Trump Extends His Military Reach into Latin America
- El País
- 2 minutes ago
- 6 min read
August 13, 2026
By Luis Doncel and Carlos S. Maldonado (EL PAÍS)
Hegseth announces that he has not ruled out a military option in Havana and proposes operations on Colombian soil. Trump’s strategy to control the region is met with resistance from Mexico and submission from Central America.
The Trump administration can be accused of many things, but not of hiding its true intentions in Latin America, which are aimed at controlling the region. Those tentacles of the United States in what it has traditionally considered its backyard extend in various ways, ranging from more or less puppet governments—such as Delcy Rodríguez’s Venezuela—to very close political alliances—such as Javier Milei’s Argentina—and even military operations to impose its interests.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is now taking another step in that direction by announcing that the new Colombian government of Abelardo de la Espriella, after just one week in office, has given him the green light for U.S. troops to operate on Colombian soil. He also says he does not rule out military intervention in Cuba. These are new additions to the list of Latin American countries where the world’s most powerful military threatens to operate with impunity.
Guadalupe González, an analyst at El Colegio de México, sees this situation as a “turning point.” “The central focus of the United States’ strategy is to restore its preeminence in the Western Hemisphere as its top priority, ahead of other conflict zones such as the Middle East, Europe, and even Asia. This is a huge development,” she adds.
“All options, including military ones, are on the table,” Hegseth said Wednesday in Panama when asked about the Republican administration’s plans for Cuba. He also urged the island to “pay attention” to Trump’s determination to “assert U.S. strategic prerogatives.” Shortly before, the Pentagon chief had issued a message with Colombia in mind.
Following the Republican administration’s clashes with leftist Gustavo Petro, the rise to power of a far-right president heralds a new era of collaboration between Washington and Bogotá. And this new phase begins with a two-part announcement. The Secretary of Defense—the department’s official title, though he prefers to call it the “Department of War”—said, on the one hand, that Colombia had asked him to join the fight against narco-terrorism by “authorizing joint military operations to destroy terrorists and terrorist networks.” And, second, that the South American country will join the Shield of the Americas, a coalition founded by Trump that, with this addition, will now include 19 countries that share methods for combating drug trafficking networks in the region.
None of these statements come as a great surprise. The Republican administration’s view of Latin America became crystal clear with the publication last December of its National Security Strategy. In it, the administration stated bluntly that the United States seeks to “restore its preeminence” in the Western Hemisphere. To that end, it revived the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine, which was summed up in the phrase “America for the Americans.” Or, in a less literal but more faithful translation of its spirit, “America for the Americans.”
“In other words, we will affirm and enforce a Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” the document asserted, in a new theory that has come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine—a play on words combining Donald and Monroe. According to the text outlining this administration’s priorities, the “Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine” constitutes “a restoration of U.S. power and priorities, consistent with the country’s security interests.” The document added that Washington must “reconsider” its military presence in the Western Hemisphere.
According to Michael Shifter, a researcher and former president of the Inter-American Dialogue—one of the most influential hemispheric policy analysis centers in Washington, D.C.—“the obstacles to military intervention have nothing to do with legal factors, because these carry no weight with this administration. “What they’re weighing are practical factors: in the case of Cuba, an intervention could lead to total chaos or a massive wave of migration,” he explains.
Shifter asserts that the agenda of institutional strengthening and the defense of human rights that once existed between the U.S. and Latin America has been completely sidelined in favor of an aggressive strategy focused on security and the fight against drug trafficking. “The entire approach aimed at strengthening institutions and protecting human rights has been overwhelmed, if not eliminated. Washington has essentially given the green light to any authoritarian project a Latin American leader might pursue,” Shifter warns. “Today, ideology matters less. There is a fairly open playing field for regimes on the right or left to eliminate checks and balances and weaken—if not destroy—the rule of law,” he notes.
Pushback from mexico
The pressure on the region was cemented last March, when Stephen Miller, Trump’s deputy chief of staff, stated that drug cartels are “the ISIS and Al Qaeda of the Western Hemisphere and must be treated with the same brutality and ruthlessness”—words that suggested the possibility of direct military intervention in Mexico. In Washington’s giant neighbor and main trading partner, powerful drug trafficking organizations, such as the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, exercise territorial control that the White House describes as an unacceptable threat.
Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has categorically and repeatedly rejected any proposal or suggestion of a U.S. military incursion. She has described such a scenario as something that “will not happen,” emphasizing that Mexico cooperates on intelligence and security matters but will not accept subordination or violations of its sovereignty. “The last time the United States intervened in Mexico, it took half the country,” Sheinbaum recalled, demonstrating her government’s firm stance with a reference to the 19th-century annexation of the states of Texas, California, New Mexico, and Nevada.
Sheinbaum’s response came after Trump’s controversial remarks, in which he refused to rule out the use of force to stem the flow of fentanyl and other drugs northward. “That’s fine by me. [Whatever] we have to do to stop drug trafficking,” the Republican said, adding that, while he wasn’t saying he would do it immediately, he would be “proud to do so.” “With Mexico, it seems that no matter what the government does to satisfy Trump, it’s never enough. Unfortunately, this is creating a rather tense and conflict-ridden situation,” says Shifter.
Trump contrasted the situation in Mexico with the operations and extrajudicial strikes against alleged drug-smuggling boats in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean, boasting that “there are almost no drugs coming in by sea anymore.” In his view, Mexico has failed to fulfill its commitments to combat organized crime: “We lose hundreds of thousands of people a year to drugs, not to mention the destruction of families. Much of that comes from Mexico, so I’m not at all happy.”
Attacks in the Caribbean and the Pacific against vessels suspected of transporting drugs have so far resulted in the deaths of more than 200 people. According to Guadalupe González, these are “extrajudicial executions, a unilateral use of force.” The same is true of the establishment in Venezuela of a situation of “quasi-neoprotectorate.” “The difference with De la Espriella is that this alignment is not imposed, but rather based on invitation,” the expert concludes. A member of the Latin American Roundtable, she discusses a range of different strategies the Trump administration is using to establish “systems of control and discipline.” Brazil, for the time being, remains outside Washington’s military offensive.
Submission in Central America
While tension and resistance set the tone with Mexico, south of the border the situation is the opposite. Central American countries have quickly aligned themselves with Trump’s security doctrine. Whether out of political calculation or a well-founded fear of direct intervention, the region has bowed to Washington’s demands. Following the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on January 3 in Caracas, the Central American isthmus has once again become the nerve center of U.S. geopolitical strategy, forcing a drastic shift in the regional fight against organized crime.
In Guatemala, President Bernardo Arévalo formally requested, in a letter to the White House, greater assistance in training, operational advice, and intelligence sharing. This rapprochement was solidified by a visit from the commander of U.S. Southern Command, General Francis L. Donovan, aimed at strengthening bilateral anti-narcotics cooperation.
For his part, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele has established himself as the primary military guardian of U.S. strategy in the Pacific. In March, Bukele attended the Shield of the Americas summit, convened by Trump in Doral, Florida, to rally his ideological allies.
In Honduras, President Nasry Asfura—who is fully aligned with Washington following the support he received during the election campaign—has promised to reinstate the extradition treaty and fully join the Anti-Cartel Alliance. Asfura’s alignment has not wavered, even after Trump granted a pardon to former President Juan Orlando Hernández, who had been convicted by a U.S. court of drug trafficking.
On the opposite ideological spectrum, Nicaragua’s authoritarian co-presidents, Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, fear they will be the next target of a direct incursion. Under constant pressure from the State Department, the Nicaraguan regime has chosen to position itself as a strict bulwark against drug trafficking to fend off Washington’s attacks following Maduro’s fall.
This article has been adapted from the original in Spanish.
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