partners who do not antagonize its allies or disrupt the status quo. In Syria, the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) also fought at the forefront against ISIS and Assad’s regime, only to be abandoned once Ahmed al-Sharaa emerged as a viable alternative. Both the Iranian Kurds and the international community should learn from history to better protect the Kurds.
Full report:
